נר לאפרים בס"ד

mishpatim משפטים

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Collection compiled hopefully for the elucidation of Torah

CONTENTS

The Nirtza – Bored-Ear Slave

The Handmaid

Must a Slave be Treated Better Than the Master

Four Shomrim

Three Regalim

Permission to Heal

An Eye for An Eye

Stealing and Robbing

Do Not Cause Others to Mention the Name of Idols

Perversion of Judgment

Selections from Rabbi Baruch Epstein

Selections from Baal haTurim

Selections from Sforno

Selections from Rabeinu Bachayei

Selections from Ohr haChaim haKodesh

Understanding the Haftorah

Understanding the Parsha according to the Rebbe

The Nirtza – One Who Chooses a Human Master, has His Ear Bored

את-ואם ה אהבתי העבד, יאמר, - אמר את אצא, -ואת אשתי -אדני, לא בני;

חפשי.

5 But if the servant shall plainly say: I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free;

אל ו אדניו, והגישו - והגישו האלקים, אל -אל או ורצע -הדלת, המזוזה;

את ועבדו -אדניו במרצע, אזנו }ס{ לעלם.

6 then his master shall bring him unto G-d, and shall bring him to the door, or unto the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him forever.

Why the punishment? The answer is that theft is the source for every sin. The Gemara B.K. 79b says that the punishment for stealthily

stealing is greater than for overt theft. This is because the covert thief has more fear of humans than of HaShem.

It is as if he is stating that Hashem's "eyes" and "ears" do not see what is happening on this lower world. This is

true with every sin as well. Would one sin if he was fully cognizant of Hashem's presence? Every sin is an offshoot

of covert theft. Therefore, the Torah prescribes this procedure by the source theft. (Rabbi Avrohom Yehoshua

Heshel Lainer brother of Rabbi Gershon Chanoch Henoch the Admor of Radzin)

Why the ear? Pirkei d’Rabbi Eliezer explains that after the sin in Gad Eden, HaShem placed nine “curses” on Chavah. One of

them was that He bored her ear like a maid-servant that must obey her master. She became subjugated to her

husband. Thus, boring the ear indicates that one must be subjugated to a human master.

Rashi explains that the ear that heard on Har Sinai that one should not steal, and in spite of this the person stole,

deserves to be pierced. Rashi explains that the ear that heard on Har Sinai that one should not steal, "lo signove"

(Shmos 20:13 per Sanhedrin 86a), and in spite of this the person stole, deserves to be pierced.

How is explained the connection to Har Sinai? This verse that Rashi brought refers to kidnapping, while

"lo tignovu" (Vayikra 19:11) is the verse that prohibits common theft.

Hadar Zkanim says that at the time of Har Sinai when they learned the Parsha of Mishpatim the people were not

aware of the later verse from VaYikra and thus, were not aware that Lo Signove did not refer to monetary items.

The Ta”z (Ch.M. 358,2) answers that either from context the verse in the Aseres haDibros refers to kidnapping

or by reasoning refers to monetary items. Either way one should know not to steal and thus is subject to the

punishment of having the ear bored

The Chanukas haTorah explains according to the Medrash that each word of the Aseres haDibros were said in

general and in particular with all the details that are connected to that word. For example, the command not to

murder includes the concept of “whitening the face of another” which is like murdering. Thus, the command not

to steal while referring to kidnapping also included the concept of not stealing property or deceiving.

Msdkil l”Dovid simply explains that the text is a scriptural error and should read “lo tignovu" and includes the

concept that the entire Torah was given at Sinai.

B’er b’Sadeh cites the Holy Zohar that Taam Elyon (public reading trup for the Aseres haDibros) has a

“interruption mark” between the word “Lo” and the word “Tignove”. The reader pauses between the two words,

and grammatically the two words are separated which requires a dagesh in the Tav of the word “Tignove.” (With

no separation the word would not have a dagesh and be read “Signove”) The Holy Zohar states the reason for the

separation of the words indicates that this command has exceptions. There are instances where it is permitted to

“steal”, such as deception by a legal system to obtain a confession from an accused, or a teacher to feint lack of

the correct answer to motivate a student to obtain the correct answer. Thus, the B’er b’Sadaeh suggests that the

thief that was sold into servitude might teach himself “permission” that only a kidnapping is not permitted but

stealing monetary items is permitted. Thus, we strike this person in the ear just like one would strike a student

(grab the ear) that deliberately misunderstood the instructions.

If so, why not have the ear pierced when the person is sold into servitude rather than 7 years

later? The Kli Yakar answers that if though the thief should receive two punishments, we have a rule that one does not

receive corporeal punishment and also having to pay for one act, "ein lo'keh umsha'leim" (B.M. 91a). When he

was sold, the compensation of the years of servitude are used to pay back for his theft. Therefore, the corporeal

punishments of piercing his ear is not performed. When the 7 years of slavery are complete, and then he shows

that he is happy with his situation of being a slave, and thus does not consider it a punishment, we are left with

the single punishment for his act of theft which is piercing his ear.

Rivash and Chizuki explain that the corporate punishment applies not when one sins the first time but when a

person sins, and then sins again. The person acquires a master and then at the end of the six years, accepts again

a human master that at that time becomes liability for the punishment of boring of the ear.

Maharal and Chosheck Shlomo explain that at the initial start of the six year of servitude one is not a complete

servant since there remains the possibility of release after the completion of the six years.

Chasam Sofer answers that an owner of a Jewish servant must be treated like the master treats himself, then the

servant is not really a servant to a human master in place of the Heavenly master. However, if at the end of the

six years, he proclaims that he loves the owner as his owner and identifies the non-Jewish maidservant as his wife

and the non-Jewish children as his children and wishes to stay with them, now he has chosen a human master and

thus is liable for boring the ear that heard on Har Sinai.

Why the door and the mezuzah? 1) Rashbam answers that it is pragmatic to do so. Even if a house is built of stone, the doors and door frames are

made of wood. Wood is a practical material into which an awl can be forced.

2) Rabbeinu Bachyei in the name of the Medrash says that Hashem gives this slave an opening to leave servitude

at the end of six years. The slave who turns down this opportunity and opts to stay on has voluntarily shut the

door to his freedom. In kind we pierce his earlobe against the doorway opening.

3) One always passes through the doorway of a house. Let the person who had the opportunity to go free and

turned it down see the hole made by the awl in the doorpost. It is at eye-level as it passed through his earlobe.

(Shomati)

4) Toldos Yitzchak: Once a thief always a thief is an attitude that some people have, including some thieves. This

former thief has served his master for the past six years. He should go free, but wants to stay on, "Ohavti es

adoni ……" It is obvious that he cannot stay on against the will of his master. When he does stay on it is only

with the master's agreement. This clearly indicates that the master has noted that there was no theft on the part

of this slave, or else why would he agree to keep him. The former thief has turned a leaf and is now clean of

this terrible character flaw. A door, when open, invites theft. When closed and locked, it prevents theft.

Similarly, one's ear is a receptacle for lashon hora and other negative speech. The ear has a flexible lobe,

which can be placed into the ear canal to muffle out negative speech. It can also be left open to absorb words

of Torah wisdom, Mitzvos, as hearing the reading of the Torah, Parshas Zachor, Megillas Esther, the blowing

of the shofar, and the like. Thus, the slave, the door, and the ear have a common denominator, that they can

either be used to promote the negative or the positive. This is the message of piercing the slave's ear against

a doorpost.

5. Bais Levi (on the Hagadah) offers that the door and mezuzah received the blood on the Jewish houses when

HaShem passed over them on the 15th of Nissan on the last night in Mitzraim. This was the indication of the

end of physical and spiritual slavery to the human masters and the beginning of service to HaShem. Now at

the time that one declares he wants again a human master, let the door and mezuzah come and bear witness

that the Jews already were dedicated to serve HaShem and no to serve a human master.

6. Ben Yehodiyah states the אזן, דלת, מזוזה are Roshei Taivos for אדם. Only a Jew that serves HaShem is called

Adam. This person who declares a human master to serve, is punished through the combination of these three

items.

The Handmaid's Deal Based on Rabbi Reuven Chaim Klein (What’s in a Word)

When discussing both a male non-Jewish slave and a Jewish slave/bondsman, the Torah uses the same

word: eved (“slave” or “servant”). However, when discussing female slaves, the Torah uses two different

words, shifcha and amah. Simplistically speaking, shifcha refers to a non-Jewish female slave,

while amah refers to a Jewish female slave. However, this begs the question:

Why are there two different words for a female slave, but only one word for a male slave? And, of course,

what is the actual difference between a shifcha and an amah?

Some argue that the word shifcha inherently refers to a non-Jewish slave woman, while the word amah refers

inherently to a Jewess. Although this might be true in rabbinic usage of the terms, it reflects only a partial picture

when it comes to the Bible. For example, Lev. 25:44 discusses taking slaves from the non-Jewish population of

the Holy Land and uses the word amah when referring to the female slaves. Similarly, the Bible reports that when

Avimelech returned Sarah, Avraham prayed for Avimelech’s wife and his amahot (plural for amah), whose

wombs G-d has closed as a punishment (Bereshis 20:17). These two sources use the word amah for non-Jewish

slaves. Conversely, when Avigail speaks to King David, she refers to herself as his amah six times, and as

his shifcha twice (I Shmuel 25). This suggests that the term shifcha applies to a Jewish handmaiden just as the

term amah does. So, what then is the difference between amah and shifcha?

Rabbi Avraham Bedersi HaPenini (1230-1300) writes that the word amah is related to the Hebrew

word eim/imma (“mother”). In his estimation, an amah is a maid who assumes certain “motherly” responsibilities,

as she is expected to nurse her master’s children. He adduces this view from the fact that Hagar is consistently

called a shifcha (Gen. 16), until the birth of Yishamel, from when she is consistently called an amah (Bereshis 21

but see 25:12). This understanding of amah is comparable to the English term “nanny” who is to help raise her

employer’s children as though she was their mother.

Rabbi Shlomo Pappenheim of Breslau (1740-1814) in Cheshek Shlomo also connects amah with eim. He

understands that shifcha and amah are two different types of “slaves”. A shifcha is expected to perform difficult

or menial tasks, whereas an amahis more dignified than that and can only be expected to oversee basic housework.

In other words, amah refers to a female domestic servant, or “maid.” Rabbi Pappenheim maintains that the

secondary meaning of amah (“hand”) is borrowed from this context, because just as the amah provides services

for the household, so too does one’s hand perform different services on one’s behalf. From that, a tertiary meaning

of amah arose — “a cubit,” that is, a commonly-used measurement based on the length of an arm.

Rabbi Eliezer Reines, in his work Maftechot Ha’Damesek (published in Warsaw in 1898), explains that a Jewish

handmaid is called an amah in order to stress that because she is not yet the mistress of the household (see below),

she is still subservient to the real mistress and the “fear” (aimah) of her mistress is upon her. Interestingly, Rabbi

Yaakov Tzvi Mecklenburg (1785-1865) writes that even after Yaakov marries Bilhah and Zilpah, each is still

described as a shifcha (Bereshis 32:23; 33:2; 33:6) on account of their great humility. Meaning, even though they

were promoted from being maidservants to being full-fledged mistresses, they still continued to act as though

they were in a lower position and did not haughtily assert their newfound authority.

Based on all of this we can now understand the difference between a male and female slave. As Rabbi Shlomo

Aharon Wertheimer (1866-1935) puts it, shifcha is the female equivalent to the male eved, as both are truly slaves

who are expected to perform a variety of tasks. However, an amah is more like a housekeeper whose duties are

more domestic in nature and is a totally different concept. For this reason, there are two different words for the

female “slave”, but only for the male “slave”.

Rabbi Moshe Sherrow offers another layer of understanding to this issue. The Tosafists (in Moshav Zekanim to

Shmos 21:4) write that when a Jewish man is sold as an eved, he loses some of his Jewishness, which is why his

master is allowed to force him to mate with a non-Jewish slave woman, even though under normal circumstances

a Jewish man is prohibited from marrying a non-Jewish shifcha. For this reason, when it comes to the males, both

Jewish and non-Jewish slaves are described as eved because both are not typical Jews.

On the other hand, when a Jewish woman is sold as an amah she does not lose any of her former status. She is

certainly not allowed to marry a non-Jewish eved. On the contrary, an amah is actually expected to eventually

marry her master or his son (see Shmos 21:8-9) and is considered like a regular Jewish woman who is supposed

to marry a regular Jewish man. For this reason, explains Rabbi Sherrow, the Torah differentiates between the

term shifcha (a non-Jewish female slave) and amah (a Jewish female “slave”).

Turning to the etymology of the word shifcha, Rabbi Mecklenburg writes that it is derived from the

root SHIN/SIN/SAMECH-PEH-CHET, which denotes “connection” or “addition”. The shifcha is “connected” to

the mistress of the house in that both are expected to perform services on behalf of the master of the household

(see Ketubos 59b which says that even if a woman brings 100 shifchot into her marriage she is still expected to

take care of certain chores herself). Another word derived from this root is mishpacha (“family”), which denotes

a unit of otherwise individual people who are “connected” by familial relations.

Others, including Rabbi Aharon Marcus (1843-1916) and Rabbi Zev Hoberman (1930-2012), explain that the

root SHIN/SIN/SAMECH-PEH-CHET specifically refers to an extra appendage which is attached to something

else. For example, sapachat,a type of leprosy (VaYikra 13:2), is derived from this root, as is the

word sapach (“appendix”). According to this approach, a mishpacha is called so because the children of the

family’s patriarch are like secondary “appendages” who are attached or ascribed to the primary family father.

Similarly, a shifcha is like an adjunct attached to the otherwise complete faculty of a household.

Translations of אמה and שפחה

Source (פרק טז) שפחה (פרק כא) אמה

Living Torah Slave Slave

Saperstein Slave woman Maidservant

R. Chaim Miller Handmaid Handmaid

Hirsch (Judaica Press) Handmaid Maidservant

Artscroll Slave woman Servant

Metsudah Maidservant Handmaid

Minor, before age 12 עבריה אמה

Must a Slave be Treated Better Than the Master Himself? כקונה אדון לעצמו , כל הקונה עבד עברי חכמים מכאן אמרו

Kiddushin 22a

“Because he is well with you” – he must be with [i.e., equal to] you in food and drink, that you

should not eat white bread and he black bread, you drink old wine and he new wine, you sleep on

a feather bed and he on straw. Hence it was said: “Whoever buys a Hebrew slave is like buying

a master for himself.”

Tosafos notes that the expression “It is as if the master has acquired a master for himself” which

the Gemara uses suggests that a master must treat a Jewish slave even better than he treats himself.

Tosafos asks, however, why it is not sufficient for the master to treat the slave the same as he

does himself. Why does the Jewish slave have to be treated better?

Tosafos illustrates that, in fact, it is necessary to sometimes give preference to the slave. For

example, as the Yerushalmi points out, it may be that there is only one pillow available. If the

master takes it for himself, he is not fulfilling the dictum “it shall be good for him with you.” If

the master decides not to use the one pillow and not to give it to the slave, this would be a selfish

expression of מדת סדום which is prohibited. Therefore, the master would have no choice other

than to forfeit it and give it to the slave, thus resulting in the slave’s being treated better than the

master.

The Achronim question this ruling of Tosafos and ask why the master would have to surrender

the one pillow to the slave. There is a famous opinion of Rabbi Akiva about two people who are

stranded in a desert, and only one has water with which to survive. The halacha is that he must

keep it for himself, as the verse states, “עמך אחיך וחי —Your brother should live with you,” which

we understand to mean “ קודמים חייך” - your life takes precedence over the life of others. Similarly,

we should understand the verse here which uses that same terminology — דברים טו, טז( כי טוב לו(

to indicate that although one must support his slave, the comfort of the master should still — עמך

take precedence. A number of answers are offered to deal with this question.

Maharit explains that in the case of the one container of water, if the owner would offer it to his

friend, the friend would immediately find himself confronted with a situation where the original

owner is now at risk of dying. He would have to fulfill the mitzvah of forfeiting the water to save

him, and the flask of water would have to be returned. The scenario would then repeat itself

endlessly. This is why we therefore say that the first owner should just keep it for himself.

In our case, the master is obligated to provide for the slave and give him the pillow. However, the

slave has no obligation to provide for the master. It is therefore reasonable that he receives the

pillow, and not have to return it to the master. חשק שלמה explains that when being bought, the

slave is in violation of the Torah’s rule עבדי" ”We at least afford him the one “pillow ”הם

advantage in order that in one area the slave be the “master” to his master.

FOUR GUARDIANS

The Torah (Shmos 22:6-14) mentions four types of watchmen and the different Halachos that apply

1. SHOMER CHINAM - the “Unpaid Guardian” is one who watches an item without receiving compensation

from the owner. He is liable for damages only in cases of Peshi'ah (negligence), but not in cases of theft or

loss, and certainly not in a case of Ones (an unavoidable accident). This Guardian is committed to guard the

object and has no intention to use the entrusted item.

2. SHOMER SACHAR – the “Paid Guardian” is one who is paid to watch an item but is not permitted to use it.

He is liable for damages in cases of Peshi'ah (negligence), theft or loss, but is not liable in a case of Ones (an

unavoidable accident). No intention to use the item but desires the benefit of being paid to guard the object.

3. SOCHER - the “Renter” is one who pays money to rent an item. He is liable for damages in cases of Peshi'ah

(negligence), but is not liable in a case of Ones (an unavoidable accident). However, Tana’im disagree if the

renter is like a Shomer Sachar or a Shomer Chinam, in cases of theft or loss. Rabbi Yehudah considers the

payment for use of the object places the responsibility similar to the Unpaid Guardian. Whereas, Rabbi Meir

says the renter is similar to a borrower since the intention is to use the object, however, since payment is made

for use, the responsibility is limited similar to the Paid Guardian.

4. SHO'EL - the “Borrower” is one who borrows an item in order to use it and becomes obligated to take care of

it. He is liable for damages in cases of Peshi'ah (negligence), theft or loss, and Ones (an unavoidable accident).

He is exempt from damages only in a case of "Meisah Machmas Melachah," when the item was damaged in

the normal manner of usage, or if the item was damaged while its owner was working for the borrower

("Be'alav Imo"). The intention is to use the item but not to guard the object.

OATH When one of the Shomrim exempts himself from payment by claiming that the item was stolen, lost

or Ne'enas (unavoidable accident) (respective to their individual liabilities, as above), the Torah obligates

him to support his claim by taking an oath (Shmos 22:7-10). Accordingly, a Shomer Chinam swears that he

was not negligent; a Shomer Sachar swears that the item was Ne'enas and a Sho'el swears that the item was

damaged in the normal manner of usage. In addition, a Shomer Chinam or a Shomer Sachar must swear that

they did not use the object that they were guarding. (Using the object without the owner's permission would

make the Shomer liable even for Ones.) Only after taking an oath are they exempt from payment.

Liabilities of the Shomrim

Negligence Theft

Loss

Accidental

Damage

Damage from

Normal Wear

Shomer Chinam

Unpaid Guardian Yes No No No

Shomer Sachar

Paid Guardian Yes Yes No No

Socher

Renter Yes

Rabbi Yehuda - No

Rabbi Meir - Yes No No

Sho’el

Borrower Yes Yes Yes No

Based on www.dafyomi.co.il

Two Watchmen, A Lost Bat, and A Broken Stove

It sometimes happens that while a person is taking care of

someone else's things, something goes wrong. What then?

Well, it depends on the situation. The parsha gives four different

possibilities. Let's follow the guidelines of the Torah with some

real-life situations:

Case 1) "Shomer Chinam"-- an unpaid watchman. If someone

volunteers to guard his friend's store, for example, he must do his utmost best job. But if a robber breaks into the

store while he is on guard, he won't have to pay for the damage as long as he swears before a Beit Din that he

wasn't careless. After all, he was not getting paid -- he was just doing his friend a favor.

Case 2) "Shomer Sachar" -- a paid watchman. If someone robs the store while a paid guard is on duty then the guard

is held responsible. Since this paid worker wasn't paying attention, he must pay the bill!

Case 3) "Shoel" -- a borrower. If you borrow your friend's baseball bat, you should take good care of it and not

let anything happen to it. But if there are a few new scratches from when you threw the bat down as you

sprinted to first base, that's normal "wear and tear" from using the bat, and your friend will understand. On

the other hand, if by accident you left the bat in the baseball field while you went off to play basketball, and

it was stolen, you must pay your friend for the bat. When you borrow something, you have to be responsible.

Case 4) "Socher"-- a renter. What happens if someone rents (pays money to borrow) someone else's property and

something happens to the property? For example, Mr. Renter rents an apartment and the stove belonging to Mr.

Landlord breaks. Who is responsible to fix the stove - Mr. Renter or Mr. Landlord?

The answer is not so simple! Even Rashi (the famous commentator on the Chumash) quotes an argument between

two great Talmudic Rabbis about this very question. Rabbi Meir says that Mr. Renter is treated like a "Shomer

Chinam" (an unpaid watchman) and it is up to Mr. Landlord to fix the stove. Rabbi Yehuda says that he is

just like a "Shomer Sachar" (paid watchman) and Mr. Renter must pay to get it fixed.

So who ends up paying to have the stove fixed? If your stove is broken and you need to know the answer right

away, first call your local Rabbi to find out the answer and then call your landlord. Good luck! We hope it

gets fixed fast!

CUSTODIANS OF THE WORLD

A DEEPER LOOK AT THE FOUR GUARDIANS

Spiritually, we are all custodians in this world. HaShem has entrusted us with our Divine and animal souls, our

bodies, our fellow beings, our environment, and the entire physical world. Yet our intention is to perform our

duties (Torah & Mitzvos) are different (even within one person).

BORROWER USER Feels entitled to benefit without paying for the service

Seeks only self-fulfillment

RENTER ENJOYER “This coin to charity on condition of a reward”

Seeks benefits of the world but wants to pay one’s dues (taxes) of Torah & Mitzvos to HaShem

PAID GUARDIAN WORKER Accepts G-d’s will as the ultimate purpose of life

Reserves an amount of self-interest; wants to get paid (rewards) for the effort

UNPAID GUARDIAN

SOLDIER Total acceptance that only created to serve HaShem

Is not owed any compensation

Based on Lekutei Sichos Vol. 31 page 112-118

Three Regalim

לש יד ,פרק כג שמות לים ש חג רג נה לי ת ש :ב

What is the meaning of three Regalim?

1. It is a positive mitzvah is to celebrate three times in Yerushalayim during the three holidays. The principal

method is to bring korbanos (Chagigah and Shelamim) to honor the holidays.

2. Explained as three “times” - similar to the use of this same word in the episode of Bilaam striking his

donkey three times. This is how the Targum also translates this word. Further, in the listing of the holidays

in Devarim, specifically mentions three times )פעמים(.

3. Since Torah uses the word “Regalim” and not “times”, the Gemara (Chagigah 2a) learns that one must be

able to travel by one’s own feet. This exempts a lame person, a blind person, an elderly person, and

anyone else unable to travel by oneself. Meiri states that one must be able to travel by foot (and not by

carriage or other means). Nevertheless, if one is able to travel by feet, then one can take other means of

transportation (yet the custom was to actually walk).

4. How far does a person need to travel to be obligated? Rashi says from the city of Yerushalayim to the

Temple courtyard. Tosfos explains that one needs to be able to travel from their home to Yerushalayim.

5. Ibn Ezra explains that the three times to celebrate represents the expression of joy and appreciation. In

the springtime, we recognize the Redemption from Egypt and the harvesting of the crops. In the summer,

we recognize the Giving of the Torah and the summer harvest. And in the fall, we recognize the Divine

Providence in the desert and the fall harvest.

6. Abarbanel explains the reason is that periodically the nation comes to Yerushalayim, the center of

judgment and learning.

7. Shach learns multiple allusions from this verse:

a. One should travel with one’s feet and not be tired, due to the three holidays.

b. They should travel with them, meaning the angels would accompany the Jews on their travel שלש

.(ministering angels) שרת (first letters) רגלים תחוג

c. Make a festival to Me – do not come for the external reasons like the korbanos, or national celebrations;

come solely for Me, to experience the relationship with HaShem.

8. Toras Shmuel explains that the word “Regalim” specifically means feet. Angels exist in a level of

“standing” as if with one foot. This stationary level has the advantage of not falling while exhibiting great

levels of “emotion.” However, they do not have the ability to travel to another level. A soul in a body has

two legs and the ability for הליכה the ability to go to a new place, move levels (up or down) with the chains

of creation. A Jewish soul also has a “third” leg to “jump” above all levels to reveal the light of G-d that

will become fully revealed in the times of Moshiach.

9. Toras Shmuel - During the Three Regalim we connect to this light of G-d. Pesach begins the process in

the month of Aviv (father of 12) connecting the Jews. This is the time of barley “animal food.” This

indicates the first stage of bitul of the animal soul. Next, Shavous is the gathering of wheat, drawing down

Torah from above to affect our holy soul. Finally, Sukkos is the gathering of all the levels of man to the

level about Creation which can only happen by the means of Teshuvah.

PERMISSION FOR A DOCTOR TO HEAL

The Gemara (Bava Kama 85b) derives from the extra phrase of "Rapo Yerapei" (Shmos 21:19) that a doctor is permitted to

heal sick people.

(The subject matter that follows extends beyond the pursuit of health and healing. It is in no way all encompassing, nor does

it come to a clear conclusion. Nevertheless, a panoramic view of the opinions of many Torah commentators will be

presented.)

Why would one have thought that a doctor is not permitted to heal a sick person, had the Torah not included the extra word

"Yerapei"? The verse refers to a situation in which one person causes bodily damage to another, and the victim needs to pay

a doctor to heal him. It is obvious from the verse, even without the extra word, that a person who is harmed does not have

to passively accept the fate of being wounded by the other person, but that he may go to a doctor to be healed.

(1) Rashi and Tosfos seem to understand that the Gemara learns from the extra word that even when a person becomes sick

or bruised without human intervention, but rather as a Divine decree, a doctor still is permitted to heal him. One might have

thought that this is a matter of faith in HaShem and that a person should trust that just as HaShem brought the illness upon

him, HaShem will take it away. The verse teaches that it is not considered a lack of faith to turn to a doctor for healing (as

long as he recognizes that it is ultimately HaShem who enables the doctor to heal him; Teshuvos haRashba 1:413. This is

clearly stated in Divrei Hayomim 2:16:12, where King Assa was criticized for placing his trust in doctors only.).

(2) Tosfos gives a second answer. The extra word teaches us that a doctor may take payment for his services. He adds that

this is indicated by the expression of the word form HEAL which will more likely be successful when done for pay rather

than gratis, as the gemara says (ad loc), "A doctor for nothing (for free) is worth nothing." (See Shulchan Oruch Y.D. 336:1

regarding doctors' fees.)

(3) The Ramban (Vayikra 26:11) indeed writes that a person with a high level of trust in HaShem will not turn to a doctor

but will ask HaShem to heal him directly.

(4) Chovas Hal'vovos in Shaar haBitochone chapter #4 writes that in any endeavor a person should pursue paths according

to the laws of nature, to the best of his ability. However, he should not feel that his efforts have brought him success, but

rather that his success comes solely from Hashem. This is true in matters of health and sickness as well.

(5) Rabbeinu Bachyei and the Ibn Ezra say that one should pursue the healing skills of a doctor when dealing with

disorders which affect the surface of the body, as is the case in this chapter, where someone afflicted a wound upon another.

However, when a person has an internal disorder, he should not turn to a doctor, but instead only rely on Hashem's healing

powers. This is the complaint of the verse in Divrei Ha'yomim 2:16:12 about the King Assa, "Gam b'cholyo lo dorash es

HaShem ki im b'rofim." King Asso had an internal health disorder. (The verse says that he had a sickness in his legs. Perhaps

it was a vascular problem, which is considered internal.)

(6) The Rashba adds that this verse teaches that one is even permitted to use methods that are poorly understood and

apparently superstitious in order to heal the sick, as long as they have been proven to be effective. As Abaye and Rava teach

in Shabbos (67a), anything done in order to heal is not a transgression of "Darchei Emori" (following the idolatrous ways

of the Emorites). Accordingly, the verse teaches that healing in such a manner does not resemble idolatry in any way.

(7) The Moshav Zekenim (Shemos 21:19) explains that this Derashah is similar to the Derashah of "Shale'ach Teshalach"

(Devarim 22:7; see Bava Metzia 31a and Chulin 141a), which teaches that one must send away the mother bird "even 100

times." Here, too, the verse teaches that a doctor may attempt to heal many times if previous efforts failed. One might have

thought that if previous efforts failed, that is a Divine sign that HaShem wants the person to remain ill or maimed. The verse

teaches that the failed efforts should not be construed as such, and the doctor may repeatedly attempt to cure the person.

(8) Rabeinu Chanael (cited by the Moshav Zekenim) explains that one might have thought that a doctor is prohibited to

heal with strong medications, because the medications might adversely or mortally affect the person being treated. The verse

teaches that the doctor may practice medicine to the best of his ability, as long as he genuinely intends to help the person.

(9) Tosfos HaRosh in Berachos (60a) cites Rabeinu Yaakov of Orleans who explains that the verse permits a doctor to

receive wages for his services. Normally, one is not permitted to take money for a Mitzvah, such as for returning a lost

object (see Nedarim 38b). A doctor, however, is permitted to take wages for his services.

(10). Shulchan Oruch Y.D. 336:1 states, "The Torah has given permission to doctors to heal, and it is a mitzvah for them

to do so. Healing goes under the ruling of saving one's life. If one refrains from healing, he is guilty of spilling blood (a

murderer). This is true even if another doctor is available, since an ill person does not always merit to be healed through

just any doctor.

(11) The GR"A is quoted in the Maa'seh Rav as saying that the gemara gives permission to a doctor, but does not state

that an ill person should go to a doctor for healing. It is incumbent upon a person who is truly reliant upon Hashem to place

his full trust in Hashem for complete recovery from a health disorder.

(12) The Baal Haturim on Shmos 15:26 and Rabbeinu Bachyei point out that the two words "v'ra*P*o y'ra*P*ei have the

letter Pei with a dot in them, called Pei kashya, a hard Pei. When a doctor is the agent for healing, his modalities come with

difficulties, harsh medicines, surgery, demanding therapies, (fees,) hence the Pei kashya. The verses in Tanach which

mention Hashem's healing are almost always expressions of healing, "r'fu'ah," written with a Fei without a dot, called Fei

rofo, a soft Fei. This indicates soft healing, not accompanied by difficulties. Examples are, "Ani Hashem ro'*F*echo (Shmos

15:26), and "R'*F*o'eini Hashem v'eiro*F*ei" (Yirmiyahu 17:14).

(13) The Chozeh of Lublin noted that a doctor only has permission to heal; he doesn’t have the right to despair or be

pessimistic about someone’s chance of recovery since HaShem has the final say and can bring about seemingly “miracles.”

THE BEST OF THE DOCTORS

The Mishnah (Kiddushim 82a) quotes Rebbi Yehudah in the name of Aba Gurya who says that "the best of the

doctors [will go] to Gehinom, and the most fit of the slaughterers are the partners of Amalek."

If doctors are given permission to heal, why are they destined for Gehinom?

(1) The doctors eat well and are not humble before G-d; at times they make fatal mistakes; and at times refrain

from healing the poor (Rashi).

(2) The primary concern of a doctor is an occupational hazard; a doctor, because of his important role, may

tend to become arrogant and conceited and begin to believe that his opinions are truth and that he is perfect

and makes no mistakes. Consequently, he might perform treatments which are unnecessary, misdiagnose

a patient, or treat him with contraindicative medication. He might feel that he does not have to consult

others, or that he does not have to commit the necessary time and thoughtfulness to each patient's

condition, due to his years of experience and professionalism. If a doctor views himself with such self-

importance, he will cease to be a source of Chesed and, on the contrary, endanger the lives of others. It is

the "best" ("Tov") of the doctors -- the ones who are the most successful at their jobs -- who must be the

most cautious in order to avoid falling into such a mindset. (Rabbi Akiva Eiger)

(3) The word טוב has a Gematria of 17. The doctor may daven the Shmoneh Ezra (18 blessings) but only really

say 17 blessings, since the doctor may believe that matters of healing are in their hands and not in the

hands of HaShem (therefore not really saying the blessing of “Heal us”) (Pardes Yosef)

(4) At times a doctor is required to amputate limbs or introduce other medications that are harmful to one part

of the body but saves the person. However, if the doctor is “good” and merciful and does not wish to take

a “cruel” approach, then refraining from harm to the patient at times leads to the death of the patient and

the doctor stands as destined for Gehinom. (Ben Yehoida)

(5) When a person goes to a doctor to heal a disorder, if all goes well, fine. If however, his condition

deteriorates he often seeks numerous other opinions. The other doctors always ask for a complete report

of the first doctor's findings. Even if they disagree with either his diagnosis or course of treatment, they

are very reluctant to say that he was totally wrong, as they in the future will likewise be on the receiving

end of a "second and third opinion." This can even lead to the death of the ill person. Their saying "good"

to the diagnosis/treatment of the first doctor makes them deserving of Gehinom.

AN EYE FOR AN EYE – עין תחת עין Overview Commentators disagree over whether the literal talionic meaning of "עין תחת עין" is also the simple meaning of the

verse when viewed in context. While early sources going back to the time of the second Beit HaMikdash, such as

Jubilees and Philo, render the verse literally, later Rabbinic sources almost unanimously reject this option and

interpret the verse metaphorically. This leads medieval and modern exegetes to struggle valiantly to reduce the

tension between the literal retributive understanding of the verse and its Rabbinic interpretation. Some, like R.

Saadia, go to great lengths to demonstrate how the Midrash is really the verse's simple meaning. Others, like Ibn

Ezra and the Rambam view the verse as presenting an ideal which must be converted and translated when applied

to real life. Finally, the Hoil Moshe differentiates between the generation of former slaves to which the Torah was

originally given and future, more civilized, generations.

Physical Punishment .is understood literally, and the corresponding retribution is administered "עין תחת עין"

SOURCES: Jubilees Chapter 4:43-45; PhiloThe Special Laws III:XXXI:173-175The Special Laws

III:XXXIII:182The Special Laws III:XXXV:195; Boethusians cited in Megillat Taanis Oxford Ms. of

Scholion 4 Tammuz; R. Eliezer Mekhilta Mishpatim Nezikin 8Bavli Bava Kamma 83b-84a; Ben Zuta (the

Karaite) cited by Ibn Ezra Shmos Long Commentary 21:23-24

Judicial theory – Philo focuses on the need for appropriate retribution for the person who committed the crime.

Thus, he explains that proper justice mandates a measure for measure punishment, exactly equal to the damage

that was done, be it injury to life, limbs, or property. Talionic justice also serves as a significant deterrent to others

who might consider committing such a crime.

.refer to retribution in kind "עין תחת עין" and "נפש תחת נפש" According to this approach, both – "נפש תחת נפש "

Biblical parallels – The principle of "מידה כנגד מידה", or "just deserts", is a dominant motif in Tanakh. A classic

case of lex talionis is the cutting off of AdoniBezek's thumbs and big toes in Shofetim 1:6-7 as a repayment in

kind for his doing the same to other kings.

Morality – Megillat Taanis cites the Boethusians as saying "יהו שוים כאחד", i.e. that the person who committed

the assault deserves to be no better off than his victim. The principle of talion also treats all people as equals, as

a wealthy person who maims a fellow man suffers just like a poor person who did the same. Finally, Philo notes

that it would be unjust to exact a punishment which bears no resemblance to the offense committed.

Only for intentional – R. Eliezer in the Mekhilta specifies that talion does not apply in a case where the action

was unintentional.

The eye of a slave – Philo explains that the law of talion does not apply to a master who knocks out the eye of

his slave, not because the action is less blameworthy, but rather because mutilating the master will only cause

him to take revenge and to further abuse his slave. Thus, in such a case, the slave simply goes free.

כפה" את תה refers to the woman's "כפה" in Devarim 25:12 – Some modern scholars have proposed that "וקצ

private parts (as in "כף הירך"). According to their suggestion, this law would be a close approximation of talion.11

This would also account for the need for the verse to conclude with "לא תחוס עינך".

Talion for perjured witnesses – According to this position, the verse in Devarim 19:21 is also rendered literally,

and it speaks of a case where the false witnesses testified that a person had committed an assault for which he

would have been punished by mutilation. Thus, they receive this very punishment which they had attempted to

inflict.

א " ן ורפא ירפ This approach can maintain that, in addition to being punished by losing his eye, the – "רק שבתו ית

assailant must also compensate his victim for his medical expenses and loss of salary. Alternatively, these

payments apply only in a case where there was no permanent loss of limb.

Monetary Compensation .is interpreted metaphorically - monetary compensation is given for the exact value of the limb lost "עין תחת עין"

SOURCES: Mishna Bava Kamma 8:1; Midreshei Halakhah Mekhilta Mishpatim Nezikin 8; Mekhilta DeRashbi Shmos

21:25; Sifra Emor 14:20:7; Sifre Devarim 190; Sifre Ki Teitze 293; Talmud Yerushalmi Bava Kamma 8:1; Talmud

Bavli Chagigah 11a Ketubot 33b Bava Kamma 83b-84a Sanhedrin 79a-b Sanhedrin 87b; Targum Pseudo-Jonathan

Shmos 21:22-25 Vayikra 24:17-21 Devarim 19:15-21; Midrash Aggadah (Buber) Shmos 21:22; R. Saadia Gaon cited

by Ibn Ezra Shmos Long Commentary 21:23-24 cited by Ibn Ezra Vayikra 24:19 Tafsir Shmos 21:24 Tafsir Vayikra

24:20 Tafsir Devarim 19:21 Tafsir Devarim 25:12; R. Chananel Cited by R. Bachya Shmos 21:24; Rashi Shmos 21:23-

24 Vayikra 24:20 Devarim 19:21 Devarim 25:12; R. Yehuda HaLevi Kuzari 3:46-47; Rashbam Shmos 21:24; R. Yosef

Bekhor Shor Shmos 21:24-25 Vayikra 24:21; Ralbag Beiur Divrei HaParashah Shmos 21:24-25 Shmos 21 Toelet 5

Beiur Divrei HaParashah Vayikra 24:19-21 Beiur Divrei HaParashah Devarim 19:21; Akeidat Yitzchak Shmos #46

Vayikra #86 Devarim #97; Abarbanel Shmos 21:18 Vayikra 24:10 Devarim 19:14; Netziv Devarim 25:12

Meaning of the metaphor – The formulation of "עין תחת עין" comes to teach that the assailant must make the

victim whole again by compensating him in full for all aspects of his injury.

עין תחת " Commentators disagree over whether this phrase (which appears immediately before – "נפש תחת נפש"

:is also to be rendered metaphorically ("עין

• Monetary compensation – R. Yehuda HaNasi in the Mekhilta and Bavli maintains that the passage is

consistent in its use of language, and that this phrase similarly refers to monetary compensation for a life

which was taken inadvertently.

• Capital punishment – The first opinion in the Mekhilta and most other commentators assert that this

phrase is rendered literally, even though all of the parallel phrases in the following verse are not. Mekhilta

DeRashbi and Sifra prove this from the verses in Bemidbar 35:30-31 which explicitly prohibit the

exacting of blood money.

Judicial theory – This approach views the primary purpose of justice to be restitution. R. Yehuda HaLevi and

R"Y Bekhor Shor emphasize that harming the perpetrator serves no purpose for his victim, who will be much

better served if he is compensated for his loss.

Issues of implementation – Many of these sources emphasize that it would be near impossible to implement

talion in a fair way, as there can be wide ranging variations in the degrees of injury and original physical conditions

of different assailants or victims. They therefore claim that there is no alternative to monetary compensation,

which can at least be adjusted to account as necessary for differing circumstances.

Biblical parallels – R. Yishmael in the Mekhilta equates the laws of assault with the laws of property damage.

These latter laws also contain the formula of "נפש תחת נפש", yet they explicitly mandate monetary compensation

.rather than retribution ("ומכה בהמה ישלמנה")

ן יעשה לו" would appear to argue "כאשר יתן מום באדם כן ינתן בו" This phrase and the similar words of – "כאשר עשה כ

against this approach. See R. Saadia Gaon and R. Chananel who cite the parallel formulations in Shofetim 15:11

and Ovadiah 1:15-16, in an attempt to demonstrate that these need not imply exact measure for measure

punishment.

Intentional / unintentional – According to this approach, these verses can refer to both intentional and

unintentional personal injury.

The eye of a slave – For this position, there is not such a fundamental distinction between injuring a regular

person or a slave, as the penalty in both is a financial one.

תה את כפה" in Devarim 25:12 – R. Yehuda in the Sifre similarly reads this phrase as a metaphor for monetary "וקצ

payment. The Sifre also presents an alternative literal option that requires one to assume that the woman's actions

constituted a life-threatening danger, thereby justifying amputation of her hand.

Perjured witnesses – Ralbag notes the difficulty in this verse, as according to this approach there is no case

where testimony can cause a loss of limb.

א" ן ורפא ירפ Mekhilta DeRashbi cites this verse as proof that the penalty for a man who wounds – "רק שבתו ית

another involves monetary compensation. R. Chananel adds that if the assailant himself loses a limb, he will not

be able to pay the medical costs of his victim.

Two Tracks Torah law reflects the validity of both the literal and metaphorical interpretations. There are a number of variations

of this approach:

Case Dependent The verse refers to talion, but monetary compensation may be implemented in some cases, depending on the

preferences of the parties or the type of injury.

SOURCES: Josephus Antiquities 4:8:15 Antiquities 4:8:33-35; Ibn Ezra Shmos Long Commentary 21:23-24

Shmos Long Commentary 21:29 Shmos Short Commentary 21:25 Vayikra 24:19Devarim 25:12; Ramban

Shmos 21:24 Vayikra 24:18; Shadal Shmos 21:24 Devarim 25:12; R. D"Z Hoffmann Shmos 21:18 Shmos

21:22-25 Vayikra 24:19-20 Devarim 19:21 Devarim 25:11-12

Determining factors – This group of commentators present a number of different possibilities:

• Victim's choice – Josephus states that the victim is given the option of deciding whether to accept money

instead.

• Perpetrator's choice – Ibn Ezra says that the perpetrator can choose whether to pay ransom for his limb.

• Court's choice – Shadal suggests that the Torah left the decision to the discretion of the judges in order to

prevent a situation where a wealthy person can maim as he pleases as he would only need to pay

compensation.

• Permanent or non-permanent injury – Ramban offers the possibility that permanent loss of limbs would

be punished by talion, while non-permanent injuries would be compensated financially.

Judicial theory – According to Josephus, the primary goal of the law is to help the victim. Shadal highlights the

need for penal code flexibility in order to maintain an orderly society.

Biblical parallels – Ibn Ezra references the case of an owner whose ox repeatedly gored who is also allowed to

pay ransom instead of being killed.

תה את כפה " in Devarim 25:12 – Ibn Ezra explains this verse also to refer only to a case where the woman "וקצ

cannot pay.

Evolving Society

The literal interpretation of the verse was its intended meaning for the generation of the Exodus, but the

metaphorical understanding is its import for future generations.

SOURCES: Hoil Moshe Shmos 21:24 Vayikra 24:19

Morality – The Hoil Moshe explains that the uncivilized society of former slaves required a harsh penal code, as

monetary punishments would not have sufficed to deter people from committing assault.

Judicial theory – The Hoil Moshe emphasizes the deterrent aspect of the legal system.

Parallel cases – This type of approach is adopted by the Rambam with regard to the need of the generation of the

Exodus for a Mishkan and sacrifices. It is also implemented by the Hoil Moshe himself in several other instances.

Ideal vs. Reality

The Torah's formulation conveys that the perpetrator truly deserves to lose a limb, even though this is not the

punishment which is actually implemented.

SOURCES: Rambam Introduction to the Mishna Sefer HaMitzvot, Aseh 236 Hilkhot Chovel UMazzik 1:2-5,9-

10 Hilkhot Rotzeach 1:7-8 Moreh Nevukhim 3:41; Seforno Shmos 21:24 Vayikra 24:17

Judicial theory and implementation – Seforno explains that while strict justice would require measure for

measure retribution, practical concerns prevent its implementation.

Based on AlhaTorah.org

Stealing and Robbing

The Torah offers two prohibitions for “stealing,” and these two prohibitions have different rules associated

with them. When the Torah says lo tignovu (Lev. 19:11), this means that a type of stealing called genivah is

forbidden, and when it later says lo tigzol (Lev. 19:13), it prohibits another form of stealing called gezeilah.

The Torah even mandates returning the stolen goods or otherwise compensating the victim of theft twice

— once concerning a ganav (Ex. 22:3) and once concerning a gazlan (Lev. 5:23). Indeed, in the Talmud’s

list of twenty-four types of damages, it reckons genivah and gezeilah as two separate items (Bava Kama 4b),

and Maimonides’ Sefer HaNizikin splits the Laws of Geneivah and the Laws of Gezeilah into two separate

sections. So what is the difference between genivah and gezeilah, and how do these words for “stealing”

differ from listim and chamas? [According to Torah tradition, the prohibition of lo tignov in the Ten

Commandments (Ex. 20:13, Deut. 5:17) actually refers to kidnapping, not to “run-of-the-mill” stealing.]

The Midrash (Ber. Rabbah 54:3) explains that the definition of gezeilah is stealing something in public or out in

the open. One of the opinions cited there, states that in order to be considered a gazlan one must steal in such an

overt way that he does so in front of ten people. If he steals in front of only nine, he is “only” considered a ganav.

Another opinion states that to be considered a gazlan a thief must come face-to-face with his victim and grab the

item in question out of his hand. The ganav, on the other hand, conceals himself from his victim and steals in a

stealthier, sneakier way (Bava Kama 79b). Even if the victim ends up seeing the robber, the fact that the

robber tried to hide himself from him is enough for him to be considered a ganav (S’ma to Shulchan

Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 348:7).

Similarly, Maimonides (Laws of Geneivah 1:3) writes that a ganav is a person who takes another individual’s

possessions in a clandestine way, such that the true owner does not know about it, like in the case of a pickpocket.

But if he took it out in the open with violence or by force, then he is not a ganav — he is a gazlan. Elsewhere,

Maimonides (Laws of Gezeilah 1:3) expands on his definition of gazlan by citing several examples: a gazlan is

somebody who grabs another person’s moveable objects from his hand (see Bava Basra 34a), or he enters

somebody’s property without permission and takes their stuff (see Shavuos 44b), or he overpowers their slaves

or animals and makes them work for himself (see Bava Kama 97a), or he goes into somebody else’s field and

eats their produce (see Bava Basra 38a).

Ernest Klein (no relation) writes that the Hebrew word gezel is related to the Arabic word jazala “cut off,” which

is a violent way of ripping out an object from the hands of its rightful owner.

In fact, Rabbi Shlomo Pappenheim (1740-1814) and others explain that the biliteral root GIMMEL-ZAYIN

primarily refers to “shaving” or “trimming,” which is a type of cutting that leaves some parts attached and some

parts detached. Other words derived from this root include: geiz (Ps. 72:6), the grass remaining after

trimming; gozez (Gen. 38:12, 31:19), the act of shearing wool from sheep; gazam, a type of grasshopper which

eats some produce and leaves over the rest; geza, a tree with a truncated top; and gazit, hewn stone. Although

Rabbi Pappenheim does not explicitly connect the word gezel to this two-letter root because the third letter

(LAMMED) does not fit with his theory, we can still argue that since gezel is the act of stealing or robbing

somebody's possession, while leaving some of his other possessions intact, it too is related to this root.

Similarly, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch (to Ex. 23:19) writes that gozel (“small bird”) is related to the

word gezel because when one takes a small bird away from its nest, he is “severing” the connection between it

and its mother, just like one who steals “severs” the connection between an item and its legitimate owner. (Of

course, it is just a coincidence that the English word robin — which also refers to a small bird — is phonetically

similar to robbing. Or is it?)

The Torah (Ex. 21:37) differentiates between a ganav and a gazlan by imposing special fines on the ganav. When

a ganav is caught stealing he must not only pay back the value of what he stole but must pay an extra of penalty

of that same value, so that in total he pays double the value of what he stole. Moreover, when a ganav steals

a kosher animal and slaughters it or sells it, he must pay back multiple times the value of the animal (five times

for a bovine, and four times for an ovacaprine). These extra fines apply to a ganav — a stealthy thief — but not

to a gazlan — an open robber.

The Talmud (Bava Kama 79b) explains that the Torah deals more harshly with the ganav than with

the gazlan because the ganav’s action bespeaks an especially heretical and unacceptable worldview. While the

Torah condemns any form of stealing as unacceptable, the ganav has committed an especially heinous sin by

respecting man more than he respects G-d. By virtue of the fact that the ganav tries to hide his thieveries from

other people, but does not care to “hide it” from G-d, he shows that he cares more about what people think than

about what G-d thinks. For this reason, the Torah imposes special penalties on the ganav. The gazlan does not

care about what anybody thinks — but at least he does not afford man more respect than G-d. He is therefore

exempt from these penalties.

By the way, if you ever get confused between the ganav and the gazlan, you can use this neat mnemonic I heard

from my fifth grade Rebbi, Rabbi A. Y. Berman: The gaNav steals at Night (i.e. when nobody is looking), while

the gazLan steals in the Light (i.e. out in the open).

Based on an uncertainty in the Talmud (Bava Kama 57a), there is a dispute among the authorities whether an

armed listim (“robber”) is considered a ganav or a gazlan. On the one hand, he steals out in the open and the

victim knows about it like a gazlan, yet on the other hand, he carries a weapon with him, which suggests that he

is scared of being caught, like a ganav (see Kesef Mishnah, Lechem Mishnah, and Even HaAzel to Laws

of Gneivah 1:3).

The Mishnaic Hebrew word listim is derived from the Greek word leistes, which means “robber.” The Hebrew

word listim/listin is really the singular form of the word, but since its ending resembles that of a word with a plural

suffix, it was also borrowed to mean “multiple robbers.” Verb forms of listim were also derived from this Greek

word in Rabbinic Hebrew (e.g., li’lastem means “to rob”). (The Greek lestes is used in English as a suffix in

scientific names for animals that are “predators.”)

The word chamas also appears in the Bible in the sense of “thievery” and “stealing.” For example, the Bible

reports that G-d resolved to bring a flood upon the generation of the Deluge “because the land had been filled

with chamas” (Gen. 6:13), which Rashi (following Sanhedrin 108a) explains refers to theft. The term chamas or

cognates thereof appear some sixty times throughout the Bible, but do not always refer exclusively to “stealing.”

Sometimes they are just general forms of “violence” and “injustice.” Indeed, Dr. Chaim Tawil writes that the

Hebrew chamas is related to the Akkadian word hamasu which means “to oppress” or “to do wrong.”

That said, the Talmud (Bava Kama 62a) explains that a chamsan is not quite a robber. Rather, he is a coercive

buyer who takes an object from his victim, but gives him money. While still considered a wrongdoer,

the chamsan is not technically a robber or a thief.

In Arabic, the word chamas is related to the Hebrew word chamesh (“five”). This might be an allusion to the

proverbial “five-finger discount” to which thieves are privy. (The Hebrew word chamas is not etymologically

connected to Hamas, the Arab terrorist organization which de facto controls the Gaza Strip, although there may

be a certain thematic affinity between them.)

Interestingly, Rashi (to Yoma 39a and Ps. 71:4) and Radak (to Ps. 71:4 and in Sefer HaShorashim) write that

a chometz or chamtzan is the same as a gazlan and chamsan. Radak notes that this is because of the

interchangeability of the letters TZADI and SAMECH. Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin (1816-1893) writes

that chamtzan does not technically refer to a thief; rather it refers to somebody who is akin to a thief in that he

took from something he rightfully deserves but took more than his due. (In Modern Hebrew, chamtzan means

“oxygen,” for reasons unrelated to our discussion.)

Do Not Cause Others to Mention the Names of Idols ר ובכל יג ,פרק כג שמות רתי-אש מ מרו אליכם א זכירו לא אחרים אלהים ושם תש ע לא ת מ ל יש : פיך-ע

“You should be careful to keep everything that I have said to you. Do not mention the name of the gods of others.

You should not cause (a non-Jew) to make heard the (name of an idol) by your mouth.”

לאדם שיעשה שותפות עם העובד כוכבים שמא יתחייב לו שבועה ונשבע בעבודת כוכבים אסוראבוה דשמואל סנהדרין ס"ג: לא ישמע על פיך אמרהשלו והתורה

Shmuel's father: One may not make a partnership with a Nochri, lest the Nochri need to swear, and he will swear

in the name of idolatry, and the Yisrael transgresses "Lo Yishma Al Picha."

The principle learned is that one should not cause another (even a non-Jew) to said the name of idol.

The Lubavitcher Rebbe (Reshimos 6, pg 8) applies the above principle in understanding Megilas Esther. The

Marasha wrote that the Megilah was written by Persians and that is why the name of HaShem is absent from

the text. The intention of the Marasha cannot be per plain meaning, since this contradicts several statements

of Chaza”l: that Esther said the Megilah with ruach hakodesh and the Anshei Kennesses HaGadolah wrote

and canonized the Megilah.

So the possible explanation is the Anshei Kenesses HaGadolah knew that the Persians would copy the story and

distribute it since it was a recent event in their country (obviously a great serial for mass publication).

Therefore, they did not place the name of HaShem in the Megilah to avoid having the Persians replace the

name with the name of their idol. This is according to the principle learned from the above verse that one

should not cause another (even a non-Jew) to say the name of idol (especially in this situation in which the

miraculous events would enhance that idol).

And thus, we can understand the Marasha to mean that since it was anticipated that the Persians would copy the

text of the Megilah and would substitute the names of idols, thus it was proper not to mention the name of

HaShem in the Megilah.

The Rishonim disagree as to the basis of this principle of Shmuel’s father. Some learn that this is a prohibition

from the Torah from the above verse (Rabenu Shmuel, Yad Ramah). Others maintain this is a rabbinical

decree and permitted in a place of monetary loss (Rabenu Tam, Rosh, Ran). And the Ramban teaches that it

is permitted but is a practice of “midas Chassidus” not to engage in such a partnership.

Rema (O.C. 156) mentions that there are some that are lenient to allow nowadays a partnership between a Jew

and a non-Jew. First reason is that in these times a non-Jew’s intention when mentioning the name of an idol

to partner with the One that made the heavens and earth (Igros Moshe). Second reason is that some disagree

if the prohibition of idol worship by a non-Jew includes “partnership” of an idol together with the true G-d.

It appears to Rabbi Baruch Epstein that an additional proof can be brought to support the Rema (above) from

Sanhendrin 74b, where the Gemara asks “are Bnei Noach commanded about Kiddush Hashem?” And the

Gemara derives an answer from verse: ח יח , ה פרק ב מלכים יסל ה ז ה ר ב ד אדני 'הל בבוא ך בד -רמון-בית לעוהוא ה מ ש חות ןלהשת ל נשע בהש -ע רמן בית חויתי והשת רמןידי בית חויתי ת (Na'aman accepted to be a Ger

Toshav, and mentioned that he must bow with his {new} master also to idolatry) and then Elisha agreed,

"Lech l'Shalom" “Go in peace”. If Na’aman (as a Ben Noach) was commanded on Kiddush Hashem, then

Elisha should have protested. And Rashi explains that from this language Elisha agreed to what Na’aman did,

as a Bnei Noach making “partnership” with G-d and an idol.

Further this can be shown from the prior verse (Kings II 5,17) where Na’aman says he would no longer offer

sacrifices to idols כי אם (usually translated as only) to Hashem. The Gemara (Berachos 12b) teaches that these

words כי אם does not imply replacing the prior item, but in addition to that item. (Similar to the verse that

states that Yaakov would no longer be called Yaacov כי אם Yisroel, and yet he continued to be called Yaakov,

but the main name was now Yisroel). Thus, Na’aman stipulates that while offering sacrifices primarily to

HaShem, he would “partner” with idols, and nevertheless, Elisha did not object, providing further evidence

that the concept of “partnership” does not apply to Bnei Noach.

Summary and Ruling: The Shulchan Aruch (C.M. 176, 51) rules that it is prohibited to enter into a partnership

with an idol worshiper, and if one does enter and the idol worshiper is now required to swear to him, he is

allowed to make him swear. The Rema (O. C. 156, 1) rules that one may be lenient and enter into a partnership

with a gentile nowadays, since when they swear their intent is to the Creator.

PERVERSIONS OF JUDGMENT

בינך בריבו: ו ,פרק כג שמות ט א ה משפ ט לא ת

Do not pervert the judgment of your poor man in his lawsuit 1. Sanhedrin 36a: Everyone is authorized to judged financial cases (different from capital cases). Rabbi

Yehuda explains that everyone includes a mamzer.

2. Sanhedrin 36a: There are 10 differences between capital and monetary cases (not as exacting in monetary

cases). Only one applies to an animal (that is stoned for killing a Yisrael): one does not tilt (to Mechayev

by a majority of one) the judgment of the poor, but you may tilt the judgment of an ox (in order to destroy

bad evil from us).

3. Mechilta: The verse is concerning a Rasha (unusual term אביון, implies even one who is different that is

lacking in Mitzvos). Even though a Rasha (who might deserve punishment) one does not judge such a

person improperly.

4. Yerushalmi: In matters of judgment one does not incline to either side. However, one does incline in

matters regarding Leket, Peah, and Shiachah (incline to the side of the poor).

5. Yerushalmi: Rabbi Yehudah says we should not be exacting in the particulars of yayin nesech; it is written:

'Do not distort the judgment of your poor in their argument'.

Yayin nesech (wine of non-Jews) and the distortion of a trial

Some explain Rabbi Yehudah's recommended leniency for yayin nesech in that he meant we should sometimes

be lenient. The Semag, for instance, rules that a gentile carpenter may repair a crack in a Jew's barrel of wine

as non-Jews do not offer wine to their idols in this way.

Some commentators on the Yerushalmi remark that these halachos were placed next to each other as Rabbi

Yehudah is lenient in both matters: he allows a mamzer to be a dayan and is lenient in the matter of yayin

nesech. We now cite two other interesting solutions.

In his Iyunim Bedivrei Chazal Uvileshonam, HaGaon Rav Chanoch Ehrentreu, Av Beis Din of Munich, explains

that the afore-mentioned verse serves as a reminder for the halachos regarding treating yayin nesech. A certain

type of barrel is called uvin and Rabbi Yehudah says we must not forbid a barrel of wine repaired by a gentile:

"Do not distort the judgment of your poor" (evyonecha, similar to uvin) but rather allow it.

Another even more interesting solution is offered by HaGaon Rav Reuven Margalios in his Mechkarim Bedarchei

HaTalmud Vechidosav. Rabbi Yehudah often gives us an acronym (like from the Hagadah to remember the ten

plagues of Egypt: datzach, adash, b'achav). Rabbi Yehudah wanted to give us a sign or symbol to remember

the halachos pertaining to dayanim! The letters of yayin nesech stand for certain halachos applying only יין נסך

to capital cases (but are allowed for monetary cases):

Yud for yom: Cases involving a death penalty the verdict is only given during the daytime.

Second Yud for yom: Cases involving a death penalty are never decided on the day they start, unless to

acquit the accused.

Nun for nochri: A convert must not serve as a dayan in cases involving a death penalty.

Second Nun for nizdaken: An announcement made at some cases but not others.

Samech for saris: One who cannot have children must also not serve as a dayan in cases involving a death

penalty.

Khaf for 20: Someone under 20 years of age without signs of puberty must not serve as a dayan in cases

involving a death penalty.

Rabbi Yehudah therefore says that we should not be exacting about these details in financial cases!

MODEH B’MIKZAS (ADMITTING TO PART OF THE OBLIGATION)

ל ח ,פרק כב שמות ל-ע ר-כ ל-דב ע ע ש ל-פ ל -שור ע ל-חמור ע ה ע ל-ש ה ע למ ל- ש ה -כ אבדר כי ר יאמ הוא זה -אש

פרשיות כתוב כאן וכי כתיב כי הוא זה עירוב אמר רב חייא בר יוסף בבא קמא דף קז/א מסכת אמלוה הוא

The concept of Modeh B’Miktzas is admitting to a portion and being exempt from paying the balance with an

oath. כי הוא זה implies “this” and no more, and thus, one admits to only a portion of the claim. The context

of the verse is concerning one who is accused of stealing, yet the verse is concerned with disputes regarding

loans and their repayment. The law of swearing on the denied balance only applies in disputes involving

loans or deposited items. Further, if a person denies the whole requested amount of the loan, then according

to Torah law one does not take an oath. The reasoning being that one is not brazen enough to completely

deny a loan to the person that was kind enough to provide to the loan to him; but one would admit a part,

thinking to pay back the balance later. This reasoning would not apply to the case of deposits since the

defendant did not receive a chesed. This is the opinion of Rashi (but Tosefos disagrees).

Further note that this only applies when one admits on their own. However, if witnesses testify about loan, then

this is not considered admitting by oneself. This is implied from the verse as well.

Further derived from the verse is that if one offers, in place of admitting, a payment of a portion and denies the

rest, this is also not a case of Modeh B’Miktzas. In this case, the two portions are considered separate: one is

being paid back, and the other portion becomes a separate loan with complete denial. The verse says “one

will say” would be obligated and not that “one will give”.

TORAH TO MOSHE ON SINAI

ר ה יב ,פרק כד שמות ל 'ויאמ ה והיה-א ר ה י ה ה עלה אל ת-מש תנה לך א ם וא - שבתי ת ר כ מצוה אש ה וה תור ן וה ב א םלחת ה : להורת

מאי דכתיב ואתנה לך את לוחות האבן והתורה לקישאמר ר' שמעון בן ברכות דף ה/א מסכתזה מקרא והמצוה זו משנה תורההדברות והמצוה אשר כתבתי להורותם לוחות אלו עשרת

מסיני: למשהאשר כתבתי אלו נביאים וכתובים להורותם זה גמרא מלמד שכולם נתנו

All the main points of Torah and halacha that future rabbis and students would derive by the way of pilpul,

derivations, and allusions, would already be included in the Torah from the beginning. However, this is not

meant to imply that everything that future generations would innovate in the learning of Torah would have

already been revealed to Moshe at Sinai. Since that understanding would “put down” all the life work and

striving of so many throughout history to clarify and derive clear understanding of Torah.

This is the proper understanding of this concept as evidenced in the famous Medrosh where G-d showed Moshe

the Yeshivah of Rabbi Akiva. At first, Moshe was disheartened since he did not understand the sources for

the laws that Rabbi Akiva derived. But Moshe was assuaged when he heard that Rabbi Akiva learned the laws

from the crowns on the letters, and this became “halacha to Moshe from Sinai.” Thus, Moshe understood that

the later laws were derived from what was revealed to Moshe.

ת ו ,פרק כא שמות ע אדניו א צ ם - ור דו לעל רצע ועב מ זנו ב א

Why does the Torah use the word מרצע? The Medrosh says since the Jews were to be servants to G-d and this

person decides voluntarily to be a slave to a person, should have his ear bored, who’s soul heard the

commandments at Sinai. But why by this commandment, and not by any other?

The Medrosh explains that the numerical value of מרצע is 400. This alludes to the concept that the Jews had been

400 years in position of servitude to others, and now should be free people. (Thus, the specific use of a מרצע

is on the ear of a human.)

כה יב ,פרק כא שמות ת מות ומת איש מ : יומ

The double language only applies when the human Bais Din has the responsibility to put someone to death.

However, when a punishment is death by the Hands of Heaven, only one מות is used.

Now Rabbi Epstein explains the order of the verses in this section regarding the punishment of death by Bais Din,

in a manner of לא זו אף זו. First is the case of one strikes another human and causes a death, this is the most

severe action and surely deserves death. Next is the punishment for striking one’s father or mother, even

though does not cause their death. This is followed by an action of kidnapping a person and selling them,

without causing the person’s death, nevertheless the action warrants the death penalty. And the lowest level

is one that curses one’s father or mother, an act without a physical action, just speaking, still warrants the

death penalty.

ד ח ,פרק כג שמות שח ח כי ה ד לא תק ושח

Chaza”l explain the word שוחד as meaning שהוא חד, that a judge that takes bribery becomes one with the giver

of the bribe, and inclines to make the judgment for the merit of that one.

Why does the Torah provide a reason for this Mitzvah? We see by the two mitzvos given to a King with

explanation, and Shlomo rationalized how he would do the two actions and not violate the reason, yet he

ultimately did. In the case of judge, they might rationalize that they would take the money in payment as

payment for their time involved in making the judgment. Thus, the Torah testifies that the taking of money

would surely blind the judge.

ר ה יב ,פרק כד שמות ל 'ויאמ ה והיה-א ר ה י ה ה עלה אל ת-מש תנה לך א ם וא - שבתי ת ר כ מצוה אש ה וה תור ן וה ב א םלחת ה : להורת

The Talmud (B’rachos 5a) לוחות this is the 10 commandments; תורה this is the written Torah, מצוה this is the

Mishneh (Oral Torah); אשר כתבתי this is the Prophets and the Writings; and להורתם this is the Talmud. This

teaches that all were given at Sinai to Moshe.

Torah refers to the five books of Moshe; then the four books of the early Prophets (Yehoshua, Shoftim, Shmuel,

Melachim), and fifteen books of the later Prophets. Plus, the Writings include Tehillim, Iyov, Mishlei, Daniel,

Ezra, Nechemiah, Chronicles, and the five Megilos. This entire group is called the כתבי הקודש, the 24 books

of Tanach.

In the initial description by the Talmud of this verse, the Mishneh separates Torah from the Prophets and Writings.

It is possible to explain like the Gemara (Nedarim 22b), if the Jews hadn’t sinned with the Calf, then the Jews

would have only be given the Torah, and not the Prophets and the Writings (since they were mainly ethical

teachings to “sinners”). Thus, the Mishneh, as part of the Oral Torah, has a greater connection to the Written

Torah than the Prophets and the Writings.

וביום השביעי שבת וינפש )תפילה בלחש בשבת(

The Gemara (Beitzah 16a) states that HaShem provides an extra soul to each Jew at the beginning of Shabbos,

and at the conclusion of Shabbos He takes it away, as the verse says וביום השביעי שבת וינפש which hints at

“woe that we lost a soul” )וי אבדה נפש( since Shabbos ends.

The Halacha (O.C. 296) says that it preferable to use wine for Havdalah rather than any other beverage. Even if

“pagum” (previously drank from) wine is available one should use it rather than another beverage. However,

the reason is not given. Possibly, due to the bitterness of the soul from the loss of the pleasure of the additional

soul one needs wine to offer comfort. Similarly, we use spices at Havdalah to ease the pain of the loss of the

extra soul.

In addition, the word שביתה implies a cessation from major issues, whereas נופש indicates cessation from only

“lighter” issues. For example, regarding a Ger Toshev (a non-Jew that accepted the to keep the 7 mitzvos and

thus, has permission to remain in Eretz Yisrael) is permitted on Shabbos to do actions like those that a Jew

would be permitted to do on Yom Tov, for needs of food (a “lighter” set of cessation. This difference is

reflected in the verse about the cessation of a Ger (Shmos 23, 12) ונפש (and not the word וישבות) which

indicates the “lighter” level of cessation.

בטי ישראל )יום כיפור(כי אתה סלחן לישראל ומחלן לש

Most of the time HaShem is referred to with the adjectives סולח ומוחל. Here the words have an addition of a

closing Nun.

The Gemara (Bava Metziah 33a) says on the verse (Shmos 23, 5) that when one sees the donkey of your friend

burdened )רובץ( under its load, then one should surely assist, that the verse using the word רובץ and not the

word רבצן to indicate when one is obligated. Rashi explains that a רבצן implies that it is regularly burdened,

and then one would be exempt, since it is like a normal burden to that donkey, and not an unusual, heavy

burden needing outside assistance.

Thus, the closing Nun teaches two concepts. One, it strengthens and reinforces the adjective. Second, it indicates

a consistency. Thus, we allude to HaShem that he is accustomed to forgive with strength the many sins of the

Jews. Also, HaShem has an attribute of constantly forgiving.

Judges

ואלה המשפטים אשר תשים לפניהם: שמות כא, א:

The Baal haTurim views this first pasuk as an introduction that alludes to guidelines for judges who preside over

civil law cases, the main topic of this Parsha.

(The Baal haTurim uses a Notrikon in this commentary. This is an accepted method of drush in which each letter of a word

becomes the first letter of an entire word or phrase. In numerous places the Gemara derives Halachos from a Notrikon

or from a Gematriya. The Rambam writes that one may not invent Gematriyos and Notrikons as he pleases. Rather,

some Halachos are derived through Gematriyos and Notrikons because those Gematriyas and Notrikons were given to

Moshe Rabeinu at Har Sinai as memory aids for Halachos that were taught to him orally as Halachos l'Moshe mi'Sinai.

Just as Moshe transmitted the guidelines for when to expound a Gezeirah Shavah and the other Midos sheha'Torah

Nidreshes ba'Hen, he also transmitted the guidelines for when to expound a Gematriya.)

דיןהחקר לתה אב יחיו - ואלה

The antecedent for pronoun “you”, is the Bais Din (court). It is not enough for a Bais Din to render a decision, but

this must also explain the law and its ramifications.

שפטמעשה ירם טשרה פיעשה שצוה מדין ה – המשפטים

The Dayan (Judge) must attempt to first negotiate a compromise before providing judgment. According to the

halacha such a compromise is considered a mitzvah, fostering peace

וציןרניהם שם א – אשר

Both must agree; compromise must not be forced

דבריםמחד יניהם ששמע ת – תשים

Listen to them both when they speak. This is a warning not to listen to one party speak when the other is not

present.

הםמתנכר ההדר ידיב נני פא ל – לפניהם

Do not show (special) honor for an important person; make yourself separate from each of them. Do not rule for

one due to friendship or rule against the other due to hatred.

Throw it to the dog

ואנשי־קדש תהיון לי ובשר בשדה טרפה לא תאכלו לכלב תשלכון אתו: שמות כב, ל:“Throw it (the tereifah) to the dog”

The final nun of the word תשלכון is not grammatically necessary. This extra letter teaches that a carcass should be

removed 50 amos (letter nun = 50) from a town (in order to diminish the effects of its foul smell.

The Baal haTurim indicates that the word תשלכון can be read as 'תשלכו ן one should throw it fifty.

(The Gemara in Shabbos 155b states that one should throw the scraps of meat and bone to a stray dog only in the

Midbar. However, in the city one should give nothing to the dog, because it could become a great pest, always

coming back. Thus, in the city one must place the tereifah meat in the garbage heap, but it must be at least 50

amos from the city.)

Maveir – a Damager

רמו :כב, ד תמוש כ ב ומיט דהו ב ש מיט חר בשדה א ובער ת־בעירה ח א ושל ם ה או־כר ד ר־איש ש יבע כי לם: יש

The Sforno interprets the first part of the verse as meaning that the owner of the animal originally put his animal

in his own field to graze, but he did not properly guard the animal and prevent it from wandering into the field

of his neighbor. Thus, the owner of the animal is liable to pay for any damages. This act of straying is a normal,

common action of an animal for the owner should have anticipated even if there is no precedent. This is what

is meant by the phrase מועד, he is considered as being forewarned.

Watchers

ף או־כלים :ו, כב תמוש כס

There are four categories of שומרים (watch people): 1) One who does so without compensation (as a favor); 2)

one who is paid; 3) one who leases; and 4) a borrower. Verses 6 thru 13 discuss the various laws to these watch

people. The Torah does not specify which verses would apply to category 1 & 2. Chaza”l teach us that verses

6-8 apply to one who watches as a favor; whereas verses 9-12 refer to one who receives compensation.

The Sforno explains logically how Chaza”l reached their opinion. The former verses deal with inanimate objects

which are easily guarded hence it refers to one who watches without compensation. The Sforno adds that the

Torah is speaking about a well-to-do person who must guard in own possessions and it is no great bother to

watch another’s as well. Verse 9, however, speaks of livestock which demands time and attention and thus

effort. Therefore, it is logically that in that circumstance, a watch person would be paid to perform this service.

Do Not Follow the Majority

עת :כג, ב תמוש בים לר חרי־ר טת לא־תהיה א בים לה חרי ר ל־רב לנטת א ענה ע ולא־ת

The Sforno explains each section of the verse based on the concept (Sanhedrin 2a) that a capital case can not be

decided by a majority of one. Thus the verse refers to a case where one judge is undecided but is inclined to vote

per the majority because they are the majority and not because he is convinced of the merit of the decision. By so

doing this judge would make the majority of two and decide the case. But he would have failed to meet his

responsibility since his decision is not based on reasoning and judgment but by a desire to concur with the

majority.

Clarity of the Sapphire Stone ר :כד, י תמוש טה ים ל מ ש ם ה צ פיר וכע ס עשה לבנת ה כמ

The Rambam in his Guide explains that the word לבנת (usually translated as whiteness) in this verse signifies

transparency and not a white color.

The Sforno explains that the object referenced here is a person’s spirit of intellect which begins as a clear substance

lacking knowledge just as the sapphire lacks color. Hence Moshe, Aaron and the Elders experience HaShem

through a prophetic vision. They comprehended that their intellect and soul were superior to their material

being just as the essence of heaven (spirituality) is clearer than the matter of heaven.

This is the explanation of the end of the verse “and like the very substance of heaven’s clarity.” Their human

intellectual spirit was separate and superior to their physical nature, and this is the “substance of heaven’s

clarity.”

Rabeinu Bachayei

Mishpatim

These things also belong to the wise; it is not good to“ .גם אלה לחכמים הכר פנים במשפט בל טוב

display partiality in judgment” (Proverbs 24,23).

From the beginning of the Book of Proverbs up until here Solomon made it his business to admonish foolish

people and adolescents. In fact, he announced his purpose at the very beginning of the Book when he said (1,4)

“to give prudence to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion.” Commencing with this verse he

switches and admonishes the scholars, the ones who preside in the courts and dispense justice. This is why he

said at the beginning of the verse we quoted above גם אלה, meaning that “also these parables” are meant for the

wise. What does his admonition consist of? “It is not good to display partiality in judgment.” Solomon condemns

partiality as a negative character trait. Why did we need Solomon to tell us this seeing that the Torah (Devarim.

1,17) has already written: במשפט פנים תכירו do not show favoritism in judgment?” Solomon added an“ ,לא

additional dimension to what the Torah had said in that the Torah did not mention a specific penalty for judges

guilty of showing favoritism. Solomon adds (verse 24) “he who says to the wicked ‘you are righteous’ will be

cursed by people, nations will abhor him.” If a judge convicts an innocent person the outrage of the people will

be even greater, and he will likely be removed from his position as judge. Seeing that the entire Torah from בראשית

until לעיני כל ישראל is inextricably tied to a system of justice Solomon said בל טוב instead of לא טוב parallel to what

we say in Psalms 147,20 ומשפטים בל ידעום, “He did not acquaint them with a system of fair justice (the Gentiles).”

and it kills a man or a woman, etc.” Shmos 21,29“ ,והמית איש או אשהAccording to Pessikta Zutrata on our verse, these words are redundant in connection with the immediate subject

at hand. They are therefore available to serve as a basic premise that just as there is no difference in the treatment

of man and woman if either has been gored by an ox, neither does Jewish law make a distinction between men

and women in other instances of woman sustaining death or injury. Although nowadays (since the Jews were

exiled to Babylon) we do not have the authority to impose financial penalties, if someone who was wronged

(injured) compensated himself by seizing property belonging to the guilty party our local courts do not reverse

what the injured party has done.

Our sages in Baba Kama 30 relate a list of anecdotes describing how careful various Talmudic scholars were to

ensure that their property (inert) could not accidentally become the cause of injuring people. They buried

plowshares 3 feet underground, were very careful that discarded shards should not pose a hazard to anyone, etc.

Devarim 22,8 (in connection with the fence on one’s roof) states “in order that you do not place blood in your

house,” as the basic warning not to become guilty of damage or injury through inadvertence. A certain individual

was observed throwing stones which he did not want any more from his house into the public domain, the street.

An old man accosted this individual challenging him why he threw refuse from a place which was his own to a

place which was not. The offender replied sarcastically: After some time had passed the offending individual

found himself in financial straits and had to sell his house. He tripped over the stones which he had thrown out

sometime earlier. He then remembered the words of the old man who had scolded him at the time and now he

acknowledged that the reproof had been in place. The story is an illustration of what Solomon said in Koheles

12,1: “remember your Creator in your youth.”

the“ ,שלם ישלם המבעיר את הבערה ;if a fire is started and spreads, etc.” by itself“ ,כי תצא אש

party who started the conflagration must pay compensation.” Shmos 22,5

The party who had started the fire is the root-cause of the damage. Had he not started it the fire could not have

spread and burned standing corn or stacked, harvested grain. The sages in Baba Kama 60 use this verse to see

an allusion in it to the destruction by fire of the Holy Temple. They quote G’d as saying that He Himself must

compensate the Jewish people for the burning down of the Temple as He had started the fire. The sages quote

Isaiah 64,10: “our Holy Temple, our pride, where our fathers praised You, has been consumed by fire; all that

was dear to us has been ruined.” Seeing that the Jews attribute the destruction to their own faults, G’d was willing

to describe Himself as the root-cause and assumes the burden of compensating the Jewish people as if He had

started the fire (compare Rashi there).

The Ohr Hachaim HaKodesh

The Wicked Burn and Damage Everyone – and HaShem Punishes Them “If a fire goes forth and finds thorns and a stack of grain or a standing crop or a field is consumed, the one who set the fire

shall surely pay for the damage” (22:5).

The Ohr HaChaim HaKodosh teaches us that this pasuk hints at the price we pay for the misdeeds of the resho’im: In order

to awaken us from our mind’s slumber and stupor and to get us to realize the extent of the damage that the wicked inflict

upon us [so that we do teshuva and avoid them and their sins], the Torah teaches us that the wicked not only cause damage

and distress to themselves and their immediate vicinity, but they also bring evil upon the entire world!

“If a fire goes forth” – all forms of tzoros – disasters and calamities – are called “fires”, as we see from the angel Gavriel

(Yoma 77a), who summoned fire from among the cherubs. This is a form of increase in judgments. “And it finds thorns” –

“thorns” refer to the resho’im, who are nothing but scratching thorns that pain us. The wicked have no master, for HaShem

the Master has given up His claim over them and hidden His face from them, so that whoever finds them can attack them

and do what they will to them. The pasuk now hints that once the fire spreads, not only does it burn the wicked, it spreads

and burns the grain and the crops.

“Grain” alludes to the young cheder boys – the tinokos shel beis rabbon – who are not yet old enough to stand up like crops

do; they are the first to be implicated and, due to sins, they too are caught up in the troubles of the world.

Then the fire spreads to the “crops” and they are burned; then the sword is placed on the necks of the leaders and they are

sacrificed for the good of the generation, and the Tzaddikim suffer for the sins of the general populace. They are known as

kama – “crops”, because the Tzaddikim are compared to tall, standing date palms as in Shir HaShirim 7:8: Zos komosech

domsa leTamar, and Tzaddikim are as date palms, as in Tehillim 92:13: Tzaddik katamar yifroch – “a Tzaddik shall flourish

like a date palm. Sometimes the sins are so great that the fire spreads even further and is not satiated by consuming the

Tzaddikim; it attacks the general populace, hinted at by the field – implying Klal Yisrael – the general populace, and then

the cheder boys and the Tzaddikim are not sufficient to save the generation. Then HaShem will attack and avenge Himself

on those wicked ones who are the cause of the demise of the young children and the Tzaddikim, as it says, “He who sets

the blaze shall pay for the damage and make restitution” – those thorns who are the wicked will have to pay dearly for all

the death, damage and destruction that they caused to spread like wildfires.

Now the pasuk emphasizes the payment of restitution for damages by repeating the phrase shalem yeshalem – “he shall

surely pay”. This refers to the yetzer hora, for it is the one that sets the blaze; it sets the hearts of the wicked aflame, ignites

the spark and pushes them to transgress and do evil. So not only will HaShem punish the wicked, He will also punish the

evil yetzer hora that causes them to sin, as it says in Sukka 52a that in the future, HaShem will judge the wicked yetzer and

slaughter it.

EVED IVRI

The Ohr HaChaim (21:4) shows how this parsha is dealing with a totally different realm. We know that man is a dual being.

We are essentially a spiritual being, a part of Hashem Himself, joined together with a physical body, a 'guf'. The purpose of

the 'guf' is to serve the neshama, because only through the 'guf' can the neshama perform various mitzvos.

"Ki sikneh eved ivri...". When you, the neshama, a part of the true Master, acquire a servant that is 'ivri'. The word, 'ivri', is

from the root 'ovar', meaning transient. The neshama acquires a 'guf' for its stint in olam hazah. There is a set, predestined

time, ordained for this 'servitude', after which there is a 'release'.

"If he is the husband of a wife, the wife will go out with him (21:3)." The 'husband of a wife', refers to the way that the 'guf'

(husband) serves the wife (neshama). If the guf is totally devoted, that all of it's dealings and interests in this world, are

completely dedicated to the advancement of the neshama, as a husband is to his wife, (all chossonim and husbands please

note!), then "the wife will go out, but, with him". Meaning, that even when the neshama leaves, the 'guf' will have been

purified to the degree that this union of the physical and spiritual will not be contradictory. The two remain bonded, even

after the transition to the next world. Tzadikim, even in their death, are considered alive.

"If the 'eved' proclaims his love for his master, wife, and children, refusing to go free... he will serve him forever

(until yovel)." If the person has such a strong desire to serve Hashem (his master), to extend and expand his spirituality (his

wife), to devote himself to Mitzvos (his children, the progeny of this union), that he has no desire to leave this world, then

"he will serve Him forever". Hashem will choose him to be one of those who have the closest bond to Him for all eternity.

Not in this limited finite world as he had blindly desired, but rather in the infinite spiritual palace of the world to come!

The Haftorah for Parshat Mishpatim The Jews Transgress the Mitzvah of Freeing Their Hebrew Servants

THE HAFTORAH IS READ FROM THE BOOK OF YIRMIYAHU

(JEREMIAH), 34: 8-22 AND 33:25-26

Jeremiah – The weeping prophet by: Rembrandt

The connection of the Haftorah to the Parsha: The first laws of Parshat Mishpatim deal with

the Hebrew servant. The Jews had suffered in Egypt as slaves and they knew firs - hand

what slavery meant. Therefore, Hashem expected the Jews to empathize with their

servants; do not take advantage of a person when he’s down. The Haftorah speaks of a

time when the Hebrew servant was being taken advantage of too much.

The storyline of this week’s Haftorah: The Jews transgress the mitzvah of freeing their

Hebrew servants.

Part 1 - Jeremiah’s word of doom. This section establishes the setting: a royal proclamation

by King Zedkiyah that all Hebrew slaves must be set free. After the initial compliance with

this “covenant” the slaveholders violate the edict and force their compatriots back into

slavery. This elicits the prophet’s condemnation. The previous episode is juxtaposed to the

event at Mt. Sinai, when Hashem “made a covenant” with all of Israe l to release its slaves

every 7th year. The present revocation of manumission is deemed a profanation of

Hashem’s name. The consequences of this breach of the slaves “release” are announced:

those who have violated the “covenant” will be punished. Jerusalem and its inhabitants

will be destroyed.

Part 2 - The natural & supernatural. Hashem swears that as surely as He established a

“covenant “with nature He will never reject the promises made to the descendants of the

patriarchs. Israel will be restored in love.

The Temple in Jerusalem

Yirmiyahu’s Biography:

• The definition of his name is “Hashem will elevate”.

• Born circumcised, to Chilkiya, also a prophet, in 640 B.C.E. about 2650 years ago,

on Tishah Be’Av in Anatot, 2 miles north of Jerusalem, in the land of Binyamin.

• Was a Kohen and a descendant of Rachav, the Yericho (Jericho) innkeeper that

Yehoshua saved.

• Spoke at childhood, cursing the day he was born. Began prophesying at age 18,

continuing for 40 years.

• Lived in Jerusalem. He never married, and had no children.

• Was the head of the Mishmeret Hakohanim (The Guard by the Priests doing work

in the Holy Temple). They were the custodians of the Ark of the Lord.

• Known as the Weeping Prophet, for he endured the destruction of the Beit

Hamikdash. Symbolically, he wore a wooden yolk around his neck.

• His prophecies took place before, during, and after the destruction of the Bait

Hamikdash (Holy Temple). Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon destroyed the

Temple. He remained in Jerusalem after its destruction with Gedalyah ben

Achikam, the man whom the fast of Gedalyah is named after. Shafan was his

scribe. Shafan brought the scroll he found in the Bait Hamikdash to Jeremiah,

which was originally written by Moses. It was open to the verse "Hashem will bring

you and your elected King to a nation unknown to your fathers." That scared

people into changing their ways.

• He was stoned to death after fleeing to Egypt, Alexandria.

• Wrote 3 Books: His own, Yirmiyahu (Jeremiah); Eicha (Lamentations), read on

Tishah Be’Av; and Melachim (The Book of Kings). . The time span of the book

Jeremiah was 66 years.

Famous phrases:

Jeremiah 30:1, “Al tira, avdi Yaakov” “Have no fear, my servant Yaakov” This phrase is the

chorus of a poignant song sung at the Melaveh Malka, Farewell to the Shabbat Queen,

Meal.

Haftorahman’s Lesson of the week:

Both “what goes around comes around” and never forget from where you came from.

You are not allowed to take advantage of a Jew’s weaknesses. On the contrary: you must

deal with them charitably.

Timeline: This story took place about 2450 years ago.

Map:

Written by: Reuben Gavriel Ben Nissim Ebrahimoff 5774-2014

E-mail: Haftorahman@Haftorahman.com

Understanding the Parsha according to the teachings of the Rebbe

QUESTION: What is the reason that the Torah lists the simple and rational understandable laws of Mishpatim

immediately after the giving of the Torah?

ANSWER: The basic concept to all the Mitzvos, even those which might be easier to understand by man’s

intellect, are that all Mitzvos given at Sinai. Thus, even “rational” mitzvos are not done out of understanding

but due to their being commanded by G-d. )242 'לקוטי שיחות כרך טז, עמ(

QUESTION: Why is the law of the Jewish slave having his ear bored, the first mitzvah listed in this Parsha?

ANSWER: The law of the boring of the ear of the Jewish slave (punishment) that decides to stay a slave (wrong

action) shows direct connection between a wrong action and its punishment. This displays one of the main

concepts of Har Sinai, the ability for a spiritual activity to have a physical affect in the world. This is the

beginning of service for a Jew is to bring the animal soul into realm of holiness.

)לקוטי שיחות כרך טז, עמ' 251(

QUESTION: How is the concept of “Tam” and “Moad” of a damaging animal apply to the service of Jews?

ANSWER: An animal is an allegory for man’s animal soul. When one sins (damages one’s relationship with

G-d), which is not one’s normal nature, then is like a Tam. However, if one repeats the sin, one becomes

a Moad, one who feels naturally distanced from G-d. In the laws of a damaging animal, if the ownership

changes, then the law changes and the animal returns to a status of Tam. Also, one can change the one’s

spiritual status through Teshuvah and immersion in Torah and Mitzvos. Then, one can change the

“ownership” of one’s animal soul back to G-d. )102 ' לקוטי שיחות כרך לו , עמ(

QUESTION: What is the spiritual understanding of the concept of Modeh BeMiktzas (partial admitting to the

claim of another)?

ANSWER: The yetzer hora leads a person to sin (a loss of spirituality), and then, demands that the person be

judged completely guilty. The Jew - the defendant - offers a "partial admission". While it is true that he

succumbed to sin, it was only a "partial" sin, involving only an external aspect of his being, and not his soul's

essence. A Jew, even with inherent lackings, can completely fulfill one’s mission by exercising bitul. )לקוטי שיחות כרך טז, עמ' 269(

QUESTION: What is the spiritual understanding of the concept of the Four Guardians?

ANSWER: Jews are custodians of this world, and can behave as any one of the four categories

Shomer Chinom (Guardian without payment) “Soldier” - serves G-d without seeking remuneration

Shomer Sachar (Guardian being paid for service) “Worker” - serves G-d but wants the reward

Socher (Guardian uses the object in exchange for payment) “Enjoyer” - serves for personal benefit

Sho’el (borrows without paying for use) “User” - demands benefits without having to perform service )לקוטי שיחות כרך לא, עמ' 112(

BEN CHAMESH L’MIKRA בס"ד - ועוד לקו"ש השבועימהענינים -

לע"נ ר' אפרים ב"ר אברהם ע"ה האפמאן נשמת אפרים ▪ Resource to encourage the study of the Rebbe’s sichos ▪

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