ODEs Activities - Examples of all phases.pdf

ODE 1 Activity - Example 1

General Situation

Internal armed struggle supported by external actors Ineffective governance and security forces UN mission ineffective due to security concerns. Peacekeepers are partially mission capable Tori Pocket security and counter-terrorism in capital are priorities for SRSG Negative STRATCOM trend in theatre

Focus for Development of JFC Assessment Contribution

STRATCOM framework to SHAPE and PDD to manage expectations, signal intent and shape operating environment

Cdrs estimate for security force assistance to Tytan Cdrs estimate for stability operations in support of UNMIKT in Tori Pocket as main effort Cdrs estimate for CT operations in support of Tytan security forces in capital as supporting effort Logistics estimate for a self-sustaining force with minimum HNS

Clarification Required

Ends and means must be reconciled. Objectives too ambitious for proposed force structure Must refine CPOE. System of systems analysis on irregular threats to Tori Pocket and capital. Also

reconsider our relationship with Tytan and posturing towards Kamon and Stellaria In-theatre coordination, collaboration and cooperation arrangements at the regional and local level with

partners

General Comments and Considerations

Plan for mission duration of two years (minimum) NATO SOFA must be in place prior to troop deployment Regional framework for political engagement must be further refined (UN, NATO, CU and other nations

in the AOI) Force generation beyond IRF

Recommendations For Assessment Team Composition

Recommend JFC and SOCC participation


General Situation

• UNSC concludes Tytan situation a grave threat to regional peace and stability • Need robust international force • Prevent Tytan GOV collapse and further deteriorating situation • UNSG letter to NATO SG requesting NATO assistance in E.Cerasia under CH VII. • NAC Decision based on full Pol Mil Estimate • NAC tasked Civilian and Mil assessments • Draft LOU tasks more detailed than potential Missions in SACEUR Strategic Assessment • Failing state under threat by neighbour who is supporting anti Govt effort • Instability and aggression creates Humanitarian crisis • Kamon, supported by other theatre actors is complex situation • SLOC threatened by variety of threats • UN lacks capacity, needs NATO as enabler NATO/UN C2 relations • Nature of Problem - understand root of crisis • Timescales for conduct of operations

Focus for Development of JFC Assessment Contribution

Clarity of Strategic objectives vs end state

Relationship with CU and level of capacity building needs/training No timescale

Means to ends balance

Overall means reasonable for initial assessment Based on initial assessment of UN force Must concentrate on Tytan Will require prioritisation of tasks as force insufficient for all at once Key Log support, C2, CIS, KD/Intel and Mobility in theatre

Criteria for Success: Measurement of achievement of Strategic goals

Stability in Tytan SSE Tytan Security forces able to maintain stability and security Freedom of navigation in theatre Security sufficient for delivery of HA

Constraints Restraints

Theatre definition, Theatre PSYOPS / STRATCOM vs UN Dealing with foreign fighters without dealing with bases outside of Tytan. Cross border ops? NATO / UN C2 relations in theatre NATO / UN priorities conflict resolution NATO access vs UN access ROE vs UN ROE clarity

Preconditions for success

NATO Commitment to Sustain Priority vs other NATO Ops Contribution of CU forces Regional Access Stratcom Coord – co-op mechanism with UN in place Full co-op with GOT CA (instruments of power)

Risks

Mission success vs dealing with root causes of crisis likelihood of resurgence. Embargo – means and opposition from other actors Mission changes Risk to NATO Strategic capacity Clash of UN and NATO ops Means to ends mismatch

Clarification Required

• What is meant by E. Cerasia area “theatre” (JOA) etc • What is meant by providing Security Assistance to Gov of Tytan • To what extent can NATO influence nations • Sustainability, FOF • End of NATO mission vs End of UN mission (Political timeline) • Theatre definition, Theatre PSYOPS / STRATCOM vs UN • Dealing with foreign fighters without dealing with bases outside Tytan. Cross border ops?

General Comments and Considerations

Plan for mission duration of two years (minimum) NATO SOFA must be in place prior to troop deployment Regional framework for political engagement must be further refined (UN, NATO, CU and other nations

in the AOI) Force generation beyond IRF

MROs

General

• Nothing is related to time - need timescale assessment • Ability to provide security and or stability • Recognition of expanding contribution of CU, UN, PfP and other forces

MRO A (Minimal)

• What impact will it make?

• Can it achieve DES • Assessment of Capability of org. • NATO reputation risk if failure

MRO B (Focused engagement)

• Most tailored to NRF. Force availability? • Still risk to NATO reputation if failure

MRO C (Robust)

• Most demanding on NATO resource, can force level be achieved? • Risk to NATO cohesion if prolonged mission • Best prospect of success

Recommendations for Assessment Team Composition

Additions to assessment team

• CIMIC • LOG • OPS • KD • STRATCOM • Potential OLRT locations (Unakos, Tori Pocket, Tigray Reg)


Principal Characteristics

• Regional theater requires Regional Approach • UN Mandate within a CA for SASE ISO HA • Internal armed struggle “irregular actors” supported by KA/ST • Ineffective governance and security in TY • UN/CU PKO partially effective. Importance of impartiality • ST can change the nature of the crisis • Ethnic, ideological, economic dimension

Key Mission Elements

• Provide security in Tori Pocket • Assist TY Security Forces in disarming illegally armed group and disrupting arms flow • Enforcing UN embargo (all environments) • Develop capacity for TY Security Forces • Safeguard SLOCs (incl. Bab el Mandeb) • Deter/defeat acts of aggression by KA/ST • Within means and resources available, address SRSG’s security concerns in Unakos

Key Issues and Areas of Special Attention

• Force flow planning to reflect TY ownership and perception • KA/ST potential intent for escalation • Non attributable KA/ST actions against NATO • Logistics redundancy required (APODs/SPODs and Log Hubs) • HNS outside of TY (Sveland, Lakuta) • STRATCOM media coord • Force protection

Coordination and Liaison Requirements

• UNSRSG – OF6 • UNMIKT - LNO Team • UN Country team/RC – LNO Team • CU - LNO Team • GOT - LNO Teams (MOI, MOD) • Lakuta, Petroceros, Saribo - LNO through NATO contact embassies • Regional UN clusters (CIMIC Teams)

Time Critical Requirements

• Receive MAB 7 Oct • Publish STRATCOM framework 8 Oct • CJ/TC SOR 10 Oct • COM and OLRT deploy 10 Oct • Force Generation Conference 12 Oct • OPLAN due to SACEUR 18 Oct • JFC-A Initial deployment 26 Oct

• Main forces deployment 14 Nov

Force Readiness and Availability

• What forces are available immediately • Enablers • Initial Entry Force

• What additional NRF forces are available at which NTM • Consider FoF for rotation


Principal Characteristics

• Key Characteristics • HA • Security in Titan (and effect on region) • Upholding International Law • Embargo Operation

• Security Mission Within a Comprehensive Approach • Complex - Broad Spectrum Op

• BPFOR Asymmetrical Ops through to High End Warfighting • STRATCOM vital and identify Target Audience and approvals

• International Approach • Land environnent – Extensive complex terrain

• Mobile Decentralised Ops

Key Mission Elements

• Identify capability requirements and availability for Entry • Provision of support to UN Security in Tori Pocket HA • Deterrence of Stellaria / Kamon • Assist Tytan (internal security)

Key Issues and Areas of Special Attention

• Identify Kamon / Stellaria triggers for offensive action • Understanding of fundamentalism, links and ties – avoid insurgency • Force structure requirements (Embargo) • Balance of Force Entry vs apparent invasion (must not make matters worse) • Look at potential to bolster Capital Security – spt to GOT

Coordination and Liaison Requirements

• Engagement at 3 levels – Regional/GOT and key IO/NGO actors • Recognise GOT primacy

• Tytan Co-ord Commission (TOR and members) • Subordinate committees

• SRSG rep in NATO / Rep in SRSG (1*? plus staff) • NATO / UN / GOT Combined Ops Co-ord meetings

• Deconflict Logs, CIS etc. • Security – Police role vs Military • CU

• Liaison with IMO, IMB and other shipping Orgs • Determine other key actors for liaison theatre and prioritise deployment

• Oil company influence, potential malign actor (appropriate target?) • Engage UN on restarting CFA


• Prepare OLRT for deployment • Liaison with UN and GOT

• Info exchange and sharing agreement • CA SME advice to Command - shortfalls in HQ setup • ID Key enablers and availability • Investigate availability of strategic lift (Air and Sea) • Stratcom: Key Messaging to prepare for deployment and engagement space • Activation of additional NATO CRMs


Commander’s Initial Intent

We are about to embark on a complex operation which will consist of two main thrusts.

I intend to secure the sea lines of communication and enforce the United Nations embargo in order to influence Kamon by deploying a robust maritime force into the Red Sea. This force will have a secondary role of deterrence/diplomacy aimed at encouraging Stellarian neutrality or cooperation.

Within Tytan, I intend to create a secure and safe environment in the Tori Pocket (ME) by deploying a Joint Force, thereby allowing the resumption of UN humanitarian operations. Assisting UNMIKT and the Tytan security apparatus in defeating insurgents and securing the borders will be secondary aims utilizing Special Forces, joint enablers and expert training and support elements in order to build capacity and confidence in the Government of Tytan. Throughout, we will be prepared to transition to high intensity operations to counter aggression should the situation dictate.

In order to meet the concerns of the UN and the Tytan Government, the deployment of forces will be sequenced to ensure a rapid and effective arrival which will not overwhelm Tytan capacity and take into account the political sensitivities of such a large western force’s footprint.

This operation will be planned and conducted within a comprehensive approach in full cooperation/liaison with the UN and its forces, the Government of Tytan and the other regional actors involved in the Luxor Peace Process.

Guidance for COA Development

• Three courses of action should be developed:

– COA 1 – A simultaneous and rapid deployment to achieve early and substantial effect on all fronts

– COA 2 – A sequenced and deliberate approach – COA 3 – A minimalist approach

COA Selection Criteria

• Sustainability

– Within theater – Long term viability

• Politically acceptable

– For NATO, non- NATO nations – Within Region

• Operational Flexibility

• Risk


Commander’s Initial Intent

Principles followed

1. Pragmatic approach

• Successive steps to achieve assigned operational objectives • Clearly-defined Lines of Operations inside each step • Each Line of Operation addresses either main action required to attain operational objective

or implied actions • Each step contains Main Effort & key Cdr’s concerns

2. Three-step Operation

• Shape, to enter into Theater & start business making an impact • Deter & Clear, to make the difference & attain objectives • Hold & Transfer, to consolidate success & prepare handover

SHAPE

• Establishment of a deterrence posture in - and around the JOA • Pre-deployment in the TYT Capital area of enabling assets • Deployment in the TORI pocket of maneuver force sufficient to ensure local FOM • Conduct of aggressive INFO OPS • Conduct of initial entry operations • Expansion of deterrent action towards key areas of operations • Establishment of air - and naval superiority in- and around the JOA • Availability of credible over-the-horizon reserve

Main Effort: credible presence in Tori Pocket IOT show NATO resolve to face humanitarian crisis.

Key Concerns: force protection, reserve, logistic footprint, balance between robust presence and public support.

SECURE & CLEAR

• Acquisition of full situational awareness • Full-scale cooperation with local actors • Employment of existing un- and cu forces in static posture • Combined, clearing air - and ground operations in key areas, nato lead role in tori pocket, nato

supporting role in tigrai • Combined, air- and ground border surveillance operations towards kamon • Enforcement of international embargo against kamon • Maintaining fom on glocs • Provision of mentoring/training support to selected tyt sf • Provision of local support/qips to tyt gov • Credible in-theater reserve

Main Effort: secure Tori Pocket IOT allow free flow of HA

Key Concerns: force protection, reserve, logistic footprint, balance between high-intensity ops and public support.

HOLD & HANDOVER

• Continued information dominance • Continued cooperation • Continued combined air- and ground deterrent presence • Continued combined, air- and ground surveillance • Continued air- and naval enforcement of international embargo • Continued combined fom presence • Mentoring/training support extended • Continued support to tyt gov • Continuation of aggressive info ops • Availability of a credible in-theater reserve

Main Effort: establish reliable TYT

Key Concerns: force protection, international support, TYT GOV reliability

Guidance for COA Development

• Adjust COA 3 to reflect HA as ME

• Develop another COA 4 - Access via proxy countries

COA Selection Criteria

• Transparency • Risk to Own of Force • Risk to local / regional stability • Deterrence • Resilient / Robust • Agile / flexible • Consistent Tempo (no voids) • Timely • Sustainable • IO / NGO coordinated (CA)


Course of Action

• Review Comd’s intent: COA 3 does not meet intent • Reduce Criteria for COA 1/2:

– Early effect on early hum sit in TP – Freedom of Navigation – Best demonstrates NATO resolve

• Endorse JOPG recommended COA 1 • Issues and Guidance:

– SRSG • Update UN assessment of:

– Ground situation – UN refinement of priorities

• COA 1: – Balance of forces TP/Capital – Advance enabling force

Operational Risk 1 Piracy

• Related Objective: Secure SLOCs; Deter KA/ST • Source

– Piracy against M/V – State sponsored – IAGs

• Consequence – DPs D2, D5, D4, D7 – Erode NATO’s credibility – HIGH impact on public opinion

• Severity – HIGH

• Probability – MODERATE during deployment – LOW after deployment

• Risk management – Passive and active measures – Improved SA and coordination – Neutralize ??? – Branch Plan – Coordinate with OCEAN SHIELD

• Conclusions – Conditionally acceptable

Operational Risk 2 BLA Insurgency

• Related objective: Sustainable Internal Security • Source:

– BLA (indirect support KAM and ST) • Consequence: Internal security LOO; DP S5 and S6; partially impacts on S2 and S4 • Severity: Short term (MODERATE); mid/Long term (HIGH) • Probability: LOW • Risk Management: Reduce vulnerability (Force Protection); Increase IC pressure on KA and ST;

Increase enablers for SOTG for north Corps; assign BPT to tactical reserve; assign BPT to strategic reserve; BPT mission to MCC; prepare branch plan

• Conclusions: Conditionally acceptable


Operational Risk 1 Failure of Theatre Logistic Access

• Sources of operational risk: – Opponents, Own Forces, Environmental

• Consequence of operational risk: – Effects every phase and DP. – Possible mission failure for severe event

• Categorisation of operational risk: – Extremely High Impact in early phase

• What is the probability that the risk will be realized: – Low

• Management of operational risk: – Environment –no – Opponents – yes mitigated by force posture and activity – Own Forces – yes mitigated by SOPs and safety

• Recommendations on operational risk: – Conditionally acceptable

Operational Risk 2 Blockage of Straits/SLOCS

• Sources of operational risk: – Stelleria, Terrorism by proxy

• Consequence of operational risk: – Failure of LOO 1

• Categorisation of operational risk: – High - Possible partial mission failure

• What is the probability that the risk will be realized: – Low

• Management of operational risk: – Strong Maritime presence – Clearance of straits (time consuming)

• Recommendations on operational risk: – Conditionally acceptable

Course of Action Selection and Factors

COA 1:

• Key Criteria – Early Effect in Tori pocket

• Change philosophy to Rapid Deployment and effects – STRATCOM

• New Criteria - Escalation


Principal Characteristics of the Operation

• What has changed?

– HA has improved in TP – Tigray region appears to be at high risk – Kamon posturing for offensive Ops. – Stellaria increasing aggressiveness

Key Issues and Areas of Attention

• Deterrence and maritime operations – D2

• Internal security in Tigray region – S5, S6

• Security in the capital – S1

• Humanitarian assistance in Tori Pocket – P1, P2

Requirements for Campaign Assessment

• Current campaign assessment to determine status of Tori Pocket and Tigray region

Requirement for Operation Estimate

• Create estimate for Kamon and Stellaria direct intervention – Potential contingency plans

• Accelerate branch plan vs. BLA insurgency in Tigray – SPODS/APODS considerations – Use of Strategic reserve?

• Examine NEO requirements in Tigray region – Size of operation? – Ensure our coord process with UN tight

Key Questions

• Do we need to shift main effort? – Impact?

• Will the nature of our operation change? – KA/ST posturing

• How to gain initiative in Tigray region? • What is impact of mass IDP/DPRE movements out of Tigray?


• Priorities – Campaign Assessment of main effort – Branch plan vs BLA insurgency – Estimate for KA/ST direct intervention


Principal Characteristics of the Operation

Deterrence and Maritime Operations LOO

Negative impact on International shipping State and non-state actors increased activity Kamon forces build-up Stellaria maritime involvement increasing

General: Deterioration in Maritime security but Embargo effective

Internal Security LOO

Security in capital and key areas not improving Capacity of TSF not improving Control of Tigray area diminishing. BLA not isolated, TSF defections Terrorism increasing

General: GOT effectiveness reducing

Tori Pocket LOO

Security improving HA status TBD GOT presence decreasing Kamon rhetoric more effective than NATO

General: Security improving but HA remains to be determined

Across the Theater (common to all LOO, LOG, IO etc)

Kamon and Stelleria increase in activity Log pinch point developing at Gambella Effect of Tigray loss on mission Effectiveness of influence ops

Key Issues and Areas of Attention

Key issues and areas requiring Staff attention

• Is ME still valid? • Revised Troops to task to counter Kamon / Stellaria aggression • What benefit for Stelleria of confrontation with NATO

Requirements for Campaign Assessment

Conduct the following ASSESSMENTS

• Review of operational priorities with a view to reprioritising ME • Reason for lack of progress of TSF capacity • Effectiveness of COIN ops • Status of HA ops • Effectiveness of NATO STRATCOM vs Kamon / Stellaria rhetoric • Why is internal security getting worse • Extent of collusion between Stellaria, Kamon, BLA and other non-state actors

Requirement for Operation Estimate

Conduct the following ESTIMATES

• Stellaria posture vs embargo • Kamon offensive posture in NE • Countering BLA progression in Tigray • Revise estimate on failure of GOT



• ROE revision • JPTL • Force generation requests • Activate Strategic reserve • Review CRM

CCIRs

• At what point will Kamon lose effectiveness because of embargo • Kamon build up – bluff or bargaining lever (I&W)


Intent

• Overview: Overall, the Campaign is experiencing significant challenges. • Where are we:

– LOO 1 (Maritime and Det): Deterrence not successful. Threat of strait closure remains. – LOO 2 (Internal Sec): Increased threat in TIGRAY AREA. Concerns Capital, ASMARA – LOO 3 (TP): On track, retain initiative

• Revised Msn Analysis and risk assessment: Deduction are: – Embargo (selected execution to be confirmed by SACEUR) – Deterrence – Shift of ME from TP to TIGRAY with focus on ASMARA and capital – Retain gains made in TP

• Principal decisions – Agree with Most Likely Enemy COA – Adopt COA 3 (ME ASMARA) – Further assessments/developments required

• 2 x UNMITK Bns for TP • Lead time for political decision to commit STRATRES

– Request MEU (C2 MCC)

Direction and Guidance

• Short term (JOC) – Develop FRAGO to further increase liaison/cooperation with TYT (MOI/ MOD) – FRAGO to LCC on partnered operations with TSF (priority Capital)

• Coordination (JCB): – Review embargo plan (if selected embargo plan is decided by SACEUR) – Prepare Joint Coordination Order to implement shift of ME – Revise priorities for air support, INTEL, JPTL, JTST, ROE

• Plan (JOPG) – Review implementation of NTM -T branch plan – Develop a CONOPS for COA 3 (including a deliberate wargame) with or w/o STRATRES – Tigray potential UN Security phase 5 (accelerate NEO plan)

Requests and Consultation

• SACEUR/SCR – NATO way forward on oil embargo – STRATRES – Possible extension of mandate and JOA

• SRSG/SCR discussion output – Broad agreement on priorities – Consistency of messaging SRSG and ForcCom to respective SecGens – Clarify NATO strategic assessment and way forward on oil embargo (SCR)


Intent

First of all, I’d wish to thank you for the quality of your assessments and estimates. In the light of the changing situation, I believe reasonable to underline 3 essential developments

1- The steady security progress in the Tori pocket 2- Deterrence and Maritime Ops 3- Internal Security

Therefore, my guiding intent is:

• Through a continued Strategic Communication effort, affirm our determination to support in close coordination with the GOT our HA mission in the Tori Pocket

• Reaffirm our steadfast commitment to ensure Tytan territorial integrity • Resolve to protect freedom of movement through the sea lines of communication

In principle, I intend to:

• Proceed with a shift in Main Effort from Tori Pocket to Asmara/Tigray region with Unakos as the secondary effort. To do this I want a modified COA including elements of COA 2 and COA 3.

Deterrence

• Reinforce our posture using the Strategic Reserve with 80% in Tigray and 20% in Unakos • Increase ISR activity and visibity to show force in the broad Northern Areas • Reduce risk to troops by preparing for escalation • In case of escalatin Reduce Kaman capability with Offensive Actions

Maritime OPS

• Maintain level of effort with Embargo • Increase ISR (SCUD in KA and SE) • Develop New ROE for BeM protection (Offensive into SE

Internal Security

• Increase posture (20% from STRATRES) in Capital area • Integrate UN forces and TSF with NATO Operations where possible • Regional Security focus conventional support of SOF (Tigray)

Tori Pocket

• Maintain level of effort as we • Prepare Increase involvement of UN, Contractors and NGOs • Air drop critical supplies if necessary

Direction and Guidance

Short Term

Study/prepare for:

• Reserve force employment 80% Tigray 20% Unacos • JOA expansion • Refocus ME in Tigray region to defend LLOC and Asmara Massawa • Increase ISR on Straits and KA border region • CRMs • NATO Training Mission-A increase priority • Hand over Tori Pocket to UN troops and redeploy to Tigray region • Increase op tempo to display resolve in Tigray • NEO in Tigray + additional refugee / HA situation if UN pulls out

Medium Term

• Recommend revisions to log support in Gambella • Increased involvement of UN

Long Term

• Develop branch for alt Tori Pocket log route via Lakuta • Develop plan for transition by UN forces in Tori Pocket • Develop a plan to address resettlement

DCom:

• Coordinate with SRSG • Hand over Tori Pocket to UN troops • Integrated ops with UN force

• Liaise with TSF for increased training and deployment in Tigray • Coordinate with IC & NGOs …

Issues fpr SACEUR Attention

• Force Generation – Activate existing Reserve – Regenerate a reserve – Use of SNFs – Sustainment of force – Use of National Forces (US MEU)

• Liaise with UN – New Mandate to counter aggression / integrity of TY – Increase UN force

• ROE revisions – for maritime force in straits and embargo ops

• CRM • JOA size

ODEs Activities - Examples of all phases.pdf

Documents

Transcript of ODEs Activities - Examples of all phases.pdf