Objections to DST

Lecture 8

Desire Satisfaction Theory

Two central claims of DST: If something is good for us, then it fulfills our

desires. If something fulfills our desires, then it is good

for us.

In this lecture we will consider objections to each claim.

Desire Satisfaction Not Necessary

Three examples of non-desired things that make our lives go better: Pleasant surprises. Small children and the severely disabled. Suicidal people.

Desire Satisfaction Not Sufficient

There also seem to be many cases in which our desires are satisfied, but we're not made better off. Desires based on false beliefs

Desires Based on False Beliefs

The satisfaction of desires based on false beliefs doesn't make us better off.

Informed Desire Satisfaction Theory: if something fulfills our informed desires (i.e., those not based on false beliefs), then that thing is good for us.

Disappointment

Imagine getting everything you want . . . . . . and then are completely miserable.

In cases of disappointment, desire satisfaction doesn't always make us better off.

Objective Theory of Welfare

The most powerful objections to DST are the possibility of impoverished and perverse desires.

To think that such persons should desire more or different things is to think that some things that are better to desire. The idea here seems to be that some desires are

intrinsically better than others.

Objective theories of welfare (OTW): what directly contributes to a good life is fixed independently of your desires and your opinions about what is important.

Kazez’s Roster

The goods necessary to a good life: Happiness Autonomy Self-expression Morality Progress

Summary

Objections to DST

Informed DST

Attractions of OTW