NOTES ON ELECTION LAWPRE-MIDTERM COVERAGE

PART I: ELECTIVE OFFICIALSElection, defined under jurisprudence.Taule v. SantosAn election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.12It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote.13Specifically, the term "election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes14which do not characterize the election of officers in theKatipunan ng mga barangay. "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute15and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed.16

Election, defined within the context of the Constitution.Javier v. COMELECThe phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in aquo warrantoproceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

Election, purpose.Lino Luna v. RodriguezThe purpose of an election is to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot.When that is done and no frauds have been committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make themannerandmethodof performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself.

Election laws, purpose.In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are determined through the will of the electorate.An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election.Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office.For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.[11]To reiterate, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes in the contested election.Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate.Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Election, classified.Regular election.SK election is not a regular election.Paras v ComelecThe evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phraseregular local electionto include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

Special ElectionSpecial Election after failure of election.Lucero v. COMELECThis "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be held.On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account offorce majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sittingen bancby a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code,viz.,(1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns.In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case.

Systems of election.a. Manual system of election.b. Automated system of election.c. Manual count during automated election.

Sec. 9, RA 8436:Sec. 9.Systems breakdown in the counting center.- In the event of a systems breakdown of all assigned machines in the counting center, the Commission shall use any available machine or any component thereof from another city/municipality upon the approval of the Commission en banc or any of its divisions.The transfer of such machines or any component thereof shall be undertaken in the presence of representatives of political parties and citizens' arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election officer of such transfer.There is a systems breakdown in the counting center when the machine fails to read the ballots or fails to store/save results or fails to print the results after it has read the ballots; or when the computer fails to consolidate election results/reports or fails to print election results/reports after consolidation.

Sec. 11, RA 9369:SEC. 11.Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follow:"SEC.13.Continuity Plan. - The AES shall be so designed to include a continuity plan in case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance of the electoral process. Activation of such continuity and contingency measures shall be undertaken in the presence of representatives of political parties and citizen's arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the election officer of such activation."All political parties and party-lists shall be furnished copies of said continuity plan at their official addresses as submitted to the Commission. The list shall be published in at least two newspaper of national of circulation and shall be posted at the website of the Commission at least fifteen (15) days prior to the electoral activity concerned."

Loong v. COMELECAs the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other machines to count the local votes in Sulu.The errors in counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of wrong sequence codes in the local ballots.The errors were not machine-related.Needless to state, to grant petitioner's prayer to continue the machine count of the local ballots will certainly result in an erroneous count and subvert the will of the electorate.Eighth.In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing.We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem.Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.Thus, we held inSumulong v. COMELEC:[28]"Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically - not from the standpoint of pure theory.The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions x x x.There are no ready made formulas for solving public problems.Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the ends of good government.In the matter of the administration of laws relative to the conduct of election, x x x we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it."In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable.It was the only way to count the decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo.The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly determined.We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436.R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work.Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.It ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

Constitutional basis for election.1987 ConstitutionArticle II, Section 1

Elective officials, enumerated.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Sections 1 & 3Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.Article VI, Section 2 & 5(1) & (2)Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twentyper centumof the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Article X, Sections 1, 15, 18 & 19Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Section 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.

R.A. 6734 or the Organic Act for ARMM as amended by R.A. 9054R.A. 6766 or the Organic Act for CAROrdillo v ComelecThe keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nadThe well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case.

From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area.Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the Autonomous Region.

If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies the Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan exercising their legislative powers over the province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government officials for so few people.:-Local Government Code of 1991Section 39Section 39.Qualifications.-(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.

Comelec Resolution, number of councilors.

President, how elected, term of office and term limit.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 4(1)Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.

Presidential term limit.Comelec Resolution, Jan. 20, 2010, 2nd Division

Pormento v Estrada

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.[6]There is in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.[7]No specific relief may conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein.[8]As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.

Difference of effects of succession on term limit between the Vice President and Vice-MayorBorja v Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, Sept. 3, 1998The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession, would be qualified to run President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have beenelectedfor purposes of the three-term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service by automaticsuccession.There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter's death, permanent disability, removal, or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming, so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the Presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the Local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one ofthem.16It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that, in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to theright to be electedas well asthe right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual hasservedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have beenelectedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

President, qualifications.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 2Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.Article IV, Section 1(3) & 2Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Natural-born Filipino, defined.Fornier v Comelec, G.R. No. 161824, March 3, 2004The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27Residence, defined.Marcos v Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.22It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. InUytengsu vs.Republic,23we laid this distinction quite clearly:There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:371. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2. Abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.38In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with anintentto supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).Domino v Comelec

It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.21"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.22"Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.23Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, IlocosSur24and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the Province of Sarangani.A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.25To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; abona fideintention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with thepurpose.26In other words, there must basically beanimusmanendicoupled withanimusnon revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.27While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.28As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.29

Residence requirement, rationale.Torayno v Comelec

Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking] an elective office to serve that community."19Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain."20Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."

Vice-President, how elected, term of office and term limit.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 4President and Vice-President, basis for proclamation.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 4(5)The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.Article IX, Section 6Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Winner, defined.Rulloda v Comelec, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003 Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office.For, in all republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.[11]Presidential and vice-presidential tie, how broken.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 4(5)The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Presidential succession, in case of vacancy at the start of term.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 7Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and qualified.If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

Presidential succession, in case of vacancy on mid-term.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 8Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

Permanent disability of the President.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 11Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.

Estrada v DesiertoThat is the law. Now, the operative facts:1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;96What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Resignation of the President.Estrada v DesiertoTo appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on thestate of mindof the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in thePhilippine Daily Inquirer.79The Angara Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential electionand stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of"dignified exit or resignation."81Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.

Vacancy in the office of the Vice-President, how filled.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 9Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

Estrada v Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.

Vacancy in both the presidency and vice-presidency, how filled.1987 ConstitutionArticle VII, Section 10Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten oclock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.Article VI, Section 25(4)

Senators, number, how elected, term of office & term limit.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 2Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.Article XVIII, Section 2(1) & 2Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

Tolentino v Comelec

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancyin the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election.Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.[28]This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority[29]and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.[30]

Article VI, Section 4Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term of which he was elected.Senator, qualifications.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 3Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

Pimentel v ComelecIn essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7or alter or enlarge the Constitution.Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13 Members of the House of Representatives, number, how elected, term of office and term limit.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 5(1), (2) & (4), Section 7Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twentyper centumof the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Number of party-list.Veterans Federation Party v Comelec, 342 SCRA 244We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation.The Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941.As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat.Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives.Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:(b)The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory.It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them.[21]But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"[22]to ensure meaningful local representation.Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition."Qualified" means having hurdled the two percent vote threshold.Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.First,the twenty percent allocation- the combined number ofallparty-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list.Second,the two percent threshold- only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;Third,the three-seat limit- each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.Fourth,proportional representation- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned parameters.After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.Step One.There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received.Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system.All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one seat each.Only these parties shall be considered in the computation ofadditionalseats.The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.Step Two.The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties.Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to twoadditionalseats.Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party.Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two reasons:(1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a seat.Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation.An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will definitelynotend up in such constitutional contravention.The Court has previously ruled inGuingona Jr. v. Gonzales[27]that a fractional membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's fractional membership.It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional representation.We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the legislature.Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court.The Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.

BANAT v Comelec, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009, BayanMuna v Comelec, G.R. No. 179295, April 21, 2009However, because the formula inVeteranshas flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.We rule that, in computing the allocation ofadditional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause ofSection 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 isunconstitutional.This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate:There are 55 available party-list seats.Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections.A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat.Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats.Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million.Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.[30]In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:1.The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.2.The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.3.Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.4.Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seatsarethe maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

Three-term limit.Purpose of term limit.Borja v Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998Indeed a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.11To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of "the term of office ofelectivelocal officials" and bars "suchofficial[s]" from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the fullterm for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for which [the official concerned] was elected." The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective local official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to theright to be electedas well asthe right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual hasservedthree consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have beenelectedto the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

Illustrations of term limit.Aldovino v Comelec, 184836, December 23, 2009

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms.A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is theabsence of apermanent replacementand thelack of the authority to appoint onesince no vacancy exists.To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability throughforce majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office.Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a term.Adopting such interruption ofactualservice as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office.The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office.The easy conclusion therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they affect the three-term limit rule.Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term.It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation.It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

Abundo v Comelec, GR No. 201716, January 8, 2013

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has beenelected for three consecutive termsin the same local government post; and

(2) that he hasfully served three consecutive terms.

As stressed inSocrates v. Commission on Elections,33rl1the principle behind the three-term limit rule covers onlyconsecutive termsand that what the Constitution prohibits is aconsecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek immediate reelection for a fourth term,34rl1albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.

There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a"voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.

While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non- candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.

Involuntary Interruption:a. Assumption of office by operation of law- The Court ruled that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor. The Court emphasized thatsuccession in local government office is by operation of lawand as such, it is an involuntary severance from office.Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to assume office as vice- mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

b. Recall election- From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,Hagedorn was simply a private citizen.This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41rl1

The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seekimmediate reelectionfor a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term [and, hence],[a]ny subsequent election, like recall election, is no longer coveredx x x.

c. Election protest-

Not an involuntary interruption:a. Conversion of a municipality into a city- This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However,the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor.Unlike inLonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitionerLatasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.

b. Period of preventive suspension- Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official's stay in office beyond three terms. Apreventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period.The best indicator of the suspended official's continuity in office is theabsence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint onesince no vacancy exists.

Members of the House of Representatives, qualifications.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 1

Party-List Representatives or Nominees, qualifications.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 5(2)Article IX(C), Section 8R.A. 7941Sections 2 & 9 Bagong Bayani-OFW v Comelec, GR No. 147589June 26, 2001 BANAT v Comelec, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009,Bayan Muna v Comelec, G.R. No. 179295,April 21, 2009Atong Paglaum v COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766,April 2, 2013

Sectors to be represented by party-list, enumerated.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 5(2)R.A. 7941Section 5

Sectors to be represented by party-list, classified.Atong Paglaum v COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, Apr. 2, 2013

Nature of constitutional & statutory enumeration ofsectors.Ang Ladlad v Comelec, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

Nature of list of nominees.BA-RA 7941 v Comelec, G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007

Vacancy in the Senate or House of Representatives,how filled.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 9R.A. 6645Sections 1 & 2R.A. 7166Section 4Tolentino v Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004Elective local officials, term of office & term limit.1987 ConstitutionArticle X, Section 8Local Government Code of 1991Section 43David v Comelec, G.R. No. 127116, April 8, 1997Elective local officials, qualifications.Local Government Code of 1991Sections 39 & 40R.A. 9164Section 7Frivaldo v Comelec, 257 SCRA 727 (1996)Labo v Comelec, 176 SCRA 1 (1989)Elective local officials, disqualifications.Local Government Code of 1991Section 40Dual citizenship.1987 ConstitutionArticle IV, Section 5Local Government Code of 1991Section 40(d)R.A. 9225Valles v Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000Mercado v Manzano, 307 SCRA 630 (1999)Labo v Comelec, 176 SCRA 1 (1989)Roseller de Guzman v Comelec, G.R. No. 180048,June 19, 2009Teodora Sobejana-Condon v Comelec, G.R. No. 198742,August 10, 2012Macquiling v Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013,Motion for Reconsideration, July 2, 2013Fugitives from justice.Marquez v Comelec, 243 SCRA 538Permanent residents in foreign country.Caasi v CA, 191 SCRA 229Omnibus Election CodeSections 12 & 68

Date of election.1987 ConstitutionArticle XVIII, Sections 1, 5Local Government CodeSection 42R.A. 7166Sections 1 & 2R.A. 9164Section 1

Adjustment of period of pre-election requirements.R.A. 8436Section 28Akbayan v Comelec, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001

Nature of Barangay elections.Omnibus Election CodeSection 38Occena v Comelec, 127 SCRA 404 (1984)

Postponement of election, grounds.Omnibus Election CodeSection 5R.A. 7166Section 4R.A. 6679Section 2Dimaporo v Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002 Postponement of election, jurisdiction. Benito v Comelec, G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001Sumbing v Davide, G.R. No. 86850 July 20, 1989Basher v Comelec, 330 SCRA 736

Failure of election, grounds.Omnibus Election CodeSection 6R.A. 7166Section 4Declaration of failure of election, jurisdiction.Benito v Comelec, G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001Loong v Comelec, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999Carlos v Angeles, 346 SCRA 571 (2000)Failure of election, grounds.Mitmug v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.106270-73, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 54Canicosa v Comelec, 282 SCRA 512Batabor v Comelec, G.R. No. 160428, July 21, 2004Sardea v Comelec, 225 SCRA 374

Special election.1987 ConstitutionArticle VI, Section 9Omnibus Election CodeSection 7R.A. 7166Section 4Fixing date of special election.Pangandaman v Comelec, 319 SCRA 283Notice of special election.Hassan v Comelec, 264 SCRA 125

Special election after failure of election.Omnibus Election CodeSection 6R.A. 7166Section 4

Requisites for special election after failure ofelection.Lucero v Comelec, 234 SCRA 280 (1994)

Calling of special election, jurisdiction.Benito v Comelec, G.R. No. 134913, January 19, 2001