Northeast Normal University, Changchun, 29 May 2013

Defaults, Inferences, and the Limits of Contextualism

Kasia M. JaszczoltUniversity of Cambridge

http://people.pwf.cam.ac.uk/kmj21

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• Primary/secondary meaning distinction cuts across the explicit/implicit divide

• Cancellability tests (Jaszczolt 2009b)

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Sources of information for

(i) world knowledge (WK)(ii) word meaning and sentence structure (WS)(iii) situation of discourse (SD)(iv) properties of the human inferential system (IS)(v) stereotypes and presumptions about society and culture

(SC)

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world knowledge (WK)

word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

situation of discourse (SD)

stereotypes and presumptions properties of human inferential system (IS) about society and culture (SC)

Fig. 1: Sources of information contributing to a merger representation Σ

merger representation Σ

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sources of information types of processes

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Mapping between sources and processes

WK SCWD or CPISC SCWD or CPIWS WS (logical form)SD CPIIS CD

DS makes use of the processing model and it indexes the components of with a subscript standing for the type of processing.

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Primary meaning:

combination of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)

conscious pragmatic inferencepm (from situation of discourse, social and

social, cultural and cognitive defaults (CD) cultural assumptions, and world world-knowledge defaultspm (SCWDpm) knowledge) (CPIpm) Secondary meanings:

Social, cultural and world-knowledge defaultssm (SCWDsm) conscious pragmatic inferencesm (CPIsm)

Fig. 2: Utterance interpretation according to the processing model of the revised version of Default Semantics

merger representation Σ

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Two examples of applications

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Example 1

First-person reference in discourse

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• Jaszczolt, K. M. 2013. 'First-person reference in discourse: Aims and strategies'. Journal of Pragmatics 48. 57-70.

• Jaszczolt, K. M. in press. 'Contextualism and minimalism on de se belief ascription'. In: A. Capone and N. Feit (eds). Attitudes De Se: Linguistics, Epistemology, Metaphysics. Stanford: CSLI Publications.

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The scenario:

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.

(2) I am to blame. I completely forgot I was put in charge.

after Perry (1979: 3)

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De se reading

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referential semantics conflates (1) with (2):

(1) The person who agreed to organise the drinks is to blame.(2) I am to blame.

x [to-blame(x)] (kasia jaszczolt)

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? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

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? Grammar produces the self-referring function

Chierchia (1989: 28): The cognitive access to oneself is ‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions. It is systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns. It is systematically and unambiguously associated with the interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds. It is associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

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The cognitive access to the self is present in the semantics (in some form or other).

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An argument from non-pronominal expressions (but not the one you expect)

x Pace Chierchia, cognitive access to oneself is not so ‘systematically’ excluded from the interpretation of non-pronominal expressions:

(3) Sammy wants a biscuit.(4) Mummy will be with you in a moment.

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Honorifics: Japanese and Thai: the first-person marker has the characteristics of

both a pronoun and a noun. Pronouns and nouns are not morphologically different: like nouns, pronouns do not form a closed class; like nouns, they form the plural by adding a plural morpheme;

also e.g. Burmese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Malay, or Vietnamese. Typically: ‘slave’, ‘servant’, royal slave’, ‘lord’s servant’, ‘Buddha’s servant’ are used for self-reference with self-denigration;

Thai: 27 forms of first person (cf. ‘mouse’) (Siewierska 2004: 228; Heine and Song (2011));

Japanese: 51 form (Tanaka 2012);

Mandarin Chinese

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Conflation of the nominal with the pronominal:

Acoma (New Mexico), Wari’ (Brazil): no personal pronouns;

Generic one and arbitrary PRO:

(5) One can hear the wolves from the veranda.(6) It is scary PRO to hear the wolves from the veranda.

Generic one and arbitrary (non-controlled) PRO express ‘generalizing detached self-reference.’ Moltmann (2010: 440)

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Counterfactuals:

‘if I were you’ conveys second-person oriented advice: (Moltmann 2010: 453)

(7) If I were you I would wait a couple of days before issuing a complaint.

cf.

(8) Wait a couple of days before issuing a complaint.

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Spatial deixis:

Thai phŏm1 nii2 ( ‘one male this’);

Japanese kotira, Korean yeogi, and Vietnamese hây (‘here’) used for self-reference;

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Degrees of cognitive access to oneself:

(9) I think I put this book back on the shelf.(10) I think I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.(11) I put this book back on the shelf.(12) I remember PRO putting this book back on the shelf.

Conscious awareness is present to different degrees rather than as a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic.

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An argument from conceptual shift

(13) ‘It1+t2 believe I should have prepared the drinks party. In a way It1 also believed that It1+t2 should have done it when It1 walked into the room. The fact is, the person appointed by the Faculty Board should have done it and as It1 later realised It1+t2 was this person.’

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Wiemt1+t2, że to jat1+t2 powinnam byłat1+t2

know1SgPres that Dem INom should1SgFPast

przygotować te drinki. W pewnym sensie, prepareInf thisAccPl drinkPlMAcc In certainSgMInstr senseSgMInstr

wtedy też wiedziałamt1, ponieważ miała je

then also know1SgFPast because be-toSgFPast theyNMAcc

przygotować osoba wybranaprzez Radę Wydziału,prepareInf personSgFNom selected by BoardSgFAcc FacultySgMGen

a to jat1+t2 byłam tą osobą.

and Dem INom beSgFPast DemSgFInstr personSgFInstr

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An argument from 1st person pronoun

Kratzer (2009): pronouns can be ambiguous between a referential and a bound-variable interpretation

(14) I’m the only one around here who can take care of my children.(15) Only I admitted what I did wrong. (16) Only you can eat what you cook.

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Restriction: Bound-variable uses are rare, restricted, and differ from language to language.

Tylko ja jeden przyznałem się do błędu.

only 1Sg soleSgMNom admit1SgPastM Refl to mistakeSgMGen

Tylko ja jedna tutaj potrafię zajmować się

Only 1Sg soleSgFNom here can1SgPres careInf Refl

swoimi dziećmi. ReflPronPl Instr childPl Instr

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Grammatical foundation of self-reference cannot be excluded.

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An argument from PRO (but not the one you expect)

(17) Lidia wants to be a scientist.no underlying ‘I’-reference ‘I want to be a scientist.’

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(18) Alice wants what Lidia wants. underlying ‘I’-reference (self-attribution of property)

But:(19) Lidia’s mother wants what Lidia wants and that’s why she is buying her lots of scientific books.

no underlying ‘I’-reference ( propositionalism)

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Summary so far

Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

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Summary so far

Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the first-person singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can adopt the function of reference de se.

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Summary so far

Self-referring that involves cognitive access to oneself does not fit into the mould of a single, systematic morphosyntactic device.

Instead, the device standardly used for this purpose in English, the first-person singular pronoun, can have other uses as well, and devices that specialise for other uses, such as common nouns and proper names, can adopt the function of reference de se.

This suggests that there is no clear indexical/non-indexical distinciton.(Jaszczolt 2012)

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The cognitive access to oneself is

?‘systematically excluded from the interpretation of (non-pronominal) referential expressions’;

?‘systematically present in the interpretation of overt pronouns’; x ‘systematically and unambiguously associated with the

interpretation of PRO the null subject of infinitives and gerunds’;

‘associated with the interpretation of long-distance reflexives (at least in some languages)’.

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lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-offs

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Reports de se/de re about oneself

(20) Kasia believes that she is to blame.

quasi-indexical

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A disclaimer: non-coreferential readings

Kasiax believes that shex is to blame.

a strong tendency for coreference, van der Sandt’s (1992) (presupposition as anaphora)

grammar delivers contextualist default contents

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Towards a (pragmatic) solution

• self-ascription (linguistic semantic)• self-reference (linguistic pragmatic)• self-attribution (epistemic)• self-awareness (cognitive)

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?Grammar conveys self-awareness

Allocation of self-awareness to grammar is a matter of an agreement as to what we want the grammar to do: capture strong tendencies or capture patterns that underdetermine meaning.

minimalist or contextualist account

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Proposal: We should not ‘split’ the power of grammar into that pertaining to the system and that pertaining to how grammar functions in utterance processing.

De se belief ascription provides strong support for a contextualist, but grammar-triggered construal

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De Se in Default SemanticsJaszczolt 2013, in press

Bel (x,’)

the individual x has the cognitive state represented as an embedded representation ’

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(i) CD default status of de re

(ii) coreference x=y

(iii) de se (= from CD, WS)

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?/In a sense, It1 believed It1+t2 was to blame. It1 just didn’t know that the person It1 referred to was It1+t2.

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Merger representation:

• coreference: condition [y=x]WS

• the lack of self-awareness: differentiation of indexing on x and y (CD vs CPI) and the non-default use of the belief operator (CPI)

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Fig. 3. ‘I believed, in a sense, I was to blame.’ (marked reading)

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x y ’

[Kasia]CD (x)

[Kasia]CPI (y) [y=x]WS

[[x]CD [believe]CPI’]WS

’: [[y]CPI isto blame]WS

Fig. 4. ‘Kasia believes she is to blame.’ (default reading)

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x y ’

[Kasia]CD (x) [Kasia]CD (y) [y=x]WS,CD

[[x]CD [believes]CD’]WS

’: [[y]CD is to blame]WS

Conclusions

There is substantial cross-linguistic evidence that there is no reliable representation of self-awareness in the grammar or the lexicon. Instead, there is a lexicon/grammar/pragmatics trade-off, allowing for various degrees of salience of communicating cognitive access to oneself.

Self-awareness can be construed as conveyed by the grammar only when grammar is allowed to produce cancellable interpretations. This is best achieved on a contextualist account such as Default/Interactive Semantics.

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Example 2

Conditional utterances and conditional thoughts(with Chi-Hé Elder)

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No strict correlation between the form of a conditional expression and the conditional meaning

(i) Conditional sentences are not the only way to express conditional thoughts:

(1) Say one word against Margaret Thatcher and David will be offended.

( If you say one word against MT, D will be offended.)

(2) Your money or your life.( If you don’t give me your money I will take your life.)

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(ii) Conditional sentences can be put to a variety of uses other than to express conditional thought:

(3) If you wouldn’t mind, could you close the door?(4) If that’s a real diamond I’ll eat my hat!

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A cross-linguistic perspective

Guugu Yimithirr (Australian, QNL): no overt conditionals

(5) The dog might bark. The postman might run away.

Evans & Levinson (2009: 443), after Haviland 1979

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• Representing conditional meanings in Interactive Semantics

The diversity of ways of expressing conditional meaning, as well as the diversity of uses to which conditional if can be put, are not a problem for a radical contextualist theory.

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Common ground

‘supposing p, then q’

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Extending the scope: two directions

(i) to ‘non-ordinary conditional sentences’

(ii) to conditional thoughts in a non-conditional form

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i.a. Different roles of the antecedent

(6) If you haven’t heard yet, the Queen attended the funeral.

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i.b. Different speech acts

(7) If you rang her now she’d say yes. (advice)

(8) Be great if you would do that. (request)

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• hedging• indication of a speech act type• conventional expressions of politeness, …

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ii

(9) Give him a treat and he will be your friend for life.

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conditional sentence xconditional thought

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Examples

Overt conditional(10) Be great if you would do that.(11) There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want some.(12) If you don’t mind me saying so, you look dreadful in this

frock.

No overt conditional(13) Snowing? Let’s go skiing.(14) Touch his iPad and he will scream.(15) The dog might bark. The postman might run away. (Guugu Yimithirr)

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Compositionality on the level of interaction of processes (interactive compositionality)

Different from:

Frege’s compositionality‘Gestaltist’, pragmatic compositionality (Recanati 2004)Compositionality of thought >> compositionality of language in Embodied Construction Grammar (e.g. Feldman’s 2010)

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Conditionals in Interactive Semantics

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Representing conditional thought (two dimensions)1. p ?PM

‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’

2. p ?SM

‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’ PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’

3. p q WS, PM

‘If it rains, we will stay at home.’

4. p q WS, SM

‘If you are hungry, there is food in the fridge.’ PM: ‘Help yourself to food.’

5. p q , PM

‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’ PM: ‘If you touch his iPad, he will scream.’

?6. p q , SM

‘Please put your helmet on.’ SM: ‘If you put the helmet on, you will be safer.’62

Fig. 5. for 1. p ?PM ‘If you leave the tea on a wobbly table…’

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x y z e1 e2

the addressee (x) tea (y) wobbly table (z)

[e1 → e2]CD, CPIpm

[ACCtf e1]WS

[ACCrf e2]CD, CPIpm

e1: [x leave y on z ]WS e2: [x spill y] CD, CPIpm

Fig. 6. for 2. p ?SM ‘If you’d like to put on your helmet.’

PM: ‘Please put your helmet on.’

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x y e1 e2

the addressee (x) helmet (y)

e1: [the speaker requests e2]CD, CPIpm

e2: [x put on y]WS

Fig. 7. for 5. p q , PM ‘Touch his iPad and he will scream.’

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x y z e1 e2

the addressee (x) ipad (y) contextually salient male (z)

[e1 → e2]CD, CPIpm

[ACCtf e1] CD, CPIpm

[ACCrf e2]WS

e1: [x touch z’s y]WS, CD, CPIpm e2: [z scream]WS

Conclusions

•The diversity of (i) uses to which conditional if can be put and (ii) ways of expressing conditional meaning can be represented in a radical contextualist account (IS).

•The semantics of conditionals is best pursued when conditional thought is adopted as the object of study, where such conditional thoughts constitute primary or secondary meaning of an utterance that is expressed by a conditional or other sentence form.

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Final word…

Compositionality is best understood as pragmatic compositionality, sought at the level of Σs rather than WS.

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radical contextualism

holistic (interactive semantics)compositional (pragmatic compositionality)?algorithmic (merger representation)

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