Oblicon Assignment

8/7/2019 Oblicon Assignment

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Somewhere Albacite

Section: Plato

A. Citytrust Banking Corporation (Petitioner) v. Carlos Romulo N. Cruz (Respondent)

GR No. 157049

The respondent, an architect and businessman, maintained savings and checkingaccounts at the petitioners Loyola Heights Branch. The savings account wasconsidered closed due to the oversight committed by one of the latters tellers. Theclosure resulted in the extreme embarrassment of the respondent, for checks that hehad issued could not be honored although his savings account was sufficiently fundedand the accounts were maintained under the petitioners check-o-matic arrangement(whereby the current account was maintained at zero balance and the funds from thesavings account were automatically transferred to the current account to cover checksissued by the depositor like the respondent).

Unmoved by the petitioners apologies and the adjustment made on his accounts by itsemployees, the respondent sued in the RTC to claim damages from the petitioner.

The RTC found that the petitioner had failed to properly supervise its teller; and that thepetitioners negligence had made the respondent suffer serious anxiety, embarrassmentand humiliation, entitling him to damages.

The CA said that the negligence of the petitioners personnel was the proximate causethat had set in motion the events leading to the damage caused to the respondent;hence, the RTC correctly opined that "while a bank is not expected to be infallible, it

must bear the blame for not discovering the mistake of its teller for lack of propersupervision."

Issue:

Whether the RTC erred in ordering the petitioner to pay moral and exemplary damages.

Rule:

No. Unquestionably, the petitioner, being a banking institution, had the direct obligationto supervise very closely the employees handling its depositors accounts, and should

always be mindful of the fiduciary nature of its relationship with the depositors. If it fellshort of that obligation, it should bear the responsibility for the consequences to thedepositors, who, like the respondent, suffered particular embarrassment and disturbedpeace of mind from the negligence in the handling of the accounts.

The CA properly affirmed the RTCs award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Itis never overemphasized that the public always relies on a banks profession ofdiligence and meticulousness in rendering irreproachable service. Its failure to exercise


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diligence and meticulousness warranted its liability for exemplary damages and forreasonable attorneys fees.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed CAs decision.

B. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Petitioner) v. Larry Marinas (Respondent)

GR No. 179105

Respondent Larry Marias opened a personal dollar savings account by depositingUS$100,000.00 with petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. On April 13,1998, respondent obtained a loan from petitioner in the amount of P2,300,000.00,evidenced by Promissory Note No. 355873. From the initial deposit of US$100,000.00,respondent withdrew US$67,227.95,then deposited it under Account No. 0-26400171-6(Foreign Currency Deposit [FCD] No. 505671), which he used as security forthe P2,300,000.00 loan.

Respondent subsequently opened two more foreign currency accounts Account No.0-26400244-5 (FCD No. 505688) and Account No. 0-264-00357-3 (FCD No. 739809) depositing therein US$25,000.00 and US$17,000.00, respectively. On April 30, 1999,respondent obtained a second loan of P645,150.00, secured by Account No. 0-264-00357-3 (FCD No. 739809).

When he inquired about his dollar deposits, respondent discovered that petitioner madedeductions against the formers accounts. Respondent, through his counsel, demandedfrom petitioner a proper and complete accounting of his dollar deposits, and therestoration of his deposits to their proper amount without the deductions. In response,petitioner explained that the deductions made from respondents dollar accounts were

used to pay the interest due on the latters loan with the former. These deductions,according to petitioner, were authorized by respondent through the Deeds ofAssignment with Power of Attorney voluntarily executed by respondent.

Respondent filed a case claiming that when he signed the loan documents, they were allin blank and they were actually filled up by petitioner. Aside from the completeaccounting of his dollar accounts and the restoration of the true amounts of his deposits,respondent sought the payment of P400,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 asexemplary damages, and P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.

On its part, petitioner insisted that respondent freely and voluntarily signed the loandocuments. While admitting the full payment of respondents P2,300,000.00

and P645,150.00 loans, petitioner claimed that the payments were made using theformers US$67,227.95, US$25,000.00, and US$17,000.00 time deposits. Accordingly,there was nothing to account for and restore.

The RTC and CA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, ordering the saiddefendants to account for the dollar deposits of the plaintiff in the amounts ofUS$30,000.00 and US$25,000.00, respectively, and then return the same, including theinterests due thereon reckoned from 31 May 1999 until fully paid.


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Issue:

Whether the petitioner is liable to respondent for moral and exemplary damages, aswell as attorneys fees because it did not exercised the diligence required in banks

Rule:

Yes. When we consider the total amount of respondents deposits in his dollaraccounts inclusive of interests earned vis--vis his total obligations to petitioner, wefind that the total depletion of his accounts is not warranted. Hence, we find noreason to disturb the CA conclusion on the award of damages. This whole incidentwould have been avoided had petitioner adhered to the standard of diligenceexpected of one engaged in the banking business. A depositor has the right torecover reasonable moral damages even if the banks negligence may not havebeen attended with malice and bad faith, if the former suffered mental anguish,serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation. Moral damages are not meant toenrich a complainant at the expense of defendant. It is only intended to alleviate the

moral suffering she has undergone. The award of exemplary damages is justified, onthe other hand, when the acts of the bank are attended by malice, bad faith or grossnegligence. The award of reasonable attorneys fees is proper where exemplarydamages are awarded. It is proper where depositors are compelled to litigate toprotect their interest.

Hence, the CA decision was affirmed with modifications.

C. The Heirs of Redentor Completo (Petitioner) v. Sgt. Amando C. Albayda(Respondent)

GR No. 172200

Facts:

Albayda (a Master Sergeant of the Philippine Air Force) testified that, while he was onhis way to the office to report for duty, riding a bicycle along 11th Street, the taxi drivenby Completo bumped and sideswiped him, causing serious physical injuries. Albaydawas brought to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital (PAFGH) inside VAB.However, he was immediately transferred to the Armed Forces of the PhilippinesMedical Center (AFPMC) because there was no orthopedic doctor available at PAFGH.

Albayda filed a complaint for physical injuries through reckless imprudence againstCompleto. He alleged that the proximate cause of the incident which necessitated hisstay in the hospital for approximately seven (7) months was the negligence of Completowho, at the time of the accident, was in the employ of Abiad. He claimed payment foractual damages and moral damages. He likewise asked for exemplary damages

Completo filed a counter-charge of damage to property through reckless imprudenceagainst Albayda. Completo alleged that, he was carefully driving the taxicab along 8thStreet, VAB, when suddenly he heard a strange sound from the rear right side of the


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taxicab. When he stopped to investigate, he found Albayda lying on the road andholding his left leg. He immediately rendered assistance and brought Albayda to PAFGHfor emergency treatment. He asserted that he had already reduced his speed to twenty(20) kilometers per hour even before reaching the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets. Incontrast, Albayda rode his bicycle at a very high speed.

Abiad testified that, he exercised diligence that is required of him. When he hiredCompleto, Abiad required Completo to show his bio-data, NBI clearance, and driverslicense. Completo never figured in a vehicular accident since the time he was employedin February 1997. Abiad averred that Completo was a good driver and a good man.Being the operator of taxicab, Abiad would wake up early and personally check all thetaxicabs.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff [Albayda]. The court awardedthe plaintiff actual and moral damages and attorneys fees. Completo and Abiad filed anappeal on the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the appeal.

Issue:

1. Whether the CA erred in finding that Completo was the one who caused thecollision

2. Whether Abiad failed to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father ofthe family

Rule:

1. No. It was proven by a preponderance of evidence that Completo failed to exercisereasonable diligence in driving the taxicab because he was over-speeding at the time he

hit the bicycle ridden by Albayda. Such negligence was the sole and proximate cause ofthe serious physical injuries sustained by Albayda. Completo did not slow down evenwhen he approached the intersection of 8th and 11th Streets of VAB. It was also proventhat Albayda had the right of way, considering that he reached the intersection ahead ofCompleto.

The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to that of other vehicleslawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be required ofa motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of thephysical advantages the automobile has over the bicycle. The physical advantages thatthe motor vehicle has over the bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than viceversa.

2. Yes. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examinethem as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, withrespect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operatingprocedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures forbreaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicariousliability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.


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The protestation of Abiad to escape liability is short of the diligence required under thelaw. Abiads evidence consisted entirely of testimonial evidence, and theunsubstantiated and self-serving testimony of Abiad was insufficient to overcome thelegal presumption that he was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver.

D. OMC Carriers Inc. (Petitioners) v. Spouses Nabua (Respondents)

GR No. 148974

Facts :

An Isuzu private tanker, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner OMCCarriers, Inc. and then being driven by its employee Jerry P. Aalucas, hit a privatevehicle, an Isuzu Gemini, which was making a left turn towards a nearby Caltex gasolinestation. The impact heavily damaged the right side portion of the latter motor andmortally injured its 18-year-old driver, Reggie T. Nabua, who was later pronounced deadon arrival at the Fairview Polymedic Hospital.

Respondent spouses Berlino and Rosario Nabua, the parents of the victim, filed aComplaint for damages against petitioners and the General Manager of OMC Carriers,Chito Calauag, before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224.

Accordingly, therefore, the Court finds and renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs asagainst defendants and ordering the latter to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily.

Issues:1. Whether the proximate and immediate cause of the accident was the negligence ofthe victim, Reggie Nabua.

2. Whether the petitioner company exercised due diligence in the selection andsupervision of their employees.

Rule:

1.) No. Both the RTC and CA had correctly found that the proximate cause of theaccident was the negligence of petitioner Aalucas. The testimony of eyewitness MarlonBetiranta shows that the victim, Reggie Nabua, was driving at a slow pace when he wasentering the Caltex station. Another eyewitness corroborated the testimony of Betirantathat the victim was slowly driving his car towards the gas station. He also emphasizedthat the truck which bumped the Gemini car was very fast. Lastly, even petitioners ownwitness, PO3 Edgardo Talacay, testified that petitioners truck left skid marks, whichwould not be present if the truck was running in a normal speed.

2.) No. The introduction of evidence showing the employer exercised the requiredamount of care in selecting its employees, is only half of the employers burden is (sic)overcome. The question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances ofemployment, which, in the instant case was not sufficiently proved by the appellants.After a thorough and extensive review of the records, this Court is unconvinced that


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petitioner company had satisfactorily discharged its burden. The alleged Memorandum(Exhibit 6) alluded to by petitioner company amounts to nothing more than a "remindermemo on offenses punishable by dismissal," wherein specific offenses are spelled out towhich erring employees may be punished by the company. Likewise, the allegedcirculars from Petron amount to nothing more than minutes of the "Haulers Meeting," alist of "Hot Spots" and a "Table of Penalties." These circulars do not, in any way,concern safety procedures to prevent accident or damage to property or injury to peopleon the road. It bears to stress that the existence of supervisory policies cannot becasually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.

The testimonies relating to the checking of damages during carbarn time, the inspectionif drivers were given traffic violation tickets and inspection of the validity of the driverslicenses are all oral evidence without any object or documentary evidence to supportthem. The alleged daily inspections conducted were not supported by any evidence onrecord. Moreover, even the seminars regarding safety and driving, allegedly conductedby petitioners witness, Max Pagsaligan, were not satisfactorily established in evidence.Specifically, there is no record that petitioner Aalucas attended such seminars.

Hence, the petitioner company was liable for the accident.

E. Saludo (Petitioner) v. Security Bank (Respondent)

GR No. 184041

Facts:

On 30 May 1996, Booklight was extended an omnibus line credit facility by SBC in theamount of P10,000,000.00. Said loan was covered by a Credit Agreement and a

Continuing Suretyship with petitioner.

Booklight drew several availments of the approved credit facility from 1996 to 1997 andfaithfully complied with the terms of the loan. On 30 October 1997, SBC approved therenewal of credit facility of Booklight in the amount ofP10,000,000.00 under theprevailing security lending rate. From August 3 to 14, 1998, Booklight executed nine (9)promissory notes in favor of SBC in the aggregate amount of P9,652,725.00. For failureto settle the loans upon maturity, demands were made on Booklight and petitioner forthe payment of the obligation but the duo failed to pay. As of 15 May 2000, theobligation of Booklight stood at P10,487,875.41, inclusive of interest past due andpenalty.

SBC filed against Booklight and herein petitioner an action for collection of sum ofmoney with the RTC. Booklight petitioned asserting that the amount demanded by SBCwas not based on the omnibus credit line facility of 30 May 1996, but rather on theamendment of the credit facilities on 15 October 1996 increasing the loan linefromP8,000,000.00 to P10,000,000.00.

The petitioner countered that he came to know that Booklight offered to pay SBC thepartial payment of the loan and proposed the restructuring of the obligation. Petitioner


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argued that said offer to pay constitutes a valid tender of payment which dischargedBooklights obligation to the extent of the offer. Petitioner also averred that theimposition of the penalty on the supposed due and unpaid principal obligation based onthe penalty rate of 2% per month is clearly unconscionable.

After trial, the RTC ruled that petitioner is jointly and solidarily liable with Booklight underthe Continuing Suretyship Agreement. The court ordered the defendants Booklight, Inc.and Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. to pay the plaintiff [sic], with 20.189% on the principalamounts with attorneys fee of P100,000.00 plus cost of suit.

Issue:

Whether 20.178% interest rate imposed by the RTC is unconscionable.

Rule:

No. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Family Foods Manufacturing Co. Ltd., the

Supreme Court upheld the validity of the imposition of 18% and 22% stipulated rates ofinterest in the two (2) promissory notes. Likewise in Spouses Bacolor v. Banco FilipinoSavings and Mortgage Bank, the 24% interest rate agreed upon by parties was held asnot violative of the Usury Law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 116.

Hence, the petition is DENIED. CA decision affirmed.

F. Benny Hung (Petitioner) v. BPI Card Finance Group (Respondent)

GR No. 182398

Facts:

Guess? Footwear and BPI Express Card Corporation entered into two merchantagreements, whereby Guess? Footwear agreed to honor validly issued BPI ExpressCredit Cards presented by cardholders in the purchase of its goods and services. In thefirst agreement, petitioner Benny Hung signed as owner and manager of Guess?Footwear. He signed the second agreement as president of Guess? Footwear which healso referred to as B & R Sportswear Enterprises.

Respondent BPI mistakenly credited, through three hundred fifty-two (352) checks,Three Million Four Hundred Eighty Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Seven Pesos and23/100 (P3,480,427.23) to the account of Guess? Footwear. When informed of theoverpayments, petitioner Benny Hung transferred Nine Hundred Sixty-Three ThousandSix Hundred Four Pesos and 03/100 (P963,604.03) from the bank account of B & RSportswear Enterprises to BPIs account as partial payment.

In a letter dated 27 September 1999, BPI demanded the balance payment amounting toTwo Million Five Hundred Sixteen Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Six Pesos and68/100 (P2,516,826.68), but Guess? Footwear failed to pay.


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BPI filed a collection suit before the RTC of Makati City naming as defendant B & RSportswear Distributor, Inc. The RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant B & RSportswear Distributor, Inc., to pay the plaintiff (BPI) P2,516,826.68 with 6% interestfrom 4 October 1999. The RTC ruled that the overpayment ofP3,480,427.43 was provenby checks credited to the account of Guess? Footwear and the P963,604.03 partialpayment proved that defendant ought to pay P2,516,826.68 more.

Issue:

Whether the interest for the payment starts at the date the letter of demand waspresumably received by the defendant.

Rule:

Yes. Where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall beginto run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code).Since this case before us involves an obligation not arising from a loan or forbearance of

money, the applicable interest rate is 6% per annum. The legal interest rate of 6% shallbe computed from 4 October 1999, the date the letter of demand was presumablyreceived by the defendant.

F. Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (Petitioner) v. Spouses Gravador(Respondent)

GR No. 186550

Petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC) extended a loan ofEight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) to respondent Cesario Gravador, with

respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers. The loanwas payable in sixty (60) monthly installments of P24,400.00 each. To secure the loan,respondent Cesario executed a real estate mortgage over his property in Sta. Maria,Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29234.

Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999. However, they wereunable to pay the subsequent ones. Consequently, on February 1, 2000, respondentsreceived a letter demanding payment of P1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receiptthereof. Respondents requested for an additional period to settle their account, butACFLC denied the request. Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure ofmortgage with the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision, reversing the RTC. It held that the amountof P1,871,480.00 demanded by ACFLC from respondents is unconscionable andexcessive. Thus, it declared respondents principal loan to be P800,000.00, and fixedthe interest rate at 12% per annum and reduced the penalty charge to 1% per month.

Issue:

Whether the interest charged by petitioner to respondents was usurious.


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Rule:

No. Interest rates, whenever unconscionable, may be equitably reduced or eveninvalidated. In several cases, this Court had declared as null and void stipulations oninterest and charges that were found excessive, iniquitous and unconscionable. ACFLCfailed to show any computation on how much interest was imposed and on the penaltiescharged. Thus, we fully agree with the CA that the amount claimed by ACFLC isunconscionable.

Hence, petition is denied. CA decision is affirmed.

G. Pasco (Petitioner) v. Heirs of de Guzman (Respondent)

GR No. 165554

On February 7, 1997, petitioners obtained a loan in the amount of P140,000.00 fromFilomena (now deceased). To secure the petitioners loan, Lauro executed a chattel

mortgage on his Isuzu Jeep in favor of Filomena. Upon her death, her heirs sought tocollect from the petitioners, to no avail. Despite numerous demands, petitioners refusedto either pay the balance of the loan or surrender the Isuzu Jeep to the respondents.Thus, respondents were constrained to file the collection case to compel the petitionersto pay the principal amount of P140,000.00 plus damages in the amount of 5% monthlyinterest from February 7, 1997, 25% attorneys fees, exemplary damages, and expensesof litigation.

Issue:

Whether an interest pegged at 5% per month is valid.

Rule:

No. In this case, the 5% monthly interest rate, or 60%per annum, compounded monthly,stipulated in the Kasulatan is even higher than the 3% monthly interest rate imposed inthe Ruizcase. Thus, we similarly hold the 5% monthly interest to be excessive,iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant, contrary to morals, and the law. It is thereforevoid ab initio for being violative of Article 1306 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the legalinterest of 12% per annum must be imposed in lieu of the excessive interest stipulated inthe agreement.

G. Solidbank Corporation (Petitioner) v. Permanent Homes, Inc. (Respondent)

GR No. 171925

Facts:

PERMANENT HOMES, a real estate development company, applied and wassubsequently granted by SOLIDBANK with an "Omnibus Line" credit facility in the total


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amount of SIXTY MILLION PESOS to finance its housing project known as the "BuenaVida Townhomes".

There was a standing agreement by the parties that any increase or decrease in interestrates shall be subject to the mutual agreement of the parties.

For the first loan availment of PERMANENT HOMES on March 20, 1997, in the amountof 19.6 MILLION, from the initial interest rate of14.25% per annum (p.a.), the same wasincreased 15% p.a. effective May 19, 1997; it was again increased to 26% p.a. effectiveJuly 18, 1997. It was thereafter reduced to 20% p.a. effective August 18, 1997, and thenincreased to 24% p.a. effective September 17, 1997. The rate was increased furtherto 30% p.a.effective October 17, 1997, then decreased to 27% p.a. on November 17,1997, and again increased to 34% p.a.effective December 17, 1997. The rate thendecreased to 30% p.a. on January 16, 1998. For the second loan and third loanavailment, interest rates also varied at different time periods.

It is [Permanents] stand that SOLIDBANK unilaterally and arbitrarily accelerated the

interest rates without any declared basis of such increases, of which PERMANENTHOMES had not agreed to, or at the very least, been informed of.

[Permanent] thus filed a case before the trial court. SOLIDBANK, on the other hand,avers that PERMANENT HOMES has no cause of action against it. It claims that inaccordance with said provisions, SOLIDBANK was authorized to, upon due notice,periodically adjust the interest rates on PERMANENT HOMES loan availments duringthe monthly interest repricing dates, depending on the changes in prevailing interestrates in the local and international capital markets.

The trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of Solidbank. The appellate court

granted Permanents appeal. It recognized the validity of escalation clauses, but alsounderscored the necessity of a basis for the increase in interest rates and of theprinciple of mutuality of contracts.

Issues:

Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the increases in theinterest rates on [Permanents] loans are void for having been unilaterally imposedwithout basis.

Rule:

No. The Usury Law had been rendered legally ineffective. In imposing interest rates, thelender and the borrower should agree on the imposed rate, and such imposed rateshould be in writing. In this case, the stipulations on interest rate repricing are validbecause (1) the parties mutually agreed on said stipulations; (2) repricing takes effectonly upon Solidbanks written notice to Permanent of the new interest rate; and (3)Permanent has the option to prepay its loan if Permanent and Solidbank do not agreeon the new interest rate. Also, there was no showing that either Solidbank or Permanentcoerced each other to enter into the loan agreements. The terms of the Omnibus Line


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Agreement and the promissory notes were mutually and freely agreed upon by theparties. Thus, the contract is valid.

H. Marsman Drysdale v. Philippine Geoanalytics, et al

GR No. 183374

Facts: Marsman Drysdale, Inc. (Marsman) and Gotesco Properties, Inc. (Gotesco) entered intoa joint venture agreement for the construction and development of an office building on a land

owned by Marsman. They agreed on a 50-50 ratio on the proceeds of the project, but did notagree on how losses would be divided. The joint venture engaged the services of Philippine

Geoanalytics, Inc. (PGI) to provide subsurface soil exploration, seismic study and geotechnical

engineering. PGI completed its seismic study but failed to complete its subsurface soil

exploration because the area where drilling was to be made had not been cleared. The buildingproject was subsequently shelved due to unfavorable economic conditions. PGI billed the joint

venture for work done, but was not paid despite its repeated demands. PGI, thus, filed acollection case against Marsman and Gotesco. Marsman passed the obligation to Gotesco

because under the joint venture agreement, Gotesco was solely liable for the monetary expensesof the project, and Marsmans participation was limited to the land. Gotesco, on the other hand,

asserted that PGI had no cause of action against it as PGI had yet to complete the services in itscontract, and it was Marsmans failure to clear the property of debris which prevented PGI from

completing its work.

Issue: Whether Marsman and Gotesco are jointly liable to pay PGI its unpaid claims.

Held:Marsman and Gotesco arejointly liable to PGI.

PGI was never a party to the joint venture agreement. While the joint venture agreement clearly

spelled out the capital contributions of Marsman (land) and Gotesco (cash) and the funding

mechanism, it cannot be used to defeat the lawful claim of PGI against the two joint venturerspartners.PGIs contract clearly listed the joint venturers Marsman and Gotesco as the

beneficial owner of the project, and all billing invoices indicated the consortium as the client.

When there are two or more debtors, the obligation is presumed to be joint unless the law or the

obligation expressly states that the liability is solidary, or unless the nature of the obligationrequires solidary liability (Articles 1207 and 1208, Civil Code). In this case, since solidary

liability was not required by law, or the contract, or by the nature of the obligation, theobligation to PGI was presumed to be joint between Marsman and Gotesco.

A joint venture being a form of partnership, it is to be governed by the laws on partnership.Under the laws on partnership, particularly Article 1797 of the Civil Code, the losses and profits

shall be distributed in accordance with the agreement; if only the share of each partner in the

profits has been agreed upon, the share of each in the losses shall be in the sameproportion.

In the joint venture agreement, Marsman and Gotesco agreed on a 50-50 ratio on the proceeds

of the project, but did not provide for the splitting of losses. Applying Article 1797, the same

ratio applies in splitting the obligation-loss of the joint venture to PGI.

I. Macedo (Petitioner) v. DBP (Respondent)


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GR No. 174979

Facts:

Plaintiff Bonifacio Maceda, Jr. (Maceda) obtained a loan from the defendant DBP in the

amount of P7.3 million to finance the expansion of the Old Gran Hotel in Leyte. Uponapproval of said loan, plaintiff Maceda executed a promissory note and a mortgage ofreal estate. Project cost of the New Gran Hotel wasP10.5M. DBP imposed the conditionthat they would choose the building contractor, namely, Moreman Builders Co.(Moreman). The contractor would directly receive the loan releases from DBP, afterverification by DBP of the construction progress.

In essence, Macedas complaint before the Makati RTC alleged that DBP conspired withthe contractor, Moreman, by approving anomalous loan releases to the latter despiteexaggerated charges and valuation made by said contractor on the hotel project. Whenplaintiff Maceda himself tried to resume the completion and construction of the hotelproject, after the building contract with Moreman was already rescinded by the CFI

Manila, defendant allegedly blocked efforts of the plaintiff by delaying the release offunds from his loan with the DBP and imposing onerous conditions which made itdifficult for plaintiff to pursue the construction of the New Gran Hotel. Due to such delayson the part of the DBP, the loan had expired. The construction of the hotel was neverfinished.

The trial court promulgated its decision in favor of Maceda. DBP is ordered toimmediately release in favor of plaintiff Maceda the unreleased loan balanceofP1,952,489.10. In addition, as to the portion thereof amounting to P1.003M, DBP isfurther directed to pay interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum beginning andcounted from January, 1978. Also, the sum of P797,988.95 representing the

interest/other charges for the period October 31, 1979 to April 1, 1980 was ordered to bereturned. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

Issues:

Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals was correct in upholding the trial court:

1. In imposing interest on the unreleased portion of the loan

2. For the return of interests paid on the loan already released to Maceda

Rule:

Yes. DBP was also at fault in not releasing the amount of P1.003 Million which hadalready been approved for release as early as January 1978. We agree with the RTCthat it is apparent that such delay in the release of plaintiffs loan is directly attributableto DBP and contributed to the construction delay, such that radical rise in constructioncost and prices of materials had already caught up with the hotel project. The P7.3million loan is a "straight loan" as described in the document dated March 7, 1977 byA.S. Martinez, a DBP managerial officer. In releasing other sums but not the P1.003


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million, and in failing to release the bigger sum of P1,952,489.10 which is the totalunreleased balance of the loan, DBP treated its prestation according to its likes anddislikes.

J. ASJ Corporation (Petitioner) v. Efren and Maura Evangelista (Respondent)

Facts:

Respondents, under the name and style of R.M. Sy Chicks, are engaged in the large-scale business of

buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-productsin

Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. For the incubation and hatching of these eggs, respondents availed of the

hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly registered in the name of San Juan and his family.

Because of delayed payments of respondents, petitioner refused to deliver the hatch eggs and their by-

products and utter threats to the former. Despite the fact that the deposited hatcheries were enough for

the withholding balance, the petitioners refused to do their obligations (release hatched eggs and by-

products) because their services were not fully paid. The parties tried to settle amicably their

differences before police authorities, but to no avail. Thus, respondents filed with the RTC an actionfor damages based on petitioners retention of the chicks and by-products covered by Setting Report

Nos. 108 to 113.

RTC ruled in favor of respondents and made the following findings: (1) as of Setting Report No. 107,

respondents owed petitioners P102,336.80; (2) petitioners withheld the release of the chicks and by-

products covered by Setting Report Nos. 108-113;and (3) the retention of the chicks and by-products

was unjustified and accompanied by threats and intimidations on respondents. The RTC disregarded

the corporate fiction of ASJ Corp., and held it and San Juan solidarily liable to respondents

for P529,644.80 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as attorneys fees,

plus interests and costs of suit.

Issue:

Whether respondents were also liable to the petitioners because of their delayedpayments.

Rule:

1.) Yes. It was respondents who violated the very essence of reciprocity in contracts,consequently giving rise to petitioners right of retention. This case is clearly one amongthe species of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. Since respondents are guiltyof delay in the performance of their obligations, they are liable to pay petitioners actualdamages of P183,416.80, computed as follows: From respondents outstanding balanceof P102,336.80, as of Setting Report No. 107, we add the corresponding services feesof P81,080.00 for Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113 which had remain unpaid.

Nonetheless, San Juans subsequent acts of threatening respondents should not remainamong those treated with impunity. Here, while petitioners had the right to withholddelivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of petitioners, as aptly found by the twocourts below, had no legal leg to stand on. Since it was established that respondentssuffered some pecuniary loss anchored on petitioners abuse of rights, although the


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exact amount of actual damages cannot be ascertained, temperate damages arerecoverable. Petitioners are obliged to pay respondents P408,852.10 for temperatedamages which is equivalent to the value of the chicks and by-products, whichrespondents, on the average, are expected to derive.

Hence, the petition was partly granted. CAs decision was modified.

K. BPI (Petitioner) v. Court of Appeals and Jimmy Go (Respondent)

GR No. 142731

Petitioner, BPI, granted a total of eight (8) loans to Noahs Arc Merchandising (NoahsArk, for brevity). The said loans were evidenced by identical Promissory Notes all signedby Albert T. Looyuko, private respondent Jimmy T. Go and one Wilson Go. Likewise, allloans were secured by real estate mortgage constituted over a parcel of land registeredin the names of Mr. Looyuko and herein private respondent. Petitioner, claiming thatNoahs Ark defaulted in its obligations, extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. The

private respondent filed a complaint for damages with prayer [for] issuance of TROand/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking [to] enjoin the auction sale.

Private respondent claimed that demand was not made upon him, in spite of the factthat he co-signed the promissory notes. He also argues that only four of the eightpromissory notes secured by the mortgage had become due. However, the promissorynotes contain an acceleration clause, to wit:

Upon the happening of any of the following events, FAR EAST BANK AND TRUSTCOMPANY (BPI) or the holder, may at its option, forthwith accelerate maturity andthe unpaid balance of the principal, as well as interest and other charges which have

accrued,shall become due and payable without demand or notice[:](1) default inpayment or performance of any obligation of any of the undersigned to FAR EASTBANK AND TRUST COMPANY or its affiliated companies;

I/We hereby waive any diligence, presentment, demand, protest or notice of non-payment o[r] dishonor with respect to this note or any extension thereof.

Issue:

Whether Noahs Ark Merchandising was already in default.

Rule:

Yes. The Civil Code in Article 1169 provides that one incurs in delay or is in default fromthe time the obligor demands the fulfillment of the obligation from the obligee. However,the law expressly provides that demand is not necessary under certain circumstances,and one of these circumstances is when the parties expressly waive demand. Hence,since the co-signors expressly waived demand in the promissory notes, demand wasunnecessary for them to be in default.


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Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

L. Guevent Industrial Devt Corp. (Petitioner) v. Philippine Lexus Amusement Corp(Respondent)

GR No. 159279

Facts:

Respondent leased petitioner's warehouse for the storage of its video machines. OnSeptember 25, 1994, heavy rains flooded Libertad St. and damaged the videomachines.

United Adjustment Company (UAC), commissioned by respondent, concluded that theclogged storm drainage and sewer pipes installed underground along petitioner's privateroad caused the flooding. On the basis of this report, respondent demanded thepayment of the value of the damage from petitioner. When petitioner refused,

respondent filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of PasigCity.

In its Answer, petitioner averred that it was the clogged public drainage of MandaluyongCity that caused the flood. It said that it was respondent's fault that it did not insure itsmachines as stipulated in their lease contract. During trial, petitioner showed evidencethat it had regularly de-clogged its private drainage and had constantly requested thecity to de-clog and rehabilitate the public sewers.

RTC dismissed the case. It ruled that petitioner was not negligent. The RTC found thatthe damage was caused by a fortuitous event and exempted petitioner from liability.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. It ruled that the flooding was not due to afortuitous event but caused by the clogging of petitioner's internal drainage system asreported by UAC. It further ruled that respondent's failure to insure the machines did notexcuse petitioner from liability. Petitioner sought reconsideration but the same wasdenied.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is liable for damages because of its negligence.

Rule:

No. First, It is worth stressing that UAC was commissioned by respondent, and UAC isnot an independent, impartial nor neutral investigator. Second, petitioner showed that ithad maintained and regularly de-clogged its own drainage as evidenced by its DailyDeployment of Personnel Report. We note also that there was proof that the publicdrainage system needed de-clogging. Petitioner also presented a barangay certificationthat the area is always flooded whenever there is heavy downpour. The Office of theCity Mayor also does not deny that the public drainage system needed rehabilitation. All


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these lead us to conclude that the poor condition of the public drainage, and not theprivate pipes, primarily caused the flooding. Conformably then, we cannot hold petitionernegligent, for the record reveals that it had constantly requested the local government todredge and de-clog the public sewers.

The maintenance of the public drainage system could not have been contemplated bythe lease contract when it provided that the lessor shall maintain the premises in goodand tenantable condition. The law on contract does not force the performance ofimpossible obligations by the parties, and the maintenance of the public sewers issomething impossible to expect from the lessor.The petitioner is accountable only for itspipes, and it should not be held responsible for the maintenance of the public sewers.

Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

M. Manila Electric Co v. Ramoy

GR No. 158911

N. Villa (Petitioner) v. Altavas (Respondents)

GR No. 162028

Facts:

Enrique Altavas II, Erlinda Liboro and Maria de Jesus (respondents), in their capacity as

heirs of Enrique Altavas (Enrique), filed a Complaint for ejectment with the 2nd MunicipalCircuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Pontevedra-Panay in the Province of Capiz against Dr. Lorna

Villa (petitioner) together with Virginia Bermejo (Virginia) and Rolito Roxas (Roxas),

alleging that respondents are heirs of the deceased Enrique, the registered owner of twoparcels of fishpond designated as Lot No. 2816 and Lot No. 2817, who have been in actual

possession through their administrator, overseer and representative, the late councilor

Mussolini C. Bermejo, the husband of Virgina; that on January 31, 1994, after the death ofMussolini, Virgina took over the possession of the premises in question without the consent

or permission of respondents; that Virginia leased in favor of petitioner a portion of about

five hectares of Lot No. 2816, without any right whatsoever to do so; that on October 21,

1997, respondents through counsel formally sent demand letters to Virginia and petitioner tovacate the respective portions occupied by them; and that despite said demands, they

persisted in continuing their illegal possession of the premises.

On the petitioners part, she contended that: she is in lawful possession of the area possessedand developed by her as lessee. Respondents have no cause of action against her, as they

(respondents) are no longer the owners of the said lots, it appearing that the same werealready conveyed by the original owners during their lifetime; and the complaint was

premature, as there was still a pending case in court involving the ownership of the properties

in question.

The MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents. Petitioner filed an appeal with the


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RTC of Roxas City. However, the RTC dismissed the appeal of petitioner pursuant to Section

7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court for her failure to file her appeal memorandum. Petitioner

then filed a special civil action forcertiorari with the CA contending that the RTCcommitted grave abuse of discretion in dismissing her appeal on technical ground.

Issue:Whether the petitioner was negligent in failing to submit her appeal memorandum on time.

Rule:Yes. He who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This the petitioner

failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of appeal as required by Rule 40,

Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court is not persuaded by petitioner's

contention that because of a typhoon that hit Roxas City, her counsel was not able to go towork on December 7, 2000 and finish the preparation of her memorandum which was due on

December 8, 2000. The 45-day extension given to petitioner was an ample period for her

counsel to prepare the required memorandum. Secondly, petitioner's counsel should have

finished the memorandum on December 8 instead of filing a motion for extension.The Court is also not persuaded by petitioner's contention that her failure to submit her

appeal memorandum was because her counsel also had to prepare a memorandum requiredby this Court in another case which was due for submission on December 10, 2000.

Petitioner's counsel should have prioritized the preparation of the memorandum required by

the RTC because of its earlier deadline. Clearly, petitioner's counsel is guilty of simple

negligence.

O. Central Shipping Co. (petitioner) v. Insurance Company of North America (respondent)

Facts:

The [petitioner] received on board its vessel, the M/V Central Bohol, 376 pieces [of] Philippine

Apitong Round Logs and undertook to transport said shipment to Manila for delivery to Alaska

Lumber Co., Inc. The cargo was insured for P3,000,000.00 against total loss. While enroute to

Manila, the vessel tilted to several degrees, due to the shifting of logs in the hold. The vessel

eventually sank and the cargo was totally lost. Respondent, being the insurer, paid for the sum of

P3,000,000.00 to the consignee and now seeks to be subrogated to all the rights and actions of the

consignee as against the [petitioner].

The petitioner interposed the defense that the vessel was fully manned, fully equipped and in all

respects seaworthy; that all the logs were properly loaded and secured; that the vessels master

exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during and after the occurrence of the

storm. It raised as its main defense that the proximate and only cause of the sinking of its vessel and

the loss of its cargo was a natural disaster, a tropical storm which neither [petitioner] nor the captain

of its vessel could have foreseen.

The RTC was unconvinced that the sinking of M/V Central Bohol had been caused by the weather or

any other caso fortuito. It noted that monsoons, which were common occurrences during the months

of July to December, could have been foreseen and provided for by an ocean-going vessel. Applying

the rule of presumptive fault or negligence against the carrier, the trial court held petitioner liable for


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the loss of the cargo. Thus, the RTC rendered in favor of the [respondent] and against the [petitioner]

ordering the latter to pay the former.

Issues:

(1) Whether the loss of the cargo was due to a natural disaster only.

(2) Whether the doctrine of limited liability is applicable.

Rule:

1.) No. Even if the weather encountered by the ship is to be deemed a natural disaster under Article

1739 of the Civil Code, petitioner failed to show that such natural disaster or calamity was the

proximate and only cause of the loss. We also find no reason to disturb the CAs finding that the lossof the vessel was caused not only by the southwestern monsoon, but also by the shifting of the logs in

the hold. Such shifting could have been due only to improper stowage. It is obvious, as a matter of

common sense, that the manner of stowage in the lower hold was not sufficient to secure the logs in

the event the ship should roll in heavy weather. Notably, they were of different lengths ranging from

3.7 to 12.7 meters. Being clearly prone to shifting, the round logs should not have been stowed with

nothing to hold them securely in place. Each pile of logs should have been lashed together by cable

wire, and the wire fastened to the side of the hold. By force of gravity, those on top of the pile would

naturally roll towards the bottom of the ship. The evidence indicated that strong southwest monsoons

were common occurrences during the month of July. Thus, the officers and crew of M/V Central

Bohol should have reasonably anticipated heavy rains, strong winds and rough seas. They should then

have taken extra precaution in stowing the logs in the hold, in consonance with their duty of

observing extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the goods. But the carrier took a calculated risk in

improperly securing the cargo. Having lost that risk, it cannot now escape responsibility for the loss.

2.) No. The doctrine of limited liability under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce is not applicable

to the present case. This rule does not apply to situations in which the loss or the injury is due to the

concurrent negligence of the shipowner and the captain. "Closer supervision on the part of the

shipowner could have prevented this fatal miscalculation." As such, the shipowner was equally

negligent. It cannot escape liability by virtue of the limited liability rule.

P. Thermochem Inc. And Jerome Castro v Naval and The Court of Appeals

Facts:

Prior to the collision, a Luring taxi, was parked along the right side of Ortigas Avenue, not far from

the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the driver executed a U-turn to traverse thesame road, going to the direction of EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the

same road going to the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The point of impact was so great

that the taxicab was hit in the middle portion and was pushed sideward, causing the driver to lose

control of the vehicle. The taxicab was then dragged into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus,causing damage to the said tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result

of the incident.

Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against petitioner, Thermochem

Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. Aftertrial, the lower court adjudged petitioner Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and

severally, to pay private respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees

and costs of suit. The petitioners filed for review on certiorari.


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Issues:

1.) Whether or not the collision resulted from the negligence of the driver of the NissanPathfinder

2.) Whether or not Eduardo Edem, driver of the taxi, was contributorily liable for the

collision

Rule:

1.) Yes. From petitioner Castro's testimonial admissions, it is established that he was driving at a

speed faster than 50 kilometers per hour because it was a downhill slope coming from the Rosario

bridge. But as he allegedly stepped on the brake, it locked causing his Nissan Pathfinder to skid to theleft and consequently hit the taxicab. The sudden malfunction of the vehicle's brake system is the

usual excuse of drivers involved in collisions which are the result of speedy driving, particularly

when the road is downhill.

Malfunction or loss of brake is not a fortuitous event. A mechanically defective vehicle should avoidthe streets. As petitioner's vehicle was moving downhill, the driver should have slowed down since a

downhill drive would naturally cause the vehicle to accelerate. Moreover, the record shows that the

Nissan Pathfinder was on the wrong lane when the collision occurred. This was a disregard of traffic

safety rules. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man ofordinary diligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Even assuming arguendo that loss of

brakes is an act of God, by reason of their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized,

rendering the Nissan driver liable for the ensuing damages.

2.) Yes. The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable particularlyon major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had not yet fully made a turn to the

other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge

are on a downhill slope. Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorilyliable.

Hence, the Supreme Court modified CAs decision. Considering the contributory negligence of the

driver of private respondent's taxi, the award of P47,850.00, for the repair of the taxi, should be

reduced in half. All other awards for damages are deleted for lack of merit.

Q. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation (Petitioner) v. New India Assurance (Respondent)

GR No. 156978

Facts:

A cargo of textiles and auxiliary chemicals from France on board a vessel owned byFranco-Belgian Services, Inc. The cargo was consigned to General Textile, Inc., inManila and insured by respondent New India Assurance Company, Ltd. While inHongkong, the cargo was transferred to M/V P. Aboitizfor transshipment to Manila.


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Before departing, the vessel was advised by the Japanese Meteorological Center that itwas safe to travel to its destination. But while at sea, the vessel received a report of atyphoon moving within its general path. To avoid the typhoon, the vessel changed itscourse. However, it was still at the fringe of the typhoon when its hull leaked. The vesselsank, but the captain and his crew were saved.

Respondent paid General Textile and was subrogated to the rights of the latter. Asurveyor, Perfect, Lambert and Company, investigated the cause of the sinking. In Itwas found that the cause was the flooding of the holds brought about by the vesselsquestionable seaworthiness. Consequently, respondent filed a complaint for damagesagainst petitioner Aboitiz, Franco-Belgian Services and the latters local agent, F.E.Zuellig, Inc. (Zuellig). Respondent added, defendants therein breached their contract ofcarriage.

Franco-Belgian Services and Zuellig claimed its vessel was seaworthy and theproximate cause of the loss of cargo was a fortuitous event. They claimed that theliability should rest with petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the sinking ofM/V P. Aboitizwas due to an unforeseen eventand without fault or negligence on its part. It also alleged that in accordance with the realand hypothecary nature of maritime law, the sinking ofM/V P. Aboitizextinguished itsliability on the loss of the cargoes.

Meanwhile, the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) conducted its own investigation todetermine whether the captain and crew were administratively liable. However,petitioner neither informed respondent nor the trial court of the investigation. The BMIdeclared the vessel seaworthy and concluded that the sinking was due to the vesselsexposure to the approaching typhoon.

The trial court ruled in favor of respondent. It held petitioner liable for the total value ofthe lost cargo plus legal interest.The complaint with respect to Franco and Zuellig isdismissed and their counterclaim against New India was likewise dismissed.

Issue:

Whether the limited liability doctrine, which limits respondents award of damages to itspro-rata share in the insurance proceeds, applies in this case.

Rule:

No. Petitioner failed to show that it exercised extraordinary diligence in the transport ofthe goods It initially attributed the sinking to the typhoon and relied on the BMI findingsthat it was not at fault. However, both the trial and the appellate courts, in this case,found that the sinking was not due to the typhoon but to its unseaworthiness. Evidenceon record showed that the weather was moderate when the vessel sank. These factualfindings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial court are not to be disturbedon appeal, but must be accorded great weight.


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In contrast, the findings of the BMI are not deemed always binding on thecourts. Besides, exoneration of the vessels officers and crew by the BMI merelyconcerns their respective administrative liabilities. It does not in any way operate toabsolve the common carrier from its civil liabilities arising from its failure to exerciseextraordinary diligence, the determination of which properly belongs to the courts.Where the shipowner fails to overcome the presumption of negligence, the doctrine oflimited liability cannot be applied.

Hence, petitioner is liable for the total value of the lost cargo.

R. St. Josephs College et al (Petitioner) v. Jayson Miranda (Respondent)

GR No.182353

Facts:

Inside St. Joseph Colleges [SJCs] premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson Val

Miranda] belonged was conducting a science experiment under the subject teacherRosalinda Tabugo, an employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of [Jaysons] class isEstefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequatelysecured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. While doing the experiment,Jaysons eyes were hit by chemicals spurting out from the test tube. As a result thereof,[Jaysons] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had toundergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Jason and his family filed a caseagainst petitioners.

On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] claimedthat Tabugo exercise due diligence in the supervision of the class. [Jayson] and hisclassmates were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for theexperiment however, Jason and his classmates violated such instructions.

Jaysons family demanded the school to pay the expenses for Jaysons medication.Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jaysons father, on Jaysons behalf,sued petitioners for damages.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of [Jayson] and against [petitioners]. The Court orderedpetitioner to pay respondents in the form of damages. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:

Whether the petitioners were liable for the accident.

Rule:

Yes. As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was theconcurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during


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the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercisethe higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, itsadministrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence of a good father of a familyraised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it hasbeen shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers(despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of whatshould have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerousexperiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers andemployees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous scienceexperiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct ofscience experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the statusquo and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect thestudents. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safetyinstructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears anddevices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers.

Oblicon Assignment

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