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Inti Martínez

Ethical Theory Class

Book 5/3/06

From Heaven to Earth: Reclaiming Ethics for Human Consumption

Nel Noddings’ Caring starts off its introduction by stating that “[e]thics, the

philosophical study of morality, has concentrated for the most part on moral reasoning…This

emphasis gives ethics a…mathematical appearance, but it also moves discussion beyond the

sphere of actual human activity…”1 Noddings wants to veer from such a geometrical and

“logical” approach because “empirical evidence suggests that individuals only rarely consult

moral principles when making decisions that result in the prevention of harm”2 and because

“ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father: in principles and propositions,

in terms such as justification, fairness, justice.” At first, this seems as a very radical proposal,

but it becomes more cogent after several pages of reading. Noddings’ caring theory does not

ascribe to rigid laws and rules—which are characterized in a masculine/paternal fashion and are

usually broken—but she approaches ethics the way a mother would—and this is the feminine

view. “This does not imply that all women will accept it or that men will reject it…It is

feminine in the deep classical sense—rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness.”3

Logic, as in traditional philosophy, is still present in this view; however, it is not what

Noddings’ caring theory revolves around. “We might observe that man (in contrast to woman)

has continually turned away from his inner self and feeling in pursuit of both science and

ethics.”4 When ethics has been sought in this fashion, the end has been a disaster, Noddings

affirms. “The father might sacrifice his own child in fulfilling a principle; the mother might

1 Nel Noddings, Caring 2

nd Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pg. 1.

2 Preface to 2

nd Edition, xv

3 Pg. 2

4 Pg. 87

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sacrifice any principle to preserve the child.”5 If one wants to be moral, if one wants to follow a

realistic ethical theory, one needs to stay away from traditional masculine philosophy because it

does not realize how prone human beings are to missing the mark. If traditional masculine

philosophy actually took into account humans’ propensity to fail, ethical theory would not be

based on rules. Following rigorous rules and dogmas does not produce human beings with fully

developed and stable emotions. If one wants to be moral towards someone, one needs to, first,

care for the other. “Far from being romantic, an ethic of caring is practical, made for this earth.

Its toughness is disclosed in a variety of features…”6

Noddings defines caring as “a relationship that contains another, the cared-for, and we

have already suggested that the one-caring and the cared-for are reciprocally dependent.”7 The

cared-for is overseen by the one-caring, and always reciprocates to the one-caring—even when

it’s in a subtle and imperceptible way. “If the demands of the cared-for become too great or if

they are delivered ungraciously, the one-caring may become resentful…and withdraw her

caring,” Noddings says about how the one-caring could react to an abusive or irresponsible

cared-for.8 In order to maintain balance and avoid confusion, Noddings has consistently

associated the generic “one-caring” with the universal feminine, “she,” and “cared-for” with the

masculine, “he.”9

From the get-go, Noddings’ system of ethical theory strikes as ambitious and inspiring.

Her analysis of traditional (masculine) philosophy seems fair and accurate. Her outright

exclusive language, while correct, could irk many readers—mostly those traditional side with

the male gender. Noddings’ straightforward division between masculine and feminine ways of

carrying out affairs, of caring, should not be expected to be taken favorably by all readers. The

5 Pg. 37

6 Pg. 99

7 Pg. 58

8 Pg. 48

9 Pg. 4

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author’s proposal of veering away from a rule-based ethical system would fascinate someone

with libertarian or anarchist sympathies. Most ethical and legal systems around the global today

are based on rules, sourced from a leader, a legislative body, judicial decisions, or from a

participatory democratic process. At first, realistically speaking, it would seem implausible to

think of a world where our moral basis for decisions would be caring ethics. Noddings would

respond by saying that this is due to the historical pervasiveness of the male figure in virtually

every society and in every way; the world needs to be reeducated and future generations should

be taught differently, she would say.

Noddings considers ethics of principle as ambiguous and unstable. She is not very fond

of Immanuel Kant, his followers, and their belief that things should be done out of duty. She

says that “[w]herever there is a principle, there is implied its exception and, too often,

principles function to separate us from each other. We may become dangerously self-righteous

when we perceive ourselves as holding a precious principle not held by the other.” Noddings

criticizes philosophers who believe ethical judgment must be universalizable (e.g., if under

conditions X you are required to do A, then under sufficiently similar conditions, I too am

required to do A). She opposes such universalizability because her “attention is not on

judgment and not on the particular acts we perform but on how we meet [others] morally” and

because the feminine view cares more about human encounters and relationships than about

rules. This criticism of universalizability, one can presume, is directed to philosophers like

R.M. Hare. What Noddings indeed considers universal—to escape relativism—is the caring

attitude itself. 10

Actions need to be judged on a case-by-case basis, not under rules but in terms

of how caring is expressed towards others. Even though Noddings tries to stir away from

relativism, it seems like her caring ethics could very well follow this avenue.

10

Pg. 5

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Chapter 1 of Caring analyzes what caring entails. Just like the traditional logical

approach to ethical problems stems out of the masculine experience, Nodding’s caring theory

emerges from the experience of women—specifically of the experience and attitude of a

nurturing mother. If we care for someone we “feel a stir of desire or inclination toward him. In

a related sense, I care for someone if I have regard for his views and interests.” I cannot claim,

however, to care for a friend or a relative if my caretaking is perfunctory or grudging. If I am in

charge of paying for my elderly mother’s nursing home bills, if I don’t visit her, or write to her,

or call her up—only pay her bills—Noddings would accuse me of not actually caring for my

mother—and that is a valid reprimand.11

Noddings discusses several other topics regarding her caring ethics. So far, she has not

given much detail on what is moral and what is not moral. Judging an action as “right” or

“wrong,” Noddings writes, is not in the chief interest of caring ethics. She, however, decides to

use these terms for simplicity. At the end, something is “right” or “wrong,” depending on

whether it is done in a caring attitude, or not—whether it will make someone suffer, or not. 12

A

caring attitude is what determines whether an action is “right” or “wrong.” For Noddings, it is

not specific actions that make a person moral or immoral; it is their attitude, their caring

attitude, in point of fact, which makes them moral or immoral. A critic could respond to this by

doubting the plausibility, however important, of giving priority to motives and attitudes over

results and consequences. How would an attitude or inclination for caring be measured in an

effective and efficient manner in the real world, assuming Noddings’ caring ethics could be put

to work in a given society?

Engrossment, Noddings says, is fundamental when the one-caring is expressing her care

towards the cared-for. Engrossment need not be intense or pervasive in the life of the one-

11

Pgs. 9,10 12

Pgs. 92, 93

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caring, but it must be present, nonetheless. The level of engrossment should be high enough to

care for someone in an effective manner, but not high enough as to deprive the one-caring of

sleep and sanity; the level of engrossment should be judged according to the circumstances of

each relationship and the personal attributes of the involved parties. Noddings rejects the

concept of universal caring—that is, caring for everyone and everything—since it is impossible

to put into practice. Instead of caring for all the people in the world, we can (and should) care

about all the people in the world. “Caring about” is “an internal state of readiness to try to care

for whoever crosses our path.” Although Noddings recognizes the possibility of caring about

people around the globe, she does not mention how you would be able to express one’s caring

towards someone you don’t know who reportedly is suffering starvation or grave illness.

The one-caring is always attuned to the cared-for’s feelings, thoughts, and desires.

There are times when the cared-for’s demands are not the same as the one-caring’s suggestions;

in such cases the one-caring may feel guilt—which is always a risk when practicing caring,

especially when sustained over time.13

This is a very positive aspect of Noddings’ ethical

theory. She tends to be very optimistic of how humans can flourish and become even better

persons under her feminine ethics.

Caring can be expressed even when the one-caring is not physically present.14

Noddings

tries to be very clear on the extent of caring by saying that it “involves stepping out of one’s

own personal frame of reference into the other’s [frame of reference]. When we care, we

consider the other’s point of view, his objective needs, and what he expects of us. Our

attention, our mental attention, is on the cared-for, not on ourselves.”15

To ascertain that an

ethical theory based on caring is possible, Noddings believes there is a form of caring natural

and accessible to all human beings—and this is her caring ethics, which mines the potential that

13

Pgs. 17, 18, 39 14

Pg. 19 15

Pg. 24

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ever human has for caring. Noddings does not believe, however, that her caring theory is some

sort of situation ethics or agapism. Since there is no commandment to love, nor a God to make

such a commandment, then it is not possible for her caring ethics to be a form of agapism, the

authors suggests.16

However, agapism, as I understand it, is offering and giving unconditional

love (agape) to someone; it is guiding one’s actions by the rule of love. Thus, if we substitute

the word “caring” for the word “loving” in Noddings’ work, we would find that her ethics is a

form of agapism.

Of the few, yet incisive, remarks that Noddings makes about religion (particularly

Christianity) throughout the book, she makes it clear that her caring ethics does not need the

help of any religious institution to work well for humans. She probably does not want to

associate herself with one religious view since her academic readership might dislike her

religious references. Furthermore, it might be the case that her caring ethics has “major and

irreconcilable differences”17

with Christianity. She argues that “[h]uman love, human caring,

will be quite enough on which to found an ethic.” As a first reaction, I notice a clear skepticism

of religion in Noddings’ work. Some irrational aspects of Christianity do not work very well

with her framework (e.g., belief in the supernatural beings or events). It is very clear that she

does not give any credit to the benefit religious activity in society.

Chapter 2 studies the one-caring in great detail. The one-caring feels empathy whenever

a caring relationship with the cared-for is established; she feels with the other, and for the other.

When caring, the one-caring enters in a feeling mode—which need not be a deeply emotional

mode. When in this mode, the one-caring accurately understands what the cared-for is facing.

Whenever there is a caring relationship, conflicts arise. When such conflicts take place, a

relationship should not be considered in bankruptcy, but opportunities to develop and

16

Pg. 28 17

Pg. 29

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strengthen the relationship should be profited from. Noddings’ description of the one-caring

appears to be very altruistic. As human beings, I believe it is imperative to keep an optimistic

outlook of life. However, a touch of realism is needed to avoid being deceived by others’ ill

intentions and dispositions. The one-caring is depicted as some benevolent and incredibly wise

being that is attuned with her emotions and knows what to do every single time she faces a

dilemma.

In chapter 3, the author analyzes the role of the cared-for. Under the perceived attitude

of the one-caring, the cared-for “grows” and “glows.” Reciprocity in a caring relationship need

not entail the cared-for becoming the one-caring—yet he must respond to her somehow. If the

cared-for is not responsive to the one-caring’s empathy, the one-caring might be tempted to

retreat and thus harm the cared-for (and herself, as well). The cared-for, in a caring relationship,

should always seek to be a responsive participant. Without this responsiveness, the one-caring

might face frustration and disappointment for the cared-for and the relationship itself. While I

find Noddings’ description of the one-caring very positive, the whole caring relationship seems

too unrealizable when not initiated and developed in a spontaneous fashion. Noddings does not

give much of a description of how to handle a major problem between the cared-for and the

one-caring. Today, most friendships that involve extremely passionate and caring individuals

usually lose their momentum, partially or completely, after some time. As human beings, we

tend to be very conflictive, and Noddings does not present a method or set of guidelines for the

one-caring and the cared-for to follow when facing a conflictive situation. It is very common,

and natural, to find that in most friendships there is always one person who feeds the

relationship more than the other. In many cases, there might be abuses from part of the cared-

for demanding too much from the one-caring—and Noddings does not give suggestions as to

how to work out “big problems.”

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Chapter 4 spends time detailing and solving several puzzles for the ethics of caring.

As expressed before, Noddings believes caring is embedded in our human nature and all we

have to do is, first, discover it, and then put this potential for caring to work. She examines the

fact that “[t]here are moments for all of us when we care quite naturally. We just do care; no

ethical effort is required.”18

With this in mind, she strengthens her theory that humans have the

natural potential to care. However, there are cases when, as frank humans, “we do not care

naturally, [and in this case] we must call upon our capacity for ethical caring.” 19

This sounds

very much like R.M. Hare’s conception of the intuitive level and the critical level. The way

these two levels work in Hare’s ethical theory is comparable to Noddings’ suggestion that we

should resort to ethical caring when our natural caring does not work in fueling an appropriate

caring relationship. Leaving the cared-for in desolation would not be a moral thing to do,

Noddings says. As ones-caring, we should always be willing to care for those who need our

caring. If we ever encounter a human being who does not feel any motivation to care for

another human being, he should be reeducated or sent to exile, Noddings unyieldingly states.20

Another drawback in Noddings’ caring ethics is the lack of distinction between types of

caring relationships. She does not talk about more than one general type of caring relationship,

which is somewhat unrealistic, considering how human relationships work. For example, the

relationship that I have with my next-door neighbor cannot be compared with the relationship a

mother has with her two-month-old infant. The level of reciprocity and conscious interaction

between my neighbor and me far exceeds that of any relationship between a mother and her

infant.

The ethical ideal, its nurture, and maintenance, are discussed in chapter 5. The ethical

ideal “springs from…the natural sympathy human beings feel for each other and the longing to

18

Pg. 81 19

Pg. 86 20

Pg. 92

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maintain, recapture, or enhance our most caring and tender moments.”21

The ethical ideal

strives to maintain and enhance caring—it is the perfect model which motivates those in a

caring relationship to yearn for and sustain this relationship. Men and women are different in

the way they approach ethical problems, because of the way society has traditionally shaped

their statuses and roles. Noddings does not believe men and women have naturally-implanted

roles to be performed in society.

Feeling joy, chapter 6 explains, enhances both the ethical ideal and our commitment to

it. Noddings does not see “joy” as emotion, per se. “Joy…must be reflective.”22

Joy can

sometimes be an emotion—but a different type of emotion: one that contributes to the

enhancement of the ethical ideal. Noddings says that the type of joy she is talking about is not

the one we experience in relation to things and ideas. She believes that “[o]ur relation to things

and ideas is not an ethical relation.”23

To be clear of the kind of joy she believes is necessary in

her caring ethics, the author asserts that this joy is the kind that makes us aware of our

existence and the reality of our surroundings; it is the type of joy that gives us a sense of

belonging or relatedness to others.24

Noddings’ joy is an enhancer of the ethical ideal. While

“joy” might be a great condition to include in a caring relationship, Noddings does not include

other conceptions or emotions like love, faithfulness, admiration, and loyalty, into her caring

ethics.

Noddings abruptly moves into her next chapter and analyzes how caring for animals,

plants, things, and ideas is essential for developing adequate ethics. She does not believe in a

hierarchy in nature and does not think humans were given dominion over the beasts of the land.

Caring for animals—for most animals—is analogous to caring for humans. Dogs, for example,

wag their tail when they see the one-caring and continue reciprocating by playing tricks and

21

Pg. 104 22

Pg. 134 23

Pg. 147 24

Ibid.

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being affectionate. Killing and eating animals appear to be fine for Noddings since “letting

them live” would be, in fact, their destruction—and our destruction, too.25

Since humans and

animals are alive, thanks to plants, plants should be highly regarded—but not to the level of a

caring relationship, since it would be a unilateral one, and thus not a caring relationship. Plants

can serve the one-caring, but they cannot consciously care for her; we, as ones-caring, can care

about plants, but not for them. Caring for things and ideas is beyond the ethical; it is

intellectual caring. This type of caring “may contribute to ethicality by giving rise to receptive

joy and that joy, in turn, may increase our personal vigor and thus help to sustain us in our

quest for ethicality.”26

Expressing care towards animals and plants seems to me a very laudable

activity. Noddings’ belief that humans and non-human animals are on the same plane in nature

could be done away with—and her caring for animals would still be cogent and plausible.

Noddings last chapter, titled “Moral Education,” presents a loose educational system

where people learn to be ethical. “Moral education is, then, a community-wide enterprise and

not a task exclusively reserved for home, church, or school.”27

This educational system does

away with the traditional model of coerced hierarchies and formal rules. A school is

administered by teachers, on a rotational basis; classes are not taught, per se, but students work

together in the process of learning with the guidance of one member of the school.28

The

“teacher” acts as the one-caring all the time and should spend at least three years with a fixed

group of students in order for them to know each other better, and for the teacher to be able to

establish a caring relationship with her students. “Teachers” are only present in the classroom

to influence students, but not to give orders or coerce.29

Parents and visitors are always

welcomed to collaborate in class discussion and group projects. The grading system would not

25

Pg. 154 26

Pg. 170 27

Pg. 171 28

What we would call a “teacher” 29

Pg. 177

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be a race to be “the best.” “Rules” in school are not rules, they are, in reality, guidelines or

expectations; expectations to further caring relationships. All students should take different

types of classes, even if they clash with their natural gifts and abilities—this helps them

become more knowledgeable; Noddings opposes specialization in education. Moral education

should also be carried out in the home and the church.

Noddings’ conception of an educational system based on caring might seem very

appealing to students, since this system gives them a lot of options to choose from. The idea of

not having a formal teacher, as we know it today, might seem outrageous to many parents.

Noddings’ system sounds very ambitious and I believe it might be possible to realize; after all,

there are many schools around the world which follow a free and democratic schooling model.

The problem of not having an official authority figure in the classroom would be that, in

cultures that authority is praised and rarely defied, this concept would assuredly lead to

anarchy. In Afro-American, Hispanic, and many East Asian cultures, authority figures are role

models. Teachers, as authority figures, give a sense of assurance to most students from these

backgrounds. I don’t think it would be possible to have an effective education where self-

determination, freedom, and laxness permeate the system—all this would lead to chaos.

Noddings would probably respond by saying that some tweaks must be made in these cultures

and in her system, in order for caring ethics in education to work properly in these situations.

Noddings continues in her moral education system by saying that all the religions

represented in a given community should be taught to children, so that they are informed of

their options. Values, beliefs, and opinions of all kinds, can and should be critically analyzed

by students. Relationships should be always fostered in this community, because they are the

basis of the ethics of caring. This last chapter gives a general overview of how a school based

on caring ethics would operate. Her description appears to be very similar to the Sudbury

model—where schooling is completely free and democratic—but a little bit more structured.

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Noddings’ last few comments on religion and community involvement seem to not fit too well

with her caring ethics.

In conclusion, Nel Noddings’ Caring is very intriguing and visionary. I would endorse

this type of ethical theory much more than I would endorse most ethical theorists of the Kantian

tradition, that’s for sure. Noddings, after almost two decades between the first and second

editions of her book, did not make any changes to her second edition. She, however, did

include an introduction to her original work that explicitly stated that she holds what she

originally wrote as true, and necessary for her society. As I have tried to point out, there are

several places in which Noddings could be more cogent. She believes that human beings can, in

fact, be more altruistic towards others and, with the help of reason, humans can become better

persons. This is a praiseworthy aim, yet one should not lose sight of reality.

It would be interesting to see Noddings describing her caring ethics being espoused in

drug and alcohol rehabilitation centers, and even prisons. Would caring ethics improve the

success rate of these centers—as measured by their capability to rehabilitate an individual?

Overall, however, Noddings’ caring ethics is well developed and current educational systems

need more of it. The embedded capacity of every human being to care for themselves and

especially for others would make Noddings’ system work very well in our violence-prone and

increasingly individualistic societies.