DSIDEFENCE and SECURITY

of INDIAVikram S. MehtaIInnddiiaa nneeeeddss ttoo tthhiinnkk bbeeyyoonndd ooiill ssuupppplliieessttoo eennssuurree iittss eenneerrggyy sseeccuurriittyy II 42

P. SaravanamuttuAA vviiccttoorryy oovveerr tthhee LLTTTTEE mmaayy eenndd tthhee wwaarriinn SSrrii LLaannkkaa,, bbuutt wwoonn’’tt bbrriinngg ppeeaaccee II 48

VOLUME 1 ISSUE 2 Rs. 200SEPTEMBER 2008

The internal security crisisSSeerriioouuss pprroobblleemmss bbeeddeevviillIInnddiiaa’’ss ccoouunntteerr--tteerrrroorriissmm aappppaarraattuuss II 26

DPP-2008TThhee nneeww ddeeffeennccee bbuuyyiinngg pprroocceedduurree ttaakkeess aa ssmmaallll sstteeppiinn tthhee rriigghhtt ddiirreeccttiioonn II 60

The Amarnath shrineland war fans theflames of discontent inJammu and KashmirBy Praveen Swami II 18

SUMMEROF HATESUMMEROF HATE

Chemring is the world leader in expendable countermeasures, mission criticalenergetics and ordnance for a wide range of weapon systems. Chemring continuesto expand its international base of operations while focusing on core competencies.

Manufacturing facilities are located in the UK, US, France, Germany, Italy, Norway,Spain and Australia.

The Chemring Group is committed to our world-class reputation for excellence,safety and reliability in serving its military, homeland security and primecontractor customers.

ChemringDELIVERING GLOBAL PROTECTION

LETTER FROM THE editor

A look at theevolution ofseparatism inJ&K shows thatthe rivalriesacrosscommunallines hasgenerated abitter politicalpolarisationthat, if notdefused,portends aviolent electionlater this year.

EDITORDefence & Security of India

oing into the second issue of Defence and Security of India (DSI), we aregrateful to our readers for their enthusiastic response to this new strate-gic affairs magazine. We have been flooded with subscription requests;perhaps we should have made clearer the way to subscribe. All youneed to do is to send an email to dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz, and ourmarketing executives will handle the rest.

Your response makes us even more conscious of our commitment to rigorous and high-qualityanalysis. In this issue we explore India’s linkages with China and the way these impact on the SouthAsian security environment. We also examine the latest Indian defence procurement policy, DPP-2008,and its effect on defence industry, both in the public and the private sectors.

As the United States moves towards operationalising the US-India nuclear agreement, DSI con-siders the future of New Delhi’s ties with Washington. While the greatest benefit to India mightwell take the form of easier inflows of high technology, the public rationale for the deal has longcentred on India’s need for energy security. In this issue of DSI, we look closely at India’s energy pol-icy, which remains largely mismanaged despite being central to the country’s growth.

Also in focus is the internal security challenge in J&K that has been dragged centre-stage by theAmarnath Yatra land controversy. A look at the evolution of separatism in J&K, and the way it hasplayed out in the recent crisis, brings us to the conclusion that the state’s multiple concerns cannot beaddressed without simultaneously engaging a range of political arbiters. The sharpening of rivalriesacross communal lines has generated a bitter political polarisation that, if not defused, portends a violent election later this year.

The bubbling of the J&K cauldron coincides with the continuation of terrorist attacks across India,most recently the Ahmedabad serial blasts and the—fortunately—failed conspiracy in Surat. With thethreat of terrorist strikes now a chronic condition in India, the demand has never been greater for acoherent institutional response across the state’s jurisdiction that empowers local first responders.

These are immediate issues confronting Indian policy-makers. An eminent panel of experts con-siders them and suggests what could be the path ahead.

Finally, to help us shape DSI into a periodical that meets your expectations, I appeal to our read-ers to take the trouble to send us feedback. Do tell us what you think of our articles, as well as whatsubjects you would like us to address. Your views are important for shaping our future. Write in atdsieditor@gmail.com.

G

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

1

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

2

CO

NT

EN

TS

The Amarnath Yatra land controversy merely stirred alarger, more dangerous phenomenon. A look at the socialfactors and politics that made Jammu and Kashmir burn.

COVER STORY 18

SUMMEROF HATESUMMEROF HATE

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

3

ENERGY POLICY 42

INDIAPETROLEUMINC.India’s ballooning energy needs, coupled with the evolving challengesof international security and globalenvironmental concerns in the 21stcentury, call for a more far-sightedand flexible energy security policy.

POLICY ISSUES 60

DPP-2008As the world’s biggest buyer of defence equipment, India needs atransparent and fair procurementpolic that does not compromise onquality. An appraisal of this year’s Defence Procurement Policy reveals a mixed bag.

INDO-US RELATIONS 34

A WHOLE NEW DEAL?What does the Indo-US civil nuclear

deal mean for the emerging strategicrelationship between the world’s oldest and largest democracies? Alook at the factors that are shaping USforeign policy vis-a-vis India.

INTERNAL SECURITY 26

SECURITYALARMWave after wave of terrorist attacks onIndian soil show up India’s ailing internal security apparatus. How longcan we keep blaming ‘intelligence failure’ and ignoring the real problem? A new look at old issues.

INTERVIEW 54

“THE GOVTAND PEOPLEARE NOT

READY FOR AFINAL BORDERSOLUTION”As two Asian giants and two of theworld’s fastest-rising powers circlewarily around their long-standing issues, Chinese scholar Rong Ying recommends some confidence-building measures to help both countries engage constructively in the 21st century.

NEIGHBOURWATCH 48

BEARDING THETIGERThe long and savage civil war in SriLanka is almost over. But without substantive engagement with the political problem at the heart of theproblem, will the government’s expected victory bring a lasting peace?

LEARNING NO LESSONS

PAKISTAN 6

INTERVIEWPolitical and strategic analystShuja Nawaz.

BOOK REVIEWCrossed Swords contributescrucially to an understandingof Pakistan’s army with valu-able new material.

General Musharraf ’s resigna-tion ends another era of mili-tary dictatorship in Pakistan.As the civil-military relation-ship evolves, AAMMIITTAABBHHDDUUBBEEYY examines the role ofthe country’s militarythrough the eyes of an insider.

CONTRIBUTORSDSI SEPTEMBER 2008

Major General (Retd) Mrinal Sumanis considered the foremost expert on

various aspects of India’s defence procurement regime and offsets, and

was closely associated with the evolu-tion of the new defence procurementmechanism. He is often consulted bypolicy makers and the Parliamentary

Committee on Defence, and heads theDefence Technical Assessment and

Advisory Service of CII.

MRINAL SUMAN

Ajai Sahni is, among other things,Founding Member & Executive Direc-

tor of the Institute for Conflict Man-agement, Editor, South Asia Intelli-

gence Review, and Executive Director,South Asia Terrorism Portal. He has

researched and written extensively onconflict, politics and development inSouth Asia, and participated in advi-sory projects undertaken for various

National or State Governments.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editorfor The Hindu, and also writes for its

sister publication, Frontline magazine.He reports on issues of security and

low-intensity warfare, particularly theconflict in Jammu and Kashmir and

the operations of Islamist terrorgroups in India. His most recent book

on Kashmir was published in January,2007. He has won several major

awards for his work.

AJAISAHNI

PRAVEEN SWAMI

SEPTEMBER 2008 VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2

EDITOR

Sonia Shukla

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Mitali Saran

ASST. ART DIRECTOR

Subrata Jana

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER

Roop Arora

COORDINATOR

Ronald Micah

CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTION

Vipul JainVishal Manchanda

PRODUCTION & PRE-PRESS

Sunil DubeyRitesh RoyDevender Pandey

CEO & PUBLISHING DIRECTOR

Rohit Goel

MEDIA TRANSASIA INDIA LIMITED

K-35, Green Park MainNew Delhi 110016. IndiaPh: +91 11 26868775/26960926Fax: +91 11 2686741

FINANCIAL CONTROLLER

Puneet Nanda

PRESIDENT

Xavier Collaco

CHAIRMAN

J S Uberoi

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVES

Charlton D’Silva, Australia

Stephane de Remusat, France/Spain

Sam Baird, UK/Germany/Switzerland/Italy

Liat Heiblum, Israel/Turkey

Mikio Tsuchiya, Japan

Clang Garcia, Philippines

Alla Butova, Russia

Dr Rosalind Lui-Frost, Singapore/Malaysia

Young Seoh Chinn, South Korea

Karen Norris, Scandinavia/South Africa

Diane Obright, USA/Brazil

Margie Brown, USA/Canada

Defence and Security of India is published and printed

by Xavier Collaco on behalf of Media Transasia India

Limited. Published at K-35, Green Park Main, New Delhi

110016 and printed at Paras Offset Pvt Ltd, C176,

Naraina Industrial Area, Phase I, New Delhi. Entire con-

tents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduc-

tion and translation in any language in whole or in part

without permission is prohibited.

Requests for permission should be directed to Media

Transasia India Limited. Opinions carried in the

magazine are those of the writers’ and do not

necessarily reflect those of the editors or publishers.

While the editors do their utmost to verify information

published they do not accept responsibility for its

absolute accuracy.

The publisher assumes no responsibility for the

return of unsolicited material or for material lost or

damaged in transit. All correspondence should be

addressed to Media Transasia India Limited.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

Defence and Security of India is published monthly and

can be obtained by subscription. Annual Subscription

rate for 12 issues is Indian Rupees 1800/-.

For subscription enquiries, please contact:

dsisubscriptions@mtil.biz

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

Vikram Singh Mehta worked with several private oil companies before

joining the public sector Oil India Limited as its Advisor (Strategic

Planning). He has been Chairman ofthe Shell Group in India since 1994.

Mehta was a member of the NationalCouncil of the CII and Chairman of itshydrocarbons committee. The views

expressed here are personal.

VIKRAM S. MEHTA

Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is Ex-ecutive Director of the Centre for

Policy Alternatives, the premier research and advocacy public policy

institute focusing on democraticpeace, governance and human rightsin Sri Lanka. He is a Director of the SriLanka chapter of Transparency Inter-

national, and a member of the Advi-sory Board of the Berghof Foundation

for Peace and Conflict Studies, Berlin.

Ajai Shukla works in both visual andprint media. He is Consulting Editor

(Strategic Affairs) for New Delhi Television (NDTV), India’s best-

reputed news broadcaster, for whichhe anchors prime time news and special programmes. He is also

Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs)for Business Standard.

AJAI SHUKLA

PAIKIASOTHYSARAVANAMUTTU

Manohar Thyagaraj is an internationalrelations expert whose work has

appeared in USAF Air and Space PowerJournal and ORBIS, and is the Found-ing Editor of EngageINDUS, a journal

on US-India relations.He is currently aDirector of the US-India Business

Alliance (USIBA), a trade associationwith offices in Washington and NewDelhi, and consults with US and In-

dian defence companies .

Amitabh Dubey is Director of IndiaResearch at Trusted Sources, a

London-based firm that providesemerging market research to financial

institutions, central banks and hedgefunds, with a particular focus on the

BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China)countries. Dubey has previously

worked at Eurasia Group, a New York-based political risk consultancy, and

has been a business journalist in India.

MANOHARTHYAGRAJ

AMITABHDUBEY

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

6

INTERVIEW

“No one can predict the future of the civilian-military

relationship in Pakistan”■ You do look at the military’s involvement inbusiness and its growing corporate interests.How is your analysis different from AyeshaSiddiqa’s Military Inc.?

I think you need to look at the issuemore broadly. Siddiqa focuses on the civil-ian aspect of the military’s business inter-ests but not on the military side, things suchas ordnance factories and so on. There is animport substitution approach to this, similarto Turkey's, although the time for this mayhave gone as demonstrated by China’s di-vestment from military industry. I also donot use loaded terms such as ‘predatory’ todescribe the military’s business interests.As I put it in the book, there is a widespread‘culture of entitlement’ in Pakistan that ex-ists in the civilian political sphere as well.The army reflects the rest of the country,and it is become increasingly more repre-sentative of society over time, as I describe inthe book.

Indeed, civilians have abetted the mili-tary’s involvement in society, and succes-sive prime ministers have relied on thearmy for a range of activities, includingZulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.Civilian leaders need to be careful not topoke the bear, so to speak, but they canalso assert their constitutional rights andnot give in to the army in having officersrun the Ministry of Defence or even be-come minister. Promotions to the three-star level have to be approved by thePrime Minister and the Minister of De-fence. In the past, Prime Minister Moham-mad Khan Junejo sat on an appointment

by Zia until the latter appointed one of hiscandidates to a particular post. And thiswas during military rule.

■ Has the army been receptive to the idea ofcommand reform, whether along thepatterns you suggest in the book orotherwise?

When I was finishing the book, I saw anews item that the army was setting up re-gional commands. I was a bit worried be-cause I did not want my recommenda-tions for their establishment, in the book, toseem unoriginal! But on investigation itturned out that these regional command-ers are to be Lieutenant Generals, thesame rank as corps commanders, whichwill cause confusion over the working ofthe chain of command and authority.

The actual idea, first suggested to meby (former commander of the US Cen-tral Command General) Tony Zinni, is toset up multi-service regional commandsin which the regional commanders areall four-star generals appointed by thesame authority that currently appointsthe Chief of Army Staff and the Chair-man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thiswould, as it has in the US, decrease theconcentration of power around one in-dividual since regional commanderswould not be beholden to the army chieffor their positions.

But there are already changes evidentin the army’s policies, including a greaterwillingness to work with civilian authori-ties. General Kiyani shocked the govern-

Political and strategicanalyst Shuja Nawaztells Amitabh Dubey

about the changingdynamic and increasinginterdependence of the

civilian and militarypower structures in

Pakistan, in the context of his new book on

the history of thePakistan Army.

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

7

ment when, after presenting options foroperations against the Taliban in the tribalareas, he asked the civilian leadership todecide what course it wanted to take. Thepoliticians had expected the army to in-form them what course of action it wouldtake, and instead it was asking them to de-cide what strategy to adopt. These are allpositive changes in the context of the is-sues I raise in the book.

■ Many in India and, I imagine Bangladesh,feel that you have been too generous to thePakistan Army over the atrocities of 1971,seeking to be balanced when the bulk ofresponsibility clearly lies with the army’sactions at the time. What is your reaction?

Well I do mention the killings based onmy first hand interviews. I also cite Indianscholars such as Sarmila Bose to show thatatrocities occurred on all sides. But I believe

that the 1971 case requires greater study forthe facts to come out in an objective man-ner. If possible, I might do such a projectmyself, or it could be left to someone else todo. But a proper study of that conflict is stillrequired, I believe.

■ Is there anything different this time aboutthe army’s withdrawal from active politicsand its apparent willingness to let the

The army made it clearthat it did not wish to be

drawn into the Musharrafdeparture, and felt thatany retributive actions

against Musharraf wouldhave been disruptive at

this stage of thetransition to democracy

”Left: Musharraf inspectsthe guard of honour duringthe farewell ceremonyfollowing his resignation

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

unpopular Musharraf go? After all, we haveseen this pattern before: overextension bythe establishment followed by retrenchment,even as it continues to exercise its monopolyover national security.

No one can predict the future of thecivilian-military relationship in Pakistan.The cynical view is that the army is bidingits time. I would like to believe that thecivilian establishment has learnt from his-tory and will want to show its ability torun the state and to reassert its su-

premacy. The army made it clear that itdid not wish to be drawn into theMusharraf departure, and felt except thatany retributive actions against Musharrafwould have been disruptive at this stage ofthe transition to democracy. It wants togive the civilian establishment time andspace to operate and to begin to find solu-tions to the major issues of today: theeconomy and militancy. Pakistan cannotafford another political upheaval at thispoint in its journey toward democracy. ■

IT IS safe to say that the strategic futureof the Subcontinent depends a greatdeal on one institution: the PakistanArmy. Only time will tell which way

this organisation will incline: towards theWestern nightmare of bearded maniacs fir-ing nuclear weapons at will; or a happy fu-ture replete with moderate officers; orsomewhere in between. Meanwhile, thoseof us trying to measure the institutionalgrowth of radicalism in the Army withoutaccess to intelligence data on the length ofofficers’ beards, can only rely on the occa-sional insightful and informed publicanalysis to quell or exacerbate our fears.

Shuja Nawaz’s masterly narrative of thePakistan Army, combining historical analy-sis with often first-hand anecdotal evi-dence, certainly contributes to our under-

standing of it. The author, brother of thelate General Asif Nawaz, Chief of Armystaff between 1991 and 1993, provides aninsider’s account built on extensive inter-views with senior army officers, and un-precedented access to the archives of thearmy’s General Headquarters (GHQ).Crossed Swords comprehensively covers thehistory of the Pakistan armed forces andtheir relationship with the country, track-ing the strategic, political and economicfacets of their evolution.

Although broadly sympathetic to thearmy, Nawaz also provides an extensive cri-tique through a detailed examination of pol-icy and leadership failings. While in some in-stances he does not take the availableevidence to its logical conclusion (such as thecriminal conduct—in many senses of the

8

BOOK FEATURE

LEARNING NOLESSONS

CROSSED SWORDS:PAKISTAN, ITS

ARMY, AND THEWARS WITHIN

Oxford UniversityPress, 2008

Author: Shuja Nawaz

With General Pervez

Musharraf’s resignation as

President, another era of

military dictatorship has

come to an end in Pakistan.

AMITABH DUBEYexamines the role of the

military in Pakistan

through the eyes of

an insider.

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

word—of the 1971 war), he isnot shy of presenting evi-dence that shows the army ina poor light, including the1971 case. This is a work thatdeserves to be taken seriously, and is essentialreading for anyone interested in better un-derstanding the relationship between thearmy and Pakistani society.

Nawaz begins by looking at the historicalroots of the Pakistan Army, including thecreation of the Indian Army by the British,the genesis of the idea of ‘martial races’ andthe creation of the Pakistan Army follow-ing Partition. He covers key episodes usinga mix of standard historical sources andhitherto unpublicised army documents.The narrative encompasses the wars of1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999; the rise of the

military as a central politicalactor; the foibles andachievements of various po-litical leaders; and the dis-placement of Ayub-era Is-

lamic nationalism by Zia-era Islamism andjihadism—and its partial retreat—as stateideology. The author addresses a range oftopics such as the changing social bases ofarmy recruitment, the increased corporateinvolvement of the armed forces, the rela-tionship with the US, the ethnic and powerpolitics of selecting the Chief of Army Staff,and the army’s repeated efforts to protectitself from civilian oversight. Other writershave previously covered much of thisground, but Nawaz brings his own per-spectives and sources to bear in a compre-hensive, well-written, enjoyable treatment.

9

The author provides an insider’s account built

on extensive interviewswith senior army officers,

and unprecedented access to the archives of the army’s General

Headquarters

”

Protesters shout anti-Musharraf slogans on thefirst anniversary of theraid on the Red Mosque

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

Strategic failureTHE most important task, from this re-viewer’s perspective, is to understand theinternal workings of the Pakistan Army,particularly how it conceives of, executesand learns from the implementation of keypolicies. And it becomes quickly evidentthat it has a poor strategic record. Indeed, it isdifficult to identify a single military cam-paign (not counting efforts to quell ethnicinsurgents domestically) in which the armyhas achieved its original objectives, with thepossible exception of the jihad against theSoviet Union. This is not to suggest thatother militaries have an untarnished record(India’s Sri Lanka misadventure comes tomind) but that Pakistan’s military leader-ship has elevated strategic failure to an artform, protestations of ‘tactical brilliance’notwithstanding.

While the author may not concur withthe reviewer’s strong characterisation, hisbook does confront the recurring problemof poor strategic leadership in Pakistan, andposits several reasons for it at the organisa-tional level. These include the tendency ofmilitary leaders to avoid wide consulta-tions prior to making decisions, their ap-parent inability to gauge an opponent’slikely actions, and their keenness to protecttheir domestic standing by suppressing orunderplaying any objective analysis.

The tendency to disregard dissentingopinions or, more commonly, completelyavoid wider consultation with institutionsestablished to prevent such arbitrariness,emerged as early as in Pakistan’s first year ofindependence. In 1947, Prime Minister Li-aquat Ali Khan (and even Quaid-e-AzamMuhammad Ali Jinnah) bypassed normalchannels—in an admittedly nascent insti-tutional setting—to launch an ill-conceivedmilitary adventure that essentially led to astalemate and the conquest of a relativelysmall part of Kashmir.

This pattern was repeated with Opera-tion Gibraltar in 1965, and more grandly in1971, when a small decision-making grouparound General Yahya Khan (includingthen Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto)chose to launch a military operation to sup-press the Awami League in East Pakistan,after ignoring contrary advice from Lt GenSahibzada Yaqub Khan and Admiral SyedMohammed Ahsan who were quickly side-lined. For instance, the subsequent decisionto launch a pre-emptive air strike againstIndia on 3 December 1971 was finalisedonly one day beforehand, and the Chief ofNaval Staff first heard about it on the radio.

In the more recent Kargil episode, the

author points out how aGHQ culture of unflinchingobedience allowed GeneralPervez Musharraf and hisclose advisors to keep thebroad contours of the plan from principalstaff officers and corps commanders untilso late in the process that any discussionnecessarily became pro forma rather thansubstantive. He describes how the one sen-ior officer to openly criticise the planningof the Kargil operation, General TariqParvez (then the commander of XII Corps in

Quetta), was removed byMusharraf, with NawazSharif ’s concurrence.

Over the course ofMusharraf ’s rule, personal

loyalty became even more important; in2003 he replaced corps commanders whohad expressed unhappiness about his dualpositions as President and Chief of ArmyStaff, and asked for the appointment of anew army chief. The author argues that thisproblem becomes more acute the longer anincumbent stays at the top, since the gulf be-

10

Army chief General A.P.Kiyani (second from left)at Independence Daycelebrations in Islamabad

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

12

tween the army chief and his increasinglyjunior corps commanders grows to thepoint where the latter are reluctant to contesta senior’s opinions, and the army chief isless likely to get objective feedback.

The second observable pattern is a re-peated inability to correctly anticipate theopponent’s reactions, whether due to theorganisational failures just mentioned, orbecause of quasi-racist myths about the infe-riority of Hindus, Bengalis, etc. This wasclear in 1965 when the army leadershipfailed to anticipate both the strength of In-dia’s military response (given India’s tepidresponse in earlier skirmishes in the Rannof Kutch region), and its willingness to ex-pand the conflict beyond the disputedKashmir region by attacking across the in-ternational border in Punjab. The army didvery little groundwork among potentiallypro-Pakistan factions in Kashmir, relying in-stead on wishful thinking about the willing-ness of Kashmiri Muslims to rise up in sup-port of infiltrating insurgents from Pakistan.

Nawaz describes how, in 1999, one un-named senior officer in the Joint Chiefsheadquarters, concerned about unrealisticassumptions in the Kargil plan, commis-sioned a ‘Staff Check’ to model what the In-dian response might be. His junior officerscame back 36 hours later saying that, in In-dia’s position, they would bring in reserveformations and heavy artillery (which is es-sentially what India did). The officer toldthe author that conducting such an exercisein the planning phase could well have re-versed the decision to proceed; at the timehe chose to keep the study to himself since itwas clear that key officials, includingNawaz Sharif, had already signed off onthe plan, and that criticism would be un-welcome. In this context, the author pro-vides first-hand testimony that Sharif waskept informed about the Kargil operationwell in advance, starting in late January(prior to the arrival in Lahore of his Indiancounterpart, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Va-jpayee, for peace talks).

A third problem—really a side effect ofthe army’s involvement in politics and itsdesire and ability to maintain institutionalautonomy—consists of repeated cover-upsof poor performance, and a refusal to pub-licly air any formal criticism of its function-ing. Both the Hamoodur Rehman reportcommissioned by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, andan internal study of the army’s militaryperformance on the western front, weresuppressed because the army did not wantto weaken itself further after the disastrous1971 war. By suppressing the report, Bhuttoof course lost the opportunity to tame for

once and for all an institution that would fi-nally end up killing him.

The secret “GHQ Report on Indo-Pak-istan War December [19]71” written by ateam headed by Major General AzmatBaksh Awan, commandant of the Com-mand and Staff College in Quetta (andwhose contents are publicly revealed forthe first time in this book), did not mincewords about the army’s military perform-ance during the war. The report found thatthe Pakistan Army had ceded all initiativeto the enemy, abandoned the lessons ofwarfare assiduously learned over the years,and failed to conceptualise policy morebroadly in an institutionalised manner thatcould have led to more rational military de-cision-making.

The last is of course a familiar problem.Pakistan refused to introspect after its Kargiladventure (in contrast to India where,thanks in no small part to a stable and non-competitive civil-military relationship, thereport of the Kargil Review Committee waswidely disseminated and discussed). Thiscult of secrecy, and the desire to protect insti-tutional autonomy at all costs, makes it hardfor the lessons learned from past mistakesto be analysed and disseminated among thewider military community.

To restate the broader point, the prob-lem is not that the Pakistan Army has erred;all organisations do. The problem, as thisreviewer sees it, is that it has systematicallyfailed to learn from these mistakes, and thepeople of Pakistan have in the end paid theprice. The irony is that a key failing of themost stable institution in Pakistan is a lack ofadequate institutionalisation. (There is, ofcourse, a hierarchy of causes: the army be-comes willing to act against an entrenchedleadership when its standing in Pakistan isthreatened by a defeat or by political blun-ders—as occurred most recently withMusharraf ’s political marginalisation fol-lowing his ill-conceived attacks on the ju-diciary and political parties in 2007.)

Jihad and shahadatALL this would be of academic interest tothe rest of the world were it not for a fewadded ingredients: religion, nuclearweapons and transnational terror net-works. The tensions among the right-winggroups, including within the Jamaat-i-Is-lami, make for interesting reading. Of partic-ular interest is not simply the well-travelledsaga of Bhutto’s flirtations with the Islamicright in the 1970s and its blooming underGeneral Zia-ul-Haq, but the ringside viewthat the author provides of the army’s ef-

forts to extricate itself from overt religious-ness while continuing to relying on jihadiststo further state policies in the region.

There is some discussion of how the or-ganisational tendencies described earlierwere exacerbated during the Zia period,when outward religiousness became onecriterion for career advancement and led,in some cases, to an appearance of piety be-ing an acceptable substitute for strategyand introspection (although it seems thatZia himself never fell prey to such afflic-tions.) A retreat from these policies began

The book would be ofacademic interest to the rest of the world were it not for a few added ingredients:

religion, nuclear weapons and transnational

terror networks

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

under Zia’s successor, General Mirza AslamBeg who, among other things, removed thereference to officers’ religious views and be-haviour in their annual confidential re-ports. The author also describes how hisbrother General Nawaz, as the comman-dant of the Pakistan Military Academy inKakul, banned the proselytising Tablighi Ja-maat from giving sermons to cadets as earlyas 1984, suggesting that there was institu-tional resistance to Islamism in the army.

The author had a ringside view of thisperiod, in part because his brother was acorps commander, and provides a fascinat-ing narrative of military changes duringthis period. In his view, although GeneralBeg was keen to re-professionalise thearmy, he also held quixotic views onAfghanistan, Iran and his doctrines of“strategic depth” and “strategic defiance”, tothe point of being willing to trade in nu-clear material and technology with Iran—amove that the author says was squelchedby General Asif Nawaz when he becamearmy chief. Beg’s confidants, GeneralsHamid Gul and Javed Nasir, had a strongjihadist orientation and shared his viewthat the Iraq war was a “Western-Zionistgame plan to neutralise the Moslem world”that would end with the defeat of the US.Despite his move away from the excessesof the Zia period, Nawaz shows that Begalso fell prey to delusional thinking regard-ing the likelihood of military successagainst India, as Benazir Bhutto has re-counted elsewhere.

Having facilitated elections in 1988, Begwas not averse to interfering in politics andfunding more pliant political allies with tax-payer money. His successor, Nawaz, ef-fected a further retreat of the army fromthese areas, choosing to stay away frompolitics (despite the entreaties of manycivilians including the Chaudhry brothersand Yusuf Haroon, the publisher of thenewspaper Dawn, and hints in this direc-tion from the US government). He alsomade it clear that there would be no trans-fers of nuclear technology to Iran, althoughthere is no mention in the book of the tech-nology transfers between Pakistan andNorth Korea that fructified under Nawaz’ssuccessor General Abdul Waheed.

In implying that Beg’s successors weremuch more restrained and sensitive to theinterests of Pakistan’s influential friend, theUS, despite the Abdul Qadeer Khan net-work’s activity during this period, the au-thor essentially supports the establishmentview—quite distinct from Adrian Levy andCatherine Scott-Clark’s view in Deception.He even quotes Lt General Javed Nasir, the

infamous chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Di-rectorate described as a“bearded, fire-and-brimstonespewing Islamic warrior”, assaying that he reported Khan's activities toPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who failed totake any action. Other senior officers suchas General Waheed are quoted as saying thatthey were suspicious of Khan’s activities butthat little was done to halt them. This re-mains a murky episode, but hopefully con-crete revelations will emerge in the future.

It merits mention here that the authorpresents the Sharif family as duplicitousand power-hungry, and narrates a numberof amusing anecdotes. The Sharif patriarchMian Muhammad Sharif (“Aba-ji”) made it ahabit to invite newly-appointed army chiefs

home to dinner at his home,and to tell him that his sonsNawaz and Shahbaz werelike their younger brothers,and if they misbehaved, to

report this to Aba-ji who would fix them.This earthy Punjabi approach, also de-scribed by Musharraf in his autobiography,In the Line of Fire, did not always go downwell with the recipient, and led Aba-ji tojudge the concerned individual negatively.As the author describes it, the Sharifs usedtribal and personal connections to build in-fluence in the army and did not shy awayfrom offering expensive gifts or industrialcontracts, such as to the brother of a corpscommander during General Nawaz’stenure. The Sharifs repeatedly attempted tofoist a gift BMW on General Nawaz, whose

14

The Army’ s influence ismainstreamed in the livesof ordinary Pakistanis; (r)Jinnah’s tomb

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

rebuffs probably further damaged their rela-tionship. (The author poignantly dedicatesan appendix to the investigation into theunexpected death of his brother, and sug-gests that the Sharifs certainly had a motiveto remove him from the picture.)

Many officers sought to insulate thearmy and political sphere from the grow-ing influence in society of irregular forces,including jihadist fighters, even as the Pak-istan Army continued to use them to attainforeign policy goals in Afghanistan andKashmir. The author describes, in a foot-note, how in 1982 his brother, as GeneralOfficer Commanding of the Peshawar-based 7 Division, ordered Mujahideenleader Gulbadin Hekmatyar (who hassince, to no one’s surprise, allied with AlQaeda) to desist from openly supporting

the Jamaat-i-Islami and otherwise involv-ing himself in domestic politics.

But possibly the most riveting descrip-tion is from the newly appointed head ofthe ISI, Lt General Javed Ashraf Qazi, of hisfirst day at work after he succeeded Nasirin 1993. Qazi tells the author of a strangenon-military atmosphere at the ISI, “wherethe corridors were filled with bearded offi-cers in civilian shalwar kameez, many ofthem with their shalwar hitched up abovethe ankle, a signature practice of the Tab-lighi Jamaat” to which Nasir belonged.More importantly, the ISI had its resourcesfocused mostly on Afghanistan rather thanKashmir, and had engaged in freelance op-erations in Bosnia, Bangkok, amongArakanese Muslim rebels, with Tamil ex-tremists and even with radical groups suchas Jamaat-ul Fuqra in the US (whose leader,Mubarak Ali Gilani, Wall Street Journal re-porter Daniel Pearl had thought he wasmeeting before he was abducted andkilled). Qazi tells the author that apart fromwrapping up these operations, he ceasedto support a variety of militant operationsrun by retired army officers into Indian-controlled Kashmir, and directed resourcestowards the more pliant Hizbul Mu-jahideen and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.

Through these anecdotes, the authorseeks to demonstrate that, despite its flirta-tions with jihadism, the Pakistan Army isessentially a non-radical (albeit conserva-tive) force whose reality is far removedfrom the public fancy of bearded maniacsrunning amok in a nuclear-armed state.While this is plausible, the fact is that theradicalisation of the jihad in Kashmir, andthe deepening involvement of Taliban- andAl Qaeda-affiliated groups such as theHarkatul Mujahideen and the Jaish-e-Mo-hammed, occurred long after Hamid Guland Javed Nasir had left the army, and waspart of a guerrilla strategy conceptualisedby clean-shaven, whisky-toting generals.

Indeed, the author refers to a still-secretplan for a broader Kashmir jihad in early1999, when Musharraf was army chief, thatwas to rely on reinforcements fromAfghanistan. In an amusing aside he tellsthe story (attributed to Major General Ir-shadullah Tarar, a former FCNA com-mander) of how the Taliban-era AfghanPresident, Mullah Mohammed Rabbani, re-quested by the ISI to provide 20,000-30,000“volunteers” for the Kashmir jihad, startledthe Pakistanis by offering to send 500,000(and, one hopes, alerting them to the per-ceptual framework inhabited by the Tal-iban). The broader relationship was clearlygoing strong at the time, as illustrated by

the Indian Airlines hijacking in December1999, and the creation of the Jaish-e-Mo-hammed under Masood Azhar. Policychange was forced by events such as “blow-back” from the 11 September 2001 attack onthe US and the 13 December 2001 attack onIndia's Parliament.

As subsequent events in the FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas and elsewherehave shown, associating with radical groupsin an offensive mode, that is to say againstforeign enemies, did not equip the army tocombat them in a defensive mode athome—or even, surprisingly, to engagethem in their own language. Nawaz re-counts the experience of a diplomatic delega-tion headed by retired Lt General Moinud-din Haider, that was sent to convince MullahOmar of Afghanistan not to demolish the

15

Nawaz Sharif is a little too generous in

his assessment ofepisodes such as the 1971 war, the spread

of the Abdul Qadeer Khan

network and Musharraf’srigging of the 2002

referendum

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

Buddha statues at Bamiyan. Theofficials told Mullah Omar thathis actions were not consistentwith the teachings of the Quranand, when challenged, pulled outa copy of the Quran to show himthe relevant verses. Unfortu-nately, they had brought along anEnglish translation, promptingMullah Omar to dismiss their ar-gument on the spot. The episodeillustrates the complexity of theestablishment’s policy contor-tions, and that they were not sim-ply the product of a jihadistmindset, but of something muchmore cynical and—as we now know andpassionately hope the army realises—short-sighted.

ConclusionTO return to the PakistanArmy’s organisational weak-nesses, including the personali-sation of policies and the concen-tration of power around thearmy chief, the author offers anagenda for organisational re-form: he suggests a US-style re-shaping of command and con-trol to multi-service regionalcommands that will broaden thecircle of decision-makers and in-troduce veto points to preventblatant errors from creeping intopolicymaking. He discusses doc-trinal and training changes thatcould better equip the army tofight armed insurgents.

There is little here to disagreewith in principle, although thereviewer sees few signs that themilitary is shifting focus from bigticket items such as F-16s andmain battle tanks to better equipment forinfantry and paramilitary forces on thefrontlines in the tribal areas and elsewhere,despite budget constraints. This is in partbecause India continues to build her con-ventional forces, but under current circum-stances, Pakistan perhaps needs to priori-tise its perceived threats, keeping in mindthat nuclear weapons should deter any In-dian adventurism (the escalating covertwar between the two countries being a sep-arate issue).

More importantly, the author’s other-wise welcome focus on the army’s internaldebates and reform measures underplaysthe significance of what is still, in the re-viewer’s view, a fundamental question:

whether Pakistan’s elected repre-sentatives will ever have real con-trol of its foreign and securitypolicies. Despite its decision towithdraw to the barracks andgenerally obey civilian directives,even Kiyani’s army retains a defacto monopoly over central secu-rity questions. This issue has yetto be resolved satisfactorily and,given the fate so far of poorly-con-ceived efforts to rein in the ISI bybringing it under Interior Min-istry control, has a long way to go.

The book covers much moreground than described in this re-

view, and includes fascinating details thatadd to the coherence of the overall analy-sis. The author does not whitewash the

Pakistani establishment’s record;on the contrary, he takes a clear-headed look at a majority of theissues. But this is inevitably an in-sider’s account, and Nawaz is alittle too generous in his assess-ment of episodes such as the1971 war, the spread of the AbdulQadeer Khan network andMusharraf ’s rigging of the 2002referendum.

As a personal account, the au-thor’s personal opinions obvi-ously play a role (for instance inthe contrasting treatment of theSharifs and Benazir Bhutto), butthey also contribute nuance andtexture to the narrative. Indeed, itis its mix of the analytical and thepersonal that distinguishesCrossed Swords from other con-temporary accounts of Pakistan.

Amitabh Dubey is the Directorof India Research at TrustedSources, a London-based firm that

provides emerging market research to financialinstitutions, central banks and hedge funds.Trusted Sources focuses on the interaction ofeconomics and public policy, and adopts a "topdown" approach looking at the impact ofmacroeconomics, politics and security oneconomies and sectors. It has a particular focuson the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, Indiaand China) that are increasingly transformingthe world economy and driving global marketsin equity, debt, currencies and commodities.Dubey has previously worked at EurasiaGroup, a New York-based political risk consul-tancy, and has been a business journalist in In-dia. He has degrees in economics and politicalscience from Delhi University, University ofChicago and Columbia University.

16

Pervez Musharraf at the Whilte House and(below) with Afghan President Hamid Karzaiat the World Economic Forum in Davos

This is essential reading for anyone

interested in betterunderstanding the

relationship between the army and

Pakistani society

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

18

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

On India’s independence day thisyear, Pakistani flags fluttered fromthe top of the clock tower in Srina-gar’s Lal Chowk.

Even in the worst years of the twenty-year, Pakistan-backed jihad, Indian forcesin Srinagar ensured that the tricolour flewfrom Lal Chowk each independence day;but on the morning of August 15, 2008, afterCentral Reserve Police Force personnelhoisted the Indian flag on the clock toweras usual, Islamist protestors marched on LalChowk. With strict orders not to fire on un-armed protestors, and without backup toblock the march, CRPF personnel brought

down the Indian flag,and withdrew.

What a twenty-year jihad in Jammuand Kashmir had not

Stone-throwingHindu protestersdefy curfew inJammu

SUMMER OF

HATE

PRAVEEN SWAMI

CCOOVVEERR SSTTOORRYY

SUMMER OFHATE

19

Understanding theAmarnath shrine land

war in Jammu andKashmir.

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

achieved, six weeks of protests had—andthat at a time when Pakistan, the traditionalpatron of the anti-India movement inJammu and Kashmir, was too embroiled ininternal strife to offer significant assistance.

It is far too early to predict just how theshrine land war will finally play out, butthis much is certain: Jammu and Kashmir’sthree regions—Muslim-majority Kashmir,Hindu-majority Jammu, and Buddhist-ma-jority Ladakh—are now locked in an eth-nic-religious confrontation which couldtear the region apart. Demonstrationsdrawing up to a quarter of a million protes-tors have been seen across the state. WithinKashmir, Islamists fighting for the creationof a Sharia-based state have acquired centre-stage, while Hindu chauvinist groups haveacquired new legitimacy and power inJammu.

Few doubt that, given the coercive andpolitical assets at its disposal, India willeventually still the crisis in weeks to come.However, the stage appears to be set for yetanother intractable ethnic-religious conflictto add to Jammu and Kashmir ’s existingmultiple crises.

The making of a crisisIF nothing else, the genesis of the shrineland war demonstrates that seismic conse-quences can result from the smallest causes.

Back in the summer of 2004, Jammu andKashmir ’s chief minister Mufti Moham-mad Saeed, and the centrally-appointedfigurehead governor S.K. Sinha, lockedhorns over the management of the annualAmarnath Yatra pilgrimage to a cave tem-ple in the mountains above the town of Pa-halgam. Sinha decided to extend the pil-grimage from four weeks to eight, andSaeed shot the idea down. Five Hindu cab-inet ministers from the Jammu region—allmembers of Saeed’s coalition partners, theCongress—resigned in protest.

Amid this feud, the Jammu and KashmirHigh Court ordered the government togive the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board,which manages the pilgrimage, the right touse forest land to provide shelter and sanita-tion for pilgrims. It took another two yearsof legal wrangling before SASB was finallygiven permission for “raising pre-fabricatedstructures only for camping purposes ofpilgrims without going in for constructionof permanent structures”. The governmentorder granting permission clearly statesthat the “proprietary status of [the] forestland shall remain unchanged”.

Islamists now mobilised against the or-

der, claiming that it was part of a conspir-acy to settle Hindus in the region, and thusreduce Kashmir’s Muslim majority to a mi-nority. Matters came to a head whenSaeed’s People’s Democratic Party, whoseministers had initially supported the landuse orders in the state cabinet, threw theirweight behind Islamist calls to revokethem. PDP leaders were driven by the factthat a significant part of their constituency isaffiliated with Kashmir ’s religious right.

However, Congress coalition partners wereunable to meet the demand, afraid that itwould undermine their position amongsttheir core constituency of Jammu Hindus.

In July Jammu and Kashmir’s new gov-ernor, N.N. Vohra, in his capacity as headof the shrine board, attempted to resolvethe stalemate. He offered to surrender theland use rights if the state government it-self would provide all facilities to pilgrims,as it had been doing since 1979. Hoping to

20

COVER STORY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

avert a showdown with the PDP, chief min-ister Ghulam Nabi Azad agreed. Later, un-der pressure from the party’s central leader-ship in New Delhi to save the Congress’alliance with the PDP, Azad revoked theland use order altogether. However, thePDP pulled out of government days beforea deadline it had set to resolve the crisis.

Hindu chauvinist groups in Jammunow began an agitation demanding theland back. Elements among them threat-

ened to blockade traffic to Kashmir. It is un-clear whether there was, in fact, a signifi-cant blockade, but the threat of one aloneprovided leverage to Islamist patriarchSyed Ali Shah Geelani, who leads theTehreek-i-Hurriyat coalition of anti-Indiaparties, and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a Srina-gar cleric who heads the rival All PartiesHurriyat Conference.

Both groups, who had announced aunification plan at the start of the protests,

organised a march across the Line of Con-trol (which divides Indian-administeredKashmir from Pakistan-administered Kash-mir), saying that the economic blockade ne-cessitated the opening of traffic from Srina-gar to Muzaffarabad. India had, in fact,been calling for free trade along the route, ademand Pakistan had rejected. However,defying the Line of Control was an act thestate simply could not countenance. To noone’s surprise, the marchers were stopped

21

PDP leaders were driven by the fact that asignificant part of their

constituency is affiliatedwith Kashmir’s religious

right. However, Congresscoalition partners

were unable to meet thedemand, afraid that it

would undermine theirposition amongst their

core constituency ofJammu Hindus

”The land row sparked right-wing Hindu nationalist protestselsewhere in the country, likethis one in Mumbai

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

by force: three people were killed, includ-ing a mid-ranking APHC leader.

Over twenty other people died in sub-sequent clashes between police or soldiersand the protestors, often a consequence ofenraged mobs attacking army and policebunkers. Jammu and Kashmir administra-tors experimented, for a time, with pullingback police in an effort to allow protestors tolet off steam. A state of near-anarchy fol-lowed, with protestors attacking and de-stroying dozens of police posts. More im-portantly, activists of Islamist groups usedthe state’s withdrawal to assert their au-thority. Mosques and local cable televisionnetworks were turned into mobilisationtools, while in many neighbourhoods resi-dents neutral or hostile to the protests werecompelled to join them.

Who were the protestors who spear-headed the protests in Kashmir andJammu? At first glance, their charactercould not be more opposed: if the protes-tors in Kashmir shouted slogans in supportof Pakistan and the creation of an Islamicstate, their Jammu counterparts fought un-der the banner of the Hindu god Shiva,casting Islam and Muslims as the enemy.

Ironically, though, the protestors in bothKashmir and Jammu appear to come frommuch the same demographic profile:mainly members of the middle and lowermiddle-class, supported by the urban sub-proletariat. Several accounts point out thatthe agitation was led by young people whooften appeared to have had no past en-gagement with organised politics. It islikely, therefore, that the protests were fu-elled by the uneven economic boom thatJammu and Kashmir has seen in recentyears. The dramatic expansion of private-sector education has created more youngpeople with service-sector skills than thereare available jobs. Moreover, the poor—street vendors, auto-rickshaw drivers orlabourers—find that they have neither theskills nor the capital needed to participate inthe new economy. It seems that the pietistreligious idiom of the protests served to le-gitimise secular rage—the rage of a class ofyoung people who stand at the gates of theearthly paradise promised by the neweconomy, but are denied entry.

New Delhi policy-makers, though, didnot have the leisure to reflect upon these is-sues. Each episode of violence in Kashmirheightened tensions in Jammu. Pushed tothe wall, the Jammu and Kashmir govern-ment resumed use of the coercive instru-ments at its disposal, arresting top seces-sionist leaders and imposing a curfew. It is

impossible, though, to guess precisely howthe confrontation will pan out.

Competing chauvinismsEVER since 2002, when jihadist violence inJammu and Kashmir began to decline, In-dian policy makers have assumed that theanti-India movement in the region will alsoslowly disappear. It has proven to be a seis-mic error of judgement.

Faith and xenophobia have become the

twin poles of a powerfully effective Islamistcampaign begun in 2005, after Islamistsrecognised that the jihad on which theirpolitical position had been predicated wasin terminal decline. Economic change, andconcomitant social dislocation, providedthe firmament for their revival.

Islamists began to make the wider casethat the secularisation of culture in Kash-mir—itself the consequence of economicgrowth—constituted a civilisational threat.In an article published in May 2006, Islamist

22

COVER STORY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

leader Asiya Andrabi wondered whatwould happen if “Muhammad (S.A.W.) willcome to know that the Muslim youth ofKashmir are busy in vulgarity, obscenity,waywardness?” She attacked “young Mus-lim girls who have lost their identity of Islamand are presenting the look of a Bollywoodactress but not Fatima and Aisha (R.A.)[Muhammad’s wife and daughter]”.

Later, Islamists leveraged the uncover-ing of a prostitution racket in Srinagar to ar-gue that secularism and modernity were

media for an Indian conspiracy to under-mine Jammu and Kashmir’s Islamic char-acter. Pro-Islamist scholar Hameeda Naeemeven said the scandal pointed “unequivo-cally towards a policy-based state patron-age [of prostitution]”. Significantly, theprostitution protests saw the first large-scale violent Islamist mob action that wentunchecked by the state. Geelani’s support-ers were allowed to gather at the home ofalleged Srinagar prostitution-ring madamSabina Bulla, and raze it to the ground.

Mobs also attacked the homes of politicianscharged with having used her services.

In the summer of 2007, the rape andmurder of north Kashmir teenager TabindaGani was used to initiate a xenophobiccampaign against migrant workers in thestate. Addressing a rally in the town of Lan-gate on June 24, 2007, Geelani said that“hundreds of thousands of non-state sub-jects had been pushed into Kashmir under along-term plan to crush the Kashmiris”. Heclaimed that “the majority of these non-

23

It seems that the pietist religious idiom of the protests served

to legitimise secularrage—the rage of a class

of young people who stand at the gates of the earthly paradise

promised by the neweconomy, but are

denied entry

”Tens of thousands ofKashmiri Muslims shout pro-freedom slogans in Martyrs’Graveyard in Srinagar

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

state subjects are professional criminals andshould be driven out of Kashmir”. His polit-ical ally, Hilal War, claimed that migrantworkers’ slums were “centres of all kinds ofillegal business”. Language like this in-spired a serious of terrorist attacks on mi-grants, most recently the bombing of a buscarrying workers from Srinagar just as theshrine board protests began.

From these events, Islamists learnedthat the objective conditions existed forxenophobic politics to succeed. Even on theeve of the shrine board protests, Islamistsmobilised against a career counsellor who,they claimed, had been despatched to Srina-gar schools to seduce students into a careerof vice. An Anantnag schoolteacher alsocame under attack, after a video surfacedshowing a group of his students dancing topop film music on a holiday in Anantnag.

When the shrine board protests brokeout, Geelani built on the fears raised bythese mobilisations. Speaking in Srinagaron June 12, he asserted that the land userights granted to the SASB were part of acovert enterprise code-named OperationYatra, which was “devised on the lines ofIsrael’s strategy of settlement in Palestine”.The SASB, he went on, was “pursuing thesimilar method to settle Hindus here”.

Geelani’s success was partly thanks tothe absence of secular voices—either in po-litical life or amongst public intellectuals—challenging his contentions. No politicalgrouping condemned his actions. Indeed,elements in the Congress made oppor-tunistic use of his mobilisation. People’s Democratic Party politicians, too, tried to appropriate Geelani’s rhetoric in an effortto draw the electoral endorsement of hissupporters. So too did the National Confer-ence. Events have shown that all partiesmiscalculated, to be swept away by theIslamist tide they failed to stem when it wasjust a trickle.

Across the Pir Panjal mountains inJammu, a near-identical chauvinist mobili-sation was underway—one that was evenmore invisible to analysts and the govern-ment than its Islamist counterpart.

From 2003, chauvinist groups in Jammubegan to argue that the PDP’s calls fortroop cuts and more federal autonomywere instruments to create a new, Islamistorder which would lead to the eviction ofHindus from the region. Hindutva groupsworked to forge these anxieties into a con-crete political mobilisation around the issueof cattle-slaughter. In December 2007, forexample, VHP and Bajrang Dal cadres organised large-scale protests against the

reported sacrificial slaughter of cows at thevillages of Bali Charna, in the Satwari area ofJammu, and Chilog, near Kathua district’sBani town. Riots had also taken place in thevillages around Jammu’s Pargwal in March2005, after Hindutva activists made bizarreclaims that a cow had been raped.

Congress leaders, hoping to strengthentheir position against the PDP, did nothingto challenge the chauvinist rising. Like thePDP and National Conference in Kashmir,the Congress is now paying the price forthis opportunism by its near-total politicalmarginalisation.

Managing the crisisHOW might events play out from here?

India has long experience in managingfaith-based crises in Kashmir. On Decem-ber 27, 1963, a relic reputed to be a hair ofthe prophet Mohammad disappeared fromKashmir’s most revered shrine, provoking

the first religion-fuelled mass mobilisationin Jammu and Kashmir. For the next sevendays, a cross-party alliance of oppositionfigures known as the Action Committeeemerged as the de facto administration ofJammu and Kashmir. Chaired by clericMaulana Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi, theAction Committee consisted both of Na-tional Conference figures, notably SheikhMohammad Abdullah’s son and later chiefminister, Farooq Abdullah, but also Is-lamists like Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq.Mobs attacked properties owned by thefamily of the New Delhi-backed chief minis-ter, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. As thestate government retreated behind well-guarded doors, the Action Committee ranwhat one contemporary has described as“an unauthorised parallel administration,controlling traffic prices and commerce”.

As it happened, the moe-e-muqaddas relicwas discovered by Indian investigators andrestored to the shrine. However, Prime

24

COVER STORY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

Minister Jawaharlal Nehru understoodthat the crisis compelled him to reconsiderthe basic premises and structure of India’sKashmir policy. At an emergency sub-com-mittee meeting of India’s cabinet, he as-serted that “if Kashmir is so destabilisedthat an ordinary incident of the theft of arelic provokes the people to the extent oftrying to overthrow the government, it istime to adopt a new approach and to bringabout a revolutionary change in our view-point”. He moved to release Sheikh Mo-hammad Abdullah, Jammu and Kashmir’smost important leader, from prison.

New Delhi seeks to emulate that modelnow, by initiating a dialogue with theAPHC in Kashmir. This could, however,prove a dangerous strategy, for there is nolonger one political arbiter who can addressall of Jammu and Kashmir’s concerns.

In January 2004, the secessionist politi-cian Mirwaiz Farooq arrived in New Delhifor his first official dialogue with the Gov-

ernment of India. “We are not expecting adecision tomorrow itself ”, the Srinagar-based cleric said hours before his meetingwith Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani,“but at least the process has begun. It is in-deed a breakthrough in the recent turbu-lent times of the history of Kashmir.”

Two words and seven million peoplewere missing from the comments, and thefive-member delegation Mirwaiz Farooqled to New Delhi: Jammu and Ladakh,home to over half the state’s population.

From the outset, the dialogue processhas prompted rival actors across the stateto sharpen ethnic-religious boundaries. In1999 the National Conference govern-ment, concerned that New Delhi’s en-gagement with the APHC would end in itspolitical marginalisation, issued a reportcalling for the de facto partition of the statealong religious lines. Secessionist SajjadGani Lone has since, championed the

theme, calling for the creation of a “Mus-lim Kashmir”. Mirwaiz Farooq, for hispart, has suggested that he would behappy to be rid of the Hindu-dominated“two-and-a-half districts”. Jammu-basedHindu leaders and Ladakh’s Buddhistleaders, for their part, have also been call-ing for a separate state.

South Asia’s troubled history makes itclear that such ethnic-religious partitions,however attractive they seem, solve noth-ing. After all, India’s division into two statesclaimed a million lives, but did not resolvethe Hindu-Muslim problem in South Asia.

New Delhi would be well advised, in-stead, to break down the communal barriersin Jammu and Kashmir by setting up insti-tutions that cut across ethnic-religious barri-ers. A common chamber of commerce, acommon bar association, and common me-dia bodies, would be a good beginning.

Faced with an impasse in their plot lines,ancient Greek novelists resorted to a deusex machina: literally, ‘god from a machine’.God would simply be winched down to thestage to miraculously resolve an impossiblesituation. New Delhi, sadly, has no such de-vice as its disposal. Patient, long-term po-litical interventions will be needed to pre-vent the shrine land war from turning into afull-blown ethnic-religious conflict.

Praveen Swami is Associate Editor for TheHindu, and also writes for its sister publica-tion, Frontline magazine. He reports on is-sues of security and low-intensity warfare,particularly the conflict in Jammu and Kash-mir and the operations of Islamist terrorgroups in India. Mr. Swami has won severalawards for his work, including the Indian Ex-press- Ramnath Goenka Print Journalist of theYear prize, 2006, for reportage on a series ofterrorist attacks across India that year; thePrem Bhatia Award for Political Journalism,2003, for an expose on how an Indian Armyformation in Jammu and Kashmir falsifieddata to exaggerate its successes; and the San-skriti Samman, 1999, for investigative workon the India-Pakistan war in Kargil. His mostrecent book India, Pakistan and the SecretJihad: the Covert War in Jammu and Kash-mir, 1947-2002, was published in January,2007, and written while he was a JenningsRandolph senior fellow at the United StatesInstitute of Peace in Washington, D.C., in2004-2005. His scholarly work includes a1999 book, The Kargil War; chapters in sev-eral edited volumes; and papers in journals in-cluding The India Review and Faultlines.Born in 1969, Mr. Swami read history atKing’s College, Cambridge University.

25

Ever since 2002, when jihadist violence

in Jammu and Kashmirbegan to decline, Indian

policy makers haveassumed that the anti-India movement in theregion will also slowly

disappear. It has proven to be a seismic error

of judgement

”The All-Parties HurriyatConference leads a massiveprotest march to the UNoffice in Srinagar

HOW does one assess a country'svulnerability to terrorism andsub-conventional warfare? Thisquestion must be coherently ad-

dressed before India can seriously focus onthe challenge of counter-terrorism policyand response; unfortunately, it remains al-most entirely unanswered in the establish-ment discourse.

There is, instead, an inordinate focus ontransient patterns or specific incidents—afocus sharpened by largely uninformed,

and often distorted and sensationalised,media commentary and coverage. Aftereach new incident, a relentless search fornovelty results in the discovery of new pat-terns, new perpetrators, new technologies,new strategies, new tactics and, crucially,new intelligence and police failure, and the

inescapable necessity of new 'out-of-the-box' solutions.

Our assessments are also deeplycoloured by the character and magnitudeof the latest incidents, rather than by anyrational evaluation of trends. The after-math of the serial blasts in Ahmedabad in

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

26

AJAISAHNI

The bogey of ‘intelligencefailure’ masks the deeper

infirmities of India'scounter-terrorism

apparatus. There is acomplete absence of

strategic vision, of thecapacity to assess and

prepare for challenges atall levels.

SECURITYALARM

INTERNAL SECURITY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

July (and the subsequent dis-covery of large quantities ofexplosives and unexplodedimprovised devices) pro-duced a reaction no different to that afterthe Jaipur serial bombings, the Lucknow-Varanasi-Faizabad courthouse bombings,

the attack on the CRPF campat Rampur, the two cycles ofbombings in Hyderabad, andthe Samjhauta Express, to

name only a few incidents in a series thatgoes back at least fifteen years if one focuseson Islamist terrorist attacks alone.

But the incidence—or lack thereof—andprofile of particular terrorist attacks, oreven the surface trends in terrorist vio-lence, are not the best index or context toevaluate the state’s vulnerabilities, as iseven now being dramatically demon-strated in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). For

27

Schoolchildren with toyguns protest the attacksin Hyderabad

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

years now, the In-dian governmenthas been boastingof the decline in fa-talities in J&K, froma peak of 4,507 killed in 2001 (South AsiaTerrorism Portal data), to the sub-high in-tensity conflict levels of 777 killed in 2007,and down further to 328 killed betweenJanuary and August 6, 2008. In this, and inthe peace process with Pakistan—as well asits various gains in terms of ‘people-to-peo-ple contacts’, back-channel diplomacy, andthe opening up of travel routes betweenPakistan and Indian-administered Kash-mir—the government saw the crystallisa-tion of an inexorable process of ‘normalisa-tion’.

Behind this Panglossian façade, how-ever, is the reality of Pakistan’s unchangingintent and continuing support to Islamistterrorist and subversive groups operatingin J&K and across India, and of acutely un-stable power equations between key play-ers. The fact that improvements in J&Kwere not the consequence of a shift in thePakistani mindset, but rather of constraintsthat emerged in Pakistan’s capacity toopenly support terrorism in the wake of the9/11 attacks in the US, was deliberatelybrushed under the carpet. It was, however,occasionally forced back into the publicconsciousness by dramatic terrorist attacksand, more recently, repeated, major cease-fire violations along the Line of Control.

The truth is that, for all her great powerpretensions, her rampaging multinationalcorporations, and her seven to nine percent rates of GDP growth, India is a tremen-dously fragile state, deeply vulnerable tothe threats of subversion, terrorism andsub-conventional warfare.

This is now more than evident in theabrupt and tragic meltdown that Jammuand Kashmir (J&K) is experiencing in thewake of the Amarnath Land Diversion agi-tation. At the core of this fragility is the polit-ical and administrative infirmity that hasgradually undermined the country's secu-rity apparatus, systematically and progres-sively eroding its capacities—or, wheresuch capacities have been preserved insome measure, paralysing their exercisethrough political vacillation and constraintsimposed through mandate and directives.

On December 18, 2008, for instance, ascrowds dispersed from the ‘mass rally’ or-ganised by separatist leaders Syed Ali ShahGeelani of the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat (TeH)and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq of the All PartiesHurriyat Conference (APHC), they ap-

proached Central Reserve Police Force(CRPF) bunkers in the old town and forcedthe personnel deployed there to withdraw.Under explicit orders from the highest au-thorities in the State not to fire on thecrowds, the troopers reluctantly complied,abandoning their posts. Their bunkerswere then smashed and reduced to rubbleby the mob.

Across Srinagar ’s old town, entireneighbourhoods have now been aban-doned by security forces on orders fromabove. These neighbourhoods were hot-beds of terrorism and secessionism throughthe 1990s; it took a slow process of attrition,of fighting from street to street and houseto house with enormous sacrifice of life, tore-establish control there. All these gainshave now been wilfully relinquished by aweak, vacillating and directionless govern-ment. And when the time comes, as it in-evitably must, to restore the state’s controlover these areas, the security forces willonce more have to pay in blood for thepresent political and administrative folly.

This has, with rare exception and some

INTERNAL SECURITY

The truth is that for all her great power

pretensions, herrampaging multinationalsand her seven to nine per

cent growth rates, India is a tremendously fragile

state, deeply vulnerable tothe threats of subversion,

terrorism and sub-conventional warfare

”28

Responsible forputting our house in

order: Home MinisterShivraj Patil

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

30

variance, been the history of terrorism andcounter-terrorism in India: hard-won gainshave repeatedly been frittered away; ad-vances secured over years and decadeshave been quickly surrendered in a mo-ment of political debility or, equally often,partisan and criminal opportunism. Andyet, when terrorist successes are registered,talk invariably returns to police, securityforce and intelligence failures—despite thenumerous successes that these agencieshave secured in the brief periods when anunambiguous political mandate and direc-tion has been forthcoming.

The extended and unending sequenceof Islamist terrorist attacks across India, cul-minating most recently in the Ahmedabadserial blasts and the failed conspiracy inSurat, once again exposes the utter hollow-ness of the country's approach to counter-terrorism—if, indeed, any coherent ap-proach can be attributed to thegovernment. As in the past, the subsequentpolitical debate remains polarised, partisan,and entirely divorced from ground reali-ties. The issues emphasised by the govern-ment and the opposition—the necessity fora ‘Federal Investigation Agency’ and of aPOTA-like law, respectively—are, in fact, al-together irrelevant to effective counter-ter-rorism responses at the present stage. Thegovernment’s position in particular has es-sentially aimed to distract from the neces-sary tasks, ignored for decades, of buildingresponse capacities—to the cumulativedetriment of national interest and security.

India has, of course, a substantial experi-ence of counter-terrorism and counter-in-surgency successes. Regrettably, there is acomprehensive lack of institutional mem-ory and learning, and past experienceshave not been sufficiently studied, distilledand transferred to present and emergingtheatres of conflict and terrorism. There is,indeed, a near-total absence of strategic vi-sion, of the capacity to assess and preparefor challenges at all levels.

The result has been a succession of ran-dom and unstructured ‘emergency re-sponses’ and improvised defences thathave consistently failed to address and ac-commodate the magnitude and complex-ity of the challenge. The security establish-ment and political leadership haveconstantly been taken by surprise, andthere is a comprehensive absence or failureof all emergency response protocols.

At a macro level the state has, for themost part, reacted to each new large-scaleatrocity with the ‘battalion approach’, sim-ply deploying bodies of central forces to the

March 12, 1993: A series of thirteen explo-

sions take place in Mumbai in March 1993.

The coordinated attacks are the most de-

structive bomb explosions in Indian history.

The single-day ‘Bombay bombings’ result in

up to 250 civilian fatalities and 700 injuries.

February 14 1998: In Coimbatore, Tamil

Nadu, 46 persons (35 men, 10 women and

one child) are killed and over 200 injured by

13 bomb attacks in 11 places.

October 1,2001: Terrorists attack the

Jammu and Kashmir Assembly complex,

killing about 35.

December 13, 2001: Five gunmen infiltrate

Parliament House in Delhi in a car with

Home Ministry and Parliament labels. Con-

stable Kamlesh Kumari is first to spot the

terrorist squad. One gunman wearing a sui-

cide vest is shot dead, the vest exploding.

The other four gunmen are also killed. Five

policemen, a security guard, and a gardener

are killed, and 18 others injured. No mem-

bers of government are hurt.

September 24, 2002: Terrorists attack the

Akshardham temple in Gujarat, killing 31.

March 13, 2003: A terrorist bomb attack on

a commuter train in Mumbai kills 11 people.

May 14, 2003: Terrorists attack an army

camp near Jammu, killing more than 30, in-

cluding women and children.

25 August 2003: Twin car bombs explode in

Mumbai, killing 52 and injuring nearly 150.

Both bombs are planted in taxis at lunch

time. One explodes at the Gateway of India

near the Taj Mahal hotel. The other goes off

in a jewellery market in central Mumbai.

August 15, 2004: Bomb explodes in Assam,

killing 16 people, mostly school children.

July 5, 2005: Five suspected Islamist terror-

ists attack the Ram Janambhoomi-Babri

Masjid site. All five are killed in the ensuing

gunfight with the Central Reserve Police

Force (CRPF), who suffer three casualties

including two seriously wounded. One civil-

ian dies in the grenade attack.

29 October 2005:Three explosions in Delhi

kill 62 and injure 210. The bombs are planted

in two busy markets and on a bus, two days

before the Diwali festival.

7 March 2006: A series of bombings across

Varanasi kill at least 28 people and injure 101.

11 July 2006: A series of seven blasts take

place over 11 minutes on Suburban Railway

trains in Mumbai, killing 209 people and in-

juring over 700. The blasts are attributed to

the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Students Islamic

Movement of India (SIMI).

8 September 2006:Explosions in Male-

gaon, in Nashik dis-

trict of Maharashtra,

kill at least 37 and in-

jure over 125. The

bombs go off in a

Muslim cemetery

next to a mosque af-

ter Friday prayers on

the Shab e Bara’at

holy day. Most vic-

tims are Muslim pilgrims.

18 May 2007: A cellphone-triggered blast

inside the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad kills

14 people.

August 25, 2007: At least 42 people die in

two blasts in Hyderabad's Lumbini park and

a restaurant. The police manage to find and

defuse another bomb in the same area in

time.

13 May 2008: Nine synchronised blasts

take place within 15 minutes at various loca-

tions in Jaipur, killing 63 and injuring over

210. A tenth bomb is found and defused.

July 25, 2008: Nine crude bombs triggered

by timers explode in Bengaluru, killing two

and injuring 20.

July 26, 2008: A series of 21 bomb blasts

over 70 minutes kills 56 people and injures

over 200 more. The low-intensity blasts ares-

imilar to the Bengaluru blasts the day be-

fore.

At least 607 people have been killed in terrorstrikes in India from 2001 to July 2008.

CHRONOLOGY OF TERROR

Organiser: GSA Exhibitions Pte Ltd

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

site of the latest outrage without plan ormandate, often abandoning them to insur-mountable odds, and transforming theminto preferential targets of terrorist and in-surgent attack. Such random responses arethe consequence of the state’s chronic fail-ure to invest in creating adequate responsecapacities, a fact evident in the most basicdata relating to policing and security in In-dia today.

India’s vulnerabilities have also beengreatly augmented by the continuous ero-sion of governance and administrative ca-pacities; the degradation of grassroots poli-tics and cadre-based political organisations;the enormous expanse and growth of in-equalities and inequities, particularly, butnot exclusively, in rural India; and a range ofdemographic factors that create vast oppor-tunities for extremist mobilisation.

The state has repeatedly placed greatfaith in ‘developmental initiatives’ to neu-tralise the recruitment base of, and sympa-thy for, extremist groups in terrorism andinsurgency-affected regions. The highestlevels of the national government have reg-ularly reiterated the need for ‘speedy landreforms’ and ‘streamlining’ the deliverymechanisms to implement various devel-opmental and poverty alleviation schemes.These exhortations, however, ignore thefundamental ground realities in conflict ar-eas, where the state’s delivery mechanismsand administrative machinery cowers un-der the shadow of violence, and govern-ment officials often pay extortion sums and‘revolutionary taxes’ to extremist groups.

The problem cannot be addressed withmere tinkering—which appears to be theprincipal response pattern at the nationallevel, as well as in most states. The Groupof Ministers (GoM) Report of February 2001clearly noted that constitutional, legal andstructural infirmities had “eroded theUnion Government’s authority to deal ef-fectively with any threat to the nation’s se-curity”, and called for “appropriate restruc-turing of the MHA (Ministry of HomeAffairs)”. After the United Progressive Al-liance government came to power, PrimeMinister Manmohan Singh repeatedly em-phasised the enormity of the crisis and, justmonths into his tenure, in June 2004, prom-ised a “comprehensive approach” whichwould “create greater synergy between ourintelligence agencies, closer coordinationbetween internal security structures”. Re-grettably, little of this promise has sincebeen fulfilled.

The crisis of India’s internal security, to-day, arises from the fact that the emergency

response paradigm, whichdominates—indeed, virtuallyexhausts—the state’s reactionsto every emerging challenge,has collapsed. This paradigmfails to recognise that terrorism, proxy warsand insurgency are no longer transient‘emergencies’, but chronic conditionsacross vast and expanding areas of thecountry; and that they demand perma-nent, coherent, coordinated and colossalinstitutional responses that are not cen-tralised but distributed right across thestate's jurisdiction, empowering local firstresponders.

It is the infirmities of the presently un-der-manned, under-trained, under-equip-ped and primitive security and justice systems—not inchoate ‘police and intelli-gence failures’—that lie at the core of ourinability to effectively tackle extremist sub-version, terrorism and sub-conventionalwarfare.

Briefly, for instance, there are acutemanpower deficits in the security system.India has a 126 per 100,000 police to popula-tion ratio, compared to Western ratios thatrange between 250 and over 500 per100,000. Worse, the Indian ratio is worked

out against sanctioned posts,against which there is a 9.75 percent deficit across the country,with some states recording anearly 40 per cent deficit. Lead-

ership deficits are worse, and often stagger-ing. Across the country there is a 17 per centdeficit in the sanctioned strength of IndianPolice Service (IPS) cadres; some statesrecord a deficit of nearly 40 per cent. Thesedeficits in manpower and leadership,moreover, are often calculated against sanc-tions that date back more than twodecades, and are woefully inadequate interms of the country’s current populationand challenges.

Western intelligence and enforcementagencies are also backed by cutting-edgetechnologies, the best technical support,enormous resources, and responsive, effi-cient judicial and legislative systems. TheIndian security apparatus, meanwhile, re-mains mired in policing techniques andtechnologies the best of which are decadesold, and many of which date back to theearly 20th century. Other elements of theIndian justice system, including legislationand a formalistic, lingering, unaccountableand often hostile judiciary, offer little sup-

32

The Bomb DisposalSquad checks forbombs in Ahmedabadafter the July attacks

INTERNAL SECURITY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

port to law and order administration orcounter-terrorism.

In the public imagination, the Intelli-gence Bureau (IB) is a million-armed octo-pus, present and watchful everywhere.That is why criticism of the IB and ‘intelli-gence failure’ is loudest after each majorterrorist strike. But even in government,few people are aware that the total strengthof IB field personnel engaged in intelli-gence-gathering for this entire country of1.2 billion souls—for all issues, not justcounter-terrorism—is under 3,500.

In the wake of the Jaipur and Ahmed-abad bombings, the Centre sought to mis-lead the media and public by blaming its se-curity deficiencies on fractious Centre-Staterelations and the Constitutional scheme,and stridently emphasising the need for aFederal Investigative Agency. However, ithas offered no explanation for its failure toimplement long-standing decisions—based on the Girish Saxena Committee’srecommendations dating back to 2001—tomassively upgrade technical, imaging, sig-nal, electronic counter-intelligence and eco-nomic intelligence capabilities, and effect asystemic reform of conventional human in-telligence gathering.

Crucially, while the role of any proposedFIA would be investigative, coming intoplay only after a terrorist crime is commit-ted, intelligence is the principal preventivetool, and this is the function of the IB. Noone has ever argued that the states or theConstitutional scheme have obstructed theIB’s duties across the country. Indeed, someof the most significant cases of terrorismhave been ‘solved’ as a result of active co-operation between State Police investiga-tors and the IB. The states are, in fact, eagerfor any help they can get from Centralagencies in tackling the scourge.

Most ‘intelligence failures’ are, in fact,failures of capacity. Yet the Centre contin-ues to ignore the most basic requirementsof capacity building. The Multi-AgencyCentre, the national intelligence database,and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence,which were to be set up under the IB, re-main mere shell organisations more thanseven years after the decision was taken tocreate them, with endemic manpower,technical, technological and resource short-ages. The Saxena Committee’s recommen-dation to immediately increase the IB'sstrength by 3,000 personnel (accepted bythe government in February 2001), had byAugust 2008 resulted in the sanction of just1,400 additional posts.

Another crucial area of persistent neglectis the National Identity Card Scheme,which has critical ramifications for all secu-rity related issues. Yet, decades after the de-cision to have a unique centrally-issuedmagnetic identity card for each citizen, withembedded biometric identifiers, the projectis still dragging along in the ‘pilot’ stage.

But not only the Centre is at fault. De-spite liberal Central schemes underwritingsecurity related expenditure and policemodernisation in the states, the latter havefailed even to spend the monies allocated(utilisation in 2006-07, for instance, stood at63.71 per cent). The deficits in the policeforce are essentially the consequence ofneglect and administrative incompetencein the states. The states are quick to blamethe Centre for failure to provide ‘actionableintelligence’, but offer no explanation forwhy no credible intelligence emanatesfrom their own (in most cases, degraded ordefunct) intelligence apparatus.

The imagination often runs riot in pro-posing new and ‘out of the box’ solutions tothe challenge of counter-terrorism in India.The reality is that all the solutions alreadyexist ‘in the box’. The problem is implemen-tation, and regime after regime has failedon this count for decades. The very possi-

bility of a coherent response to the risingchallenges of internal security, and to thedanger it poses to India’s economic growthand development, depends on the coun-try’s willingness and competence to recog-nise and address the endemic capacitydeficits in its security, policing and justiceestablishments.

Ajai Sahni is Founding Member & ExecutiveDirector of the Institute for Conflict Manage-ment. He is also Editor, South Asia Intelli-gence Review; Executive Director, SouthAsia Terrorism Portal; Executive Editor,Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolu-tion; Member, State Police Commission, Ut-tarakhand; and Member, Council for SecurityCooperation in the Asia Pacific - India. He hasresearched and written extensively on issuesrelating to conflict, politics and developmentin South Asia, and participated in advisoryprojects undertaken for various National orState Governments. Jointly edited (with K.P.S.Gill) Terror & Containment: Perspectiveson India’s Internal Security; and TheGlobal Threat of Terror: Ideological, Mater-ial and Political Linkages. Received a Ph.D.from Delhi University with his thesis onDemocracy, Dissent & the Right to Information.

33

The infirmities of theunder-manned, under-

trained, under-equippedand primitive security and

justice systems—notinchoate ‘police and

intelligence failures’— lieat the core of our inabilityto tackle internal security

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

34

Strategic partners: PrimeMinister Singh andPresident Bush at the 2007G-8 summit in Germany

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

WHEN the Manmohan Singh-ledgovernment survived a vote ofconfidence on July 22, 2008, itwas able to set in motion a chain

of events that had been dormant for ayear—the operationalisation of the US-India nuclear deal.

Within a week, the IAEA Board of Gover-nors had approved the Safeguards Agree-ment for India, and the ball had moveddown the field to the Nuclear SuppliersGroup. So, if the US-India nuclear deal isoperationalised to the fullest degree, Indiatransforms from a state left out in the nu-clear winter to a fully invested member ofthe nuclear community.

It’s important to note that the NSG wasset up at US insistence in the first place, indirect response to India’s nuclear detona-tion of 1974. Since the US has now spent agood chunk of diplomatic capital on India’sbehalf at international institutions, theprocess of converting the Bush-Singh an-nouncement of July 18, 2005 into a full-fledged and internationally acceptedagreement throws up the question: Howwill the US-India strategic relationship betransformed from this point on? And is thistransformation irreversible?

The answer must be split into three

parts: first, the history and strategic ration-ale for proceeding with the deal from theUS and Indian perspectives; second, theimpact of the finalisation process on thebroad ‘atmospherics’ in each capital and;third, the likely impact of the nuclear dealon defence cooperation and procurement.

History vs. the currentstrategic rationale

IT is largely accurate to say that, between1947 and 2001, US foreign policy and secu-rity diagramming of Asia placed India pri-marily in a regional context that containedPakistan. India was not commonly thoughtof, in Washington, as a unique determinantin the future of Asian security, unlike thepossible role that Sir Olaf Caroe and theViceroy’s Study Group saw for India.

Notwithstanding, the two countriescontinued to engage at diplomatic and secu-rity levels, but, at least officially, this con-nection was anything but firm. India’s em-brace of the Soviet Union during the ColdWar fed a broad suspicion in Washingtonof India's leanings. Similarly, India was con-stantly suspicious about the level of US mil-itary aid to Pakistan. The nadir in US-Indiaties was the deployment of the Seventh

INDO-US RELATIONS

35

A WHOLENEW DEAL?

Will the Indo-US nucleardeal really change the

relationship between theUnited States and India

forever? A look at theimpact of the deal on the

bilateral strategicrelationship.

MANOHARTHYAGRAJ

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

Fleet to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971Indo-Pak war.

When India decided to demonstrate itsnuclear capability in 1974, the US Congresstriggered a series of non-proliferation ini-tiatives that essentially cut India off fromthe global high-technology supply chain.Both countries have struggled with nucleardiplomacy since Pokhran-I, with the Indiannuclear and missile programmes essen-tially driving these US commitments toglobal non-proliferation regimes. As a con-sequence, licensing US technology to Indiawith possible applications to either of theseareas became among the most restrictivefor any recipient country in the 1980s.

Even during this period, both govern-ments made concerted efforts to resolve theissue of technology transfer, recognisingthe importance of a robust relationship be-tween the two largest democracies in theworld. The 1984 MoU led directly to collab-oration in projects like the Light CombatAircraft, but any progress was cut short afterPokhran-II in 1998.

All this history is well known. But whatspecifically has changed in the last 10years? The Talbott-Singh dialogue between1998 and 2001 certainly jump-started thedialogue on finding ways to resolve thetrough that the Glenn Amendment sanc-tions had created. Starting from 2001, four‘inflection points’ have changed the wayIndia is seen by the US, both on Capitol Hilland in the Executive offices.

First, George W. Bush assumed office onJanuary 20, 2001. He brought with him ateam whose approach to diplomacy nevershied away from unilateralism when theybelieved the situation demanded it. Thiswas reflected in an early withdrawal fromthe Kyoto Protocol. Further, the first USAmbassador to India under the Bush 43 ad-ministration was Robert Blackwill who,along with key advisor Ashley Tellis andUndersecretary of Defence Douglas Feith, iscredited with authoring a new direction fora US approach that focuses on India’sunique attributes in Asia.

The 2002 ‘National Security Strategy ofthe United States’ document was a reflec-tion of this approach. For the first time, theUS government was open to the idea of nu-clear diplomacy with India outside of theNPT. A major driver of this new thinkingfrom the US standpoint was that a strongIndia—one with unfettered growth poten-tial—would be needed in Asia to balanceChina’s prolific rise. To that end, India’s lim-ited access to all possible sources of energy,including nuclear, was a detriment, as was

the cap on access to dual-usetechnologies.

Second, in September 2001,the US suffered the cataclysm of9/11 in New York and Washing-ton. From the depths of the tragedy came anew American focus on instability in notjust Afghanistan, but in Pakistan, especiallyin its tribal areas. While the seeds for de-linking India from Pakistan had alreadybeen sown in the US security calculus, theycame into greater focus at the same timethat the American military presence inSouth Asia strengthened.

Third, between 2002 and the present

time, the Indian-American com-munity emerged as a politicalforce to reckon with in domesticUS politics. Where, in the past,the community had been frac-

tured and disorganised, there emerged agradual cohesion of interests, led by organ-isations such as the US-India Political Ac-tion Committee (USINPAC).

Fourth, India’s frenzied economicgrowth, which began in the last decade butreached a compounded zenith in this one,puts it in direct competition with the Westfor fossil fuel energy. The desperate needfor energy can be best exemplified in In-

36

INDO-US RELATIONS

The devastation of9/11: a turningpoint for US policyin South Asia

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

dia’s serious shortage of natural gas. Thisdearth of available carbon-based energysources has motivated prospecting by In-dian companies in places the US considersanathema from a security standpoint, suchas Iran, Syria and even in the US backyard inVenezuela. For the US, competitive pres-sures on energy supply proved to be a deci-sive driver toward nuclear accommodationwith India.

So the Bush-Singh announcement ofJuly 18, 2005 has to be seen in the window ofhistory to understand its importance toboth countries. It fundamentally changesthe playing field by resolving the biggest

legacy issue in bilateral relations—that ofIndia’s status as an outlier in the NPT. Tounderstand why the deal represents a cleanbreak from the past, one major factor has tobe kept in mind: India’s meteoric rise in ab-solute measures of state power has made itimportant to the US. At the same time, In-dia’s new-found economic strength gives itnegotiating power with the internationalcommunity, and especially with the US.

The deal is expected to create a plethoraof investment opportunities for US capitalin India, to serve the huge expansion in nu-clear power infrastructure. Consequently,there will be an expected surge in technol-

37

Between 1947 and 2001, US foreign policy and

security diagramming ofAsia placed India

primarily in a regionalcontext that contained

Pakistan. The deal de-couples India from

Pakistan in theatmospherics on Capitol

Hill and Foggy Bottom that surround US

policy in South Asia

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

ogy-related jobs in both countries. The re-sults will only show in a decade or so, butif the US-India nuclear deal proves to be akey factor in lifting artificial caps on India’seconomic growth, the product—India’senormous potential achieved—would bebeneficial to the strategic interests of bothcountries.

While the US would like India to emergeas a contender for China in Asia (and Indiawould like to achieve growth to rivalChina), US and Indian officials do not pub-licly believe that a strategic partnershipshould be ‘aimed’ at China. In fact, both theUS and India would prefer to maintaintheir own independent axes to China. In-

dia’s future as an Asian power, from bothcountries’ viewpoints, need not thus belinked only to a counter-China orientation.

If, as a result of the economic impact ofthe US-India nuclear deal, India firmly andirreversibly becomes another ‘accretionnode’ in Asia around which smaller statescould coalesce, the interests of both the USand India will be served.

Finally, the deal de-couples India fromPakistan in the atmospherics on CapitolHill and Foggy Bottom that surround USpolicy in South Asia. Pakistan can obviouslynot be granted a similar exception in nuclear commerce rules, given the blatantviolation of non-proliferation norms that

the AQ Khan network engaged in. An ex-ception under those circumstances wouldbe unthinkable. The undertones of this de-coupling are strategic in nature, but theyhave specific relevance to micro-issuessuch as technology transfer decisions.

The process and related‘atmospherics’

THE process of finalising the deal threw uptwo happenstances that are relevant to thefuture impact of the US-India nuclear dealon bilateral relations.

First, as previously mentioned, the

38

INDO-US RELATIONS

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

Indian-American community emerged as apolitical force in the US. Their continuedpresence on the US stage from this point onwill ensure that past dips in the tempera-ture of government-to-government dia-logue do not recur.

India, and groups with an affinity to In-dia, belatedly realised what the Pakistanlobby had learned a while earlier: that theprocess of public advocacy in Washington isincomplete without a strategy to advocatebefore Congress. Until 2003, rhetoric lambasting India was frequently heard atInternational Relations hearings in bothchambers of Congress. As the Indian-American community began to make itself

more visible, and as India’s importance tothe US began to be seen in unitary termsacross Washington, the volume and fre-quency of rhetoric that the Indian govern-ment had previously found offensiveclearly decreased.

Second, in deciding to find alternativesto the Left to push the deal forward, theCongress party gained a degree of freedomto pursue economic and security initiativesto which the Left had been reflexively op-posed. Without entirely ruling out the possibility of a future political accommoda-tion between the Congress and the Leftparties, there is little likelihood of such apossibility any time soon. If the BJP is able toform the next Central government, the Leftbloc will certainly continue to be sidelined.The Left’s influence on central policies isprobably, therefore, smaller now thanwhen they were part of the government.This state of affairs is a direct result of theprocess of operationalising the nucleardeal.

In both capitals, the precepts of democ-racy and openness dictate that bureaucraticdecision-making becomes the product ofinstitutionalism. Specifically, each new ini-tiative has opponents and proponents whoare able to work within the system to pro-mote their ideas. The phenomenon of ‘at-mospherics’ thus becomes very important.In Washington at least, lower-level officialsalso have the ability to discuss or delay ini-tiatives that they fundamentally question.

Although there is no explicit link be-tween the nuclear deal and bilateral de-fence cooperation, during the year whenthe US-India nuclear deal was in hiberna-tion, the importance in Washington of atmospherics was especially felt in somedecisions that affected the pace of collabora-tion on security.

To provide a broad reference, manytechnology transfer decisions in the US re-quire proponents, especially in cases wherethe transfer needs to go through additionaldiligence for possible effects on US securityor for non-proliferation concerns. In thepast, dual-use technology licensing provedproblematic in cases that could ‘help’ In-dia’s nuclear or missile programmes. Anec-dotes suggest that when the nuclear dealpicked up steam again, so did top US offi-cials’ interest in pushing tough decisions ontechnology transfer. When the deal fellsilent, many in Washington turned their at-tention elsewhere, believing that the mercu-rial nature of US-India relations was back,like the proverbial bad penny.

The nuclear deal could not have pro-

39

If the US-India nucleardeal proves to be a key

factor in lifting artificialcaps on India’s economic

growth, the product—India’s enormous potential

achieved—would bebeneficial to the strategic

interests of both countries

”POWER CAPACITY STATION STATE (MW)

Kaiga Karnataka 660

Kakrapar Gujarat 440

Kalpakkam Tamil Nadu 440

Narora Uttar Pradesh 440

Rawatbhata Rajasthan 740

Tarapur Maharastra 1400

TOTAL 4120

THE PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AREKaiga Karnataka 220

Rawatbhata Rajasthan 440

Kudankulam Tamil Nadu 2000

Kalpakkam Tamil Nadu 500

TOTAL 3160

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

gressed to the present point without top-level support in both New Delhi and Wash-ington. It’s pretty clear that, for the mostpart, the US Administration and Congresssupport it (though some in Congress maycontinue to have reservations). The processof finalising the deal has clearly and posi-tively affected the atmospherics toward India in Washington and will serve noticein the US internal system that the relation-ship has irrevocably changed; that is, thathistory is history, the future is now. Simi-larly, if the Indian government’s eagernessto move to the IAEA and NSG is an indica-tion, the atmospherics in New Delhi arealso currently favourable, bearing in mindthat there is now an opportunity to castaside the mercurial history of Indo-US interaction within the international system.

The impact of the deal onthe defence relationship

IT’S very clear that the militaries of bothcountries seek a closer relationship witheach other. India has begun to see the US asa viable and reliable source of defence tech-nology and, in January this year, placed anorder for six C-130J transport aircraft forSpecial Operations use.

The Pentagon has consistently held thatthe nuclear deal has nothing to do with itspursuit of a closer defence relationshipwith India. Successful exercises such asCope India, Malabar and the hugely antici-pated participation of the Su-30 MKI in RedFlag this year have all proceeded inde-pendently of the deal. Still, acknowledgingthe impact of atmospherics on decision-making culture (each country has an inter-agency process), it would be accurate to suggest that defence officials in both coun-tries were paying attention to the fate of thenuclear deal.

Most likely, the nuclear deal will have alimited impact on Indo-US defence ties thatgo over and above close cooperation be-tween the militaries. The procurementprocess in India views each programme independently, and this will probably notchange, except in situations where the of-fering from the US is not available on theworld market. In competitive situations,cost will still be a prime determinant ofwhich company wins a particular bid.

Many analysts in India have surmisedsome sort of connection between the nu-clear deal and the $11b MRCA (Multi-RoleCombat Aircraft) programme; that is, thatthe passage of the nuclear deal means that

India will go with an Americanentry (F-16 or F-18) in a direct cor-relation. The sheer size of thatdeal means that India would beremiss in not leveraging somesort of strategic advantage fromit. Passing the nuclear deal could certainlyencourage India to go with the US in thisprogramme for political reasons. However,the decision would not be related only tothe nuclear deal, but to the other interde-pendencies that such a purchase wouldbuild.

Atmospherics suggest that the Indiangovernment may now be more receptive toarguments on trenchant defence issuessuch as End-Use Monitoring and the CIS-

MOA (Communication Interop-erability and Security Memoran-dum of Agreement), which ac-cording to US law are essential toassure Congress that US technol-ogy is protected. But the final de-

cisions in these cases will depend on India’sdomestic drivers, not the nuclear deal.

From the US perspective, the biggest im-pact of the deal’s revival will be US defencecompanies continuing to maintain a pres-ence in India. Unlike their competitors inmany countries, US companies cannotcount on their government for financialsupport in market development.

Certainly, while the nuclear deal was inhibernation, many companies were hesi-

40

Sukhoi 30-Mki inthe United Statesduring jointexercises betweenIndia and the US

INDO-US RELATIONS

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

tant to expand their respective Indian operations. The consummation of the dealsignifies, to the US defence industry, thatthey have a chance in the market—that is,the Indian market will take them seriously.Given that the nuclear issue previouslycaused some of them to terminate Indianoperations, the symbolism is apparent.

This, ultimately, will be the lastinglegacy of the US-India nuclear deal for bothcountries: it will lay the first building blockfor both countries to simultaneously mini-mize energy competition and maximize India’s economic potential. The securityimplications for both in this combinationare evident enough, even outside a crys-tallised defence relationship.

Manohar Thyagaraj has a Masters in International Relations from MarquetteUniversity, studying with Dr. Raju Thomas,a noted scholar of South Asian security and nuclear issues. He has been published in journals such as the USAF Air andSpace Power Journal and ORBIS. He iscurrently a Director of the US-India Busi-ness Alliance (USIBA), a trade associationwith offices in Washington and New Delhi.He is also the Founding Editor of En-gageINDUS, a new journal on US-India relations. He has been a consultant to USand Indian defence and aerospace companiesin developing business opportunities andteaming arrangements in the defence andhomeland security spaces.

41

From the US perspective,the biggest impact of thedeal’s revival will be US

defence companiescontinuing to maintain a

presence in India.Theconsummation of the

deal would signify that they have a chance in

the Indian market

”

The silhouette of an oilrefinery: the outdatedprofile of our energysecurity policy

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

42

ENERGY POLICY

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

VIKRAM S. MEHTA

43

INDIAPETROLEUM

INC.A secure oil supply is no

longer enough to meet theenergy challenges of the

21st century. India needs tostep on the gas and rethinkits energy security policy to

avoid future catastrophe.

ENERGY security in the 21st century iswidely written about and discussed forgood reason: the price of crude oil hastouched unprecedented highs; the po-

litical drama in Delhi is being played out in theshadow of the Indo-US nuclear energy deal;

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

the Middle East is on edge with US Presi-dent Bush's unremitting remonstrationsagainst Iran; and the world is warming because of the pattern and content of energy consumption.

The question is: Will this heightened interest and concern lead to a reassessmentof our energy policy, and trigger the organ-isational and structural changes requiredto effectively respond to emergent chal-lenges that are very different today fromthose we have faced in the past? This re-mains to be seen, but what is clear is thatthe costs of carrying on with 'business asusual' are potentially colossal.

Energy security has so far been seenthrough the lens of oil/gas supply security,the assumption being that energy securityis guaranteed if petroleum is secured onlong-term, reliable terms. The substantivefocus of our policy has therefore been on thelevers of petroleum supply, rather than ondemand management. The policy has beennationalist and short term, favouring bilat-eral deals over international arrangements,with scant debate about longer-term imper-atives. The rhetoric on renewables has al-ways been louder than the action.

Looking ahead, it is clear that this nar-rowly-focused policy cannot meet theemergent challenges of energy security, because security is no longer only aboutsupply and demand of petroleum. It is alsoabout sustainability, and about the impact ofenergy on the environment. We live in aconnected world in which global problemslike climate change have no respect for national boundaries; pursuing energy se-curity without considering its carbon foot-print will only deepen our exposure to thevicissitudes of the outside world.

A unidimensional, supply-focused, na-tionalist approach cannot address theseproblems. We require a multipronged policyalong the several fronts of supply, demand,technology, renewables and carbon, and anorganisational and decision-making struc-ture that has the remit, expertise and execu-tive authority to weld these prongs into oneholistic, seamless instrument.

This article has a three-fold purpose: toset the backdrop of our approach to energysecurity; to elaborate on the underlying dynamics of energy security in the 21st cen-tury; and to sketch the contours of a robustfuture policy.

The backdropTHE Yom Kippur war of October 1973, andthe subsequent embargo on crude oil sup-

plies to Western countries sym-pathetic to Israel, jolted Indiainto recognising its vulnerabil-ity to the geopolitics of interna-tional petroleum. Before thewar, the notion of energy security wastalked about, but was not a policy priority.Thereafter, it was thrust into the forefrontof the public agenda.

Since Yom Kippur, India's energy secu-rity policy has rested on oil supply securityand has three components:

DDeevveelloopp iinnddiiggeennoouuss hhyyrrooccaarrbboonn rreesseerrvveessTHIS was initially the preserve of theONGC, but once the government realisedthat exploration was high-risk and high-cost, and that technology and operationalexpertise were key to success, it relaxed policy to include the private sector. Theterms were formalised in a 'production-sharing' contract, and 'sold' to the privatesector under the New Exploration LicensingPolicy (NELP). Seven such rounds have

been completed.This policy component has

not been successful. Domesticproduction has not increasedand, more pertinently, the re-

covery of hydrocarbons from our discov-ered fields remains much lower than the re-covery from international fields ofcomparable geology. The Directorate Gen-eral of Hydrocarbons has officially statedthat India recovers only 28% of its reserves.The international average is closer to 40%.

The government has also recently ap-proved the creation of strategic reserves designed to sustain consumption for up to15 days. Whether 15 days is sufficient safe-guard against a major disruption, andwhether the carrying costs of the invento-ries will outweigh the benefits of a 15 daybuffer, needs to be rigorously studied.

AAccqquuiirree oovveerrsseeaass eexxpplloorraattiioonn aanndd pprroodduucc--iinngg aasssseettssTHE government created ONGC Videsh

44

ENERGY POLICY

Rising oil prices andenvironmentaldegradation call fornew energy solutions

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

(OVL), a 100% subsidiary of ONGC, for thispurpose. OVL started slowly, but in recentyears has aggressively expanded its inter-national footprint. Today it has producingassets in almost every continent, with Sudan and Russia absorbing perhaps itslargest investments.

The question persists whether owner-ship of overseas assets is the appropriatetool to enhance supply security. In a worldof embargoes and sanctions it would cer-tainly be. But is it so in a globalised and connected world? Oil is tradable; in princi-ple, anyone with money should be able topurchase it. Further, if production were disrupted or shipping lines clogged, owner-ship would not be of any help since sup-plies would be interrupted.

These questions should be debatedagainst the backdrop of whether a strategicpremium should be paid for these acquisi-tions—especially in view of how countrieslike China are vigorously scouring theworld for oil/gas assets—or whether they

should be seen as arms-length commercialtransactions. If the view is that these acqui-sitions are indeed of strategic import, then afurther question should be asked: Are weeffectively leveraging the balance sheet ofIndia Petroleum Inc. to compete in the international market?

PPuurrssuuee ooiill ddiipplloommaaccyy IT IS not formally acknowledged, norfound in the lexicon of government-speak;but the term 'oil diplomacy' permeates thepolicy interstices of oil supply security. Rela-tionships with major resource holders likeSaudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Iran,Russia and Venezuela are deemed strategic,and pursued in concert with the Ministryof External Affairs. The results have beencommendable. We have effectively lever-aged our economic strength, and in particu-lar the attractions of our domestic market, to conclude government-to-governmentcrude oil term deals such as an LNG sup-ply contract with Qatar, the Sakhalin investment in Russia, and so on.

These three components, singularly focused on oil supply, have in essence de-fined our energy security policy since themid-1970s. The policy has, of course, alsoemphasised coal, and in more recent yearshas increasingly supported renewables likesolar, wind, nuclear and bio. Demand man-agement and efficiency have, of course,been acknowledged as important tools ofpolicy. But compared to the resources thathave been allocated to petroleum, theseother initiatives have hardly been conse-quential.

The high opportunity costs of this uni-dimensional approach can be gauged fromthe results achieved by countries that took amore holistic view of energy. France, for in-stance, responded to the first oil shock byinvesting heavily in nuclear energy. Today itderives 80% of its power from nuclear en-ergy. Brazil legislated to incentivise its sugarproducers to produce ethanol. Today, everyretail outlet has the dual facility to offerethanol or gasoline; the cars are flex fuel,and the motorist can choose to buy gaso-line or ethanol depending on the relativeprice. Brazil, once a major importer of oil,today exports the commodity. The US andEurope tightened standards on energy effi-ciency and allowed the price mechanism todampen consumption. Their elasticity ofdemand for energy has consequently fallento around 0.25 (i.e., for every 1% increase inGDP, their demand for energy increases byonly 0.25%). The comparable figure in In-dia is closer to 1.

45

The policy has beennationalist and short-term,

favouring bilateral dealsover international

arrangements, with scantdebate about longer-termimperatives. The rhetoric

on renewables has alwaysbeen louder than action

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

The presentEDMUND Burke said that society is a part-nership between the dead, the living andthe yet unborn. Our energy security policymust draw on the lessons of the past andbuild on the underlying trends of the pres-ent, to protect the interests of the unborn.

Three hard truths underpin the present.First, energy demand in India will con-

tinue to increase as population rises and be-comes more prosperous. The burgeoningmiddle class, for instance, will want to tradeup from cycles to two-wheelers to cars.

Second, the supply of energy will struggleto keep pace with growing demand. India isnot sitting on a sea of hydrocarbons. We willno doubt find additional accumulations ofoil and gas, but these will be in difficult ter-rain; the costs of development and produc-tion will be high, and the quantities, mostlikely, relatively small. We have abundantcoal resources, but their potential is limitedby quality (a high ash content) and infra-structural and transport bottlenecks (the bigmines are located a long way from markets).

If the 123 Indo-US nuclear agreementnow inching its way to resolution is con-cluded, it will boost the share of nuclear energy in our energy consumption basket;but the challenges associated with uraniummining, plant construction and waste dis-posal should not be underestimated. Two, ifnot three major industries will have to bedeveloped for nuclear energy to make ameaningful contribution.

Bio energy will also gain inimportance, but short of a tech-nological breakthrough, it willbe limited by land availabilityand the (unintended) fallout onagricultural production and food prices.Solar and wind have potential, but it de-pends on how quickly technology canbring down costs and render them com-mercially competitive.

The naked truth is that India’s economyis built on the foundations of fossil fuels,and it will take a long time and huge invest-ment to rebuild it. Until then, the demandand supply equation will be tight.

Third, our environment is under stress.The government correctly refuses to acceptmandatory limits on carbon emissions, butcannot deny the link between containingcarbon emissions and national self-interest.Our economy is currently on a high energyand carbon path; if we do not get off thispath, we will some years from now face anenormous social and economic cost. Howwe do it is another matter, but that we mustis the hard truth.

The futureTHE contours of an emerging new energysecurity policy must be framed againstthese three present truths, and driven bythe following principles:

First, it must recognise that energy secu-rity cannot be divorced from climate secu-

rity. Security attained at the costof environmental degradation isno security at all.

Second, it must recognisethat there is no silver bullet. A

multi-pronged effort will be required specif-ically along the fronts of supply accretion,demand management, renewables, energyefficiency, infrastructure, technology andthe containment of avoidable losses (suchas theft and T&D losses).

Third, it must recognise that in a con-nected and interdependent world, withglobal warming transcending nationalboundaries, energy nationalism is a neces-sary but insufficient step towards sustain-able energy security. This does not meanthat we should forego opportunities simply because the rest of the world op-poses us, but it does mean that while pursuing these opportunities we shouldkeep in mind the broader imperatives ofthe environment.

Fourth, it must recognise that state-of-the-art technology and innovation is key tounlocking new and sustainable sources ofenergy. This will require a stable operatingand regulatory environment, and open-ness to partnerships.

Fifth, it must set a price for carbon, andcreate a transparent mechanism for carbontrading. The objective should be to‘shadow price’ the carbon footprint of ourenergy policy, and in the process incen-tivise the development of clean technol-

46

ENERGY POLICY

Our energy securitypolicy has to plan fordemand that is onlygoing to go up and up

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

ogy, Carbon Capture and Sequestration(CCS) and clean fuels.

Finally, it must recognise that energypolicy has to be developed holistically andunder one decision-making and organisa-tional structure. The current system of deci-sion-making is not conducive to an integrated energy security policy. Multiplegovernment ministries are directly or indi-rectly engaged with energy (viz. separateministries for Petroleum, Coal, Power,Non-conventional, Atomic, Planning Com-mission and the PMO). Each has a minis-ter, a civil service head and several publicsector entities. Each has a distinct agenda, awell-defined constituency, and a vested in-terest in promoting itself. Under these cir-cumstances it is no surprise that our ap-proach to energy security has been ad hoc.The structure must change, and functionunder an appointed energy czar who hasthe responsibility and the authority to for-mulate and implement all aspects of en-ergy policy.

Our energy system sits at the nexus ofsome of the greatest dilemmas facing thegovernment: the development dilemma ofprosperity versus poverty; the industrialisa-tion dilemma, of growth versus environ-ment; and the political dilemma, of pop-ulism versus statesmanship. There is noideal way of resolving the consequent ten-sions and contradictions. The inevitablestrains will be easier to manage if we bearin mind, at all times, the five words that

summarise the challenge of energy securityin the 21st century: More energy, less car-bon dioxide.

Vikram Singh Mehta is Chairman of theShell Group of Companies in India since 1994.His career began with the Indian Administra-tive Service (IAS), in 1978. He resigned thatposition in 1980 and joined Philips Petroleumin London as their Senior Economist. He waswith Philips Petroleum for 4 years in Londonand at their headquarters in Bartlesville, Okla-homa, USA. In 1984 he returned to India tojoin the Public Sector Oil Company "Oil IndiaLimited" as its Advisor (Strategic Planning).He resigned from Oil India in 1988 and joinedShell International, London. In 1991, he wasposted to to Egypt as the Managing Directorfor Shell Markets and Chemicals, Egypt. In1994, he returned to India as the Chairman ofthe Shell Group in India. Vikram was a mem-ber of the National Council of the Confedera-tion of Indian Industry (CII) and Chairman ofits hydrocarbons committee. He is a non-exec-utive Director of Colgate Palmolive India Lim-ited and Indian Public Schools Society. He wasalso Chairman of the Board of Trustees, YoungPeople's Award Programme (Duke of Edin-burgh's Award) India. Vikram has a BA(Hons) degree in Mathematics from St.Stephens College, Delhi University, an MA inEconomics from Magdalen College, OxfordUniversity and an MA from the FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Univer-sity. The views expressed here are personal.

47

Our economy is currentlyon a high energy and

carbon path; if we do notget off this path, someyears from now we will

face an enormous socialand economic cost. How

we do it is another matter;but that we must is the

hard truth

”

ACCORDING to all avilable reports,the government of Sri Lanka ispoised on the cusp of a military vic-tory against the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For two years, andsince it succeeded in evicting the LTTE fromthe Eastern Province, the government hasbeen determined to destroy the LTTE’s mil-itary capability and recapture the territoryunder its control in northern Sri Lanka. Tap-ping into frustration with the twenty-five-year-old conflict, and an ideological alle-giance to a status quo unitary state in SriLanka, President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s gov-ernment has galvanised overwhelmingsupport in its favour, on the grounds thatthis is not an ethnic conflict, but a waragainst terrorism; and furthermore, that itcan and will be won, with victory both cer-tain and imminent.

The most recent evidence of popularsupport for the President’s position is thesweeping success his coalition obtained inelections to provincial councils in theSabaragamuwa and North CentralProvinces on 23 August 2008.

Political failure THE anticipated victory, however, obscuresthe profound challenge confronting theregime, which is the question of whethermilitary conquest will end the conflict andprovide the basis for a durable peace.

The long-standing consensus regardingconflict resolution and transformation inSri Lanka has been: that it is an ethnic con-flict, of which terrorism and the LTTE aresymptomatic; that, accordingly, it requires anegotiated political and constitutional set-tlement along power-sharing lines and be-yond the existing constitutional parametersof a unitary state; and that the northernand eastern provinces of Sri Lanka consti-tute, as set out in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accordof 1987, are areas historically inhabited byTamil-speaking peoples, and will thereforebe merged as the Northeastern province.

Since assuming office, the Rajapaksaregime has systematically, and so far suc-cessfully, unpacked and discarded these be-liefs, replacing them with the fundamental

belief that it is not an ethnic conflict but awar against terrorism; and that politically,no more needs to be done than implementdevolution under the existing constitution.The regime has thus effectively staked out aposition in defence of the status quo.

Military victory could provide respitefrom war for some years, but not a resolu-tion of the conflict. Sri Lanka could conse-quently be consigned to an indefinitelyprotracted conflict in which the LTTE will, ifit can, revert to guerilla warfare and rebuild

its military capabilities on the continuinggrievances and unfulfilled aspirations ofthe Tamil population in the north and east.

Qualifications are in order, however.The expectation of the government’s mili-tary victory is built upon war reportageprovided almost exclusively by the regime.It is also not clear whether the LTTE is ced-ing territory in order to draw security forcesdeeper into territory under its control be-fore it counter-attacks, or whether it is astrategic retreat and a precursor to intensi-

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

48

PAIKIASOTHYSARAVANAMUTTU

NEIGHBOURWATCH

BEARDING THE

TIGERThe government’s impendingmilitary conquest of the LTTE

may end the twenty-five-year-oldwar in Sri Lanka, but it will take

more than that to bring peace toIndia’s troubled neighbour.

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

fied guerilla war. The LTTE’s ability to re-vert to guerilla warfare and wreak punitivedamage on security forces and governmentinfrastructure is an open question.

What is very clear is that the pool ofmanpower and resources available for theLTTE to sustain military resistance to the SriLankan state over time is considerably di-minished, and continues to diminish daily.Civilians in LTTE-held areas are fleeinghostilities, some to government areas andothers deeper into LTTE-controlled terri-

tory; there are reports of thegovernment encouragingcivilian flight, and of the LTTElikewise preventing it. Inter-national action has proscribedthe LTTE’s fundraising and front organisa-tions in a number of countries, severely re-stricting its access to material support fromthe Tamil diaspora in the West in particular.

All of this reinforces the argument that apolitical settlement is central to preventing aprotracted and debilitating conflict. What-

ever the fate of the LTTE, theTamil community’s grievancesand aspirations, and that ofother minorities and their re-lationship with the majority

community and state, remains at the heart ofthe challenge of democratic peace and gov-ernance in Sri Lanka.

A number of key figures have recentlyalluded to this, both directly and indirectly.The Sri Lankan Army Commander, brief-ing foreign correspondents in Colombo,

49

The elite counter-terrorism Special TaskForce unit demonstratesunarmed combat skills

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

made the point that the war would be con-cluded by the end of next year but, becauseof a continuing belief in Tamil nationalism,the conflict could endure for years to come.The Indian National Security Advisor MKNarayan weighed in to say that the govern-ment of Sri Lanka had to win over the Tamilpopulation, in response to which thebrother of the Sri Lankan president, De-fence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, saidthat Mr Narayan’s view concurred withwhat President Rajapaksa has been sayingall along about the importance of a politi-cal settlement. He went on to concede thatthe regime did have a problem winningover the Tamil people.

Prospects for a politicalsettlement

RHETORIC and benevolence notwith-standing, the question remains whetherany political settlement will be forthcom-ing, and in what circumstances. It is diffi-cult to conceive of a situation in which theRajapaksa regime will come up with a polit-ical package on the heels of military victory,given its ideological orientation and politicalalliances—especially with the Sinhala na-tionalist Jathika Hela Urumaya (or NationalHeritage Party), supported by a section ofthe Buddhist priesthood.

Tragically, the history of the conflictdemonstrates that the principal source ofleverage with the Sri Lankan state has beenmilitary resistance by the LTTE and, beforeit destroyed them, other Tamil militantgroups as well. The discussion about devo-lution and power-sharing—in effect about anew social contract in Sri Lanka—has beenprompted only by stalemate on the battle-field of ethnic conflict, or by external inter-vention, as in the case of devolution ush-ered in by the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.Given the majority community’s strongcommitment to majoritarian democracy,devolution and genuine power-sharing hasat best been gradually and grudgingly ac-cepted in the political agenda, with no realenthusiasm or active support to explore itspotential for conflict transformation as anational priority.

The LTTE is highly unlikely to achieve aconventional military defeat of the govern-ment forces. A peace process aimed at ne-gotiating a political and constitutional settle-ment is more likely to evolve out of astalemate situation, in which both sides willnegotiate because they have to rather thanbecause they want to. For the LTTE, negoti-

ations based on the currentmilitary and political statusquo would be politically prob-lematic in view of their loss ofthe east, especially given the article of faithabout the north and east being the ‘tradi-tional homelands’ of the Tamils. However,the organisation’s totalitarian nature mayironically afford greater flexibility in pre-senting a return to the negotiating table inadverse circumstances as a tactical ploy in alarger strategic plan.

Currently, there is no formal peaceprocess. The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA)

signed in 2002 was abrogatedby the government at the be-ginning of 2008. The CFA pro-vided for a Scandinavian

monitoring mission under the aegis of theNorwegian facilitators of the process. It wasobserved more in the breach throughoutthe period of its existence, although it mustbe credited with reducing the number of fa-talities, and generating enthusiasm and ex-pectations—unfounded though theyturned out to be—for a permanent peace.

Seeking a political settlement is ostensi-bly the responsibility of the All Party Repre-

NEIGHBOURWATCH

50

Manmohan Singh andRajapakse ahead of asummit in Colombo

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

sentatives Committee (APRC), establishedby President Rajapaksa in 2006 to come upwith what was is termed a ‘southern’ con-sensus, or consensus of all non-Tamil politi-cal parties, on a political settlement of theethnic conflict.

After some eighteen months in exis-tence, and in response to international, andin particular Indian pressure to come upwith a set of political proposals, the APRC inearly 2008 recommended the full imple-mentation of the Thirteenth Amendmentto the Constitution, which was passed inthe wake of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Ac-

cord, and which paved the way for the es-tablishment of provincial councils. Key pro-visions of this legislation, devolving policepowers to the provinces, have never beenimplemented in the twenty years sinceprovincial councils were established in thecountry. The APRC in effect proposed, af-ter over a year’s deliberations, and the pres-ident’s prodding, that the constitution ofthe country be implemented in full!

The APRC saga is illustrative of the gov-ernment’s position on the utility of constitu-tional reform for conflict transformationand power-sharing. The devolution provi-

sions of the constitutional amendment andthe provincial council system, never fullyimplemented, were intended especially forthe northeast province, as the two pro-vinces were called after their merger as a re-sult of the 1987 Accord. However, the ChiefMinister of that province unilaterally de-clared independence, claiming that thecouncil had not received the resources itwas entitled to, and was dismissed in 1990.Neither province had an elected counciluntil the March 2008 provincial elections inthe demerged Eastern Province.

This illustrates two key problems with

51

Devolution and genuinepower-sharing has at best

been gradually andgrudgingly accepted in the

political agenda, with noreal enthusiasm or active

support to explore itspotential for conflicttransformation as a

national priority

”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

the provincial council system as a mecha-nism of devolution. The first relates to thesystem’s imbalanced power structure infavour of the central government, a keyreason for why the Supreme Court of SriLanka passed it, ruling by a majority of onethat it fell within the confines of the unitarystate stipulated by Article 2 of the Constitu-tion. The second, consequent to this, is theculture of centralisation within the bureau-cracy, which militates against operationalis-ing devolution and power sharing. This hasbeen the experience of all councils through-out the country, even when the council andruling power are of the same party.

The Rajapaksa regime originally pro-posed decentralisation within the APRC, be-fore openly championing the constitutionalstatus quo. District-wise decentralisationhad been suggested in the early 1980s with-out success. The APRC had been widely ex-pected to propose what had come to be pop-ularly called Thirteenth Amendment Plus,i.e., going beyond the existing constitutionalconfines. It was also widely believed that thekey international proponent of this, and theone with the most leverage—given,amongst other things, that it had authoredthe 1987 Accord—was India. India pointedlywelcomed the APRC Interim Report as a“first step”, buying itself time and avoidingany responsibility it had to ensure thatsomething more substantial be proposed. Atthe same time, it created additional space forthe Rajapaksa regime to pursue its militaryobjectives against the LTTE.

International responsesTHE international response to the Ra-japaksa regime and its pursuit of militaryvictory provides interesting insights intothe impact of the new international balanceof power on a local conflict and regionalpower dynamics.

The post-2002 CFA peace process pro-voked considerable international interesteven though Sri Lanka does not constitute astrategic interest for any of the major actorsin the international community besides In-dia. The concern may have had to do withthe world’s desire to support and partici-pate in a process that it believed could suc-ceed. In addition, the United National Front(UNF) government in India aimed to con-struct an international safety net withwhich to contain the LTTE—an objective itshared with the US. The high point of inter-national involvement was the establish-ment of the Co-Chairs of the 2003 TokyoDonor Conference, comprising the US, the

Norwegian facilitator of thepeace process, the EuropeanUnion and Japan, whichserved as a liaison body be-tween the Sri Lankan government and theinternational community. The Co-Chairskept India constantly informed of their de-liberations, although India was not a formalmember of the group.

The Co-Chairs and the internationalcommunity faced the challenging of find-ing an appropriate response to CFA viola-tions and the threat of war. Besides rhetoricalstatements urging a return to negotiationsand further restrictions on the LTTE, interna-tional actors were confronted with thedilemma of responding to the unravellingpeace process, without exposing the limits oftheir leverage or being accused of desertion.The challenge was compounded in 2006with the outbreak of full-scale hostilities anda mounting human rights and humanitar-ian crisis, in which serious allegations werelevelled against the government and secu-rity forces.

The Western-dominatedinternational community hasbeen critical of the govern-ment on the human rights

front and for fostering a pervasive culture ofimpunity—a criticism expressed by cur-tailed official development assistance, andthe sponsorship of a resolution in the UNHuman Rights Council. However, the SriLankan government has more or less coun-tered the impact of this by exploiting theopportunities presented by the emergingglobal balance of power. In particular, it hasoffset the West’s reluctance to assist its wareffort, with arms purchases and develop-mental and military assistance from China,Iran, Pakistan and Russia—all countriesthat do not place human rights or gover-nance-related conditions and benchmarkson their assistance.

As far as relations with the US go, theRajapaksa regime has firmly positioned it-self as being in the forefront of the waragainst terror. It emphasises that it is fight-ing one of the world’s deadliest and most

52

NEIGHBOURWATCH

In Chinese President HuJintao (r), Rajapaksahas a willing partner

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

vicious terrorist organisations—one so de-scribed by US intelligence agencies. Conse-quently, while US criticism takes the shapeof Congressional initiatives relating to theculture of impunity in respect of humanrights, and includes curtailed non-lethalmilitary assistance and halting the due dili-gence process leading up to a MillenniumChallenge Account grant to Sri Lanka, thesuperpower continues to assist and sup-port Sri Lanka in the war against terrorism.

The Indian position is more complexand, based on past experience, engagementwith Sri Lanka invariably has to take intoaccount the ‘damned if you do, damned ifyou don’t’ syndrome. There are numerousagencies and actors from the Prime Minis-ter’s Office to South Block to the Researchand Analysis Wing (RAW) in the intelli-gence wing. Official policy is conditionedby a number of factors, key amongst thembeing the experience of the Accord and In-dian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) which breda ‘once bitten, twice shy’ inhibition aboutproactive involvement, and Rajiv Gandhi’s

assassination by the LTTE. Add to this is theTamil Nadu factor and the extent to which,given national coalition politics, it impactson domestic Indian political concerns.

There are two more important factors ofrelatively recent vintage. First, Indianpower and influence is increasingly eco-nomic in form and content, befitting thesecond-fastest growing economy in theworld, and Indian economic influence inSri Lanka is considerable and growing. Pol-icy-makers may well feel that proactive po-litical involvement in the Sri Lankan con-flict resolution process will adversely, andunnecessarily, impact this. Second, China’sgrowing influence is of greater long-termstrategic significance for India as a regionalpower. New Delhi has to balance its obliga-tions and sensitivities to its own Tamil pop-ulation, and its commitment to humanrights as the world’s largest democracy,with its overarching strategy of containingChinese influence in the region.

Indian policy has consistently beengrounded in the territorial integrity and

unity of Sri Lanka, and in the destructionof the LTTE's military capability. India haspressed for a political resolution of the con-flict in Sri Lanka and consistently called onthe Rajapaksa regime to go beyond theThirteenth Amendment and ProvincialCouncil system, which Delhi itself was pri-marily responsible for introducing in 1987.The dilemma, however, is what India canand will do in the event that the Rajapaksaregime achieves military victory and re-fuses to proceed to a political settlement be-yond the current constitutional confines.

A new social contractTHE conflict in Sri Lanka emphasises thepivotal importance of the political. Militaryaction can only be effective in the service ofa political goal, and if the latter is no morethan a defence of the status quo that lies atthe heart of the discord, there will be no res-olution. The roots of the conflict have to beaddressed.

The ethnic conflict is a brutal and de-structive illustration of the fact that SriLanka, like most of its South Asian neigh-bour states, is badly in need of a new socialcontract. International assistance is neces-sary in this process, but should not obscureor distort the primary responsibility of do-mestic actors. India in particular has under-stood this, thus far, through trial and error,and bitter experience. But if Sri Lanka re-mains enmeshed in protracted conflict, re-gardless of what happens on the battlefield,and cognizant of the primary responsibil-ity of domestic actors, it will still requirepersuasion and pressure from the outsideto fully explore constitutional reform forconflict transformation. And India willhave to take the lead on this.

Dr Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu is Execu-tive Director of the Centre for Policy Alterna-tives, the premier research and advocacy pub-lic policy institute focusing on issues ofdemocratic peace, governance and humanrights in Sri Lanka. He has aPh.D from LSEand is widely quoted on issues of governanceand the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. He is a Director of the Sri Lanka chapter of Trans-parency International, and a member of theAdvisory Board of the Berghof Foundation forPeace and Conflict Studies, Berlin and theUNDP Regional Centre on Governance,Bangkok. In 2003, Dr Saravanamuttu madethe civil society presentation at the TokyoDonor Conference on Sri Lanka and deliveredthe Gandhi Memorial Oration under the auspices of the Indo-Sri Lanka Society.

53

The ethnic conflict is abrutal and destructive

illustration of the fact thatSri Lanka, like most of its

South Asian neighbourstates, is badly in need of a

new social contract.International assistance isnecessary in this process,but should not obscure the

primary responsibility ofdomestic actors

”

■ Is a clash of interests inevitable as bothChina and India grow?

There are some misunderstandingsabout the simultaneous rise of China andIndia. People see a clash of interests and akind of competition and rivalry… [but] ifyou look at the aspirations of the two coun-tries, both have a strong desire to play a big-ger role beyond the region, and to make acontribution to the world.

The most important factor [needed for]the rise and development of China and In-dia is a stable international environment,particularly in the neighbourhood. TheChinese government, and people like us,believe that both sides must view the risepositively and find a way to sort out theirproblems and differences.

■ In India there are apprehensions thatChina might view India as a potential rival

that must be suppressed. And therefore, inforums like the United Nations and theNuclear Suppliers’ Group, China willattempt to shut the door on India.

I understand that there are some mis-perceptions. There are some in China aswell. They are viewing some of India’s poli-cies and strategies as an attempt to join—not contain, but join—an attempt to putsome hold on China’s development. Sothese misperceptions are there. They arelargely due to the fact that people don’t un-derstand each other. Given the history andthe momentum of China and India—Indiais doing very well in terms of IT and also interms of rate of economic growth since[economic] reforms were initiated in the1990s—I believe the two countries shouldview each other ’s rise in a positive way.Otherwise their different perceptions andmany other factors can bring them into ri-

valry and confrontation.You mention the UN Security Council

and NSG, and it cannot be denied thatChina is more involved in international is-sues. But India also has its advantages interms of a very strong role in the Non-Aligned Movement, and getting along well,

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

54

China’s spectacular handling of the 2008 Olympics inBeijing only capped its meteoric rise on the worldstage over the last few years. As India’s giant neigh-bour opens its doors and comes front and centre, bothChina’s and India’s foreign policy-makers must findways of engaging with the issues that have longplagued bilateral relations between nations largeenough and close enough to make them natural rivals.Ajai Shukla spoke with RRoonngg YYiinngg , vice president ofthe China Institute for International Relations, a government-run thinktank in Beijing, just ahead of the crucial NSG meet in Vienna, where Indiawas granted a historic waiver and gained admittance into the global club ofnuclear-empowered nations.

NEIGHBOURWATCH

“The governments and the pfor a final border solution”

AJAI SHUKLA

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

particularly in recent years, with Westerncountries. There is also a perception thatthe West perceives India in more favour-able terms than China.

This is what we see if we want to com-pare, although we don’t think it is a goodidea to compare, because we are different

countries with different histories and condi-tions. But if we did compare, we would saythat in the international environment Indiais more favoured by the West, maybe be-cause they believe India is a democracy andChina is not a democracy in their conven-tional view.

■ Are you suggesting that China is not happyabout India’s developing relationship withthe west?

I don’t think China has such misgivingsabout your relationship with the US. Therelationship between major powers has be-come so complex, and is no longer black

55

The Indian PM withChina’s President Hu

Jintao: stronger alliesor greater rivals?eople are not ready

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

and white. We don’t see any triangles, orbalance of power—this, we say, is Cold Warmentality. If you look at the relationship be-tween China and the US, it would be fair tosay it is more profound and more interde-pendent. Look at the level and intensity ofinteractions. Given that, I don’t think Chinahas such a large misgiving about your rela-tionship with the US, except maybe in cer-tain quarters in the military and securityside. But we also understand that India isan independent country and treasures itsindependence and sovereignty, and the de-bates in the past two years about the nu-clear deal reflect very well the political cul-ture of India and the feelings about yourrelationship with the US.

■ When you observe this debate carefully doyou see the strength of the anti-USsentiment in India, and does that make youhappy?

For me it is a complicated thing to seewhat is happening in India and what is hap-pening between India and the US. I thinkthere are different reasons for opposition tothe deal, but one thing is clear: that the peo-ple who oppose it don’t want India to un-dermine its sovereignty just for the sake of itsrelationship with the US. This is one thingthe Chinese have observed very well. Acountry that is aspiring for major power status has to hold on to its independence,otherwise no one will take you seriously.

As far as our experience is concerned, ifyou want to be a country to be reckonedwith, you have to be independent, youhave to pursue your policy, taking into con-sideration your own national interests.

■ India is watching China’s actions in theNuclear Suppliers Group very carefully. Whatis China’s stand on giving India a waiver?

The NSG issue is a technical issue. Don’ttake it too seriously. It is not a small or aninsignificant issue, I understand that. ForIndia it has become a big, emotional issue.The Chinese government has not taken anopen position yet. China is only one of the45 members and there are certain coun-tries—European countries—who havevery strong views on this issue. I don’tthink they are against India, but I thinkthey are against the [idea of making] an ex-ception for India, which for them will un-dermine the non-proliferation regime. Ithink this is a problem shared by the major-ity of NSG members, including China. But Idon’t think China will take an official posi-tion till the picture is clear. I cannot speakfor the [Chinese] government, but I think

the position will be taken after taking intoconsideration the overall relationship ofChina and India. I don’t think it will be asurprise.

■ Will it boil down to China letting othercountries do the dirty work of opposingIndia, and only if they don’t oppose Indiaeffectively, then China will make a move?

It is always difficult for China to take aposition. For any government, includingChina’s, you always have to balance theprinciple, which in this case is nonprolifera-tion, and the relationship. You have to takeinto consideration all these factors, soChina’s position will be taken on the merits

of the issue, and will not be affected by oth-ers.

■ If China wants good relations with India,then why doesn’t it solve the border issue? InChina people hardly know about it, but inIndia it is a big issue.

That tells you something. In China, theborder issue is not the only issue betweenChina and India. It seems that [in India] theborder issue has become the only issue,which is not good, as the relationship—particularly in the last decade—is improv-ing, becoming multi-pronged, deep and ex-tensive. The border issue is just one issue.

Look at how we solved the boundary is-

NEIGHBOURWATCH

56

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

sue with other countries, like Russia. Ourapproach was that we started with the easi-est and prepared the ground. When theground is ready and the two sides are ready,particularly when public opinion is ready,the boundary issue will be solved. But in thefinal analysis the resolution of the bound-ary issue will be based on principles, so Idon’t think it is good for the media andopinion-makers to focus on the issue. Thatcreates problems for the government andthe representatives working on them. Itputs pressure on them. The boundary issueis too complicated. Personally, I don’t thinkthe governments and the people are readyfor a final solution, even with the principles.

The Chinese position always is to buildup trust and find a way gradually. We hopeour Indian friends will understand. Wehave a lot of experience. Our boundary dis-pute with India is not the only land bound-ary dispute. Once we have solved all ourboundary disputes, even Bhutan will besolved immediately. It would be good forIndia because for them it will be the first[boundary dispute which they resolved].

■ The final solution that China wanted in the1950s is the final solution acceptable toIndia today. But China wants more; theentire Tawang tract has come into thebalance. India feels China is moving away

57

It seems that in India the border issue has

become the only issue,which is not good, as the

relationship—particularlyin the last decade—isimproving, becomingmulti-pronged, deep

and extensive

”President Hu Jintao greets

Prime Minister Putin (left) at the2008 Olympics; the Forbidden City

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

from the Political Parameters negotiatedbetween the two countries [one of whichmentioned that a final settlement wouldsafeguard the interests of borderpopulations].

These parameters left some room for in-terpretation. If everything was clear-cutthen there would have been no talks, itwould have been enough just to demarcatethe border. It is natural that for two sidesthere are two interpretations. Now that wehave agreed upon parameters and princi-ples, the two sides should take a realisticview and prepare the ground for imple-mentation, for exploration of the frame-work for settlement of boundary issues inline with these parameters. It is not goodfor both sides to play up the issue, to sayyou are not sticking to the parameters, youare going back and against promises. Firststep, don’t let’s focus on that too much; sec-ond step, let us prepare. Take the spirit ofthese parameters, have give and take, andmutual accommodation.

Each must understand why the otherside is asking for something. On theTawang tract there is a real reason on theChinese side why this is coming into con-tention. I have no idea about the Chinesegovernment position. It is top secret. As ascholar, I understand some people aresaying that China should have takenTawang because culturally and religiouslyit is important for China and for Tibet inparticular. If you look at the history, it wastaken by the Indian side after new Chinawas founded.

The official position, the talks—whichnone of us know—will become more com-plicated if we go on talking about it. Wheneverything is ready, some solution mayemerge. Sometimes we need creativethinking, some innovation. But if the envi-ronment is not ready, the two sides may beforced to hold positions that will provideno flexibility, no room for the diplomats tofind a solution, which is bad.

■ In India the boundary dispute is anemotional issue that stands in the way ofbetter relations with China. If this isresolved there will be a quantum jump inrelations.

I accept that, but I would argue that weshould start with the easiest part instead ofcracking the hardest nut; otherwise you arenot going anywhere. This is the lesson wehave learnt from the past five decades sinceour border war. After [the 1962 war] therewas a difficult period. Now China has said,let us start with the easiest things—the eco-

nomic and cultural relations, and only thenwill we come to the stage where we can sitdown and talk face to face about emotionalissues. I think that lesson is still valid.

■ But there are incursions on the border, hotwords are being exchanged, is that not anegative sign in relations?

I don’t think so. I was a bit surprisedwhen I saw the Indian press doing a lot ofreports on this. In China, I don’t see manyreports in this regard. I was also pleased tosee that your foreign office and official gov-ernment tried to play down the issue. It is atechnical issue; on the LAC there are differ-ences so you say there are incursions, butfor the other side it may not be so. If peoplelike us and the media want to help then weshould not play up the incursions.

■ Are you saying the Indian media is playingup the stories irresponsibly? Or do you believethat Indian officials plant these stories?

We are trying to understand this. We areaware of how the West, the US in particu-lar, functions. There are a lot of official leaksas a way of manipulating a process. Nowwe see that India too has this culture.Maybe it would be good for the Chinese tounderstand that. And maybe we shouldnot take it too seriously.

■ How come Sikkim has suddenly become anissue?

I have no particular idea about this. Thegeneral perception is that there are differ-ences and sometimes, if the other side be-comes hardened, then it must be re-sponded to. People have to be careful; they

58

NEIGHBOURWATCH

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

should not play up the issue and use pres-sure tactics. We already have agreementsand parameters, so let us explore the frame-work. Let us be quiet and have patience.China is changing. Ten years ago it was to-tally different, and ten years from now itwill be totally different.

■ For China, the Olympics have unleashed awave of nationalism, bringing peopletogether. When the games finish will therebe a vacuum of ideology, of something thatkeeps the people together?

I think to understand that you have totake a longer-term view: to 1984, whenChina first competed in Olympics; and to2001 when China won the right to host theOlympic Games. It was a long process andChina wanted to show to the world that

Chinese sportsmen can compete with de-veloped countries like the US and Ger-many. This is something that ordinary peo-ple in the street feel very happy about. It is akind of nationalism. You have to look atChinese enthusiasm in a broader context,where China is developing and changing,where Chinese people want to competeand succeed and be recognised as some-thing big. It is a natural part of the process ofdevelopment.

Ajai Shukla works in both visual and printmedia. He is Consulting Editor (Strategic Affairs) for New Delhi Television (NDTV),India’s best-reputed news broadcaster, forwhich he anchors prime time news and specialprogrammes. He is also Consulting Editor(Strategic Affairs) for Business Standard.

59

I would argue that weshould start with the

easiest part instead ofcracking the hardest nut;

otherwise you are notgoing anywhere. This is

the lesson we have learntfrom the past five

decades since our border war

”Huge crowds of tourists at the

Tiananmen Square (below);and spectacular shows at the

Bird’s Nest stadium in Beijing

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

60

MRINAL SUMAN

As India prepares forsome of its most

expensive defenceacquisitions, the

government has releasedan updated defenceprocurement policy.

Mrinal Suman examinesthe document that

promises greatertransparency in

defence spending.

DEFENCE Minister A.K. Antony re-leased the much-anticipated up-dated version of the defence pro-curement procedure at New Delhi

on 1st August 2008. The new procedure isa major step in the government’s endeav-our to make the process of defence procure-ments more efficient. Called the DefenceProcurement Procedure 2008 (or DPP-2008), it will apply to all cases in which theRequest of Proposal (RFP) is issued after 1stSeptember 2008.

Prior to the disintegration of the SovietUnion most of India’s defence importswere from the Soviet bloc countries and al-ways on a ‘Government to Government’basis, so a separate procedure to procuredefence equipment was never deemednecessary. Indigenous procurement wascarried out mostly by placing indents onpublic sector undertakings and ordnancefactories. The role of the private sector waslimited to the supply of components andlow-tech sub-assemblies to the public sector.

Three developments made the PublicAccounts Committee (PAC) examine the is-sue of defence procurements critically in1989. First, an environment of open compe-tition had emerged with the entry of Israel,South Africa and many other countries.Second, the Indian private sector had comeof age and demanded equitable opportuni-

ties in defence procurements. And third,proliferating visual and print media intensi-fied the public’s interest in defence deals,with the result that all major deals wereclosely scrutinised, and criticised for lack-ing a well-defined acquisition process.

Appreciating that a well-structured pro-cedure helps to expedite procurement with

POLICY ISSUES

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

61

the highest degree of probity, transparencyand impartiality, PAC in its 187th Report(1989) recommended that proper guide-lines be framed for defence procurements.

Consequent to these recommendations,the Ministry of Defence (MoD) promul-gated the first-ever defence procurementprocedure in February 1992. Although cer-tain modifications were made with timeand experience, the procedure sufferedfrom some major inadequacies and wasfound wanting in many critical aspects.

The Group of Ministers (GoM) on Na-tional Security, in their report submitted tothe Prime Minister on 26 February 2001, feltthat the existing system governing defenceacquisitions suffered from a lack of inte-grated planning; weak linkages betweenplans and budgets; cumbersome adminis-trative, technical and financial evaluationprocedures; and the absence of a dedicated,professionally equipped procurementstructure within the MoD.

Based on the GoM Report, the MoD es-tablished a new setup in October 2001, andpromulgated a new defence procurementprocedure in December 2002 that wasmade applicable to all ‘Buy’ decisions ofover Rs 20 crores. Its scope was enlarged inJune 2003 to include ‘Buy and Makethrough Imported Transfer of Technology’.The procedure was revised in 2005 to incor-porate ‘Indigenous Warship Building Proce-dure’ and defence offset policy.

The procedure underwent a major revi-sion in 2006. In an unexpected develop-

ment, the Defence Research and Develop-ment Organisation (DRDO) was asked tofocus only on the development of strategic,complex and security-sensitive technolo-gies; all other developmental tasks were as-signed to the Acquisition Wing. Underpressure from Transparency International,a compulsory Integrity Pact was also man-dated for all deals worth more than Rs 100crore.

Although the Defence ProcurementProcedure 2006 (DPP-2006) was an evolvedand exhaustive policy document, it failedto address many critical issues. First, far toomany procurement cases continued to re-sult in single vendor deals, despite the gov-ernment’s repeated assertions that itwanted to promote competition. Even theComptroller and Auditor General of Indianoted with concern, during the perform-ance audit of Army import contracts be-tween January 2003 and March 2006, that66 percent of cases were single vendorbuys.

Second, India’s trial and evaluationmethodology was faulted for lack of trans-parency and adhoc-ism. Most vendors feltthat the ingress of extraneous factors meantthat the inter se assessment of competingequipment lacked objectivity. They alsowanted to be kept informed of the per-formance of their equipment at every stage.

Third, the Services Qualitative Require-ments (SQR) formulation was consideredover-ambitious, impractical, imprecise andunverifiable. Although DPP-2006 man-

NO MORESCAMS

OFFSET POLICY AT A GLANCEAll defence imports (both for outright pur-chases and purchases with transfer oftechnology) where the indicative cost isover Rs 300 crore will necessarily carry anoffset obligation. This is also applicable toshipbuilding cases in which the estimatedcost of the individual contract is over Rs300 crore.

Initially, offset value has been pegged at30 percent of indicative cost. However forspecial cases, the Defence AcquisitionCouncil is empowered to stipulate higheroffset value or even waive the requiremententirely.

Offset obligation has to be fulfilled co-ter-minus with the period of the main contract,through any one or a combination of thefollowing routes:

1.Direct purchase of, or executing ex-port orders for, defence products and

services provided by Indian defence in-dustries. Services include maintenance,overhaul, upgradation, life extension, en-gineering, design, testing, defence-re-lated software or quality assurance serv-ices.

2.Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inIndian defence industries.

3.FDI in Indian organisations engagedin research in defence R&D, as certi-

fied by the Defence Offsets FacilitationAgency (DOFA).

Foreign vendors can generate and accu-mulate offset credits by undertaking ap-proved offset programmes in anticipationof future obligations. Offset credits so ac-quired can be banked and dischargedagainst future contracts within a period oftwo years. Banked offset credits will not betransferable except between the maincontractor and his subcontractors withinthe same acquisition programme.

All offset offers which satisfy minimumeligibility conditions are considered at par.No preference is given for any extraamount offered. For indigenously devel-oped products, offsets provisions will notapply, provided indigenous content is notless than 50 per cent. The vendor cannotdelay execution of the main contract on theplea that the Indian offset partner is un-able to execute the offset contract.

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

dated that user requirementsbe comprehensive and interms of functional characteris-tics, the SQR looked like awish list prepared with totaldisregard for the equipmentavailable in the market.

Foreign vendors also ex-pressed major concerns related to the pro-visions of the recently introduced offsetpolicy. They felt that the Indian defence in-dustry was not developed enough to ab-sorb the anticipated quantum of offset in-flows. As offset obligations have to befulfilled co-terminus with the main con-tract, they were apprehensive that default-ing Indian partners could adversely affectthe implementation of the main contract.They wanted the government to allow off-set banking, under which foreign vendorscould undertake offset programmes in an-ticipation of future obligations, and de-manded that indirect offsets (in sectors un-

related to defence) and trans-fer of technology be acceptedagainst offset obligations.

Finally, the current provi-sion of seeking commercialquotes at the outset with 18months’ validity was seen asunrealistic and loaded against

vendors. In almost all cases, a technicalevaluation process takes two to threeyears. Vendors are asked either to extendthe validity of their quote, or to withdrawfrom further participation in the case. Mostconsidered this a highly unfair provision,a tough call to take after investing consider-able resources in the technical evaluationregimen.

When DPP-2006 came up for review thegovernment solicited suggestions from alarge number of entities. The Indian de-fence industry participated enthusiasti-cally, and the US India Business Counciland the Defence Manufacturers Associa-

tion of the UK provided useful inputs re-garding their expectations. A number ofpublic and private sector enterprises alsogave constructive feedback. Having delib-erated all recommendations, the govern-ment deemed the basic configuration ofthe procedure to be sound and warrantingno major reconstruction. Following earlierpractice, however, it attempted to furtherrationalise the procedure and make it morecredible. Some of the significant policychanges introduced in DPP-2008 follow.

Greater transparencyTHE primary thrust of DPP-2008 is on pro-moting transparency in the technical eval-uation process, to convince the environ-ment of its impartiality and objectivity.First, the complete trial methodology is re-quired upfront in the RFP itself. All ven-dors must know, when they submit pro-posals, what parameters and

POLICY ISSUES

62

Above: Procurement ofweapons directlyimpacts a soldier’seffectiveness. Oppositetop: A.K. Antony andChief of Army StaffGeneral Deepak Kapoor

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

64

methodology will be used to assess theirequipment. Second, the trial directive is-sued by the Service HQ must be based onthe previously declared trial methodology,and no new aspects can be added to it.Third, during field trials, all vendors mustbe debriefed in a common meeting aftereach stage of trials, preferably at the triallocation itself, regarding performance vis-à-vis SQR compliance.

All verbal communication with vendorsmust be confirmed in writing within aweek, and placed on file for record. More-over, the Technical Oversight Committeeis tasked to oversee whether the trialmethodology used is in consonance withthe RFP. Finally and most importantly, ven-dors have to be intimated with the reasonsfor disqualification at every stage.

No single vendor buysA NUMBER of innovative measures within-built checks have been introduced tomaximize competition and avoid singlevendor situations. The SQR formulation

requires the inclusion of a compliance tableshowing the SQR vis-à-vis the technicalparameters of equipment available in theworld market, to ensure that a number ofmanufacturers can meet the SQR. In caseit emerges, during a paper evaluation oftechnical proposals, that only one vendorappears fully compliant, the RFP has to beretracted and reissued with a reformulatedSQR. A Technical Evaluation Committee isalso required to identify the reasons forsuch an outcome, and initiate correctivemeasures for future cases.

Offset banking ACCEDING to the demand of foreign vendors, the government has allowedthem to generate and accumulate offsetcredits by undertaking duly sanctionedprogrammes in anticipation of future obligations. Offset credits so acquired canbe banked for discharge against futurecontracts. Proposals to undertake offsetprogrammes for banking purposes mustbe submitted to the designated Joint Secretary in the MoD, who will allot aunique Project Identification Number toeach sanctioned proposal. If offset bankingis done by way of investing in the Indiandefence industry and R&D, the related foreign investment has to remainvalid and active throughout the duration of the MoD contract in relation to the con-cerned RFP.

Selecting recipients ofimported technologyACCEPTING representations made by theIndian private sector, the government hasagreed, in principle, that recipients of im-ported technology should be selected froma broader base,and not limited to the publicsector. Previously the Department of De-fence Production (DDP) nominated the re-cipient, which was always one of the publicsector companies under its wing. Now, theDefence Acquisition Council (DAC) willperform this task, nominating any com-pany best suited to absorb the technology.

More financial powers

THE government has enhanced the hith-erto grossly inadequate financial powers atvarious levels to expedite the Acceptance ofNecessity grant. This single step is likely togo a long way towards speeding up sanc-tions. Now, only cases worth over Rs 100

The primary thrust ofDPP-2008 is on promoting

transparency in thetechnical evaluation

process, to convince theenvironment of its

impartiality and objectivity

”

Be a Part of Asia-Pacific’sPremier Event on Maritime Defence

www.imdexasia.com

Participate In IMDEX Asia 2009!Contact our international representatives:EUROPE/THE AMERICAS/

MIDDLE EAST/INDIA/ AUSTRALIA

IMDEX Asia Ltd

Mr Roger Marriott, Managing DirectorTel: +44 (0) 1959 565869

Fax: +44 (0) 1959 563512Mobile: +44 (0) 7767 783237

Email: rogermarriott@imdexasia.com

NORTH ASIA/S.E.A./SINGAPORE

IMDEX Asia Ltd

Ms Constance Lee, Project Director Mobile: +65 9180 8008 Fax: +65 6822 2614 Email: constance@singex.com.sg

Ms Carolyn Chew, Project Manager Mobile: +65 8163 6777 Fax: +65 6822 2614 Email: carolyn@singex.com.sg

MEDIA PARTNERSORGANISED BY OFFICIAL SUPPORT HELD IN

IMDEX Asia LtdOFFICIAL AIRLINE

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

crore rupees have to be submitted to theDAC. The new powers are as follows:◗ Defence Procurement Board: Rs 100 crore◗ Defence Secretary: Rs 75 crore◗ Vice Chief of Staff at Service HQ: Rs 50crore◗ Director General Coast Guard: Rs 10 crore

Appraisal of DPP-2008THE government cannot be faulted for thewill to change. However, despite introduc-ing a number of commendable changes inDPP-2008, it has missed an opportunity tomake the procedure more responsive anddynamic. The following major issues re-main unaddressed.

Mid-course review ofcommercial process

ONE of the major flaws of DPP-1992 was acomplete absence of in-built checks and re-views, resulting in a failure to detect andrectify mistakes in time. DPP-2002 cor-rected this by introducing a technical andcommercial scrutiny of all major contractsby independent experts through the Techni-cal Oversight Committee and the EminentPersons Group (EPG) respectively. In a sur-prising move, DPP-2005 did away with thecommercial review, for which the govern-ment got considerable flak as most con-tracts are questioned for their commercialaspects. The EPG review was meant to auditpre-contractual processes and procedures.Observers expected the government toreintroduce this review, to strengthen itsclaim of promoting probity, but have beendisappointed.

Extension of validityIN a major policy change, vendors can nowsubmit a fresh commercial proposal if thevalidity of a submitted proposal expires be-fore the staff evaluation report is accepted.However, the government seems not tohave studied the implications of this provi-

sion. India follows a single-stage two-bidsystem to prevent a technically successfulvendor from inflating his commercialquote. The new provision effectively nulli-fies this. Since the MoD has to intimate theresults of every stage of trials to all vendorsin a common gathering at the trial locationitself, it will be commonly known whichvendors remain in contention; therefore,when a staff evaluation report is prepared,any single vendor who is successful will bewell aware of it, and is likely to submit a re-vised and inflated bid, comfortable in theknowledge that he can call the shots.

Competition at the cost of technologyTHE procedure mandates that the SQR ofequipment should be of a contemporarytechnology widely available in theworld/indigenous market. The govern-ment wants the services to pitch the SQR ata base level to ensure that there are multipleproducers of the equipment. This is a to-tally skewed approach. Whereas all gov-ernments try to provide their armed forceswith the latest equipment, the Indian gov-ernment’s misplaced enthusiasm to beabove board will encumber the Indianarmed forces with equipment that may beclose to obsolescence. Prudence demandsthat India acquires cutting edge technol-ogy, even if it is available from only a hand-ful of sources.

Intimating reasons forrejection to vendorsWITH a view to promoting transparency,the new policy stipulates that every vendormust be apprised of the reasons for his rejec-tion at every stage. This is a well-inten-tioned policy change, but only experiencewill tell whether it will actually improve thecredibility of the evaluation methodology,or merely drag the MoD into rancorous in-

quisitions and protracted adjudicationprocesses. There are fears that vendors willinvariably contest the inadequacy of their

equipment, and their ouster, and it will bewell nigh impossible for the acquisition or-ganisation to convince and placate all un-successful vendors, especially at the stageof staff evaluation, which is a complex andmulti-dimensioned process. Despite itslaudable intentions, the policy may be im-practical.

Restrictive features of offset bankingAS PER Indian policy, banked offset cred-its are not transferable except betweenthe main contractor and his subcontrac-tors within the same acquisition pro-gramme. These credits also lapse unlessthey are discharged against tenders is-sued within two financial years. This is ahighly restrictive policy. Generatingbankable offsets requires a considerableinfusion of resources. As no vendor canbe assured a contract within the stipu-lated time period, he needs a suitable exitoption to recover his costs. Therefore,whenever offset banking is allowed, offsettrading must be accepted; they are con-tingent upon each other.

Managing offsets is an intricate, highlycomplex task. It is unfair to expect the De-fence Offset Facilitation Agency to han-dle offsets worth billions of dollars witha staff of four functionaries. As for devel-oping high-tech complex systems, not a

66

POLICY ISSUES

DSISEPTEMBER 2008

single project has taken off inthe last two years. The cur-rent ‘Make’ procedure is veryskewed. Instead of curtailingthe role of the DRDO, itwould have been more pru-dent to make the DRDO ac-countable through external audit. DPP-2008 has unfortunately failed to correctthis infirmity.

INDIA is one of the largest buyers ofweapons and defence equipment in theworld. According to various estimates, In-dian defence imports will cross $ 30 billionover the next five years, a phenomenalamount by any measure. It is essential that

a dynamic and responsiveprocedure be in place, whichensures expeditious procure-ment by optimally using allo-cated budgetary resources. Anenvironment of confidenceand faith in the system can be

built only through probity and public ac-countability. The government is making aserious and concerted effort to streamlinethe entire acquisition process, and despiteits remaining flaws, DPP-2008 is a signifi-cant step in that direction.

Major General (Retd) Mrinal Suman,AVSM, VSM, PhD is a highly qualified andexperienced officer. After acquiring a B Techdegree, he earned an MA in Public Adminis-tration and an MSc in Defence Studies. Hisacademic pursuits culminated in a Doctoratein Public Administration. General Sumanwas closely associated with the evolution andpromulgation of the new defence procure-ment mechanism. Today, he is considered theforemost expert on various aspects of India’sdefence procurement regime and offsets. He isoften consulted by policy makers and the Par-liamentary Committee on Defence and is reg-ularly invited to address various industrialchambers. He heads the Defence TechnicalAssessment and Advisory Service of Confed-eration of Indian Industry. The General is aprolific writer, publishing articles regularlyin a large number of journals.

67

India is one of the largest buyers of

weapons and defenceequipment in the world.

The government is making a serious and

concerted effort tostreamline the entire

acquisition process, anddespite its remainingflaws, DPP-2008 is a

significant step in that direction

Defence Minister A.K.Antony (centre)releasing the DefenceProcurement Policy-2008: a step in theright direction ”

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

68

The sub totalINDIA’s strategic establishment has begun thecountdown to two important milestones. In lateJune, a modified Akula-II class nuclear-poweredattack submarine, the Chakra, began harbour acceptance trials at the Komsomolsk-on-Amurshipyard in the Russian far east. In the next fewmonths, the Russian submarine, formerly theNerpa (Seal), is to sail into the Pacific Ocean offVladivostok for full-fledged sea trials with a Russian crew.

Nuclear submarines are powered by a nuclearreactor which produces enormous heat that runssteam turbines. They can stay underwater almostindefinitely and stealthily launch ballistic missilesfrom under the sea.

The national maritime doctrine unveiled lastyear calls a nuclear-armed missile submarine the“most credible of all arsenals in a second strike”and “most preferred for small nuclear forces”.

The aim is to field three submarines equippedwith nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles—the so-called third leg of the nuclear triad comprisingair, land and sea-launched weapons-on “deterrentpatrols” (to deter a potential adversary fromlaunching a nuclear first strike) by 2015.

India’s Advanced Technology Vehicle is basedon the Russian Akula-I class submarine, but ispowered by a single indigenously-built nuclear reactor and equipped with 12 K-15 ballistic missiles or 16 of the Indo-Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles.

Three ATVs are under construction, and hullfabrication and integration of the nuclear reactoron the first submarine have been completed. Likethe Chakra, it will begin harbour trials in a spe-cially made, enclosed anchorage in the ShipBuilding Centre at Visakhapatnam. Here, all theonboard systems, including the reactor and steamturbines, are to be fully tested before it can sail out for sea trials in the Bay of Bengal. ATV is expected to join the navy after a two-year shakedown period.

Due to its design commonality with ATV, theChakra is being leased primarily to train crews toman ATVs. With its cruise missiles and torpedoes,it will also be used for sea-denial missions in theIndian Ocean.

The under construction 12,000-tonne Chakrawas to be completed and leased to India for 10years under a $650-million deal signed in 2004. Itwas to be inducted into the navy on August 15 this year, but was delayed by a year, following technical snags.

“Project India”, as the classified lease pro-gramme is called, seems to be back on track afterbeing seemingly caught in last year’s freeze inIndo-Russian defence ties over escalating costsof the aircraft carrier Vikramaditya’s refit.

Published in India Today

Nuclear ‘war’ with USA MOCK encounter between a US nuclear-powered submarine and an Indian submarine isamong a set of manoeuvres planned for the latestedition of the India-US “Malabar” series. The USflotilla from the Carrier Strike Group-7 with theUSS Ronald Reagan, the latest nuclear-poweredsupercarrier, will be off India’s west coast for theMalabar war game from October 15 to 24.

The duel between the submarines that lies atthe core of the latest edition of the exercise indicates just how the India-US military engagement has been scaled up in intensity andcomplexity. Both navies now claim that they areable to operate jointly in a battle group.

The last edition of the exercise (September2007)—in which four other navies participated—became a political issue with the Left alleging itwas part of a programme to integrate the Indianmilitary with America ambitions.

The USS Ronald Reagan is on its way to replacethe USS Kitty Hawk—which was de-commis-sioned in May—which led the US flotilla in the lastwar game. India’s only aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat, is not usable right now. The carrier is beingput through a major refit to extend its life.

The USSN Springfield nuclear-powered submarine and the Indian Navy’s INS Shishumar—made by German firm HDW—will face off in theMalabar “encounter-ex” to test searching, tracking and killing capability. On paper, the

An update onmilitary policy

Russian NavalForces’ SSN Akulaclass attacksubmarine

de

fen

ce

talk

DSIAUGUST, 2008

69

defencetalk

nuclear-powered submarine is noisier—making it easier to detect—than the diesel-electric Shishumar, but it is more powerful.

The Indian Navy is understood to have refused to pit one of its quieter Kilo-class(or Sindhughosh-class) submarines for theexercise. It had refused to deploy a submarine in the last Malabar exercisethough the US had sent one.

The Indian Navy’s Sindhughosh-classsubmarines have recently been equippedwith Klub missiles from Russia. The Iranian

navy is also known to operate Kilo-classsubmarines. The exercise will involve alter-nating command-and-control. For part of theexercise, the US rear admiral commandingCSG-7 will be in command, and for the rest itwill be the Indian western fleet commander.

The USS Springfield is nuclear-poweredand, technically, not classified as a submarine equipped to fire nuclear war-heads. The INS Shishumar is classified as anSSK—a sub-surface killer.

The “encounter-ex”—in which the Indian

and US forces will face off—is scheduledfrom October 15 to 17. During the harbourphase of the exercise, US vessels will beberthing or anchoring off Goa and Mumbaion October 18 and 19.

Manoeuvres after the harbour phase willinclude visit, board, search and seizuredrills, naval air patrols, airborne early warn-ing and strike missions of aircraft on boardthe USS Ronald Reagan and from shore-based Sea Harriers of the Indian Navy.

Published in The Telegraph

IAF Buys SpyderAir-DefenceMissilesISRAELI company Rafael has beenawarded a $260 million contract by the Indian Air Force for 18 Spyder Low LevelQuick Reaction Missiles (LLQRM). Thecontract was inked September 1st.

Rafael was shortlisted to supply themissiles against France’s MBDA earlylast year. However, the contract was delayed, mainly due to opposition from India’s leftist parties. The deliveries of the Spyder missiles will begin in 2fi yearsand be completed within four. The contractwill not include any mandatory defenseoffsets.

The Israeli-developed Spyder system isbased on Rafael’s Python 5 passive infrared and Derby active radar-guidedair-to-air missiles, with an effective rangeof 15 kilometers. The system uses an Eltasearch radar and is built as a quick-

reaction surface-to-air missile defencesystem against aircraft, UAVs, and evenprecision-guided missiles, according tothe makers.

The request for proposals was sent inmid-2005 to France, Israel, Poland, Russia,South Africa, Switzerland and the UnitedKingdom. India began looking to foreignfirms after the Trishul LLQRM system developed by its state-owned Defence Research and Development Organizationwas rejected by the Army, Navy and AirForce.

This project, cleared by the CabinetCommittee on Security in July 2007, willprovide IAF with an initial nine air defencesquadrons. It’s actually an extension of theongoing DRDO-IAI project, cleared inJanuary 2006 at a cost of Rs 2,606 crore, todevelop a supersonic 70-km-range Barak-2missile defence system for the Navy. Thisnaval long-range SAM (LR-SAM) systembasically has four components: the multi-function surveillance and threat alertradars, with a 350-km range; the weaponcontrol system with data links; the verticallaunch units; and the actual two-stage

interceptor missiles.These projects, once again, underline

the emergence of Israel as India’s secondlargest defence partner since the 1999Kargil conflict, with New Delhi sourcingarmaments worth a staggering $8 billionfrom Tel Aviv.

Published in Defense News

Submarine-launched versionof BrahMosmissileTHE Indo-Russian BrahMos multi-role supersonic cruise missile is in full production with deliveries being made toIndian Navy and Army. A complete batteryof land-based missiles is also in servicewith the Army, BrahMos Aerospace chiefexecutive, Dr Sivathanu Pillai said.

Speaking at the MSVS-2008 show inMoscow, he said that the Indo-Russianjoint venture is looking at producing 40-50missiles annually in order to meet Indianrequirements. This will be increased tohandle export orders.

The Mach 2.8 supersonic, ramjet-powered BrahMos may be exported in2009. He also said that a major productioncontract had just been signed. Dr Pillaisaid that warplane designer and manufacturer Sukhoi’s workload on otherprojects, such as the Su-35 and PAK-FAfifth generation fighter has delayed workon creating a platform for the air launchedversion of the BrahMos. The “criticalpath” for tests of the air launched versionof the BrahMos, is the modification of aSu-30MKI fighter as a test platform.

SPYDER is a low-level quick-reaction surface-to-air missilesystem capable ofengaging aircraft,helicopters,unmanned airvehicles, dronesand precision-guided munitions.It provides airdefence for fixedassets, and pointand area defencefor mobile forcesin combat areas

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

70

defencetalk

Sukhoi and the Indian Air Force havedecided on a single-missile configurationfor the Su-30MKI, rather than a two-orthree-missile version. For this, the aircraftneeds a new pylon as well as structuralstrengthening and a modified fire-controlsystem to handle the new missile.

Also under consideration is an airlaunched version for the Indian Navy’s Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft, which may bemodified to carry 6-8 missiles. Thedilemma is whether the impending retire-ment of these aircraft from active servicemakes their modification worth the effort.

As for a submarine-launched version,the missile has already been launchedfrom a static, underwater test stand inRussia and underwater tests in India willbe carried out at the end of the year. TheBrahMos’s Russian precursor, the3M55/P-800 Oniks, was designed for submarine launch.

www.domain-b.com

India tests multi-barrel rocketlauncherINDIA’s indigenously developed multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) weapon system, ‘Pinaka’ was successfully testedjointly by the army and scientists from a defence base at Chandipur-on-sea, about15 km from Balasore, Orissa.

‘Pinaka’, which has undergone severaltough tests since 1995 and is in its advancedstage of development, were put to sampletrials at the Proof Experimental Establish-ment by army and scientists from DefenceResearch and Development Organisation.

“The objective of the trials was to assessits stability in flight as well as accuracy andconsistency,” a defence official said,adding that the MBRL, capable of acting asa force-multiplier, can gradually replace thecurrent artillery system.

The first round of trials, conducted at12:14 pm, yielded the desired results, PXEdirector Maj-Gen Anup Malhotra said. Thetests coincided with the golden jubilee celebrations of the DRDO.

The sophisticated ‘Pinaka’ is an areaweapon system aimed at supplementingthe existing artillery gun at a range beyond30 km. Its quick reaction time and high rate

of fire gives an edge to the army during low-intensity warlike situation.

The unguided rocket system is meant toneutralise bigger geographical area withrapid salvo of rockets. With a range of 40 km,‘Pinaka’ can fire salvo of 12 rockets in 44seconds. One salvo each (12 rockets) fromthe battery of six launchers can neutraliseat a time a target area of 3.9 sq km.

The system’s capability to incorporateseveral types of warheads makes it deadlyfor the enemy as it can even destroy theirsolid structures and bunkers.

Pune-based Armament Research andDevelopment Establishment (ARDE),which is the nodal agency to develop the‘Pinaka’, has also reported to have developed a high performance artilleryrocket system, which can fire up to a rangebetween 70 km and 120 km.

ARDE has announced that it is develop-ing a 7.2-metre rocket for the Pinaka MBRL,which can reach a distance of 120 km andcarry a 250 kg payload. These new rocketscan be fired in 44 seconds, have a maximumspeed of mach 4.7, rise to an altitude of 40km before hitting its target at mach 1.8 andcan destroy an area of 3.9 sq km.

Integrating UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) with the Pinaka is also in thepipeline, as DRDO intends to install

guidance systems on these rockets to increase their accuracy.

Development and trials will continue andthe rocket is expected to enter service by2012.

www.rediff.com

Armed forces tofund DRDOprojectsTHE Ministry of Defence’s (MoD’s) highestbody, the Defence Acquisition Council(DAC), has handed a significant victory tothe Defence Research & Development Or-ganisation (DRDO) in its long-running questto get the defence services to fund researchand development (R&D) into high-technol-ogy military projects. As a result, the serv-ices could soon begin contributing 10 percent of the cost of developing indigenous mil-itary systems.

So far, the DRDO has funded such proj-ects—which include successes like theDhruv helicopter, the Agni ballistic missile

PINAKAThe system has a maximum range of 39-40 km and fires a salvo of 12 HE rockets in under 40seconds, with a beaten zone of 3.9 square kilometres. The system is mounted on a Tatra truckfor mobility. A battery of Pinaka consists of six launcher systems, six loader cumreplenishment vehicles, three replenishment vehicles, a command post vehicle with firecontrol computer and meteorological radar

DSIAUGUST, 2008

71

and the Arjun tank—entirely from itsbudget. “The DAC has agreed in principlethat such projects should be funded in a 70-20-10 per cent ratio: 70 per cent by theDRDO, 20 per cent by the industry partnerthat will manufacture the developed prod-uct; and 10 per cent by whichever of the threeservices the product is being developed for,”senior MoD officials told Business Standard.

That 10 per cent liability for the militarywill amount to no more than Rs 300 crore ayear, which is a small fraction of the Rs30,000 crore spent annually on foreign arms.But the DRDO hopes that this relativelysmall amount will transform what it calls anunduly critical approach of the military towards home-grown military products. A 10per cent ownership, the DRDO believes, willtransform the military from a detached anddemanding buyer into a stakeholder, whichregards the projects as its own.

The military is unhappy with this decision.Sources in the tri-service Integrated Defence Staff say the army argued forcefully against the proposal, when it wasdiscussed in the MoD.

The DRDO chief, M Natarajan, admittedrecently the behind-the-scenes battles thatpreceded this decision. But he underplayed

the benefits to the DRDO, telling a gather-ing of the defence manufacturers that theprivate sector and defence PSUs would beequal beneficiaries. Natarajan said, “TheDRDO has certainly demanded this, but it isequally applicable to the private sector andthe public sector undertakings.”

The defence minister said that while heappreciates the DRDO’s concerns, hewould also like to take on board the views ofthe services. “So the proposal was consid-ered carefully and finally the DAC has givenits approval. I think this is a very significantdevelopment,” the minister said.

But the new funding pattern has not beenincluded in the new Defence ProcurementPolicy (DPP-2008), which will come into ef-fect from September 1. The DPP-2008 givesthe DRDO responsibility to develop “strate-gic, complex and security sensitive systems”, which include ballistic missilesand electronic warfare systems that are notnormally up for sale. These will continue tobe funded entirely by the DRDO.

The new 70-20-10 per cent funding patternapplies to what the DPP-2008 categorisesas “High Technology Complex Systems”,which include advanced systems like tanks,fighters and helicopters, which could be

bought internationally, but which the MoDwants the domestic industry to develop. TheDPP-2008, however, excludes the DRDOfrom this category, reserving it for“RuRs/Indian industry/DPSUs/OFB/Consortia”.

A similar provision existed in the DPP-2006 but over the last two years only theDRDO has developed “High TechnologyComplex Systems”, such as the Dhruv heli-copter, Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), andArjun tank. Not a single project has beentaken up by any private company or DPSU.In addition, under the “Strategic, Complexand Security Sensitive Systems” category,the DRDO has developed several variantsof the Agni missile and electronic warfaresystems like the Samyukta.

Senior army sources say they intend tofight the DAC decision on joint funding. Themilitary has already pointed out that theDPP-2008 does not mention the DRDO aseligible to develop “High Technology Com-plex Systems”. The DRDO admits that thenew decision could face delays in imple-mentation if the military decides tostonewall it, citing the DPP-2008.

Published in The Business Standard

US troops train at Indian junglewar schoolCAPTAIN Greg Adams and troops of theU.S. Army’s Special Force, Green Berets,watched with rapt attention as soldiers ofthe Special Force of the Indian Armycrawled on a jungle strip towards a mock insurgent hideout, with the Israeli Tavors intheir hands booming deafeningly. As livebullets from automatic weapons flew in alldirections, 24 personnel of the Green Beretslearnt a few lessons from their buddies ofthe Special Force on how to fight a guerrillalike a guerrilla.

Capt. Adams and his team arrived at thefiring range of the Counter-Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) after hoursof exciting joint manoeuvres. They wereflown over the Mizoram hills by an Indian AirForce chopper, the hilly terrain providing theperfect setting for learning jungle warfareand counter-insurgency skills.

defencetalk

American SpecialForces personnelundergoing junglewarfare training

SAINIK SAMACHAR

DSI SEPTEMBER 2008

Soldiers from both armies emplaned anddeplaned in batches of 10 during the slither-ing exercise from the chopper at the CIJWShelipad here. During the ‘style exercise,’they hovered over the hilly terrain ofVairengte in groups of five.

The manoeuvres were part of their fifth

joint exercise—Vajra Prahar-08—at CIJWSfrom August 4-24. The first joint exercisewas held in April 2003, the second in March2004, the third in September 2005 and thefourth in August 2007. So far 133 U.S. per-sonnel have undergone training at CIJWS.

Over the 38 years since its inception, 1,487

personnel of 25 countries and 1,56,000 per-sonnel of all ranks of the Indian ArmedForces, Navy, paramilitary forces and cen-tral police organisations have been trainedat CIJWS.

Published in The Hindu

India bags $20mn helicoptercontractAFTER getting a foothold in the SouthAmerican market, India has bid success-fully to get its second international contractfor three Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH)for an estimated $ 20 million from Turkeyamidst stiff competition from global players.

The contract, finalised by HindustanAeronautics Limited (HAL), comes weeksafter India made its debut in the interna-tional helicopter market by winning a $ 50million order for seven indigenously built

ALH for the Ecuadorian Air Force.HAL Chairman Ashok Baweja confirmed

that an Indian delegation in Turkey finalisedthe deal and the initial order of three helicopters is expected to go up further. TheIndian Aviation giant will start deliveringthe three machines within six months.

While he didn’t disclose the value of thedeal, it is expected to be over the $ 20 millionmark. Sources said Turkey is planning to buyaround 17 ALH helicopters over the next fewyears and the total value of the deal could beclose to $150 million.

What makes the success even more special for HAL is that its helicopter wonthe bid in the presence of American giantBell that was also in the fray. Turkey is alsoknown to have traditional preference for US

made defence products.After suffering a series of setbacks—it

lost the race to supply 12 utility helicoptersto the Chilean Air Force in January and thecontract was bagged by American Bell 412helicopter; and then failed to get a contractfrom Malaysia—the ALH seems to havemade a mark in the international market.

It had won the Ecuador contract amidstcompetition from Elbit (Israel), Eurocopterand Kazan (Russia), and with Turkey in thebag, will look forward to contracts in theLatin American market where it is the fron-trunner in several trials. The USP of the heli-copter is its price that is sign ificantly lowerthan its competitors.

Published in The Indian Express

72

The Dhruv iscapable of flyingat very highaltitudes, a crucialrequirement forthe Army’soperations in theSiachen Glacierand Kashmir. InSeptember 2007,the Dhruv wascleared for high-altitude flying inthe SiachenSector after six-month-long trials.In October 2007,a Dhruv flew to analtitude of27,500 ft ASL inSiachen—thehighest it hadflown, and higherthan the 25,000ft record set by anIAF Cheetahhelicopter in 2005

defencetalk