Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action - F. Stoutland

8/12/2019 Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action - F. Stoutland

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F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L A N D

O B L I Q U E C A U S A T I O N A N D R E A S O N S F O R A C T I O N

B y a c a u s al t h e o r y o f a c t i o n I m e a n o n e w h i c h m a k e s t w o d i s t in c t i v ec l a i ms : ( 1 ) t ha t be ha v i o r i s no t i n t e n t i ona l un l e s s i t i s c a us e d i n ac e r t a i n w a y- un l e s s i t ha s c e r t a i n s pe c i f i c k i nds o f c a us e s ; ( 2 ) t ha t a l la c c e p t a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s o f i n te n t i o n a l b e h a v i o r a r e c a u s a l - i n p a r ti -c u l a r, t h a t w h e n w e e x p l a i n a n a g e n t s a c t b y g i v in g t h e r e a s o n s f o rh is a c t in g a s h e d i d, w e s p e c i f y c a u s e s o f h i s b e h a v i o r , s o t h a t r e a s o n sre c a us e s o f a c e r t a i n k i nd . A c a us a l t he o r y s e e s t he s e t w o c l a i ms a s

n e c e s s a r i l y c o n n e c t e d : a n i n t e n t i o n a l a c t j u s t i s a n a c t t h a t h a s ac e r t a i n k i n d o f e x p l a n a t i o n , n a m e l y , o n e t h a t w a s d o n e f o r a r e a s o n ,a nd a n a c t i s done f o r a r e a s on on l y i f i t i s c a us e d i n a c e r t a i n w a y .

T h e m o s t i n fl u en t ia l a d v o c a t e o f a c a u s a l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i n r e c e n tye a r s i s D ona l d D a v i ds on , w ho i n s p i t e o f c a nd i d s e l f - c r i t i c i s m c on t i n -u e s t o d e f e n d t h e m a i n l i n es o f a n a c c o u n t h e f i rs t l ai d o u t in A c t i o n s ,R e a s o n s , a n d C a u s e s . I n th a t p a p e r D a v i d s o n d e f e n d e d t w o t h e s e s :

1. R i s a p r imary r eason why an agen t per fo rmed th e ac t ion A unde r the descr ip t iond on ly i f R cons i s t s o f a p ro a t t i tude o f the agen t toward ac t ions wi th a ce r ta inproper ty , and a be l ie f o f the agen t tha t A , under descr ip t ion d , has tha t p roper ty .

2 . A p r imary r eason fo r an ac t ion i s it s cau se)D a v i ds on he r e i de n t i f i e s t he c a us a l c ond i t i ons o f i n t e n t i ona l a c t i onw i t h t he a ge n t s b e l i e f s a nd p r o a t t i t ude s , o r , a s he pu t s i t l a t e r , w i t hthe be l ie f s and des i r es o f an agen t tha t rationalize an ac t ion , in the s ense tha t the i rp ropos i t iona l expres s ions pu t the ac t ion in a f avorab le l igh t , p rov ide an accou n t o f thereasons the agen t had in ac t ing , and a l low us to r econs t ruc t the in ten t ion wi th which heacted. 2W h e n t h e s e b e l i e f s a n d d e s i r e s c a u s e t h e a g e n t s b e h a v i o r i n a c e r t a inw a y , t h e n t h e y a r e t h e a g e n t s r e a s o n s f o r b e h a v i n g a s h e d i d , a n d t h ebe ha v i o r t ha t r e s u l t e d i s i n t e n t i ona l .

D a v i d s o n a r g u e s f o r a c a u sa l t h e o r y o f a c t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i ta l o n e e n a b l e s u s t o m a k e s e n s e o f t h e n o t i o n o f a n a g e n t s a c t in g fora r e a so n . T h a t n o t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s a d i s t in c t i o n b e t w e e n a n a g e n t sSynthese 43 (1980) 351-367. 0039-7 857/80/0 433-035 1 01.70.Copyright 1980 by D. Reidel Publishing Co. Dordrecht Holland and Boston U.S.A.


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35 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N D

acting n d having reasons and his acting b e c u s e of those reasons.One may j u s t i f y an act by citing reasons an agent had even if he didnot act because of them, but one cannot e x p l i n his act unless heacted because of those reasons. This because , Davidson argues,m u s t be causal: an agent acts because of or for reasons, that is, proattitudes or beliefs (which I shall simply call attitudes ), only if theattitudes cause his behavior. If on a given occasion an agent has anattitude but it does not cause his behavior on that occasion, then theagent has a reason but he has not acted because of it; only if theattitude caused his behavior on that occasion did he act because of it(and only then could the attitude be a sufficient condition for his act sbeing intentional)?

I do not believe that this because must be causal; my intent in thispaper, however, is not to develop that general position, but to arguethe inadequacy of Davidson s distinctive causal accoun t of thisbecause . What is distinctive about his account is that it is designed

to avoid commitment to any covering law model of explanation.Debate about the causal theory has tended to turn on whetherexplanations of human action fit that model. Defenders of the theoryhave argued that they do, and that explanations of action, therefore,presuppose causal generalizations which cover the behavior and theexplanatory attitudes. Critics of the causal theory, on the other hand,have argued that there are no such causal generalizations and that thecovering law model is, therefore, incorrect and the causal theoryinadequate. Davidson s most noteworthy contribution has been toargue that this whole debate is beside the point, on the grounds that acausal theory of action does not stand or fall with the possibility offormulating causal generalizations connecting attitudes with behavior.The thesis of this paper is that insofar as Davidson s theory avoidscommitment to the covering law model, it faces difficulties moreserious than any faced by that version of the causal theory.

I I

Davidson avoids the covering law model by construing the causaltheor y s claim that attitudes cause behavior wheneve r it is intentional


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O B L I Q U E C A U S A T I O N A N D R E A S O N S F O R A C T I O N 3 5 3

in an o lique sense, holding not that there are causal laws connectingtypes of attitudes with types of behavior, but that the events which onan occasion are in fact attitudes are connected to types of behaviorbecause they are tokens of physical event types not because they aretokens of attitude types. An attitude is (contingently) identical on anoccasion with a physical event (presumably neural), and it is thelatter, not the former, which is related by causal law to behavior.Although reasons are causes, there are no causal laws connectingreasons and actions; the only genuine causal laws connect neuralevents with behavior described non-psychologically.What lies behind this are two theses. The first is Davidson s obliquetheory of singular causal statements, statements affirming that oneparticular event caused another, which is how Davidson construes thestatement that an agent s attitudes caused his behavior. Davidson stheory is Humean in the sense that it is committed to the view thatsingular causal statements entail causal laws. But he argues that thelatter is ambiguous.I t m a y m e a n t h a t A c a u s e d B e n t a il s s o m e p a r t ic u l a r la w i n v o lv i n g t h e p r e d i c a t e s u s e di n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s A a n d B , o r it m a y m e a n t h a t A c a u s e d B e n t a il s t h a t th e r e e x i st sa c a u s a l l a w i n s t a n t i a t e d b y s o m e t r u e d e s c r i p t i o n s o f A a n d B . A.R.C., p. 194)The first option is the covering law model of explanation, whichDavidson rejects. The second allows Davidson to argue that anattitude causes an act even if no causal law can be formulatedconnecting attitudes of that type with a type of behavior. All that isrequired for an attitude to cause behavior is that there be in principlea causal law connecting events of a type to which that particularattitude happens to belong with the behavior.T h e p r i nc i p l e o f t h e n o m o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f c a u s a l i t y . . , s a y s t h a t w h e n e v e n t s a r er e l a t e d a s c a u s e a n d e f f e c t , t h e y h a v e d e s c r i p t i o n s w h i c h i n s t a n t i a t e a la w . I t d o e s n o ts a y t h a t e v e r y t r u e s i n g u l a r s t a t e m e n t o f c a u s a l i t y i n s t a n t i a t e s a l a w . 4With regard to action he argues:T h e l a w s w h o s e e x i s t e n c e i s r e q u i r e d if r e a s o n s a r e c a u s e s o f a c t io n d o n o t , w e m a y b es u r e , d e a l in t h e c o n c e p t s i n w h i c h r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n s m u s t d e a l . I f t h e c a u s e s o f a c l a s s o fe v e n t s ( a c t i o n s ) fa l l i n a c e r t a i n c l a s s ( r e a s o n s ) a n d t h e r e i s a l a w t o b a c k e a c h s i n g u l a rc a u s a l s t a t e m e n t , i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e r e i s a n y l a w c o n n e c t i n g e v e n t s c l a s s i f ie d a sr e a s o n s w i t h e v e n t s c l a ss i fi e d a s a c t i o n s - t h e c l a s si f ic a t io n m a y e v e n b e n e u r o l o g ic a l ,c h e m i c a l , o r p h y s i c a l . A.R.C., p. 195)


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354 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N DThe second thesis is that this classification must be physical (in thebroad sense of 'non-psychological' or 'non-mental') because there are

no causal laws which can be formulated in psychological (or mental)terms. This thesis, which Davidson has de fended only in papers morerecent then Actions, Reasons and Causes , goes beyond assertingthat causal laws relating acts to the attitudes which cause them areunnecessary, to asserting that there can be no such laws. This is the'principle of the anomonalism of the mental': There are no strictdeterministic laws on the basis of which mental events can bepredicted and explained. M.E., p. 81) Davidson's argument for thisprinciple is very interesting, though complex and obscure; I believe itis worth spending a little time trying to clarify it. It has two facets: adirect argument that there are no causal laws relating attitude des-criptions and behavior descriptions (Davidson calls both of these'psychological' or 'mental' descriptions since they do not belong to aphysicalistic language) and an indirect argument based on the im-possibility of psycho-physica l laws.

The direct argument turns on the 'holism of the mental': Beliefsand desires issue in behavior only as modified and mediated byfurther beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit.(M.E., p. 92) The withou t limit is the crux here; it implies aninability ever to fix the framework within which we can ascribeconditions sufficient for the performance of an intentional act. Thisinability is in principle ineliminable in the same way and for the samereason that indeterminacy of radical translation is ineliminable: it is amistake to think that there are truth conditions which uniquelydetermine the correctness of an attitude ascription. Given an agent'sbehavior, there is no one right choice of what attitudes to ascribe tohim. If we fix his beliefs on an occasion, we may be able to fix hisdesires on that occasion, and vice versa. But to fix an agent's beliefson an occasion requires fixing his beliefs or desires on otheroccasions, and the difficulties will be compounded. There are alter-native ways of (in Davidson's sense) rationalizing an action; theimportant point is not that we do not know which is correct, but thatit doesn't make any difference. There is no fact of the matter to makeone rationalization more correct than (a range of) others.


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O B L I Q U E C A U S A T I O N A N D R E A S O N S F O R A C T I O N 55

This implies that there will be no genuine causal laws connectingattitudes with behavior psychologically described.A n y e f fo r t a t i n c r e a s in g t h e a c c u r a c y a n d p o w e r o f a t h e o r y o f b e h a v i o r f o r c e s u s t ob r in g m o r e a n d m o r e o f t h e w h o l e s y s t e m o f t h e a g e n t s b e l ie f s a n d m o t i v e s d i re c t l yi n to a c c o u n t . . . . S u p p o s e w e h a d t h e s u f fi c ie n t c o n d i t i o n s [ f o r a n a c t] . T h e n w e c o u l ds a y : w h e n e v e r a m a n h a s s u c h - a n d - s u c h be l ie f s a n d d e s i re s , a n d s u c h - a n d - s u c h f u r t h e rc o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s fi e d , h e w i ll a c t in s u c h - a n d - s u c h a w a y . T h e r e a r e n o s e r i o u s l a w s o ft h is k i n d . B y a s e r i o u s l a w , I m e a n m o r e t h a n a s t a t is t ic a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . . . ; i t m u s t b ea la w t h a t . . , a l l o w s u s t o d e t e r m i n e i n a d v a n c e w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c o n d i t io n s o fa p p l i c a t i o n a r e s a t i s f i e d . P .P . , p p . 4 3 , 4 5 )We can't determine in advance whether conditions of application aresatisfied for a (putative) causal law connecting attitudes and behaviorunless we determine exactly what an agent's attitudes are on anoccasion, and that will require not only knowing his behavior on thatoccasion-in which case the conditions will not be determined inadvance - but also knowing his attitudes on previous occasions, whichrequires the task of taking his whole system of attitude into account-a task practically impossible and theoretically pointless since there isno one right way of taking the system into account.

That there are for this reason no causal laws connecting attitudesand behavior is less a discovery than a commitment: if we areintelligibly to attribute attitudes and beliefs, or usefully to describemotions as behavior, then we are committed to finding, in the patternof behavior, belief, and desire, a large degree of rationality andconsistency P.P. , p. 50). It is this commitment which drives us on totake into account the whole system of the agent's beliefs andmotives, for that is the only way to make him a rational andconsistent agent, to understand how a seemingly irrational action is,from his own larger perspective, a reasonable thing to do. Thiscommitment is not arbitrary, however, and it is fundamental: Thelimit placed on the social sciences is set not by nature , but by us whenwe decide to view men as rational agents with goals and purposes,and as subject to moral evaluation. P.P. , p. 52).

Davidson puts more emphasis on an indirect argument from theimpossibility of strict psycho-physical laws, an argument resting onthe claim that the conditions for ascribing physical and psychologicalpredicates respectively are radically different. He puts it intuitively by


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356 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L A N Dsaying that mental and physical predicates are not made for oneano ther. (M.E., p. 93) In ascribing either kind of predicate , wepresuppose a certain framework (or theory) to hold for the subjectsof predication, but the frameworks are different.I t i s a f e a t u re o f phys i c a l r e a l i t y t ha t phys i c a l c ha nge c a n be e xp l a i ne d by l a ws t ha tc onne c t i t w i t h o t he r c ha nge s a nd c ond i t i ons phys i c a l l y de sc r i be d . I t i s a f e a t u re o f t hem e n t a l t h a t t h e a t t ri b u t io n o f m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a m u s t b e r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e b a c k g r o u n dof r e a sons , be l i e f s , a nd i n t e n t i ons o f t he i nd i v i dua l . M.E . , p . 97f )

The framework of the mental, therefore, requires that we muststand prepared, as the evidence accumulates, to adjust our theory inthe light of considerations of overall cogency: the constitutive ideal ofrationality partly controls each phase in the evolution of what must bean evolving theo ry. (M.E., p. 98) No such condition holds for theattribution of any physical predicates (for we do not assume thatevents in nature are the expressions of rational agents) and, there-fore, standing ready, as we must, to adjust psychological terms toone set of standards and physical terms to another . . . we cannotinsist on a sharp and law-like connection between them. P.P., p. 52)The impossibility of psycho-physical causal laws in turn implies theimpossibility of psychological laws, since the psychological does notconstitute a 'closed system': Too much happens to affect the mentalthat is not itself a systematic part of the mental. M.E., p. 99) Anycausal law connecting reasons and action, therefore, would have totake account of physical factors which causally impinge on thepsychological, and since there are no causal laws covering thispsycho-physical interaction, neither can there be any causal lawscovering reasons and actions.

These arguments against the possibility of psychological causallaws entail that all causal types are physical types: any event hascausal power only insofar as it is a token of some physical type. Sinceattitudes are not physical types, attitudes are not causal types: anattitude never causes behavior because it is a token of some attitudetype but because it is (also) a token of a physical type. To describe anevent as an attitude, therefore, is not to describe it in terms of itscausal powers. This in turn entails the conclusion that every attitude,


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O B L I Q U E C U S T I O N N D R E S O N S F O R C T I O N 357insofar as it causes behavior, must be identical with some physicaleve nt- Dav ids on s so-called token materialism . To put it in otherwords: every event which causes behavior and which has an attitudedescription must also have a physical description. It is the physicaldescription which figures in c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s of behavior; theattitude descriptions merely specify c a u s e s of behavior. Whereas thecovering law version of the causal theory holds that attitudes mustcausally explain behavior if it is intentional, Davidson holds that it issufficient for a causal theory that attitudes merely cause it, and thatany causal explanation of behavior will be in terms of the neuralevents with which the attitudes happen to be identical.

I I IThis is an ingenious and striking way of undercutting the significanceto the causal theory of the debate over the covering law model ofexplanation. But new and even more serious difficulties emerge, aslong as the theory escapes commitment to that model, a commitmentwhich it is central to Davidson s approach to avoid. All the difficultiesare roo ted in a significant consequence of Davidson s theses, namely,that there can be no explanatory relation between the causal powersof attitudes and the fact that they a r e attitudes. It is, on the one hand,because they are attitudes that they account for the intentionality ofbehavior (or figure in the explanation of intentional action); it is, onthe other hand, (only) because they are identical with physical(neural) events that they cause behavior. But that any particular eventshould be both a specific attitude and a specific neural event- that is,that the same event should have both an attitude description and aphysical description- is something for which there cannot, on David-son s grounds, be an explanation. For if there were an explanation, itwould have to take some such form as this: an event which belongedto this type of attitude would also belong, under such and suchcircumstances, to this type of physical event. But that subjunctiveconditional would be a l a w and if types of attitudes are connec ted bylaw to types of physical events, which are connected by law to typesof behavior, th en -t hi s relation being transit ive- types of attitudes


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358 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N Dwould be connected by law to types of behavior, and we would beback with the covering law model.

To avoid commitment to the covering law model means, therefore,given Davidson s theses, that it is simply a brute fact, withoutexplanation, that an attitude produces the behavior it does. But thisinduces a strange alteration in the notion of acting because of areason, giving an account of which motivated the causal theory in thefirst place. A causal theory construes the statement that an agentacted because of an attitude as involving two claims: (1) the agent sattitudes w e r e reasons for acting in that way, tha t is, his behavior wasreasonable in the light of his attitudes-they rationalized hisbehavior; and (2) the agent s attitudes caused his behavior. On thecovering law version there is an important relation between these twoclaims: the first (at least partly) e x p l i n s the second, so that an agent shaving reasons for acting causally explains his acting. In particular, ifhe has strong reasons for acting, he is more apt to act on them than ifhe has weak reasons for acting, just because they are strong reasons.

On Davidson s theory this relation cannot obtain, for that the twocl aim s- that an agent s attitudes were reasons for acting and that hisattitudes caused his behavior-are ever true of an agent on the sameoccasion is simply a brute fact, and the truth of the first cannot evenpartly explain the truth o f the second. Consider a case where I want adrink and reach out for the glass on the table because I believe it isthe only one around. Davidson, of course, accepts the causal thesisthat only if my desire and belief caused my behavior in taking theglass did I act intentionally for those reasons. Bu t his oblique theorymakes it brute f act that this desire and belief, which were reasons forthat act, caused my act. Their causing the act and their being reasonsfor the act are distinct matters, since they caused it because theywere tokens of physical types, but they were reasons for it becausethey were desires and beliefs, which are not physical types. That anyevent should be a token of both types (on an occasion) is beyondexplanation, as long as we eschew the covering law model. Thetokens of the types my desire for a drink and my belief that this isthe only glass around would have had the effects they did havewhether or not they were tokens of those types, for they had the


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O B L I Q U E C U S T I O N N D R E S O N S F O R C T I O N 359effects they did have by virtue of a quite distinct matter namely thatthey were tokens of causal i.e. physical types. That they werestrong reasons rather than weak reasons does not account for myacting because of them since acting because of them was a matter oftheir causing my behavior and hence of their causal powers whiletheir being strong or weak was a matter of their being reasons orattitudes of a certain type and hence not a matter of their causalpowers.

This surely involves a strange alteration in the notion of acting for areason: whether persons ever do something for a reason on anoccasion is now disconnected from their status as intentional agentson that occasion. Davidson is right that merely having the desire andbelief I had was not sufficient for my act of taking the glass to beintentional for I might have had those reasons but not acted becauseof them. He adds the conditions that they must cause my taking theglass; given the oblique theory however that this causal conditionever obtains is independent of-not explained by-what the agentmay want or believe how he may evaluate his act whe ther he hasstrong reasons or weak reasons. His having attitudes of a certain kinddoes not a ccount for the fac t that the tokens of those attitudes belongto any causal types and therefor e given a causal theo ry cannotaccount for the fact that his act is intentional. While we may grantthat his attitudes caused his behavior that they did so on anyoccas ion is externa l to his capac ity for belief desire or evaluationand therefore disconnected from his status as an intentional agent onthat occasion. On the assumption that singular causation in theoblique sense is a neces sary condition of intentionality we have thestrange situation of a causal theory of action holding that there is notand cannot be a causal explanation of why an intentional agent everacts intentionally on a particular occasion.

I VOne line of objection to this treatment of Davidson calls for specialconsidera tion namely that I have oversimplified his account byignoring certain kinds of generalizations about reasons and actions. 5


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360 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N DThese generalizations fall short of being causal laws, and acceptanceof them is not, therefore, inconsistent with the anomonalism of themental and the rejection of the covering law model. But they are, itmay be argued, sufficient nevertheless to rule out the difficulties towhich my treatment of Davidson exposes him.

What I have said is net a criticism of the oblique theory ofcausation as such, and that theory requires such generalizations sincethey constitute an important kind of evidence for singular causalstatements. Thus consider a situation where I drop a china dish on thefloor and it breaks; I would normally explain what happened bysaying that dropping the dish caused it to break-a singular causalstatement. The oblique analysis seems propos here: the descriptiondropping the china dish describes a particular event which was the

cause of another event described as the dish s breaking . But thesedescriptions occur in no causal law-no amount of provisos orconditions will yield an exceptionless causal generalization containingthem. To get the latter we need a new vocabulary of causal types.Then it could be said that this dish dropping was a token of a typerelated by causal law to another type of which the dish breaking wasa token, where the types would be specificable in the language ofphysics. But we do not need to know what that law is; we need onlyknow that there is such a law and that there are such types 6

Here is where generalizations which fall short of being causal lawsplay a crucial role. For the rough generalization that china dishesdropped on the floor tend to break is our evidence that there is acausal law at work here, and it gives good reason to expect thatdropping the dish will probably result in its breaking.

The descript ions that figure in rough generalizations of this kind arenot causal t yp es - the latter figure only in strict causal la ws - but wemight call them quasi-causal types . They have an evidential andpredictive, but non-explanatory, relation to causal types. Eventswhich are tokens of quasi-causal types are apt also to be tokens ofrelevant (if unspecificable) causal types. To know that an event is atoken of a quasi-causal type is to have evidence that it is likely to be atoken of some relevant causal type, and that enables predictions to bemade about its causal powers. That an event is a token of a quasi-


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c a u s a l t y p e d o e s n o t , h o w e v e r , expl in w h y i t i s a t o k e n o f a c a u s a lt y p e , f o r t h a t w o u l d r e q u i r e t h a t t h e r e b e a c a u s a l l a w t o t h e e f f e c tt h a t a n y e v e n t w h i c h w a s a to k e n o f t h e o n e t y p e w o u l d b e a t o k e n o ft h e o t h e r , a n d t h a t w o u l d e n t a i l t h a t b o t h t y p e s w e r e c a u s a l .

Q u a s i - c a u s a l t y p e s m a y b e e m p i r i c a l o r l o g i c a l . T h e y a r e e m p i r i c a li f t h e y f ig u re i n ro u g h g e n e r a l iz a t i o n s o f t h e d i s h - d r o p p i n g s o r t. T h e ya r e l o g i ca l i f t h e y f ig u r e i n s u ch s t a t em en t s a s i n g es t i n g p o i s o n is ap tt o c a u s e b o d i l y h a r m o r b r i tt le o b j e c t s te n d t o s h a t t e r w h e n s t r u c k ah a r d b l o w . I n g es ti n g p o i s o n o r b r i tt le n e s s a r e n o t c a u s a l t y p e s -t h e y f i g ur e in n o s t r ic t c a u s a l l a w s - b u t a d e s c r i p t io n o f a s u b s t a n c ea s p o i s o n o u s o r b r i t t l e ent ils t h a t i t b e l o n g s t o a c a u s a l t y p e w i t h ina d e f in i te r an g e . T h e s e t y p e s h a v e , b y v i r tu e o f th e m e a n i n g o f th ed e s c r i p t i o n s , a n e v i d e n t i a l a n d p r e d i c t i v e , b u t n o n - e x p l a n a t o r y , r e l a -t i o n w i t h c a u s a l t y p e s .

T h e o b j e c t i o n to m y t r e a tm e n t o f D a v i d s o n s a c c o u n t o f r e a s o n sf o r a c t io n c a n n o w b e f o r m u l a t e d a s f o l lo w s : I h a v e i g n o re d t h e f a c tt h a t a t ti t u d e ( a n d a c t io n ) d e s c r i p t i o n s a r e q u a s i - c a u s a l t y p e s - e i t h e rl o g i ca l ( a s i n t h e d i s p o s i t i o n a l i s t o r f u n c t i o n a l i s t a cco u n t o f men t a ls t a te s ) o r e m p i r ic a l ( b y v i r t u e o f t h e r o u g h g e n e r a l i z a t io n s w e c a nm a k e a b o u t a t t i t u d e s a n d a c t s ) . T h e l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e f i n d s s u p p o r t i nD a v i d s o n , w h o , w h i l e a r g u i n g a g a i n s t s t r i c t p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l l a w s ,a f f i r m s t h e r o l e t h a t p s y c h o p h y s i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s p l a y a s e v i d e n c ef o r u n d e r l y i n g c a u s a l l a w s .I f a n e v e n t o f a c e r t a i n m e n t a l s o r t h a s u s u a l l y b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y a n e v e n t o f ac e r t a i n p h y s i c a l s o r t , t h i s o f t e n i s a g o o d r e a s o n t o e x p e c t o t h e r c a s e s t o f o l l o w s u i tr o u g h l y i n p r o p o r t i o n . T h e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s t h a t e m b o d y s u c h p r a c t i c a l w i s d o m a r ea s s u m e d t o b e o n l y r o u g h l y tr u e . . . . T h e i r i m p o r t a n c e l i es m a i n l y in t h e s u p p o r t t h e yl e n d s i n g u l a r c a u s a l c l a i m s a n d r e l a t e d e x p l a n a t i o n s o f p a r t i c u l a r e v e n t s . T h e s u p p o r td e r i v e s f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a g e n e r al i z at i o n , h o w e v e r c r u d e a n d v a g u e , m a y p r o v i d eg o o d r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t u n d e r l y i n g t h e p a r t i c u l a r c a s e t h e r e i s a r e g u l a r i t y t h a tc o u l d b e f o r m u l a t e d s h a r p l y a n d w i t h o u t c a v e a t . M . E . , p. 9 3 f )G i v e n t h is , t h e o b j e c t i o n c o n t i n u e s , D a v i d s o n s t h e o r y , w h i l e d is a l-l o w i n g c a u s a l l a w s c o v e r i n g a t t i t u d e s a n d a c t i o n s , a l l o w s a m p l e r o o mf o r g e n e r a l i z a t io n s a b o u t r e a s o n s f o r a c t io n ( g e n e r a l iz a t i o n s w h i c h d on o t s u p p o r t c o u n t e r - f a c t u a l c l a i m s , f o r e x a m p l e ) , a n d s u c h g e n e r a l -i za t i ons a re su f f i c i en t t o e l im ina t e t h e d i f f i cu l ti es imp l i c i t i n h i s ac-c o u n t .


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362 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N DHowever, even granting that attitude types are quasi-causal is notsufficient to save Davidson s theory. For the adequacy of a causal

theory of action requires that there be more than an evidential orpredictive relation between attitude types and causal types. Itrequires that there be an explanatory relation, that is, requires thatattitude types be genuinely causal, and that is just the covering lawmodel.

Let us remember that the fundamental motivation for the causaltheory is to give an adequate account of the difference betweenjustification and explanation-to distinguish between an occasionwhere an agent has an attitude R and does A but not for that reasonand another occasion where he has R and does A because of RDavidson s claim is that this because expresses singular causationand no more, so that the only relevant difference between the twooccasions is that on the second but not the first R caused A (in theoblique sense). Given that this is the only relevant difference betweenthe two occasions, however, then that an agent s attitude caused hisact on a particular occasion, and, therefore, that he acted for thatreason on that occasion, is without explanation and afortiori in-dependent of his status as an intentional agent in just the way I haveargued.It might be replied: singular causation is not the only elementpresent when an agent acts because of R, absent when he does not actbecause of it. Attitudes agents act on have special features expressedin generalizations about the strength of desires, the depth of belief,etc., expressed, in short, in those generalizations that Davidsoncharacterizes as embodying practical wisdom. But this is not anadequate reply, for such generalizations, if they are not causal laws,at best give evidence that singular causation is present on suchoccasions. What is needed, however, is not evidence that singularcausation is apt to be present but an explanation of its presence on aparticular occasion in terms of the character o f the agent s attitudeson the occasion in which he both had the attitudes and acted becauseof them. Failing an explanation of this kind, it is brute fact that onany particular occasion an agent s attitudes were both reasons foracting and causes of his behavior.


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O B L I Q U E C U S T I O N N D R E S O N S F O R C T I O N 6

To argue that attitudes are quasi-causal types misses the point,because attitudes will be equally quasi-causal on an occasion wherean agent has them and doesn t act because of them and on anoccasion where he has them and acts because of them. Appealing togeneralizations about attitudes and act ions - about how persons withcertain attitudes are apt to perform certain actions, and so on- mayenable one to make reasonable predictions about what agents are aptto do on certain occasions, but it does not speak to the issue whichmotivates the causal theory. For these generalizations do not dis-criminate between an occasion when an agent has those attitudes andacts on them and an occasion when he has them and doesn t act onthem, simply because any generalization which falls short of being acausal law will apply equally to both kinds of occasion and hence giveno explanation of why singular causation underlies the one and notthe other.

The covering law theory avoids this objection by arguing, not onlythat the because in S did A because of R is causal, but also thatthere are causal differences necessarily tied to the attitudes them-selves between the attitudes an agent has in a situation where he actsbecause of them and those he has in a situation where he does not actbecause of them, causal differences which allow for a causalexplanation of his act in terms of his attitudes in the former case butnot in the latter. Any causal theory which avoids the covering lawmodel cannot allow for such explanations since, given that attitudesare at best quasi-causal, there can be no causal explanation of whythe attitude is in the one case a token of a re levant causal type and inthe other case not. A causal theory without the covering law model,therefore, simply fails to give an adequate account of the verydistinction which motivated the theory in the first place.

VGiven the fairness of my treatment of Davidson, the seriousness ofthe difficulties implicit in his version of the causal theory of action ispretty clear. There is first of all an epistemological difficulty, for thetheory implies that no one, including the agent himself, is ever in a


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364 F R E D E R I C K S T O U T L N Dposition to know with any certainty whether he is acting for a reasonon an occasion and therefore acting intentionally. The theory does,as we have seen, allow for certain generalizations about the agent sattitudes and acts (provided the generalizations are not causal laws),and predictions could be made about the agent by others (or perhapsthe agent himself) as to the probability of his attitudes causing an acton a particular occasion, and therefore as to the probability of hisacting intentionally in a certain way on that occasion. Moreover, it istrue that we may sometimes be in doubt about the reasons for whichwe are acting or even whether we are acting intentionally. Neverthe-less, in the central cases we do not merely think it probable that weare acting intentionally. If you ask me to turn off the television, Imight come to reflect on why I obeyed you so passively, or whatmight have led me to do it, but I am not in doubt that I pushed theswitch in order to turn off the set, and not in doubt that pushing theswitch was something I did intentionally. If you were in doubt, theinquiry would not be a neuro-physiological one, as Davidson s theoryimplies it mus t be, f or det ermination of intentionality never goes inthat direction. In any case, the chance of such an inquiry would belost forever after the act was done, since there could be no neuraltraces of the attitude and belief without there being causal lawsconnecting neural events with attitudes and beliefs as psychologicaltypes. Whatever we may say about peripheral cases, in the centralcases, at any rate, to act intentionally just is to act knowing what weare doing and fortiori knowing that we are acting intentionally, andDavidson s theory cannot account for that knowledge.

The knowledge here is of what I am now doing. A similar problemarises for knowledge of what I could do, which brings in the conceptof ability. Most of the things I do intentionally (ruling out things Iaccomplish just by luck) I also have the ability to do, in the sense ofability that ranges over act types. Being able to do an act in this sensepresupposes that I can recognize situations in which I have theopportunity to do the act, and hence recognize the kind of situation inwhich I can do the act if I want to. If I can wiggle my ears, then I amable to recognize the kind of situation where if I want to I could andindeed would. But on Davidson s theory the opportunity for doing an


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O B L I Q U E C A U S A T I O N A N D R E A S O N S F O R A C T I O N 365act always includes the condition that my attitudes should cause theact, and it is simply impossible to recognize a situation as being ofthat kind There are no kinds of situations in which my wanting to doan act causes the act, for wanting to do an act is not a causal kind.

A similar difficulty can be stated without reference to epistemolo-gical considerations about what the agent can know or recognize.Given Davidson s theory it can never be true of an agent that he hasthe ability to do an act on a given occasion, has, that is, the sense ofability Austin called the all-in sense , which ranges over act tokensand is most naturally expressed by saying the agent can if hechooses . If it is true of an agent that he can if he chooses, then theonly thing lacking in the given situation for the intentional per-formance of the act is the agent s choosing to do it, so that if hechooses he will. This conditional is not, I think, causal, but it doesasser t that choosing to do this act is, in the situation, sufficient fordoing it. But this will never be true for Davidson; that the agentshould choose can never be the only thing lacking since the agent schoice must also be on that occasion a token of a causal type, andthat is something external to his status as an intentional agent, notdetermined by what his choice is. No matter how fortunate thecircumstances, there will always be something which does not dependsimply on the choice the agent made, so that it will never be true tosay of an agent that he can if he chooses, and hence never true thathe has the all-in sense of ability, never true, that is, that the onlything lacking for his doing it is his choosing to do it.

Finally, Davidson s account makes the problem of wayward causalchains intractable. This difficulty in the causal theory is one whichDavidson himself has pressed and which he candidly admits he doesnot know how to resolve. It involves a counterexample to the claimthat it is su~cient for an intentional act that it is caused by theattitudes which are the agent s reasons for acting. Davidson s ownexample is as good as any.A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another manon a rope and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could ridhimself of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as tocause him to loosen his hold and yet it might be the case that he ne ver hose to loosenhis hold nor did he do it intentionally.


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O B L I Q U E C A U S A T I O N A N D R E A S O N S F O R A C T I O N 3 6 7

action to be intentional, using only such concepts as those of belief,desire, and cause?... [Not] without using notions like evidence, orgood reasons for believing, and these notions outrun those with whichwe began. P.P. , p. 45) At the same time it seems to me that thecritics of the covering law theory, one of the most penetrating ofwhom is Davidson himself, are correct, and that strict causal lawsconnecting reasons for acting with acting are not to be found. Thereasonable conclusion to draw is that any causal theory of action isincorrect, but to construct an alternative is a different and rather moredifficult task. 7St . Ola f Col lege , Nor th f ie ld , Minnesota

N O T E SI D . D a v i d s o n , ' A c t i o n s , R e a s o n s , a n d C a u s e s ' , i n C a r e a n d L a n d e s m a n ( ed s .) , Read-ings in the Theory of Act ion, B loom ing ton , 1968 , pp . 181 , 188 . ( H e nc e f o r th : ' A . R . C ' )2 D . D a v i d s o n , ' F r e e d o m t o A c t ' , in T . H o n d e r i c h ( e d . ), Essa ys on Freedom o f Ac t ion ,L o n d o n , 1 97 3, p . 1 4 7. ( H e n c e f o r t h : ' F . A . ' )3 C f . D a v i d s o n , ' P s y c h o l o g y a s P h i l o s o p h y ' , i n S . C . B r o w n ( e d .) , Phi losophy o fPsychology, L o n d o n , 1 97 4, p . 4 4 ( h e n c e f o r t h : 'P.P. ' ) a n d A . R . C , pp. 72ff .4 D . D a v i d s o n , ' M e n t a l E v e n t s ' , i n F o s t e r a n d S w a n s o n ( e d s. ), Experience and Theory( A m he r s t , 1970 ) , p . 89 . ( H e nc e f o r th : 'M . . E . ' )5 L a w r e n c e D a v i s a n d D a v i d P e a r s h a v e p r e s s e d t h i s o b j e c t io n .6 Cf . A . R . C , p . 1 96 , . . . I n o r d e r t o k n o w t h a t a s i n g u l a r c a u s a l s t a t e m e n t is t r u e , it i sn o t n e c e s s a r y t o k n o w t h e t r u t h o f a la w ; i t i s n e c e s s a r y o n l y t o k n o w t h a t s o m e l a wc o v e r i n g t h e e v e n t s a t h a n d e x i s t s .7 I h a v e d e f e n d e d a n a l t e r n a t i v e in ' T h e C a u s a t i o n o f B e h a v i o r ' , i n E s s a y s o nWit tgenstein in Ho nor o f G. H. Von Wright (A cta Phi losophica Fennica V o l . X X V I I IN o r t h - H o l l a n d , A m s t e r d a m ) , p p . 2 8 6 - 3 2 6 . D r a f t s o f t h e p r e s e n t p a p e r w e r e r e a d t op h i l o s o p h ic a l g r o u p s i n E n g l a n d a n d W a l e s a n d a t t h e W e s t e r n D i v i s i o n M e e t i n g s o f t h eA . P .A . I a m i n d e b t e d t o c o m m e n t s I r e c e i v e d f r o m m e m b e r s o f t h o s e g ro u p s , f ro m m yc o l le a g u e s in t h e N o r t h fi e ld N o u m e n a l S o c i e t y , a n d f r o m G . E . M . A n s c o m b e , D a v i dC h a r l e s , L a w r e n c e D a v i s , H . E . M a s o n , a n d D a v i d P e a r s .

Oblique Causation and Reasons for Action - F. Stoutland

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