OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS andDR. MERCEDITA J. MACABULOSG.R. No. 159395, 07 May 2008,

The use of the word “may” is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved.

Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) whowas then holding the position of Medical Officer V at the Department of Education, Culture and Sports –  National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and acts unbecoming a public official in violation of the Civil Service Laws and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of P45,000 and she was required by the latter to produce dental and medical receipts for the liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she did not submit the receipts and invoices.

Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr. Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist, who used the money to purchase medical and dental supplies. In support of her claim, she attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee admitting said purchase using the cash advance of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advanceby improperly spending it and that she tried to liquidate the same by submitting a tampered invoice in conformity with the amount of the cash advance. Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos from the administrative charge. However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit but the

contents of the first page were entirely different from the affidavit submitted by Dr. Macabulos in her counter- affidavit. A new memorandum by the Ombudsman was released finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the government service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion for consideration before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the decision of the Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman can no longer investigate the complaint since the acts complained of were committed one year from the filing of the complaint and that the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not immediately executory.

ISSUES:1) Whether or not CA‘s interpretation of Section 20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The Political Law Ombudsman Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is correct

2) Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the service meted on the private respondent is immediately executory in accordance with the valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly observed in administrative disciplinary cases

HELD: The Court of Appeals should have granted the motion for intervention filed by theOmbudsman. In its decision, the appellate court not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman but also delved into the investigatory power of the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not impleaded as a party when the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move for intervention and reconsideration of the decision in order to prevent the undue restriction of its constitutionally mandated investigatory power. The Court of Appeals held that under Section 20(5) of R.A.6770, the Ombudsman is already barred by prescription from investigating the complaint since it was filed more than one year from the occurrence of the complained act. The Court found this interpretation by the appellate court unduly restrictive of the duty of the Ombudsman as provided under the Constitution to investigate on

its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

The use of the word ―may‖ is ordinarily construed as permissive or directory, indicating that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the word ―may,‖ when used in a statute, does not generally suggest compulsion. The use of the word ―may‖ in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 indicates that it is within the discretion of the Ombudsman whether to conduct an investigation when a complaint is filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission.

The Court of Appeals held that the order of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissalis not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 of RA 6770 are neither final nor immediately executory. In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The refusal

or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section 7 of A.O. 17 provides for execution of the decisions pending appeal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was whether the decision of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner therein from office for six months without pay was immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded by the case of In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal.

The petition is meritorious.

Intrinsic Aids Where the meaning of a statue is

ambiguous, the court is warranted in availing itself of all illegitimate aids to construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of the statute.

The aids to construction are those found in the printed page of the statute itself; know as the intrinsic aids, and those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page, called extrinsic aids.

Title

It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its construction and to ascertaining legislative will.

If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to the title to clear the obscurity.

The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be constructed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise.

Serve as a guide to ascertaining legislative intent carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject who shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The constitutional injunction makes the title an indispensable part of a statute.

Central Capiz v. RamirezG.R. No. L-16197 (March 12, 1920)

FACTS:Private Respondent contracted with Petitioner Corporation for a term of 30 years, a supply of all sugar cane produced on her plantation, which was to be converted later into a right in rem and recorded in the Registry of Property as an encumbrance upon the land, and binding to all future owners of the same. The Respondent refuses to push through with the contract thinking it might violate Act No. 2874, “An Act to amend and compile the laws relating to lands of public domain, and for other purposes,” since more than 61 percent of the capital stock of the corporation is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.

ISSUE:W/N said Act no. 2874 is applicable to agricultural lands, in the Philippine Islands which are privately owned.

HELD:

The limit and purpose of the Legislature in adopting Act No. 2874 was and is to limit its application to lands of public domain and that lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Jones Law of 1916: “That no bill may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”

Preamble

It is a part of the statute written immediately after its title, which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the law.

Usually express in whereas clauses. Generally omitted in statutes passed by:

Phil. Commission Phil. Legislature National Assembly Congress of the Phil Batasang Pambansa

These legislative bodies used the explanatory note to explain the reasons for the enactment of statutes.

Extensively used if Presidential decrees issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power.

When the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. Nor can be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning.

When the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted to clarify the ambiguity.

Preamble is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the lawmakers as to the purpose is achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished, by the provisions of the legislature.

May decide the proper construction to be given to the statute.

May restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of law.

It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively in

which case the law has to be given retroactive effect.

People v. Purisima

A person was charged w/ violation of PD 9 which penalizes, among others, the carrying outside of one’s residence any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood, with imprisonment ranging from five to ten years.

Question rose whether the carrying of such weapon should be in relation to subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder as a necessary element of the crime.

The mere carrying of such weapon outside one’s residence is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law

Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the events that led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent and spirit of the decree is to require the motivation mentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element of the crime.

The severity of the penalty for the violation of the decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be justified by associating the carrying out of such bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble.

People of the Philippines v. PurisimaG.R. Nos. L-42050-66 (November 20, 1978)

FACTS:Twenty-six petitions for review were filed charging the respective Defendant with “illegal possession of deadly weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. An order quashed the information because it did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by P.D. No. 9. It failed to state one essential element of the crime, viz.: that the carrying outside of the residence of the accused of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. Petitioners argued that a

perusal of P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and that they are essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.

ISSUE:W/N P.D. No. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities.

HELD:The primary rule in the construction and interpretation of a legislative measure is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall under P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or “whereas” clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

Punctuation marks

Semi- colon – used to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, what follows must have a relation to the same matter it precedes it.

Comma and semi- colon are use for the same purpose to divide sentences, but the semi – colon makes the division a little more pronounce. Both are not used to introduce a new idea.

Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words.

An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or wholly solved by a punctuation mark may be considered in the construction of a statute.

The qualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents.

An argument based on punctuation is not persuasive.

US. v. HartG.R. No. L-8327 (March 28, 1913)

FACTS:Respondent was caught in a gambling house and was penalized under Act No. 519 which punishes “every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support”. The said portion of the law is divided into two parts, separated by the comma, separating those caught in gambling houses and those straying through the country without means of support. Though it was proven that Hart and the other Defendants had “visible means of support”, it was under the first part of the portion of law for which they were charged with. The prosecution persisted that the phrase “without visible means of support” was in connection to the second part of the said portion of Act No. 519, therefore was not a viable defense.

ISSUE:How should the provision be interpreted?

HELD:The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and is in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be as an additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words in the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based on punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous and incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant had, “visible means of support” and that the absence of such was necessary for the conviction for gambling and loitering in saloons and gambling houses, defendants are acquitted.

Case No. 203G.R. No. L-22945 (March 3, 1925)

FACTS:

Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial court finding her guilty for the violation of “illegal practice of medicine” and “illegally advertising oneself as a doctor.” Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured a certificate to practice medicine. She ‘treated and manipulated’ the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of “doctor” should be understood to refer to “doctor of medicine” and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act 3111 is unconstitutional as it does not express its subject.

ISSUE:W/N “chiropractic” is included in the term “practice of medicine” under Medical laws provided in the Revised Administrative Code.

HELD:Act 3111 is constitutional as the title “An Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be amended)” is sufficient and it need not include the subject matter of each section. ‘Chiropractic’ is included in the ‘practice of medicine.’ Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of the term. The constitutional requirement asto the title of the bill must be liberally construed. It should not be technically or narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity, it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. “A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressed in its title,” to prohibit duplicity in legislation by apprising legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of the law.

Capitalization of letters

An aid of low degree in the construction of statute.