UST Coop vs Treasurer of the City of ManilaFACTS:Apelle is a duly organized cooperative association registered in the SEC. Its net assets never exceeded 500,000PHP. From the time of its registration It was under jurisdiction of the Cooperative Administration Office. On June 22,1957, R.A. No. 2023 was enacted, were it states that all Coop with net assets of not more than 500,000php shall be exempted from all taxes and government fees. Unaware of the said law, apellee paid to respondent in the total amount and for the period already stated. Apellee requested for refund and was denied.

ISSUE:Whether or not Apellee may still recover the fee.HELD:Since apellee was unaware of the exemption provided under R.A. No. 2023, he is entitled to recover whatever taxes and license fees he had paid to respondent city. A payment of tax under a mistake of fact has been held not to be voluntary and therefore recoverable.

Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

Elcano vs. Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a minor and is already legally married. Reginald is still living and gets subsistence with his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistakes.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the present civil action for damages is already barred by the acquittal of Reginald.

(2) Whether or not Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the father of a minor child who committed a delict.

Held: No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Also, Art 2177 CC provides that Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (ART 327CC), and under Art 397, emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.

G.R. No. 2684 March 15, 1907THE FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, plaintiff-appellant, vs.WILLIAM A. WILSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.Facts:

Wilson, is a disbursing officer in the Philippines, he took money, sureties, and funds, then fled to Canada. When he was caught, several lawsuits were filed against him intercorrelating each complaint. The American Company of New York became sureties on the official bond of Wilson for the sum of USD 15,000. Wilson defaulted USD 8,931.80, so the surety companies paid half from each of them to the Government. His funds were placed in a depositary named by the court to take care of the money. A little earlier before the complaint was filled, Wilson transferred the funds to Terrell, in payment of his debt for the professional services already rendered.Since the funds were under the possession of the Treasurer entrusted with the depository, the transfer could not have been made since, , it would have been necessary that the delivery of the funds had been made directly Terrell, which fact has not been proved at any time. But Terrell never claimed that the delivery was ever made, he only claims that the ownership thereof should be derived to him, not thru the fact of delivery but thru the very fact of the transfer and of his subsequent notification to Treasurer Baranagan, although, it is very clear that such notification does not constitute, in any manner, the fact of delivery as established by articles 1462, 1463, and 1464 of the Civil Code, all of which cover, in full this subject-matter.Issue:Should Terrell and The Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, claim ownership of the funds in accordance to Art 609 of the Civil Code?Decision:." In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." And as the logical application of this disposition article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right." (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to him."In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue for a contract. With this, it can therefore be concluded that: "The transfer of the ownership in the contract of such transfer, does not produce the effect by the fact of the mere consent, but is acquired by tradition and in the due observance of general precepts." Therefore, by reason of the non-delivery Terrell did not acquire the ownership of the property transferred to him by Wilson.The court therefore finds that neither of the two creditors should enjoy preference with regard to the other. Preference is determined by the nature of the credit in some cases and by the priority of date in others. The first, when it deals with privileged credits, which different kinds of privileged credits are enumerated in articles 1922, 1923, and 1924 of the Civil Code; and the second, when such credits are without special privilege, but are set forth in a public document or a final judgment. (Par. 3, article 1924.) In neither of these two classes do we find the credit of the appellant or that of the appellee. The credit of the appellee is only shown in a private document, and the right, or credit, of the appellant is that derived by reason of the payment made by appellant to the Government as a surety on the bond of Wilson, and nothing more than this appears in the allegations and admissions of the parties during the trial of the case. It does not appear by the bill of exceptions in this case that any document was ever presented in justification of such payment. Neither does the decision refer to any document as showing, as proven, said payment. These two credits not coming under any of the articles herein cited, the same pertain to a general class, and therefore do not enjoy any preference, in accordance with provisions of article 1925 of the Civil Code. This being so, the two creditors should be paid of pro rata from the funds in question and without consideration of the dates. (Rule 3, of article 1929.)