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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Introduction to the Problem of Language

1

I. Thesis Summary 1

II. Analyses of Sources 2Chapter 2. Application of Primary Sources to the Problem of Language

11

I. Cultural, Scientific, and Philosophical Explorations 11

II. Understanding the Interaction Between Language and Reality

14

III. Application of Source Material to, and Analyses of,

21

the Problem of Language Chapter 3. Solution, Defense, and Conclusion

24

I. A Solution to the Problem of Language and an Application

of Martin Bubers I-Thou

24

II. Criticism of Buber as Applied to The Problem of Language 27

III. Summary, Solution, and Conclusion 30 Bibliography

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Chapter 1

Introduction to the Problem of LanguageThesis Summary

If you use language, you are limited in your ability to perceive the world as it is. As needs be defined, the individual components of the world-as-it-is (or, reality) and the underlying structures or patterns which govern its nature exist interdependently of our own thoughts, perceptions, and behaviors. Certainly, our interaction with reality alters its landscape, but, in lieu of our presence, the things which we perceive would continue to exist in some form. The use of subject-object oriented language as a means of reality interface implies separation from the world apriori, before the fact of our implementation of the artificial structures and symbolic word-wrappers we use to quantify and qualify its components. When we manipulate the world, we are primarily manipulating the stored meaning of our symbols for things and not the things as they are, as a consequence of the fact that everything we perceive is, in a sense, coated by language. The Problem of Language is as follows: instead of using language to reveal the world, we have created a synthetic reality interface with language that allows our nervous system to store and share compressed subjective data, imprisons us in an artificial reality, inherently limits our capacity for absolute knowledge of things, objectifies the world around us and negatively impacts the way in which we interact with the world and the living beings that we share it with.

The very act of using language, both as a mental construct of applied symbol sets and as a function of the brain, creates between the language using agent and the world an impenetrable gap, one that is filled with ultimately arbitrary sounds and syntax, and which could never be crossed by the use of language itself, nor with the abjectly internal and seemingly unbounded faculty of our thoughts. Yet, beneath the synthetic reality created by language there is a necessarily legitimate and essential world that is purportedly accessible through non-ordinary states of consciousness which forgo language as the primary mode of interaction and perceptual processing. It is not, however, my endeavor to define this fundamental world nor would it be relevant to do so, as the problem of language must be tackled before reality can be accurately understood.

Language is something that the majority of us take for granted by nature of its necessity. At its most basic, human language can be understood as having two purposes: to communicate external events or our internal thoughts to another person and to categorize the world or our thoughts so as to create a coherent mental structure of that world and those thoughts. Our use of language is governed in part by our neuroanatomy and in part by the way we are socialized, both of which create a feedback loop onto each other and modify the function of either side. For example, infants vocalize as a result of brain structures that react to external and internal stimuli without any external incentive, yet those very brain structures require a complex system of aural input and visual cues in order to physically develop, so as to vocalize with further intricacy and aptitude, creating in the infant brain and body a positive cycle of language acquisition that stimulates the brain, and so on.

Analyses of Sources

In defense of my thesis, the debate between ontological and empirical relativism and the classical permutations of the two finds itself at the center stage, and it is the logical soundness as well as the practical, demonstrable implications of those varying viewpoints that will be used to verify their applicability. The fundamental physical components of language are conjoined with the imaginary constructs of its use and definition, making the accurate analysis of language an ephemeral and difficult process. However, it is not impossible to do so and the nature of language as a reality altering construct is supported by many philosophers and researchers, including Edward Sapir, Benjamin Lee Whorf, Lera Boroditsky, William Van Orman Quine, Robert Anton Wilson, Jacques Lacan, Jean Baudrillard, and Paul Tillich. It is imperative to approach the problem of language as outlined previously in a holistic fashion, incorporating the sciences and philosophy so as to support one another and draw conclusions that are both succinct and valid. As such, the work of Martin Buber contains a vital exploration of the type of solution to the problem of language presented in this text.

The published work of those philosophers and scientists who have made it their endeavor to explore the intrinsic connection between the faculty of language and its use, with the language using agent's perception of and interaction with reality, covers an entire landscape of ideas and insights: from the ontological and empirical to the existential and metaphysical; from neuroanatomy and brain development to quantum theory. An exploration of the problem of language requires a reach as broad as that which language itself has won. However, for the sake of formulating and proving a coherent, cohesive argument, I will only be focusing on those works which are appropriately focused on the problem at hand, and the components of said works that I have found to be apropos.

According to the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis:

We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way - an agreement that holds throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of our language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated one, but its terms are absolutely obligatory; we cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data which the agreement decrees.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis defines the act of using language as a process by which the whole of the natural world is separated into component parts and codified into individual pieces. The way in which nature is segmented is by an agreement made between the language using person and the society within which they communicate. Barring tangential examples of people left to isolation, the use of language as it is used at a given time is chosen by the person using it, and not a simple fundamental aspect of average-everyday life. In essence, Whorf is saying that the structures of language, such as grammar and vocabulary, determine our ability to conceive of and perceive reality.

Boroditsky makes a similar claim to Whorf's as a result of her time spent with the native populations of Australia and her research into differences in the details of recalled events between Eastern and Western language families. A prime example being that people who speak different primary languages recall the events of a crime they witnessed differently, attributing to said event differing motivations and even a different sequence of events or responsible parties. Boroditsky's research demonstrates the effect that language has on our perception of the world and the resulting ways in which we interact with it, such effect being one that radically alters the meaning and memory we have attached to the various events we encounter, large or small. The potency of language in its capacity to alter our perception of reality is paramount to Boroditsky's work, as can be seen in her time spent with the Aborigine people of Australia. In experiments conducted with the Kuuk Thaayorre tribe, Boroditsky found that their use of cardinal direction for immediate spatial orientation caused the tribe's people' to arrange chronological photos from East to West, as opposed to beginning left of their body and moving right or vice versa. Boroditsky concluded that their cardinal orientation of time deeply affected their perception of life and death and the way in which events in between the two points unfold.

The cognitive sciences of Boroditsky find companion in the philosophical work of Willard Van Orman Quine, which covers a broad spectrum from analysis of science and mathematics to linguistics and ontology, the latter two categories being meaningful to the subject at hand, as they offer support to Boroditsky's and other's research. Quine's Indeterminacy of Translation thesis posits that translated meaning is subjective within a scope of individual experience, giving the example that a person translating the imaginary word gavagi from a native language may interpret it as meaning anything from a part of a rabbit to an omen of an approaching storm, depending upon the context it is used in, as well as the speakers familiarity with the language. Such a translation can become more accurate as familiarity with grammar and syntax increases. Even with familiarity in mind, the translator has a perceptual bias that cannot be assuredly overcome and which may forever skew a truly accurate translation. In this way, it is not guaranteed that meaning can ever be completely captured in the process of translation. Our senses must translate the color, sound, texture, spatial dimensions, placement, etc. of objects into an internal language of thought. As such, it is in the same way that a translator cannot guarantee the accuracy of meaning in their translation that we cannot guarantee the accuracy of meaning in our translation of those things we perceive in the external world as a result of the indeterminacy with which we translate reality, making logically sound claims that time is running left to right for some, and East to West for others is not just possible, but to be expected. The indeterminacy of translation is directly tied into the theory of knowledge, a subject which Quine explored in-depth and with an acute focus.

Quine's portion of the Duhem-Quine thesis applies ontological relativity and epistemological holism to the theory of knowledge. Essentially, Quine presents the case that all empirical knowledge is based upon inquiry that can never be separated or isolated from the factors which surround and underpin its existence, and that any holistic body of knowledge is as valid as any other in its attempts to explain the world as well as the conclusions it draws from said attempts. For Quine, the natural sciences and physics are as sound an empirical paradigm as the ancient Greeks use of Gods to explain the normatively unobservable mechanisms by which the natural world functions. In the same way, our own personal empirical paradigms are subject to derivation by the continuum of time and experience in which we dwell.

Robert Anton Wilson has covered territory that shares a border with the practical application of Quine's aforementioned explorations in linguistics. Wilson's Language and Reality presents the idea that the word is represents an essentially deranged use of language in which reality becomes quantified as a solid, unchanging and irrefutably certain relationship between subjects and objects. The theory proposed by Wilson for the derangement caused by the word is finds familiar ground in the work of Boroditsky and Quine. On the part of Boroditsky, the equally valid differences in reality perception between speakers of varying spatially oriented languages can be individually held as the static state of reality, meaning that for the left-to-right oriented language speaker, time is moving left-to-right, a use of language that precludes a natural or reasonable East to West orientation. As far as Wilson and Quine, Quine's theory of knowledge allows for equal validity between states of knowledge, a position supported by the negation of hierarchical comparison resulting from Wilson's analysis of the word is. Wilson uses the example of the word is to expound upon Timothy Leary's theory of the reality tunnel, that is, that what we perceive to be reality is filtered or tunneled by our beliefs and experiences and objective truth or reality are mediated by our cognitive sense-experience matrix. The reality tunnel as defined by Leary and Wilson operates as an adversary to the fluid, multi-dimensional perceptions of reality described herein.

Lacan presented a similar theory to the former authors, one in which a distinction is drawn between the Real" and the Symbolic". For Lacan, the Real is an imminent and unified reality through which symbols are mediated and parsed into intelligible components that are both coherent and digestible. The Symbolic, on the other hand, represent a delusional subconscious differentiation of the unified real via the sense-mind complex that distorts the way in which we perceive the Real itself.

The Lacanian dichotomy of real pitted against symbolic indicates a duality present in language, as the use of language to perceive something attempts to extract the meaning or qualities revealed by that thing (the Real) using a method which inherently obfuscates that meaning with what the language user projects upon it (the Symbolic). The mode in which we use language naturally creates the subject-object perceptual game proposed by De Beauvoir, and with it, all of the ethical pitfalls that come from perverting a thing or person into what we take it to be as opposed to what it is. Baudrillard describes a similar phenomenon to that which is presented by Lacan in his precession of simulacrum, specifically identifying the steps in between the distortion of the Lacanian Real into his Symbolic.

The process of symbolic abstraction, when a symbol and its attached meaning become separate from the meaning with which each is defined, has the effect of distancing a language-using agent from the real things that his or her language refers to, resulting in the creation of a barrier that stands between both the agent and the physical world he or she lives in, as well as between the agents own understanding of his or her internal reality and his or her actual self. Baudrillard has much to say on the subject, and his treatise regarding the simulacra is of particular interest here. A simulacra is, in the plainest of terms, a simulation of a simulation, i.e., something that has been distanced from the original thing being simulated to such a degree it is no longer based upon anything real, but rather upon constructs of abstract simulations. Baudrillard defines the creation of the simulacra in four stages, his precession of simulacra. The first stage of the precession of simulacra is one in which we believe that a symbol is an accurate reflection of a profound reality. The second is a perversion of the symbol into an obfuscated copy of itself which refers to, but does not, accurately portray the thing it symbolizes. The third stage is characterized by a copy of the second stage's symbol that is not, in fact, based upon anything real but is rather a reference to the previous reference of reality. The fourth and final stage of the precession of simulacra is an absolute] simulation in which the simulacra has no actual relationship to reality.

Paul Tillich's work exploring linguistics is centrally focused on religion and the nature of our relationship as finite, physical beings with a transcendental God, yet he defines and elaborates upon important linguistic concepts relevant to the problem of language. In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich states that the character of the symbol is to point beyond itself to something else, and that the symbols or signs we use in language participate in that which they define. For example, the image of the flag of the country is intrinsic to what that flag itself symbolizes: national pride. So too does the word apple, as a symbol for the real fruit, impart an ideal of what an apple ought to be into the judgment of and quality of our participation in, eating an actual apple. Tillich also believed that symbols opened up components of reality which are not able to be directly referred to by language; for Tillich, these linguistically impenetrable levels of reality are correlated with a spiritual plane yet they can just as easily be considered the fundamental aspects of the objects being symbolized, the reality of the object that is lost in the process of abstraction into symbolic form. On the surface of this, we find something of a contradiction; how can a symbol used to refer to an apple simultaneously obfuscate the true nature of the apple (its realness) and reveal its fundamental reality? The answer is quite simple in Tillich linguistics: the confusion of the symbol with what the symbol points to, and not the act of using said symbol causes delusion as opposed to revelation.

Martin Buber analyzes modes of interpersonal relationship to point out a kind of interaction between that which can be revealed and that which is implied, with implications that are similar to those found by Tillich. Buber's I and Thou contains three sections, of which the first aims to define, and then describe the immediate implications of, the dual modes of relationship he sees human beings entering into: the I-It and the I-Thou. In the second section of I and Thou he describes how the I-It relationship is primary in our mode of social interaction and uses numerous examples of the ways in which this is seen in and effects the institutions found in society and the facets of daily social life. The third and final portion of I-Thou presents a solution to the issue of neglecting an I-Thou mode of interaction while stating that even though the I-It may be necessary, it need not be the primary mode of social and worldly engagement. On the surface, it may seem as though Buber's work has less to do with linguistics and more with ontological, epistemological, psycho-social and religious or spiritual issues. Buber does not claim nor does he imply that the problem he sees is primarily the result of the use of language, yet his description of the I-It and I-Thou modes of relating clearly describe the results of the problem of language, and the qualities of his solution can be readily applied to its solution. As such, the final chapter of this thesis will incorporate the work of Martin Buber as an adjunct to the description of the problem of language and the solution contained herein.

Chapter 2

Application of Primary Sources to the Problem of LanguageCultural, Scientific, and Philosophical Explorations

In many ways our use of language and the way we are taught to structure and consider it transforms it into something like a self-replicating virus that, once allowed to infect a host, begins to coat objects and ideas with symbols that initially serve as containers for more complex sensory data, but which over time actually come to replace in our minds the object that the symbol is referring to with the symbol itself. While this notion may seem far-fetched, it is supported by both the artistry and philosophy of human culture, and the science of the brain. For the former, lets us explore an ancient Sumerian text known as the Namshub of Enki. The Namshub of Enki was considered a magical incantation and self-fulfilling prophecy that when read, would apply a specific type of mental transformation to the reader and their listeners. While it is not necessary to recite this Namshub in full a revisiting of its final lines is crucial:

...The lord of Eridu (Enki), endowed with wisdom,

Changed the speech in their mouths, put contention into it,

Into the speech of man that had been one.

It seems innocuous upon tertiary examination, however the purpose of the Namshub is multifaceted: to retell an event of linguistic disintegration, and to cause that same linguistic disintegration by its retelling. By reading aloud the Namshub in its entirety, the same transformation applied to those that it refers to will also befall the reader and his or her listeners. The efficacy of this incantation may seem absurd and problematic, but Douglas Hofstadter makes mention of a similar phenomenon in his description of the use-mention distinction in Metamagical Thema., to quote Hosftadter, When a word is used to refer to something, it is said to be being used. Which is to say that by using a symbol which has meaning placed into it, it is effectively the same as interacting with the thing that the initial meaning refers to, or in this case, by reciting the Namshub, one recreates the transformation spoken of in the Namshub. This demonstrates an ancient and intuitive cultural understanding that is relevant to the exploration of language as being able to transform the language using an agents perception of reality.

The neurosciences lend themselves to the understanding of language as a paradigm-altering viral agent as well. Research carried out by Ousterhout et al. clearly demonstrated that learning a language enlarges gray matter concentration in the inferior parietal region of the left hemisphere, an area of the brain that houses neural structures related to the use and processing of language. One can imagine the information for a new language that is being learned moving into the brain and being processed, slowly transforming neural pathways and clusters of specialized matter to accommodate its presence, much like a virus does to cellular DNA in a host. The brain-colonization that is carried out by language fundamentally alters the primary organ of our sense-perception and processing matrix, clearly defining language as something which alters the basic mechanisms which allow us to experience and perceive reality. By way of Whorf, we can understand language as a virus that infects the civilized person with a particular program through which he or she filters and interprets nature by the standards of that language. The problem with the linguistic virus in its current form is that it will always interrupt our ability to clearly interface with reality as a unified whole, for reality is neither static nor is it categorically manifest.

If language colonizes the human mind and alters the way in which we perceive reality, overlaying upon it something static and consistent, what of the mind before it acquires language? Can human beings accurately sense and interact with reality without the use of language, and if so, is that reality perhaps more legitimate than the reality induced by use of language? Saeed et. al. demonstrated that EEG feedback devices can be used to allow the wearer to manipulate three dimensional computer generated images with thought alone; not using silent mental commands, verbal triggers, or any physical signal, but merely by using EEG feedback devices to create complex series of brainwave patterns which bare striking resemblance to the brainwave patterns produced when the user manipulated an identical physical object in the same manner. The similarity between induced thought and normative thought demonstrates clearly that thought and language are not intrinsically linked. However, the question then becomes whether or not language proceeds thought or vice versa, and the evidence is clear. Legerstee (1992) and Trevarthen (1998) found through their research on the cognitive development of infants that an infant can distinguish between complex objects and people, receive satisfaction from meaningful interaction, and have a surprisingly developed concept of linearity and time all of which occur before the language centers of their brain are capable of creating language that operates those same faculties in the developed mind. Certainly, it seems that the human brain, in a stage of development prior to language acquisition, is capable of accurately informing and being informed by the rest of our organism and psyche, offering a potential pathway to the rectification of the dilemma we face in being obstructed from reality by language. As for the nature of true reality, a definitive answer to such a question is beyond the descriptive powers of any person for exactly the reasons outlined in this essay, e.g., language cannot be used to define a reality whose essence is beyond language. However, it is possible to direct a language using agent's attention toward the components of our fundamental reality, yet such an endeavor requires that the process by which language obscures reality be described and explored.

Understanding the Interaction Between Language and Reality

Tillich utilized a positively-tinted approach to the process of the language game which obscures our perception of reality, primarily relating his insights to the ways in which language influences our perception of God and religion, yet his description of the meaning of symbols and their abstraction from reality is poignant in itself. Tillich asserts that absolutes must exist because absolutism and relativism (objectivity and subjectivity, respectively) are the primary modes of identifying our position in reality, and absolutes must exist as relativism is itself an absolute principle: negating its own value and proving its opposite true. He provides a list of examples for the supremacy of absolutism from the various spheres of human experience, ranging from the arts to language and scientific knowledge. For example, Tillich offers an analysis of the term absolute relativism as his most poignant example of the aforementioned principle. If we apply the term absolute to the term relative we are quickly confronted with an illogical and unreal paradox of meaning. Yet, the term itself can exist and we can derive meaning from it. Not only does the assertion of the quality of the term absolute relativism imply a logical absolute or essential foundation, it also describes a process very similar to the procession of simulacrum.

Baudrillard's precession of simulacra matches precisely the generation of meaningful language identified by Quine and Tillich. If a person says the word apple, he or she intends to refer to a fruit of the Malus Domestica tree. However, there is a mighty abyss between the apple that the word apple refers to, and the actual fruit that the communicator intends to share about. Let us assume that a person has seen an apple, yet has no word for fruit, food, apple, ad infinitum. At that point, the apple can be defined as neither solely its appearance, nor its texture, flavor, nor food-value, but only as a thing for which there is no word to describe. In order for the existence of the apple to be communicated or thought of cohesively, a symbol must be used to capture what it translates to our senses as, and the symbol must be carried on more symbols, be they sounds symbolic of the thingness of an apple, or written characters to the same effect. Already, an apple is thrice removed from its reality as a thing through the use of language; once when the sensory data is processed by the brain, again when the brain applies a symbol to it in order to categorize and store the sensory data, and a third time when the knowledge of the apple is communicated and this is only in a mind that has no other thoughts, no history, no inference or personality, a true Tabula Rasa.

The Tabula Rasa, a blank slate, is neither relevant nor possible, and as such further layers of abstraction are applied to the apple; the warmth of the sunlight during its discovery, the mood of the finder, the entire history and memory of that person as well as that of his or her culture and environment, all modify the pure thingness of the apple during the process of thought that allows said thingness to become encapsulated by language. This final modifier in the process of language, that of the individual person, can be identified as Baudrillard's fourth stage of simulation in much the same way that the previous three stages are drawn parallel to the rest of the procession. Language creates simulacrum of everything that it is applied to.

Once we have abstracted something into a concrete symbol, language plays another game: it affixes that symbol in time and space through syntax, then applies to it modifiers that further remove it from reality. Recalling Wilson, when a person says the apple is warm, not only are they distancing the apple in question from what it truly is, but by using the word is the apple is subjected to a fixed-state in which it exists in the state of being warm. This state precludes change and other qualities, and warmth becomes the primary focus. Herein lays the problem: so too is language used in such a way with other people, the world's events, and ourselves as it is with simple objects. Once we have assigned a symbolic interpretation of a person (or event, or self) to that person, we then affix to them other states that become a checklist of qualities which rarely leave our mental calculus of that person. Someone will say My wife is so cold and instantly we have, in our mind and potentially in the world, trapped who we consider that person to be person in a state of coldness, distance, frigidity, etc. If our thoughts determine how a quanta is expressed, and thusly how matter forms, the process of projecting qualities onto a person works from the ground up and in some way large or small affects the expression of that person's being.

In our increasingly reductionist global scientific culture, it is commonly believed that the mechanisms of the human brain are the primary source of all discovered cognitive phenomena, and that our consciousness is either non-scientifically classifiable or merely the result of biochemical and electrical processes. The preceding notion of absolute physical reductionism is heavily contested by researches such as Schwartz ET. al., who have declared that the scientific paradigm which dismisses terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. feeling, knowing and effort)in the understanding and application of the neurosciences are in fact based upon notions of the natural world that have, for the past three-quarters of a century, been demonstrated as not only intrinsically flawed but outright incorrect. The work reviewed by Schwartz offers empirical evidence of a faculty for self-directed neuroplasticity, one that is based upon the Zeno Effect as demonstrated in sodium ion channels within the brain that are essential to synaptic functions. Self-directed neuroplasticity is capable of altering physical mechanisms in the brain, allowing for an unprecedented way of looking at the development of human cognition. If the review done by Schwartz is drawn upon as presenting fact, it becomes possible that the hidden faculty of quantum mechanically affected neuroplasticity acts as a medium for the attentive holding pattern preserved by society and language, a holding pattern which continuously enforces a simulated reality and which could indeed alter physical brain function so as to create a very real language barrier between ourselves and the world. If the landscape of our brain is beholden to the whims of quantum mechanics and the resulting effects it can have, then it stands to reason that our perception of other people may in fact have an influence on the way in which those people's brains structure themselves, resulting in the creation of a biological factor that provides impetus for their person and behavior to express itself in a way close to our expectations.

UC Santa Barbara's Andrew Cleland has done scientific work to demonstrate some of the basic functioning of quantum theory in reality. If the basics can be demonstrated, then that which arises from those basic functions can be assumed as true. The classic double-slit experiment as well as the work of Schwartz et al. demonstrate that thought and attention determine whether or not a particle will behave singularly as a particle, function as a wave, or react in a certain way. It is through attention and intention that the potential of the fundamental components of reality takes root in our world, and as such, our thoughts and awareness influence the actual manifestation of things. If the former is true, then it is readily acceptable to assume that the language we use actually affixes the world into the states and forms that we believe it to have. This is not to say that as a collective, we could do something like stop gravity or another natural process, perhaps because such basic principles (even if they are not named) function within the current framework of most conscious beings on the planet and exist within a massively intricate net of our shared paradigm. Rather, the interaction of thought and matter reveals that the way in which the world unfolds around is, to some degree, collectively determined by the way language is used and the attention or intention applied to said world.

Reality is not static. The minutest components of matter are in constant flux from a wave-state to that of a particle, and has thus far been discovered the only factor which influences the stability of either state is that of the conscious observer. Starting in the 1970's and continuing to today with the work of Cleland, it has been demonstrated time and again that particles oscillate between a solid-wave state at steady intervals until they are observed, at which point they settle into a form that the observer initially measured (The Zeno Effect). The process of measurement and quantification in general is directly tied to language ability. Indeed that is the purpose of language, and as such the world without language or attention set to it is one that is in a constant state of movement between possible configurations of matter and the potential events that result from said movements. It is language that affixes an imaginary constancy to the fluctuating nature of reality and its essential components, much like Wilson declares in his lectures on the word is and the reality tunnel in which language creates around us, and it is through this effect of language that Quine's theory of knowledge is proven to have a basis in the modern sciences as an accurate, logically-preceded model of understanding the action of reality in its movement.

The conclusion drawn by Cleland is evidenced in the works of philosophers such as Zhuangzhi, Lao Tzu, and George Berkeley. Zhuangzhi wrote his self-titled work as a supplement to the Tao Te Ching, within which he offers us an account of a dream he once had. In the dream, Zhuangzhi was a butterfly and had no memory of being a man. Upon awakening, Zhuangzhi was cast into doubt as to whether he was a human being who dreamed that he was a butterfly, or a butterfly now dreaming that he was a human being. The relative reality of Zhuangzhi is an example of the same kind of doubts about the static nature of reality that were held by George Berkeley, who posed the famous idiom esse es percipi or to be is to be perceived. In Berkeleys philosophy, if there were no observer to hold an object in his or her mind, the object would simply cease to exist in the form it was previously known as. While Berkeley concluded that because the world does seem to continue to exist, it must be God that acts as the omnivident glue which allows this to occur. It is important to exclude God from Berkeley's equation while focusing on the model he has constructed for the permanency of objects. The parallel between the efficacy of attention in controlling quantum states of the particle that has been demonstrated in contemporary particle physics and Berkeley's 17th century philosophy is quite striking, and serves as an interesting case for the truth of the matter as evidenced by separate observers.

If language makes static the liquidity of reality, and symbolic abstraction is the means by which this occurs, we must explore the purpose of the symbol as used in the formula of language. Berkeley referred to human language as artificial, in that it applies to any object or thing a conventional symbol and a contingent sign (or word). Much like in my earlier example of an apple, Berkeley posited that the word apple does not in any way correspond to the qualities of an apple, but rather it is conventionally used to denote that a specific kind of object shares certain qualities with other objects of its type. In the former regard, we may just as well have initially referred to the apple as a gavagi, as its meaning is contingent upon that which the speakers agree it to mean. The signs (words) that Berkeley calls upon simply refer to a specific thing, as above. While the specifics of the signs may be ultimately arbitrary, they have a valuable function in indicating to the speaker that a certain thing possesses particular qualities.

Another layer of Berkeley's linguistic theory deals with suggestion and significance. In the same process by which a word is a sign (by reference), a suggestion leads to a kind of significance. The word apple suggests a fruit of the same name, but the image or visual appearance of that fruit is essentially meaningless without the significance of its qualities: the memory inspired by the sight of it, the taste of its flesh, the waxy-smoothness of its skin, all of these things are what make the word apple meaningful in its individual way.

Lacan is supported by Berkeley in his seventh seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. In Lacan's definition of psyche, the Symbolic, the Real, and the Imaginary form a triad of conscious thought and the framework for our interaction with the world. Lacan denoted a subjective experience through this triad which arose, similar to Wilson and Leary's reality tunnel. Our entrance into the reality tunnel begins with the Lacanian mirror stage, in which the experience of an infant looking into a mirror is used to set the stage for a process of creating the whole person as abstracted from component parts. In some ways, the mirror stage creates a simulacrum of a person in its attempt to unify the human being into a tangible whole.

At the same time that we acquire language, we begin to build an identity of ourselves based upon the whole we have seen in the mirror, a process that is continuously modified and alternatively accepted or battled as we develop and change our physical appearance. Lacan's mirror stage situates us subjectively in the reality tunnel, and it is this tunnel that the interplay of symbol, real, and imaginary becomes a central focus. The symbol of Lacan's triad draws a line between Berkeley's significance and the various aspects of language. That which makes a person ordered and categorized in his or her expressions and interactions with reality is reduced to the symbol, and it is the symbol that bridges the imaginary with the real. Our internal self-image, the interpretation of what we saw in the mirror, is Lacan's imaginary. The imaginary is in many ways an advanced form of Freud's ego, as it ultimately negotiates between the internal world and the external one. The last and most abstract leg of the Lacanian triad is the real. The real is essential reality, it is that which defies Baudrillard's process of symbolic abstraction and instead is the foundation from which a simulacrum is synthesized.

Application of Source Material to, and Analyses of, the Problem of LanguageLanguage acts upon the human brain like a virus, altering its cellular expression and distorting the individual person's ability to perceive of and interact with reality through a mechanism of positive feedback which semi-permanently alters the structures of the brain which generate thought and temporal presence. By the action of language, we confuse the symbol of the language with the thing it symbolizes and are thrown into a reality tunnel that serves to cut us off from those things and qualities of things which we do not have words for or presence of perception to understand. The distortion of reality that is created by language acquisition and use fundamentally perverts our nature by limiting and abstracting the way in which can interact with the world, ourselves, and other people. Our use of language as we know it is harmful to humanity and our interaction with the world around us. As soon as the mythical Adam named the animals, he elevated himself into a position of superiority and domination over them, one which stripped their essential rights as living beings and placed their lives into the control of his desires. The act of naming, of identifying the reality of a thing with the symbol we use to understand it, is responsible for many of the problems we have seen in our world-to-date. For example, when we name another person as an enemy, when a fundamentalist Muslim names a white American Christian as the opponent of Islam, the latter person is instantly stripped of his or her individual humanity and is seen as something that the former has the right to abuse or murder. In the same way, when an African-American is named as a racial epithet by a non-African American, the former is no longer a member of the human family in the latter's mind, but a subhuman animal, complete with all of the historically established qualities that defame him or her and the supposed authority that those stereotypes confer to the person doing the naming.

In a way similar to the problem we find by naming others, the grammatical structure of language also entraps everything it is applied to in a perverted matrix of temporal-spatial placement. The use of the word is serves as a prime example of the above in its ability to force fixed qualities upon the ever-changing things that inhabit the landscape of reality, some of which may well manifest as real and truly distort the thing itself, as opposed to merely distorting the symbol we use to represent that thing in our mind. In either case, the grammar and syntax of language disallows that which is codified by its use the ability to be accurately portrayed in our minds and to some extent, accurately portrayed in the landscape of reality. By fixing things into static states, we handicap our own perception of them and thusly our ability to discover truth as it is defined by the essence or undiluted nature of the thing in question. If that which is true and real is what gives rise to the harmonious order of nature, and as such imparts upon human beings as well as other living things essential rights and dignities, the preservation of those rights is impossible if our perception of reality is perverted. In this case, language fundamentally perverts our perception of the nature of things and in turn provides an obstacle to understanding essential truth as well as understanding other living things accurately, behaving towards them in a way that is both ethical and just.

In summary, we have found that since the beginning of human civilization, the power of language to transform the individual person and the world around him or her has been understood and explained through various means. One of the primary ancient civilizations, the Sumerians, undertook to explain the power of language through a mythic tale of the Gods interference in human life, and the lasting result it had on their society. As philosophy has developed, the nature of language itself was analyzed more deeply and it has been explained by some to be an artificial construction of symbols and signs that, on the one hand, create a distorted labyrinth out of the individual and collective components of reality, perverting and confusing the reality of objects and events with their abstracted symbols, and which, on the other hand serves as a series of signs and place-markers to navigate the language user through the labyrinth its very use has created. The sciences, especially those which focus upon quantum physics and neuroanatomy, have also explored how our language and the thoughts it entraps effect our interaction with reality. For the quantum physicist, we find that thought (intrinsically tied to language) alters the actual expression of matter in the world around us, within ourselves, and as a result within other people. The neuroscientist has found that the acquisition of language itself alters our brain, and that without it we are capable of understanding and reacting to reality in a way that is, while being impossible to elaborate on without real experience, fundamentally capable of allowing for our survival. Aside from distorting the ability to perceive reality and comprehend truth, the effect of language as we know it on the individual causes, without conscious awareness or intent, a degradation of their ability to interact with other living things and the world around them in an ethical and harmonious manner, negatively impacting the behavior of the individual and creating a cycle of reactions toward one another that can very quickly turn into the violation of rights and/or unethical treatment at the most basic and complex levels. Language is a necessary tool. However, its current form is essentially harmful and is implicit in perverting our experience of reality in each of its manifestations. The simplest conclusion which can be drawn from the fact that language is simultaneously useful and harmful is that the way in which we use language its syntax, meaning, and structures - must be changed.

Chapter 3

Solution, Defense, and Conclusion

A Solution to the Problem of Language and an Application of Martin Bubers I and ThouHow can the problem of language be solved? The answer to this question is relatively simple, but its implementation is as complicated and multifaceted as the question itself, if not more so. It does not seem as though there is a singular or series of reputable criticism(s) of the notion that the way in which we use language is harmful. However there are criticisms of the theories and discoveries that support such a claim. By and large, the criticisms of the theories I have put forth and their respective authors are patchwork and fragile, at best, due in large part to the fact that they ignore or deny without reason the claims and arguments made by the theories that I have proposed. In addition to a lack of criticism directed at the specific argument in this essay, it appears that there are very few solutions to the problem as a whole and while there are a number of solutions to the facets of this problem as proposed by the many thinkers I have named, they are largely incomplete and insufficient within the context of this thesis and the body of work examined thus far.

The solution to the problem of language, that the way in which it is used creates a harmful subject-object relationship for everyone using it, is twofold. First, qualifiers must be added to our language which indicate a given observation or idea is subjective, subject to change, and can at any point in time be made false. Second, our grammar and syntax must reflect the change in our qualifiers by replacing the words that append a fixed-state to a thing with words that allow that thing to change organically, without the impediment of hierarchical and self-projecting statements.

The respective components of said solution are beholden to further inquiry and exploration, and it is as such that I will endeavor to do so.

The simple act of qualifying our language as subjective (or soft) allows for the I-Thou relationship championed by Martin Buber to be held firm in our day to day life not only in regards to human-to-human interactions, but also in regards to human-to-nature and human-to-object interactions. Martin Buber proposed in his seminal work I and Thou that human beings are defined by two word pairs: I-It and I-Thou. The It contained in the I-It word pair refers to any relationship between the participant and other things or people in which they are determined as objective and discrete objects. Its are objective in the sense that they possess potent predetermined characteristics projected by the I, and discrete in that they are not overtly recognized as simple objects, but rather possess projected characteristics in place of their essential ones. The I categorizes the It using a specific paradigm and internal library that reflects the inner preconceptions of the participant as measured by their degree of separation from other Its, creating a barrier between itself, the It, and other Its.

The process of entering into an I-It relationship creates separation by the means of objective categorization, explained by Buber as follows:

But when the I of the relation has stepped forth and taken on separate existence, it also moves, strangely tenuous and reduced to merely functional activity, into the natural, actual event of the separation of the body from the world round about it, and awakens there the state in which I is properly active. Only now can the conscious act of the I take place. This act is the first form of the primary word I-It, of the experience in its relation to I. The I which stepped forth declares itself to be the bearer, and the world round about to be the object, of the perceptions. Of course, this happens in a primitive form and not in the form of a "theory of knowledge ". But whenever the sentence I see the tree " is so uttered that it no longer tells of a relation between the man-I-and the tree-Thou, but establishes the perception of the tree as object by the human consciousness, the barrier between subject and object has been set up.

The I-It relationship as described by Buber is similar to what this thesis has defined the problem of language to be, albeit his analysis of the origins of the problem and his solution to it are different. For Buber, the I-It relationship is a natural part of human existence and is not merely acceptable, but useful and necessary, when applied to non-sentient objects and average-everyday experience. Buber failed to consider that language itself, as a synthetic device, may be at the heart of the I-It relationship and as such, the I-It is less an innate way of being in reality and more the by-product of deranged language use. It is possible to successfully navigate, quantify, and qualify the world around us without entering into an I-It relationship by the use of soft language, allowing the objects or persons participating in the experience to reveal themselves as changing-but-defined within an experiential structure that is both fluid and non-hierarchical.

The I-Thou relationship that Buber describes implies a relationship between the I and whatever they are interacting with that is devoid of hierarchical judgments and hard expectations or experiential structures, and instead the I-Thou mode of experience allows for a fluid and level interaction to occur. Buber's proposition for experiencing the I-Thou relationship relies upon positive thinking directed toward the Thou in question that is free of personal imperatives and preconceived notions, as described herein:

If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a thing among things, and does not consist of things. This human being is not He or She, bounded from

every other He and She, a specific point in space and time within the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose bundle of named qualities. But with no neighbor, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself.

Buber makes the claim that the modes of I-It and I-Though exist in a natural oscillation, and that such a dichotomy of experience is to be accepted as opposed to fought. However, the root of the oscillation between the I-It and I-Thou is based in our use of language and not in innate epistemological, biological, or even religiously spiritual grounds. In addition, Buber has overlooked a fundamental flaw in the logic of his approach, which is understandable given his framework, yet none-the-less detrimental to the implementation of his idea: the language used to create an I-Thou experience can defy the definition of the I-Though by overriding the intent to foster unity with words that necessarily imply separation and hierarchical categorization. For example, a person sitting next to a stranger at the park may attempt to enter into an I-Thou relationship by considering the stranger positively, yet the normative use of phrases like This person is good and essentially as human as I am or I'm happy to be sharing this space with another person, I'm sure they have very interesting and useful things to share with me creates an essential separation that is championed by language through the use of definitive statements and projected qualities that force the stranger (the Thou) to, in the mind of the person sitting on the bench (The I), adhere to the qualities and characteristics applied to them. Certainly, Buber's solution has merit as a sort of spiritual in the sense of something ephemeral and far-reaching - supplement to solving the problem of language. However, it overlooks the primary problem which creates and misappropriates what might be considered the I-It relationship.

Criticism of Buber as Applied to The Problem of Language

Critics of Buber offer an analysis that can be both applied to, and rebutted by, the argument that language is the cause of our fundamental separation. The two critics of this philosophy of note are Franz Rosenzweig and Herman Dooyeweerd. Of the former, Rosenzweig, the argument that the I-Thou takes primacy over the I-It is supported by stating that the I-Thou is overly ideological and effectively impossible to maintain, as a social and ethical habit, in a world characterized by I-It interactions and structures centered around object-oriented as opposed to subject-oriented paradigms. Rosenzweig's criticism is easily rebutted by a linguistic-centered stance when it is understood that there is an intrinsically harmful ethical imperative in primarily utilizing the I-It or object-oriented relationship. When the world is contextualized in terms of fixed and objective categories, the inherent qualities of those things which are experienced are overruled by the perceiver and, as such, their intrinsic nature is stripped away. When we, with any seriousness, apply to other people our own categorizations and expected qualities, we are imposing our will upon theirs in an ontological fashion. Doing as much, imposing one's will upon that of another's, is at the core of all ethical violations, as described in Li Zhong Wu's Thick Black Theory When you impose your will on others, that is Evil. As can be plainly seen, Rosenzweig's criticism of the importance of subjective relationships in remedying the problem of language and/or objective relationships are without merit when the basis upon which they stand that objective relationships are as important as subjective relationships is demonstrated as being inherently harmful in practice, regardless of how well-put or elegant the theory proposed may be.

The second aspect of Rosenzweig's criticism, that it is impractical to implement a subject-oriented relationship model and ideology, holds validity only when compared to Buber's philosophy. Implementing a subject-oriented paradigm of relating to the world using object-oriented language seems like an insurmountable task, yet, as compared to the solution offered by this thesis for the problem of language, it is relatively simple to replace vocabulary, and their resulting modes of thought, with subjective or I-Thou focused linguistics modalities.

Dooyeweerd criticized Buber for disallowing boundaries, rules, and laws in the consideration of the primacy of I-Though over I-It relationships, and the same argument can be applied toward the repercussions and acute effects of a shift to subject-oriented language. Dooyeweerd's criticism is not without merit, but neither is it without response. Certainly judgments - qualitative or otherwise- and hierarchical contextualization must occur in enforcing the specific judicial tenets of a society. Yet the context in which those judgments and impositions of hierarchy occur can be shifted so as to allow for all hard language used to be past oriented. For example, a person may be punished for having behaved like a criminal, not for being a criminal, or, instead of saying You are found guilty for committing the crime of murder, it would be better said You will be punished for having committed the crime of murder. It may seem as though the distinction between the versions given for each example is pedantic, however the use of language in either example is crucial, as it maintains a subject-oriented relationship (which is the basis of ethical behavior) while effectively implementing the judicial system necessary to maintain a peaceable society.

As far as Dooyeweerd's indication of rules, which will be defined as the behavior appropriate to social limits and boundaries, which will be defined as the behavior appropriate to personal limits, a shift in language use as indicated requires a dissolution of many arbitrary boundaries and establishes that a more authentic personal preference take their place. There is absolutely no rational foundation for why the piercings or hair style that a person has would be in violation of a social code of conduct in the modern age. Perhaps in ages past, involuntary piercings or hair style signified exiled social status or affiliation with an alien or otherwise dangerous social group outside of the society. However, that is no longer the case and, as such, the stigma around the person as unacceptable in certain situations is entirely a matter of personal preference and the objectification of the person that the rule is being applied to. Summary, Solution, and ConclusionIn the same sense as the petty social stigmas found in the former section i.e. hair style and piercings, things such as bigotry, racism, and militant religious zealotry would be hard pressed to find root in a world that utilized subject-based language. The three evils indicated rely upon hierarchical categorizations and static qualitative assessments of other people to don the guise of authority and primacy. If harmful judgments were replaced by subjective statements and declarations of opinion and experience oriented in the appropriate temporal location, they would no longer be capable of commanding social power, as they would be relegated to personal opinions. Thus, it would not be possible to present them as fact.

The solution that I have proposed to the problem of language offers a practical implementation to remedy the issues raised by the work of Buber, Wilson, Quine, and Lacan and is, as such, a superior solution to the problem. As a way to implement Buber's I-Thou relationship, the shift in language from objective to subjective alters the primary method by which an I-It relationship comes into being and effectively makes the creation of that relationship impossible. The Reality Tunnel proposed by Wilson and Leary and the use of syntax that fosters such an impediment is expanded when the possibility that everything we state is outwardly falsifiable and subjective, as the fixed-state created by the reality tunnel becomes permeable and simply cannot remain fixed in any particular mode for longer than the present experience allows. In regards to Quine, a subject-oriented language naturally allows for the translations errors present in interpreting foreign modes of communication to be filled by the context in which it is analyzed, while simultaneously shifting the basis of the way in which knowledge is interpreted so as to allow for equal validity amongst multiple interpretations of the same event. The Lacanian observation of the dual Real and Symbolic is also cured in practice by the use of subject-based language. Very simply put, an affirmation that I see myself as having these components of a body radically shifts the meaning of the statement I am the body parts that I see from an affirmation of separateness as found in Lacan's description of the initial split from Real to Symbolic, while still making it possible to observe and record said awareness. The same formula can be applied to the continuation of Lacan's theory throughout life and will inevitable be found to remedy the foundation that the movement of Real to Symbolic is based upon, allowing for the essential unity that he considers inherent in our being to naturally arise.

It can be said that, essentially, those things which are unethical are those that violates the will of another person, and by projecting the qualities we assume to exist unto other peoples (or ourselves), we violate the innate expression of their being. If we can agree that the process which unfolds as a result of the problem of language is real and valid, we can begin to unravel the historical discourse of human suffering by simply understanding the way in which language shapes our perception of reality and the resulting effects on our interaction with other. The solution to the problem of language as proposed in this text entails a shift in the intended or implied meaning of those words which affix a static-state to any particular experience or thing. If the proposed solution was applied to such words it would imply to both the subject and object - linguistically and as such cognitively - that the projected meaning of a word is a fallible observation stemming from a subjective experience, and not definitive of that which it pertains to.. If a word cannot be understood as having completely subjective implications in the categories or qualities that it projects, as in the case of the word is, it must be replaced with a word that fulfills a similar linguistic role without violating the tenets of the proposed solution. It is crucial that language be re-examined in a cultural and social context, as it is currently serving as a major roadblock in our transition from a modern to a postmodern cultural model.

The implications of the problem of language can be found in object oriented relationships which work to inhibit the expression of the object in question by limiting its possibilities. For example, classifying a pretty brunette as slightly smarter than a blonde and likely to be more sexually experienced because she is pretty makes it difficult for that person, the brunette, to ever reveal herself and enter into a genuine and authentic subject-subject relationship with the person projecting the indicated qualities and judgments onto them. Such an interaction not only dehumanizes the person-object, it also curtails the ability to establish a productive, revelatory relationship at some point in the future of the subject-object interaction. The same can be said of our interaction with objects: objectifying an object (as peculiar as that phrase may seem), inhibits innovation on the part of the perceiver by disallowing the use and various transformations that can possibly be extracted from the experience of interacting with that object. As with a pretty brunette, objectifying an object narrows the possibilities of its expression and our interaction with it. The inventive spirit of humankind as a whole would be expanded greatly if we held a baseline of perception that included, in the conscious and working mind, the potential uses and network of interactions that any specific object may possess. It is through the relatively rare manifestations of subject-subject relationships, as applied to objects, that human ingenuity and creativity has found an outlet and major breakthroughs in human technology and/or innovation have occurred.

A shift from objective to subjective language will have a substantial impact on the political and religious spheres of culture. Politically, borders, and resource rights could only be claimed on a per-use basis due to the linguistic prohibition against objective and future-oriented hierarchical classifications. Simply put, in a world of subject-subject language games and I-Thou relationships, it would be unheard of to make a serious claim for the future ownership of a natural or artificial resource. It may perhaps seem that a political world as described would be one without boundaries or ownership, and all of the negative implications that a system of the sort would entail. However, the clause to the solution of the problem of language that insists upon conscious relationships through a subject-subject language model would insure the right of a person to, for instance, remain in control of who occupies his or her home or eats his or her food for so long as it is useful to him or her.

As far as religion, the solution to the problem of language as stated in this text eliminates the edicts that can be imposed by a religious authority or dogma while decapitalizing the word God and the de-contextualizing the implied meaning of that word, replacing it with a god that can be approached equally and universally, regardless of that particular god's origin or method of worship. The current spiritual and religious paths that seem to most easily embody the indicated shift are: Taoism, with its indeterminacy of essence as stated in the phrase The Tao that can be named is not the Eternal Tao, The Advaita Vedanta sect of Hinduism, which seeks to establish interconnected non-dual relationships between man as subject, god as subject, and the world as subject, and Pantheism which declares that the supreme deity it could be called that is imminent, omnipresent, and intimately connected with all things as it in truth the essence and point of manifestation for all things.

Subject-subject oriented language has profound effects on philosophy and many, if not all, of its schools of thought. An exploration of such implications would require a much lengthier work than this text could rightfully allow and, that being the case, a brief overview of the most powerfully impacted school of philosophy will herein be stated. Ontology is heavily dependent upon the category of language within which it is explored, and many of its facets are fundamentally altered through the solution to the problem of language. The ontological question of categorization concerning types of being would be radically altered by a subject-subject linguistic paradigm, as any indicated type of being would always be in relation to all those things which it is reasonable to associate it with. The ontological concern over layers of existence and physical objects would be transformed as well; as has been found the case in quantum mechanical theory the layers of existence would be impossible to categorize as absolutely separate. Instead, the existence that contains being would be considered from the most basic level as a continuum of interrelated modes expressing being. Ontological discourse on physical objects would be radically changed in the presence of subject-subject language. The definitions of physical and abstract objects would inevitably be based upon the maybe logic of Robert Anton Wilson, as opposed to the hard logic that defines an object by stating that it is this or that objective quality or quantity.

The problem of language begins in the brain and it is possible that a shift from objective to subjective language could change, via the mechanism of self-directed neuroplasticity, the brain structures which support language's obfuscation of reality. As time progresses, we may see the implementation of subjective language indoctrinating the neonate or developing mind with a linguistic system that reveals, as opposed to masks, the essence of those things that are experienced. In the least, utilizing subjective language would serve as a partial fix to the problem of our synthetically created blockade that exists between the user of language and the world around them. By modifying already existent language use with the two-fold solution as proposed throughout this chapter, it is possible to avoid the issues that arise when language is used as something definitive and objective, and to find in our world the boons presented by such a shift in language.

Directly and outwardly indicating that the symbols and signs of our language are not definitive nor completely accurate transforms language from something rigid into something soft and fluid, and it is the individual person that applies language to reality, regardless of how deranged or sane his or her application is. The individual as we know it is constructed, in part, by a series of simulacrum and language games, inferences linking distinct factors and highly subjective

memories, and it is the matrix of the individual person that determines how language is used. If the individual can be made to understood that the normative use of language is inherently detrimental to the world around him or her as a whole and in each of its facets, he or she will naturally embrace a shift from I-It relationships with the world and its people, which are built upon the foundation of subject-object oriented language, to I-Thou relationships with those things as based upon subject-subject oriented language. Terrence McKenna put it best when he said If the truth can be told so as to be understood, it will be believed.

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The word civilized is used in the broadest sense: belonging to a society

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Colwyn Trevarthen. "What Is It like to Be a Person Who Knows Nothing? Defining the Active Intersubjective Mind of a Newborn Human Being." Infant and Child Development (2010)

True reality meaning unaltered by language.

John Locke.An essay concerning human understanding. (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1995.)

Jeffrey M. Schwartz, Henry P. Stapp, and Mario Beauregard. "Review. Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mindbrain Interaction." Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 360.1458 (2005): 1309-1327. http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/360/1458/1309.full

Ibid.. Introduction: Paragraph 4

Max H. Hofheinz Wang, M. Ansmann, Radoslaw C. Bialczak, Erik Lucero, M. Neeley, A. D. O'Connell, D. Sank, J. Wenner, John M. Martinis, and A. N. Cleland. "Synthesizing Arbitrary Quantum States in a Superconducting Resonator." Nature459.7246 (2009): 546-49.

Wing-tsit Chan. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1969).

Robert Fogelin.Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge.(Routledge, 2001.) 27.

Ibid.., 48-51

Ibid.., 73-75

Jacques Lacan, Jacques Miller, and Dennis Porter. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. 1959-1960. Reprint. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1997). 153-155

Martin Buber, and Ronald Gregor Smith.I and Thou. (Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 2010.) 35

Ibid..,8

Leora Faye Batznitzky.Idolatry and representation: the philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig reconsidered. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000.) 113-116

Zhong Wu, Thick Black Theory (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2009). 21

Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, vol. 2, (The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company. 1969). 22. http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/dooy002newc08_01/dooy002newc08_01.pdf

Stephen Mitchell.Tao te ching. London: Frances Lincoln Limited, 2009.1

Robert Anton Wilson.Cosmic Trigger: Volume I.(Tempe, Arizona. New Falcon Publications. 2013). 2

Terrance McKenna. "Re: Evolution ." Erowid Terence McKenna Vault http://www.erowid.org/culture/characters/mckenna_terence/mckenna_terence_re_evolution.shtml