Occidental Engineering Case Study Author: Michael McFarland, S.J. "A Tutorial on Ethical Decision Making" Online Ethics Center for Engineering 8/17/2012 National Academy of Engineering Accessed: Monday, April 01, 2013 <www.onlineethics.org/Resources/Cases/OccidentalEng/26863.aspx>

Wayne Davidson is a software engineer in the aerospace division of Occidental Engineering, a large engineering firm. For the past two years he has been working as a test engineer for Operation Safe Skies, a project to build a prototype of the next generation air traffic control system. This project, which is funded by a contract from the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), is a very important one for Occidental. With all the cutbacks in defense spending, the aerospace division has been losing business. The Safe Skies project has provided much needed business, and could lead to a much larger contract if successful. Mindful of its strategic importance, the company had bid very aggressively for the original contract. In fact they had "low-balled" it, bidding less than it would take to do the work properly. They felt that was the only way they could beat out their competitors, who were just as hungry for the work. Because of their somewhat shaky financial position, the company was not willing to take a loss on the project, so the project has been underfunded and understaffed. Nevertheless those working on the project have made a heroic effort, working eighteen hour days seven days a week to meet the deadline, because they know how much it means to the company, not to mention their own jobs. They are now very close to success.

A version of the prototype has been completed and turned over to Wayne for testing. He ran extensive simulations on it and found that it works as it should except for one little problem. When there are too many aircraft in the system, it will sometimes lose track of one or more of them. The "forgotten" aircraft will simply disappear from the screen, there will be no trace of it anywhere, and it will be ignored by all of the collision avoidance and other safety tests. Wayne has been working with the software designers to identify the cause of the problem, and they have traced it to a subtle error in memory allocation and reuse. They are confident that they can fix it, but it will take a month or more to do the redesign, coding and testing.

Wayne meets with his boss, Deborah Shepherd, the project manager, to discuss the implications. She tells him that what he is asking for is impossible. The contract requires that the company deliver a fully certified, working version of the software in three days for system integration and test. The government has developed a new, get-tough policy on missed deadlines and cost overruns, and Occidental is afraid that if they miss this deadline, the government will make an example of them. They would be subject to fines and the loss of the remainder of the prototype contract; and they might not be allowed to bid on the contract for the full system. This would have a devastating effect on the aerospace division, resulting in thousands of lost jobs.

They consider whether they can do a quick patch to the software before turning it over, but Wayne adamantly refuses to release any code that has not been tested thoroughly. There is always a chance that the patch would interact with some other part of the program to create a new bug.

"Then we'll have to deliver the software as is," Deborah says. "I can't jeopardize this project or the jobs of my people by missing that deadline."

"We can't do that!" exclaims Wayne. "That's like delivering a car with defective brakes."

"Don't worry," Deborah reassures him. "We have contacts in the FAA, so we know their testing plans. They will do a lot of simulations to make sure the software works with the hardware and has all the functionality in the specs. Then they will do live tests, but only at a small airport, with a backup system active at all times. There is no way they will overload the system in any of this. After that they will have some change requests. Even if they don't, we can give them an updated version of the program. We can slip the bug fix in there. They will never see the problem. Even if they do, we can claim it was a random occurrence that would not necessarily show up in our tests. The important thing is no one is in any danger."

"Maybe they won't find the bug, but I know it's there. I would be lying if I said the system passed all the necessary tests. I can't do that. Anyway, it would be illegal and unprofessional."

"You can certify that it is safe, because it is, the way they are going to use it."

And so he does. In the end Wayne signs off on the software. It is delivered to the FAA and makes it through all the preliminary tests, including live tests at a small airport in the Midwest. As a result of these tests, the FAA requests some changes in the user interface, and when Occidental delivers the new software it includes a robust solution to the problem of the disappearing aircraft. No one outside of Deborah's group ever learns of the problem. In fact Occidental's success with the prototype leads to major contracts for air traffic control software, giving much-needed business to the aerospace division. This saves hundreds of jobs, and allows the company to add hundreds more.

Wayne Davidson, however, takes early retirement once the prototype project is finished, in order to write a book on software testing. He feels that the book should have a chapter on ethics, but he can never bring himself to write it.

What do you think about Wayne's decision? Was it ethical?

The story of Occidental Engineering, which is fictional but hardly implausible, illustrates several important points about ethics. First of all, ethics is normative. That is, it involves making judgments according to a standard for what is right and good. In the case of ethics, the judgments are about human behavior insofar as it affects human welfare. Deborah and Wayne are not simply trying to predict how long it will take to fix the program or what the risk of failure will be if they release the code as is, although these factors are relevant. They are rather trying to choose the course of action that best satisfies their duty to do what is right in the given circumstances. Their judgments are based on certain standards or principles for evaluating behavior. For example, when Wayne says he cannot lie, he is applying a principle that it is wrong deliberately to make a statement that is untrue. Deborah, on the other hand, sees her primary obligation as acting for the good of her company and her employees, without harming anyone else.

The second point is that ethical judgment can involve uncertainty and conflict, even when there is substantial agreement about the principles involved. For example, Deborah and Wayne agree that there is an obligation to protect the safety of anyone using their software. Furthermore, Deborah implicitly acknowledges Wayne's claim that it would be wrong for him to lie about test results by formulating for him a statement he can assent to. Nevertheless they come to quite different conclusions about what should be done, though both are reasonable, unselfish and acting out of good will.

The third point illustrated by this story is that the possibilities for ethical action are always determined by the social structures and relations in which the agents find themselves. For example, Deborah and Wayne are forced into the unfortunate situation of having to choose between compromising their professional integrity by delivering a defective product and risking the loss of jobs of many of their coworkers. They are faced with this dilemma largely because of the policies of their company in bidding low on the project and not putting in the resources to do the job right. The company in turn might claim that they were forced to take this approach because they are trying to survive in such a competitive environment and because of the overly rigid expectations of the government.

Finally, the story shows that it is not enough to make the right ethical judgment. One must also act on it. Wayne may have been right, even noble, in refusing to falsify the test results. But in the end he does not act according to his best judgment. On the other hand, Deborah is very skillful, not only in getting her point across, but also in getting Wayne to follow her on it.

To be ethical, then, means to make correct ethical judgments and to translate them into effective action.

The existence of ethical conflict, so obvious and so painful in our experience, has led some to question whether there is any common basis at all for ethical judgment. In this view, commonly called "ethical relativism," ethics seems completely personal and arbitrary. If someone wants to take drugs or view pornography or collect automatic weapons, that is their business. It is not for anyone else to criticize them. Of course a certain amount of tolerance is necessary and desirable, especially in a pluralistic society. But that is very different from the position that all ethics is individual and that there can be no shared ethical principles. For suppose the drug user robs a convenience store and kills the owner. Suppose the pornographer abuses young children. Suppose the weapons lover takes a neighboring family hostage and kills three police officers who try to rescue them. Even the most tolerant and accepting would want to say there was something wrong with these acts, and that they must be prevented. But if they are truly ethical relativists, they cannot oppose any of these actions. If the child abuser believes that children were meant to be abused, that is his belief. It is not for anyone to criticize it. If a zealot is convinced that he has a divine mandate to make war on a society of unbelievers, there is no basis for questioning that, for there are no common moral principles. In fact the ethical relativist cannot even criticize those who seek to enforce their own code of ethics. If someone seeks to oppress drug users, gays, smokers, bicycle riders, or anyone else whom they find morally offensive, that is their business. There is no ethical basis for opposing them, because there is nothing to ethics beyond personal belief. Clearly ethical relativism in this sense is untenable. If

taken seriously it can only lead to a society where there is no respect, no civility, no protection for anyone, in other words to complete chaos.

Most often when people claim that we should not criticize the behavior of others, what they really mean is that we should accept that behavior as long as it does not interfere with anyone else. In this view there is nothing wrong with taking drugs or viewing pornography or any other behavior as long as it does not hurt anyone else. But this is very different from the position that there is no common basis for morality, because it is itself based on a moral principle which everyone is expected to observe. This principle, which we might call the principle of noninterference, states that any act is morally acceptable that harms no one except the agent. But then anyone who holds the principle of noninterference would have to argue why that is any better than other possible moral principles or moral systems. It does not avoid the problem of judging when a moral position is correct.

Another form of relativism recognizes that a society must have and enforce moral standards in order to be viable, but still believes that those standards are arbitrary and can differ from one society to the next. This is sometimes called cultural relativism. Cultural relativism is based on the well-known sociological fact that different cultures do have different ethical standards and practices. Some societies strongly oppose drug use, while others accept it, or even encourage it as a religious practice. Some societies believe that all property ought to be held in common, while others are structured around private property. Some societies revere their elderly and insist that everything possible be done for them, while others expect that those over a certain age will be left to die. Clearly community standards are important in forming people's ethical consciousness, and community standards differ from one society to the next.

Nevertheless, to conclude from this that ethics is purely a cultural phenomenon with no underlying basis leads to some of the same problems we found with ethical relativism applied to individuals. For if there are no universal principles, it is impossible ever to criticize or question any practice commonly accepted in some culture. That would, of course, prevent more "advanced" cultures from condemning "primitive" ones for being too brutal, too licentious, or not industrious enough1. Many would see that as good insofar as it protects against an arrogant and insensitive cultural imperialism. But it would also mean that no one, including friends and protectors of indigenous cultures, could ever criticize the cultural imperialist for being avaricious, arrogant, insensitive, or inhumane. If the Conquistadores' culture told them they had a divine right to rob and brutalize native Americans, they were right to do so within their culture, and that is the only standard they were answerable to, because there is no other. Similarly, if a society finds it acceptable to exterminate those of another race, as in Nazi Germany, or to keep them powerless, oppressed and deprived, as in the South Africa of apartheid, it must be right for them.

Moreover, it is hard even to say what it means for a "culture" or a "society" to believe that something is right or wrong. A society has many voices. For example, at the time of the Conquistadores, there were those like Bartolome de las Casas, who condemned their treatment of the Native Americans2. There were many in Nazi Germany like Dietrich Bonhoeffer who opposed the policies of the government.3 Which voice is to be considered "authentic" in articulating ethical standards if there are no fundamental principles for deciding? Is it the voice

of majority? If so, then lonely, courageous figures like de las Casas and Bonhoeffer, whom we consider to have been prophetic voices opposing unjust policies, would have to be judged wrong.

The idea that a majority of the population of a society decides what is right and wrong seems too arbitrary. Suppose, for example, that there is an isolated village that contains fifty-nine smokers, all of whom think smoking ought to be allowed, and fifty-eight nonsmokers, all of whom think smoking is a threat to public health and ought to be banned. If the majority decides what is right, then smoking ought to be tolerated. But suppose a couple of smokers die of cancer. Is smoking now wrong? Of course one might argue that there is an ethical Darwinism at work here: that ultimately the practices that promote survival will come to be accepted because those who hold them will survive the longest. But then suppose the smokers cannot tolerate the ban on smoking so they get together and kill all the nonsmokers. Has smoking, not to mention the elimination of nonsmokers, become right again? This hardly seems like a satisfactory solution.

Perhaps it is the authorities that decide the ethical standards for a society. But then the Nazis would have to be judged right, as would the governments in South Africa that imposed apartheid, even though they did so against the wishes of the vast majority of the population, who are black. Perhaps then it is legitimate authority that sets ethical standards. But in the absence of any independent standards or principles, how do we decide what or who is legitimate? If we say those who speak to the majority, we are back to where we were before. Some might want to say that it is religious authority or those who are validated by religious authority who have legitimacy. But the authority of religion comes from its transcendence, the fact that it somehow witnesses to a universal truth. If there is no such universal truth, religion is just another local cultural phenomenon and has no more legitimacy than the culture itself.

Another problem with cultural relativism is deciding what one's culture is and therefore whose standards to follow. An individual belongs to many communities.4 If one's country is involved in a war, and one's church opposes it, which one is right? What are one's obligations in that case? On the other hand, suppose one's church has declared war on everyone who belongs to another religion, even fellow citizens, while the government is trying to protect religious tolerance and the lives of all of its citizens. Which is right? How does one decide? Leaving religion aside, suppose that one belongs to a social club that is open only to whites. The members are convinced that, not only should they be free to exclude others, but it is a good thing for them to do so. But the wider society finds exclusion of people on the basis of race objectionable and demands that the club integrate. Members of the club belong to both "cultures." By whose ethics are they bound, absent any trans-cultural principles?

Cultural relativism, therefore, like personal relativism, is untenable as a foundation for ethics. Not only does it lead to the unacceptable conclusion that a society cannot be wrong in its ethical judgements, but it does not even hold together logically. We need some concept of an ethical truth that transcends individuals and societies.

Fortunately some principles do exist that have been accepted as constitutive of the good life by people of wisdom and good will across many times and cultures. These can be expressed as a set of duties, as in the following version due to the ethicist W. D. Ross:5

• Fidelity, especially in keeping promises • Reparation in making up for harm done to others • Gratitude for good done by others • Justice in distributing benefits to others as they deserve • Beneficence, doing good for others • Self-improvement especially in virtue and intelligence • Non-malfeasance, avoiding harm to others

These principles are rooted in our experience of and reflection on what it is to be human. There are certain elements that are common to all human experience. We avoid pain. We seek happiness, which means not only physical pleasure, but also an intelligent grasp of our world and its meaning, and the cultivation of virtues such as strength, courage, compassion and generosity. We form families and live in society. All of these are directed toward the ultimate goal of self-actualization in freedom, to be a free and creative human subject in relation to other free and creative human subjects. The fundamental ethical principles are those that have been found necessary to support these basic human aspirations. Ethical truth, then, is rooted in our own experience, intuitions, and judgments, purified by careful thought, self-examination, and mutual criticism. As Ross says, "the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics, just as sense-perceptions are the data of natural science."6

Of course we all frequently violate these ethical demands; but that does not mean that we do not recognize and honor them. Either we acknowledge we were wrong, or we find it necessary to offer some excuse. We might argue that we were not free, but were compelled somehow to act as we did; or that we did not know what we were doing; or that we violated one precept to fulfill a more important one; or that the precept we violated did not apply to us in that case. These excuses are not always valid, however. Often they are used to avoid responsibility for actions that are in fact wrong. That is why it is important to examine where and how these ethical principles apply.

Why is there so much disagreement on ethical judgments, if we have these well-established ethical principles? How, for example, can Wayne and Deborah come to such different conclusions about reporting unfavorable test results in the case described earlier? Clearly the above principles do not always lead to clear and unambiguous solutions to ethical issues.

There are a number of reasons why reasonable people of good will can differ in their ethical judgments, even when they agree on the basic principles.7 First of all, there can be empirical differences, that is, different readings of the facts of the case. Sometimes they disagree about the facts themselves: who fired first in a confrontation, for example, or how many people were killed in a battle. Even more often, they differ on the implications, especially in predicting the consequences of certain policies or actions. In the Occidental case, Deborah believes that it is completely safe to release the flawed system because its flaws will never show up in the environment where it will be used. Wayne seems more skeptical. More aware, perhaps, of how often systems fail because of unanticipated circumstances, he does not see the operating environment as quite so benign as Deborah does.

Another problem is that the principles are very general, and therefore need a great deal of adaptation and interpretation when they are applied to individual acts and policies. For example, what does it mean to tell the truth? Does it mean always telling the all the facts exactly as they are, as Wayne insists, or just avoiding significant deceptions, as Deborah seems to imply? What does it mean to avoid harming someone? Does it refer only to bodily harm, or does it include intangibles such as freedom or privacy? Is it limited only to direct, immediate harm to a well-defined victim, or does it also include indirectly increasing the chance of harm to an unspecified population? In war, is bombing a city's water supply, which will lead to widespread disease and death, the same as machine-gunning civilians in the streets?

Other differences arise because the basic ethical duties sometimes conflict when applied to a particular situation. They cannot all be satisfied in all cases, so it is necessary to prioritize them and decide to what extent each one must be observed. In our example, Wayne insists strongly that the duty to tell the truth, which comes from the duty of fidelity, is paramount and must not be violated. Deborah puts much more emphasis on the duty to avoid harm to others, especially her employees who could lose their jobs if the full truth is disclosed. As another example, a government might adopt economic and social policies that bring prosperity to much of its population but leaves rural peasants largely impoverished and on the margins of society, thus putting the duty to do good to a large number of people before the duty to show justice by ensuring that all participate equally in the goods of the society. On the other hand, a rebel group might seize the land of wealthy landowners by violent means and redistribute it to the peasants, giving the demands of justice higher priority than the duty to do no harm. There can also be differences in the priorities given to different groups affected by a decision. For example, Deborah seems to put her company and her employees first, while Wayne is more sensitive to the interests of their customers, including both the FAA and the ultimate users of the system.

Politicians often have to choose between the narrow interests of their constituents and the good of the country as a whole, or of the international community. This occurs, for example, when a member of Congress must decide whether to vote for a "pork barrel" project that will help the economy of his or her district but is a waste of the taxpayers' money from every other standpoint. Finally, legitimate disagreements can arise because of different modes of ethical reasoning. This refers to the methodology used to interpret and apply the fundamental ethical principles in particular circumstances, to reason from the general principles to specific ethical judgments.

A number of different systems have been proposed; and while these complement one another in some ways, they can lead to different conclusions in some cases.

It is easy enough to accept in theory the duties to help and not to harm others, to keep promises, to treat others fairly and so on. But how do these translate into specific obligations in concrete circumstances? How do they help us choose between competing alternatives? How do we weight our obligations when we cannot satisfy all of them? What tradeoffs can we make?

A number of ethical theories have been formulated to provide a unified understanding and justification of our ethical obligations and to guide their application. We will study several of the most representative systems, because each one offers key insights into the nature and structure of ethics, and each one emphasizes an important dimension of our concrete obligations.

Teleological Ethics and Utilitarianism

Acts are good if they produce good results, bad if they produce bad results. That is the view of teleological theories. An act, or policy in some cases, is evaluated in view of its consequences, that is, its telos or goal. Acts are not good or bad in themselves, but only through the results they produce. This view sees beneficence, doing good, and non-malfeasance, avoiding harm, as the fundamental ethical principles, subsuming all others. The obligation to fidelity, including keeping promises and telling the truth, is valid only because it brings about good and avoids harm, and binding only insofar as it does so. It is acceptable to lie for a good purpose; indeed one is obliged to do so. The other basic duties, such as justice and gratitude, are regarded in the same way.

In the Occidental case, Deborah's is a good example of a consequentialist position. She argues that the best course of action is to falsify the test data that exposed flaws in the system, even though it means violating an implicit–and probably also a written contractual–obligation to the government. The reason she gives is that no one will be hurt and it will bring benefits to the company and its employees. To tell the truth, on the other hand, would not help anyone in practice, since the system was safe enough as is; and it could cost some people their jobs.

There remain the problems of defining what is good and what is harmful and of comparing different kinds of goods and harms. For example, in Deborah's case, suppose releasing the flawed system would create some small chance of an accident that could lead to the loss of a few lives, but that the probability would be only one in 100,000. Would it be justified to take this chance if it would save two hundred jobs? What about five thousand?

The theory of utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham8 addresses these problems. Utilitarianism is a teleological theory, in that it evaluates every act in terms of the effects it produces. Moreover it assigns a quantitative value to all effects according to their goodness or badness. Good effects are given a positive value, and the greater the good the higher the value. Similarly bad effects are given a negative value in proportion to their badness. The moral value of an act is proportional to the sum of the values of all its effects on all the people affected. When choosing between alternative actions, one is to choose the one with the greatest positive value, or the least negative one, if none are positive.

Bentham's version of utilitarianism was hedonistic, meaning that he evaluated all consequences in terms of the pleasure or pain that they gave. He identified seven factors that should go into the calculation of the degree of pleasure or pain produced by an act. They were9 :

1. Intensity 2. Duration 3. Certainty or uncertainty 4. Propinquity (closeness) or remoteness 5. Fecundity, meaning its likelihood to lead to more pleasure if it is a pleasure or pain if it is a pain 6. Purity, meaning its likelihood of not being accompanied by pain if it is a pleasure, or pleasure if it

is a pain 7. Extent, meaning the number of persons affected.

The way to calculate the goodness of an act, then, was to find all the people affected by the act and all the consequences for each one; to assign a value to each consequence according to how much pleasure or pain it would produce, using factors 1-6 above, with the greatest pleasure giving the largest positive value; and to take the sum over all those affected of the sum of all the consequences for each one. When choosing among alternatives, the one with the largest value was the one that ought to be chosen. Formally, if there are M people affected by an act A and A has N consequences, and if Pl(i,j) is the value of the pleasure produced by consequence j for person i, while Pa(i,j) is the absolute value of the pain produced by consequence j for person i, then the measure of the "goodness" of A is

The pleasure that this system attempts to maximize is not necessarily limited only to physical pleasure. It can mean anything that leads to human happiness. John Stuart Mill, for example, in his classic defense of utilitarianism, insisted that the highest human values are those that produce the greatest pleasure and therefore ought to be rated most highly in the utilitarian10 calculus. These include intellectual and moral sentiments, liberty, and a sense of dignity. Mill quotes approvingly the adage, "Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied," and feels that utilitarianism's way of calculating pleasure can and should be consistent with this.11

Utilitarianism is attractive, particularly as a guide for government policy, which is what Bentham originally intended. There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, it is consistent with some of our fundamental moral convictions and intuitions. As we noted at the outset, two of the fundamental ethical principles are that we must avoid doing harm to others and seek to do good. When we consider alternative actions or policies, we do tend to evaluate them in terms of their effects. Will they be good for people, or will they harm them? Which does the greatest good or the least harm? These are precisely the issues that utilitarianism looks at. Moreover, in taking into account all the people affected by an action, and treating them all equally, utilitarianism demands altruism, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. In this it is quite different from egoism, with which it is sometimes confused. For if I choose a course of action for utilitarian reasons, that does not mean it is the best for me, but that it is the best for everyone. The interests of every individual are given equal weight, so the system is even-handed in the way it treats different populations and interest groups.

Another advantage of utilitarianism is that it provides a systematic way of balancing competing interests. As we saw earlier, one of the biggest problems in making an ethical judgment is that in order to gain some benefits or satisfy some duties, one must sometimes forego other benefits or violate other duties. This makes the choice especially difficult. Utilitarianism gives a seemingly objective way of finding the "best" alternative under these circumstances. Even more important, it offers a credible justification for those decisions that appear wrong because they violate some basic duty or deny some benefit. For example, if lying will not hurt anyone, short term or long, and will protect people's lives or bring economic benefits, then utilitarianism says go ahead and lie. Even if there would be some harm from lying, it would be the right thing to do as long as the benefits gained outweigh the harm. As another example, tearing down a neighborhood to build a highway, a stadium, a factory, or some other engine of economic growth, would be justified by

utilitarian standards as long as the overall economic benefits were greater than the suffering to those displaced. For policymakers and other public figures, it is especially attractive that utilitarianism gives definite answers, arrived at by a scientific methodology, to these vexing moral questions.

Because of its effectiveness as a tool for ethical analysis and judgment, we use a form of utilitarianism all the time for policy and decision-making, both in government and in the private sector. We call it cost/benefit analysis. The measure we use to quantify all goods is money, which is to be expected given our society's fixation on wealth and what it can buy. Thus in many cases when the government faces a major decision that has identifiable effects on peoples' lives, whether it is approving plans for a nuclear power plant, changing the regulations for automobile safety and pollution, or building a levee, a cost/benefit analysis is required. All of the effects of the proposed action are identified, and their impacts on the population are calculated in terms of dollars. This would include economic gains and losses, increased or decreased risk to human lives, and to some extent changes in the quality of life. These numbers are added up, and, if the outcome is positive, the proposed action is seen to be beneficial.

For all its advantages, however, utilitarianism does have a number of problems12. Some have to do with its implementation. For example how do we identify all the consequences of an act or policy, and how do we decide which ones are relevant enough to merit consideration?

How much of a horizon do we use? Do we just consider immediate and certain effects, or do we include long term and uncertain ones? Do we just look at the present generation of victims and beneficiaries, or their children and grandchildren as well? Telling a lie may not do any immediate harm, but every lie told makes it easier to tell the next one, and if lying becomes widespread, it seriously undermines the trust necessary to sustain a civilized society. How much does that count for, and how much of that loss is assignable to a single lie? Should the government require very costly measures to prevent global warming, when scientists cannot even agree if there is such a thing, and, if there is, how serious it is and what its impact will be? What level of certainty is required before we have to act?

Another problem is how to reduce all possible goods and harms, all aspects of human happiness and well-being, to numbers on a single scale. This means comparing values that are generally thought to be incomparable. How many jobs is a human life worth? How much growth in the GNP would pay for ten children with cancer? How many hours saved by suburban commuters would compensate for a family forced to live in an abandoned car because affordable housing has been destroyed by a freeway?

It seems arbitrary, indeed offensive, to put a dollar value on a human life or on human suffering. Yet it could be argued that we do it all the time. There are several more or less objective methods that are commonly used. One is to consider the economic contribution of a person. For example, we might calculate that an average person in a certain population earns about $1 million in wages over his or her lifetime. We could then use that as a rough measure of the value of that life. Or we could do a more careful analysis to calculate how much that person would contribute to the economy minus the resources he or she would use up. We could even pro-rate the figure depending on how much of the person's productive period had already passed. In that case many

elderly people could be considered liabilities. Another way to evaluate a life is to look at actuarial figures. Insurance companies have standard tables of damage awards: so much for the death of a young adult, so much for the loss of an arm, so much for paralysis of both legs, and so on. These in turn are related to what juries generally award in such cases, which is another good source of data. Finally we can look at peoples' preferences, in the value they put on their own lives. This can be inferred from the kind of risks people are willing to take in return for some economic benefits. One way to get this is to use survey data. People are asked if they would be willing undertake some hazardous activity, say trying a new, untested drug, with a 1% chance of fatal complications, in return, say, for $10,000. If the answer is yes, it would indicate that they value their lives at no more than $1,000,000. The other way to measure preferences is to look at peoples' actual behavior. For example, if someone takes a coal mining job at $45,000 per year, when the only other jobs available pay $15,000, knowing that coal miners on the average have a shorter life expectancy than the rest of the population by fifteen years, then it would seem that the extra fifteen years is worth no more than about $1,000,000 to the person, assuming thirty years in the work force. Or, if people are generally unwilling to spend an extra $500 for air bags in their cars, knowing that having them would reduce their chance of a fatal injury by one in 10,000, we can conclude that they value their lives at no more than $5,000,000. Admittedly, in practice the situation is more complicated than this. Many studies have shown that the type of hazard, the degree of risk, and many other factors influence people's preferences, so the exact price we are willing to put on our lives varies. Nevertheless, experience does support the utilitarian's contention that in practice a human life does have a finite value, and that this value can be estimated, at least to within an order of magnitude. (For middle class Americans, it seems to be a few million dollars.)

However, all these cases involve no more than exposing some lives to danger and order to obtain some good. They do not involve a direct and intended attack on specific human lives. A pure utilitarian would argue that there is no moral difference, since the outcome is the same: some lives will be lost. But for most of us, there is a significant difference between accepting some risk for oneself or others and directly attacking human beings with the intent to kill them. The moral quality of an act is defined relationally, at least in part. The involvement and intent of the agent matter. Accepting foreseeable but unwanted evil as part of the consequences of an act is different from directly willing that evil13.

Another problem with the way utilitarianism puts a value on human life and other goods is that it contains significant value judgments. If we use the potential economic contribution of a person or the dollar value insurance companies and juries put on a life, we will end up favoring some groups over others, for example the young over the old, the rich over the poor, and citizens of first world societies over those in the third. For example, a study of the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal India showed that Union Carbide spent far less on safety measures in the Bhopal plant than in a similar plant in Institute, West Virginia.14 Even if the system avoids such discrimination, it can still contain more subtle value judgments, such as the extent to which the society is willing to put peoples' lives at risk in order to achieve economic growth. The problem here is not that there are value judgments; ethics always involves value judgments. The problem is that the value judgments are often hidden; and those who make them are not held accountable. Cost/benefit analyses are generally presented as "objective" and "scientific," free of any biases and value judgments; and they are accepted on those terms. This shields the hidden value

judgments from the kind of public criticism and debate necessary to ensure that they represent our highest ethical standards. Any official who said in public that the residents in a poor, rural town are worth less than those in a wealthy suburb would be severely criticized, and rightly so. But that kind of value judgment could easily be embedded in a cost/benefit analysis for locating a power plant or a highway.

There are also deeper objections to the assumptions behind utilitarianism. For, even if we are willing to take some risks to our lives for a price, we still have a sense that there are some things that simply should not be done, no matter how beneficial. For example, suppose there was a shortage of organ donors and many young, productive people with families dependent on them who would die very soon without a transplant. A utilitarian calculus would seem to indicate that it would be good to find a homeless, friendless, unhappy, but healthy derelict and cut him up for spare parts, if it would save several lives. Certainly the immediate gains outweigh the losses. Perhaps a more careful analysis would show that in the long run the negative effects of killing the derelict, a diminished respect for life, for example, would tip the balance the other way. But suppose the case could be arranged so that there were no negative effects except on the poor victim. Then killing him would be justifiable by utilitarian reasoning. Yet there is something objectionable in the willingness to treat him like a used car, valuable but expendable under the right conditions. As another example, it has been argued that many criminals in the United States go free because of all of the procedural protections accorded the accused. We could put more criminals away, and therefore make our society safer and provide more protection for potential victims by relaxing some of these protections, at the cost of allowing an innocent person to be convicted and punished occasionally. Yet we have steadfastly refused, in principle at least, to compromise our protection of the innocent, even if it means a criminal justice system that is less efficient and less effective in dealing with serious crime. Apparently we still believe that there are some things that cannot be sacrificed, even if there is a considerable advantage to doing so.

Another fundamental objection to utilitarianism is that it does nothing to specify how the goods are to be distributed, as long as the action taken achieves the greatest net good. This can lead to policies that are extremely unfair. According to a utilitarian analysis, there is nothing wrong with sacrificing a minority group for the benefit of the majority, as long as the gains to the majority are greater to the loss to the minority. For example, a cost/benefit analysis might show that the best place to build a major power plant to serve the city of Los Angeles is in northeast Arizona, an area that is very sparsely populated, mostly by Native Americans. A few thousand people living near the plant might suffer some increased risk to their health because of pollution, as well as a loss of some of the majestic beauty of their homeland. Some might also suffer from the desecration of what they consider sacred lands. But this would hardly outweigh the substantial economic benefits and enhanced quality of life for millions of residents in the Los Angeles area. The numbers would certainly favor building the plant. Yet this seems unfair, because those being forced to bear the burdens of living near the plant get none of the benefits and would oppose building the plant if they had anything to say about it. The injustice seems even more acute given the long history of oppression of Native Americans by the white majority. There seem to be moral issues here that a purely utilitarian analysis does not account for. Considerations such as these have led the ethicist William Frankena, who advocates a largely teleological ethical system, to acknowledge that such a system is not adequate without some provision that the benefits and burdens of an action must be distributed fairly.15

Teleological ethics, and utilitarianism in particular, are helpful in making ethical choices. They help clarify the alternatives and their implications and provide guidance in choosing greater good. But in themselves they do not do justice to all ethical demands. It is necessary to introduce other considerations. This we will do in the next section.

Deontological Ethics

Deontological ethics recognizes that there are some things that are wrong in themselves, apart from their effects. Thus when in the Occidental case, Wayne says, "I would be lying.... I can't do that," he is making a deontological argument. In his view, lying is simply wrong; it does not matter whether it bring about good results. In a deontological system, therefore, duty is primary. This is what gives it its name: deon is the Greek word for duty. An ethical action is one that is consistent with the basic duties, such as fidelity, non-malfeasance, and justice. To violate any of these is unethical.

The best known statement of deontological ethics is due to Immanuel Kant.16 Kant wanted to get to the foundation of ethics, so he began by asking what is good in itself. He decided that it is a good will, that is, the will choosing out of a sense of duty, not because of some advantage gained. For if the will chooses some object because of an expectation of a good result, then there is nothing particularly moral in that. The good is in the result, not in the choosing. It is the pure response to an inner moral law, without regard for the consequences, that is morally good.

The next question, according to Kant, is, what kind of law is it that can be chosen in itself, without reference to its effects? He concluded it had to be a law that was universal, not tied to any particular circumstances, and derivable by pure logic. This led to his first statement of the so-called categorical imperative: "I should never act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal good."17 This captures Kant's idea that to be good is to be directed by a universal, inner moral law. While this law appears to be strictly formal and without content, Kant maintained that it formed a basis for judging specific behaviors. For example, one can conclude from the categorical imperative that breaking a promise is wrong. For if it were ethical for me to break a promise, I would have to accept that it was ethical for everyone to do so. But if everyone was free to break promises, promises would have no meaning. Thus inherent in the notion of a promise is the duty to keep it. There are no exceptions to this because the moral law is universal, applying to all reasonable beings.

At the center of Kant's moral universe is the free and rational subject. That subject follows its own moral law, acting for its own purposes, not for the sake of anything outside of itself. Therefore the subject is an end in itself, not the means to any other end. This suggested a second, more practical statement of the categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means."18 This principle, which we might call the principle of human dignity, has profound implications for the way we treat one another. It means that we cannot sacrifice the interests of any individual or group, even when there is great benefit in doing so. We cannot simply use someone to accomplish some goal of our own, no matter how good that goal is. For example, a manager cannot simply regard her employees as units of production or information processors, to be used in whatever way is necessary to maximize the firm's profits,

without regard to their wishes or needs. Nor can customers be treated simply as consumers of goods and services and producers of revenue. All are in some way partners in the enterprise.19

A third principle, or third statement of the categorical imperative, follows from the recognition that it is the will freely following the moral law that makes the subject good. As Kant wrote, "autonomy of the will is universally bound up with it [morality], or rather is its very foundation."20 It is this autonomy that gives the rational subjection its goodness and dignity. Therefore respect for the dignity of a rational being also demands respect for its autonomy. We cannot decide what is good for others, even with their best interests at heart. They must be able to exercise their autonomy. This means, for example, that a doctor, no matter how knowledgeable and well-intentioned, cannot simply decide what treatment to give to a competent patient. The patient must participate in the decision and must give full and informed consent to what is decided.

The system of Kantian ethics is highly abstract and formal, and therefore difficult to apply in practice. The categorical imperative, especially in its first form, has little content, so it is not clear what specific duties follow from it, although the fundamental duties listed earlier in this chapter could probably be justified in Kantian terms. The other problem with the Kantian system is that it gives no guidance about what to do when duties conflict. For Kant all duties bind absolutely. To violate any one is wrong, no matter what good might be achieved by it. Thus is one were harboring a fugitive from an unjust oppressor, and it was necessary to lie to protect him, it would still be wrong to lie.

Any deontological system, precisely because it refuses to reduce ethical values to measurable consequences, will have trouble with choices in conflict situations. There are, however, some ways to ameliorate the problem. The distinction, mentioned earlier, between accepting foreseen but unintended consequences of an act and directly willing evil, is helpful. One might, for example, risk harm to innocent civilians in attacking an unjust aggressor, even though to attack the civilians directly would be wrong, no matter how advantageous that strategy might be. The acceptance of an unintended evil byproduct of a good act is valid, however, only if the good done, or evil avoided, by the act outweighs the evil that accompanies it, and there is no alternative that avoids the evil.

Some deontological systems also allow for a prioritizing of duties, so that when these duties conflict one can choose the most important. This is the approach that W. D. Ross takes, for example.21 The fundamental duties he lists are prima facie duties, meaning that each one is presumed to hold unless there is a more important duty that overrides it. When duties conflict, one is to choose the most important. In some cases the duties can be given an absolute priority. For example, for Ross the preservation of human life is more important than the cultivation of the life of the mind, so you would be obligated to drop your book and run next door to save your neighbor whose house was on fire, assuming you had the necessary knowledge and ability to help him. In most cases, however, one must decide based on the specific context what duty has priority.

Nevertheless, in a deontological system there are still values that are immeasurable. One cannot, for example, trade one human life for another, or even one for five. As Paul Ramsey writes:

Human, embodied, physical, individuated life is the subject of all values and goods we know. The value or good of life itself should be acknowledged as not to be commeasured with all other or higher worthiness which for that life cannot be if it is not. Moreover, one life is not to be pooled or interchanged with another. Where human lives are concerned, the idea that they compose a net measurable good is a vacuous and a right dangerous notion.22

This gives little comfort or guidance in conflict situations where one cannot act without violating some fundamental ethical duty. Its value is that it recognizes those situations as tragic, as having no truly acceptable outcome, rather than blithely declaring good the sacrifice of a thousand lives as long as it saves a thousand and one. In spite of its ambiguities, Kant's ethics suggest three important principles that help balance the everything-for-sale spirit of utilitarianism and other teleological systems. They are:

1. Universalizability. This states that if action X is justified in situation Y, then X is also justified in any situation Z that does not differ from Y in any morally significant way. This principle, which follows from the first statement of Kant's categorical imperative, ensures that moral judgment will be applied fairly, without favoritism or prejudice. There cannot be one set of rules for me or my group and a different set for everyone else. For example in the Occidental case, one way of testing Deborah's judgment that it is acceptable knowingly to deliver software with hidden flaws as long as they will cause no harm would be to ask if she would accept that same attitude from a subcontractor. It is always worth asking, "How would I feel if this were done to me?"23

2. Human dignity. Human beings must always be treated as ends in themselves, not simply as means. This is just the second form of the categorical imperative. This recognizes the primacy of the human person in ethics, as against economic considerations for instance, which are important only insofar as they serve the interests of the human person. It also provides some protection for the individual and the minority group against domination and manipulation by a powerful majority.

3. Autonomy. Always respect the autonomy of the human subject. This principle, from the third form of the categorical imperative, asserts not only that people must be given responsibility for their own lives, but that all must have an opportunity to participate as free and responsible subjects in the ethical, social and political life of their communities. There are a number of modes of ethical reasoning that are based on these principles and are therefore at least derivatively Kantian. We will discuss three of them: rights, contracts and justice.

Rights

Rights are certain protections people are entitled to simply as human beings. Rights are seen as necessary to safeguard people's interests and autonomy, and thus are rooted in the principles of human dignity and autonomy.

There are a number of rights that are seen as fundamental to human existence.24 They include:

1. Life. This includes freedom from violence and torture as well as threats to one's life.

2. Freedom. This includes freedom of movement and freedom from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.

3. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This includes the ability to express and advocate one's thoughts and beliefs.

4. Equality. This means equal treatment under the law and protection from organized racial or religious prejudice and hatred.

5. Freedom of Association. This includes the right to participate in the political process.

In addition to these human rights, there are certain economic rights that are recognized, especially in socialist countries, as being necessary to safeguard human dignity.25 These include:

1. An adequate standard of living. 2. The freedom to organize and belong to trade unions. 3. Social security, including social insurance. 4. Freedom from hunger. . 5. Health care. . 6. Education. .

These are coming to be accepted as important in the first world as well, although it would be inaccurate to say that western governments are ready to commit themselves to ensuring all of these rights for all their citizens.

There are other rights that, while not fundamental like the above rights, are seen as important for safeguarding the fundamental rights. These we call derived rights. Examples are procedural rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, the right to legal counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and so on. Many of the rights listed in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution are of this sort. They are deemed necessary to protect individuals against the abuse of power by a hostile government, and therefore to guard the life, freedom, and dignity of the individual. Private property is also a derived right. It is possible to conceive of a society without private property that is nevertheless humane and free. In fact such societies have existed, at least on a small scale. Although the idea is not popular today, some have suggested that a property-less society would by its nature be more likely to nurture human freedom and dignity.

However that may be, it is widely accepted, based on human experience, that private property creates a sphere in which people can pursue their personal interests relatively free of outside influence, protect their lives, and provide for their economic needs. Therefore private property is seen as an important part of the rights package in many societies. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that property is not a fundamental human right in the same way that, say, the rights to life and liberty are.

Respect for rights is an important dimension of ethics. Rights guarantee the individual certain personal, economic and social goods that are necessary for a decent human life, and they safeguard individual autonomy against oppressive societies and governments. The original justification for liberal democratic government, with its ideals of limited governmental power and guaranteed freedoms for its citizens, was based on human rights.26 Moreover rights ensure a certain measure of fairness in that they are meant to protect all human beings, not just those who are economically productive or politically loyal or who belong to the favored religion, race, class

or gender. To appreciate the importance of the fundamental human rights, one need only contemplate what life is like in societies that do not respect them.

Nevertheless critics see some dangers in a rights-based ethic. Because rights involve the claims individuals have against society, they can be divisive. They emphasize privileges and protections individuals can demand from society, and not the duties individuals have to contribute to society and to make it work. Understood in this way, rights serve individual interests but not the common good. Those who worry about a "welfare state mentality," in which individuals see themselves as entitled to be taken care of by society without giving anything in return, often attribute it to an excessive emphasis on rights. On the other hand, those who are disturbed by the behavior of some individuals and corporations who pursue their own profit single-mindedly to the detriment of society blame it to an assertion of freedom unbalanced by any sense of social obligation.

Another problem with rights is that they can be so open-ended. It is hard to define where legitimate expectations end and unreasonable ones begin. The temptation is to keep sliding the line further and further out to encompass every possible unpleasantness. Now people are demanding protection against the rude language of second-graders, the freedom to defecate in public, insurance against all job-related stress, and immunity from the consequences of their own reckless activity.27 All of these claims, if accepted, as they have been in some cases, create further costs for the rest of society. They also insulate the claimants from having to take responsibility for their own actions. Finally, like the duties in other Kantian systems, rights can conflict with one another, and there is no well-defined procedure for deciding between them. The old adage says, "Your rights end where mine begin," but where do we draw that line? Suppose some parents' religious beliefs compel them to beat their children severely when they misbehave. What takes precedence, their freedom of religion or their children's right to protection from physical harm? What happens when one person's freedom to smoke impinges on another's right to a healthy, smoke-free environment, or when one person's freedom of expression is experienced as racial or sexual harassment by another? Many of the most difficult and hotly contested ethical issues in our society are rooted in rights conflicts. Rights theory itself, because it is based on individual claims, has no reliable way of choosing between them.

Rights language has become the favored mode of ethical reasoning in the developed countries of the west. In fact it is their distinctive contribution, and an important one, to ethical thought and practice. But too much emphasis on rights can lead to excessive individualism and a loss of civility and coherence in society, an acknowledged problem in those societies.

Freedom and Contracts

Another approach, closely related to rights-based ethics, makes human autonomy its supreme value. What is most important in this view is that people be able to do what they choose and choose what they do. They should be free to pursue their own happiness, development and self-fulfillment in whatever way they decide is best. In this libertarian ethic, if people want to take drugs they should be able to do so, no matter what it does to them, as long as they understand the consequences and assent to them, and as long as they do not hurt or inconvenience anyone else. If ten women want to marry the same man, that is fine, provided all agree to the arrangement and

no one else is adversely affected. And if a man makes a fully informed and rational decision that his life is not worth living anymore, he ought to be able to end it, although he should be careful not to leave a mess for someone else to clean up.

There are of course limits that even libertarians would recognize in how far people can go in pursuit of their own freedom. For one thing we are all constrained by the limits of the possible. Susan may decide she wants to live to be two hundred years old; but it is not necessarily a moral failure on someone's part if she doesn't make it. Todd may choose to be the next Michael Jordan, but if he is 5'7" with a six inch vertical leap and no shooting eye, neither the Chicago Bulls nor anyone else owes it to him to guarantee that he will achieve his dream. Another limitation arises when one person's freedom interferes with another's, as noted above. Harry may want to marry Joan, but if she wants nothing to do with him, he has no claim on her or the marriage. Steve and his friends may enjoy partying and playing loud music at 3 AM on Sunday; but his neighbors might want to sleep at that time. Someone's freedom is going to have to be limited.

But noninterference is not enough. A view of human life that has every individual pursuing his or her ends in isolation without reference to anyone else, except perhaps to stay out of their way, is an impoverished one. Cooperation is necessary for the realization even of many individual goals. Therefore a libertarian ethic must somehow account for cooperation and the sacrifices it entails. It does so through the mechanism of contracts. In a contract two or more parties agree to cooperate for their mutual advantage, even though it means surrendering some freedom and other prerogatives. When people agree to go to work for a company, they typically agree to work during certain hours, even though at times they would rather be home or out recreating then, and they agree to do certain tasks that they might not do just for their own edification. The company's owners, for their part, agree to part with some of their wealth, sharing it with employees in the form of wages, which they would rather keep for themselves or invest in the company. Ultimately both sides benefit in spite of the sacrifices. The company needs a reliable workforce in order to function; and the employees can make more money than they could if they worked on their own, with whatever benefits come with that. The contract preserves freedom while allowing the limitations on individual prerogatives that cooperation requires, because the obligations people take on are those they choose themselves.

A libertarian ethic has much to recommend it. It recognizes that the human person is the origin and locus of ethical value by protecting every individual's ability to pursue his or her interests. It reverences and guards human autonomy, which is central to the identity, value and uniqueness of the human person. In particular it guarantees that people will participate in the decisions that affect them. It stands as a bulwark against the oppressive power of government and other large institutions that would otherwise use individuals for alien purposes, rather than allowing them to be themselves and serve themselves. Moreover an ethic of freedom encourages individuality, diversity and creativity. Much of the vitality and flexibility shown by liberal democratic countries can be attributed to their commitment to individual freedom. An ethic that is strictly libertarian, however, does have its problems. Outside of its commitment to freedom, it has no content. There is no duty except to respect the freedom of others and no recognition that human life has certain fundamental values that cannot be contracted away. Anything at all is acceptable, as long as everyone affected consents to it. The ultimate irony is that someone could sell himself

into slavery, no matter how abusive, degrading and oppressive, as long as the decision was made freely.

Another problem is that a libertarian ethic has an atomistic view of society. Society is no more than a collection of individuals pursuing individual goals. People cooperate through contracts, but only insofar as they choose and only when it benefits them individually. Beyond this there is no obligation to serve family, community or state. John Locke and other early theorists of liberal democracy tried to compensate for this by postulating a "social contract" by which all people agreed to live in society because it was mutually beneficial to do so.28 For to live without society and without a government to keep order would be to live in a "state of nature," in which everyone would responsible for defending his own life and property, and which would therefore be a chaotic, perpetual "state of war." The suggestion was not that our ancestors had on some occasion gathered under a sacred oak and entered into such a contract. Rather it is a theoretical construct meant to convey the idea that it is in our interests to have government, so that if we were given the choice of whether or not to accept the limitations of living in society, we would do it. Thus it reconciles the need to surrender some freedom to government with the conviction that the only obligations we have are those we choose to accept. This is still a very weak account of social obligation, however. It implies that the only demands family or society can make on us are those we accept, which are only those that serve our self-interest.

The other danger of an ethics of freedom is that it only works for those who can understand, choose and promote their own interests. The big question is, who defends the defenseless and who speaks for those who cannot speak for themselves. Because the primary responsibility for promoting a person's interests lie with the individual, and because society is seen primarily as facilitating that, those who cannot act autonomously, because of age, race, mental or physical handicap, gender, or economic or social status, tend to be treated as if they had no interests. Thus those who are most vulnerable and on the margins of society are given the least protection and treated the worst. For these people human dignity is not well served.

Justice

Justice governs the complex economic, social and political relationships within and between societies and the social structures that sustain them, more than obligations between individuals. Based on the essential worth and dignity of every human being and the principle of universalizability, which says that people should not be treated differently because of morally irrelevant differences, justice demands equal treatment of all human beings. In other words, it requires that the benefits and burdens of society be distributed fairly. Certainly the burdens of society should not fall disproportionately on one group; nor should any group enjoy more of the benefits than it is entitled to. In particular those who are already weakest in society should not be unduly burdened or denied participation in society and a share of its goods. This is a particular concern because those who are already on the margins of society and least able to claim their proper place in it are the most likely to be taken advantage of and denied its benefits. The justice of a society is most clearly shown in how it treats its poor. Consideration of justice is an important part of ethical reasoning because it forces us to look beyond individual relationships, acts and obligations and to consider broader issues, including institutional and societal issues. In the Occidental case, for example, Deborah and Wayne both fail to consider the fairness of their

proposed actions. When the government accepted bids on the project, it was with the understanding that the winner would deliver a working prototype by a certain date. This applied to all of the bidders. In bidding low and then trying to compensate by not putting enough resources into the project to guarantee making the deadline, Occidental tried to gain an unfair advantage over its competitors, who presumably bid higher based on an honest assessment of what it would take to meet the requirements. The punishment Occidental is subject to for failing to make the deadline is meant to ensure fairness in the bidding process, and Occidental's attempt to avoid the deserved penalty is therefore unjust. This is one of the strongest arguments, perhaps the decisive one, against Deborah's position. There are a number of ways in which the requirement of equal or fair treatment can be understood. One, the weakest, is simply a prohibition of discrimination against any individual or group based on race, religion, ethnic background or other characteristics for which the subjects are not responsible. People should not be deprived of any good, impeded in the pursuit of their own interests, or otherwise put at a disadvantage for arbitrary reasons, those that are beyond their control and have nothing to do with their merit or worth. This discrimination can take many forms, from attacks on people's lives, to denial of equal protection under the law, to denial of religious freedom, to economic and job discrimination, to social ostracism and other forms of demeaning treatment.

Certainly the protection from discrimination is an important part of justice. Any society that failed to provide it would have to be judged unjust. The question is whether it is enough that society not interfere with individuals' rights and freedoms. For even when people are not victimized by direct discrimination, they can be at a disadvantage because of a past history of discrimination to their race, religion or ethnic group or because of randomly occurring and unmerited factors such as intelligence, appearance, health, family background and so on. Even without interference society's goods end up being distributed very unequally. Is there an obligation to do something positive to even it out? If so, in what way, to what extent, and according to what criteria?

Some, such as the contemporary philosopher Robert Nozick, would argue that there is no such obligation.29 He points out that there is no central distribution system for all of society's benefits. Different goods are controlled by different people and they are transferred by trade or by gifts. To force a change in the existing distribution of goods or to try to control how they are transferred would be to violate the liberty of those who hold them and therefore would itself be unjust. The existing distribution is just as long as it has been reached by legitimate means, without fraud or force or any other interference in the free acquisition and exchange of goods. Thus for Nozick the free market is the best guarantor of justice, and the government should not try to force any particular pattern of distribution in society. While this view of justice may, in some formal sense at least, uphold the freedom of the individual, it leaves many individuals, through no fault of their own, unable to pursue their own interests or to participate as they would like in the life of society. Moreover it tolerates enormous inequalities in the way people are treated and in the advantages they enjoy and the burdens they have to bear. Some families can be living in abject poverty, crowded into dismal housing, their children starving, with no hope of improving their lot, while others amass enormous wealth, more than they could ever use; and that would be considered acceptable as long as it could be shown that there were no explicit acts aimed at further depriving the poor or blocking their attempts to help themselves. This hardly

seems like equal and fair treatment. Nor does it recognize the fundamental duty to help those in need.

This has led many to define justice in such a way that it includes the obligation to narrow the inequities between rich and poor. This has been done in a number of ways. One approach, like Nozick's, does not focus on equality of results, the actual distribution of society's goods, but on equality of opportunity. Unlike Nozick's, however, it recognizes that many are impeded in their ability to participate in the life of society and share in its benefits by factors that, while they may not be the result of discrimination or malfeasance, still are not chosen or deserved by the subjects. This includes inequality in natural gifts, family background, education and so on. This view recognizes that society has the obligation, to the extent that it is able, to help compensate for these inequalities. Thus society would have an obligation to provide compensatory education, job training, health care, day care and so on, so that those who start out deprived will at least have a chance to compete for decent jobs, housing and so on. This definition still tolerates large discrepancies in the actual distribution of goods, but at least it recognizes some form of social obligation to help those most disadvantaged.

Other theories of justice focus on outcomes. They insist that the actual distribution of benefits and burdens in society should conform to certain rules. These usually take the form of "to each according to his/her X," where X could be merit, contribution to society, or need. The first two envision some sort of rewards system, where people are compensated for hard work, character, ability, and what they are able to do for others, but are not allowed to accumulate or hold undeserved wealth. The third leads to a communist society that simply distributes goods as needed to give everyone the same level of benefits regardless of merit. In any case this kind of justice requires strong social control over economic activity, which does diminish individual liberty, as well as the flexibility and creativity of the economic system. Furthermore, to the extent that need rather than merit dictates distribution, there is less individual incentive to contribute, especially in a large and diverse society, which in practice generally leads to less economic output and fewer goods to distribute.

Neither equality of opportunity nor equality of result seems entirely satisfactory. In practice most societies combine the two. They define a certain minimum of essential goods that everyone is entitled to, in income, education, housing, health care, and so on, and recognize that society has an obligation to provide that minimum. Beyond that, they allow great freedom in economic, social and political activity and accept whatever distribution of goods results. This of course is the foundation of the modern democratic socialist state. Philosophically this solution is incoherent and therefore not very satisfying.30 And it leaves open many practical questions, such as what minimum of goods is acceptable, how society is to provide and pay for this, and so on. But it does seem to provide the foundation for a workable solution.

A contemporary philosophical approach to justice that attempts to reconcile the demands of equality and freedom is found in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice.31 Rawls begins, like John Locke before him, with the primacy of individual freedom, and derives from it a justification for accepting one's obligations to society. What is right for Rawls is what the reasonable person would choose if fully informed and fully free. Therefore he begins with what he calls "the original position." In this hypothetical construct, a group of people who are to form a society

meet to decide by what principles their society is to be governed. To make the choice fair and free of self-interest, each person is assumed to be behind a "veil of ignorance," with no knowledge of his or her natural gifts, class, race, family background, or other naturally occurring advantages or disadvantages. Thus no one will seek to maximize his or her advantages under the system, and everyone will take special care to ensure that the situation of those who are worst off will be tolerable, because they might end up in that position. Rawls argues that a group of people in the original position would decide on the following two principles:

1. "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberty compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."

2. "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ..., and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Rawls also gives rules for prioritizing these principles when they conflict. The first principle, the protection of liberty, is to have priority over the second, and a liberty can be limited only when it strengthens the overall system of liberty. Furthermore equality is to have priority over maximizing the advantages of all in society and equality of opportunity is to have priority over the allowance of inequality for maximum advantage.32

As can be seen, Rawls seeks to integrate many of the concerns and values advocated by the various theories of justice discussed above. Individual liberty has priority, not only as his conceptual starting point but also in the resulting system of justice, because without it there can be no political justice. However in the distribution of society's goods, especially in its economic life, he insists on equality except where inequality will benefit those who are most needy. This equality encompasses both equality of opportunity and equality in the actual distribution. Thus Rawls allows the free market system because it can produce more goods to be shared, but only when it is structured so that the poor can participate in its benefits.

Rawls's system can be criticized from both sides. Libertarians would be uncomfortable with the attempt to put limits on how society's goods can be distributed. On the other hand, those with a more communitarian view of justice would want to see the obligation to serve the good of the community given a higher priority, rather than being secondary to, and derived from, individual freedom. Nevertheless, Rawls's system is an important achievement, not only as an intellectual tour de force, but also for the practical guidance it gives in how to integrate and balance the various elements of justice.

Virtue Ethics

The systems considered above looked at individual acts, judging them either according to their consequences (utilitarianism and similar systems) or by whether they satisfy certain rules and requirements (deontological systems). Another approach considers not so much the acts themselves as the one who performs them, the agent. Good acts come from a good person, that is, one with the proper character and disposition. This approach, which goes back to the classical Greek philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, seeks to understand ethics in terms of the qualities that make a person good.

In general something is good if it fulfills its purpose in the best possible way. Thus, since the purpose of a book is to inform and entertain, a good book is one that informs and entertains us. The purpose of a saw is to cut wood. Therefore a good saw is one that cuts wood effectively and efficiently. To use one of Aristotle's analogies, the purpose of a physician is to produce health, so a good physician is one that can make patients healthy. This may seem obvious; but it is worth noting that we often overlook it and judge physicians on their salaries, the elegance of their offices, their knowledge, or even their appearances. Sometimes the obvious, common-sense truths are the ones we need most to hear.

In seeking to understand what makes people good in general, Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, asked what the purpose of human life is, and decided it was happiness, since that is what we all seek for its own sake. Furthermore he decided that the happiness that was our ultimate purpose could not come from sensual pleasure, adulation or similar factors, because these depend on external elements over which the subject has little control. Therefore they could not produce lasting happiness. Genuine happiness and fulfillment are intrinsic and come from attaining those qualities that are most pleasing and praiseworthy in a human being. These are what Aristotle called the virtues or "excellences" of the human person, and included such qualities as temperance, courage, generosity, and especially justice and friendship. The good person is the one that possesses these qualities, and good actions are the ones that follow from them.

Virtue ethics provides a valuable complement to the other systems. In focusing on the agent, it looks at the source of ethical behavior and how and why it comes to be. Virtuous people generally do know the right thing to do, and find a way to do it. Furthermore it emphasizes the very important insight that ethical acts have significance for the one who performs them, not just for those on the receiving end. Finally it provides a more positive and expansive view of human behavior. Rather than concentrating on following the rules or producing the right results, it urges us to live nobly, to reach for what is best and most fully human in us.

The main problem with virtue ethics is that it has limited usefulness in deciding difficult issues or resolving ethical conflicts. Like many of the deontological systems we studied earlier, it has no way of weighing and choosing among competing values, and it does not offer a framework for analyzing complex moral dilemmas. In its purest form, it depends on the moral intuition of those who are virtuous to provide guidance. That can go a long way; but finding one's way through the moral mazes encountered when one faces unfamiliar situations like those created by new technology, requires more systematic analysis. For example in the Occidental case, Deborah shows an unselfish concern for her employees, which for Aristotle would be an especially commendable manifestation of friendship. She also has a strong loyalty to her company and considerable fortitude in holding her ground. On the other hand, she falls short on some aspects of justice and seems less than completely honest. Wayne, conversely, is praiseworthy for his honesty and his sense of fairness, but perhaps lacks courage. Applying these categories does give some insight into the character and motivation of the two principals; and it even suggests how each could do better. But it does not help choose between their two positions. Most importantly it does not provide much guidance for someone faced with the same decision, since different virtues lead in different directions. However, it does at least help clarify the choices. For example, if one puts care for those with whom one has a direct relationship first, a position often identified with feminist ethics, then one would tend to side with Deborah. Conversely, if one was

committed to more abstract and general values like honesty and justice, a more Kantian position, one would see Wayne as being in the right.

In practice when we are faced with an ethical dilemma, we seldom think it through from first principles. We usually draw on existing experience and past judgments. Making a sound ethical judgment is difficult. It involves consideration and weighing of many factors, the sifting through of different positions, careful reasoning and argument, and much experience of the implications of different actions, what works and what does not. It is helpful to be able to apply the wisdom so dearly bought by applying the judgments to new situations. There are a number of ways in which we do that.

Analogy

In ethics as in law, we often decide a case by finding a similar case that has already been decided and applying the same judgment. When Wayne in the Occidental case protests that delivering flawed safety-critical software is like selling a car with defective brakes, he is reasoning by analogy. We are well aware of issues of safety in the automobile industry and the importance of engineers maintaining the highest standards for critical systems. Most would agree that it is wrong for engineers knowingly to release a vehicle with brakes that could fail. In the same way, Wayne argues, it would be wrong for him knowingly to release safety-critical software that could fail. The cases are analogous according to his analysis because they both involve engineered systems whose failures could cost lives, and both are being released with known flaws.

The use of analogy and arguing by cases goes back at least as far as the ancient Greek philosophers. For example in Plato's Gorgias, Socrates wishes to discredit sophists because of the shallowness of their flattering oratory, so he sets up the following analogy: "what pastry making is to medicine, oratory is to justice."33In other words, just as pastry gives the body an immediate sensation of well-being, though it is in fact unhealthy, whereas medicine produces real health, so the sophists' oratory seeks only the appearance of good, while justice is the true good of the state. The implication is that because there is something misleading and unhealthy about pastry, in the same way there is something untrue and corrupting about sophistry.

The ultimate justification for using analogy in ethical judgment is the principle of universalizability noted above as one of the principles derivable from Kant's categorical imperative. According to this principle if Case A and Case B are ethically analogous, meaning that they are governed by the same ethical principles and do not differ in any ethically significant way, then whatever judgment is attached to A should also be attached to B. If we have already arrived at a judgment for A, we can use it for B as well. The hard part is deciding when cases are analogous, and especially what differences are significant enough ethically to invalidate the analogy. For example, one might counter Wayne's use of the defective brakes analogy by pointing out that, while brakes have physical defects that cause them to fail randomly, the air traffic control program has a logical defect that fails in a predictable manner, and that removing a program bug is a routine procedure that can be done with a regularly scheduled program update, whereas retrofitting brakes is a major operation that can only be done through an extraordinary recall. But are these differences enough to invalidate the judgment based on a fundamental

similarity, that both involve knowingly releasing a safety-critical system with a potentially dangerous flaw? For that matter, are software bugs really that predictable and controllable?

The above example shows that analogies can be enlightening, but they can never simply be taken at face value. They must always be examined very carefully. Nevertheless, even though analogies seldom give easy answers to ethical problems, they are often worth pursuing because of the insight they can provide. Thinking through the similarities and differences with known cases highlights the ethical issues and the ethically relevant factors, and suggests applicable ethical principles. At the very least comparative case analysis is a good way of exploring new issues and cases. For example, to what extent do our categories and rules about ownership of tangible property apply to software? What are the relevant similarities and differences? Can software be "owned" in the same way that a car or house can? Is copying software "stealing" or "sharing, " two competing analogies with quite different ethical implications.

Laws

Law is one of the ways in which society orders its common life. It concretizes some of society's expectations for justice, honesty, fidelity, and respect for rights. Thus the law reflects, in some complex and imperfect way, society's ethical requirements.

While there is a strong relationship between law and ethics, they are not identical. It is a mistake to think that when something is legal, it is necessarily ethical, or worse yet, that "It's ok as long as you get away with it." The law, at its best, represents the minimum expectations necessary to maintain a civilized society. There are many areas of private life it does not seek to regulate, and other areas that, while they touch public life, are left alone because it would be too oppressive to try to control them. Even in the areas that it can and should be concerned with, the law is a less than perfect representation of ethics, both because of disagreements and misunderstandings about what is right and because powerful interests often block legislation that would serve the public good at their expense. Therefore there are many actions that are legal but still not ethical. It may not be illegal in some cases to make misleading claims about a product, but it is unethical. It may not be illegal to take an unpublished idea from a colleague and publish it as one's own, but it is certainly wrong. In most places it is still not against the law to force employees to spend all day at a keyboard working under conditions that are likely to lead to very painful injuries, but it is still a violation of the duty not to harm others. Those who take the law as the ultimate standard of what is right and wrong are in an arrested stage of moral development. 34

On the other hand, not everything illegal is also immoral. There some laws whose requirements are arbitrary; they have nothing to do with right and wrong. For example, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with driving on the left side of the road. Yet in many countries the law forbids it. Some such law is necessary to impose at least a minimum of order on the flow of traffic, but the choice of right over left as the preferred side is arbitrary; other countries do as well driving on the left.

Other laws are simply wrong. The laws that maintained slavery in the United States, for example, were unjust, and those who violated them by refusing to return escaped slaves were not necessarily acting unethically. An even more striking example is the whole system of laws meant

to facilitate the extermination of the Jews in Nazi Germany. Those who broke them by hiding Jews or helping them escape were not immoral. In fact they may have been the only people acting justly in that society. It can never be taken for granted that the law is right. There is always a responsibility to examine and critique it, and, if it is found to be seriously deficient, to try to change it.

Nevertheless, there is generally a presumption in favor of obeying the law, once it is established. There are a number of reasons for this. First, laws, imperfect as they are, often represent an attempt to codify society's standards of ethical behavior. In many cases a law is the product of a serious debate over ethical issues and an attempt to balance and reconcile competing values and interests. Also laws develop over time, as people learn more about their effects and reflect on their meaning. Therefore laws embody a certain collective wisdom. This in itself is enough to command serious consideration, if not uncritical acceptance. Second, there are usually penalties for violation of the law. To break a law is to put oneself, and often one's community or institution, in danger of fines and imprisonment, embarrassment and scandal, and other losses. Someone would have to have very grave reasons for taking on this risk. Civil disobedience is sometimes an important weapon in the struggle for justice; but it is not to be taken lightly. Third, laws, even when they are arbitrary, are needed to keep order in society, and to violate them is to violate that order. To drive on the left is not wrong in itself, but to drive on the left when the law says to drive on the right is to disrupt traffic flow unnecessarily and to endanger oneself and others. Finally, the law, when it works properly, defines a certain set of constraints under which everyone operates. When individuals or groups act outside the law, it gives them an unfair advantage over those who observe it. For example part of the cost of an industrial process is usually the disposal of wastes. If a company can simply dump them into the air or water, it is really transferring some of the costs to public agencies that must clean up the waste and the public, who pay in terms of a greater threat to their health and enjoyment. Clean air and water standards are meant to avoid that. When a company breaks these laws, it is avoiding its fair share of the cost of maintaining a livable environment and gaining an unfair advantage over companies that keep them.

When Wayne in the Occidental case protests that releasing the flawed software would be illegal, presumably because it involved fraud and violated the terms of their contract with the government, he is raising a very serious objection, even if the law is overly restrictive, as Deborah seems to think. They would be exposing themselves and the company to the risk of very serious consequences, including fines, imprisonment, disgrace, loss of customers, and loss of future government contracts. Furthermore, because the laws exist in part to keep the bidding process fair and make sure the bidders deliver what they promise, it would be an injustice to violate the law, for the reasons listed earlier in the section on justice.

Laws, therefore, by their very existence, create ethical obligations to observe them. At the same time, these laws are not above ethical analysis and criticism. When we examine an ethical issue, therefore, we must both understand what the law requires and ask whether the law is right or if it needs to be changed.

Norms

Norms are ethical "rules of thumb." They are guidelines and rules that have been developed for analyzing and deciding cases in a particular area of ethics, such as medical ethics or political ethics. They are less fundamental, and therefore less general and authoritative, than the basic duties listed earlier. Their authority comes from their having been found useful in practice and from the fact that they somehow embody our judgments about what is right in a given situation. Therefore they are a way of formalizing, generalizing and communicating ethical wisdom and experience in a specific field.

A good example of a set of norms is the so-called "just war theory." This is a set of tests that are to be applied to determine whether a particular war can be justified. 35 There are two parts to it. The first governs the decision to enter into a war. This is tolerable only if the following conditions are met:

1. There must be a just cause; 2. There must be a right intention; 3. It must be a last resort; 4. There must be a reasonable hope of success; 5. The good to be achieved or the evil avoided by the war must be in proportion to the evil done

by the war; 6. The decision to enter into the war must be made by legitimate authority; and 7. There must be a declaration of war with a clear statement of what it intends to achieve. The

second part defines the legitimate means for pursuing the war. The means used must be proportional to the ends to be achieved, and there must be no direct attacks on civilians. The just war theory is thus an intermediate position between the two absolutist positions that claim, on the one hand, that all war is wrong, and, on the other, that in war anything is justified. Because that middle position tolerates some use of violence, but only in extreme situations and only to a limited extent, it requires careful analysis and judgment in its application. The norms of the just war theory provide the necessary framework. While the just war theory is by no means universally accepted, it is widely respected as a solid and sensible set of minimal guidelines for analyzing the morality of war or a particular war. It has to be part of any serious and well-informed discussion on that topic.

In the computer field, an example of norms is the "Ten Commandments of Computer Ethics" published by the Computer Ethics Institute:

1. Thou shalt not use a computer to harm other people. 2. Thou shalt not interfere with other people's computer work. 3. Thou shalt not snoop around in other people's computer files. 4. Thou shalt not use a computer to steal. 5. Thou shalt not use a computer to bear false witness. 6. Thou shalt not copy or use proprietary software for which you have not paid. 7. Thou shalt not use other people's computer resources without authorization or proper

compensation. 8. Thou shalt not appropriate other people's intellectual output.

9. Thou shalt think about the social consequences of the program you are writing or the system you are designing.

10. Thou shalt always use a computer in ways that insure consideration and respect for your fellow humans.

These norms are not as specific or precise as the just war theory, nor do they have the weight of tradition or the test of time behind them. Nevertheless they do represent a consensus among many computer ethicists on what constitutes ethical computer use, and can provide some general guidance to users.

Norms are different from laws in that they are meant to guide judgment rather than to regulate behavior. Norms are not meant to be enforceable and do not have the authority of government behind them, although in some cases, norms can be incorporated into laws. In general, however, norms must stand on their own; their authority comes from their own inherent wisdom and the moral authority of the community that has formulated and accepted them.

An important task of ethics is to formulate or recognize norms for particular areas of concern. This is far more valuable than endorsing or condemning specific acts. A good set of norms gives a person guidance in understanding new situations, in knowing what questions to ask and what factors to consider, and in formulating an ethical response.

Professional Codes of Ethics

Many professions, including doctors, lawyers, and the military, have their own specific codes of ethics. These are needed because these groups are entrusted with special responsibilities in the community, so that a higher degree of care and dedication to the common good is expected of them, and because in their work they deal with special issues and problems that ordinary citizens do not usually face. For example, physicians have had codes of ethics going all the way back to the Hippocratic Oath that had its origins in ancient Greek society. Now they are covered the codes of their professional societies, such as the code of the American Medical Association or the code of the British Medical Association. There is also an International Code of Medical Ethics. These are all attempts to define the physician's duty to the patient, the profession, and the society. They include the duties to preserve life, to act always for the welfare of the patient, to respect confidentiality, to act honestly and justly, and so on. 36

Professional codes of ethics tend to come from within their professions; part of the definition of a profession is that it is self-governing. In some cases the codes are enforceable. Serious violations can lead to suspension or expulsion from the profession and the dishonor that comes with it. However the moral authority of a professional code comes from the fact that it represents a consensus of the traditions of the profession and the judgments of its most respected members on the duties specific to their particular calling.

Computer scientists and engineers represent a relatively young field compared to law, medicine and other well-established professions. Nevertheless they have a number of professional organizations that have developed codes of ethics. These include the codes of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), the International Federation for Information Processing (IFIP),

and the Data Processing Management Association (DPMA). The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), which includes many computer professionals in its ranks, also has a code of ethics; and the IEEE Computer Society (IEEE-CS) and the ACM have jointly developed and approved a Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Practice.

Of these the ACM code and the joint ACM/IEEE-CS code for software engineering are the most comprehensive. The ACM Code37 , revised in 1992, contains a preamble and four parts. The first is a set of "general moral imperatives" that link the responsibilities particular to computer professionals to fundamental ethical principles such as the duties to be honest and fair, to contribute to the good of society and humanity and avoid harm, and to respect privacy, confidentiality and intellectual property rights. Section 2 has more specific responsibilities of individual computer professionals. These include the obligation to understand and take responsibility for the consequences of their work, to honor contracts, laws and other obligations, to help educate the public, and to avoid unauthorized access to computers and communications systems. Section 3 balances the individualist perspective of section 2 by giving the obligations of those who have roles of leadership in organizations. These include the responsibility to see that the organization serves the needs, welfare and dignity of workers, users of its products, and others affected by its work. Finally there is a short section on compliance. This is seen as mainly voluntary, but there is a possibility of the ACM taking action against a member for serious code violations. The code proper is accompanied by a set of so-called Guidelines that serve as a commentary on and explanation of the code.

The joint ACM/IEEE-CS Software Engineering Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct38 contains a number of principles to guide the judgment and conduct of software engineers, organized around the stakeholders to whom they owe responsibility and other professional concerns, including the public at large, the client and employer, the product, professional judgment, management, the profession, colleagues and personal development. The code makes it clear that protecting the public interest takes priority over all other concerns. Under each principle is a list of specific obligations that illustrate how that principle is to be put into practice. For example, under the first principle, which states that "software engineers shall act consistently with the public interest," one of the specific obligations (1.06) requires that software engineers shall "Be fair and avoid deception in all statements, particularly public ones, concerning software or related documents, methods and tools." This is particularly relevant to the Occidental case discussed here. So is 5.11 under Management, which says that anyone managing a software engineer shall "Not ask a software engineer to do anything inconsistent with this Code."

These codes are not meant to be a comprehensive definition of ethical behavior for computer professionals, although the ACM Code has been applied in a number of cases. 39 Nor do they give an answer to every ethical dilemma; that is neither possible nor desirable. There must be respect for the ethical and professional autonomy of the individual member, and awareness of the need for individual judgment in particular cases. As the joint ACM/IEEE-CS Code states in its Preamble:

Ethical tensions can best be addressed by thoughtful consideration of fundamental principles, rather than blind reliance on detailed regulations. These Principles should influence software engineers to consider broadly who is affected by their work; to examine

if they and their colleagues are treating other human beings with due respect; to consider how the public, if reasonably well informed, would view their decisions; to analyze how the least empowered will be affected by their decisions; and to consider whether their acts would be judged worthy of the ideal professional working as a software engineer. In all these judgments concern for the health, safety and welfare of the public is primary; that is, the "Public Interest" is central to this Code.

What these codes do provide is a set of shared expectations and obligations that can help define the profession and its commitment to serve the public. That in itself is important.

When Wayne in the Occidental case loses his argument with Deborah, his manager, he still faces an ethical dilemma. If he is still convinced that there is something wrong with certifying the defective software, he must decide whether he should go ahead and do it as ordered, refuse to cooperate, or actively oppose any such action. If he does nothing, and an accident does occur because of the flawed software, is it his fault? This raises the issue of responsibility.

In making an ethical judgment, it is not enough to decide what is right to do or what should have been done in a certain case. It is also necessary to decide to what extent one is or was responsible for doing what is right. It is certainly wrong for the driver of a car to crash into another car parked by the side of the road; but if the driver had lost control of his car because he suffered a heart attack or if he didn't see the parked car, he cannot be blamed for the accident, unless he could have avoided the circumstances that led to it.

In the case of an individual act, assessing responsibility is relatively straightforward. To be held responsible, the agent must have knowledge of the act and its consequences and must have the freedom to choose or not choose the act. The driver who has a heart attack and loses control of his car is not in a position to choose whether or not to hit the parked car. The driver who comes around a corner driving at a safe speed in what he has every reason to believe is a clear travel lane and unexpectedly plows into a car that has been left in the road did not know and could not be expected to know that his actions would lead to a crash. In neither case would the driver be ethically responsible for the crash. In the first case he lacked the freedom, in the second the knowledge.

When a person acts in a social and institutional context, the problem of responsibility is much more complex. As part of a group, one may be asked to take part in, or at least not interfere with, actions with which one does not agree, as in Wayne's case. Or it may be clear that some action is called for, but not at all clear who should take that action. The Red Cross says the blood supply has fallen so low that there is a crisis for the hospitals. Someone ought to donate; but why should it be me?

Another problem is that institutions so constrain people's options and their ability to act that sometimes they cannot satisfy all the ethical demands on them. Prior to the disastrous flight of the space shuttle Challenger, engineer Roger Boisjoly of Thiokol, Inc., the maker of the rocket motor that failed and led to the crash, had serious doubts about the safety of the O-ring seals, especially at low temperatures. He made his misgivings known to his managers, but when they chose to ignore him, he went no further. To do more, he felt, would have been disloyal and

disrespectful of the prerogatives of management. As he later told investigators, "I must emphasize, I had my say, and I never take [away] any management right to take the input of an engineer and then make a decision based upon that input, and I truly believe that....So there was no point in me doing anything any further."40Ben Powers of NASA was in the same position. Both were aware of an inordinate risk to the lives of the astronauts, and both wanted to act to protect them; but they were frustrated by both the personnel and the procedures of the organizations in which they worked. If management had been more responsive, or if there had been alternative procedures for airing safety concerns, the tragedy might have been prevented. As it was, Boisjoly and Powers could not do anything effective without violating what they saw as their obligations to their employers. Ironically, even the loyalty they showed was not enough. Boisjoly was treated as a traitor at Thiokol and eventually put on permanent leave for speaking publicly about the company's part in the disaster. 41

Incidents like this show the power of institutions to influence and shape our ethical decisions. But we must also acknowledge the power of our ethical decisions to shape institutions. Therefore there are two aspects of responsibility to consider in a social context: our responsibility within institutions and our responsibility for institutions.

Responsibility within Institutions

In a social or institutional context, ethical responsibility can be so diffused that no one feels responsible, even when organizational roles are well-defined. This is especially true when positive action is required to bring about some good or avoid some harm. If it is wrong to lie, then it is wrong no matter how many people are involved. But who is required to step forward and tell the unpleasant truth? Beating someone with a baseball bat is wrong no matter whether one is alone or in a mob. But when is one required to step forward from a crowd of bystanders and stop such a beating, or, for that matter, to alert the public to the dangers of a particular technology? These questions become even more obscure and difficult when the people involved are bound together by institutional loyalties and contractual obligations.

In their study of corporate responsibility, 42Simon, Powers and Gunnerman looked at these questions. They used as an analogy the case of Kitty Genovese, who was stabbed to death outside her apartment in Queens while at least thirty-eight of her neighbors looked on, none of whom even called the police, let alone intervened. She was attacked three different times by her assailant over a half hour, so there was time to save her. It is obvious enough that the failure of the neighbors to help was wrong, but more difficult to explain why and how. When is there an obligation to take positive action to prevent harm to another? The authors identified four conditions that must be met:

1. Critical need. Some fundamental good or right must be threatened. 2. Proximity. This is "largely a function of notice," but it also involves role relationships. "We do

expect certain persons and perhaps institutions to look harder for information about critical need. In this sense proximity has to do with the network of social relations that follow from notions of civic duty, duties to one's family, and so on." 43

3. Ability to help without damage to self and without interference with important duties owed to others.

4. Absence of other sources of help.

Condition 2 says that those who are in the best position to know about a serious threat have the strongest obligation to act. In particular, when the threat comes from a certain piece of technology, the engineers who are most intimately involved with the technology and best understand its consequences have a special duty to protect the safety of the public. However, condition 3 qualifies that obligation: it only exists if action can be taken without any serious risk to the agent. This is a very conservative requirement. If the threat is serious enough, say the near-certain, catastrophic meltdown of a nuclear power plant, an engineer ought to be willing even to risk his or her job if there was a chance of preventing the disaster.

The reason for the reluctance to require an engineer to take on significant personal risks to help out is that it is unfair. The engineer did not cause the danger, at least not intentionally, so he or she should not have to pay so high a price for preventing it. Yet in many instances that is the only choice, because of the way the organization is structured. That is why whistle-blowing cases like Boisjoly's are often so tragic. 44Either the engineer suffers unfairly or the public suffers even more unfairly. There is no choice that satisfies all the ethical demands of the situation.

That is why it is not enough in such cases to ask what the individual should do, that is, what is the ethical choice. The more important question is how to change the institutional context so that there is an ethical choice.

Responsibility for Institutions

To return once more to our original case, the corporate structure and climate at Occidental Engineering was part of the reason why Deborah and Wayne faced such difficult ethical decisions and why the outcome was so unsatisfactory. If the company had had an uncompromising commitment to quality and safety, it would not have put itself and its engineers in the position of having to cut corners to satisfy its commitments; and when safety concerns arose, it would not have tried to suppress them. Furthermore if the company had had more respect for its engineers, especially those like Wayne who are ultimately responsible for safety, it would have given them more input in formulating the bid, to make sure they could do what they promised, and it would have provided channels for concerned employees and managers like Wayne and Deborah to pursue concerns about safety and integrity without feeling they were endangering their jobs or those of their employees. As it was, Wayne and Deborah found themselves in a position where whatever they decide, they would violate some ethical obligation. This did not excuse them of the responsibility to do what was right under the circumstances, but it was unfair to them. Because of the institutional context, they were in a position where any choice they made would be hurtful in some way. A satisfactory resolution of this case, therefore, would have to include more than a prescription for how Wayne and Deborah should have acted. It must include an analysis of how the organizational context in which they operate should change to enable and support ethical action.

Robert N. Bellah and his associates, in The Good Society, 45 have written about the importance of institutions in our moral life:

It is tempting to think that the problems that we face today, from the homeless in our streets and poverty in the Third World to ozone depletion and the greenhouse effect, can

be solved by technology or technical expertise alone. But even to begin to solve these daunting problems, let alone problems of emptiness and meaninglessness in our personal lives, requires that we greatly improve our capacity to think about our institutions. We need to understand how much of our lives is lived in and through institutions, and how better institutions are essential if we are to lead better lives....We Americans tend to think all we need are energetic individuals and a few impersonal rules to guarantee fairness; anything more is not only superfluous but dangerous–corrupt, oppressive, or both....It is hard for us to think of institutions as affording the necessary context within which we become individuals; of institutions as not just restraining but enabling us; of institutions not as an arena of hostility within which our character is tested but an indispensable source from which character is formed. 46

Institutions embody and perpetuate the values of those who shape them. If those values are harmful, like carelessness and greed, the institution will be destructive, and will frustrate the efforts of those within and around it to do what is right. On the other hand, if those values are good, the institution by its normal operation will bring about much good, and will make it much easier for its members to be ethical.

Institutions do not just happen. They are the result of human choices. Ultimately we are responsible for them. Our ethical obligations are not just to act ethically in whatever situation we find ourselves, but to build ethical institutions. This means institutions that are fair, that respect human dignity and freedom, and whose purpose is to achieve some good in whatever domain they operate in. This may seem like an impossible task. The institutions are too large and powerful, and we have so little influence on them. That is true if we think ourselves only as isolated individuals. But that is where our thinking needs to change, as Bellah and his coauthors point out. Institutions are powerful because they can mobilize purposeful, organized, collective action. It takes purposeful, organized, collective action to change them. That is part of our ethical responsibility.

It is not always enough, then, for ethics to evaluate individual judgments and actions. It must also step back and examine the social and institutional context in which ethical issues arise, and to ask how that context needs to be changed to enable and support ethical behavior.

When we are faced with an ethical issue, whether it is in the evaluation of a case, the choice of a course of action, or the formulation of a policy, there are a number of questions that we need to examine:

• What are the facts? • Who are the stakeholders? That is, be aware of all the people involved in the issue in any

way, whether they are responsible in some way for the decision or they have some interest in the outcome.

• What alternatives responses to the issue exist? • What are the costs and benefits of each alternative? This examination should include all

the stakeholders and be as comprehensive as possible.

• What rights are at stake? In particular what rights would be violated by each of the alternatives? Special attention should be given to the autonomy as well as the lives and well-being of all the stakeholders.

• How would the benefits and burdens be distributed for each alternative? What groups among the stakeholders would be favored and which would be disadvantaged under each of the alternatives?

• Are there any familiar analogies that would help us understand the issue better? Are these analogies legitimately applicable?

• What laws are applicable to this issue in these circumstances? Are the laws justifiable? • Are there any professional standards or norms that apply here? • What is the institutional and social context in which the issue is played out? How does

this context constrain the alternatives? Does it make a satisfactory alternative impossible to find? If so how can the context be changed?

• What are the agents' responsibilities, individually and collectively, for the decisions that have been made or should be made, and for the context in which they are made?

Ethics is a practical science, as Aristotle pointed out. Its goal is action: a life well-lived. It is not enough to analyze a situation. One must come to a definite judgment on what ought to be done and then do it. Ethical analysis, therefore, should be directed toward judgment. That is not to say that there is one and only one right judgment in any situation or that there will never be legitimate disagreement. But there are good judgments and bad ones; and it is possible to tell the difference. Here are some of the qualities of a good ethical judgment:

• It is consistent with the facts. • It has a reasonable and coherent justification. • It is based on sound ethical principles. • The benefits outweigh the costs. • It respects the autonomy and basic human rights of all the stakeholders. • It is fair to all. In particular it does no further harm to the disadvantaged. • It is universalizable. • It is consistent with existing laws and norms unless there is a very compelling reason to

violate them. • There are no better alternatives.

Of course it is not always possible to satisfy all these requirements simultaneously. It may be necessary to make compromises, to prioritize the demands and satisfy as many of the most important ones as possible. It is in such tragic situations, where there are competing interests, that the bitterest disagreements and the most difficult choices occur. It may be necessary simply to make the best choice possible, even when it does some harm. But there is also an obligation to look for alternatives that avoid the conflict. This may mean fostering negotiation and cooperation to bring competing interests into line. It may mean developing new capabilities, human and technological, that more adequately meet the demands of the situation. Or it may mean restructuring relationships and institutions to remove some of the conflicts and constraints that make ethical action impossible.

References:

1. Mary Midgley, "Trying Out One's New Sword," in Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics, Christina Sommers and Fred Sommers (eds.), Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993, pp. 174-180.

2. Bartolome de las Casas, In Defense of the Indians, trans. Stafford Poole, Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois Univ. Press, 1992.

3. Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Man of Vision, Man of Courage, New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

4. John Hospers, "The Problem with Relativism," in Sommers and Sommers, op. cit., pp. 169-173.

5. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1930, p. 21.

6. ibid, p. 41. 7. Ralph B. Potter, War and Moral Discourse, Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1969, pp.

23-24. 8. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Theory of Morals and Legislation, New York:

Hafner Press, 1948. 9. ibid, pp. 29-32. 10. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1987. 11. ibid, p. 20. 12. Alasdair MacIntyre, "Utilitarianism and Cost/Benefit Analysis: An Essay on the

Relevance of Moral Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory," in Ethics and the Environment, Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983.

13. For an excellent discussion of the distinction, see Richard A. McCormick, SJ and Paul Ramsey (eds.), Dong Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations, Chicago: Loyola Univ. Press, 1978.

14. B. I. Castleman and P. Purkavastha, "The Bhopal disaster as a case study in double standards," in The Export of Hazard: Transnational Corporations and Environmental Control Issues, J. Ives (ed.), Boston: Routledge & Kegan, 1985.

15. William Frankena, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973. 16. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of a Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W. Ellington,

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1981. 17. ibid, p. 14. 18. ibid, p. 36. 19. William M. Evan and R. Edward Freeman, "A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern

Corporation: Kantian Capitalism," in Ethical Theory and Business (4th edition), Tom L. Beauchamp and Norman E. Bowie (eds.), Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993, pp. 75-84.

20. Kant, op. cit., p. 48. 21. Ross, op. cit. 22. Paul Ramsey, "Incommensurability and Indeterminancy in Moral Choice," in

McCormick and Ramsey, op. cit., p. 95. 23. See Frankena, op. cit. 24. United Nations, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," 1966. 25. United Nations, "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights," 1966.

26. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980.

27. George F. Will, "Our Expanding Menu of Rights," Newsweek, Dec. 14, 1992, p. 90. 28. Lock, op. cit. 29. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974. 30. But see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, New

York: Basic Books, 1983, for an argument in favor of pluralism in the definition of justice.

31. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971. 32. ibid, pp. 302f. 33. Plato, Gorgias, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987, p.

26. 34. Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy of Moral Development, New York: Harper & Row,

1981. 35. See James R. Childress, "Just-War Theories," Theological Studies, Vol. 39, 1978, pp.

427-445. 36. See John Arras and Robert Hunt, Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, Second Edition,

Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1983, pp. 3-6. 37. http://www.acm.org/about/code-of-ethics. See Ronald E. Anderson, "The ACM Code of

Ethics: History Process and Implications," in Chuck Huff and Thomas Finholt, eds., Social Issues in Computing: Putting Computing in its Place, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994, pp. 48-62.

38. http://www.acm.org/about/se-code 39. Ronald E. Anderson, et al., "Using the New ACM Code of Ethics," Communications of

the ACM, Vol. 35, No. 5, May, 1992, pp. 94-99. 40. Trudy E. Bell and Karl Esch, "The Fatal Flaw in Flight 51-L," IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 24,

No. 2, February, 1987, p. 49. 41. ibid, p. 51. 42. John G. Simon, Charles W. Powers, and Jon P. Gunnerman, The Ethical Investory:

Universities and Corporate Responsibility, New York: Yale University Press, 1972. 43. Ibid, p. 24. 44. See, for example, Alan F. Westin (ed.), Whistle-blowing: Loyalty and Dissent in the

Corporation, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. 45. Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven M. Tipton,

The Good Society, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991. 46. ibid, pp. 5f.