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Nuclear and Missile Trade and Developments

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1999

NUCLEAR- AND MISSILE-RELATEDTRADE AND DEVELOPMENTSFOR SELECTED COUNTRIES,

MARCH - JUNE 1999

The material in this overview is drawn from selected abstracts that appear in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ nuclear andmissile databases. Transactions of nuclear and missile technologies, parts, and materials are listed according to the recipient country.Other developments are listed according to the country where the event or development took place.

by Clay Bowen, Erik Jorgensen, Gaurav Kampani, and Fred Wehling

ASIA

BANGLADESH

NuclearThe Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commis-sion reported in late March 1999 that theBangladeshi government is considering re-viving plans for a small nuclear power plantin Rupper. An agreement for a 60-MW unitwas signed with Belgian firms in 1970, butthe project fell through when Bangladeshseparated from Pakistan. Financing has notyet been negotiated.

Nucleonics Week, 25 March 1999, pp. 17-18.

CHINA

NuclearAccording to US officials, China’s recentprogress in the miniaturization of its nuclearwarheads was accelerated by the theft ofnuclear secrets from Los Alamos National

Laboratory in New Mexico. The espionagereportedly occurred in the mid-1980s but itwas not detected until 1995 when US intelli-gence analyzed Chinese nuclear tests andfound that the technology used was verysimilar to America’s latest nuclear warheaddesign, the W-88. China has denied the USallegations of nuclear theft and ChineseForeign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzaosaid that the allegations were groundlessand irresponsible.

James Risen and Jeff Gerth, New York Times, 6March 1999, p. A1; Walter Pincus, WashingtonPost, 7 March 1999, p. A19; Inside China To-day [Online], <http://www.insidechina.com/>,12 March 1999.

A Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Con-trol report, titled “U.S. Exports to China,1988-1998: Fueling Proliferation,” states thatsince 1988, China has purchased high-tech-nology strategic equipment from the UnitedStates worth over $15 billion. US exports in-cluded equipment used in nuclear weaponsproduction, cruise missiles, aircraft radar, andother military goods. Furthermore, “some of[the] dual-use equipment was licensed di-rectly to leading Chinese nuclear, missile,

and military sites—the main vertebrae ofChina’s strategic backbone.” According tothe report, China spent more than half of the$15 billion on high-technology equipmentsuch as computers. Most sales occurred in1993 after President Clinton loosened exportrules on computers. The report also statesthat “several of the Chinese buyers later sup-plied nuclear, missile, and military equipmentto Iran and Pakistan.” Some of the sales listedin the Wisconsin Project report are: (1) com-puter and imaging equipment with potentialfor uranium prospecting sold to the ChinaNational Nuclear Corp.; (2) equipment thatcould be used to develop powerful anti-air-craft radar sold to the China National Elec-tronics Import-Export Corp.; (3) gear thatcould be used to develop C-802 and C-801cruise missiles sold to the China PrecisionMachinery Import-Export Corp.; and (4) com-puter equipment sold to the Chinese Acad-emy of Sciences that could be used todevelop a fusion nuclear reactor. China alsopurchased “semiconductor manufacturingequipment, high-speed oscilloscopes (usedin nuclear weapons tests), precision ma-chines tools (used in weapons and long-



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range missiles), and vibration testing gear(for nuclear weapons and missiles)” from theUnited States.

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control,“U.S. Exports to China 1988-1998: Fueling Pro-liferation,” April 1999.

Western diplomatic officials believe thatChina may be preparing to decommissionsome of its older military nuclear processingfacilities and designate large amounts ofwaste material for geological disposal. TheLanzhou uranium plant and the plutoniumproduction complex at Guangyuan inSzechwan Province are reportedly slated forclosure. Some Western analysts dispute thatChina would shut down the Guangyuan fa-cility as it is China’s only remaining pluto-nium production facility, although China hassupposedly stockpiled a large amount ofweapons-grade plutonium. The decommis-sioning of the plants was ordered by Chi-nese Premier Zhu Rongji to force the ChinaNational Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) to cutits workforce and carry out structural reor-ganization. China is building a second, largeruranium enrichment facility utilizing gascentrifuges at Lanzhou with Russian help.This facility will replace an older gaseousdiffusion plant at the site. According to Chi-nese officials, the first enrichment facility atHanzhong has been completed and is pro-ducing low-enriched uranium. The Sino-Russian project originally called for theconstruction of further centrifuges atHanzhong, but China relocated them toLanzhou. The first stage of the Lanzhouproject involves the construction of a500,000 SWU per year plant. A second500,000 SWU per year plant is to be builtlater at Lanzhou. Officials said that the plantwas transferred to Lanzhou to prevent lay-offs, maintain the location as a uranium en-richment site, and conform to Chinesestrategy of having multiple, dispersed, stra-tegic nuclear processing locations. When theLanzhou plants are completed, China willhave a gas centrifuge enrichment capacityof 1.5 million SWU per year by 2005.

Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 17 May 1999, p. 11.

According to US military sources, China con-ducted an underground nuclear test on 12 or

13 June 1999. The suspected test was car-ried out at the Lop Nor test facility, althoughit is not clear whether the blast produced anuclear yield. If the test produced a yield,China would be in violation of its announcedmoratorium on nuclear testing.

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, WashingtonTimes, 18 June 1999, p. A5.

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry(MINATOM) has approved a proposal thatallows the Tvel nuclear group to negotiate acontract with China to design the core of afast breeder reactor (FBR). The contract willinclude the possibility of transferring highlyenriched uranium and reactor control rodsto China. All sales and transfers will be sub-ject to Russian export regulations, and theprocess will be monitored by MINATOM.

Nuclear Engineering International, 22 June 1999,p. 4.

MissileAccording to a US Department of Defenseintelligence report, China is continuing tosecretly transfer missile and weapons tech-nologies to Middle Eastern and Asian coun-tries despite promises to stop. The classifiedreport concludes, “the Chinese are prolifer-ating on a consistent basis without techni-cally breaking agreements with the UnitedStates,” by going through government-owned companies. China is believed to havesupplied Iran with specialty steel compo-nents for building missiles and telemetryequipment to test them. China is presentlytraining 10 Iranian scientists on inertial guid-ance techniques. Reportedly, China trans-ferred US-manufactured equipmentdisguised as cookware to a missile produc-tion facility in Pakistan. A separate intelli-gence report concludes that China hasprovided North Korea with high-grade steelused for missile frames under the guise ofassisting the North Korean space program.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times [Online], <http://www.washtimes.com>, 15 April 1999.

According to a senior Chinese official, theUnited States has been warned against sell-ing to Taiwan any military equipment thatcould enhance the latter’s defensive abilityagainst missile attacks. The Chinese officialsaid that if the United States decided to trans-

fer theater missile defense (TMD) technol-ogy to Taiwan it would be “considered ahostile act and would certainly lead to seri-ous consequences,” and would be the “laststraw” in US-China relations. The seniorChinese official said that a TMD system inTaiwan might give it a “false sense of secu-rity” providing the motivation to declare in-dependence. Furthermore, China “reservesthe right to attack Taiwan if the island de-clares independence.” According to China’sForeign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, any transferof a TMD system to Taiwan would be anencroachment on China’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity. Tang also said thatChina is against any transfer of TMD tech-nology to Japan. Tang suggested that aTMD system would “violate Japan’s consti-tutional pledge to maintain only defensivemilitary capabilities.”

John Pomfret, Washington Post, 6 March 1999,p. 13; John Pomfret, Washington Post, 8 March1999, p. 13.

On 10 March 1999, a US grand jury indicteda Chinese citizen and a naturalized Canadianon charges of smuggling US missile tech-nology to China. Both individuals, Yao Yi ofChina and Collin Xu of Canada, and theircompanies, Lion Photonics of China andLion Photonics Inc. of Canada, allegedly at-tempted to smuggle out fiber optic gyro-scopes from a Massachusetts firm to China.According to court papers, the Chinese firmsaid that it would use the gyroscopes on arailroad project. After the first applicationwas rejected by US customs, the manufac-turer of the gyroscope received another ap-plication for the same device from theCanadian firm. Suspicious, the manufactureralerted US Customs, who set up a success-ful sting operation.

Inside China Today [Online], <http://www.insidechina.com>, 10 March 1999.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson SunYuxi denied a Newsweek magazine allegationthat China had seized two US cruise missilesthat did not detonate when the United Statesattacked suspected terrorist bases in Af-ghanistan in 1998. Sun referred to the allega-tion as a “groundless fabrication.”

China Times [Online], <http://www.chinatimes.com>, 23 March 1999.

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INDIA

NuclearAt the Association of South East Asian Na-tions (ASEAN) Regional Forum on 3 March1999, the Indian delegation proposed a mul-tilateral dialogue on disarmament tostrengthen global security and confidence-building in the Asia Pacific region. Indiandelegates also called for no-first-use com-mitments by the nuclear powers. The Indiandelegation suggested de-targeting and de-alerting all nuclear weapons to reduce theirrole in the security postures of the nuclearweapon states. The Indian delegates saidthese steps would lead to the“delegitimization” and the eventual aboli-tion of nuclear weapons.

P.S. Suryanarayana, The Hindu [Online], <http://www.webpage.com/hindu/>, 4 March 1999.

India has increased its nuclear-relatedbudget by nearly Rs3.5 billion to Rs29.62billion for fiscal year (FY) 1999. TheNuclear Power Corporation of India willreceive Rs12.81 billion to support con-struction at the Kaiga-1, Kaiga-2,Rajasthan-3, Rajasthan-4, Tarapur-3, andTarapur-4 nuclear power plants. Approxi-mately Rs1.07 billion was set aside for theRussian-aided Koodankulam project, twoVVER-1000 units. Funds were also allo-cated to improve operations at Tarapur,Rajasthan, and Narora stations. BhabhaAtomic Research Center will receiveRs5.3461 billion in FY99. The IndiraGhandi Center for Atomic Research is al-located Rs1.16 billion in FY99 for the op-eration of the Fast Breeder Test Reactorand developing materials in support of thefast breeder program.

Neel Patri, Nucleonics Week, 11 March 1999, p.11.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeesaid on 15 March 1999 that India was willingto “resolve all outstanding issues with Paki-stan through talks.” Vajpayee also said thatsince both India and Pakistan had nuclearweapons, “they had no option but to livetogether in peace.” He said that nuclear weap-ons were defensive weapons, stressing thatthe “balance of terror” maintained during

the Cold War deterred both sides from usingnuclear weapons.

The Hindu [Online], <http://www.webpage.com/hindu/>, 16 March 1999.

The Chief Executive of India’s Nuclear FuelComplex (NFC), C. Ganguly, said that the NFCwas ready to enter the global market to ex-port natural uranium oxide fuel assemblies,zirconium alloy coolant tubes, reactor corecomponents, and fuel cladding. Ganguly saidthat India had “a number of advantages incompeting with the United States, France,Russia ... and China.” NFC started its inte-grated fuel fabrication facility in 1972, wherezirconium oxide fuel pellets and zirconiumalloy clad fuel assemblies for reactor coreswere fabricated.

IRNA (Tehran) [Online], <http://www.irna.com>,24 March 1999.

Indian Defense Minister George Fernandessaid during an interview that the Indian gov-ernment was willing to sign the Comprehen-sive Test Ban Treaty before the September1999 deadline. However, he said that signingthe treaty would be subject to addressingIndia’s security concerns. Regarding a pro-posed moratorium on fissile material pro-duction, Fernandes said that India wouldresolve such matters “through formal multi-lateral talks.” In speaking about Indo-Paki-stani relations, Fernandes said that “anuclearized South Asia shouldn’t bother ei-ther [India or Pakistan]” and that “in a vicari-ous or conscious way it has made us sitdown and talk to each other.” He said thatIndo-Chinese relations suffered followingIndia’s May 1998 nuclear tests and China’ssubsequent reactions and responses, but thatboth sides were seeking to restore a dia-logue.

Maleeha Lodhi, The News (Islamabad), 5 April1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990405000108,5 April 1999.

Russia has offered to fund the entire cost ofthe 2,000-MW Kudankulam nuclear powerproject through a $2.6 billion soft credit. TheRussian state bank Vnesheconombank hasalready given India’s Nuclear Power Corpo-ration (NPC) a letter of guarantee for comple-tion of the project, which will be executed byNPC and the Russian counterpart,Atomstroyexport. Russian Ambassador to

India Albert S. Chernyshev said that 10percent of the cost will be taken from therupee debt and the rest of the credit willbe in hard currency. The credit will be re-paid over 12 years, after the commission-ing of Kundankulam, which will beconstructed in two phases, the first ofwhich is scheduled to be completed inseven years and the second in an addi-tional two to three years. Chernyshev saidthat most of the equipment for the nuclearpower project will be supplied from Rus-sia, involving over 200 factories and re-search establishments, and someequipment will be manufactured in India.

Anoop Saxena, Indian Express, 9 April 1999.

According to an Indian military spokes-man, the Indian nuclear arsenal shouldinclude three components: bombers (Su-30 or Mirage 2000 aircraft), surface-to-sur-face missiles (SSMs), and submarines.Previously it was presumed that the In-dian nuclear force structure would onlyinclude bombers and SSMs. The spokes-man said that Indian will have 20-100nuclear warheads and it will take about 15years before India can deploy them.

Unian, 12-18 April 1999, p. 26.

The Indian Department of Atomic Energyis reportedly preparing to build an addi-tional research reactor at the BhabhaAtomic Research Center (BARC) inTrombay. The new research reactor wouldbe similar to the existing 100-MW Dhruvareactor, but appropriate design modifica-tions would be incorporated based onoperating experience. BARC scientistsexpect the new reactor to become opera-tional by 2010. The existence of an addi-tional research reactor would increaseIndia’s production capacity ofunsafeguarded plutonium.

Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 27 April 1999.

A spokesman for the Indian External AffairsMinistry on 3 May 1999 refuted reports thatIndia was among those countries posing athreat to the United States by spying innuclear weapons laboratories. The spokes-man said that a recent US report claimingthat India posed an “immediate” threat was



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“malicious and completely baseless.” Thespokesman said that India’s nuclear programwas “an excellent example of indigenization.”

The Hindu [Online], <http://www.webpage.com/hindu>, 4 May 1999.

According to Indian military officials, therewas little to no effort to involve the militaryservices in nuclear planning after the 11May and 13 May 1998 nuclear tests. A se-nior army official said, “The services haveno clue about the installation, utilization, ordynamics of nuclear weapons.”

Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 May 1999,pp. 25-31.

The government of Indian Prime Minister AtalBehari Vajpayee resigned on 17 April 1999,after losing a parliamentary confidence vote.The Vajpayee government had made con-siderable progress toward signing the Com-prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In regardto signing the CTBT before the September1999 deadline, Indian Defense MinisterGeorge Fernandes said that the “Parliamentis dissolved and therefore nothing is goingto happen on that front, certainly not untillate October.”

International Herald Tribune, 6 May 1999.

On 14 May 1999, officials at the BhabhaAtomic Research Center (BARC) said thenuclear tests at Pokaran on 11 May and 13May 1998 did not cause any radioactive con-tamination. “Radiation monitoring of thearea is being carried out at regular intervalsand it is confirmed that the entire area is to-tally free of any radioactivity as a result ofthe tests.” BARC officials added that therehave been no established cases of radiation-related sickness in the area.

Times of India (Internet Version), 15 May 1999,in FBIS Document FTS19990515000040, 15May 1999.

On 17 May 1999, Indian High CommissionerG. Parathasarthy told journalists at the Paki-stan Institute of International Affairs that adraft agreement for exchange of informationabout nuclear and missile technology wasalmost ready for approval by India and Paki-stan. Parahtasarthy said, “India is not wor-ried about Pakistan’s missile tests because it[Pakistan] has the right to handle its own

affairs. The Indian missile program has otherobjectives other then being anti-Pakistan.”He said that if the North Atlantic Treaty Or-ganization (NATO) could use nuclear weap-ons and missiles at the place of theirchoosing, India too would have an “inde-pendent policy.”

The News (Islamabad), 18 May 1999, in FBISDocument FTS19990518000801, 18 May 1999.

There have been indications within India’snuclear establishment that signing the Com-prehensive Test Ban Treaty would notweaken India’s nuclear deterrent capability.In early May 1999, head of India’s AtomicEnergy Commission (AEC) RajagopalaChidambaram said the AEC advised the gov-ernment to declare a moratorium on testingbecause the 11 May and 13 May 1998 nucleartests generated a “valuable scientific data-base on which to base a credible deterrent.”He said the May 1998 designs were “robust”and new ideas and sub-systems had been“tested to perfection.” Chidambaram saidthe May 1998 tests gave India enough datathat simulation tests could be conducted ata “modest” cost if India were to pursue anuclear program.

Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 May 1999,p. 15.

In late May 1999, analysts said India andPakistan had taken a “dangerous stepcloser to conflict” over the skirmishes inKashmir. Gerald Segal of the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies said, “Thisis a definite deterioration. ...This blows ahole in the argument that after the nucleartests, relations between India and Pakistanwere starting to look more stable.” Execu-tive director of the Forum for Strategic andSecurity Studies Vijai Nair said, “I don’tsee this going beyond a skirmish. ...Butthe Line of Control no longer exists as faras I’m concerned, and there is now tech-nically a war on.” On 28 May, IndianBharatiya Janata Party (BJP) spokesmanK.R. Malkani said that the use of nuclearweapons by India over the Kashmir con-flict was “completely out of the question.”He said the attacks were unlikely to stopimmediately, but that it was clear that thesituation would not escalate. He said, “Wewould very much like the Pakistani force

to withdraw from this side of the Line ofControl.”

Pakistan Link [Online], <http://www.pakistanlink.com>, 27 May 1999; Dawn[Online], <http://www.dawn.com>, 29 May 1999.

In early June 1999, independent experts saidIndia and Pakistan were “miles away” frombeing able to deploy nuclear weapons, “letalone ordering strikes similar to the ones thatobliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Formerchairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Com-mission K. Srinivasan said, “Both [India andPakistan] have limited capability.” Directorof the Institute of Peace and Conflict in NewDehli Padmanabha Chari said there was“nothing to worry about” because neitherPakistan nor India had “an established ca-pability to attack each other with nuclearweapons.”

AFP, 8 June 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990608000060, 8 June 1999.

On 9 June 1999 the US Senate voted to sus-pend economic sanctions that were placedon India and Pakistan after their May 1998nuclear tests. The sanctions will be sus-pended for five years, after which the Senatemeasure grants the US president a nationalinterest waiver to renew suspension of thesanctions. The ban on military and nucleartechnology sales remains in effect, but themeasure allows the president to grant a na-tional security waiver for sales of defensearticles and services, foreign military financ-ing, and dual-use technologies not used pri-marily for missile development or nuclearweapons programs.

AFP, 10 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online],<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 10 June 1999.

United States scientists report that India ex-aggerated the yield of its 11 May 1998nuclear test by at least 200 percent and per-haps by as much as 500 percent. The IndianDepartment of Atomic Energy reported thatone of the tests was a thermonuclear devicecalled Shakti-1 that had a nuclear yield of 43KT, and that the other two were fission de-vices with yields of 12 KT and 0.2 KT. USDepartment of Energy analysts concludedthat India had exaggerated the yield of its 11May 1998 tests to “support its claim that ithad tested an H-bomb.” According to US

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officials, analysts said India had probablytried to detonate a two-stage thermonuclearweapon, but that a complete ignition of thefusion energy stage did not occur, resultingin a lower yield than India expected. UnitedStates government officials would neitherconfirm nor deny the report.

Nucleonics Week, 10 June 1999, pp. 1, #12-13.

On 9 June 1999, the Group of Eight (G-8) lead-ing industrial countries urged India and Pa-kistan to sign the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty. The foreign ministers also de-manded an immediate cease-fire in Kashmirand the resumption of peace talks.

AP, 10 June 1999 in Lexis-Nexis [Online], <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>, 10 June 1999.

On 18 June 1999, Indian Foreign MinisterJaswant Singh said the fighting in Kashmirwas “unlikely to escalate into a full-fledgedwar with fellow nuclear power Pakistan.” Hesaid India had no intention of escalating theconflict. In late June 1999, director of theIndian Institute of Defense Studies andAnalysis (IDSA) Air Commodore JasjitSingh said there was “no risk of even a full-fledged war” between India and Pakistan overKashmir. He said that a nuclear war re-mained a “far-fetched possibility.”

Krishnan Guruswamy, AP, 18 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 18June 1999; Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 20 June 1999.

On 30 June 1999, Indian Defense MinisterGeorge Fernandes said that Pakistan’s threatof making a nuclear strike against India inthe event of a fourth India-Pakistan warshould not be taken lightly. He said that hehoped international pressure on Pakistan“would deter it from using nuclear weaponsin case of a war.” On the same day, IndianPrime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said thatIndia was prepared to face a nuclear attackfrom Pakistan. He said that India was “pre-pared for all eventualities.”

Hindustan Times [Online], <http://www.hindustantimes.com>, 30 June 1999; Timesof India [Online], <http://www.timesofindia.com>, 1 July 1999.

MissileRussian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyevpaid an official visit to India from 19 March

to 23 March 1999. Russian and Indian offi-cials discussed the possible sale of the S-300 anti-missile system to India.

Hindustan Times, 23 March 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990323000032, 23 March 1999.

On 11 April 1999 at 9:47 am, India test-firedits Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic mis-sile (IRBM) from inner Wheelers Island offthe Orissa coast. The Indian Defence Re-search and Development Organization(DRDO) and Indian Defence Minister GeorgeFernandes claimed that the launch was asuccess. The missile was launched from amobile-rail launcher. The missile’s flightlasted 11 minutes and covered a distance of2,000 km before it reached the splashdownpoint. According to Prime Minister AtalBehari Vajpayee, Pakistan was notified on 9April 1999 of the decision to launch the Agni-2 and India “remains committed to minimumdeterrence, to no first-use of nuclear weap-ons, and never to use them [nuclear weap-ons] against a non-nuclear state.”

BBC News [Online], <http://news.bbc.co.uk>, 11April 1999; Times of India [Online], <http://www.timesofindia.com>, 12 April 1999;Manvendra Singh, Indian Express [Online],<http://www.expressindia.com>, 12 April 1999.

After days of international pressure urgingrestraint following India’s 11 April 1999 Agni-2 intermediate-range ballistic missile test, aForeign Ministry official announced that In-dia would “go ahead with more tests-flightsof the Agni-2.” The Indian official said, “In-dia will do whatever is required to developits minimum credible nuclear deterrent,”which may mean at least five to six additionaltests before the Agni-2 could be deployed.

Pranay Sharma, The Telegraph (Calcutta), 13April 1999; in FBIS DocumentFTS19990413001276, 13 April 1999. IndianExpress [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>,14 April 1999.

Indian External Affairs Minister JaswantSingh said Pakistan’s 14 April 1999 Ghauri-2ballistic missile launch would not result inan arms race in the region. Singh said thatPakistan informed India of its plans to testlaunch a missile. However, he said that themissile launch was not good for Indo-Paki-stani relations.

Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 14 April 1999.

Indian DRDO head A.P.J. Abdul Kalam saidin late May 1999 that India’s missile capa-bility is not Pakistan-centric. According toAbdul Kalam, unlike Pakistan’s capability,India’s missile capability was “indigenous.”He said the “import content is less than 10percent” and that the Agni-2 was “designedto carry a nuclear warhead if required.” Hesaid that if the government approves “Iwould like to neutralize the Missile Technol-ogy Control Regime (MTCR) that has triedbut failed to throttle our program.” He saidthat India did not support proliferation, buthe would like to “devalue missiles by sellingthe technology to many nations and breaktheir stranglehold.”

Raj Chengappa, India Today International, 26April 1999, p. 31.

India’s Integrated Guided Missile Develop-ment Program (IGMDP) is believed to be de-veloping a 3,700 km-range Agni-3 and a4,000-5,000 km-range Agni-4. Reports indi-cated the Agni-3 is based upon merging ex-isting Agni propulsion technology with thePolar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) devel-oped by the Indian Space Research Organi-zation (ISRO). According to an Indian defenseanalyst, the diameter of the Agni-2 “wouldneed to be widened from 1 m to 1.8 m to in-corporate the PSLV propulsion system.”The PSLV solid-fuel rocket propellant has adiameter of 2.8 m; India would therefore haveto modify the PSLV technology to the Agni-3 1.8 m specification. The Agni-4 “could bederived from either the successful conver-sion of the PSLV as an SSM which coulditself achieve intercontinental range, or in-corporating ISRO’s rocket technology fromthe Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicleprogram.” A challenge facing India in con-verting its satellite launch vehicles (SLVs) tointercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)would be the development of a re-entry ve-hicle capable of withstanding the extremetemperatures faced by 3,700 km and 5,000km-range missiles.

Ben Sheppard, Jane’s International Defence Re-view, May 1999, pp. 57-59.

Indian officials reported that the Prithvi-1 andPrithvi-2 surface-to-surface missiles (SSM),which were to be deployed with the IndianAir Force, would be ready for extended se-



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rial production after extended trials. The In-dian Army’s 333 Missile Group, a new artil-lery regiment based in Scunderabad, had anundeclared number of Prithvi-1s and wasIndia’s only missile-equipped service. Thearmy projected a requirement for 75 Prithvimissiles.

Rahul Bedi, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 5 May 1999,pp. 25-31.

In an interview with the newspaper MainichiShimbun in early May 1999, Indian DefenceMinister George Fernandes said that his gov-ernment does not “plan to conduct work oncreating” the Agni-3 intermediate-range bal-listic missile (IRBM) or the Surya interconti-nental ballistic missile (ICBM). He said thesuch “allegations” published in Jane’s De-fence Weekly were “speculative and un-founded.” He said the Agni-2 was at thestage where production could begin, but nodecision has been made on a productiontime frame due to security considerations.He denied that India has a program to createa nuclear submarine.

RIA Novosti, 11 May 1999.

In an interview with Defense News, IndianDRDO scientists said India was launch-ing a comprehensive plan to develop awide range of modern nuclear missiles.Within two years, India would develop anintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),a medium-range naval missile, and me-dium-range air-to-air missiles. DRDO offi-cials said the Surya ICBM will have a rangeof 5,000 km. DRDO officials said the Suryawill be able to carry a nuclear warhead2,000 km. DRDO officials said $50 millionwill be spent on the Surya. It will be readyfor launch by mid-2001. An advanced ver-sion will be developed after the test launchof Surya-1. DRDO, the Defense Researchand Development Laboratory inHyderabad, and 90 other scientific andprivate institutions are involved in the de-velopment of the Surya program. DRDOofficials said they were extending therange of the Prithvi ballistic missile from150 km to 350 km. Officials said they werealso developing a naval version of thePrithvi, called the Dhanush, with a rangeof 250 km. The Dhanush will be tested in

late 1999. DRDO will produce 20 Agni bal-listic missiles with a range of more than2,000 km by the end of 2001 at a cost of$150 million.

Vivek Raghuvanshi, Defense News, 24 May 1999,p. 14.

An Indian Defence Ministry spokesman saidthat India test fired a naval version of itsTrishul surface-to-air (SAM) missile at 10:05GMT from the Dronacharya naval base inCochin on 26 May 1999. He said the “flightmarked a step towards user evaluation andinduction of the Trishul system in the navyby the year 2000.” He said the Trishul wastested against low-altitude maritime targetsand the mission objectives “were fully met.”

AFP, 26 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online],<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 26 May 1999.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayeesaid the 26 May 1999 launch of India’s po-lar satellite launch vehicle (PSLV) was “per-fect” and that it was a “proud day for Indianscience.” Vajpayee said the launch of thePSLV-C2 showed India’s mastery of spacetechnology. Indian officials said its spaceprogram was only for peaceful purposes.The PSLV-C2 was launched from the spacecenter on an island in the Bay of Bengal.

Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 26 May 1999.

The United States has “reportedly accused”Israel of transferring radar technology fromthe US-Israeli Arrow anti-missile system toIndia. Israel claimed the technology was de-veloped before US involvement in theproject and therefore did not require ap-proval from the United States to be exported.In September 1998, the head of Israel Air-craft Industries, which is developing theArrow, declared that the “missile or systems”would be sold “only to countries friendly”to both Israel and the United States.

P.R. Kumaraswamy, Jane’s Intelligence Review,June 1999, pp. 21-22.

On 14 June 1999, Indian External Affairs Min-ister Jaswant Singh arrived in China for high-level talks with the Chinese government.India’s officials hope the talks will improvepolitical-level ties between China and Indiaand generate a discussion of several issues

including “the clandestine nuclear and mis-sile technology cooperation between Chinaand Pakistan.”

Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 14 June 1999.

INDONESIA

NuclearAccording to Russian First Deputy PrimeMinister Yury Maslyukov, Moscow is con-sidering exporting small floating nuclearpower plants to Indonesia.

ITAR-TASS, 15 March 1999, in Inquisit [Online],<http://www.inquisit.com>, 15 March 1999.

JAPAN

MissileAccording to Japan’s Chief Cabinet Sec-retary Hiromu Nonaka, Japan will rely onits own technology to develop the fourintelligence satellites that are planned forlaunch in 2002. He added that developingthe satellites domestically would be in thebest interest of Japan. Nonaka explainedthat “[Japan] decided to develop the sat-ellites using Japanese technology because[the] satellites will be launched for the mainpurpose of gathering necessary data forJapan’s national security.” In addition, hesaid that “[Japan] is going to acquire sat-ellite parts and a system on intelligenceanalysis from the United States and otherforeign companies.”

Japan Times [Online], <http://www.japantimes.co.jp>, 1 April 1999; SouthChina Morning Post [Online], <http://www.scmp.com>, 2 April 1999.

KAZAKHSTAN

NuclearDirector of the Moscow Center of theWorld Association of Nuclear OperatorsFarit Tukhvetov said that the BN-350 re-actor at Aktau was officially decommis-sioned on 22 April 1999. According toTukhvetov, Kazakhstani autorities decidedthat the reactor was too isolated fromtechnical support and design organizationsin Russia.

Nucleonics Week, 24 June 1999, p. 16.

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KYRGYZSTAN

NuclearKyrgyzstani security agents at Manas air-port, outside Bishkek, arrested an Uzbek na-tional who was trying to smuggle a capsuleof radioactive material onto a flight to theUnited Arab Emirates, Vecherniy Bishkekreported on 14 May 1999. According to thereport, the smuggler, identified as TakhirNaizov, was carrying the material in a metalcapsule wrapped in rubber in his pocket.Security guards checking passengers board-ing the flight became suspicious of Naizovwhen they noticed he was very pale and ap-peared nauseated. Upon searching him, theydiscovered the capsule, 3 cm in diameterand 7 cm in length, marked with the interna-tional symbol for radiation hazard. Theguards then called on specialists of theKyrgyzstani State Sanitary Commission toconduct an examination of the capsule. Acheck of the capsule with a dosimeter indi-cated that it was emitting fatal doses of ra-diation at close range. The radiationdiminished to near normal background lev-els at a distance of about 1 meter from thecapsule, however, and the background ra-diation level of the room in which the cap-sule was being held was also normal. Thearticle reports that “most likely, the capsuleholds plutonium.” However, the characteris-tics of the capsule described and the radia-tion it was emitting make it seem likely that itcontains a radioactive isotope stolen from amedical or industrial facility, rather than plu-tonium. The suspect, Mr. Naizov, told policethat he had agreed to carry the capsule tothe United Arab Emirates in return for a$16,000 payment. He had received the cap-sule at the airport from an unidentified man.Naizov had an accomplice, a Kyrgyzstani citi-zen, who was also arrested.

Yu. Gruzdov, Vecherniy Bishkek, 14 May 1999, p.1; Timur Isayev, ITAR-TASS, 14 May 1999; AFP,14 May 1999; AP, 14 May 1999.

NORTH KOREA

NuclearAccording to a US Department of Energyintelligence report, North Korea is in the ini-tial stages of developing a uranium enrich-ment capability, which in six years will beable to produce weapons-grade uranium.

The report indicated that a North Korean firm,Daesong Yushin Trading Co., was trying topurchase “frequency converters” from aJapanese manufacturer. It is believed theconverters are the first parts of a “centrifugecascade.” A US secret intelligence assess-ment indicated that North Korea plans to setup a uranium enrichment capability fornuclear weapons with the assistance of Pa-kistan.

Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 12 March 1999, p.9; Bill Gertz, Washington Times, 11 March 1999,p. 6.

On 16 March 1999, the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) and the UnitedStates issued a joint press statement sayingthat both sides had reached an agreementon access to a suspected undergroundnuclear site at Kumchang-ri. The US Secre-tary of State Madeleine Albright stated thatNorth Korea will allow: (1) multiple site vis-its by a US team to the underground site atKumchang-ri; (2) the first visit in May 1999,with follow-up visits continuing as long asthe US concerns about the site remain; and,(3) access to the entire site during each visit.The agreement also states that the UnitedStates “has decided to take a step to improvepolitical and economic relations between thetwo countries.” Albright highlighted that theUnited States did not agree to DPRK de-mands for “compensation” in return for ac-cess to the site. Albright also announcedthat the DPRK and the US agreed to resumemissile talks on 29 March 1999 in Pyongyang.During the meetings held between 27 Febru-ary-13 March 1999 in New York, the DPRKand the US also reaffirmed their commit-ment to the Agreed Framework of 21 Octo-ber 1994 in its entirety and to the principlesof their bilateral relations expressed in theUS-DPRK Joint Statement of 11 June 1993.DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwanand US Special Envoy Charles Kartman ledthe delegations.

US Department of State, 16 March 1999.

According to International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) officials, critical parts of theNorth Korean 50-MW nuclear reactor havebeen missing since the first IAEA investiga-tors arrived at the North Korean nuclear cen-ter in 1994. The parts are vital to control the

atomic reaction in the reactor’s graphitecore. Apparently some US State Departmentofficials knew about the missing parts, butneither Congress nor the lead negotiator ofthe 1994 Agreed Framework, Robert Gallucci,were made privy to that information. Clintonadministration officials say they were awareof the missing parts, which can be used inanother nuclear reactor. According to USState Department officials, the 1994 AgreedFramework was successful in freezing activ-ity at Yongbyon and Taechon. It is entirelypossible that North Korea is still continuingnuclear research at other sites. The officialsalso said that this research might not evenbe in violation of the Agreement. Accord-ing to a nuclear expert, the concern is notthat the missing parts are now in a nuclearreactor, but how much plutonium North Ko-rea processed at Yongbyon before the 1994Agreed Framework. United States State De-partment spokesperson James Rubin saidthat the United States had no basis to con-clude that North Korea is in violation of the1994 Agreed Framework. He added that theInternational Atomic Energy Agency neverreported the equipment as missing but saidthat the parts were unaccounted for. In addi-tion, Rubin said that the unaccounted partswere discussed with Congress on the publicrecord in a General Accounting Office reportin 1998.

Stewart Stogel and Ben Barber, Washington Times,24 March 1999, p. 3; James Rubin, “State De-partment Noon Briefing, March 23, 1999,” USIATranscript, 24 March 1999.

Kim Tok-yong, a member of the South Ko-rean parliament and the Hannara oppositionparty, has alleged that in addition toKumchang-ri, North Korea has another un-derground nuclear complex located betweenTongsan-ri and Huiyon-ri in Kusong City inthe northwestern part of the country. Ac-cording to Kim, the complex consists of threefacilities located within three kilometers ofeach other. He has alleged that a reservoirand a small island exist behind the third facil-ity. In addition, plutonium is being producedin the underground nuclear development fa-cility.

Shukan Post, 16 April 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990410000079, 16 April 1999.



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On 4 May 1999, the Japanese foreign minis-try announced that Japan had signed a con-tract making $1 billion available to the KoreanPeninsula Energy Development Organiza-tion (KEDO). On 30 June 1999, the JapaneseHouse of Councilors approved Japan’sscheduled payment of $1 billion to KEDOfor the construction of two light-waternuclear reactors in North Korea.

Gamini Seneviratne and Simon Rippon, NuclearNews, June 1999, p. 59; Kyodo (Tokyo), 30 June1999, in FBIS Document 19990630000226, 30June 1999.

On 14 May 1999, US State Departmentspokesperson James Rubin said that theUnited States supplied 90,000 metric tons ofheavy fuel oil to North Korea between Janu-ary and April 1999. Further shipments willcontinue in May and June 1999, he said. Inaddition, US President Bill Clinton signedcertifications on 4 March 1999 to release$15 million to the Korean Peninsula EnergyDevelopment Organization.

Yonhap (Seoul), 15 May 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990514001834, 15 May 1999.

On 25 June 1999, US Department of Statespokesman James Rubin announced thatUS inspectors, who visited the suspectednuclear site at Kumchang-ri in North Ko-rea from 18-24 May 1999, found no evi-dence or indication that the site was beingused for nuclear-related activities. Theinspectors photographed certain parts ofthe facility and inspected the undergroundportions, per the March 1999 agreementthat allowed them to visit the site. The sitewas empty with bare rock walls. The StateDepartment press release said that “thesite at Kumchang-ri does not contain aplutonium production reactor or repro-cessing plant, either completed or underconstruction.” It added that although theunderground facility was unsuitable for aplutonium reprocessing plant or graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, it could bemodified in the future. The United Statescannot rule out Kumchang-ri’s potentialutility for nuclear-related activities. Thesite does not violate the 1994 AgreedFramework because there is no evidenceof North Korean nuclear activity at thistime. US inspectors will visit the site again

in May 2000 and will examine the feasibil-ity of converting the facility to commercialuse.

US Department of State Press Statement, 25 June1999.

MissileSouth Korea has confirmed that North Ko-rea has at least four missile factories and 10missile bases. Further, North Korea is build-ing additional bases and there is specula-tion that North Korea has eight missileplants and over 12 bases, the official said.According to the official, missile factory no.26 in Kanggye (Jagang Province) manufac-tures missile parts, factory no. 118 inKaechon (South Pyongan Province) pro-duces launch engines, factory no. 125 at Mt.Hyongje in Pyongyang assembles missileparts, and an additional factory inMangyongdae-ri, Pyongyang, develops ex-plosive compounds. In addition, a NorthKorean defector has confirmed missile fac-tory locations in Kangso, (Nampo, SouthPyongan Province). Further, the official saidthat the 10 missile bases are located at Mt.Kanggamchan (Jungsan, South PyonganProvince), Mayangdo (Sinpo, SouthHamkyong Province), Paekun-ri (Kusong,North Pyongan Province), Rodong-taepodong (Hwadae, North Hamkyong Prov-ince), Chonggang-up (Huchang, JagangProvince), Okpyong (Munchon, KangwonProvince), Jiha-ri (Ichon, Kangwon Province),and the three Pyongyang metropolitan ar-eas of Sangwon-kun, Oryu-ri andChunghwa-kun. Further, two additionalbases are under construction in TocksongCounty (South Hamgyong Province) andYongo-tong (South Hamgyong Province).The South Korean official noted that NorthKorea has trained missile development ex-perts since the establishment of its NationalDefense University in 1965. Apparently,North Korea recently told a delegation froma Middle Eastern country that missile fac-tory no. 125 is an assembly line for Scud-Bmissiles. The official added, “North Korea iscurrently capable of producing more than 100Scud-type missiles a year.”

Yonhap (Seoul), 25 March 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990324002145, 24 March 1999;Hangyore (Seoul) [Online], <http://www.hani.co.kr>, 25 March 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990324002145, 25 March 1999.

A US spy satellite has confirmed that NorthKorea has deployed Nodong ballistic mis-siles. The missiles have been deployed nearthe North Korea-China border. The satellitephotos indicate that the Nodong launchershave been vehicle mounted. The Nodongmissiles have a range of 1,000-1,300 km, andare capable of striking Japan.

AFP, 28 March 1999.

North Korea conducted a combustion testfor a rocket engine in early May 1999. Ob-servers suspect that the engine tested wasfor the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile, an up-dated version of the missile that North Ko-rea tested in August 1998. A USreconnaissance satellite detected heat sig-natures from the engine test. It is assumedthat the purpose of the test was to ensurethat the engine would combust smoothly andgenerate propulsion strong enough to en-able the Taepodong-2 missile to developsufficient range and speed. South Koreanand US intelligence analysts believe that theTaep’o-dong-2 could have a maximum rangeof 4,000-6,000 km. Furthermore, North Koreamay have developed sufficient competenceafter the August 1998 Taep’o-dong launchto develop larger ballistic missiles.

Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 24 June 1999, in FBISDocument 19990623001649, 24 June 1999.

On 15 June 1999, undisclosed Japanese gov-ernment sources said that North Korea hasstarted preparations for launching a Taep-odong ballistic missile with a range of morethan 1,500 km in July or August 1999. Infor-mation from US reconnaissance satellitesand South Korean government sources in-dicates that North Korea is expanding con-struction on its missile launching facilities.

Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), 16 June 1999,in FBIS Document FTS19990615001749, 15June 1999.

PAKISTAN

NuclearThe Pakistani press reported on 11 March1999 that the Pakistani Commerce Divisionhas issued a statutory regulatory order tocontrol the export of nuclear technology toforeign countries. The new order states thatnuclear technology cannot be transferred to

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any other country without a “no objectioncertificate” from the Pakistani Atomic En-ergy Commission. The new restrictions ap-ply to nuclear substances, radioactivematerial, equipment, arms, ammunition, ex-plosive ingredients, complete rocket andunmanned aerial vehicle systems, and theparts for all aforementioned items.

Ansar Abbasi, Dawn [Online], <http://www.dawn.com>, 11 March 1999.

According to an article in the Kashmir Times,neither India nor Pakistan has performed“one-point safety” tests on nuclear warheadsto reduce the chances of accidental detona-tion during fabrication, installation, or flight.

Praful Bidwai, Kashmir Times, 15 March 1999,in FBIS Document FTS19990317000472, 15March 1999.

As the September 1999 deadline for signingthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)approaches, the Pakistani government hasattempted to convince domestic critics of thetreaty’s “non-discriminatory” nature. Paki-stani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz told thecountry’s National Assembly on 18 March1999 that Pakistan “could sign the CTBT evenbefore September 1999 in conditions free ofcoercion and pressure.” Aziz said that thereare “certain misconception that signing theCTBT will either cap [Pakistan’s nuclear] pro-gram and some newspaper comments wentto the extent [of saying] it will roll back ourprogram.” He explained that the CTBT onlycalls for halting nuclear test explosions,which Pakistan has already declared a mora-torium on. The CTBT would formalize thatmoratorium but place “no restrictions on acountry’s nuclear program, including pro-duction of further weapons.”

Amit Baruah, The Hindu [Online], <http://www.webpage.com/hindu>, 27 March 1999.

US Marine Corps General Anthony Zinnibriefed Pakistani Army Chief General of StaffPervez Musharaf on conditions for resum-ing military ties on a 21 April 1999 visit toIslamabad. Indian military and political lead-ers were also informed through the US Em-bassy in New Delhi on the conditions forresuming US military ties. Those conditionsincluded signing the CTBT, a ban on fissilematerial production, implementation of clear

export controls, and an exercise of strategicrestraint. The phased plan called for recip-rocal visits, military exercises, officer educa-tion, troop training and strategic planningactivities. US military officials stressed theplan would not involve equipment providedthrough the US foreign military sales pro-gram, but the last phase of re-engagementcould involve limited technology sharing.

Barbara Opall-Rome, Defense News, 10 May,1999, p. 28; Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 6 May 1999.

In early May 1999, US government nuclearintelligence analysts concluded that Paki-stan produced enough heavy water to startup and operate the unsafeguarded pluto-nium production reactor at Khushab. Offi-cials said there was no information, classifiedor unclassified, to substantiate allegationsthat Pakistan diverted heavy water suppliedunder International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) safeguards by China to Pakistan’spower reactor at the Karachi Nuclear PowerPlant (Kannup). China has denied any heavywater diversion to Khushab. According toinformation compiled by the US Central In-telligence Agency (CIA), the 50-MWtKhushab reactor was constructed in the1990s with Chinese assistance. In 1997, USofficials said the reactor was nearly com-pleted, but lacked enough heavy water tooperate. By May 1998, the Khushab reactorhad gone critical and was being operated togenerate plutonium for Pakistan’s nuclearweapons program. In May 1999, US officialssaid it was likely that Pakistan mastered theengineering process for heavy water pro-duction during Khushab’s construction anddedicated the output from an indigenousheavy water plant to the production reactor.A source said the engineering process forthe most common heavy water productiontechnology, employing hydrogen sulfide(H2S), was nearly identical to that used instandard petrochemical refineries. If Paki-stan were to build a heavy water plant in anindustrial location adjacent to a petrochemi-cal complex, it would be difficult to detectusing conventional satellite surveillance.

Mark Hibbs, NuclearFuel, 10-17 May 1999, pp.1,10-11.

Pakistan has set up a command structure toaddress nuclear attacks. The command struc-ture would be headed by the chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff Committee, GeneralPervez Musharraf, and would decide in con-sultation with the prime minister whether ornot to counterattack in the event of a nuclearattack. In the event of an enemy missile at-tack, Pakistan would have an estimated sixto eight minutes to respond.

Khabrain (Islamabad), 13 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 16May 1999.

Pakistan nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan said on11 May 1999 that Pakistan had achieved amajor breakthrough in its nuclear weaponsprogram by enriching uranium up to 96.4percent U-235.

BBC, 13 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online],<http://www.lexis-nexis.com>, 13 May 1999.

According to government officials, Pakistanhas decided to equip its navy with a nuclearcapability. The naval nuclear capabilitywould be kept under the central commandand control system. There would be fourcomponents to this system: development,control, strategic force command, and a sec-retariat of the three armed service commandsthrough the governing body of the NationalCommand Authority.

Jang (Rawalpindi), 18 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis[Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 20 May1999.

Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic EnergyCommission Ishfaq Ahmad said that a ma-jor amount of uranium and other chemicalsubstances used in the preparation of nuclearbombs and other nuclear arms was obtainedfrom district Lukki Marwat of North-WestFrontier Province (NWFP). He said Pakistanhas acquired every kind of nuclear technol-ogy and that it had gathered enough data tocontinue its work in the future. Ahmad saidthe Chagai site was established in 1981 andPakistan had nuclear capability in 1984. Hesaid, “we have every kind of modernweapon and no government created anyhurdles in this regard.”

Nawa-I-Waqt (Rawalpindi), 19 May 1999, in FBISDocument FTS19990520000490, 19 May 1999.



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MissileAccording to a report published in CurrentScience, Pakistan’s Ghauri missile is theNorth Korean Nodong missile, “probablysupplied to Pakistani on a turnkey basis byNorth Korea.” The Nodong missile is a single-stage liquid fuelled missile with a range of950-1,020 km and capable of carrying a 700-1,000 kg warhead. The report warned that ifNorth Korea were to supply Pakistan withits two-staged Taepodong missile, which hasa range of between 1,900-2,100 km, Pakistanwould have the ability to strike all of India.The report also indicated that the Ghauri mis-sile was derived from the Russian Scud-Bmissile. S. Chandrashekar from the IndianInstitute of Management said that Pakistan’sGhauri missile is probably kerosene-basedand that its total fuel load equaled thirteentons.

Indian Express [Online], <http://www.expressindia.com>, 4 March 1999.

The Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen (Hatf-4)ballistic missiles were displayed for the firsttime at the Pakistan Day parade in Islamabadon 23 March 1999. The Ghauri missile, devel-oped by the Kahuta Research Laboratories,has a range of 1,500 km and was tested on 6April 1998. The Shaheen had not been testedat the time of the parade, and was developedby the National Development Complex(NDC). The Shaheen can reportedly belaunched from both mobile and static launch-ers. Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the NDC di-rector, said that the Shaheen has a range of750 km and could carry a payload of 1,000kg. He said that the Shaheen is a solid-fuelmissile and is highly accurate due to its ter-minal guidance system.

The Hindu [Online], <http://www.webpage.com/hindu>, 24 March 1999.

Pakistan test-launched its Ghauri-2 (Hatf-6)ballistic missile on 14 April 1999 and itsShaheen-1 surface-to-surface missile on 15April. Pakistani officials said that the twomissile tests concluded a “series of flighttests involving solid and liquid fuel rocketmotor technologies.” An official statementreleased by the Pakistani Foreign Office saidthat the missile tests were “part of the re-search and development of Pakistan’s indig-enous missile program,” which was a part of

Pakistan’s “policy of maintaining deterrencein the interest of our security.” The state-ment also said that the latest missile testswould contribute to the Hatf-2 and -3 mis-sile programs. Unnamed official Pakistanisources said that a second, more advancedShaheen missile with a 2,300-km range was“ready and waiting to be tested.”

CNN [Online], <http://cnn.com>, 15 April 1999;Umer Farooq, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April1999, p. 3.

On 6 June 1999, the Indian Express newspa-per reported that US Stinger surface-to-airmissiles (SAMs) have been deployed by“Pakistani intruders” in the Kargil sector ofKashmir. The paper reported that in 1994 to1995, the US Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) attempted to recover all the Stingermissiles supplied to Afghan guerillas duringthe Soviet-Afghan war. The CIA estimated120 Stinger missiles were “missing.” IndianExpress reported that the Stinger missileswere used by the “Pakistani intruders” toshoot down a Mi-17 military helicopter.

Manvendra Singh, Indian Express [Online],<http://www.indian-express.com/>, 7 June 1999.

SOUTH KOREA

NuclearSouth Korea and Russia have initialed anagreement to upgrade an extant 1994 proto-col on cooperation in peaceful uses ofnuclear energy. The agreement calls for bothstates to cooperate in the use of peacefulnuclear energy. It also places restrictions ontransferring nuclear materials to third coun-tries and delineates other obligations in thetransfer of nuclear technology. Both coun-tries also agreed to resume a joint steeringcommittee meeting on cooperation in thedevelopment of laser and nuclear fusion, aswell as other nuclear-related technologies.

Yonhap (Seoul), 8 April 1999, in Inquisit [Online],<http://www.inquisit.com>, 8 April 1999.

On 13 April 1999, South Korea ratified theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Korea Herald [Online], <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, 14 April 1999.

On 22 April 1999, South Korea agreed inprinciple that the repayment of supportfunds for the construction of light-water re-

actors in North Korea would be madethrough the KEDO. Consequently, SouthKorea will provide $3.22 billion for the projectas a grant rather than a loan. During talkswith the United States in early April 1999,South Korea agreed to vague provisions stat-ing that repayment of the loan would be guar-anteed after consultation by the executivemember countries of KEDO, not by KEDOitself. Earlier, South Korea had demandedloan repayment guarantees from KEDO. AUS official criticized South Korea’s policyand said “this posture of being reluctant togive up repayment of the loan while pursu-ing a sunshine policy toward North Korea isinconsistent.” The KEDO loan agreementhas to be ratified by the South Korean Na-tional Assembly.

Tong-a Ilbo (Seoul), 23 April 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990423001945, 23 April 1999.

On 7 May 1999, South Korea’s governmentannounced that it would issue SWon330 bil-lion in government bonds to cover SouthKorea’s contribution for the construction oflight-water nuclear reactors in North Korea.The government also stated that if the do-mestic economy improved, it would cancelthe bond issuance and instead impose a 3percent surcharge on electricity bills.

Shin Jong-rok, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul) [Online],<http://www.chosun.com>, 7 May 1999.

MissileOn 26 April 1999, South Korean Vice DefenseMinister Ahn Byung-kil announced that theUnited States has agreed to let South Koreadevelop private-use space projectiles with-out limits on range or payload. In addition,Ahn said, the United States is close to al-lowing South Korea to develop missiles witha range of 300 km and payload of 500 kg,which would effectively end the 1979 agree-ment that restricts South Korean missiles toa 180-km range. However, the two parties aredivided on how to formalize the agreement.Ahn said, “Seoul is trying to conclude theagreement through a letter of intent, whileWashington is calling for a more formal memo-randum of understanding.” At a meeting ofthe South Korean defense committee of theNational Assembly, some officials called forbuilding missiles with ranges up to 700 km.Ahn also denied reports that the United

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States had protested the 10 April 1999 mis-sile launch by South Korea. He said, “no priorconsultations were required with respect tothe test-firing because the missile’s rangefell short of the 180 km, the limit set by theU.S.” The spokesperson for North Korea’sForeign Affairs Ministry criticized theUnited States for supporting the develop-ment of South Korea’s missile program. Hesaid such support was hostile to North Ko-rea and could harm current missile talks withthe United States.

Korea Times [Online], <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>, 27 April 1999; Yoo Yong-won, Chosun Ilbo [Online], <http://www.chosun.com>, 27 April 1999; Jangsoo Seo,JoongAng Ilbo [Online], <http://www.joongang.co.kr>, 27 April 1999.

Seoul’s Sisa Journal reported that South Ko-rea conducted a ballistic missile test on 10April 1999. According to the report, SouthKorea’s Agency for Defense Development(ADD) test fired “Hyonmu,” a 300 km-rangemissile on the west coast of the country. Asthe missile was partially fueled, it flew only50 km. The report further stated that SouthKorea manufactured a prototype of a 300km-range missile several years ago and con-ducted flight-tests secretly.

Yi Chong-hun, Sisa Journal, 29 April 1999, p.14,in FBIS Document FTS19990426000865, 29April 1999.

On 3 May 1999, a high-ranking South Ko-rean official reaffirmed that Seoul has noplans to join the US-led theater missile de-fense (TMD) program. The official said that“at this stage, [South Korea has] neither anintention nor ability to take part in the TMDplan, which requires a huge sum of invest-ment and up-to-date technology.” Accord-ing to officials at South Korea’s DefenseMinistry, skepticism is arising in Seoul aboutwhether the TMD plan would be able to ef-fectively intercept short-range North Ko-rean missiles. The Defense Ministry officialsalso underlined the huge cost of the plannedTMD.

Jun Kwan-woo, Korea Herald [Online], <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>, 4 May 1999.

Russia’s Aviation and Space Agency hasoffered to launch satellites for South Koreaand has proposed “an entire package of co-

operation ideas” to South Korean spaceofficials.The package reportedly includedproposals to jointly develop telecommuni-cations and Earth-monitoring satellites, datasales from Russia’s Earth-monitoring satel-lites, and an offer to use Russia’s Glonassglobal navigation system, which has alreadybeen offered to the European Union. YulraeCho, South Korea’s science attaché in Mos-cow, confirmed South Korea’s interest in ac-quiring Russian optical and launch technolo-gies. He also suggested that South Koreawould like to acquire some “basic theoreti-cal knowledge” about spacecraft design andlaunch vehicles, as long as it would not vio-late international bans on missile technol-ogy proliferation. He stated it would takeseveral years for any significant accomplish-ments in South Korean-Russian space rela-tions. Cho also said that South Korean in-dustry is currently actively cooperating withthe Russian space industry.

Simon Saradzhyan, Space News, 14 June 1999,pp. 1, 36.

TAIWAN

NuclearOn 17 March 1999, Taiwan’s Atomic EnergyCouncil (AEC) granted licenses for the con-struction of the first and second units of thefourth nuclear plant to the Taiwan PowerCompany (Taipower). Each unit will have aproduction capacity of 1.35 million kilowatts.The first and second units are expected tobecome operational by June 2004 and June2005, respectively. The new units will bringTaiwan’s gross installed nuclear power gen-erating capacity to 7.8 million kilowatts,“about one third of the island’s total installed[electricity production] capacity.”

Maubo Chang, Taiwan Central News Agency, 17March 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990317001025, 17 March 1999.

MissileTaiwan is planning to increase its indigenousmissile program budget by $600 million forthe next fiscal year. The money is likely to beused to modify the anti-ship Hsiung Feng 2missile to produce a version with cruise mis-sile capabilities. Such a capability would al-low Taiwan to launch pre-emptive strikesagainst China’s land-based missile sites.

Taiwanese military sources suggest that theTien Ma (Sky Horse) surface-to-surfacemissile program will be revived, with similarpre-emptive strike capabilities. Taiwan hasalready purchased the Modified Air DefenseSystem (MADS) or Patriot-T, which is animproved US Patriot high-to-medium surface-to-air missile. According to a US Departmentof Defense report, Taiwan cannot exclusivelyrely on an active missile defense system todeter China. By 2005 China will have an over-whelming advantage in offensive missiles.

Bryan Bender and Robert Karniol, Jane’s De-fence Weekly, 10 March 1999. p. 4.

On 23 March 1999, Taiwan’s Air Force MajorGeneral Wang Chih-ke said that Taiwanwould acquire a US-built long-range earlywarning system to increase its air-defensecapability against China. He added that thebudget had been set for the planned acqui-sition. Earlier, Liberty Times reported that theradar system would cost an estimated 26 bil-lion Taiwanese dollars ($785.7 million) andwould be operational within six years. Thesystem will be used to track aircraft and mis-siles. The report added that Taiwan’s cur-rent military radar systems can only trackaircraft movement within a range of 600 km.

China Times [Online], <http://www.chinatimes.com>, 24 March 1999.

According to Taiwan’s Defense MinisterTang Fei, Taiwan would have to spend ap-proximately $9.23 billion over the next de-cade to build and deploy a low-altitudemissile defense system. The defense systemwould have the capability to destroy 70 per-cent of all missiles launched against Taiwan.Tang said it is important for Taiwan to beginthe foundation work for joining the US-ledtheater missile defense system.

Taiwan Central News Agency, 24 March 1999, inFBIS Document FTS19990324001145, 24 March1999.

Taiwan’s China Times reported that Taiwanwill buy or build Aegis-equipped guidedmissile destroyers. Taipei plans to purchasefour such ships at about $800 million each.The Taiwan Defense Ministry declined tocomment on the report. Meanwhile, Taiwan-ese military authorities have approved plansto dredge the Tsoying harbor by an addi-



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tional 20 meters and build four additionalpiers to accommodate the 8,000-ton vessels.

China Times [Online], <http://www.chinatimes.com.tw>, 18 May 1999.

THAILAND

NuclearAccording to Kriangsak Bhadrakom, the di-rector-general of the Office of Atomic En-ergy for Peace (OAEP) and secretary of theNuclear Safety Committee (NSC), theOngkharak nuclear research reactor projectin Thailand should be reviewed by both theUS Oak Ridge Laboratory and the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). TheUS company General Atomic, which is con-structing the reactor, has not requested asafety guarantee from the US Nuclear Regu-latory Commission (NRC) because the lattercannot give guarantees abroad. The OAEPhas decided that General Atomic needs toseek reviews from Oak Ridge and the IAEAbefore it begins construction. Both reviewswill be submitted to the NSC to verify thatsafety standards for the project are approvedbefore any construction begins.

Kamol Sukin, The Nation (Bangkok), 28 April1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990427001948,28 April 1999.

VIETNAM

MissileAccording to Asian intelligence sources,North Korea has sold modified Scud ballis-tic missiles to Vietnam. It is believed that themissiles are Scud-C variants. North Korea’sScud-C has a range of 550 km and can carrya 770 kg payload. The missile also uses animproved guidance system. Vietnam’s formervice defense minister, Nguyen Thoi Bung,oversaw the purchase during his December1996 visit to North Korea. The deal for theScud-C included two Sang-o-class subma-rines and a number of man-portable air-de-fense systems believed to be the SA-16Gimlet.

Robert Karniol, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 April1999, p. 17.

EUROPE

ARMENIA

MissileAccording to an Azerbaijani Ministry ofForeign Affairs statement released on 3June 1999, the defense ministers of Russiaand Armenia signed a deal on delivery ofeight Chinese-built Typhoon missiles to Ar-menia during their joint visit to China in sum-mer 1998. Chinese Deputy Foreign MinisterWang Yingfan denied knowledge of the clo-sure of the deal and explained that thoughthe number of Chinese arms exporting firmsis limited and their activity is strictly con-trolled by the government, Chinese law doesnot require arms exporting firms to receivegovernment approval for each transaction.

Statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministry of theRepublic of Azerbaijan, 3 June 1999.

ESTONIANuclear

The Riigikogu (Estonia’s parliament) ratifiedthe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on 21June 1999.

Interfax, 21 June 1999.

RUSSIA

NuclearAccording to Mr. Yamato, a member of theJapan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute(JNC) board of directors, and Mr. TsutomuImamura, deputy director-general of the Sci-ence and Technology Agency (STA), Japanand Russia are in the process of concludingan agreement on disposition of plutoniumfrom dismantled nuclear weapons. Accord-ing to the 3 April 1999 issue of Nihon KeizaiShimbun, the STA has already sent the Rus-sian Ministry of Atomic Energy a plan forcooperation in carrying out this agreement.Under the agreement, the JNC will assistRussia in remodeling the core of the BN-600fast breeder reactor (FBR) at the Beloyarsknuclear power plant so that it can be loadedwith mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. The primaryobjective is to help Russia burn a total of

20,000 kg of excess plutonium in the BN-600reactor by 2020 and reduce the proliferationrisk by converting weapons-grade pluto-nium removed from dismantled Russiannuclear weapons into fuel for nuclear powerstations.

Atoms in Japan, April 1999, p. 10; BBC SovietUnion Economic, 5 April 1999; VladimirSolntsev, ITAR-TASS, 5 February 1999; NikkanKogyo Shimbun, 24 February 1999.

On 20 April 1999, Japan announced a plan tooffer Russia about $35 million in aid to dis-mantle 50 deteriorating nuclear-poweredsubmarines of the latter’s Pacific Fleet. AJapanese Foreign Ministry official said thatthe submarines “are weather-beaten and inserious condition, which may affect Japan’senvironment.” Specifically, the aid would gotowards removing spent nuclear-fuel rodsfrom the submarines and scrapping the sub-marine hulls.

Daily Yomiuri [Online], <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp>, 21 April 1999.

On 21 April 1999 the Strategic Rocket Forces(SRF) launched the first converted RS-20[NATO designation SS-18 ‘Satan’] boosterrocket, the Dnepr-1, from the Baykonurcosmodrome. The Dnepr-1 was carrying aBritish research satellite. The SRF has about180 RS-20 missiles that are scheduled fordestruction by 2002 if the START-2 Treaty isratified. About 150 missiles can be con-verted into boosters for launching commu-nications satellites weighing up to 4,000 kg.Kosmotras, an international space company,ordered the launch as part of the Russian-Ukrainian Dnepr program. ITAR-TASS re-ported that Russia and Ukraine could launchbetween four and eight Dnepr boosters peryear, if they gain access to the internationallaunch vehicle market. In an interview withITAR-TASS on 21 April, Deputy Com-mander-in-Chief of the Russian StrategicRocket Forces Vladimir Nikitin stated that thesuccessful launch indicated that all RussianICBMs removed from service should beconverted into commercial space boostersrather than destroyed.

Nikolay Novichkov, ITAR-TASS, 21 April 1999.

The Security Council of the Russian Federa-tion conducted a closed meeting to discussthe status and the prospects of the nuclear

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deterrent forces. Reports were made by De-fense Minister Igor Sergeyev and Ministerof Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov. At asubsequent briefing the secretary of the Se-curity Council, Vladimir Putin, reported thatthe council adopted three documents. Onecovers the development and security of thenuclear weapons complex (i.e. development,production, and testing of nuclear war-heads); another is a concept for the use ofnuclear weapons, including tactical nuclearweapons; the third document, said Putin, wasso secret that even its title could not be dis-closed. He stressed that Russia would con-tinue “to abide by all obligations it hadundertaken” in the area of arms control andinternational security. Press reports sug-gested that in the view of the breakdown ofthe START-2 ratification process, the Secu-rity Council decided to extend the servicelife of RS-20 [NATO designation SS-18 ‘Sa-tan’] heavy ICBMs, retain eight nuclear pow-ered Delta-3 ballistic missile submarinespreviously slated for decommissioning, andbuy eight Tu-160 and three Tu-95 heavybombers from Ukraine. The Security Councilalso reportedly decided to develop a new,low-yield nuclear warhead and to develop acapability to ensure the reliability of Rus-sian nuclear weapons within the frameworkof the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.Considerable attention was devoted to thesafety and security of Russian nuclear weap-ons design, production, and storage facili-ties.

Interfax, 29 April 1999; Ilya Bulavinov and IvanSafronov, Kommersant-Daily, 30 April 1999; IgorKorotchenko, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 April1999, p. 2; Rossiyskaya gazeta, 30 April 1999,p. 2; Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 6 May 1999,pp. 1, 2.

Specialists at the Russian Ministry ofAtomic Energy (Minatom) disagree with theconclusions reached in the 18 May 1999 re-port of the Committee on Upgrading Rus-sian Capabilities for Controlling HighlyEnriched Uranium and Plutonium of the USNational Research Council, Interfax reportedon 20 May 1999. Minatom officials particu-larly dispute the conclusion in the report thatthe threat of diversion of nuclear materialsfrom Russian facilities is now greater thanpreviously estimated. The officials arguedthat Russian facilities storing nuclear mate-

rials meet international standards, andclaimed that US specialists who have visitedthese sites have declared that the materialsstored there are subject to a “high level ofsecurity.” Minatom’s press service also toldInterfax that “in recent years there has notbeen a single confirmed leak of nuclear ma-terials from Russia.” Minatom officials saidthe only exception was the shipment of“contraband” plutonium to Germany, an ap-parent reference to the August 1994 Munichcase. The Minatom officials hastened to addthat they are grateful for the financial assis-tance provided by the United States Depart-ment of Energy through the MaterialsProtection, Control, and Accounting Pro-gram.

Interfax, 20 May 1999.

On 3 June 1999, at 18:20 hours Moscowtime, Russia conducted a flight test of itsRS-12M2 Topol-M [NATO designation SS-27 ‘Sickle’] ICBM, the seventh such test sinceDecember 1994. The missile was launchedfrom the Yuzhnaya-1 launch pad at thePlesetsk Cosmodrome (Arkhangelsk Oblast)and hit its target at the Kura test range inKamchatka after 23 minutes and 48 seconds.The two sites are approximately 9,000 kmapart. The launch was unprecedented in thatit tested a “lateral anti-missile maneuver,”the main object of which was to simulateavoiding anti-missile defense systems. Colo-nel General Vladimir Yakovlev, commander-in-chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces,explained: “Problems have now arisen withthe 1972 Russian-US ABM [Anti-BallisticMissile] Treaty, and therefore we have beenobliged to incorporate into our new missilesthe potential to overcome anti-missile de-fense systems.” In addition, it was the firsttime that the missile was equipped with the“terminator” navigation system. The “ter-minator” system uses the Glonass satellitenavigation system, enabling the missile to“know” its exact position throughout itsflight and communicate that information backto the ground.

Yuriy Golotyuk, Izvestiya, 5 June 1999, p. 1.

From 21 to 26 June, the Russian armed forcesconducted what was described as the larg-est military command-staff exercise of thepast 10 years, with the final stage of the exer-

cise featuring simulated nuclear strikes byair-launched cruise missiles against Europeand the United States. Code-named Zapad-99 (West-99) the exercise involved exten-sive cooperation between Russian andBelarusian forces, while Kazakhstani militaryofficers attended as observers. The Russianforces involved included all of the armedservices, with up to 50,000 troops taking part. According to Russian Defense Minister IgorSergeyev, the purpose of the exercises wasto “work out one of the provisions of theRussian military docrine—the use of nuclearweapons in the case when all other methodsof organizing defense have been ex-hausted.” While Russian Ministry of De-fense officials denied any direct link betweenthe exercise and NATO’s air campaignagainst Serbia, claiming that the exercise hadbeen planned in December 1998, several as-pects of Zapad-99 were designed to test pos-sible countermeasures to the tactics used byNATO against Serbia. The exercise includedsimulated nuclear strikes beginning on 26June, when two Tu-95 MS Bear-H bombersfrom the 22nd Guards Heavy Bomber Divi-sion flew near Iceland on a simulated cruisemissile launch mission, reportedly with theUnited States as the target. The same daytwo Tu-160 Blackjack bombers flew down thecoast of Norway, reportedly in a simulatednuclear strike against continental Europe. These strikes apparently ended the exercise,indicating that Defense Ministry plannersbelieve that escalation to limited nuclearstrikes might successfully terminate a con-flict. No cost figures for the exercise havebeen released, but the Russian press hasspeculated that the cost could run into thebillions of rubles, and may have exhaustedthe training budget for the year. Accordingto Defense Minister Sergeyev, similar exer-cises may be held every two years in thefuture.

Dmitriy Litovkin and Roman Fomishenko,Krasnaya zvezda, 13 July 1999, p. 2; AleksandrBabakin, Rossiyskaya gazeta, 26 June 1999, p. 2;Interfax, 22 June 1999; Michael R. Gordon, NewYork Times, 10 July 1999, p. A1; Interfax, 9 July1999; Yuriy Golotyuk, Izvestiya, 29 June 1999,p. 2; Vladimir Georgiyev, Nezavisimaya gazeta,p. 2; Ivan Safronov, Kommersant, 10 July 1999,p. 2; Aleksandr Koretskiy, Segodnya [Online],<http://home.eastview.com>, 2 July 1999;Anatoliy Yurkin, ITAR-TASS, 28 June 1999;Nikolay Karpov, Delovoy vtornik, No. 24, 13July 1999, p. 2.



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MissileInterfax reported on 8 March 1999 that Rus-sia intends to equip its Tupolev Tu-160, Tu-95MS, and Tu-22M2 strategic bombers with“precision cruise missiles that cannot bedetected by radar.” The cruise missiles havea range between 3,000 and 5,000 km. Accord-ing to experts from the Air Force Main Staff,plans to equip bombers with stealth cruisemissiles capable of carrying nuclear or con-ventional charges is the “most importantmodernization program for the Russian AirForce.”

Interfax, 8 March 1999.

According to reports prepared by US andIsraeli intelligence agencies, ballistic missileand nonconventional weapons technologyand expertise continue to flow from Russiato Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israeli Prime Minis-ter Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to lodgea formal complaint over Russian military aidto Iran, Iraq, and Syria during his upcomingmeeting with Russian Prime MinisterYevgeny Primakov.

Eytan Rabin, Ma’ariv (Tel Aviv), 12 March 1999,p. 4, in FBIS Document FTS19990312000642,12 March 1999.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahuannounced in Moscow on 22 March 1999that Israel and Russia have agreed to an ini-tiative to create a jointly administered mecha-nism to combat the flow of nonconventionalweapons technology and expertise fromRussia to Iran. Israeli Foreign Minister ArielSharon and Russian Foreign Minister IgorIvanov are expected to head a committee todiscuss how the mechanism will be estab-lished and function.

Danna Harman, Jerusalem Post [Online], <http://www.jpost.com>, 23 March 1999.

According to unconfirmed reports, the Rus-sian government or parties within Russia arebelieved to have supplied elements of be-tween six and ten Russian-built S-300PM[NATO designation SA-10b ‘Grumble’] sur-face-to-air missile (SAM) systems to air de-fense units of the Yugoslav Air Force beforethe launch of NATO air campaign. Accord-ing to an unidentified high-ranking Serbianmilitary source, S-300 missiles without theirself-propelled transporter-launchers were

shipped into Serbia in early 1999, concealedin railway cars carrying scrap iron. It is be-lieved that up to 20 missiles may have en-tered into Serbia in this fashion. Thehigh-ranking source noted that the MAZ-7910, which houses the Flap Lid B radar ve-hicle/command post, was difficult to deliverclandestinely and added that the delivery ofthe 36D6 Clam Shell target designation andtracking radar, which is a part of the S-300SAM system, was interrupted by NATObombings. However, Yugoslav engineersclaimed to have successfully modified theexisting P-15M (Squat Eye) radar and PVR-11 (Side Net) height-finder systems to bepaired with older-generation S-300 missiles.It is believed that the S-300s were deployedin the Banat plains of Vojvodina, 10 km eastof Pancevo. Serbian sources claimed that theSerbian units failed to launch the S-300 be-cause NATO aircrafts covering the F-16sbombing the Pancevo refinery detected ra-dar emissions from the Serbian launch siteand eventually destroyed the intended S-300launch site, killing several Yugoslav offic-ers. Following this, the Serbs withdrew theremaining S-300s to underground tunnels inthe Rakovica suburb south of Belgrade. TheRussian Foreign Ministry dismissed the re-ports of the alleged supply of the S-300 sys-tems to the Serbs as “speculations.”

Zoran Kusovac, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 August1999, p. 4; Interfax, 13 August 1999; ITAR-TASS, 2 August 1999.

UKRAINE

NuclearUkrainian authorities on 19 May 1999 ar-rested four Russian citizens of Armeniandescent who were attempting to smuggle 20kg of “enriched uranium ore” to WesternEurope, Fakty i Kommentarii reported on22 May 1999. Colonel Vasyl Vartsaba, headof the Transcarpathian directorate for fight-ing organized crime, said that the suspects,residents of the Krasnoyarsk and Stavropolregions of Russia, had brought the uraniumto Ukraine in December 1998, hoping to finda buyer. They originally hoped to sell it for$60,000/kg, which would have netted them$1.2 million, but later reduced their askingprice to $35,000/kg. After several weeks ofsearching for a buyer, they made a deal in

the town of Berehovo (located near theUkrainian-Hungarian border) to sell 2 kg ofthe uranium. When one of the suspects metwith the buyer to complete the deal, carryingthe uranium in a sports bag, he was arrestedat the Berehovo bus station. The police be-lieve that the smuggler was planning to mar-ket the uranium in Western Europe. Afterhis arrest, the suspect told the police thatanother 18 kg of uranium was buried outsidea house in nearby village, and it was subse-quently recovered. The material was sent toUzhorod State University for analysis,where physicists said it was “enriched ura-nium ore.” The level of enrichment was notspecified. According to the report, the ura-nium “is known to have been stolen at a ra-dioactive materials recycling facility inKrasnoyarsk.” This information comes frompolice interrogation of one of the suspects.If this report is accurate, the facility involvedis probably the Mining and Chemical Com-bine in Zheleznogorsk (formerly known asKrasnoyarsk-26), which is located inKrasnoyarsk Kray. Other sources, however,report that the material involved is low-en-riched uranium metal suitable for making fuelfor RBMK-type reactors. The material’sproperties and origin may be clarified by asecond examination by the Kiev Institute ofNuclear Research, the main expert organiza-tion consulted by Ukrainian authorities innuclear smuggling cases. The suspectedsmugglers will be charged with violating Sec-tion 1 of Article 228-2 of the Ukrainian Crimi-nal Code, and could receive up to five yearsin prison if convicted.

Yaroslav Halas, Fakty i Kommentarii, 22 May1999; Oleksandr Ilchenko, Segodnya (Kiev), 21May 1999, pp. 1-3; Aleksey Breus, NucleonicsWeek, 27 May 1999, pp. 15-16.

LATIN AMERICA

BRAZIL

MissileUkrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs BorisTarasyuk announced on 28 April 1999 thatUkraine will use Brazil’s Alcântara aerospace

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facility to launch satellites into orbit. Ukraineplans to carry out its first launches fromAlcântara in the next two years. A formalagreement for space cooperation was sched-uled to be signed in May 1999 when Brazil-ian Minister for Special Projects and AffairsRonaldo Sardenberg visits Kiev. Brazil’sInfraero, Italy’s Fiat-Avia, and Ukraine’sYuzmash and Yuzhnoye firms are expectedto collaborate in marketing Alcântara’sspace launch services. Tarasyuk also dis-cussed possible Ukrainian-Brazilian coopera-tion on uranium enrichment and reactorconstruction during his visit.

Correio Brasiliense (Brasilia), 29 April 1999, inLexis-Nexis [Online], <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>, 4 May 1999.

Five military officers and 13 civilians are thefirst to complete a two-year course in liquidpropulsion technology for rockets at Brazil’sAeronautical Technology Institute (ITA).The course was administered by 30 expertsfrom the Moscow Aviation Institute in con-junction with the ITA. Aluzio Weber, direc-tor of Brazil’s Aerospace Technical Center(CTA), said that “this is the first step towardsdeveloping, in Brazil, rockets run on liquidpropellant.” Brazil reportedly plans to de-velop liquid-fueled space launch vehicles tocomplement its solid-fueled Satellite LaunchVehicle (Veículo Lançador de Satelites-VLS).

Virginia Silveira, Gazeta Mercantil (Saõ Paulo), 3June 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990603001829, 3 June 1999.

CUBA

NuclearOn 12 May 1999, members of the Intergov-ernmental Russo-Cuban Commission forTrade, Economic, Scientific and TechnicalCooperation, met in Moscow to discusscompletion of Cuba’s Juragua nuclear powerplant as well as other matters. Russian andCuban officials reportedly agreed to form ajoint venture that will seek internationalpartners to finance construction of twoVVER-40 reactors at Juragua. The project isestimated to cost up to $700 million to com-plete.

Nuclear News, July 1999, p. 51.

VENEZUELA

MissileThe Dutch defense firm Signaal has won acontract from the Venezuelan Ministry ofDefense (MoD) to integrate fire-control op-erations of Barak-1 surface-to-air missilespurchased from Israel with Venezuela’s ex-isting anti-aircraft artillery. Signaal will sup-ply its Flycatcher Mk2 all-weatherfire-control radar system to coordinate op-erations between the two systems. The Fly-catcher Mk2 system is reportedly capable ofidentifying and tracking up to four targetssimultaneously at a maximum range of 20km.

Patrick J. O’Donoghue, Vheadline, 26 May 1999,in FBIS Document FTS19990526001956, 26May 1999.

MIDDLE EAST ANDAFRICA

ANGOLA

MissileUnconfirmed intelligence reports state thatJonas Savimbi’s National Union for the To-tal Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebelgroup may have received more than 20 Rus-sian-built FROG-7 artillery rockets, andthree Mi-25 Hind military helicopters fromUkraine. According to the reports, UNITAmay take delivery of an additional seven Mi-25 helicopters from Ukraine.

Mail & Guardian (Johannesburg), 19 March 1999,in FBIS Document FTS199903360001092, 19March 1999.

EGYPT

NuclearAccording to media sources in Cairo, the USgovernment has reportedly offered Egypt$200 million in exchange for delaying itsnuclear power program. Sources say that theUS government offered to assign US com-panies to build non-nuclear power stations,which would cost $200 million and would bepaid by the US Exports Bank as a non-re-turnable loan. The Egyptian sources also say

that the United States agreed to finance sta-tions for the BOT system [likely to mean“Build-Operate-Transfer” processed] andthe generation of electricity by use of windand solar energy, in return for Egypt’s post-ponement of its nuclear program. There isno report on the Egyptian government’s re-sponse to the US offer. However, Egypt’selectricity ministry has asked Canada andGermany to supply it with small nuclear re-actors with capacities between 100,000kWand 150,000kW and a life span of 50 years.These reactors are known for their safety lev-els at comparably lower prices than their UScounterparts.

‘Adil al-Jawjari, Al-Mustaqillah (London), 22 June1999, p.6, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990624000932, 22 June 1999.

MissileOn 11 March 1999, US Secretary of DefenseWilliam Cohen announced the Clintonadministration’s approval of a $3.2 billionmilitary assistance package requested byEgypt. Pending congressional approval, thepackage will provide Egypt with an eight-missile fire unit of Patriot PAC-3 surface-to-air missiles, 24 F-16 fighter aircraft, and 200M-1A1 tank kits to be assembled in Egypt.The tank kits and F-16 aircraft will be deliv-ered over the next two years. The Patriotmissile system will not be delivered for sev-eral years, however, as it is still undergoingtesting in the United States. Following theannouncement, Cohen met with Israeli PrimeMinister Benjamin Netanyahu to assure himthat the United States remains “committedto Israel’s qualitative edge in military capa-bility to protect its people.”

Linda D. Kozaryn, American Forces Press Ser-vice [Online], <http://www.defenselink.mil/news>,11 March 1999; John Diamond, WashingtonTimes, 12 March 1999, p. 15.

IRAN

NuclearRussian Minister of Atomic EnergyYevgeniy Adamov informed Interfax that Iranhas officially offered to expand its coopera-tion with Russia on the peaceful use ofnuclear energy and explore the possibility ofbuilding a second unit at the Bushehrnuclear power plant. Adamov said that bothsides should carefully study the feasibility



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of constructing a second reactor at the Bu-shehr nuclear power plant. He added thatRussia had not yet decided on this offer.Russia is continuing the work on the firstblock, which “is going actively enough,strictly in line with the contract,” Adamovsaid.

Interfax, 8 May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990508000294, 8 May 1999.

After Iranian President MohammadKhatami’s five-day state visit to Saudi Arabia,Iran and Saudi Arabia issued a joint state-ment. The Saudi news agency SPA reportsthat the two countries “expressed their sup-port for turning the Middle East into a zonefree from weapons of mass destruction, in-cluding nuclear weapons, expressing theirabsolute belief that Israel’s policy, based onproducing and stockpiling types of weap-ons of mass destruction and its non-compli-ance with international laws and treatiesposes a real and serious threat to peace andsecurity in the region.”

SPA (Riyadh), 19 May 1999 in BBC [Online],<http://www.bbc.co.uk>, 19 May 1999.

The Czech daily Mlada fronta Dnes reportedon 19 May 1999 that Czech government of-ficials do not intend to block the sale of com-ponents to Iran for its Bushehr nuclearpower plant despite US pressure to cancelthe sale. However, Michael Zantovsky, chair-man of the Czech government’s Foreign Af-fairs, Defense, and Security committee, saidthat the proposed sale should be studied“very carefully” but that cooperation withIran should not be ruled out. Zantovsky alsosaid that he would ask Deputy Premier EgonLansky for more information about the sale.Premier Milos Zeman has not made a clearstatement on the issue. According to the 24May issue of the Iran Report, Zeman statedthat “Iran is not Iraq” to justify the sale ofnuclear reactor components to Iran. Accord-ing to Lansky, money is the deciding factor.The total amount of the contracts is worthapproximately $200 million, and Iran is alsorecruiting Czech scientists to work in theBushehr nuclear power plant. Representa-tives from the Czech firm Skoda met withmembers of the Atomic Energy Organizationof Iran and the Russian Ministry of Atomic

Energy to discuss the sale of “cooling andventilation equipment and a steam turbine,”among other items. The Czech governmentwas expected to decide on whether to pro-ceed with the sale on 9 June 1999.

CTK (Prague), 19 May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990519001110, 19 May 1999, CTK(Prague), 19 May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990519000090, 19 May 1999; Bill Samii,Iran Report [Online], <http://www.rferl.org/iran-report>, 24 May 1999; CTK (Prague), 7 June1999, in FBIS Document FTS19990607000384,7 June 1999.

MissileThe New Jersey Justice Department said thatDaniel Malloy, president and part owner ofthe New Jersey-based International Heli-copter Inc., admitted he shipped missile andmilitary jet parts to Iran between January 1996and September 1997. The shipments werefirst made to Joseph Balakrishna Menon inSingapore, owner of Heli-World Aviation,Ltd., who then sent them to Iran. Spare partsfor the Northrop F-5 fighter, the Pratt andWhitney TF30 military jet engine, theGrumman F-14A fighter and 100 batteries forthe Hawk surface-to air missile were shipped,according the Justice Department report.Malloy is to pay more than two million dol-lars in fines and serve between five and 10years in prison for the illegal exports. Malloyadmitted to falsely declaring the shipmentsto US Customs as “commercial aircraft parts.”Malloy had not registered as an exporter withthe State Department. US Customs and De-fense Logistics Agency officials began scru-tinizing Malloy’s activities when in February1997 he ordered 20 missile batteries from aMissouri company that could only be usedfor the AIM-54 Phoenix missile on the F-14A. In the 1970s, the United States soldPhoenix-equipped jets to Iran.

Agence France Presse, 4 March 1999.

According to Japanese officials, North Ko-rean technicians assisted with the produc-tion of Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile. TheNorth Koreans reportedly used the sameequipment used to produce the Nodong bal-listic missile. The Shahab-3, which was testedin 1998, can reach targets in Israel, SaudiArabia, and Southern Russia. Iranian offi-cials reported that only Iranian technicians

and equipment were involved in productionof the missile.

Iran Times (Washington, DC), 5 March 1999, inTAAS (Tokyo), 25 February 1999.

The Iran Brief reports that in February 1999,Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani saidthat Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile is “fullyoperational.” A top secret US intelligencereport indicates that Iranian PresidentMohammed Khatami has ordered the pro-duction of 15 Shehab-3 missiles, to be de-ployed in underground bunkers nearKhorramabad, Iran. According to sourcesfamiliar with the report, Iran is expected toflight test its 2,000 km-range Shehab-4 bal-listic missile by 2002, several years earlierthan originally anticipated. The Shehab-4 isbelieved to be based heavily on the RussianR-12 [NATO designation SS-4 ‘Sandel’] in-termediate-range ballistic missile. Shamkhanihas said that the Shehab-4 “will have no mili-tary purpose” and is “intended to carry sat-ellites into orbit.” Shamkhani has also saidthat the Shehab-4 will use the same RD214engines that are used in the R-12. In October1998, Russia’s Energomash and Khrunichevfirms delivered RD214 engines to Iran.

Iran Brief (Bethesda, MD), 8 March 1999, pp. 4-5.

According to US government officials fa-miliar with classified US intelligence reports,Iran test-launched a short-range ballisticmissile from a barge in the Caspian Sea in1998. The missile is believed to have beenliquid-fueled and may have been based onRussian sea-launched ballistic missile de-signs. Western analysts believe that Irancould equip cargo ships with sea-launchedballistic missiles to directly threaten theUnited States or Middle Eastern countriessuch as Israel.

Iran Brief (Bethesda, MD), 8 March 1999, pp. 1-3.

IRNA reported that Iran has successfullytested a surface-to-air missile (SAM) namedSayyad-1. Quoting Keyvan Khosravi, thespokesman of the Iranian Ministry of De-fense and Armed Forces Logistics, IRNAreports that the missile successfully de-stroyed a target drone at the desired alti-tude. Khosravi added that the missile, whichis named after army commander Lieutenant-

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General Ali Sayyad Shirazi who was killedon 10 April 1999, is designed and con-structed by the Aerospace Industries Orga-nization, an affiliate of the Iranian DefenseMinistry.

IRNA (Tehran) [Online], <http://www.irna.com>,14 April 1999.

Grigoriy Rapota, general director of Russia’sRosvoorouzhenie arms export agency, saidon 21 April 1999 that the company has com-mitted itself under the provisions of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to end allmilitary-technical cooperation with Iran bythe end of 1999. Rapota declared that “as astate company, Rosvoorouzhenie strictlyobserves the law and therefore has no rightto sign new contracts (with Iran).” He addedthat the company would resume arms salesto Iran once the ban on such transactions islifted.

Interfax (Moscow), 21 April 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990421000619, 21 April 1999.

The Tel Aviv-based Ha’aretz newspaper re-ported on 20 June 1999 that Iranian Presi-dent Mohammed Khatami is seeking to opena secret dialogue with the Israeli govern-ment aimed at improving relations betweenthe two countries through the implementa-tion of confidence-building measures. Uni-dentified senior British government officialssaid that they received the Iranian requestand relayed it to Israeli leaders. The Britishsources said that Khatami’s two major sug-gestions were: “a regional agreement amongall Middle Eastern countries possessingground-to-ground missiles not to launch apre-emptive missile attack on another coun-try that is a party to the agreement;” and “abilateral agreement regarding the disarma-ment of long-range ballistic missiles withnon-conventional warheads, to be followedby a treaty in which both sides would under-take not to develop long-range missiles formilitary purposes, but solely for the launch-ing of satellites into space.” On 21 June 1999,the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA)carried a story describing the Ha’aretz re-port as “baseless.”

Sharon Sadeh, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online],<http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 20 June 1999;IRNA (Tehran) [Online], <http://www.irna.com>,21 June 1999.

The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force(IRIAF) recently unveiled two new laser-guided air-to-surface missiles, which werebuilt under Project ASSR-67, at Tactical AirBase 1 in Mehrabad, Iran. The Sattar-1, whichreportedly has a 20-km range, closely re-sembles a combination of the US-builtHAWK surface-to-air missile and the AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile. The Sattar-2,which is reportedly designed and manufac-tured by Iran, is equipped with a Paveway-type search sensor and has a 30-km range.The two missiles are apparently for use byIranian F-4E and F-5E fighter aircraft.

Homa Farmehr, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 30 June1999, p.18.

IRAQ

NuclearThe New Yorker magazine reported on 28March 1999 that US and British intelligenceofficials believe that Iraq paid Russian PrimeMinister Yevgeny Primakov $800,000 in No-vember 1997 for “strategic materials fromMoscow to build up its nuclear weaponsstockpile.” The report claimed that “while itwas not clear how Primakov was identified,the intelligence officials say it was traceableto the Russian Prime Minister.” The reportquoted former head of the UN Special Com-mission on Iraq (UNSCOM) Rolf Ekeus assaying “Russia is hopeless now. It is clearthat Russia is not making a serious effort tocontrol events. [Iraqi President SaddamHussein] will get a bomb, because thesematerial are floating in. Every day, they aremore advanced.”

Reuters, 28 March 1999.

According to the London-based ForeignReport, the Iraqis have accelerated their huntfor components to develop nonconventionalweapons and ballistic missiles while West-ern intelligence agencies have been preoc-cupied with the crisis in the Balkans. Iraq’schemical and biological warfare programscould be resumed within the next ninemonths and its nuclear weapons programcould be resumed within the next 18 months.Iraq’s nuclear weapons program has report-edly been helped by Russian scientists em-ployed by the Iraqi government and theIraqis have tried to purchase parts for ballis-

tic missiles in Eastern Europe.Douglas Davis, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (Lon-don), [Online] http://www.jta.org, 3 June 1999.

Iraq accused Iran on 11 June of firing threelong-range, surface-to-surface missiles at abase of the Iranian opposition group,Mujaheddin-i Khalq Organization (MKO),located deep inside Iraq. Iraq has threatenedto retaliate for this attack. An MKO spokes-man said that three Scud-B missiles landedon their base, approximately 110 km north-east of Baghdad, and another Scud explodedin mid-air. He said that the missiles werelaunched by the Iranian RevolutionaryGuard Corps from the Iranian city ofBakhtaran (western Iran), approximately 700km from the MKO base. The leader of theIranian opposition sent a letter to the Secre-tary General of the United Nations, KofiAnnan, accusing Iraq of the attack.

Al-Khaleej (Dubai) [Online], <http://www.alkhaleej.co.ae>, 12 June 1999.

On 15 June 1999 in the Bavarian High Court,German engineer Karl-Heinz Schaab con-fessed to illegally selling blueprints for a gasultra-centrifuge to Iraqi buyers in Septem-ber 1989. He said that the Iraqis paidDM100,000 for the plans in sales totalingDM980,000. Schaab also said that he knewthe blueprints could be used to produceweapons-grade uranium in militarily signifi-cant quantities. According to Schaab, a col-league, Bruno Stemmler, acquired the plansthat were subsequently sold to Iraqi busi-nessmen in Vienna, Austria. Schaab addedthat he met with Iraqi scientists in Baghdadon five occasions. The court found Schaabguilty of treason on 29 June, and sentencedhim to five years in prison.

Robert Jaquet, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich)[Online], <http://www.sueddeutsche.de>, 16 June1999; AFP (Munich), 16 June 1999, in Taz, dietageszeitung [Online], <http://www.taz.de>, 16June 1999; AP (Munich), 14 June 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 14June 1999; Deutschlandfunk Network (Cologne),29 June 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990629000348, 29 June 1999.

MissileOn 10 March 1999, the Russian arms exportagency Rosvoorouzhenie denied sendingany anti-aircraft systems to Iraq, and added



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that it has not aided Iraq in the moderniza-tion or maintenance of its air defenses.Deputy Head of Rosvoorouzhenie’s anti-air-craft systems exports division SergeyKulakov said at a 10 March Moscow newsconference that all contacts with Iraq weresuspended once the United Nations imposedsanctions on the country. Kulakov did say,however, that Rosvoorouzhenie has sup-plied arms to Iran in quantities that the Rus-sian government permits. Vladimir Svetlov,director general of the Fakel Design Bureau,said that in his opinion all Iraqi air defenseswere destroyed during the 1990-91 Gulf War.Svetlov said that Fakel has no business withIraq, even though Iraq has sought contactswith his company. “If Iraq had Russian anti-aircraft systems,NATO pilots would notfind flying over [Iraq] so easy,” he said.

Interfax, 10 March 1999, in Lexis-Nexis[Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 11 March1999.

Unidentified Middle Eastern sources haveindicated that Ukraine and Iraq signed a se-cret military cooperation agreement in No-vember 1998. The agreement, which wouldbe in violation of UN sanctions against Iraq,allegedly provides for the export of Ukrai-nian industrial equipment to Iraq in ex-change for Iraqi oil. The agreement wasreportedly signed by the chief executives oftwo Ukrainian arms companies, a senior Iraqidiplomat, and representatives of an Iraqiarms firm. According to the Middle Easternsources, the tractor engines, trucks, heavyvehicles, generators, tires, gears, and elec-trical circuitry that Ukraine reportedly plansto ship to Iraq could be used to overhaulmissile launchers and upgrade tanks. Thesources also suggested that the agreementcould be a model for future military coopera-tion pacts between Ukraine and Iraq onceUN sanctions against Iraq are lifted.

Foreign Report (London), 20 April 1999, in FBISDocument FTS19990421001682, 20 April 1999.

ISRAEL

NuclearA draft bill under consideration by the USSenate Armed Forces Committee couldban Israeli scientists from working at USnuclear laboratories. The bill, introducedby Senate Intelligence Committee chair-

man Richard Shelby, labels Israel as a“sensitive” country, thus banning its sci-entists from working at US nuclear labora-tories. A Senate Armed Forces Committeespokesperson said that the Department ofEnergy (DOE) includes Israel on its list ofsensitive countries because it has notsigned the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). OtherMiddle Eastern states listed as “sensitive”by the DOE include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan,and Syria.

Ran Dagoni, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], <http://www.globes.co.il>, 4 May 1999.

MissileAccording to the Tel Aviv-based Globesnewspaper, Israel is requesting US finan-cial and political support to develop a newmissile defense system known as BoostPhase Launcher Intercept (BPLI). BPLI isdescribed as a refinement of the IsraeliBoost Phase Intercept System (IBIS), andenvisions using unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs) to destroy enemy ballistic missilelaunchers as they attempt to fire missilesat Israel. The UAVs would be equippedwith infrared guided missiles that woulddetect the heatsignature of an initial mis-sile launch and destroy the launcher. BPLIdiffers from the earlier IBIS concept, whichinvolved destroying ballistic missiles af-ter they were launched and not the launch-ers themselves. US Department ofDefense officials estimate that the devel-opment cost of the BPLI could reach $500million over four to five years, with thecost of deployment reaching up to $1 bil-lion.

Ran Dagoni, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], <http://www.globes.co.il>, 23 March 1999.

On 20 March 1999, the Israeli navy took de-livery of the first of three Dolphin-class sub-marines from the German Ministry ofDefense. The 1,700-ton diesel-electric sub-marine has 10 torpedo tubes capable of fir-ing torpedoes, missiles, mines, and decoys.A senior Israeli military source said that theDolphin submarines will “create a new era”for Israeli navy strategy. The first Dolphin isscheduled to be piloted to Israel later in1999, with the second boat scheduled to be

commissioned by the end of 1999 and thethird in 2000.

Amnon Barzilai, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online],<http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 30 March1999.

Based on a report published by the JaffeeCenter for Strategic Studies at Tel AvivUniversity, Ha’aretz defense correspondentAmnon Barzilai reports that Israel has devel-oped a third generation of Jericho surface-to-surface missiles. The information, whichaccording to Barzilai is based on foreign re-ports, adds that the original Jericho missilehad a range of 1,500 km.

Amnon Barzilai, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online],<http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 12 April 1999.

Following his 27 April 1999 meeting withChinese leaders in Beijing, Israeli PresidentEzer Weizman said that Russian missile salesto Syria pose a greater threat to Israel thanChinese weapon sales to Iran. According toWeizman, Syria’s Russian-supplied ballisticmissiles pose the greatest military threat toIsrael.

Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], <http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 28 April 1999.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staffhas held a series of meetings to reassess thethreats facing Israel. Distant states such asIran and Iraq that are developing long-rangeballistic missiles and weapons of mass de-struction (WMD) are now considered to bethe primary security threat. These states werepreviously considered a secondary threat,less dangerous than the prospect of a largeconventional war with Israel’s immediateneighbors. Israeli planners believe that thethreat posed by distant WMD and missile-armed states jeopardizes Israel’s existence,and is likely to grow in the future.

Ze’ev Schiff, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv), 5 May 1999,p. B1, in FBIS Document FTS19990507001392,5 May 1999.

The future of Israel’s Moav air-to-air missileappears uncertain due to disagreements inIsrael’s defense establishment over thesystem’s merits. The Moav is designed foruse by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) tointercept and destroy enemy ballistic mis-siles during their vulnerable boost phase. Inlate 1998, Israeli defense establishment offi-

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cials agreed to move to the second phase ofthe Moav’s development and allocatedfunding for it. However, Major General YitzhakBen Israel, head of the Israeli DefenseMinistry’s weapons development authority,decided against proceeding with the project.Ben Israel’s decision, which went against of-ficial Defense Ministry policy, was based onhis opinion that the Moav project faced toomany technical hurdles to be successful. Dueto Ben Israel’s action, the Defense Ministryfailed to submit a formal request for US fund-ing and the United States thus has not allo-cated any funds for the Moav project in its2000 budget.

Reuven Pedatzur, Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online],<http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 25 May 1999.

The US Army Space and Missile DefenseCommand (SMDC) and US defense contrac-tor TRW have reached a tentative agreementto restructure their contract for developmentof the US-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser(THEL). TRW told the SMDC in late May1999 that it intended to pull out of the projecteffective 1 June 1999 due to disputes overliability for cost over-runs. Under the origi-nal contract, TRW was liable for 100 percentof the cost over-runs. Under the new con-tract the liability will be split with TRW as-suming half the burden and the US and Israeligovernments liable for the remaining 50 per-cent. These terms will be in effect until theTHEL achieves its first intercept of a target,following which TRW’s liability will be re-duced to 25 percent of the total with the restshared between the United States and Is-rael. TRW has agreed to provide “a techni-cal data package, a ‘predictive avoidanceanalysis’ year 2000 certification and addi-tional data reports” not included under theterms of the original contract. The UnitedStates and Israel have spent a combined$130.8 million on the THEL project, which isdesigned to provide Israel with a laser sys-tem for destroying artillery rockets launchedat the country from positions in Lebanon.TRW has spent $21.5 million on the project,which is expected to cost another $50 mil-lion to complete.

Michael C. Sirak, Inside the Pentagon, 2 June1999, p. 1.

According to Israeli Defense Ministry Di-rector-General Ilan Biran, the Arrow anti-mis-sile system will be on display at the Paris AirShow even though it is not for sale. “TheArrow system is not for sale,” Biran said,denying that Turkey and India may be nego-tiating with the United States and Israel topurchase it. Biran added that Israel hopedto deploy the system between the end of1999 and the beginning of 2000. Speakingat the event, Israeli Defense Minister MosheArens said on 13 June 1999 that the Arrowsystem could be used to protect not just Is-rael, but also Jordan, Turkey, and the WestBank from regional ballistic missile threats.Arens said that he has discussed such apossibility with US Secretary of DefenseWilliam Cohen and expects the United Statesto grant Israel approval to sell the Arrowsystem to other countries. The Paris AirShow marked the debut of the Etrog Zahav(Golded Citron) command-and-control sys-tem produced by Israel’s Tadiran defensefirm. The system is used to manage opera-tions of the Arrow system.

Heidi Gleit, Jerusalem Post [Online], <http://www.jpost.co.il>, 8 June 1999; Amnon Barzilai,Ha’aretz (Tel Aviv) [Online], <http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng/>, 14 June 1999.

On 15 June 1999, US defense manufacturerRaytheon and Israel Aircraft Industries(IAI) announced they had signed an agree-ment for joint development of an unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV) based on IAI’s HarpyUAV. Israeli Ministry of Defense Director-General Ilan Biran said that the new UAV,dubbed Cutlass, “can serve for hunting downballistic missile launchers, and for suppress-ing enemy air-defense systems.” Marketingefforts for the Cutlass will reportedly focusprimarily on the US military.

Dror Marom, Globes (Tel Aviv) [Online], <http://www.globes.co.il>, 15 June 1999.

At the June 1999 Paris Air Show, Israel Air-craft Industries announced that its MABATdivision is developing a “next generation”version of its Gabriel anti-ship cruise mis-sile. The new missile will reportedly haveover-the-horizon range and, according toMABAT manager Yitzhaq Nisan, “will be

able to penetrate any naval defense systemknown today.”

Arye Egozi, Yedi’to Aharonot (Tel Aviv), 15 June1999, p.5, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990627001132, 15 June 1999.

Israel Air Force (IAF) Commander-in-ChiefMajor-General Eitan Ben-Eliahu said that theIAF has successfully completed a three-yearinitiative to develop means to counter thethreat posed to Israel by surface-to-surfacemissiles. Ben-Eliahu said that the IAF pack-age of measures includes pilot training,force exercises, and “adapting our command-and-control system to run this sort of mis-sion.” According to Ben-Eliahu, the IAFconducted training scenarios to combat mis-sile attacks from countries directly border-ing Israel and from more distant countries.

Arieh O’Sullivan, Jerusalem Post [Online], <http://www.jpost.com>, 28 June 1999.

JORDAN

NuclearOn 13 June 1999, Jordanian King Abdullahand Bahraini Amir Shaykh Hamad Bin IsaAl Khalifa issued a joint communiquJ‚ which“stressed the need to pressure Israel to jointhe [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons] and to bring Israelinuclear establishments into the interna-tional inspection and monitoring system.”

Petra (Amman) [Online], <http://accessme.com/Petra>, 13 June 1999.

LEBANON

NuclearLebanese security agents have arrested twomen, Fu’ad ‘Abduh al-Shuwayri and ButrusMichael Najim, who were allegedly attempt-ing to sell 6 kg of uranium to Syrian nation-als with close connections to Iran.Al-Shuwayri told interrogators that he de-veloped a friendship with Syrian nationalMakram Sukkariyah. While visitingSukkariyah’s Damascus home, al-Shuwayrimet Suhayl Lurba, and an engineer knownonly as Ahmad. Ahmad allegedly told al-Shuwayri that he possessed 6 kg of a radio-active substance, which he would like to sellto people linked with Hezbollah or Iran for$210 million. Later, al-Shuwayri, Sukkariyah,and Najim met at Lurba’s Damascus home.



198

At Lurba’s home, Najim met ‘Ali NayaziDandash who reportedly had close links withTehran, and offered to sell him a sample ofthe uranium. Dandash agreed and Najim thencontacted Ahmad to obtain a uraniumsample. Najim said that he provided Dandashwith the sample in a glass tube wrapped inblack adhesive tape. Dandash took thesample to Tehran and returned to Lebanon45 days later. Upon his return, Dandash toldNajim that he would buy the uranium andgave him the glass tube and a check for $5million, drawn on the Iran Exports Bank inBeirut, as a down payment. Najim said thatbefore his arrest, Dandash gave him a sec-ond check for 400 billion Iranian riyals. Al-Shuwayri and Najim also said that whenDandash returned the glass tube containingthe sample to them, the uranium had beenreplaced by a charcoal-like substance.

Al-Nahar (Beirut), 18 March 1999, in FBIS Docu-ment FTS19990318001196, 18 March 1999.

In his opening remarks to the eighth gather-ing of Mediterranean news agencies inBeirut, Anwar al-Khalil, the Lebanese min-ister of information, stated, “what greaterthreat can there be in the region than theinsistence of the Zionist regime [Israel] oncontinuing its program of producing nuclearweapons and [weapons] of mass destruc-tion.” He asked the participants of the gath-ering to decide on ways to alleviate thenuclear threats to the region coming fromIsrael.

IRNA (Tehran) [Online], <http://www.irna.com>,24 June 1999.

LIBYA

NuclearIn March 1998, Russia’s Atomenergoeksportcompany and Libya signed an $8 million dealfor partial overhauling of the Tajura nuclearresearch center near Tripoli. The Tajuranuclear center has a Soviet-built 10-MW re-search reactor and a staff of 750. The Libyannuclear program lacks technical expertise,finances, and the support of foreign suppli-ers. However, this is expected to change withRussian involvement. Libya’s Soviet-eraplans to purchase an 800-MW nuclear power

station from Russia for $4 billion may alsobe revived.

Foreign Report (London), 22 April 1999, inInquisit [Online], <http://www.inquisit.com>, 22April 1999.

MissileRussia is planning to sell S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to Libya. Accord-ing to Yuri Rodin-Sofa, the president ofOboronitelnyye Sistemy [Defense Sys-tems], the firm that produces the missiles,“since the lifting of the United Nationssanctions against Tripoli, Libya has beenplaced at the top of the list [of potentialbuyers].” He added that a proposed com-prehensive air-defense package for Libyawill be based on S-300PMU-1 and S-300PMU-2 SAM systems. The report inAl-Hayat adds that Rosvoorouzhenie,Russia’s principal arms export intermedi-ary company, will handle the weapon salesto Libya.

Al-Hayat (London), 24 April 1999, p. 6.

SAUDI ARABIA

NuclearA delegation of Saudi Arabian govern-ment officials, led by Prince Sultan Bin-‘Abd-al-‘Aziz, toured Pakistani nuclearfacilities and the ballistic missile develop-ment facility on 7 May 1999. The Saudidelegation was accompanied by PakistaniPrime Minister Nawaz Sharif and otherPakistani government officials. The visi-tors went to the Kahuta research centerand the center of nuclear research and themissile and nuclear weapons programs ledby A.Q. Khan. Khan briefed Sultan on ura-nium enrichment processes.

Al-Sharq-al-Awsat (London), internet version, 9May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990509000652, 9 May 1999.

In an interview with Al-Sharq al-Aswat,Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah de-fended the right of Iran to arm itself. “Iranhas every right to develop its defense ca-pabilities for its security without harmingothers, we also do the same. All countriesfollow the same policy, then why only Iranis singled out here without mentioningothers. Why don’t you ask about the Is-

raeli armament and its unlimited weaponsdevelopment program. If people intention-ally neglect such a development they haveto review it.” According to an article inthe Tehran Times, “The crown prince evenscolded those who target Iran with base-less, vitriolic propaganda, all the whilewillfully ignoring the immense thermo-nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenalsthat Israel has amassed illegally.”

Reuters (Riyadh), 1 June 1999, in CNN [Online],<http://www.cnn.com>, 2 June 1999; TehranTimes (Tehran) [Online], <http://www.tehrantimes.com>, 4 June 1999.

SOUTH AFRICA

NuclearOn 28 April 1999, Russia and South Africasigned an agreement on the formation of ajoint intergovernmental committee ontrade and economic cooperation, and onthe development of mining, and a declara-tion of cooperation in nuclear energy. Thisdeclaration provides for the initiation ofcontacts between the two countries re-garding developing modular heliumnuclear reactors. These reactors are con-sidered to be among the safest.

Interfax, 28 April 1999.

The German company HTR GmbH (a jointventure made up of Siemens and AseaBrown Boveri) signed a licensing and co-operation deal with South African energycompany Eskom. The deal would giveEskom the right to use high-temperaturereactor technology in the construction ofsmall-scale, high-temperature, 100-MWnuclear reactors in South Africa.

SAPA, 11 May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990511001423, 11 May 1999.

Nozipho Joyce Mxakato-Diseko, SouthAfrica’s permanent representative to theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organiza-tion (CTBTO), and CTBTO chairmanWolfgang Hoffman signed South Africa’sfacilities agreement under the terms of theComprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on21 May 1999. Signing the agreement bringsSouth Africa into full compliance with theCTBT, making it the first country to reachsuch status. Construction can now begin in

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South Africa of five stations to monitor theban on nuclear explosions in the region.

SAPA, 21 May 1999, in ANC Daily News Brief-ing [Online], <http://www.anc.org.za>, 21 May1999.

MissileSouth Africa is reportedly increasing its ef-forts to sell arms to the Gulf states of theMiddle East. George Tait, a spokesman forSouth Africa’s state-owned Denel defensefirm, said that Saudi Arabia is anxious to buysurface-to-air missiles and G-6 artillery fromSouth Africa. According to South AfricanDefense Minister Joe Modise, Saudi Arabiais also interested in purchasing unmannedaerial vehicles from South Africa. Speakingat the International Defense Exposition(IDEX) ‘99 in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emir-ates, Tait said that negotiations were under-way to sell some of the same systems toKuwait and Qatar in contracts that could beworth “several millions” of dollars.

SAPA, 16 March 1999, in ANC Daily News Brief-ing [Online], <http://www.anc.org.za>, 16 March1999.

SYRIA

NuclearRussian Minister of Atomic Energy YevgenyAdamov and Ibrahim Osman, director of theSyrian Commission for Atomic Energy,signed an agreement on 18 May 1999 forRussian-Syrian cooperation on peacefuluses of nuclear energy. The agreement pro-vides for cooperation in nuclear energy, sci-ence and technology, and commerce for thenext 10 years. On 19 May, Osman signed anagreement with the Russian government forthe construction of two nuclear reactors inSyria that would be used for peaceful pur-poses. The agreement was concluded withinthe framework of the Comprehensive Co-operation Agreement, which the two coun-tries signed in 1997.

IRNA (Tehran), 19 May 1999; Al-Bayan (Dubai),23 May 1999, p. 24, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990530000096, 23 May 1999.

TURKEY

MissileTurkey and Israel are to start implementingtheir joint project to produce the Popeyeair-to-surface missile. The Israeli-designed

missiles will be produced in Turkey underthe direction of an Israeli company. Thisproject will begin immediately after obtain-ing agreement from the two countries’s fi-nance ministries, and will cost approximately$200 million.

Al-Khaleej (Dubai) [Online], <http://www.alkhaleej.co.ae>, 10 June 1999.

NuclearBulgarian customs agents at the DunavMost checkpoint on the Bulgarian-Turkishborder arrested a Turkish citizen on 29 May1999 after they found a lead container withuranium in his car. According to customsspokesperson Roumyana Kroumova, thesuspect was driving a Toyota Corina fromTurkey to Chisinau (the capital of Moldova),when his nervousness attracted the suspi-cion of customs officers at the Bulgarianborder crossing. When the officers searchedthe car, suspecting that the driver might be adrug courier, they found “a certificate for thepurchase of uranium 235,” and a 2.4 kg leadcontainer with “uranium 235.” The report isnot clear about the quantity of uraniumseized. It says that the exact amount of ura-nium in the container is unknown, but that“expectations are that it contains the stan-dard 10 g.” It also does not specify the levelof enrichment of the uranium. Specialistslater measured “weak radioactive emmissionsthrough the lead walls of the container.” Thesuspect, Uskan Hanifi, a Turkish citizen ofKurdish extraction, told police that he hadoriginally purchased the uranium in Moldovaand then taken it to Turkey in an attempt tosell it. After failing to market the material inTurkey, he was driving it back to Moldova atthe time of his arrest.

BTA (Sofia), 29 May 1999, in FBIS DocumentFTS19990529000729, 29 May 1999.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

NuclearThe United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ministerof Information and Culture ShaykhAbdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, during hisvisit to Pakistan in May, stated that Pakistancould contribute to the Middle East peaceprocess through their nuclear capabilities.“Islamabad’s nuclear capabilities can serveas a catalyst and Pakistan can play a key rolein putting tremendous pressure on Israel to

vacate the occupied territories and restorethe rights of Palestinians.”

Zulfikar Raja, Gulf News (Dubai), [Online] http://www.gulf-news.co.ae, 27 May 1999.

On 25 May 1999, UAE Minister for Informa-tion and Culture Shaykh Abdullah BinZayid Al Nuhayyan met with Pakistaninuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Kahn at A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories inRawalpindi. Zaiyid was interested in obtain-ing Pakistani help in the nuclear field. Khanreplied: “Pakistan would not present theatomic bomb or a missile on a platter butcould train UAE manpower.”

Pakistan (Islamabad), 26 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis [Online], <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>, 27May 1999; Karachi Jasarat, 26 May 1999, inFBIS Document FTS19990527000106, 28 May1999.

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