Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument, Cohen's response, and notes

5/19/2018 Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument, Cohen's response, and notes

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Political Philosophy

Allen Jeffrey GurfelHonors Essay

I.

In Chapter 7 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick presents the WiltChamberlain argument. Imagine your preferred patterned distribution of resources, D1.Now suppose basketball player Wilt Chamberlain, a great gate attraction, enters into acontract stipulating that 25 of every ticket sold is paid directly to him. By the end of theseason Chamberlain has $250,000, much higher than the average income. Is he entitled tothis income? Is the new distribution, D2, unjust? If so, why? asks Nozick, noting that noperson had any claim of distributive justice against Chamberlain in D1, that all persons at D1were free to dispose of their just shares as they pleaseda, and that their choices to do so byseeing Chamberlain play were voluntary. If D1 was a just distribution isnt D2 also just?Third parties still have their shares. And certainly those who freely transferred 25 toChamberlain have no claim on any portion of that 25. Nozick concludes that no end-state

principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized withoutcontinuous interference with peoples lives. Any favored patter would be transformed intoone unflavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, bypeople exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving things [the transferors areentitled to] to other people Any distributional pattern is overturnable by the voluntaryactions of individual persons over time.

II.

In Chapter 1 of Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality G.A. Cohen offers a response toNozicks Chamberlain argument, specifically aiming to defend socialism against the challenge

it poses.

Cohen cites Nozicks own account of just distributions: Whatever arises from a justsituation by just steps is itself just.Importing Nozicks position that steps are just if they are freeof injustice, and that they are free of injustice if they are fully voluntary on the part of allagents who take them, Cohen paraphrases: Whatever arises from a just situation as a result of fullyvoluntary transactions on the part of all the transacting agents is itself just. Cohen claims that thisprinciple is too strong to be accepted without much more defense than [Nozick] provides.Instead he suggests a more plausible principle: Whatever arises from the just situation as a result offully voluntary transactions which all transacting agents would still have agreed to if they had known what theresults of so transacting were to be is itself just. This qualification is motivated by the observation

that individuals enter into transactions for reasons, assessing the benefits to themselves ofthose transactions and acting accordingly.b Cohen argues that according to this plausible

aThere is an assumption here that a person can rightfully divest himself of the share allocated to him by D1.Cohen touches on this in section 4 of this chapter.bThis principle is intuitively plausible at least in a case like the following: a seller S is aware both that a buyer Bbelieves B will derive a certain benefit from the transaction and that B is thoroughly mistaken, ignorant ofsome negative consequence N of the transaction, but S chooses to transact without informing B of N. If,however, S and B are both ignorant of N, then transacting is not intuitively immoralbut it remains toseriously consider whether the transaction is a just.


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principle the transactions in question may be unjust. The transactors are not aware that theiractions will result not only in undesirable inequalities in the distribution of resources but alsoin inequalities of power. Nozick would have us believe of third parties that their shares areunaffected, but in fact inequalities of wealth and power have third party consequences.

Cohen correctly points out that Nozick is begging the question if he simply assumesthat any restriction on such transactions are unjust, for it will be clear that [the transactors] rights are violated only if the entitlement they received was of the absolute Nozickian sort,and this cannot be assumed. Whatever principles underlie D1 will generate restrictions onthe use of what is distributed in accordance with them. These underlying principles areprinciples of justice, which Nozick fails to canvas and investigate.

Cohen turns to consider liberty. For even if Nozick admits the justice of some givenpattern of distribution he may still reply that however just it may or may not be, it isincompatible with liberty. Nozick believes that a socialist society would have to forbidcapitalist acts between consenting adults.But presumably, in a socialist society a law againstcapitalist acts would be like a present law against eating cheese on Marsit doesnt happen

anyway. In a socialist society individuals view capitalism as unfair and instead value cooperation,equality, and community. In other words, the socialist subject would freely choose not toengage in capitalist acts. Cohen admits that this assumes a certain view of human nature, buta view Nozick has not argued against.

Even so, while a majority of the population may desire socialism and have thesubjectivity necessary to make it work, a sizable minority may be highly capitalist-minded. Ifthe minority is large enough their capitalist activity will undermine the socialist project andthus will need to be prohibited. And Cohen concedes that any but the most utopiansocialist must be willing under certain conditions to restrict the liberty of a few for the sakeof the liberty of the many. For Nozick this would constitute a violation of moral side

constraints. Nozick does not, according to Cohen, justify his deferral to side constraints, andso the socialist has nothing for which to apologize in being willing to restrict freedom inorder to expand it.c

Finally, Cohen considers the case of Z, a laborer at the bottom of the economic heapforced into a position of choosing between labor and starvation. For Nozick Z is not forcedif his position is the result of just actions undertaken by the other market participants Athrough Y. Cohen correctly points out that this makes absolutely no difference. Z is in anidentical position either way and that position is one of severely limited freedom and liberty.Liberty is not merely a matter of nominal, formal rights, of words on a page. Liberty must beaccompanied by power, by a real ability to exercise that liberty.

III.

I have now outlined Nozicks Wilt Chamberlain argument and Cohens responses. Inthis section I will take those responses and use them as starting points in mounting furtherchallenges to Nozick.

cI will later return to this argument concerning moral side constraints and their justifications.


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i.

Let us consider the following state of affairs. A state that guarantees absoluteproperty rightsin other words, liberty la Nozickextends full civil rights to a class ofpeople who were previously enslaved. These newly free individuals own no property. In

order to access essential goods, such as food, water, and shelter, they must sell the only thingthey have to sell: labor. Although the market wage for a certain job may be $15 per hour,these individuals can be hired for $1, working 15-hour days, as even this would be preferableto starvation and death. This is the case of Z as outlined by Nozick. Cohen responds, but hedoes not push the example to its logical extreme. It is certainly open to those hiring to hireindividuals of this group at obscenely exploitative wages. Their objective conditions nowmay even be worse than they were under slavery. But another option is available to thosehiring: dont hire members of this group at allinstead leave them homeless, sick, andstarving. In other words, leave them to die. And even worse: leave them to die besidewarehouses of unsold, rotting produce. For Nozick this is justice, liberty, and freedom.

It does no good to note that, since the oppressed groups starting position was

slavery, some compensation, some reparations are due. For this state of affairs or one verynear to it can be brought about at any moment should a group with sufficient economicpower choose to do so. What is it called when one group systematically immiserates orexterminates another? Genocide, and we tend not to call it just. It is in fact a paradigmaticcase of the most profound injustice.

It may seem that these are question-begging assertions about justice and injustice.Consider, however, the suspicion wed rightfully express toward a proposed moral theorythat commanded rape, murder, and theft. Or a moral theory that prescribed a principalwhereby the right action is that which brings about the most suffering for the greatestnumber. Or a moral theory that recommended eating cheese on Mars as the quintessential

human good.

Nozick is committed to endorsing as just (even if not moral) the state of affairsdescribed above. Such an endorsement follows from his commitment to a certainconception of freedom, or liberty. Just as we cant (or can we?) rule out the absurd moraltheories mentioned above, so we cant rule out this conception of liberty. But we can andshould demand a very good, even flawless, argument. Absent that, we should reject thatconception of liberty if we are more certain that the above state of affairs is unjust than weare that Nozicks arguments for his conception of liberty are solid.

ii.

Above I suggested that normative theories can rightly be judged by whether theirconsequences align or conflict with our most basic intuitions. These judgments can bedecisive when we are substantially andproperlymore sure of our intuitions than we are of thearguments grounding a given normative claim. d As Rawls wrote, Moral philosophy is

d This isnt an un-exceptionable, logical ruleIm well aware that in this world there are those who arecompletely certain of the most absurd things. I intendproperly to suggest, to recommend, an attempt at unbiasedreflection regarding ones moral intuitions. For example, if your moral view finds support across geographies,


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Socratic. Socrates shtick is precisely leading his interlocutors to conclusions they cannotaccept.

Now Id like to outline two ways of reasoning when presented with a view on justiceand the state.

If a given theory justifies an intuitively unjust, morally impermissible state of affairs,that is a point (or more) against it. If there is a nearly identical theory, leading to a nearlyidentical State, that avoids the need for such an absurd shrugging of the shoulders in the faceof obvious and profound cruelty, oppression, and paradigmatic injustice, then that theoryshould be preferred, especially if the grounds that justify the amended theory are preciselythose that were used to justify and argue for the original theory. In other words, one mightground the right to property in principles, arguments, or considerations X, Y, and Z, andfrom there derive a theory regarding the proper limits of the state. A challenger might takeup those principles X, Y, and Z and attempt to show that the original theory fails to fullydraw out their conclusions. The challenger draws those conclusions, and from there derivesan appropriately revised theory regarding the proper limits of the state. There are several

ways to judge between the two final theories. First, whose lines of reasoning from XYZ torights to a theory of the state are sounder? Second, which theory, if either, is (more) free ofinternal, seemingly irreconcilable contradictions? Third, which theory allows us to criticizestates of affairs like the one Ive described above as obviously, blatantly unjust or betteryet, prevents such a state of affairs from coming about? Or, which theory is line with ourmost strongly held, pre-philosophical moral intuitions? I shall exemplify this presently.

Private property alone offers a system in which idleness is not rewarded at theexpense of industry, a system in which those who take on the burdens of prudence andproductivity can expect to reap some reward for their virtue which distinguishes them fromthose who did not make any such effort. This is a long-standing justification of private

property. It relies on moral intuitions about just and unjust rewardeffort is appropriatelyrewarded; virtuous and prudential behaviors are thus encouraged for the betterment of oneand all.

The principles invoked by this justification are now fair game. I might try to show,then, that the very notion of just reward for effort and for undertaking the burdens ofprudence and productivity is completely empty, meaningless, incoherent, and without forceif a class of people are arbitrarily and systematically prevented from undertaking those veryburdens. Thus this line of argument for private property must clearly stipulate thatindividuals not be arbitrarily prevented from undertaking the burdens that yield reward if it isto succeed as a justification. If arbitrary discrimination constitutes precisely such a

prevention, then whatever conception of private property permits such discrimination issurely not the conception of private property justified above. For such a conception cannotpermit such discrimination lest the principles of its justification completely collapse.

times, and cultures then all the more certain you can be. This may be a hopeless approach, but I want tosuggest that we can be more certain, for example, that random killing is wrong than we can be that homosexualrelationships or wearing short sleeves are wrong. It certainly is the case that more people come around to seethose latter two as morally permissible than to the opinion that murder is morally permissible.


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The state that protects the right of private property consistent with the justification

offered above is the state that prohibits the sort of arbitrary discrimination that falls outsideof this conception of private property. Thus the prohibition does not constitute a limit onprivate property as justified above and is, rather, completely in line with that conception of

private property.

The additional bonuses are 1) that the state is acting legitimately when it enacts lawsthat prevent a state of de facto slavery from coming about and 2) that the theory has exactlythe principles and resources necessary to articulate what is fundamentally unjust about thatstate of affairs which we perceive to be blatantly unjust by the use of our most basic moralintuition.

That is the first approach. The second approach consists in mounting a directchallenge against the foundational principles of the view presented. In the case of theexample above this would mean undermining the justification for property offered.

iii.

In this subsection I challenge Nozicks foundational principle.

Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them(without violating their rights).So opensAnarchy, State, and Utopia. These natural rights arenegative, specifying what must not be done to an individual and not what must be done for him,and they exist pre-politically. Part of the message of that opening proclamation is that thereare certain things that may not be done to individuals even if, by some standard, they aresocially optimizing. The rights that individuals have are moral bulwarks against behavior thatpromotes even the most radiantor apparently radiantsocial end.


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a.

Nozick grounds his notion of liberty in self-possession, which I take to be equivalentto self-ownership.eWhatever concept of liberty or freedom follows from this, it must beadmitted that our libertyis not coextensive with ourpower. After all, I have thepowerto kill butnot the libertyto do so. There is, then, a gap between the scope of our power and the scopeof our liberty. What accounts for this limit on our power? For Nozick, our exercise of ourpower is limited by others equal self-ownership. But this is meaningless unless self-

ownership is given some sort of positive content. Call the set of actions within my power totake A and the set of actions within my liberty to take L. There are countless distinct ratiosof A to L compatible with mutual limitations on individuals abiding by Le.g. you dontappropriate my property by force, I wont appropriate your property by force; or, you wontdiscriminate in your market transactions, I wont discriminate in my market transactions; or,you can kill me in the night, I can kill you in the night. Here is the point: the assertion ofself-possession amounts to nothing but the claim that I exercise power over my body, butabsolutely nothing followsno normative claim followsfrom the fact that I exercisepower over my body. Whatever limitations L sets, these limitations are identical to anenumeration of rights and obligations. Rights and obligations must be justified, but an appealto the fact that I control my body doesnt do the trick. Most specifical ly, importantly, and

relevantly, it does not follow from the fact that I exercise control over my body that I have aclaim to anything at all in the world beyond my body, let alone a claim to an unlimitedamount of such things checked only by my ability to acquire them. To restate the point:self-possession is just shorthand for some enumeration of rights and obligations. Itprovides no justification for any ration of A to L, even if it is capable of stating what thecontent of L is.

b.

The reasoning above is a little fast and loose. Let us look closer at a specificargument from Nozick. Whether we understand the principle of self-possession as the claim

that we own ourselves or as the claim that individuals are not ownable, one thing is clear:slavery violates the principle. If it is slavery when one master compels my actions, it isequally slavery when two masters, by agreement, compel my actions. This doesnt changeeven when ten thousand masters compel my actions, my labor, under threat of force. This

eIt should be noted that it does not follow from the fact that we exercise power over our own bodies that weown ourselves in the common sense of own. Certainly, however, no one else can own us. But if no oneelse owns us, who does? The answer may be no one, an individual is not in the class of things that can beowned at all.


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doesnt change when those ten thousand masters decide commands by popular, democraticvote.

A conception of justice cannot be deduced from self-evident premises. Its justification is a

matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into oncoherent view.

Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain argument, Cohen's response, and notes

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