Ołena Łucyszyna, CLASSICAL SĀṀKHYA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A WORD AND ITS MEANING

8/10/2019 Oena ucyszyna, CLASSICAL SKHYA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A WORD AND ITS MEANING

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C lassical S khya on the Relationship between a Wordand Its Meaning

O ena ucyszyna

The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract The aim of this article is to reconstruct the classical Sam khya view onthe relationship between a word and its meaning. The study embraces all the extanttexts of classical Sa m khya, but it is based mainly on the Yuktid pik , since thiscommentary contains most of the fragments which are directly related to the topic of our research. The textual analysis has led me to the following conclusion. It ispossible to reconstruct two different and conicting views on the relationshipbetween a word and its meaning from the classical Sam khya texts. The rst view,the source of which is the Yuktid pik , is that all words are conventional in theirorigin. It resembles the Nya ya-Vais es

ika theory of the primary linguistic convention

and the conventional origin of all words. The second view, which is the implicationof the Sa m khya idea of the authorless Vedas we can reconstruct on the basis of themajority of the classical Sa m khya commentaries (including the Yuktid pik ), is thatthe relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. This view is probablyinuenced by M ma m sa . Both of these views are hardly compatible with theSa m khya teaching. It seems like classical Sam khya, not having created its own

detailed theory, oscillated between different conceptions.

Keywords Sa m khya Language Word ( abda ) Meaning ( artha ) Primary language convention

Introduction: The Aim of this Research and the Primary Sources on whichit is Based

The nature of the relationship between a word ( abda ) and its meaning ( artha ) wasvividly discussed in Indian philosophy. The main contributors to this discussion

O. ucyszyna ( & )The University of Humanities and Economics in Lodz, d , Polande-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

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J Indian PhilosDOI 10.1007/s10781-014-9264-1


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quality ( gua) of the gross element of ether ( k a) (it is a view of the P, the SVr,

the SSVr, the GB, and the MV) or each of the ve gross elements, that is, of ether,

air, re, water, and earth (it is a view of the YD, th e JM, and the TK) (see classicalSa m khya commentaries to k rik s 22, 26, and 38). 6

It is worth noting that Sa m khya, like Nya ya-Vais esika and unlike M ma m sa , doesnot draw a distinction between word sounds and non-linguistic sounds. In M ma m salanguage sounds are distinguished from non-linguistic sounds, that is, acoustic tones(nda ; dhvani ) through which language sounds and words are manifested; wordsounds and words are permanent (eternal), while acoustic tones arise and cease toexist immediately after th eir emergence. In YD 34 the author uses the word dhvani as a synonym of abda .7 Also in a polemic with a Buddhist opponent in which theauthor of the YD (see YD 10) disagrees with him that sounds and words aremomentary ( k aika) in their nature, the a uthor does not make any distinction

between linguistic and non-linguistic sounds.8

The Meaning of Meaning (artha ) in Classical S khya

What did classical Sam khya authors understand by meaning? Their texts do notprovide enough material for the reconstruction of the classical Sam khya theory of meaning. They do not explicate Sa m khya comprehension of meaning. In the YD wend some examples of the meanings of words. These examples embrace the main

structural principles of Sa m khya ontology ( tattva )9

and other thin gs that real ly exist,perceptible as well as imperceptible (a cook, a cutter, 10 a tree, 11 heaven, 12 etc.).Besides the passages containing these examples, there are also some other contextsin the YD which indica te indirectly that by word meaning the author understands athing that really exists. 13

Can we conclude on the basis of these passages that by meaning Sam khyasunderstood the individual? In my opinion, rather not. The texts of other schools of

6 In Sa m khya all the gross elements are perceptible by ordinary people and constitute an essential unitywith their qualities (they are not different from their qualities), from which it follows that sound must be

perceptible everywhere the gross element(s) being its bearer is/are present. One of the important gaps inthe Sa m khya teaching is that Sam khya does not explain why sound, being an inseparable quality of theperceptible gross element(s) (in fact, a quality undistinguishable from its bearer), is not alwaysperceptible when its bearer is present.7 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 218, vv. 910.8 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 130, vv. 414 and p. 131, vv. 519.9 Introduction to the YD ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 7, vv. 2326). The YD gives more extensive explanationsof most of the k rik s than other classical Sam khya commentaries, therefore in my references to the YD Iindicate, besides the number of the k rik , the page and the verse number of the edition of the YD.10 Introduction to the YD ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 7, vv. 1920).11

YD 6 (Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 101, v. 6).12 YD 6 (Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 101, vv. 67).13 See polemics in which the author argues that authoritative verbal testimony cannot be reduced toinference (YD 6; Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 101, v. 16p. 105, v. 9), as well as polemics where the authordefends the view that comparison ( upam na ) is not a separate source of valid knowledge ( pram a)(YD 4; Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 70, v. 25p. 72, v. 21).

WordMeaning Relationship in Sam khya

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Indian philosophy, for example, the texts of Nyaya, contain fragments in which theauthors give as examples of meanings concrete individual things, e.g., gayal (theforest cow) ( gavaya ), mudgapar and m apar (these are plants) (Va tsya yanas Ny yabh ya and Uddyotakaras Ny yav rttika I, 1, 6), food, re, sword

( Ny yabh ya II, 1, 53), but from this it does not follow that the authors of theseNyaya texts understand by meaning a concrete individual thing. According tothese Nya ya authors, the word means (i.e., d enotes, stands for, refers to, designates),rst, the concrete individual thing ( vyakti),14 second, the form ( k ti), and third,the universal ( j ti) (see Ny yastras , Ny yabh ya, and Ny yav rttika II, 2, 5969).

What else can we say about the Sam khya understanding of meaning? It is almostcertain that we can exclude the possibility that the authors of classical Sam khyabelieved the universal to be the meaning of the word. In YD 28 the author rejects theview that the universal ( smnya ) can exist and be perceived as something distinct

from the individual thing.15

The author rejects here the view of Naiyayikas andVais es

ikas, which hold that the universal ( smnya , j ti) is a separate entity,

exist ing even when the concrete individual which is its seat does not exist. From YD15 16 it follows that Sa m khyas understand the universal as a similarity of form/asimilarity of nature/likeness ( s r pya).17 It is difcult not to agree with thescholars that Sam khya metaphysics has no place for universals understood asrealities that can exist separately from concrete individual things (Frauwallner 1973 ,p. 314; Maas 2010 , p. 385), that at best Sa m khya could accept universals as generalnotions (Kumar 1983 , pp. 136137, 300), 18 and that Sa m khyas do not appear to

have g iven considerable thought to the problem of universal (Kumar 1983 ,p. 300). 19

As for the word smnya , being a common Indian term denoting the universal,in Sa m khya it is an important term applied to prak ti. In Sa m khya in most cases itcan be translated with one of the following words: common, general, universal,commonness, universality, generality. This term is used when prak ti ischaracterized, rst, as something common to all unliberated puru as (that is, as thecommon object of experience of all unliberated puru as, as well as the commoncause of all the subtle and gross bodies with which the puru as not liberated from sa s ra are connected), second, as the common, or universal cause of everything(of all the things of the visible and invisible world) except puru a , third, as

14 The notion of individual thing (the individual, the particular) very often embraces not only individualsubstance. In Nyaya-Vais es

ika it embraces also action and quality, in Sa m khyaproperty in the widest

sense of this word.15 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 202, vv. 28.16 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 143, vv. 1425.17 The Nyaya and Mmam sa opponents of Sam khya ascribe the view that the universal is s r pya toSa m khya philosopher Vindhyavasin (ca. 300400 CE). See Chakravarti ( 1951 , p. 143), Kumar ( 1983 ,

pp. 136, 300), Larson and Bhattacharya ( 1987 , pp. 144145), Takenaka ( 1977 , pp. 505, 502501).18 At best Sam khya would sanction it a notional existence (Kumar 1983 , p. 137).19 See also Harzer Clear: The theory of universals and particulars was not one that developed within theSa nkhya school. At the time of Vindhyavasin, the Sa m khya school incorporated notions which belongedto other schools. Among these were the notions of universals and particulars (Harzer Clear 1990,pp. 334335, note 9).

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According to many authors of Nyaya, the word meaning is threefold: the wordmeans the individual ( vyakti), the form ( k ti), and the universa l ( j ti, smnya )(see Ny yastras , Ny yabh ya, and Ny yav rttika II, 2, 5969). 25 According toNavyanyaya, the word means the individual as qualied by the universal (section

J ti aktiv da of Gan ges as Tattvacint maisee Saha 2001 ). It is difcult to makegeneralizations about the views of the Grammarians (Vaiyakaran

as), but I shall

venture to state that most of these philosophers identify the word meaning as theuniversal ( j ti, k ti), the individual ( dravya ), or both of themsee, for instance, thepublications of Dravid ( 1972 , pp. 225226), Coward and Raja ( 2001 , p. 6), Raja(2001a , p. 194, 2001b , pp. 116117), Sajdek ( 2011 , pp. 5354), Houben ( 1995 ,pp. 8795). Bhartr

hari the Grammarian in the J tisamudde a of his V kyapad ya

claims that the meaning of a word is the universal ( j ti); he also discusses differentviews of the earlier Grammarians ( V kyapad ya III, 1, 213).

How did philosophers of the sister Yoga dar ana explain the meaning of meaning ( artha )? In the Yoga texts I dealt with (the Yogas tras , theYogas trabh ya, Va caspati Misras Tattvavai rad , and the R jam rta a byBhoja Ra ja) I have found only one small fragment where the author says what hemeans by meaning: commenting upon Yogas tras III, 17, in the R jam rta a (ca.1150 CE) Bhoja Raja explains artha as j ti-gu a-kriy -di (the universal, thequality, action, etc.). It follows from this that according to Bhoja Ra ja the wordmeans both the universal and the particular. This small fragment is not enough formaking any denite conclusions about the Yoga theory of meaning.

The Yogas

tras speak about the erroneous identication of

abda (word), artha(meaning), and pratyaya (notion, idea), which should be distinguished fromone another (III, 17). As an example of meaning ( artha ) the commentators give areal empirical cow, possessing a dewlap and other necessary attributes of a cow (seethe Yogas trabh ya, the Tattvavai rad and the R jam rta a on Yogas tras III,17). In all the four Yoga texts mentioned a meaning of a word is clearlydistinguished from a notion produced by a word in our mind. Bhoja Ra ja explains pratyaya as knowledge, that is, the modication of the intellect in the form of theobject ( jna vi aya- k r buddhi-v tti) ( R jam rta a III, 17). The abovedistinction between the word meaning and the mental idea evoked by the wordimplies that the Yoga philosophers did not identify a meaning as a notion.

Thus we can say, generally, that according to philosophers representingBrahmanical dar ana s, including philosophers of Yoga, a sister dar ana of Sa m khya, the meaning of a w ord, be it the universal, the form, or the particular, isa thing of the external world, 26 but not a notion or something that exists only in ourthought. I think we can sum up that the theories of meaning of Brahmanicalphilosophies of language are referential. 27 I do not claim that the philosophers in all

25 The su tras of Vaisesikas seem to be silent about the meanings of words (see Vai e ikastras VII, 2,

1420).26 For Advaita it is the world which is real from the lower, relative standpoint.27 I do not agree with the following generalization made by Raja ( 1969 , p. 25) concerning the Indianphilosophy of language: The Indian conception of the relation between abda and artha (word andsense) is quite analogous to de Saussures denition of a linguistic sign as a relation between the signi ant and the signi . Here it must be noted that both the signi ant and the signi are psychical entities .

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the contexts by meaning ( artha ) understand a referent, that is, the thing to whichthe word refers in the existent world; I claim that in the cases when the philosophersexpress their view on the word meaning directly they identify the meaning with thereferent. I assume that in some contexts, speaking about meaning ( artha ), they

speak about sense. There is no doubt that the philosophers distinguished between anexistent thing to which the word refers and the notion produced in our mind by thisword. This mental image evoked by a word was very often called jna , which isusually translated as knowledge, though jna embraced not only validknowledge, but also erroneous knowledge, doubtful knowledge, and some othermental states. I think that here, in this distinction between the knowledge or notionproduced by the word and the thing for which the word stands in the existing world,lies the root of the sensereference distinction in Indian philosophy, rightly pointedoutby some scholars inquiring into the philosophy of language of Indian philosophers:

see, for example, the publications of Siderits ( 1986 , 1991 , pp. 6586), Taber ( 1989 ,2002 ), Ganeri ( 1996 , 2011 ), Houben ( 1995 , pp. 3335). However, we shouldremember that, unlike certain Western philosophers, Indian philosophers neverclaimed that the word meaning had two distinct elements; the sensereferencedistinction did not have the status of theoryit was only implicitly present in theIndian philosophy of language.

Taking into account all the above, we can suppose that for Sa m khya the meaningis a thing that really exists. It is barely possible that Sam khya understood themeaning as a notion or something that exists only in our thought, though we cannot

entirely exclude this possibility. We can also su ppose that Sa m khya understood themeaning as the particular, not as the universal. 28 The classical Sa m khya texts onwhich this research is based do not contain material sufcient for drawing anydenite conclusions about the Sam khya understanding of meaning.

Footnote 27 continued A fundamental identity of opinion is often concealed by divergent and overlapping terminologies.Thus the artha or sense appears as signi in de Saussure, thought or reference in Ogden-Richards, mental content in Stern, sense in Gombocz, idea in Roudet, concept in Weisberger and meaning in Gardiner. Iagree with the careful observation of Siderits ( 1991 , p. 65): It is generally accepted that Indian phi-losophers of language do not posit sense as a component of the meaning of an expression in addition to itsreference. We nd instead a more or less pure reference theory of meaning: the meaning of anexpression is that entity which the expression designates. I shall nonetheless argue that, predominantthough the reference theory might be in their tradition, certain Indian philosophers of language were stillforced to recognize something akin to sense as a distinct element in meaning. That the sensereferencedistinction was never extensively made use of by Indian philosophers of language is clear; I shall not beconcerned to dispute this .28 The following evidence concerning the Sam khya view before I svarakr

snas SK can support our

hypothesis: According to Kumarila in his lokav rttika and his commentator, Umbeka ( k tiv da , 76and 65), Vindhyavasin accepted Vars

agan

yas interpretation of vyaktiv da , or the notion of particularity

(in contrast to k ti or genus or class) with respect to the meaning of words (Larson andBhattacharya 1987, pp. 144145). However, views of classical Sam khya can differ from views of theseSa m khya philosophers.


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Classical S khya Texts about the Relationship between a Word and ItsMeaning

Evidence for Sa m khyas Accepting the Conventional Origin of the Relationship

between a Word and Its Meaning

Evidence 1

This view can be reconstructed on the basis of two fragments of the YD (whichcontain evidence 1 and evidence 2).

In the Introduction to the YD we nd the following fragment:

A name ( sa j ) is a word used for revealing ( praty yana ) the [thing] named

( sa jin). It is of two kinds: based on the [etymological] meaning ( artha-nibandhana ) and based [merely] on the own form [of the word] ( svar pa-nibandhana ). Of these [the name] based on the [etymological] meaning refersto fullling purpose ( artha-kriy ) [by the thing named, referring to it] by forceof the meanings ( artha-va ena ) [of the meaningful component parts of thename]. It encompasses the specic features of the thing ( artha-svar pa), suchas [its] class, etc. ( j ti-di), [and] reveals the [thing] named exactly ( eva ) inthat form ( tath -bhtam ) a s ( yath ) [its etymological] meaning ( artha )[implies]. These are the examples: a cook , a cutter . However, [the name]

based on [its] own form [only] is merely a means of revealing the [thing]named ( sa ji-praty yana-up ya-m tram ); it serves [for revealing this thing]through the own form [of the word] only ( svar pa-m tra-upak rin ) [and]reveals the [thing] named without [relying on] the meanings of the componentparts [of the word] ( vin -avayava-artha ), by force of the [language]convention ( samaya-va d ) [only], even though [the thing named] is not such(atath -bhtam ) [as the name implies]. These are the examples: an elephant ear ( gaja-kar a), a horse ear (a va-kar a). The blessed supreme seer( parama-r i) [Kapila], having grasped the own nature ( svar pa ) of all the

principles ( tattva ) through the seers cognition (

r ea j

nena ),29

with greatcare bestowed ( vidadhat ) names, so there are no words based [merely] on[their] own form [in Kapilas original teaching]. For example, pradh na iscalled so because [all her] products are primarily placed ( pradh yante ) in her(atra ), puru a is called so because he rests in the body ( puri ete), and so on.Also the teachers ( c rya ) who follow his [that is, Kapilas] doctrine have noregard for producing ( vidhna ) new names, because they well communicate( savyavah ra ) through these very [names]. 30

29 As it follows from the YD (see YD 4), the seers cognition of Kapila is a supernatural cognition whichhas the nature of direct insight. This cognition is beyond the pram as, that is, it is not obtained throughthe sources of valid knowledge (it is called apram a-p rva , which literally means not preceded by a pram a). The seers cognition of Kapila is inborn and does not require any means ( sdhana ) for itsarising ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 67, v. 20p. 68, v. 2; p. 68, vv. 1013; p. 75, vv. 1924).30 sa jipraty yan rtha abda samj / s ca dvividh / arthanibandhan svar panibandhan ca / tatr rthanibandhan rthava en rthakriy pek / j tydyarthasvar pntarbh v yath rthas tath bhtam

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This fragment is a part of the larger passage in which the author presentscharacteristics of a genuine tantra , arguing that the SK composed by I svarakr

sna

possesses all of t hem. The author says that one of the components of a tantra isname ( sa j ).31 The author describes two types of names, arguing that

Isvarakr snas treatise SK, which is a genuine tantra , is based on the proper (thatis, meaningful) names/special terms ( sa j ). It follows from this fragment that theSa m khya doctrine presented in the works of different Sam khya teachers, to whichIsvarakr

sna, the author of the SK, belongs, is based only on those special terms

which were given originally by Kapila (who is according to Sam khya tradition thefounder of Sa m khya), for the author says that the later teachers being the followersof Kapilas doctrine do not produce any new special terms of the Sa m khya system.

The author says that there are two categories of names ( sa j ): based on the[etymological] meaning (or based on the meanings [of the meaningful parts of

which the word consists]) ( artha-nibandhana ) and based [merely] on the own form[of the word] ( svar pa-nibandhana ). The rst category includes names with suchan etymological meaning that reveals the specic features of the thing named. Theauthor of the YD gives the following examples: pcaka (a cook), l vaka (acutter); pradh na is called so because [all her] products are primarily placed inher ( prad h yante tra vik r ); puru a is called so because he rests in the body( puri ete).32 ,33 The second category embraces names with such an etymologicalmeaning which says nothing about the nature of the thing. The examples given bythe author are gaja-kar a, literally meaning an elephant ear, and a va-kar a,

literally meaning a horse ear, being the botanical names of the plants or the propernames.The author says that Kapilas original teaching is based on artha-nibandhana

names only, and that the supreme seer ( i) Kapila bestowed ( vidadhat ) themwith great care ( prayatnata ), after having grasped the own nature ( svar pa) of all the principles ( tattva ) through the seers cognition ( r ea j nena ). It is clearthat all names given by Kapila (these are the names of the tattva s and probably alsoother terms of the Sa m khya system) are based on his direct insight into the essenceof things denoted by them. Kapilas cognition of the nature of all the Sam khyatattva s (the main structural principles of Sa m khya ontology) should be interpreted as

Footnote 30 continuedeva sa jina praty yayati / tad yath pcako l vaka iti / svar panibandhan puna sa jipraty ya-nop yam tra svar pam tropak ri vinvayav rtha samayava d atath bhtam api sa jina praty yayati / tad yath gajakar o vakar a iti / prayatnato bhagavata paramar er r ea jnena sarvatattv n svar pam upalabhya sa j vidadhato n sti svar panibandhana abda / tad yath pradh yante tra vik ra iti pradh nam / puri ete iti puru a ity di / tanmat nus rim apy c ry t bhir eva sa vyavah r n n sty aprvasa jvidhna praty dara / (Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 7, vv. 1627.)31 About these components, one of which is the terminological name/the special term, see entries

Tantragu a, Tantrayukti (Oberhammer et al. 1996, pp. 109112), and Sa j (Oberhammer et al. 2006,pp. 219223).32 Literally: rests ( ) in the fortress ( pur ).33 The author gives the popular traditional etymologies of pradh na and puru a. These etymologiesare not correct from the point of view of scientic linguistics. They express certain religious orphilosophic beliefs.


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a direct insight into the nature of all things, for 25 tattva s, being the ultimate objectsof knowledge, embrace everything that exists.

What can we say about the relationship between a word and its meaning on thebasis of this fragment? I think we can conclude that all words are conventional in

their origin, because Kapilas creating the Sa m khya terms should be understood asestablishing the primary linguistic convention. First I shall try to prove that Kapilasact in regard to the special terms of the Sa m khya system is an act of creation of these terms, that is, an act of establishing the linguistic convention . Next I shallattempt to prove that the convention established by Kapila is a primary linguisticconvention.

What are the arguments conrming that Kapila does not manifest alreadyexisting names but creates them? The action of Kapila in regard to the names isdenoted by the word vidadhat (literally: distributing; granting, bestowing;

producing, creating), being a derivative (a present active participle) of the verbvi- dh . The verb vi- dh has a wide range of meanings. To this range thefollowing meanings belong: to distribute; to grant, to bestow; to produce, tocreate. Does Kapila disclose already existing names or create them? Answering thisquestion is of great importance for clarifying the authors view on the relationshipbetween a word and its meaning. If we accept that Kapila creates the names, we cansay that Kapila is the author of the linguistic convention. If we assume that Kapilaonly discloses already existing names to the future users of language, we can saythat the connection between these names and their meanings is natural, namely,

exists independently of the will of Kapila or any other person. Below I present thearguments for interpreting Kapilas act as an act of creation of names. I shallattempt to prove that the artha-nibandhana names bestowed by Kapila areconventional in their origin; the relationship between these words and theirmeanings, though not random, is nevertheless not inborn, not eternal, and notinseparable.

First, in the same fragment, in a similar and close context, there is anotherderivative of the verb vi- dh , that is, vidhna , which means in this contextcreation. It denotes the action of the teachers ( c rya ) in regard to Sam khyaterms, and it is clear from the context that the author of the YD speaks here aboutthe possibility of creation of new terms by Sam khya teachers. This appearance of vidhna in the same context in the meaning of creation can be considered anargument for interpreting the action of Kapila as creation of names.

Second, there is no meaning which conveys the idea of manifesting, disclosing,or revealing among the main dictionary meanings of the verb vi- dh . If the authorintended to convey the idea of manifesting by Kapila already existing names, hewould probably use some other expression. If we take the rst dictionary meaningto distribute as the meaning intended by the author of the YD, we cannot make aconclusion that the relation between the words bestowed by Kapila and theirmeanings is natural. The idea of distribution of names seems to be incompatiblewith the idea of the natural relationship between these names and their meanings,for names which are naturally and inseparably connected to their meanings need nodistribution.

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Third, the author says that Kapila creates ( vi- dh ) the names with great care(with special effort, carefully) ( prayatnata ). Special effort, care, or carefulnessis more needed in the case of creation of names than in the case of merely makingthem manifest.

Fourth, the author does not say a word about Kapilas knowledge of alreadyexisting names. It does not follow from Kapilas cognition of all things that he alsocognizes names existing independently of his will, for in Indian philosophy a person(or persons) possessing knowledge of things can play the role of the creator (or thecreators) of words naming these things. For example, in Nyaya-Vais es

ika cognition

of things is the basis of creation of their names. As it follows from Vai e ikas trasII, 1, 1719, names ( sa j ) of things imperceptible by ordinary people are createdby persons distinguished from ourselves ( asmad-vi i nm) on the basis of theirperception of these things. In the later texts of Nya ya-Vais es

ika all-knowing I svara

creates names, being the author of the primary linguistic convention (see, forexample: Candra nandas Vai e ikas trav tti II, 1, 1819; Ny yamajar of JayantaBhat

ta (Potter et al. 1977 , pp. 371, 377378; Vacaspati Mis ras Ny yav rtti-

kat tparya k II, 1, 5256; S ankara Mis ras Upask ra VII, 2, 20 and II, 1, 1819).It does not follow from I svaras omniscience that he manifests names which existindependently of his will.

Fifth, this fragment brings to mind some parallels between the role of all-knowing Kapila, who is characterized in t he YD (see YD 1 and 69) as born at thebeginning of the world ( vi va-agra-ja ),34 and the role of omniscient I svara in

Nya ya-Vaises ika, who creates names at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. Kapila is the knower of all things; he creates the names on the basis of direct insight into the own nature ( svar pa ) of the things he names. This knowledgeis necessary for giving correct, that is, meaningful namesthe names which conveyinformation about the specic features of the things named. In Nyaya-Vais es

ika

omniscient I svara is the author of the primary linguistic convention which isestablished (re-created) by him according to his will at the beginning of a new cycleof existence of the world. In fact, the Vedas and the language convention establishedby I svara are the same in all the creations. The following fragment from Ny yamajar of Nya ya philosopher Jayanta Bhat

ta, cited by Pollock ( 1985 , p. 516),

illustrates the Nyaya idea of the persistence of the Vedas: All sciences haveexisted, precisely like the vedas , from the rst creation. People, however, ascribethem to one or another human author who has sought to abbreviate or expand them.Though the Vedas and the primary language convention are the same in all thecreations (in this sense we can say that they are persistent), they are dependent onthe will of I svara, who is identied by the adherers of Nyaya-Vais es

ika as their

author, and for this reason the relationship between a word and its meaningestablished by I svara is considered as conventional.

Taking into account these arguments, I am inclined to think that the author of theYD implies that the Sam khya terms bestowed by Kapila are conventional in theirorigin. The interpretation of Kapilas action (denoted by the derivative of the verbvi- dh ) in regard to these terms as creation of them seems to be more natural and

34 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 8, v. 20; p. 267, v. 14.


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substantiated than any other interpretation. Though the names bestowed by Kapilaare not accidental (for they convey information about the specic features of thethings named), they are created by him (in accord ance with his knowledge of thesethings) and therefore conventional in their origin. 35

It is clear from this fragment that Kapila creates core terms of the Sa m khyasystem: Kapila creates names for the tattva s and probably also other special terms of the Sa m khya doctrine. For the Sam khyas their own system is the highest science:one can attain the highest goal mok a only through this science (see SK 2, 69,and 70 together with the commentaries to these k rik s). They ascribe to their ownsystem the status of the Veda or even higher (see P 69 and SVr

, SSVr

, JM, and MV

70). In YD 2 the author says that the highest goal prescribed in Sam khya is the sameas the highest goal prescribed in ruti , and that the Sam khya path of liberationthrough knowledge ( jna ) is considered in ruti the sole path which leads to the

permanent and complete elimination of all kinds of suffering ( dukha ). The authorclaims that Sam khya is the Vedic doctrine, for the highest goal prescribed inSa m khya, as well as the Sa m khya path of realization of this goal, are the same as thehighest goal and the path of i ts realization prescribed in the Upanis

ads, which are

the quintessence of the Vedas. 36 From all this we can conclude that according to theSa m khyas the special terms of the Sam khya system are the same as the specialterms of the Vedas, that is, of the Vedic science of liberation through knowledgewhich is considered by the Sam khyas the highest science of the Vedas. Thus Kapilaappears at the beginning of the world cycle (as it is mentioned above, he is

characterized in the YD as born at the beginning of the world) and creates thebasic S khya-Vedic terms . The Vedas are often believed to appear at the verybeginning of each creation. If the basic Sa m khya-Vedic terms are conventional intheir origin, this convention cannot be other convention than the primary linguisticconvention. As it has been mentioned above, the role of Kapila is similar to the roleof omniscient I svara in Nyaya-Vais es

ika, which creates names (establishes the

primary linguistic convention) and the Vedas at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. In Nyaya-Vais es

ika the words of the Vedas are the words

created by I svara, that is, the words of the primary linguistic convention.To sum it up, the convention of Kapila, who creates the special terms of the

Sa m khya system, is the primary linguistic convention. If the primary linguisticconvention takes place, then all words are conventional in their origin.

35 Artha-nibandhana words, though conventional in their origin, are not random. It may turn out to befruitful to compare this idea of convention which is based on the nature of a thing and is therefore notrandom with Platos idea of the relationship between a word and its meaning. Perelmuter ( 1980 ) in hisprofound and careful research devoted to Platos linguistic views writes that in the dialogue CratylusPlato holds the view that the relationship between a word and its meaning (that is, the thing denoted by it),though established by convention, is not merely conventional (random), for it is based on the nature of thething.36 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 50, v. 12p. 54, v. 16.

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Evidence 2

The second evidence for Sam khyas acceptance of the conventional origin of therelationship between a word and its meaning we nd in YD 6. It is in the passage

devoted to polemics in which the author argues that authoritative ve rbal testimony( pta-vacana ; abda ; gama ) is irreducible to inference ( anum na ).37 Refuting anopponents view that authoritative verbal testimony is a kind of inference, the authortries to show that the relation between a word and its meaning, unlike the relationbetween a logical sign ( li ga ) and the thing to be proved by it ( sdhya ; li gin) in aninference, is not inseparable and natural. The author says that the same word can beconnected with different meanings, that is, denote different things, and the samething can be denoted by different words. He holds that the same word in differentplaces (regions) and different times can have different meanings, and the same

meaning can be conveyed by different words. Moreover, the author adds, the wordsuse in one or another meaning depends on the intention ( i a; abhipr ya; apek ) of the speaker. The author gives concrete examples to support his point of view. Theauthor contrasts the relationship between a word and its meaning with theinseparable relationship between a logical sign and the thing to be proved by it in aninference. He notices that smoke cannot be separated from re, which essentiallydistinguishes the relationship between smoke and re from the relationship betweena word and its meaning. Contrasting the logical sign wi th the word, the author saysthat the logical sign is natural ( sv bhvika li gam ),38 that is, it is by its nature

and inseparably connected to the thing to be proved by it ( s

dhya ); by saying this,the author implies that the relationship between a word and its meaning, unlike therelationship between a logical sign and the thing to be proved by it, is not naturaland inseparable. The author notices that a word is capable of denoting every thing,and this universal denotative power of a word is limited by man ( puru a). He endsthe fragment which interests us with the following words:

It is not so that just as one word ( abda ) uttered in the world, depending on[its] usage by man ( puru a-viniyoga-apek a), is capable of denoting everything, in the same manner one logical sign ( li ga) is capable of making known

every thing throug h some reasoning. Therefore [authoritative] word ( abda ) isnot a logical sign. 39

Evidence Which Does not Agree with the Theory of the ConventionalRelationship between a Word and Its Meaning and Imply That ThisRelationship Is Natural

Classical Sa m khya texts provide the evidence which seems to contradict the theoryof the conventional origin of the relationship between a word and its meaning,implying that this relationship is natural. This evidence is the idea of the authorless

37 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 101, v. 12p. 103, v. 7.38 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 102, v. 7.39 yath caika abdo jagaty evam udita puru aviniyog pek a sarvam artham abhidh tu samartho

na tathaika li ga kaycid yukty sarv rthapratyayanasamartham / tasm n na abdo li gam / (Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 103, vv. 47.)


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Vedas we nd in most of the classical Sam khya texts. The author of the Y D andVa caspati Mis ra in the TK state directly that the Vedas have no author (YD 5 40 ; TK 2 and 5). Four other classical Sa m khya commentators, though they do not formulatetheir view explicitly, suggest that the Vedas are authorless (see SVr

5, SSVr

5, GB

5, MV 5). A detailed analysis of these classical Sa m khya fragments, containing theidea of the authorless Vedas, is presented in my article Classical Sa m khya on theAuthorship of the Vedas, published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy(Lutsyshyna 2012 ).

If the Vedas are authorless, that is, not created by some author, human or divine,the following question arises: how do they come into existence? There werephilosophers, for example, S ankara and adherers of his Advaita, Bhartr

hari the

Grammarian and his followers, who accepted the concept of a periodic re-manifestation of the authorless Vedas. This concept was probably shared also by

Sa m khyas: they held that the Vedas arise from prak ti spontaneously at thebeginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. It is worth noticing thataccording to the S khyas tra s and Aniruddhas commentary to it called theS khyas trav tti, which are important post-classical Sa m khya texts, the authorless,but uneternal Vedas evolve from prak ti spontaneously (see S khyas tra s andS khyas trav tti V, 4650).

The idea of the authorless Vedas, reemerging from prak ti at the beginning of anew creation, seems to be incompatible with the theory of a primary linguisticconvention as a source of language. This idea implies that the relationship between a

word and its meaning is natural and stable: language sounds and words from whichthe Vedas consist are the products of a natural development of prak ti (ungovernedby any consciousness); they reappear from prak ti at the beginning of each newcreation and preserve stability till the next periodic dissolution ( pralaya ) of theworld.

If Sa m khya in some passages of its texts tended to accept this view, it wasprobably inuenced by M ma m sa which held that word sounds, words, and theVedas are eternal, that is, have neither beginning nor an end. In the context of Sa m khya, which accepts, unlike M ma m sa , the concept of periodic dissolutions of the world, this stability of language sound, word, and the Vedas can be understoodnot as eternal actual existence but as duration from the beginning of creation to the pralaya and reappearance from prak ti (where they subsists in a potential stateduring the pralaya ) at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world.

Is such a view compatible with the Sam khya teaching? This view, inuenced bythe M ma m sa conception of language sound and word, seems to be incompatiblewith the Sa m khya doctrine. In M ma m sa each language sound and word, though it isnot always manifested (a speaker is needed to manifest it, namely, to make itperceptible), is always existent as a separate entity and never loses its identity;words preserve their identity and connection with their meanings also before andafter their manifestation by the speaker. According to Sam khya, an unmanifestedstate of every thing originated from prak ti, including sounds and words, is a state of

40 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 87, vv. 89.

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its dissolution into its material cause, that is, a state of its essential unity with itsmaterial cause and non-distinction from it. 41

What is the immediate material cause of language sounds and words? It is hardlypossible to give a clear, unambiguous answer to this question on the basis of the

classical Sa m khya texts. On one side, accord ing to the YD, the phoneme ( var a)and the word ( pada ) are modications ( vik ra )42 or manifestations ( abhivyakti )43 of sound ( abda ) which is a quality of the gross element(s), and it follows from thisthat the unmanifested state of different language sounds and words is a state of theirnon-distinction from the gross element.

On the other side, there are reasons for interpreting the unmanifested state of sounds and words as a state of their latent (potential) ex istence in the tanm tra of sound ( abda-tanm tra ) or each of the ve tanm tra s44 (and not in the grosselement). As it follows from the passage of YD 38 in which the author comments on

the third line of SK 38 where the bhta s are characterized as vi e a (differenti-ated), the qualities of the bhta s are differentiated, that is, we can distinguishmany different sounds, touches, colours, tastes, and smells within the bhta s.45 If different sounds exist in the gross elements in the manifest state, then theunmanifest state of these sounds should be interpreted as a state of their potentialexistence in the tanm tra (s), for the tanm tra s are immediate material causes of thebhta s. Moreover, in YD 38 the author suggests that those products of prak ti whichare modications of the gross elements (li ke cow, etc.) arise due to the joiningtogether of several different gross elements. 46 But language sounds and words are

not combinations of several gross elements (like a cow, a pot, or a tree), for sound isonly a quality of the gross element(s). It can follow from this that language soundsand words are not modications of the gross element (they are the gross elementitself), but modications of the tanm tra .

The state of potential existence of sounds or words in the tanm tra is a state of their unity with it, that is, a state of their dissolution in the tanm tra . In the state of

41 See the classical Sam khya commentaries to k rik 15 of Isvarakrsnas SK, namely, the fragment of

these commentaries in which the Sam khya authors comment on the fth (the last) SK argument foravyakta s (the unmanifest, by which the unevolved prak ti is meant) being the ultimate material cause.

It follows from the commentaries that things originated from prak ti in a state of their dissolution intotheir material cause are not distinct from this cause, that is, do not exist as separate entities. Thus all thegross material things which consist of the ve gross elements ( bhta , mahbhta ) in the state of unitywith their immediate material cause are not different from the gross elements, the ve gross elements inthis state are not different from tanm tra s, etc. In most of the commentaries it is said that different entitiesin the state of their dissolution into their immediate material cause are indistinguishably (avibh ga)united with it (see P, SVr

, SSVr

, GB, and MV 15).

42 See YD 34 ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 218, vv. 910).43 See YD 29 ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 207, vv. 2931).44 The author of the YD states forth quite original conception of the tanm tra s, which is untypical forSa m khya, for we do not nd this conception in other classical Sam khya commentaries. According to the

YD, not only the gross elements which arise from the tanm tra s but also the tanm tra s themselvespossess qualities ( gua), and sound is a quality of each of the ve tanm tra s (not only of the abda-tanm tra ) (Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 225, vv. 1519). This untypical understanding of the tanm tra s ishighlighted by Bronkhorst ( 1999 , p. 26).45 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 225, v. 19p. 227, v. 16.46 Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 226, v. 1213.


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dissolution in the tanm tra sounds and words lose their peculiarities and mutualdistinctions. It is said in the YD that the abda-tanm tra is an undifferentiatedprinciple of sound, that is, there are no specic sounds within it (it is not anaggregate of specic, distinct sounds or words). Sam khya calls the tanm tra s

undifferentiated ( avi e a) principles (see SK 34 and 38 together with thecommentaries to these k rik s). An important piece of evidence conrming thatthere are no different sounds within the abda-tanm tra is given in the YD, in itscommentary on the 38 th k rik of the SK. Explaining the rst line of the 38th k rik where the tanm tra s are characterized as avi e a , the author states that there is nodifferentiation ( vi e a) within the same kind ( tulya-j t ya-vi e a-anupapatti ) in thecase of the tanm tra s. As to the abda-tanm tra , the author says tha t specic sounds(sounds possessing any distinctive features) do not exist within it. 47

Taking into account these aspects of the Sa m khya teaching, we can conclude that

it is hardly possible to agree the M ma m sa conception of language sound, word, andthe Vedas with the Sa m khya doctrine.

47 The YD commentary on the rst line of SK 38, which sounds tanm tr y avi e (the tanm tra s areundifferentiated), is translated and analyzed by Bronkhorst ( 1999 , p. 25). My rendering of the rst line of SK 38 and of some terms differs from the rendering of Bronkhorst, but there is no need to accentuatethese differences here. I shall cite his careful translation of this important fragment together with a part of his commentary: Sam khya Karika 38 begins with the words tanm tr y avi e a The ones withoutspecic features ( avi e a) are the tanm tra s. The Yuktid pika comments:

Those indeed are the ones without specic features. Which are the tanm tra s? They are abdatanm tra , spar atanm tra , r patanm tra , rasatanm tra , and gandhatanm tra . Why are they[called] tanm tra s? Because specic features of the same kind are not possible [in them]. Whenthere is no difference of kind, e.g. sound, no other specic featuressuch as the accents calledud tta , anud tta , svarita , or the being nasalare found in it, and that is why it is [called] abdatanm tra (approx. sound and nothing but that). In the same way [there are no specicfeatures] such as soft, hard etc. in the tanm tra of touch; [no specic features] such as white,black etc. in the tanm tra of colour; [no specic features] such as sweet, sour etc. in thetanm tra of taste; [and no specic features] such as fragrant etc. in the tanm tra of smell. Forthis reason only the general feature of each quality is present in the [ tanm tra s], no specicfeature; and this is why those ones without specic features are the tanm tra s.

We are primarily interested in the abdatanm tra . It is here presented as sound without the specicfeatures that may accompany sound. It is, moreover, different from the quality sound. The quality sound,we may assume, possesses all the specic features which the abdatanm tra is here stated not to possess(Bronkhorst 1999 , p. 25).

The Sanskrit original of this fragment of the YD ( Yuktid pik 1998 , p. 224, v. 19p. 225, v. 2):

te khalv avi e / k ni punas tanm tr ti /

ucyate

abdatanm

tra

spar

atanm

tra

r patanm

tra

rasatanm

tra

gandhatanm

tram iti / katha punas tanm tr ti /

ucyate tulyaj t yavi e nupapatte / anye abdaj tyabhede pi sati vi e ud tt nud ttasva-rit nun sik dayas tatra na santi / tasm c chabdatanm tram / eva spar atanm trem duka hindaya / eva r patanm tre uklak daya / eva rasatanm tre madhur ml daya / eva gandhatanm tre surabhy daya / tasm t tasya tasya gu asya s mnyam ev tra na vi e a ititanm tr y ete vi e /

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Conclusion and Perspectives for Future Research

It is possible to reconstruct two different and conicting views on the relationshipbetween a word and its meaning on the basis of the classical Sam khya texts. The

rst view, which we can nd in the YD, is that all words are conventional in theirorigin. According to the YD, Kapila, who is identied by the Sam khya tradition asits founder, is the author of the primary linguistic convention. The second view isthat the relationship between a word and its meaning is natural. It is the implicationof the Sa m khya idea of the authorless Vedas which can be reconstructed on the basisof the majority of the classical Sam khya texts (the YD and ve other commentaries:the SVr

, the SSVr

, the GB, the MV, and the TK). This idea of the authorless Vedas,

evolving from prak ti at the beginning of a new creation, implies that therelationship between a word and its meaning is natural and stable: it follows from

this idea that language sounds and words from which the Vedas consist are theproducts of a natural development of prak ti (ungoverned by any consciousness),reappearing from prak ti at the beginning of each new creation and preservingstability till the next periodic dissolution ( pralaya ) of the world.

Which of these views is really Sa m khyas, and which of these views is morecompatible with the Sa m khya doctrine? It is difcult or maybe even impossible toanswer these questions. The rst of these views resembles the Nyaya-Vais es

ika

theory of the primary linguistic convention and the conventional origin of all words.It seems not to agree with the Sam khya idea that all things which evolve from

prak ti (including words) are the products of its spontaneous development, n otgoverned by any consciousness (see SK 57 and the commentaries to this k rik ).48

The second Sa m khya view on word and the relationship between a word and itsmeaning is probably inuenced by M ma m sa .49 This view is incompatible with theSa m khya doctrine, for in this doctrine there is hardly any place for word or soundpreserving its identity (its nature of being this very word or sound, distinct fromother words and sounds) in the unmanifested state. It seems like classical Sa m khya,not having developed its own detailed theories of sound, word, and th e relationshipbetween a word and its meaning, oscillated between different views. 50 Answering

48 Our ordinary observations, indicating that such things as books, pots, etc., come into existence due tothe conscious efforts of some author, contradict this Sam khya idea.49 About the Mmam sa inuence on the fragments of the YD and the TK in which the authors of thesecommentaries state that the Vedas have no author see my article (Lutsyshyna 2012 , pp. 461463, 465).50 I shall venture to say that the sister Yoga dar ana also did not develop a consistent and detailed viewon the relationship between a word and its meaning, oscillating between different theories. According tothe Yogas trabh ya (see I, 27), the relationship between a word and its meaning ( abda-artha- sabandha ) is permanent ( sthita ), and convention ( saketa ) is understood in this text not as an act of agreement being an act of creation of the relation between a word and its meaning unrelated before thisact, but as an established usage of words (established custom of usage of words). It is said that the relation

between a word and its meaning is not created by convention but only made known through it. Thisunderstanding of a language convention is similar to its understanding by Bhartrhari the Grammarian and

his followers (about Bhartrharis and Helara jas notion of language convention see the article of Houben

1992 ). In the Yogas trabh ya the relation between a word and its meaning is compared to the relationbetween a father and his son; the author implies that this relationship is natural. It is said that the languageconvention is the same in all the creations ( sarga ). In the context of Yoga teaching, like in the context of Sa m khya, this permanent relationship should be understood as existing from pralaya to pralaya and


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the questions formulated above could be an area for future research. This researchshould include a careful examination of pre-I svarakr

sna Sa m khya material, post-

classical Sa m khya texts, texts of the sister Yoga dar ana , as well as evidencepresented in the texts which do not belong to the Sa m khya or Yoga dar ana .

Acknowledgements I am very grateful to Diwakar Acharya, who generously helped me to understandthe difcult passages of the Yuktid pik and formulate my claims more carefully. All imperfections whichremained in this paper are my own.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licensewhich permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) andthe source are credited.

References and Abbreviations

S khya Sanskrit Texts and Abbreviations

GB. S khyak rik bh ya, or Gau ap dabh ya = The S khya K rik with an exposition called Candrik by N r yaa T rtha, and Gau ap d c rya s commentary (1883). Edited by BecanaramaTripa t

h . Benares: Messrs. Braj B. Das & Co. (Benares Sanskrit Series. No. 9.)

JM. Jayama gal = S khyak rik of r mad varak a with the M harav tti of M har c ryaand the Jayama gal of r akara (1970). Edited by Vis

nuprasada S arma [MV] and

Satka ris arma Vang ya [JM]. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Ofce. (Chowkhamba

Sanskrit Series. No. 56.)MV. M harav tti see JM. Jayama gal .P. The commentary translated into Chinese by Paramartha = (1) La Sa m khyaka rika e tudie e a la

lumie re de sa version chinoise (II). Traite sur les Septante dor (Suvarnasaptati) ou Traite sur

la philosophie Sam khya (Sa m khyas astra) traduit par Paramartha (1904). Traduit de chinois parJunjiro Takakusu. Bulletin de lEcole Francaise dExtre me-Orient 4, pp. 9781064. (2)Suvar asaptati stra. S khya-K rik -Saptati of vara-K a with a commentary (1944).Reconstructed into Sanskrit from the Chinese translation of Paramartha and edited with Englishnotes, introduction and appendices by N. Aiyaswami Sastri. Tirupati: Tiru malai-TirupatiDevasthanams Press. (Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series 7). (3) The Sam khya Karika studied inthe light of its Chinese version (1932, 1933). Translated [from the French translation of Takakusu]by S.S. Suryanarayanan [known also as S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri]. Journal of the Madras

University 4(Supplement); 5, pp. 81114.S khyastras and S khyastrav tti = Aniruddha s commentary and the original parts of theVed ntin Mah deva s commentary to the S khya S tras (1888). Edited with indices by R. Garbe.Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal.

Footnote 50 continuedreappearing from prak ti at the beginning of a new cycle of existence of the world. Though according tothe Yogas trabh ya the relationship between a word and its meaning is permanent and natural, VacaspatiMis ra in his Yoga commentary Tattvavai rad (see I, 27) mentions that the language convention isreestablished by I svara at the beginning of every new cycle of existence of the world in accordance withthe convention of the previous creations. It is hardly possible to agree the idea of the natural relationship

of a word and its meaning with this role of Isvara. These Yoga fragments are difcult to interpret. Theyrequire a detailed and profound analysis. Comparison of Sam khya and Yoga views on word and the

relationship between a word and its meaning can be fruitful and helpful in clarifying the point of view of both of these schools, though we should always be careful in trying to reconstruct ideas of one dar ana onthe basis of ideas of other dar ana . It is worth noticing that there are evident parallels between the role of Isvara in Yoga and the role of Kapila in Sam khya which they have in expounding Yoga/Sam khyateaching for the sake of liberation of all beings suffering in sa s ra (see Yogas trabh ya I, 25).

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SK. S khyak rik = varak a:S khyak rik (1998). Edited by Ferenc Ruzsa. http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/samkhya/isvskaru.htm . Accessed 5 Decem-ber 2011.

SSVr. S khyasaptativ tti = S khya-Saptati-V tti (V1) (1973). Edited by Esther A. Solomon.

Ahmedabad: Gujarat University. (Bibliotheca Indica. New Series. No. 688.)

SVr . S khyav tti = S khya-V tti (V2) (1973). Edited by Esther A. Solomon. Ahmedabad: GujaratUniversity.

TK. S khyatattvakaumud = Sankhyatatwa Koumudi by Bachaspati Misra (1871). Edited with acommentary by Taranatha Tarkavachaspati. Calcutta: Sucharu Press.

YD. Yuktid pik = Yuktid pik . The most signi cant commentary on the S khyak rik (1998).Critically edited by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi (Vol. I). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.(Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44.)

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Ołena Łucyszyna, CLASSICAL SĀṀKHYA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A WORD AND ITS MEANING

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