Office of Force Transformation

Transforming Defense

“The Path Not Taken …yet”

• The Role of Defense in National Security• The Management of Defense• The Force

Arthur K. CebrowskiDirector, Force Transformation23 July 2003

Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage

Office of Force Transformation

Connecting the Present to Our Future

Expanding Competition Power and Principle

Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional, Disconnected Gap of Globalization

Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two punch

Mapping Future Challenges Risk

Issues:• How to make near-term actions robust across alternative futures?• How to create on-ramps for capabilities?

Office of Force Transformation

Trends in Security Competition

• Short Cycle Time• New Competencies• Adaptive Planning • Integrated Joint • Interdependent

Information Age

• Developed Rules• Mature Markets• Narrowing Customer Base• Security=Defense

Globalization II• Emerging Rules• Market Opportunities• New Customer Base Emerging• Security=All Else+Defense

Globalization III

• Long Cycle Time• Well Developed Tools/Processes• Deliberate Planning• Deconflicted Joint• Tortured Interoperability

Industrial Age

Office of Force Transformation

Expanding Competition

Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}

U.S. power is unmatched

• Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through its moral principles (legitimacy, international law, etc.)

If the frontiers of National Security can be everywhere and are not territorial borders but fault lines within societies, then …

• The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy is intelligence

• We must be able to look and operate deeply within societies

Assured Access includes the domains of political victory

• Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases

Decisively Defeat

Duration

Assure, Dissuade, Deter

In

ten

sity

Office of Force Transformation

Security System Balance? … Major Movements

Forces Forward(Garrison Forward)(Sea-based)(Hubs)

Strategic DeployFrom Home

(Reactive)

Alliances

Strategic Distances(CONUS and Hubs)

Sea GarrisonForward

Strategic Maneuver/BalanceForces forwardStrategic deploy from home Allies

Operational Maneuver

From forward garrison From the seaFrom strategic distances

Deter Forward2d derivative forceSustaining forceConstabulary/Nation-building force

Office of Force Transformation

FunctioningFunctioning

FunctioningFunctioning

Functioning

Functioning

FunctioningFunctioning

Functioning

Mostly Non-Integrating Gap

Evac’s Peace/Relief Contingency Positioning Show of Force Combat

U.S. Military Responses to Situations, 1990-2002

0

10,000

20,000

30,000

40,000

50,000

60,000

70,000

1970s 1980s 1990s* Total number of response days for all operations by Navy, Marines, Air Force and Army

Baseline9kMideast

Iraq

FRY

Somalia/Haiti

32k

22k

5k CombinedService

ResponseDays*

“Crisis”

Vietnam

Source: CNA Corp.

Strategic Posture … Exporting security

The Red Zone … … Our Response

Office of Force Transformation

Industrial Age

Information Age

Globalization IIIGlobalization II

Iraq 1

Iraq 2

Global Trends … Military Response

The Emerging American Military:

• More expeditionary (including lighter, more lethal)

• More networked (more interoperability at the JTF level)

• Designed to leverage the exterior positions (precision from distance as sensors move in)

• Leverages increasingly persistent ISR

• Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2, fly-out)

• Values Information Superiority (information operations)

• Expanded unmanned capabilities(UAV, UCAV, UUV, robotics)

Office of Force Transformation

Industrial Age

Information Age

Globalization IIIGlobalization II

Global Trends…Threats …Strategic Response

Strategic Capabilities:• More Preventative - Less Punitive

• Achieve unambiguous warning earlier

• More SOF-Like characteristics

• A Deter Forward Force

• An Intel/Surveillance-based force

• Coping with system perturbations

-----[Great Power War?]-----

Political Ideology

Hated Dictator

Hated Dictator w/Nukes

Nuclear Nationalists

Narco-terrorists

Regional Terrorists

International Terrorists

SEI w/Bugs

System

State

Individual

Office of Force Transformation

Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes

Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}

Event Focused Continuous

Punitive Preventative

Access to Battlespace Access to Political Victory

Citizen SoldierVolunteer (Recruited) Force Professional

Warrior + Enforcer + “Systems Administrator”

Projecting Power Exporting Security

Office of Force Transformation

Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret

Warfare Elements• Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy• Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift for operational maneuver• Protection - Urban Operations, “Bug-to-Drug” Cycle Time• C2&C – Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability• ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space• Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics

Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps)• Joint S&T• Joint Experimentation• Modern Warfare Modeling Tools• People: cost or resource• Precision Deterrence

Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}

Office of Force Transformation

Transforming Defense

Surrogate Wars

System Perturbations

and Consequences

Global HomelandInterests Security

MADContainment

=>

1990

2000Global HomelandInterests Security

Precision Deterrence?

=>

Office of Force Transformation

Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against fixed targets

Then & Now: One-sixtieth the tonnage required to drop a bridge span

1940s

B-17240 Tons

1960s

F-4D200 Tons

1970s

F-4D LGB12.5 Tons

1990s

F-117 LGB4 Tons

2000s

All weatherB-1 JDAM

4 Tons250

200

150

100

50

0

To

ns

Req

uir

ed

Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90% confidence)

Office of Force Transformation

UnguidedUnitaryBombs

1940s

So

rtie

s re

qu

ired

1960s

UnguidedCluster

Weapons

1970s

Maverick

1990s

SFW

2000s

WCMD/SFW/P3I

Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against mobile targets

Then & Now: Sorties required to neutralize 10 mobile armored battalions *

* Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per battalion

Office of Force Transformation

176 Bombs88 F-4 Sorties

400' CEP

1970s

Evolution of Precision Strike:… Quantity of bombs assigned for 90% Probability of Kill

Then & Now: Over Three Orders of Magnitude reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed target

Advanced weapons systems armed with precision munitions are extremely accurate but are highly dependent on quality information

9,000 Bombs1,500 B-17 Sorties

3,300' CEP

1940s

2 Bombs1 F-16 Sortie

10' CEP

1990s

1 Bomb1 B-2 Sortie< 10' CEP

2000s

Office of Force Transformation

Paradigm Changes … To Enable Precision Deterrence

• Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise Weapon and Target Location

• Non-Linear Political Consequences

• Self Deterring

• Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused Effects

• Militarily Relevant

• Operationally Useful

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Nukes)

Weapons of Precision Deterrence

Precision Deterrence = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}Ours & Ours & Ours &Theirs Theirs Theirs

Office of Force Transformation

Deterrence is …

Context Dependent– Highly reliant on intelligence

– A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter

An Effects Based Operation– Precision Deterrence: creating

a precise local effect in the cognitive domain

– Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic

– The Duality of Means …

Precision Deterrence must have a local effect – it can have a global impact

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Nukes)

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Nukes) Weapons of

Precision DeterrenceWeapons of

Precision Deterrence

Viewed as Viewed asDisproportionate Proportionateby the Target by the World

PrecisionEffect

Office of Force Transformation

Military Options … for Precision Deterrence

• Directed Energy Weapons– Lasers

• Covert engagement at a safe distance

• All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability

• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint

• Adjustable delivered energy

– High Powered Microwaves• Deter belligerents

• Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint

• Deny an area to personnel

• Control crowds

• Non-Lethal Weapons– Counter-Personnel– Counter-Material– Counter-Capability

• Need for decision space and time– Ability to act while

discriminating intent– Increase engagement time

and range

• Need to satisfy policy and operational constraints– Target– Non-combatants– Own force

Operational Commonality

?

Office of Force Transformation

Precision Deterrence … Issues and Choices

How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and global (strategic) deterrence?

What kind of JWAC-like process is required to create cognitive effects?

Can our intelligence community identify that which our adversaries hold most dear?

What are the new tools of deterrence that support our moral principles and strategic interests and how do they interact?

What are the new concepts for deterrence?