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Office of the Director of National ntellieenceWashington, C 20511

I 2014Mr. JasonLeopoldInvesti

Reference:ODNI Case DF-2013-00198Dear Mr. Leopold:

This is in response o your ernail dated 30 August 2013 (Enclosure1), received n theInformation ManagementDivision of the Office of the Director of National lntelligence (ODNI)on 4 September2013. Pursuant o the Freedomof Information Act (FOIA), you are requesting"the charter for the NSA review group that President Obama announcedAugust 9."

Your requestwasprocessedn accordance ith the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. $ 552,as amended.A thorough searchof our recordsand databasesocatedmaterial responsive o your request.Upon review it is determined hat the documentmay be released n its entirety (Enclosure2).If you have any questions, lease all the Requester erviceCenterat (703)874-8500.

Sincerely,r t1.4l ; r ' l ' f . " , I 'l : l ; l : i l r t tsa,A'^,{Jh{J'Llnc+x"''JenniferHudson

Director, Information ManagementDivisionEnclosures

JUL

7/27/2019 NSA Review Group Charter (FOIA from ODNI)

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UNCLASSIFIED

FINALTerms of ReferenceReview Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies

Recentyearshavebrought unprecedented nd rapid technologicaladvancementsncommunications echnologies particularly with respect o global telecommunications. Thesetechnologicaladvances avepresentedhe IntelligenceCommunity (IC) with greatbenefitsandsignificant risks - enablingsignificantly enhanced echnicalcollection capabilities, while alsoincreasing he risk of insider andcyber threats- and the IC has changed n many ways inresponseo these echnological dvancements.Given the impact of these echnological advanceson the work of the IC, we believe t isimportant to take stock of how new global communications rends alter the environment q whichwe conduct our intelligence mission. In particular,we believe it is important to consider bothhow these echnological changesaffect our ability to collect andprotect ntelligence,but alsohow, in light of these echnologicalchanges,our ability to collect andprotect ntelligenceaffectsour national security and foreign policy more broadly, as well asprinciples of personalprivacy.Key Objectives:At the direction of the President,a Review Group on lntelligenceand CommunicationsTechnologieswill be established o develop a set of recommendationso the Presidentand theDNI that meet the following core objectives:

To assess hether,given these echnologigal dvances,he U.S. Governmentemploys tstechnical collection - and, n particular, ts signals ntelligencecollection - capabilities na manner hat optimally protectsour national security, andadvancesour foreign policywhile appropriately accounting or otherpolicy considerations, ncluding the risk ofunauthorizeddisclosure,our need o maintain the public trust, and principles of personalprivacy.To assesswhetherwe haveestablishedappropriatepolicies,proceduresandguidelines oaccount or national securityand foreign policy risks associatedwith thesecollectionactivities, including the collection of metadata,especiallywith respect o the risks relatedto unauthorizeddisclosuresand other insider threats.

Structure and Modalities:The structureof the assessment ill be as ollbws:

o The Presidentwill direct the establishmentof the Review Group ("RG") within the ODNIfor the purposesof achievingthe objectives dentified above. Individuals currently underconsideration o serve on the Review Group include Mr. Michael Morell, Mr. CassSunstein,Mr. RichardClarke, Mr. PeterSwire, andpossiblyothers;

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UNCLASSIFIED

. The membersof the RG will draw on signals ntelligence expertiseand advice ofappropriatelyclearedcurrentand former officials as necessary.o The membersof the RG will servewithout compensationor their work on the RG, but,

while engaged n the work of the RG, shall be allowed travel expenses nd a per diem, tothe extentpermittedby law for personsserving ntermittently in the Government service;o To the extentpermittedby law, and subject o the availability of appropriations, heODNI shall dentify suchstaff for the RG as s necessary or the Review Group toachieve ts purpose;o The ODNI will provide the RG suchother administrativeservices, unds, facilities,equipment, ecords management, nd other support services,asmay be necessary or theReview Group to achieve ts purpose; .o Subject o the successfulcompletion of an appropriatebackgroundevaluation, hemembersof the RG will be offered appropriateaccess o classified nformation relevantto the review:o The team will brief their interim findings to the President hrough the DNI within 60days, and will provide a final report and recommendationso the President hrough theDNI no later han December15,2013.The DNI will, as appropriate,eport he RG'sfindings and recommendationso relevantMembersof the U.S. Congresswithin 30 daysof the issuanceof the final report.o Although the matters o be reviewedby the RG relateto national securitypolicy, plans

and strategy hat areproperly classifiedpursuant o Executiveorder 13526and disclosureof the minutes, notes,or other records of the RG may reveal nformation that reasonablycould be expected o causedamage o national security, n order to increase ransparency,the RG will work to ensure, o the greatestextentpracticable, hat an unclassifiedversionof the findings of the review is available o be sharedwith the public.Scopeof the Review:

o The Review Group will limit its review to the broader,strategicmatters elating tonational securityand foreign relations mplications of U.S. IntelligenceCommunitypolicy andproceduresgoverningtechnicalcollection and, n particular,signalsintelligence collection, with particular focuson the impact of advances n communicationtechnology

o The RG will not be asked o assesshe intelligenceandpolicy value of specific signalsintelligencecollection targetsand activities.

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UNCLASSIFIEDKey Policy Ouestions:The RG will be asked o consider he following strategicquestionsas they undertake heirreview.Assessment f Threats,Risftsand Cost-BenefitAnalysis

o As a strategicmatter,how shouldpolicymakersweigh the national securityand foreignpolicy imperativesservedby technical collection against he possibilitiesof unauthorizedexposure, nsider threats,andattendant isks to privacy? Given the current scopeof ourtechnicalcollection - and, n particular,our collection of metadata are the strategicbenefitsgenerallyworth the risks?o Should the increasedprevalenceand emergenceof cyber and nsider threatschange hisrisk analysis?Do currentpolicies andproceduresgoverningtechnicalcollection, and, nparticular,signals ntelligence,address he risks adequately n the current environm6nt?o If not, what, if any, changesarenecessaryo currentpolicy andprocedures,or example,to mitigate the risks of unauthorizedpublic exposureof theseactivitiesand capabilities;to enhanceprotections or unauthorizedcollection, useand disclosure?

Appropriate Tailoring and Protectionso In light of the technologicaladvancementshat have ncreasedour technical collectioncapacity,do we have appropriatepolicies andprocedureso ensure hat technicalcollection (including the collection of metadata),and n particular,signals ntelligence,activities areoptimally tailored to meet nationalpriorities?o Similarly, do we haveappropriatepolicies andprocedureso ensure hat technicalcollection (including the collection of metadata),and in particular,signals ntelligence,activities are appropriately ailored with respect o the collection of andprotectionofpersonal nformation?o If not, what strategic-levelchangeso our policies andproceduresmay be warranted?