G.R. No. 167219 February 8, 2011RUBEN REYNA and LLOYD SORIA,Petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT,Respondent.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for certiorari,1under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside Resolution No. 2004-046,2dated December 7, 2004, of the Commission on Audit (COA).The facts of the case are as follows:The Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) was engaged in a cattle-financing program wherein loans were granted to various cooperatives. Pursuant thereto, Land Banks Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur Branch (Ipil Branch) went into a massive information campaign offering the program to cooperatives.Cooperatives who wish to avail of a loan under the program must fill up a Credit Facility Proposal (CFP) which will be reviewed by the Ipil Branch. As alleged by Emmanuel B. Bartocillo, Department Manager of the Ipil Branch, the CFP is a standard and prepared form provided by the Land Bank main office to be used in the loan application as mandated by the Field Operations Manual.3One of the conditions stipulated in the CFP is that prior to the release of the loan, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the supplier of the cattle, Remad Livestock Corporation (REMAD), and the cooperative, shall have been signed providing the level of inventory of stocks to be delivered, specifications as to breed, condition of health, age, color, and weight. The MOA shall further provide for a buy-back agreement, technology, transfer, provisions for biologics requirement and technical visits and replacement of sterile, unproductive stocks.4Allegedly contained in the contracts was a stipulation that the release of the loan shall be made sixty (60) days prior to the delivery of the stocks.5The Ipil Branch approved the applications of four cooperatives. R.T. Lim Rubber Marketing Cooperative (RT Lim RMC) and Buluan Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries MPC (BARBEMCO) were each granted two loans. Tungawan Paglaum Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Tungawan PFMPC) and Siay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (SIFAMCO) were each granted one loan. Pursuant to the terms of the CFP, the cooperatives individually entered into a contract with REMAD, denominated as a "Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement."6In December 1993, the Ipil Branch granted six loans to the four cooperative borrowers in the following amounts:Date of ReleaseName of BorrowerAmount of LoanAmount of Livestock InsuranceAmount Paid to Cattle Supplier (REMAD)

12-10-93RTLim RMCP795,305P62,305P733,000

12-10-93BARBEMCO482,82537,825445,000

12-16-93Tungawan PFMPC482,82537,825445,000

12-22-93SIFAMCO983,01077,010906,000

12-22-93RTLim RMC187,70514,705173,000

12-22-93BARBEMCO448,10535,105413,000

TOTALP3,375,775264,7753,115,0007

As alleged by petitioners, the terms of the CFP allowed for pre-payments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD. This Court notes, however, that copies of the CFPs were not attached to the records of the case at bar. More importantly, the very contract entered into by the cooperatives and REMAD, or the "Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement"8did not contain a provision authorizing prepayment.Three checks were issued by the Ipil Branch to REMAD to serve as advanced payment for the cattle. REMAD, however, failed to supply the cattle on the dates agreed upon.In post audit, the Land Bank Auditor disallowed the amount ofP3,115,000.00 under CSB No. 95-005 dated December 27, 1996 and Notices of Disallowance Nos. 96-014 to 96-019 in view of the non-delivery of the cattle.9Also made as the basis of the disallowance was the fact that advanced payment was made in violation of bank policies and COA rules and regulations. Specifically, the auditor found deficiencies in the CFPs, to wit:The Auditor commented that the failure of such loan projects deprived the farmer-beneficiaries the opportunity to improve their economic condition.From the Credit Facilities Proposals (CFP), the Auditor noted the following deficiencies.x x x x4. No. 1 of the loan terms and conditions allowed prepayments without taking into consideration the interest of the Bank.Nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD, the supplier/dealer.There was no justification for the prepayment scheme. Such is a clear deviation from existing procedures on asset financing under which the Bank will first issue a "letter guarantee" for the account of the borrower. Payment thereof will only be effected upon delivery of asset, inspection and acceptance of the same by the borrower.The prepayment arrangement also violates Section 88 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, to quote:Prohibition against advance payment on government Except with the prior approval of the President (Prime Minister), the government shall not be obliged to make an advance payment for services not yet rendered or for supplies and materials not yet delivered under any contract therefor. No payment, partial or final shall be made on any such contract except upon a certification by the head of the agency concerned to have effect that the services or supplies and materials have been delivered in accordance with the terms of the contract and have been duly inspected and accepted.Moreover, the Manual on FOG Lending Operations (page 35) provides the systems and procedures for releasing loans, to quote:Loan Proceeds Released Directly to the Supplier/Dealer Proceeds of loans granted for the acquisition of farm machinery equipment; and sub-loan components for the purchase of construction materials, farm inputs, etc. shall be released directly to the accredited dealers/suppliers. Payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of reimbursement documents (delivery/ official receipts/ purchase orders) acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that same has been delivered.In cases where supplier requires Cash on Delivery (COD), the checks may be issued and the cooperative and a LBP representative shall release the check to the supplier and then take delivery of the object of financing."10The persons found liable by the Auditor for the amount ofP3,115,000.00 which was advanced to REMAD were the following employees of the Ipil Branch:1. Emmanuel B. Bartocillo Department Manager II2. George G. Hebrona Chief, Loans and Discounts Division3. Petitioner Ruben A. Reyna Senior Field Operations Specialist4. Petitioner Lloyd V. Soria Loans and Credit Analyst II5. Mary Jane T. Cunting11 Cash Clerk IV6. Leona O. Cabanatan Bookkeeper III/Acting Accountant.12The same employees, including petitioners, were also made respondents in a Complaint filed by the COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, before the Office of the Ombudsman for Gross Negligence, Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Bank and Giving Unwarranted Benefits to persons, causing undue injury in violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.13On January 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance was premature in view of the pending case in the Office of the Ombudsman. The Motion was denied by the Auditor. Unfazed, petitioners filed an appeal with the Director of COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City. On August 29, 1997, the COA Regional Office issued Decision No. 97-001 affirming the findings of the Auditor. On February 4, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Regional Office in Decision No. 98-00514issued on February 18, 1998.Petitioners did not file a Petition for Review or a Notice of Appeal from the COA Regional Office Decision as required under Section 3, Rule VI15of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. Thus, the Decision of the Director of COA Regional Office No. IX became final and executory pursuant to Section 5116of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Consequently, on April 12, 1999, the Director of the COA Regional Office No. IX issued a Memorandum to the Auditor directing him to require the accountant of the Ipil Branch to record in their books of account the said disallowance.17On July 12, 1999, the Auditor sent a letter to the Land Bank Branch Manager requiring him to record the disallowance in their books of account. On August 10, 1999, petitioners sent a letter18to COA Regional Office No. IX, seeking to have the booking of the disallowance set aside, on the grounds that they were absolved by the Ombudsman in a February 23, 1999 Resolution,19and that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas had approved the writing off of the subject loans.The February 23, 1999 Resolution of the Ombudsman was approved by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHERFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.SO ORDERED.20COA Regional Office No. IX endorsed to the Commission proper the matter raised by the petitioners in their August 10, 1999 letter. This is contained in its February 28, 2000 letter/endorsement,21wherein the Director of COA Regional Office No. IX maintained his stand that the time for filing of a petition for review had already lapsed. The Regional Director affirmed the disallowance of the transactions since the same were irregular and disadvantageous to the government, notwithstanding the Ombudsman resolution absolving petitioners from fault.In a Notice22dated June 29, 2000, the COA requested petitioners to submit a reply in response to the letter/endorsement of the Regional Office Director. On August 10, 2000, petitioners submitted their Compliance/ Reply23, wherein they argued that the Ombudsman Resolution is a supervening event and is a sufficient ground for exemption from the requirement to submit a Petition for Review or a Notice of Appeal to the Commission proper. Petitioners also argued that by invoking the jurisdiction of the Commission proper, the Regional Director had waived the fact that the case had already been resolved for failure to submit the required Petition for Review.On July 17, 2003, the COA rendered Decision No. 2003-10724affirming the rulings of the Auditor and the Regional Office, to wit:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Commission hereby affirms both the subject disallowance amounting toP3,115,000 and the Order of the Director, COA Regional Office No. IX, Zamboanga City, directing the recording of subject disallowance in the LBP books of accounts. This is, however, without prejudice to the right of herein appellants to run after the supplier for reimbursement of the advance payment for the cattle.25In denying petitioners request for the lifting of the booking of the disallowance, the COA ruled that after a circumspect evaluation of the facts and circumstances, the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of the complaint did not affect the validity and propriety of the disallowance which had become final and executory.26On August 22, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the COA in a Resolution27dated December 7, 2004.Hence, herein petition, with petitioners raising the following grounds in support of the petition, to wit:RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING THE PREPAYMENT STIPULATION IN THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BANK AND REMAD PROSCRIBED BY SECTION 103 OF P.D. NO. 1445, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE STATE AUDIT CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR HOLDING THE PETITIONERS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR HAVING PROCESSED THE LOANS OF THE BORROWING COOPERATIVES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BANKS MANUAL (FOG) LENDING OPERATIONS.RESPONDENT COA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT HELD THE PETITIONERS LIABLE AND, THEREFORE, IN EFFECT LIKEWISE OBLIGATED TO REFUND THE DISALLOWED AMOUNT EVEN AS AMONG OTHER THINGS THEY ACTED IN EVIDENT GOOD FAITH. MORE SO, AS THE COLLECTIBLES HAVE BEEN ALREADY EFFECTIVELY WRITTEN-OFF.28The petition is not meritorious.I.Anent the first issue raised by petitioners, the same is without merit. Petitioners argue said issue on three points:first, the COA is estopped from declaring the prepayment stipulation as invalid;29second, the prepayment clause in the Land Bank-REMAD contract is valid;30andthird, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that is not unusual for winning bidders involving public works to enter into contracts with the government providing for partial prepayment of the contract price in the form of mobilization funds.31As to their contention that the COA is estopped from declaring the prepayment stipulation as invalid, petitioners argue in the wise:x x x xThe CATTLE BREEDING AND BUY BACK MARKETING AGREEMENT sample of which is attached as Annex "I" was a Contract prepared by the bank and REMAD, it was agreed to by the cooperatives. It was a standard Contract used in twenty two (22) Land Bank branches throughout the country. It provided in part:6.1 That the release of the loan shall be made directly to the supplier 60 days prior to the delivery of stocks per prepayment term of REMAD LIVESTOCK COPORATION (supplier). Inspection shall be done before the 60th day/delivery of the stocks.Again, these Contracts were standard bank forms from Land Bank head office. None of the Petitioners participated in the drafting of the same.32In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, questions of fact cannot be raised in a petition forcertiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The office of the petition forcertiorariis not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort to the said petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.33Accordingly, since the validity of the prepayment scheme is inherently a question of fact, the same should no longer be looked into by this Court.In any case, even assuming that factual questions may be entertained, the facts do not help petitioners' cause for the following reasons:first, the supposed Annex "I" does not contain a stipulation authorizing a pre-payment scheme; andsecond, petitioners clearly violated the procedure of releasing loans contained in the Bank's Manual on Field Office Guidelines on Lending Operations (Manual on Lending Operations).A perusal of the aforementioned Annex "I,"34the Cattle-Breeding and Buy-Back Marketing Agreement, would show that stipulation "6.1" which allegedly authorizes prepayment does not exist. To make matters problematic is that nowhere in the records of the petition can one find a document which embodies such a stipulation. It bears stressing that the Auditor noted in his report that, "nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD, the supplier/dealer."Moreover, it is surprising that one of petitioners defense is that theyprocessed the cooperatives' applications in accordance with their individual job descriptions as provided in the Banks Manual on Field Office Guidelines on Lending Operations35when, on the contrary, petitioners seem to be oblivious of the fact that they clearly violated the procedure in releasing loans which is embodied in the very same Manual on Lending Operations, to wit:Loan Proceeds Released Directly to the Supplier/Dealer Proceeds of loans granted for the acquisition of farm machinery equipment; and sub-loan components for the purchase of construction materials, farm inputs, etc. shall be released directly to the accredited dealers/suppliers.Payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of reimbursement documents (delivery/ official receipts/ purchase orders) acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that same has been delivered.36However, this Court is not unmindful of the fact that petitioners contend that the Legal Department of Land Bank supposedly passed upon the issue of application of Section 88 of PD 1445. Petitioners argue that in an alleged August 22, 1996 Memorandum issued by the Land Bank, it opined that Section 88 of PD 1445 is not applicable.37Be that as it may, this Court is again constrained by the fact that petitioners did not offer in evidence the alleged August 22, 1996 Land Bank Memorandum. Therefore, the supposed tenor of the said document deserves scant consideration. In any case, even assumingarguendothat petitioners are correct in their claim, they still cannot hide from the fact that they violated the procedure in releasing loans embodied in the Manual on Lending Operations as previously discussed.To emphasize, the Auditor noted that "nowhere in the documents reviewed disclosed about prepayment scheme with REMAD."It is well settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the COA, are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.38If the prepayment scheme was in fact authorized, petitioners should have produced the document to prove such fact as alleged by them in the present petition. However, as stated before, even this Court is at a loss as to whether the prepayment scheme was authorized as a review of "Annex I," the document to which petitioners base their authority to make advance payments, does not contain such a stipulation or provision. Highlighted also is the fact that petitioners clearly violated the procedure in releasing loans found in the Manual on Lending Operations which provides that payments to the dealer shall only be made after presentation of reimbursement documents acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the same has been delivered.In addition, this Court notes that much reliance is made by petitioners on their allegation that the terms of the CFP allowed for prepayments or advancement of the payments prior to the delivery of the cattle by the supplier REMAD.It appears, however, that a CFP, even if admittedly apro formacontract and emanating from the Land Bank main office, is merely a facility proposal and not the contract of loan between Land Bank and the cooperatives.It is in the loan contract that the parties embody the terms and conditions of a transaction. If there is any agreement to release the loan in advance to REMAD as a form of prepayment scheme, such a stipulation should exist in the loan contract. There is, nevertheless, no proof of such stipulation as petitioners had failed to attach the CFPs or the loan contracts relating to the present petition.Based on the foregoing, the COA should, therefore, not be faulted for finding that petitioners facilitated the commission of the irregular transaction. The evidence they presented before the COA was insufficient to prove their case. So also, even this Court is at a loss as to the truthfulness and veracity of petitioners' allegations as they did not even present before this Court the documents that would serve as the basis for their claims.II.Anent the second ground raised by petitioners, the same is again without merit. Petitioners impute on the COA grave abuse of discretion when it held petitioners administratively liable for having processed the loans of the borrowing cooperatives. This Court stresses, however, that petitioners cannot rely on their supposed observance of the procedure outlined in the Manual on Lending Operations when clearly the same provides that "payment to the dealer shall be made after presentation of reimbursement documents (delivery/official receipts/purchase orders) acknowledged by the authorized LBP representative that the same has been delivered." Petitioners have not made a case to dispute the COA's finding that they violated the foregoing provision. Any presumption, therefore, that public officials are in the regular performance of their public functions must necessarily fail in the presence of an explicit rule that was violated.There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COA as petitioners were given all the opportunity to argue their case and present any supporting evidence with the COA Regional Director. Moreover, it bears to point out that even if petitioners' period to appeal had already lapsed, the COA Commission Proper even resolved their August 10, 1999 letter where they raised in issue the favorable ruling of the Ombudsman.III.Anent, the last issue raised by petitioners, the same is without merit. Petitioners contend that respondents Order, requiring them to refund thedisallowed transaction, is functus officio, the amount having been legally written-off.39A perusal of the records would show that Land Bank Vice-President Conrado B. Roxas sent a Memorandum40dated August 5, 1998 to the Head of the Ipil Branch, advising them that the accounts subject of the present petition have been written-off, to wit:We are pleased to inform you that Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in its letter dated July 20, 1998 has approved the write-off of your recommended Agrarian Reform Loan Accounts and Commercial Loan Accounts as covered by LBP Board Resolution Nos. 98-291 and 98-292, respectively, both dated June 18, 1998 x x x.41The Schedule of Accounts for Write-Off42attached to the August 5, 1998 Memorandum shows that the same covered the two loans given to BARBEMCO, the two loans given to RTLim RMC, and the only loan given to Tungawan PFPMC. The total amount approved for write-off wasP2,209,000.00.43Moreover, petitioners contend that the last loan given to SIFAMCO was also the subject of a write-off in a similar advice given to the Buug Branch. The total approved write-off in the second Memorandum44was forP906,000.00.In its Comment,45the COA argues that the fact that the audit disallowance was allegedly written-off is of no moment. Respondentmaintains that Section 66 of PD 144546expressly granted unto it the right to compromise monetary liabilities of the government.47The COA, thus, theorizes that without its approval, the alleged write-off is ineffectual. The same argument was reiterated by the COA in its Memorandum.48The COAs argument deserves scant consideration.A write-off is a financial accounting concept that allows for the reduction in value of an asset or earnings by the amount of an expense or loss. It is a means of removing bad debts from the financial records of the business.In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit,49this Court ruled that Land Bank has the power and authority to write-off loans, to wit:LBP was created as a body corporate and government instrumentality to provide timely and adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution of needed agrarian reform (Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended, Sec. 74). Section 75 of its Charter vests in LBP specific powers normally exercised by banking institutions, such as the authority to grant short, medium and long-term loans and advances against security of real estate and/or other acceptable assets; to guarantee acceptance(s), credits, loans, transactions or obligations; and to borrow from, or rediscount notes, bills of exchange and other commercial papers with the Central Bank. In addition to the enumeration of specific powers granted to LBP, Section 75 of its Charter also authorizes it:12. To exercise the general powers mentioned in the Corporation Law and the General Banking Act, as amended, insofar as they are not inconsistent or incompatible with this Decree.One of the general powers mentioned in the General Banking Act is that provided for in Section 84 thereof, reading:x x x xWriting-off loans and advances with an outstanding amount of one hundred thousand pesos or more shall require the prior approval of the Monetary Board (As amended by PD 71).It will, thus, be seen that LBP is a unique and specialized banking institution, not an ordinary "government agency" within the scope of Section 36 of Pres. Decree No. 1445. As a bank, it is specifically placed under the supervision and regulation of the Central Bank of the Philippines pursuant to its Charter (Sec. 97, Rep. Act No. 3844, as amended by Pres. Decree No. 251). In so far as loans and advances are concerned, therefore, it should be deemed primarily governed by Central Bank Circular No. 958, Series of 1983, which vests the determination of the frequency of writing-off loans in the Board of Directors of a bank provided that the loans written-off do not exceed a certain aggregate amount. The pertinent portion of that Circular reads:b. Frequency/ceiling of write-off. The frequency for writing-off loans and advances shall be left to the discretion of the Board of Directors of the bank concerned. Provided, that the aggregate amount of loans and advances which may be written-off during the year, shall in no case exceed 3% of total loans and investments; Provided, further, that charge-offs are made against allowance for possible losses, earnings during the year and/or retained earnings.50While the power to write-off is not expressly granted in the charter of the Land Bank, it can be logically implied, however, from the Land Bank's authority to exercise the general powers vested in banking institutions as provided in the General Banking Act (Republic Act 337). The clear intendment of its charter is for the Land Bank to be clothed not only with the express powers granted to it, but also with those implied, incidental and necessary for the exercise of those express powers.51In the case at bar, it is thus clear that the writing-off of the loans involved was a valid act of the Land Bank. In writing-off the loans, the only requirement for the Land Bank was that the same be in accordance with the applicable Bangko Sentral circulars, it being under the supervision and regulation thereof. The Land Bank recommended for write-off all six loans granted to the cooperatives, and it is worthy to note that the Bangko Sentral granted the same. The write-offs being clearly in accordance with law, the COA should, therefore, adhere to the same, unless under its general audit jurisdiction under PD 1445, it finds that under Section 25(1) the fiscal responsibility that rests directly with the head of the government agency has not been properly and effectively discharged.On this note, the reliance of respondent on Section 66 of PD 1445 is baseless as a reading thereof would show that the same does not pertain to the COAs power to compromise claims. Probably, what respondent wanted to refer to was Section 36 which provides:Section 36.Power to compromise claims.-1. When the interest of the government so requires, the Commissionmaycompromise or release in whole or in part, any claim or settled liability to any government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos and with the written approval of the Prime Minister, itmaylikewise compromise or release any similar claim or liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through the Commission and the Prime Minister, with their recommendations, to the National Assembly.2.The respective governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self-governing boards, commissions or agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to compromise or release any similar claim or liability when expressly authorized by their chartersand if in their judgment, the interest of their respective corporations or agencies so requires. When the charters do not so provide, the power to compromise shall be exercised by the Commission in accordance with the preceding paragraph.x x x x52Under Section 36, the use of the word "may" shows that the power of the COA to compromise claims is only permissive, and not mandatory. Further, the second paragraph of Section 36 clearly states that respective governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self-governing boards, commissions or agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to compromise or release any similar claim or liability when expressly authorized by their charters. Nowhere in Section 36 does it state that the COA must approve a compromise made by a government agency; the only requirement is that it be authorized by its charter. It, therefore, bears to stress that the COA does not have the exclusive prerogative to settle and compromise liabilities to the Government.The foregoing pronouncements notwithstanding, this Court rules that writing-off a loan does not equate to a condonation or release of a debt by the creditor.As an accounting strategy, the use of write-off is a task that can help a company maintain a more accurate inventory of the worth of its current assets. In general banking practice, the write-off method is used when an account is determined to be uncollectible and an uncollectible expense is recorded in the books of account. If in the future, the debt appears to be collectible, as when the debtor becomes solvent, then the books will be adjusted to reflect the amount to be collected as an asset. In turn, income will be credited by the same amount of increase in the accounts receivable.Write-off is not one of the legal grounds for extinguishing an obligation under the Civil Code.53It is not a compromise of liability. Neither is it a condonation, since in condonation gratuity on the part of the obligee and acceptance by the obligor are required.54In making the write-off, only the creditor takes action by removing the uncollectible account from its books even without the approval or participation of the debtor.Furthermore, write-off cannot be likened to a novation, since the obligations of both parties have not been modified.55When a write-off occurs, the actual worth of the asset is reflected in the books of accounts of the creditor, but the legal relationship between the creditor and the debtor still remains the same the debtor continues to be liable to the creditor for the full extent of the unpaid debt.Based on the foregoing, as creditor, Land Bank may write-off in its books of account the advance payment released to REMAD in the interest of accounting accuracy given that the loans were already uncollectible. Such write-off, however, as previously discussed, does not equate to a release from liability of petitioners.Accordingly, the Land Bank Ipil Branch must be required to record in its books of account the Php3,115,000.00 disallowance, and petitioners, together with their four co-employees,56should be personally liable for the said amount. Such liability, is, however, without prejudice to petitioners right to run after REMAD, to whom they illegally disbursed the loan, for the full reimbursement of the advance payment for the cattle as correctly ruled by the COA in its July 17, 2003 Decision.57On a final note, it bears to point out that a cursory reading of the Ombudsman's resolution will show that the complaint against petitioners was dismissed not because of a finding of good faith but because of a finding of lack of sufficient evidence. While the evidence presented before the Ombudsman may not have been sufficient to overcome the burden in criminal cases of proof beyond reasonable doubt,58it does not, however, necessarily follow, that the administrative proceedings will suffer the same fate as only substantial evidence is required, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.59An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution orvice versa.60The criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA. So also, the dismissal by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, of the criminal charges against petitioners does not necessarily foreclose the matter of their possible liability as warranted by the findings of the COA.In addition, this Court notes that the Ombudsman's Resolution relied on an alleged "April 6, 1992 Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department" which supposedly authorized the Field Offices to undertake a prepayment scheme. On the other hand, the same Ombudsman's Resolution also made reference to a "January 19, 1994 Memorandum of EVP Diaz" and a "May 31, 1994 Memorandum of VP FSD" which tackled the prohibition on advance payment to suppliers. All these documents, however, were again not attached to the records of the case at bar. Particularly, the supposed "April 6, 1992 Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department" was not even mentioned nor raised by petitioners as a defense in herein petition.1awphilThe decisions and resolutions emanating from the COA did not tackle the supposed April 6, 1992 Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department which allegedly authorized the Field Offices to undertake a pre-payment scheme. While it is possible that such document would have shown that petitioners were in good faith, the same should have been presented by them in the proceedings before the Commission proper - an act which they were not able to do because of their own negligence in allowing the period to file an appeal to lapse. The April 6, 1992 Memorandum of the Field Loans Review Department would have been the best evidence to free petitioners from their liability. It appears, however, that they did not present the same before the COA and it is already too late in the day for them to present such document before this Court.Petitioners' allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the COA implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, the exercise of the power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.61It is imperative for petitioners to show caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the COA whose exercise of discretion is being assailed. Proof of such grave abuse of discretion, however, is wanting in this case.WHEREFORE,premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Decision No. 2003-107 dated July 17, 2003 and Resolution No. 2004-046 dated December 7, 2004, of the Commission on Audit, are hereby AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 167239 May 5, 2010HICOBLINO M. CATLY (Deceased), Substituted by his wife, LOURDES A. CATLY,Petitioner,vs.WILLIAM NAVARRO, ISAGANI NAVARRO, BELEN DOLLETON, FLORENTINO ARCIAGA, BARTOLOME PATUGA, DIONISIO IGNACIO, BERNARDINO ARGANA, AND ERLINDA ARGANA-DELA CRUZ, and AYALA LAND, INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before the Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1dated December 13, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, Las Pias City in Civil Case No. 93-3094, entitled "William Navarro, Isagani Navarro, Iluminada Legaspi, Belen Dolleton, Florentino Arciaga, Bartolome Patuga, Dionisio Ignacio, Bernardino Argana, and Erlinda Argana-Dela Cruz [plaintiffs] v. Ayala Land, Inc. (formerly Las Pias Ventures, Inc.), [defendant], and Estrellita Londonio, Emerita Feolino, Porfirio Daen, and Timoteo Arciaga [intervenors]," stating that petitioner Atty. Hicoblino M. Catly will be entitled only to the reduced amount ofP1,000,000.00 as additional attorneys fees, not the entire amount ofP20,000,000.00 as prayed for, and its Order2dated March 1, 2005 denying reconsideration of the said decision.Respondents Navarro,et al. (therein eight (8) plaintiffs) filed a Complaint3dated September 6, 1993 with the RTC, Branch 147, Makati City, against Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (therein defendant, now substituted by herein respondent Ayala Land, Inc. [ALI]), for annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-5332 and recovery of possession with damages. Respondents were represented by petitioner, now deceased and substituted in this case by his wife, Lourdes A. Catly. In their Complaint, respondents alleged that they owned and occupied 32 hectares of land which were registered in the name of their predecessors-in-interest in 1920, as evidenced by tax declarations; that after conducting a relocation survey, a portion of their land was included in a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-5332, then registered in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc., containing an area of 370,868 square meters, more or less; that the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-5332 originated from Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1421, pursuant to Decree No. N-60635 and issued in L.R.C. Record No. 45516, Case No. 976 which, in a Partial Decision dated September 26, 1986 rendered by the RTC of Pasig, Branch 167, was ordered cancelled and set aside; that since TCT No. T-5332 belonging to Las Pias Ventures, Inc. originated from OCT No. 1421, the same must, consequently, be cancelled and declared null and void; that respondents also filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), docketed as Case No. 027-90, against Las Pias Ventures, Inc. for deliberately fencing the subject property, including a government road to the area known asDaang Hariand, thus, depriving them access to their property; that COSLAP noted in its resolution that per Sketch Plan SK-004, Lot 10, PSU-80886, AP 4217, the subject property actually contained an area of only 70,868 sq. m., not 370,868 sq. m. which appeared in the title of Las Pias Ventures, Inc.; and that Las Pias Ventures, Inc. and its predecessors-in-interest were in bad faith when they fraudulently, forcibly, and stealthily acquired possession over their property by cutting and bulldozing 104 fruit-bearing mango trees so as to pave the way for the construction of subdivision roads. Thus, respondents prayed that TCT No. T-5332 be declared null and void and that Las Pias Ventures, Inc. be directed to open the gate leading toDaang Hariroad, and that Las Pias Ventures, Inc. be ordered to restore possession of the property to the respondents and to pay the respondents actual and moral damages, attorneys fees, and expenses of litigation.On December 3, 1993, respondent ALI filed a Motion for Substitution4praying that it be substituted in place of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. as party-defendant by virtue of the Certificate of Filing of the Articles of Merger,5dated November 6, 1992, entered into between them. On even date, it also filed a Motion to Dismiss6averring that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case as the respondents did not pay the proper amount of filing fees, that their complaint failed to state a cause of action, and that their cause of action had already prescribed.Meanwhile, respondents sought to declare respondent ALI in default,7which the latter opposed. On December 27, 1993, pending the resolution of the said incidents, respondents filed with the trial court a Motion to Prosecute Action as Pauper8on the ground that their individual gross income did not exceedP4,000.00 a month. Moreover, respondents moved to admit their Amended Complaint9dated December 27, 1993, adding that respondent ALI was named therein as a party-defendant and the titles sought to be declared null and void would be TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983, instead of TCT No. T-5332, as the land formerly under TCT No. T-5332 had been subdivided and presently covered by TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983 which was duly registered in the name of respondent ALI.Thereafter, since the subject properties were located in Las Pias, the case was re-raffled to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255, then presided by Judge Florentino M. Alumbres.In its Order10dated January 3, 1995, the trial court granted the motion of respondents to prosecute the case as pauper litigants and exempted them from paying the legal fees.In an Order11dated May 3, 1995, the trial court denied respondent ALIs Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint.12In its Order13dated July 31, 1995, the trial court denied the motion of respondents to declare respondent ALI in default for lack of merit.In its Answer to Amended Complaint14dated August 18, 1995, respondent ALI countered that the case involved a real action where the assessed value of the property, or if there be none, the estimated value thereof, should have been stated and used as the basis for computation of the filing fees to be paid by respondents; that respondents did not state the assessed value of the property either in the body or prayer of the Amended Complaint; that using the conservative figure ofP1,000.00 per sq. m., the property claimed by respondents would be worthP320,000,000.00 and, thus, the filing fees to be paid by them would have been at leastP1,602,350.00; that since respondents failed to pay the proper filing fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case; that the amended complaint of respondents failed to state a cause of action as the property subject of litigation was not properly identified; that respondents invoked the September 24, 1986 Partial Decision15of therein trial court in favor of one Jose Velasquez, but the same never became final and executory and was superseded by the December 12, 1986 Judgment,16whereby Jose Velasquezs rights were quitclaimed and transferred to International Corporate Bank and its transferees; that res judicata barred the complaint of respondents, since the proceedings which led to the issuance of a decree in a land case were proceedings in rem that would bind the whole world and, thus, the issuance of Decree No. N-60635 in 1957 became binding upon respondents; that respondents cause of action to file the complaint had prescribed, since an action to annul a decree of registration prescribes in one year after its issuance, as in the case of Decree No. N-60635 and OCT No. 1421 which were issued in 1957, but the complaint was filed only in 1993, or more than 30 years later; and that as a consequence of this baseless suit, respondents should be ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, including attorneys fees and costs of suit.Respondents and respondent ALI submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.17Respondent ALI filed a Motion for Production of Documents18dated September 18, 1995 for the production of survey plans and tax declarations alleged by respondents in their amended complaint and Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint19dated January 4, 1996 (which the trial court treated as a third motion to dismiss) due to respondents non-payment of docket fees.In its Order20dated March 4, 1996, the trial court denied respondent ALIs motions for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial on April 30, 1996 at 8:30 in the morning with a warning that should respondent ALI file a fourth motion to dismiss, respondents would be allowed to present their evidenceex-parte,and respondent ALIs counsel would be cited for contempt of court for delaying the proceedings of the case.Perceiving bias on the part of the trial judge, respondent ALI filed a Motion to Inhibit21on March 25, 1996. The trial court, in its Order22dated May 27, 1996, also denied respondent ALIs Motion to Inhibit then Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres from hearing the case as the grounds alleged therein did not fall under Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and the filing of the same was solely for the purpose of delay.On June 17, 1996, respondent ALI filed a Petition forCertiorari23with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the trial courts Order dated January 3, 1995 (allowing respondents to litigate as paupers) and Order dated March 4, 1996 (denying respondent ALIs motions). In its Decision dated September 27, 1996, the CA dismissed respondent ALIs petition and, later, denied the reconsideration thereof.Respondent ALI then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, in G.R. No. 127079, with this Court, alleging that the CA erred in holding that respondents are pauper-litigants and in sustaining the trial courts Order denying its motion for inhibition and, later, a Supplemental Petition forCertiorari(with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated November 9, 2000 seeking to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the case insofar as the complaint-in-intervention of Porfirio A. Daen is concerned.On May 13, 1997, pending the resolution of respondent ALIs petitions, both parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),24where herein 8 respondents and 66 other therein plaintiffs (heirs of Lorenzo dela Cruz, Florentino Navarro, Jose Dolleton, Patricio dela Cruz, Ignacio Arciaga, Dionisio Dolleton, Leon Argana, Esteban Patuga, respectively), assisted by petitioner, waive, renounce and cede in favor of respondent ALI, represented by its Senior Vice-President and General Counsel Mercedita S. Nolledo and Assistant Vice-President Ricardo N. Jacinto, and assisted by its counsel, any and all rights of exclusive ownership over the subject properties. The said MOA provides that:MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENTKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:This Memorandum of Agreement, made and entered into by and between:The persons listed in Annex "A" [herein 8 respondents and 66 other therein plaintiffs] hereof, all Filipino citizens, and residents of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Heirs;" and AYALA LAND, INC., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with address at Tower One, Ayala Triangle, Ayala Avenue, Makati City, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as "ALI" and represented herein by its Senior Vice-President and General Counsel, Ms. Mercedita S. Nolledo;WHEREAS, the Heirs represent themselves to be the successors-in-interest of Lorenzo [dela] Cruz, Jose Dolleton, Patricio [dela] Cruz, Dionisio Dolleton, Esteban Patuga, Florentino Navarro, Ignacio Arciaga, and Leon Argana (collectively, the "Predecessors"), with respect to their claims over Lot 10 of Psu-80886 (Ap 4217), covering an area of approximately 370,868 square meters, more or less;WHEREAS, ALI is the registered owner of several parcels of land in Las Pias, Metro Manila under TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983, which titles were derived from TCT No. T-5332 which, in turn, was derived from OCT No. 1421, as per Decree No. N-60635, L.R.C. Record No. 45516, Case No. 976;WHEREAS, Lot 10 of Psu-80886 is now under ALIs TCT Nos.T-6975 to T-36983;NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants hereinbelow specified, the parties hereto hereby agree as follows:1. For and in consideration of the sums to be paid by ALI as stated in par. 2 x x x hereof, the Heirs hereby:a) Waive, renounce and cede, in favor of ALI, any and all rights to exclusive ownership or co-ownership, past, present or future, xxxx x x x2.1First Tranche. The first tranche payment shall be in the amount of Ninety-Nine Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Pesos and Forty-Six Centavos (P99,995,630.46), Philippine Currency, which sum shall be, as it is hereby, paid directly to the Heirs immediately upon execution of this Agreement; and the receipt of which amount said Heirs hereby so acknowledge to their full satisfaction, thereby rendering immediately operative the releases and waivers in parcel hereof. Upon the collective request of the said Heirs, the said payment is hereby broken down as follows.x x x x2.2Second Tranche. The sum of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) shall be payable to the payees named below ninety (90) days after the date of execution of this Agreement. Likewise at the request of all the Heirs, the said payment should be broken down as follows as and when it becomes due.x x x x2.3 The Heirs also unqualifiedly declare that their agreement with each other as to the sharing of the proceeds of the settlement is exclusively between and among themselves, and any dispute or controversy concerning the same does not affect this Agreement or their Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise to be signed and filed in court by the parties hereto. Release of the balance referred to in par. 2.2 hereto by ALI to the Heirs shall completely and absolutely discharge all of ALIs obligations under the said Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise to the Heirs.3. Upon execution hereof, the Heirs and all persons claiming rights under them shall immediately vacate the area comprising the Property, or any portion thereof which they may still be occupying, if any. The failure of the Heirs and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the Property or any portion thereof which they may still be occupying shall entitle ALI to secure a writ of execution to eject them from any portion of the Properties.4. The Heirs have entered into this Agreement in their respective personal capacities and as successors-in-interest of their Predecessors. They hereby jointly and severally warrant that they collectively constitute the totality of all the heirs of the Predecessors and that no one has been left out or otherwise excluded. Any breach of this warranty shall be deemed a substantial breach of this Agreement and each breach hereof shall be deemed a breach by all the Heirs.5. The Heirs expressly warrant that they own and possess all of the rights and interests claimed by the Predecessors to the Properties, and that there are no other claimants to the said rights and interests.6. The Heirs warrant that they have not sold, leased, mortgaged or in any way encumbered in favor of any third party or person whatsoever, nor have they otherwise diminished their rights to the Properties by any act or omission [including but not limited to the non-payment of realty taxes].7. The Heirs expressly warrant that only they, individually and collectively, have any claim to the Properties arising from the documents and decisions mentioned in pars. 1 (a) and 1 (b) hereof as they relate to pars. 5 and 6 hereof.8. All the foregoing warranties are to be treated as perpetual in character.9. In case of breach of any of their warranties in pars. 5, 6 and 7, above and any of their covenants elsewhere in this Memorandum of Agreement, the Heirs shall hold ALI, its officers, stockholders, agents and assigns free and harmless, without regard to the amount of damage or claims, from any claim or suit lodged or filed against them by third parties claiming to be them or to be authorized by them, or in any manner claiming rights to the Properties.10. With the exception of the consideration described in par. 2 hereof, the Heirs acknowledge that no representation, undertaking, promises or commitment of present or future fact, opinion or event has been made by ALI to induce this Agreement. The Heirs acknowledge that they have entered into this Agreement relying solely on their own independent inquiry into all relevant facts and circumstances and with knowledge, or with full opportunity to obtain such knowledge, of all the facts relating to the allegations upon which their claims are based.Accordingly, any law or jurisprudence purporting to give the Heirs the option to either revive their original demand or enforce this Agreement in the event of breach thereof, notwithstanding, the Heirs agree that their claims shall remain extinguished in any event and shall not be revived for any reason and upon any ground whatsoever, and that they shall be barred from asking for the rescission hereof and from annotating any lis pendens or adverse claim on ALIs aforementioned titles.11. On the other hand, ALI has entered into this Memorandum of Agreement relying solely upon the Heirs representations in pars. 5, 6 and 7 hereof and their waivers, obligations and undertakings in pars. 1 and 3 hereof. Accordingly, in the event of the falsity of these representations and/or breach of these waivers, obligations and undertakings, ALI shall, in addition to its rights under pars. 9 and 10 hereof which shall, in any case, remain effective, have the right to rescind this Agreement, without however and moreover waiving the releases made by the Heirs in its favor under par. 1 hereof.12. The Heirs hereby likewise quitclaim and waive, in favor of ALIs predecessors, any and all causes of action which they may have against such predecessors.13. All parties hereto acknowledge that each of them has read and understood this Memorandum of Agreement or that the same has been read and explained to each of them in a language that they understand by her/its respective counsel.14. The Heirs hereby agree to execute such documents as may be required to carry out the purpose of this Memorandum of Agreement.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereby set their hands this 13th day of May, 1997 at Makati City, Philippines.25On the same day, May 13, 1997, therein plaintiffs (including herein respondents), as successors-in-interest, and respondent ALI executed the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise expressing their desire toward an amicable settlement. Thus,JOINT MOTION FOR JUDGMENTBASED ON COMPROMISEWHEREAS, the plaintiffs represent themselves to be the sole and exclusive successors-in-interest of Lorenzo dela Cruz, Jose Dolleton, Patricio dela Cruz, Dionisio Dolleton, Esteban Patuga, Florentino Navarro, Ignacio Arciaga, and Leon Argana (collectively, the "Predecessors"), with respect to their claims over Lot 10 of Psu-80886 (Ap 4217), covering an area of approximately 370,868 square meters, more or less;WHEREAS, Ayala Land, Inc. ("ALI") is the registered owner of several parcels of land in Las Pias, Metro Manila under TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983, which titles were derived from TCT No. T-5332 which, in turn, was derived from OCT No. 1421, as per Decree No. N-60635, L.R.C. Record No. 45516, Case No. 976;WHEREAS, Lot 10 of Psu-80886 is now under ALIs TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983;NOW, THEREFORE, plaintiffs and defendant, assisted by their respective counsel[s], and desiring to put an end to litigation between them, hereby respectfully request the Honorable Court to render judgment based on the compromise reached by the parties herein, upon the following terms and conditions:1. For valuable consideration already fully and completely received, plaintiffs hereby:a) Waive, renounce and cede, in favor of ALI, any and all rights to exclusive ownership or co-ownership, past, present or future, which they may have over those parcels of land known as Lot 10 of Plan Psu-80886 and/or any amendment thereof, as recorded in Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. 1421 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on November 26, 1957 pursuant to Decree No. N-60635, and now under Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") Nos. 36975 to 36983, and/or any portion of what is now generally known as the Ayala Southvale Residential Subdivision Project, regardless of the source basis of such claim. Said Lot 10 and any and all other lots/portions and lands over which plaintiffs may have any claim (whether or not arising from Psu-80886) are hereafter referred to as the "Properties."b) Waive, renounce and cede, in favor of ALI, any and all rights of exclusive ownership or co-ownership, past, present or future, which they may have, pertaining to the Properties and arising from any and all other judicial or administrative decisions from which they may derive any rights of ownership or possession with respect to the Properties.c) Expressly transfer and assign to ALI all of their rights indicated in items 1, a) and 1, b) above.d) Expressly acknowledge and affirm, in any case, the validity, efficacy and superiority of ALI's Torrens Certificates of Title Nos. T-36975 to T-36983 issued by the Register of Deeds of Las Pias, as well as all their predecessor titles and any and all derivative titles which in the future may be issued, over the area covered by Properties, in particular, Lot 10 of Plan Psu-80886, and any amendment thereof, over the area covered by OCT No. 1421 and any other title derived therefrom. Plaintiffs' intention herein, is to unqualifiedly declare, that they have absolutely no other rights, claims, reservations or interests in the lands covered by ALI's titles and/or any portion of what is now generally referred to as the Ayala South[v]ale Residential Subdivision Project, whether or not arising out of said Psu-80886 and/or any amendment thereof;e) Expressly acknowledge and affirm that they have inspected and verified the area presently being occupied and possessed by ALI and, by these presents, unqualifiedly declare that their claim, which is assigned and transferred to ALI in this Agreement, covers the very same area presently occupied by ALI and that this Agreement resolves with finality all issues concerning the location of the Propertiesvis--visthe area covered by ALI's titles and which area is actually and physically possessed by ALI.2. Plaintiffs and all persons claiming rights under them shall immediately vacate the area comprising the Property, or any portion thereof which they may still be occupying. The failure of plaintiffs and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the Property or any portion thereof which they may still be occupying shall entitle ALI to secure a writ of execution to eject them from any portion of the Properties.3. Plaintiffs and their co-heirs have entered into this Agreement in their respective personal capacities and as successors-in-interest of their Predecessors. They hereby jointly and severally warrant that they collectively constitute the totality of all the heirs of the Predecessor and that no one has been left out or otherwise excluded. Any breach of this warranty shall be deemed a substantial breach of this Agreement, and each breach hereof shall be deemed a breach by all the Heirs.4. Plaintiffs expressly warrant that they own and possess all of the rights and interests claimed by the Predecessors to the Properties, and that there are no other claimants to the said rights and interests.5. Plaintiffs warrant that they have not sold, leased, mortgaged or in anyway encumbered, in favor of any third party or person, or otherwise diminished their rights to the Properties by any act or omission [including but not limited to the non-payment of realty taxes].6. Plaintiffs expressly warrant that there are no other claims to the Properties arising from the documents and decisions mentioned in pars. 1(a) and 1(b) hereof as they relate to pars. 4 and 5 hereof.7. All the foregoing warranties are perpetual in character.8. In case of breach of any of their warranties in pars. 4, 5 and 6 above and any of their covenants in this Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise, plaintiffs shall hold ALI, its officers, stockholders, agents and assigns free and harmless, without regard to the amount of damage or claims, from any claim or suit lodged or filed against them by any of the plaintiffs, or third parties claiming to be authorized by them, or in any manner claiming rights to the Properties.9. With the exception of the consideration described in par. 1 hereof, plaintiffs acknowledge that no representation, undertaking, promises, or commitment of present or future fact, opinion or event has been made by ALI to induce this Agreement. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they have entered into this Agreement relying solely on their own independent inquiry into all relevant facts and circumstances and with knowledge, or with full opportunity to obtain such knowledge, of all the facts relating to the allegations upon which their claims are based.Accordingly, any law or jurisprudence purporting to give plaintiffs the option to either revive their original demand or enforce this Agreement in the event of breach thereof, notwithstanding, the plaintiffs agree that their claims shall remain extinguished in any event and shall not be revived for any reason and upon any ground whatsoever, and that they shall be barred from asking for the rescission hereof and from annotating any lis pendens or adverse claim on ALIs aforementioned titles.10. On the other hand, ALI has entered into this Agreement relying solely upon plaintiffs representations in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 hereof and their waivers, obligations and undertakings in pars. 1 and 2 hereof. Accordingly, in the event of the falsity of these representations and/or breach of these waivers, obligations and undertakings, and in addition to its rights under paragraphs 8 and 9 hereof which shall, in any case, remain effective, ALI shall have the right to rescind this Compromise Agreement, without, however, waiving the releases made by the plaintiffs in its favor under par. 1 hereof.11. Plaintiffs hereby likewise quitclaim and waive, in favor of ALI and ALIs predecessors, any and all causes of action which they may have against such predecessors.12. All parties hereto acknowledge that each of them has read and understood this Agreement or that the same has been read and explained to each of them in a language that they understand by his/her/its respective counsel.13. Plaintiffs hereby agree to execute such documents as may be required to carry out the purpose of this Compromise Agreement.P R A Y E RWHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered by this Honorable Court in accordance with the terms and conditions of the above Compromise Agreement of the parties.Other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for.Makati City for Las Pias, 13 May 1997.26On May 14, 1997, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion27with the trial court alleging that he was not consulted when therein heirs signed the MOA; that his Contract for Legal and Other Valuable Services28dated September 3, 1993, wherein respondents engaged his services as counsel, be noted on record; that should there be an amicable settlement of the case, his attorneys fees should be awarded in full as stipulated in the contract to fully compensate his efforts in representing herein respondents and therein heirs; and that the trial court issued an order confirming his right to collect his attorneys fees to the exclusion of the other agents and financiers. Petitioner also appended therein a copy of the Authority to Collect Attorneys Fee[s] as Stipulated in the Contract for Legal Services and Other Valuable Considerations29which stated that should there be an amicable settlement of the case by way of respondent ALI paying respondents any amount which may be agreed upon by the parties, the respondents authorize petitioner to directly collect from respondent ALI his 25% attorneys fees and that they authorize respondent ALI to deduct the 25% attorneys fees from the total amount due them and to pay and deliver the same to petitioner, his heirs or assigns.On May 27, 1997, respondents, respondent ALI, and petitioner executed an Amendatory Agreement incorporating the provision that, in addition to theP10,000,000.00 attorneys fees as previously agreed upon, petitioner would also be entitled to the amount of Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00) Pesos as additional attorneys fees, or a total amount ofP30,000,000.00, subject to the trial courts approval.AMENDATORY AGREEMENTKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:DIONISIO IGNACIO, WILLIAM NAVARRO, DIONISIO ARCIAGA, ILUMINADA LEGASPI, BELEN DOLLETON, ISAGANI NAVARRO, BERNARDINO ARGANA, BARTOLOME PATUGA (collectively, the "Heads of the Families"), LEOPOLDO ESPIRITU. EMERITA FEOLINO, and ESPERANZA ESPIRITU (collectively, the "Brokers"), ATTY. HICOBLINO M. CATLY ("Atty. Catly"), and Ayala Land, Inc. ("ALI"), do hereby declare:WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families are among the signatories to the 13 May 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (the "MOA") with ALI;WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers are collectively entitled to the sum of Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) under the Second Tranche payment of the MOA;WHEREAS, under the terms of the MOA, ALI was authorized by the Heads of the Families and their co-heirs to pay for their account Atty. Catly an aggregate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under the First and Second Tranche payments of the MOA;WHEREAS, Atty. Catly has claimed from the Heirs (as this term is defined in the MOA), an additional Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for his attorneys fees, which claim is pending resolution before Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias (the "Las Pias Court") in Civil Case No. 93-3094 entitled "William Navarro, et al. v. Ayala Land, Inc." ("Civil Case No. 93-3094");NOW, THEREFORE, the parties declare and covenant as follows:1. The respective amounts to be received by the following under the First Tranche provided in Par. 2.1 of the MOA are hereby recomputed and adjusted as follows:FromTo

1.Dionisio IgnacioP9,086,345.98P8,850,245.98

2.William Navarro5,079,636.684,947,636.68

3.Dionisio Arciaga651,333.74634,433.74

4.Iluminada Legaspi1,286,749.301,253,349.30

5.Belen Dolleton1,415,875.841,379,075.84

6.Isagani Navarro3,302,585.863,216,785.86

7.Bernardino Argana922,224.90898,224.90

8.Bartolome Patuga1,741,572.231,696,272.23

9.Leopoldo Espiritu(financier)11,000,000.0010,714,200.00

10.Emerita Feolino(agent)1,500,000.001,461,000.00

11.Esperanza Espiritu(agent)750,000.00730,000.00

12.Leopoldo Espiritu(agent)1,750,000.001,704,500.00

13.Hicoblino Catly(attorneys fees)9,000,000.0010,000,000.00

The recomputed and adjusted amounts set forth under the second column above shall be in lieu of the amounts provided for under Par. 2.1 of the MOA.2. The Heads of the Families, the Brokers and Atty. Catly agree to abide by the final decision or resolution of the Las Pias Court in Civil Case No. 93-3094 on the total amount of attorneys fees that should be paid to Atty. Catly. They agree to implement the said decision or resolution, once it attains finality, immediately and without any delay.3. The provisions of Paragraph 2.2. of the MOA, notwithstanding, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers authorize ALI to retain the sum of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) provided under the Second Tranche of the MOA, which sum ALI shall apply to the satisfaction of the claim of Atty. Catly for attorneys fees once this is finally decided and resolved by the Las Pias Court and in such amount as such court shall declare. Any balance remaining after the satisfaction of Atty. Catlys claim in accordance with the decision or resolution of the Las Pias Court shall be paid by ALI to the Heads of the Families and the Brokers in proportion to the amounts corresponding to them as set forth in Paragraph 2.2 of the MOA upon the lapse of the 90-day period referred to in such agreement or the date of the finality of the Las Pias Courts decision or resolution on Atty. Catlys claim, whichever is later.4. Atty. Catly accepts the amount set forth in the MOA and such other amount, if any, as the Las Pias Court may declare, as the final settlement of his claim for attorneys fees and waives all other claims which he may have in connection with Civil Case No. 93-3094. In acknowledgment thereof, he shall affix his own signature on the MOA.5. Upon signing this Amendatory Agreement, the Heads of the Families and Atty. Catly shall turn over to ALI all documents in their possession, whether original or otherwise, which support or which they intend to present as evidence in support of their claim in Civil Case No. 93-3094.6. By signing this Amendatory Agreement, the Heads of the Families, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 93-3094 hereby unconditionally and irrevocably authorize the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on ALIs TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983 under Entry No. 758-11 dated 16 June 1994, which annotations were made at the instance of Atty. Catly on behalf of the Heads of the Families. This Amendatory Agreement constitutes an authority to ALI to effect the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens on behalf of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 93-3094.7. Nothing herein shall be construed to amend, supersede or revoke to any extent the terms and conditions of the MOA in any other respect, except as provided herein, and only insofar as the signatoriers hereto are concerned.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have signed this Declaration and Waiver this ____ day of May, 1997 at Makati City.DIONISIO IGNACIOWILLIAM NAVARRO

DIONISIO ARCIAGAILUMINADA LEGASPI

BELEN DOLLETONISAGANI NAVARRO

BERNARDINO ARGANABARTOLOME PATUGA

LEOPOLDO ESPIRITUEMERITA FEOLINO

ESPERANZA ESPIRITUATTY. HICOBLINO M. CATLY

AYALA LAND, INC.By: Sgd.MERCEDITA S. NOLLEDOAndSgd.RICARDO JACINTOAssisted by:POBLADOR BAUTISTA & REYES5th Floor, SEDCCO I BuildingRada cor. Legaspi StreetLegaspi Village, Makati CityBy:Sgd.ALEXANDER J. POBLADORPTR No. 8002896/Makati/1-13-97IBP No. 345214/Makati 3-1-93DINO VIVENCIO A.A. TAMAYOPTR No. 8003065/Makati/1-13-97IBP No. 427804/Q.C./1-13-97In his Motion to Withdraw Manifestation and Motion dated May 27, 1997, filed on July 9, 1997, petitioner stated that he would be withdrawing all objections to the May 13, 1997 MOA and prayed for the approval of the said MOA, without prejudice to his claim for attorneys fees.However, in an Order30dated June 10, 1997, the trial court held in abeyance its resolution on the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise, pending the action of this Court on respondent ALIs petition.In its Order31dated June 23, 1997, the trial court directed the parties to formally submit a copy of their amendatory agreement. In compliance therewith, the respondents submitted an unnotarized but signed copy of the subject document, while respondent ALI later submitted the notarized Amendatory Agreement dated May 27, 1997.On July 14, 1997, respondent ALI filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the trial court that it agreed to pay the 8 respondents and 66 other heirs (or a total of 74 claimants) the total amount ofP120,000,000.00,P10,000,000.00 of which would be paid to petitioner as attorneys fees. It also stated that as petitioner claimed for a higher amount of attorneys fees, the parties executed the amendatory agreement with the understanding that the issue of how much of the additionalP20,000,000.00, if any, that petitioner would be entitled to by way of attorneys fees, would have to be resolved by the trial court.1avvphi1On July 22, 1997, the trial court (per Judge Florentino M. Alumbres) rendered a Separate Judgment in favor of the petitioner as follows:SEPARATE JUDGMENTOriginally submitted to the Court for approval and judgment on June 9, 1997 is the JOINT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT BASED ON COMPROMISE dated May 13, 1997 of the parties, duly assisted by their counsels, Atty. Hicoblino M. Catly for the plaintiffs and Atty. Alexander J. Poblador for the defendant.During the hearing of the said motion on June 10, 1997, the parties discussed an AMENDADORY AGREEMENT which relates to attorneys fees of Atty. Catly which they alluded to as forming part of their compromise agreement, but the said amendatory agreement has not yet been submitted to the Court. On June 23, 1997, an order was issued directing the parties to submit the same for approval by the Court.Thus, on June 27, 1997, in compliance with the said order, the plaintiffs submitted their copy which is not notarized, while the defendant submitted its, duly notarized, on July 4, 1997.However, on July 15, 1997, this Court received a copy of defendants MANIFESTATION AND MOTION dated July 14, 1997 which it filed with the Honorable Supreme Court whereby it "prayed that the Honorable Court itself approve forthwith the parties Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise dated 13 May 1997, without prejudice to the resolution by the Respondent Judge of Atty. Catlys claim for attorneys fees." (Underlining supplied for emphasis). With that relief prayed for before the High Court, what is left to be decided by this Court is on the matter of the claim for a attorneys fees of Atty. Catly as contained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the said Amendatory Agreement.The AMENDATORY AGREEMENT reads, as follows:KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:DIONISIO IGNACIO, WILLIAM NAVARRO, DIONISIO ARCIAGA, ILUMINADA LEGASPI, BELEN DOLLETON, ISAGANI NAVARRO, BERNARDINO ARGANA, BARTOLOME PATUGA (collectively, the "Heads of the Families"), LEOPOLDO ESPIRITU. EMERITA FEOLINO, and ESPERANZA ESPIRITU (collectively, the "Brokers"), ATTY. HICOBLINO M. CATLY ("Atty. Catly"), and Ayala Land, Inc. ("ALI"), do hereby declare:WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families are among the signatories to the 13 May 1997 Memorandum of Agreement (the "MOA") with ALI;WHEREAS, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers are collectively entitled to the sum of Nineteen Million Pesos (P19,000,000.00) under the Second Tranche payment of the MOA;WHEREAS, under the terms of the MOA, ALI was authorized by the Heads of the Families and their co-heirs to pay for their account Atty. Catly an aggregate amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under the First and Second Tranche payments of the MOA;WHEREAS, Atty. Catly has claimed from the Heirs (as this term is defined in the MOA), an additional Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for his attorneys fees, which claim is pending resolution before Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias (the "Las Pias Court") in Civil Case No. 93-3094 entitled "William Navarro, et al. v. Ayala Land, Inc." ("Civil Case No. 93-3094");NOW, THEREFORE, the parties declare and covenant as follows:1. The respective amounts to be received by the following under the First Tranche provided in Par. 2.1 of the MOA are hereby recomputed and adjusted as follows:FromTo

14.Dionisio IgnacioP9,086,345.98P8,850,245.98

15.William Navarro5,079,636.684,947,636.68

16.Dionisio Arciaga651,333.74634,433.74

17.Iluminada Legaspi1,286,749.301,253,349.30

18.Belen Dolleton1,415,875.841,379,075.84

19.Isagani Navarro3,302,585.863,216,785.86

20.Bernardino Argana922,224.90898,224.90

21.Bartolome Patuga1,741,572.231,696,272.23

22.Leopoldo Espiritu(financier)11,000,000.0010,714,200.00

23.Emerita Feolino(agent)1,500,000.001,461,000.00

24.Esperanza Espiritu(agent)750,000.00730,000.00

25.Leopoldo Espiritu(agent)1,750,000.001,704,500.00

26.Hicoblino Catly(attorneys fees)9,000,000.0010,000,000.00

The recomputed and adjusted amounts set forth under the second column above shall be in lieu of the amounts provided for under Par. 2.1 of the MOA.2. The Heads of the Families, the Brokers and Atty. Catly agree to abide by the final decision or resolution of the Las Pias Court in Civil Case No. 93-3094 on the total amount of attorneys fees that should be paid to Atty. Catly. They agree to implement the said decision or resolution, once it attains finality, immediately and without any delay.3. The provisions of Paragraph 2.2. of the MOA, notwithstanding, the Heads of the Families and the Brokers authorize ALI to retain the sum of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) provided under the Second Tranche of the MOA, which sum ALI shall apply to the satisfaction of the claim of Atty. Catly for attorneys fees once this is finally decided and resolved by the Las Pias Court and in such amount as such court shall declare. Any balance remaining after the satisfaction of Atty. Catlys claim in accordance with the decision or resolution of the Las Pias Court shall be paid by ALI to the Heads of the Families and the Brokers in proportion to the amounts corresponding to them as set forth in Paragraph 2.2 of the MOA upon the lapse of the 90-day period referred to in such agreement or the date of the finality of the Las Pias Courts decision or resolution on Atty. Catlys claim, whichever is later.4. Atty. Catly accepts the amount set forth in the MOA and such other amount, if any, as the Las Pias Court may declare, as the final settlement of his claim for attorneys fees and waives all other claims which he may have in connection with Civil Case No. 93-3094. In acknowledgment thereof, he shall affix his own signature on the MOA.5. Upon signing this Amendatory Agreement, the Heads of the Families and Atty. Catly shall turn over to ALI all documents in their possession, whether original or otherwise, which support or which they intend to present as evidence in support of their claim in Civil Case No. 93-3094.6. By signing this Amendatory Agreement, the Heads of the Families, who are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 93-3094 hereby unconditionally and irrevocably authorize the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on ALIs TCT Nos. T-36975 to T-36983 under Entry No. 758-11 dated 16 June 1994, which annotations were made at the instance of Atty. Catly on behalf of the Heads of the Families. This Amendatory Agreement constitutes an authority to ALI to effect the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens on behalf of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 93-3094.7. Nothing herein shall be construed to amend, supersede or revoke to any extent the terms and conditions of the MOA in any other respect, except as provided herein, and only insofar as the signatoriers hereto are concerned.Finding the terms and conditions set forth under the Amendatory Agreement to be freely agreed upon, and the same not being contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy, the same are hereby approved.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the basis of the terms and conditions agreed upon under the Amendatory Agreement with emphasis on Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 thereof, and in accordance with Section 5, Rule 36 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.ACCORDINGLY, the defendant [respondent ALI] is directed to immediately release the sum of Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00) Pesos in favor of Atty. Hicoblino M. Catly representing his attorneys fees as herein approved by the Court.SO ORDERED.32On July 28, 1997, petitioner filed anEx-ParteMotion to Issue Writ for Execution of Judgment33with the trial court to enforce his claim for attorneys fees pursuant to the Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997 on the premise that said judgment is immediately executory. This prompted the respondents to file, in G.R. No. 127079, an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order34with this Court seeking to enjoin the trial court from enforcing the said Separate Judgment, particularly with regard to theP30,000,000.00 award of attorneys fees in favor of the petitioner. Respondent ALI also opposed the petitionersex-partemotion.In its Order dated August 25, 1997, the trial court held in abeyance the resolution on petitioner's motion for execution of the trial courts Separate Judgment dated July 22, 1997 until the respondents application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order shall have been resolved by this Court.In the meantime, Estrellita Londonio,35Emerita Feolino,36Porfirio Daen,37and Timoteo Arciaga38filed their individual Complaints-in-Intervention raising therein their respective rights and interests with regard to the subject property. Respondent ALI also filed its Answers-in-Intervention.39Likewise, respondents filed a joint Answer-in-Intervention.40All parties filed their respective Pre-trial Briefs.In a Decision dated May 7, 2004, this Court (Third Division), in G.R. No. 127079, entitled "Ayala Land, Inc. v. William Navarro, Isagani Navarro, Iluminada Legaspi, Belen Dolleton, Florentino Arciaga, Bartolome Patuga, Dionisio Ignacio, Bernardino Argana, and Erlinda Argana," dismissed the petition of therein petitioner (herein respondent ALI) for being moot, and ordered the remand of the records of the case to the trial court for the determination on the propriety of the award ofP30,000,000.00 attorneys fees in favor of petitioner. The pertinent portions of the Decision state:We now go back to the issue raised in the instant petition,i.e., whether or not the Court of Appeals erred (a) in allowing respondents to litigate as paupers; and, (b) in sustaining the trial courts order denying petitioners motion for inhibition.Obviously, with the execution of the May 13, 1997 MOA or compromise agreement and the May 27, 1997 amendatory agreement, the parties resolved to settle their differences and put an end to the litigation.41It bears reiterating that on July 22, 1997, the trial court rendered its Judgment approving this amendatory agreement.We have consistently held that a compromise agreement, once approved by final order of the court, has the force ofres judicatabetween the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. InArmed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association v. Court of Appeals,42we also held:Once stamped with judicialimprimatur, it (compromise agreement) becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. It has the effect and authority ofres judicata, although no execution may issue until it would have received the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation pends and its compliance with the terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed. A judicial compromise is likewise circumscribed by the rules of procedure.Thus, by virtue of the trial courts Judgment approving the parties amendatory agreement (or amendatory compromise agreement), the instant petition has become moot and academic.InCity of Laoag vs. Public Service Commission,43we ruled that a petition may be dismissed in view of the compromise agreement entered into by the parties.Relative to Atty. Catlys attorneys fees ofP30,000,000.00, while it was agreed upon by both parties in their MOA and amendatory agreement, however, they are now contesting its reasonableness. In fact, petitioner filed with the trial court an opposition to Atty. Catlys motion for execution of Compromise Judgment on the ground that his attorneys fee is excessive and unconscionable; while respondents filed with this Court a motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the trial court from granting Atty. Catlys motion.The issue of whether or not Atty. Catlys attorneys fee is reasonable should be resolved by the trial court. For one, this incident stemmed from Atty. Catlys motion for execution of the compromise Judgmentfiled with the trial court. As earlier stated, petitioner filed its opposition,also with the trial court. For another, this incident appears to be factual and is being raised before us only for the first time. InDe Rama v. Court of Appeals,44we held that issues or questions of fact cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.WHEREFORE, the instant petition, being moot, is DENIED. Nonetheless, let the records be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of resolving with dispatch the propriety of Atty. Hicoblino Catlys attorneys fee ofP30,000,000.00 being assailed by both parties before that court.SO ORDERED.45In a Decision dated December 1, 2004, the trial court (per Judge Raul Bautista Villanueva) approved the parties Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise dated May 13, 1997, dismissed all the complaints-in-intervention by therein intervenors, and directed respondents to pay respondent ALI the amount ofP563,358.00 by way of attorneys fees which shall be taken from the second tranche payment and deducted from theirpro-ratashare. The salient portions of the said Decision state:Thereafter, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated May 13, 1997 (Exh. "6") was entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendant Ayala Land wherein the latter agreed, among others, to pay in two (2) tranches the sum ofP99,995,630.46 andP20,000,000.00, respectively, or the total amount ofP119,995,630.46, to the plaintiffs and their co-heirs in amounts broken down for each of them, thus:x x x x x x x x x2.1First Tranche. The first tranche payment shall be in the amount of Ninety-Nine Million Nine Hundred Ninety-Five Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Pesos and Forty-Six Centavos (P99,995,630.46), Philippine Currency, which sum shall be, as it is hereby, paid directly to the Heirs immediately upon execution of this Agreement, and the receipt of which amount said Heirs hereby so acknowledge to their full satisfaction, thereby rendering immediately operative the releases and waivers in par. 1 hereof. Upon the collective request of the said Heirs, the said payment is hereby broken down as follows:PayeeAmount

A. Heirs of Lorenzo dela Cruz1. Dionisio Ignacio9,086,345.98

2. Alejandro dela Cruz5,332,562.30

3. Lydia Arcega5,332,562.30

4. Eugenia Arciaga5,332,562.30

5. Melchor dela Cruz1,185,000.25

6. Gertrudez dela Cruz1,185,000.25

B. Heirs of Florentino Navarro1. William Navarro5,079,636.68

2. Antonio Navarro400,000.00

3. Tanyag Navarro400,000.00

4. Isagani Navarro285,444.44

5. Rodolfo Navarro285,444.44

6. Victoria Navarro285,444.44

7. Leonora Navarro285,444.44

8. Violeta Navarro285,444.44

9. Ramon Navarro285,444.44

10. Salud Navarro285,444.44

11. Rosalina Navarro285,444.44

12. Purita Navarro500,000.00

13. Bayani Navarro500,000.00

14. Dakila Navarro500,000.00

15. Leonila Navarro100,000.00

16. Johnny Navarro100,000.00

17. Alexander Navarro100,000.00

18. Soliman Navarro2,000,000.00

19. Francis Hernandez2,000,000.00

C. Heirs of Patricio dela Cruzx x x x x x x x xD. Heirs of Ignacio Arciaga1. Iluminada Legaspi1,286,749.30

2. Pedro Arciaga304,722.22

3. Julia Bergado304,722.22

4. Nieves Jover304,722.22

5. Teresita Clamaa304,722.22

6. Dolores Arciaga304,722.22

7. Ernesto Arciaga304,722.22

E. Heirs of Dionisio Dolleton1. Belen Dolleton1,415,875.84

2. Lucila Dolleton100,000.00

3. Conrado Dolleton100,000.00

4. Jerry Dolleton100,000.00

5. Evelyn Dolleton100,000.00

6. Susana Dolleton100,000.00

7. Estrelita Agnabo100,000.00

8. Imelda Dolleton100,000.00

9. Mateo Dolleton, Jr.250,000.00

10. Maria Venus Dolleton Gutierrez250,000.00

11. Mariano Dolleton250,000.00

12. Rosalina Dolleton250,000.00

13. Encarnacion Dolleton500,000.00

14. Dominga Dolleton250,000.00

15. Hilardo Dolleton250,000.00

F. Heirs of Jose Dolleton1. Isagani Navarro3,302,585.86

2. William Navarro2,263,000.00

3. Tanyag Navarro100,000.00

4. Antonio A. Navarro100,000.00

5. Leonora Navarro500,000.00

6. Salud Navarro500,000.00

7. Rodolfo Navarro500,000.00

8. Victoria Navarro500,000.00

9. Rosalina Navarro500,000.00

10. Ramon Navarro500,000.00

11. Violeta Navarro500,00.000

12. Purita Navarro182,460.00

13. Dakila Navarro182,460.00

14. Bayani Navarro182,460.00

15. Leonila Navarro36,492.00

16. Alexander Navarro36,492.00

17. Johnny Navarro36,492.00

18. Soliman Navarro912,300.00

19. Francis Hernandez912,300.00

G. Heirs of Leon Argana1. Bernardino Argana922,244.90

2. Benjamin Arciaga100,000.00

3. Idelfonso Arciaga100,000.00

4. Luciana Arciaga100,000.00

5. Pedro Arciaga100,000.00

6. Erlinda Arciaga100,000.00

7. Brigida Argana500,000.00

8. Renato A. Trozado83,335.00

9. Natividad Marmeto83,335.00

10. Josephine Trozado Espiritu83,335.00

11. Teresita Trozado83,335.00

12. Crecenciano Trozado Feolino83,335.00

13. Buenaventura Trozado Espiritu83,335.00

H.Heirs of Esteban Patuga1. Bartolome Patuga1,741,572.23

2. Rodrigo Patuga554,555.55

3. Reynaldo Patuga554,555.55

4. Lolita Patuga554,555.55

5. Ofelia Patuga554,555.55

6. Maria Patuga2,347,151.40

7. Remedios Patuga293,393.93

8. Melchor Patuga293,393.93

9. Surbino Patuga293,393.93

10. Ernesto Patuga3,227,333.30

I.Others1. Leopoldo P. Espiritu (financier)11,000,000.00

2. Hicoblino Catly (attorneys fees)9,000,000.00

3. Emerita Feolina (agent)1,500,000.00

4. Esperanza Espiritu (agent)750,000.00

5. Leopoldo Espiritu (agent)1,750,000.00

2.2.Second Tranche.The sum of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) shall be paid to the payees named below ninety (90) days after the date of execution of this Agreement. Likewise at the request of all the Heirs, the said payment should be broken down as follow as and when it becomes due:PayeeAmount

A.1. Dionisio Ignacio2,000,000.00

2. William Navarro2,000,000.00

3. Dionisio Arciaga500,000.00

4. Iluminada Legaspi1,700,000.00

5. Belen Dolleton1,700,000.00

6. Isagani Navarro4,900,000.00

7. Bernardino Argana1,700,000.00

8. Bartolome Patuga2,000,000.00

B.1. Leopoldo Espiritu1,500,000.00

2. Hicoblino Catly1,000,000.00

3. Emerita Feolino500,000.00

4. Esperanza Espiritu250,000.00

5. Leopoldo Espiritu250,000.00

2.3. the Heirs also unqualifiedly declare that their agreement with each other as to the sharing of the proceeds of the settlement is exclusively between and among themselves, and any dispute or controversy concerning the same does not affect this Agreement or the Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise to be signed and filed in court by the parties hereto. Release of the balance referred to in par. 2.2 hereof by ALI to the Heirs shall completely and absolutely discharge all of ALIs obligations under the said Joint Motion for Judgment Based on Compromise to the Heirs.x x x x x x x x xFor one, and with the Decision of the Third Division of the Supreme Court promulgated on 07 May 2004 in G.R. No. 127079 in the case entitled "Ayala Land, Inc. v. William Navarro, et al.," there is no longer any impediment to the resolution