SHIPWRECK 1

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מאי חזית דדמא דידך

What seemed like a nice relaxing boat ride had become a nightmare.

Shore was nowhere in sight, the winds were going crazy, and the boat wasn't going to last. The captain told the passengers that the only chance to make it out of the boat alive was to drop some weight – and fast. But there was one problem – the extra weight was coming from the people on the boat!

There were seven people on the boat. The captain said he could get them out of the mess, but only with four people aboard. Any more than that, and they would all surely drown. The captain said three people must jump off, or everyone would die without question!

Some of the passengers wanted to make a lottery to see who would stay on, and others protested. Now what?

Sources[1] Gemara Pesachim 25b

[2] Rashi, ibid.

[3] Maharam Chalavah

[4] Chazon Ish: Sanhedrin 25

[5] Chashukei Chemed

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Gemara Pesachim 25b [1]

Rashi, ibid. [2]

Logic dictates that one should give up his life rather than kill another person. In fact, such a scenario occurred, and the person subject to this life-determining decision subsequently asked Rava what to do. The person told Rava that the governor of his city instructed him to either kill another person, or be killed if he disobeyed. Rava told this person that the correct response is to be killed rather than kill the other. “Who says your blood is “redder” than the other’s blood?”

“Who says your blood is “redder” than the other’s blood?” – The reason why this person was unsure about what to do is because normally, a Jew is required to preserve his own life even if it means he will need to violate a sin in order to do so. Rava explained to this person that this may be true with regard to all other Mitzvos [i.e. that preserving his own life takes precedence], but when it comes to killing another Jew, the case is different. In any other case, the Torah gives precedence to the Jew’s life because of how dear his life is. In our case, however, the sin will be done and one life will definitely be lost no matter what happens, so saving one’s own life no longer takes precedence over performing the sin of killing the other person. The only reason why this man would be permitted to kill the other is if it can be assumed that his own life is more valuable than the life of the victim. But who says that this person’s life is more valuable than the other’s? Perhaps the other’s life is worth more, and the sin will be done!

Maharam Chalavah, ibid. [3]

There are those who say that only if a person is given the option of either (a) killing another, or (b) allowing himself to be killed while leaving the other alive – the person himself must allow himself to be killed. However, if the oppressor says that he will kill this person and the other person if the first one disobeys, then the first man is permitted to kill the other, since the other person will die in any case, regardless of the first person's choice.

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Chazon Ish: Sanhedrin 25 [4]

The Pischei Teshuva quotes from the Tiferes L’Moshe that although killing another is prohibited even if one is forced to do so, killing one person in a group through a lottery is permissible. In fact, we find two scenarios that support this conclusion: One, when Jonah was fleeing against G-d’s command on a ship, and G-d brought about a storm that threatened to sink the ship, the people aboard drew lots to determine that Jonah was the one responsible for the storm, and they subsequently threw Jonah overboard. The second is the instance in which seven of Saul’s offspring were chosen by lot to be killed.

However, this conclusion seems impossible because of the following: If an oppressive group were to demand of a town to hand over an unspecified individual to be killed, or else the entire town will be killed – Halacha requires that all of the residents should be killed. If the Tiferes L’Moshe were correct, in this scenario, then the town should draw lots to determine someone to be killed as opposed to allowing everyone in the town to be killed.

Furthermore, the story of Jonah is irrelevant to our case, because the lot simply indicated who was responsible for the storm, and Jonah willingly allowed himself to be thrown overboard. The story of Saul’s sons, too, is incomparable because the lot was drawn in accordance with divine instructions. A normal individual, however, cannot decide to do so on his own!

Although we concluded that killing another through a lottery is prohibited, if they all decide to have a lottery and the person who is chosen agrees to give up his life, then it's allowed. This is because any individual is permitted to give himself over to be killed in order to save a larger group.

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Chashukei Chemed: Pesachim 25b [5]

QUESTION: Is it permissible to kill individuals who will die in any case in order to save the rest of a group? For example, if seven people are on a boat that threatens to sink due to the weight of the passengers, and the ship’s captain needs to throw three of the passengers overboard to lighten the ship’s load and save the others, can he do so?

One could also ask about the permissibility of this case. The floor of a house collapses with many individuals trapped under the piles of rubble, forcing the rescue team to use a tractor and a crane to ascend the piles. It is almost certain that in the process of saving those trapped the rescue team will actively kill some of the others. It is permissible to attempt a rescue?

ANSWER: The Pischei Teshuva quotes the following from the book, Tiferes L’Moshe: If non-Jews say to the residents of a city, “give us one amongst you and we will kill him. If you don’t, we will kill all of you,” the residents are permitted to decide on the individual through a lottery, like we find elsewhere my Jonah, the Givonites, and Serach the daughter of Asher.

The Darchei Teshuva quotes that the book Chadrei Deah proves from many examples that Chazal (our Rabbis) never used a lottery to kill another. The Chazon Ish as well, has problems with the Tiferes L’moshe, saying, “how can he be correct if both the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi say that all should be killed, instead of saying that the residents draw lots to determine who will given over to the non-Jews? It must rather be that all should be killed rather than using a lottery to determine an individual to be given over. (Continued on next page)

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(Continued from previous page)

In addition, the Sefer Chassidim seems to conclude like the Chazon Ish as well. He says, “When there are men on a ship and a stormy wind threatens them, they are not permitted to draw lots to determine someone to throw over as the members on the boat did to Jonah the son of Amitai. For if asmachta (a form of potential acquisition that occurs when using a lottery to get money) is an insufficient method to acquire money, certainly one cannot rely upon a lottery to decide the fate of someone’s life! Even though Saul and his son Yehonasan used a lottery to decide between the two of them, they were guided by the Ark of G-d, and knew in what way to use a lottery. In our day however, we cannot use a lottery.”

However, in another place the Sefer Chassidim says that “when people are at sea and a stormy wind threatens to break or sink their ship in contrast to the other ships that are traveling normally, it is clear that someone aboard their ship is at fault. Those aboard are permitted to draw lots with the intent that an individual whose name is drawn three times in a row will be thrown overboard. In addition, all pray that the lot not choose someone who is of merit.”

There is no contradiction between this and what we previously mentioned that one cannot use a lottery to kill someone, for in this scenario we see clearly that there is someone on board from whom G-d is collecting debt. There are two indications of this: a) all of the boats are sailing normally except for this one b) the lottery fell upon the same individual three times in a row (as explained by the Mekor Chessed). Also see Pirkei D’Rebbi Eliezer who says that in the story of Jonah, all of the other boats were sailing normally, with the exception of their own. Thus, we are left with the question of how the sinking-boat riders and the rescue team saving those trapped under rubble should act. (Continued on next page)

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(Continued from previous page)

The Gemara in Sanhedrin (72) states: If a woman’s life is threatened during childbirth, if the child’s head has already come out, do not do anything to the baby because we don’t take one life to save another life. Rashi there says, “Don’t we take a life for the life of another in the story of Sheva Ben Bichri, as the verse there says “Behold his head (of Sheva Ben Bichri) is given to you (Yoav)”? Yes, however there it was only permitted because even had he (Sheva Ben Bichri) not been given over, he would have been killed with the entire city when Yoav captured it. If he would have been saved, even if the others would have been killed, they would not be allowed to give him over to save themselves. Alternatively, they were allowed to give him over because he had rebelled against the king (which is punishable by death).”

The book Panim Meiros writes, “I was asked regarding a woman who was having difficulty in childbirth and the child was exiting feet first. Is it permissible to cut the child into pieces to save the woman?” He says that in light of the Rashi we quoted above it seems that if we know for sure that if the child exists legs-first, both he and his mother will die, we can take a life (the baby's) for another (the mother's), but one needs to contemplate this. The likely reason the Panim Meiros adds that this question needs more thought is because Rashi gave two possible answers, and the Panim Meiros only fits with the first one.

It also seems clear from the Yad Rama (Sanhedrin 72) that if it is clear to us that both mother and child will die in the process of childbirth, we should kill the child to save the mother, even if the child’s head has already left the womb. (The reason we prefer to kill the child and not the mother is because the child does not have the same guarantee of life that the mother has.)

This is indicated from how the Yad Rama is astounded at Rashi’s first answer that we quoted above (saying that even if they will all die anyway, that is reason to permit giving an individual over to die)! He says that in a case in which an oppressive authority requests that an individual from a group of women be given over to them to be raped, or else they will all be raped, it is nevertheless preferable that they all be raped to giving one of them over (even though they are all potentially subject to this)! The Yad Rama answers on behalf of Rashi that perhaps these cases are different. In the case of the group of women, there was no specific woman to be handed over, therefore giving one over is at the expense of potentially having been saved, as someone else could have been chosen. If however, they had asked for a specific woman (similar to Rashi’s case where a single person was being chosen to be killed), there would be reason to say to give her over, for otherwise they would all be raped. Therefore, in the case of a child’s head having left the womb during life threatening childbirth, we would abstain from killing the child because perhaps the child would survive (however, this needs further investigation).

What thus seems clear from the Yad Rama, is if it is clear that neither the mother nor the child will survive without intervention, we should kill the child to save the mother (however, this needs further investigation).

In addition, the Gemara in Pesachim (25b) tells a story of a city governor who commanded Reuven to kill Shimon, or else the governor would kill Reuven. Reuven asked Rava if it was permissible to kill Shimon. Rava responded “What makes you think that your blood is ‘redder’ than his blood? Perhaps his blood is ‘redder’!” In other words, how do you know that your blood is redder (worth more), perhaps the other’s is, and it is therefore prohibited to kill him. The Maharam Chalavah says about this, “There are those that say that only if a person is given the option of killing another, or being killed while leaving the other alive, must the person be killed. However, if the oppressor says that he will kill this person and the other if the first one disobeys, the first man is permitted to kill the other, (as the other person will die in any case).”

Furthermore, the Minchas Avraham writes that what seems to result from the Kesef Mishna is that when we said that if non-Jewish oppressors request a single life from a group or else the entire group will be killed that it is preferable that all or killed to giving over a single Jewish life, that is only if it seems likely that the specified individual could otherwise avoid being killed. If it is clear to us that he will die with the others anyway, he should be given over. However, the Kesef Mishna himself would nevertheless say that the individual should not be given over even in such a case (even though one can not longer save this individual’s life due to his potentially greater worth, as he will die in any case) because we assume that when it comes to murder one should always be killed instead of transgressing the sin of murder.

In light of all of the above, it would seem that in the case of the first question, where seven people are in danger of drowning at sea, there is reason to allow the ship’s captain to throw three of the people overboard in order to save the others, similar to the way the Panim Meiros permitted killing the child in order to save the mother in childbirth, and to the opinion quoted by the Maharam Chalava permitting Reuven to kill Shimon if otherwise they will both be killed. It

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also seems that in our case (of the ship) it would be permitted to draw lots to decide who should be thrown over. Even though the Chazon Ish asked how such a thing could be permitted, (in light of the tosefta that only gave the option of all being killed as opposed to drawing lots) the Yad Rama and Maharam Chalava and Lechem Mishna all said that when it is not clear that the individual given over will certainly be killed, one cannot give him over, and if it is clear that he will be killed in any case, one is permitted to give him over. However, it would seem from the Chazon Ish that even if it is clear that all would otherwise be killed, it is stilled prohibited to give one of them over to be killed.

In regards to the second case, where the rescue team is attempting to save those covered by rubble, it seems the conclusion is the same. If without the help of this team all of those trapped will surely die, it is permissible to use a tractor and crane to save those trapped, even though it is almost certain that some of them will die in the process, given that otherwise, they will all die anyway (like in the aforementioned cases of the Panim Meiros and Maharam Chalava). It also seems from here that one need not act in consideration of temporary life when there is opportunity to save eternal life.

In addition, if one examines the introduction to the Pnei Yehoshua one will come to the following conclusion. He tells a story of when he was stuck under the debris of fallen homes and swore to G-d that he would dive into the depths of Torah would he be saved. Many people came to save those trapped, and more than those who were already dead were killed in the process of saving the others, although there was no other way to do so. It sounds from here that what the rescuers did was good (even though many were killed in the process) given that there was no other way to save those trapped. The reason this was permitted is because without their rescue everyone would have died. In any case, when it is not certain that one will kill it seems permissible to act, especially in a scenario when the reasoning of the following case of the Chazon Ish applies. He says that if an arrow is falling towards a group of people, it is permissible to redirect the arrow to the other side of the group which contains fewer people, because redirecting the arrow is essentially an act of saving where there happens to be murder involved.

It also seems that even if one were to assume that in the case of the shipwreck, it is prohibited to send three of the passengers overboard, this would only be true if there is nothing else threatening the lives of the passengers (ie. there is reason to assume that the passengers are going to live). However, if a woman was giving birth to seven children and in absence of action we will assume all of the children will die, it would seem that we could kill one of the children to save the others. This is no longer an act of killing, given that the children are essentially dead already. A comparable scenario is that of a child of an eight month pregnancy who is albeit alive now, but is assumed to die, and therefore killing the child is not murder. In this case as well, given that there is no chance the children will survive childbirth without external assistance, the act of “killing” one is not an act of murder but rather, an act of giving life (to the other six children), as during this moment, they are all set to die.

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DISC L A I M ER:The views and opinions presented in this sourcesheet should not be taken as halachah l’maaseh.

Before applying these halachos to real-life situations, one must consult with a competent halachic authority.

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CONCLUSION