North Anna, Exam 05000338/2008301 - DRAFT Senior Reactor ...

Draft Submittal(Pink Paper)

Senior Reactor Operator Written Exam

NORTH ANNA JUNE 2008 EXAM05000338/2008301 & 05000339/2008301

QUESTIONS REPORTfor NORTH ANNA NRC examSRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08

1. 005 AA2.02 076INEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/

Initial conditions:

• A spurious Turbine Runback occurred on Unit 1.• Tave was 5.5 degrees F higher than Tref and rising.• Control Bank D rods were inserting at the required rate.

Current conditions:

• Reactor power 58%.• Steam Dumps closed.• Rod Motion stopped.• Tave and Tref are approximately equal and stable.• Control Bank D Group Step counters are at 170 steps.• All Control Bank D rods indicate approximately 170 steps, with the exception of

Rod H-8, which is at 184 steps.

A blown fuse is the cause of the mispositioned rod.The crew determines that recovery will be to restore the misaligned rod to its group.

Which ONE of the following describes (1) the rod speed of rod H-8 PRIOR to the blownfuse and while being realigned, and (2) the Technical Specification implications for thealignment of rod H-8?

Reference Provided

A. 64 SPM prior to failure, 64 SPM while realigning; Shutdown Margin must be verifiedor boration initiated within 1 hour to ensure safety analysis assumptions remainvalid.

B. 64 SPM prior to failure; 64 SPM while realigning; the rod may be misaligned up to24 steps for up to 1 hour in a 24 hour period because reactor power is less than75% and Hot Channel Factors are less likely to be exceeded in a design transient.

C. 72 SPM prior to failure, 48 SPM while realigning; the rod may be misaligned up to24 steps for up to 1 hour in a 24 hour period because reactor power is less than75% and Hot Channel Factors are less likely to be exceeded in a design transient.

D~ 72 SPM prior to failure; 48 SPM while realigning; Shutdown Margin must be verifiedor boration initiated within 1 hour to ensure safety analysis assumptions remainvalid.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:22 PM 1

QUESTIONS REPORTfor NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 11 08

A Incorrect. Rod speed is incorrect, as a 5 degree mismatch will cause rods to insert at72 SPM (maximum speed) 64 SPM prior to the failure is close, and also plausiblebecause manual shutdown bank speed is 64 SPM. Realignment after the failure alsorepresents shutdown bank rod speed. Basis is also correct.

B Incorrect. Rod speeds incorrect but credible as in A above, and basis is incorrect. Anote in the technical specification LCO allows rod position indication to be 24 stepsdeviant for up to 1 hour only if it is not known that an actual misalignment exists.Plausible because power level is below the threshold and an applicant couldmisinterpret the note.

C Incorrect. Same basis incorrect but plausible as B, but rod speed is correct.

D Correct. a 5 degree F mismatch will cause Bank D to auto insert at maximum rate(72 SPM) 48 SPM is control bank speed when operated in manual. In this case,shutdown margin must be verified because the rod is misaligned by >12 steps.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Inoperable / Stuck ControlRod: Difference between jog and run rod speeds, effect on CRDM of stuck rod

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

12

Importance Rating: 3.0

Technical Reference: Rod Control LP, TS 3.1.4 basis

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: TS 3.1.4 & BASIS

Learning Objective: U 6512, U 6514

Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.7,43.2

Scramble Range: A - D

NORTH ANNA

Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: D B C A C B B A B D

Source If Ban1e

Difficulty Level :

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Comments:KA Match: Difference between jog and run speeds is a B&W term, but it has been previouslyapplied to Westinghouse exams as auto versus manual speeds. This item evaluatesunderstanding of control bank speed in a transient circumstance versus a manual realignment.Also, this item meets SRO criteria because the SRO must determine whether the LCO appliesand basis based upon a note in the LCO versus plant conditions. The interpretation of theseconditions is exclusive to the SRO.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 2


2. 005 G2.2.40 077INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081

Given the following:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 6 with refueling cavity level at 289' 10".• Upper internals have been removed.• 1A RHR pump is in service.• An electrical fault on 1H bus causes a loss of the bus.

Which ONE of the following describes the action required, and the basis for the actionin accordance with Technical Specifications?

Reference Provided

A. Immediately suspend any RCS makeup from sources.with a boron concentrationless than that required by TS 3.9.1; ensures that there will be NO reduction in RCSboron concentration from its current value from allowable RCS makeup sources.

B~ Immediately suspend any RCS makeup from sources with a boron concentrationless than that required by TS 3.9.1; ensures that if RCS boron concentration isreduced due to RCS makeup, acceptable margin for subcritical operation ismaintained.

C. Immediately initiate action to establish >/= 23 feet of water above the top of thereactor vessel flange; ability to remove decay heat and ensure mixing of boratedRCS water is degraded.

D. Immediately initiate action to establish >/= 23 feet of water above the top of thereactor vessel flange; provides acceptable results in conjunction with actions toinitiate containment closure to limit radioactive release to the environment.

A Incorrect. Action is correct, and reason is plausible because only borated watersources that will not reduce boron concentration below TS limits will be allowed tomake up. Incorrect because those sources may be lower than the current value.

B Correct. 289 feet is >23 feet above the flange, and the SRO must determine thispiece of information. Action and basis is correct.

C Incorrect. Cavity level is already more than 23 feet above the vessel flange. Theapplicant must determine that from the given cavity level. Basis would be correct if thiswas the correct action.

o Incorrect for same reason as C. Basis information is consistent with the wording inTS and would be a correct answer if the action was correct based on conditions ofcavity <23 feet above the flange.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 3


Equipment Control: Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

21


Technical Reference: TS 3.9.5 and TS 3.9.6 and basis

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: TS 3.9.1, 3.9.53.9.6 & BASIS

Learning Objective: U 444 U 12006

Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.2

Comments:KA Match: item directly evaluates tech spec requirements, action, and basis with respect tooperation of RHR.


NORTH ANNA

o 123 4 5 6 7 8 9

BDBAADABDA

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Version:

Answer:

1.00Points:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level is met because the SRO must determine which Tech Spec LCD entry is required,and the basis for the action on the applicable LCD. This selection is made from among 2plausible conditions that require evaluation, and plausible reasons for each action potentiallyselected.MCS Time:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 4


3. 006 A2.03 078INEW//HIGHER/ISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081


• Unit 1 has been at 100% power for 9 months.• The following alarms are received approximately 5 minutes apart:

• 1J-D7, ACCUM 1A-1B-1C HI-LO LEVEL• 1J-D8, ACCUM 1A-1B-1C HI-LO PRESS

• SI Accumulator levels and pressures are as follows:

Pressure

1A1B1C

655 psig670 psig610 psig

Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the unit, and the TechnicalSpecification basis for the action required?

A':' SI Accumulator check valve leakage is occurring and requires Chemistry sample of1B SI Accumulator contents to ensure that subcriticality can be maintained in apost-LOCA environment.

B. SI Accumulator check valve leakage is occurring and requires Chemistry sample of1B SI Accumulator contents to ensure that accident analysis assumptions for ColdLeg to Hot Leg Recirculation switchover remain valid.

C. SI Accumulator vent valve leakage is occurring and pressurization of 1C SIAccumulator is required to ensure that peak cladding temperature remains withinlimits following a design basis LOCA.

D. SI Accumulator vent valve leakage is occurring and pressurization of 1C SIAccumulator is required to ensure that accident analysis assumptions for SIAccumulator injected volume during the reflood portion of a large break LOCAremain valid.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 5


A Correct. With the core at MOL, RCS boron concentration will be lower thanaccumulator concentration. Chemistry must sample to ensure that boron concentrationremains within limits. Check valve leakage is occurring because 1B accumulator ishigh in presure as well as level.

B Incorrect. Plausible because leakage is correct, but basis for recirc switchover is forhigh Accumulator boron concentrations, not low concentrations.

C Incorrect. Incorrect leakage but plausible because 1C accumulator is near the lowlimit, and significantly lower than 1A or 1B accumulators in level and in pressure. Basiswould be correct if this was the correct failure.

D Incorrect, and reason is same as CAbility to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and(b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate theconsequences of those malfunctions or operations: System leakage

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:

Technical Reference:

21

3.7

TS 3.5.1 and basis; 1J-D7, D8, OP-7.3

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

Question History:

U 3414


Comments:KA Match because SI system leakage can either be in-leakage or out-leakage. In this case,procedures are provided to ensure the plant remains within design basis due to a plantcondition where in-leakage is occurring.

SRO level because the SRO must choose between 2 failures resulting in the presented plantconditions, and among plausible reasons for the actions that may be required for thoseconditions, in accordance with Technical Specifications.

Note: We have developed questions in the past with similar basis statements for SIaccumulators; none with these conditions.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: A DAD D B B C B C Scramble Range: A - D

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 6


Source: NEW Source If BanlcCognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty Level:

Job Position: SRO Plant: NORTH ANNADate: 6/2008 Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 7


4. 007 G2.2.44 079INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• Unit 1 is at 100% power.• The following alarm is received:

• 1B-F1, PRZ RELIEF TK HI PRESS

• PRT pressure indicates 14 psig and rising slowly.• PRT temperature is 92 degrees F and stable.• PRT level is 70% and stable.• RCS pressure indicates 2225 psig and stable.

Which ONE of the following describes the appropriate operator response?

A. Ensure PZR PORVs are closed, and PG and N2 to PRT are isolated; Go to1-AP-16, Increasing Primary Plant Leakage.

B~ Ensure PZR PORVs are closed, and PG and N2 to PRT are isolated; Vent the PRTin accordance with 1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank.

C. Submit a WR, verify PG water alignment and cool the PRT by draining and refillingin accordance with 1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank.

D. Submit a WR, and cool the PRT by draining and refilling in accordance with1-0P-5.7, Operation of the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Refer to 1-AP-16, IncreasingPrimary Plant Leakage.

A Incorrect. Alarm response directs transition to 1-AP-16 if PRT level is rising.Plausible because temperature and pressure are elevated, but level is stable, so AP-16would not be performed.

B Correct. Alarm response directs venting and/or draining and filling for the listedparameters (Rising pressure and elevated temperature).

C Incorrect. A WR would not be submitted unless the alarm was received without thecorresponding indications to cause the alarm (ie, PRT pressure below 14 psig).Plausible because the action would restore PRT parameters, at least temperature.

o Incorrect. See above explanation for plausibility and incorrect reason.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 8


Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operationof a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and systemconditions.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

21


Technical Reference: ARP 1B-F1, 1-0P-5.7


Learning Objective:

Question History:


Comments:KA Match: Item evaluates knowledge of PRT parameters, as well as interpretation of theindications given, with one parameter in alarm status and the other parameter at an elevatedvalue. It also evaluates understanding of actions and directives based on those indications byevaluating knowledge of the actions required.

SRO level because the applicant must assess abnormal plant conditions relateOd to the PRT,and select the appropriate procedure and process for response, from among plausible choicesdirected by the procedure used.


NORTH ANNA

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

New item; have written similar items on other exams, with abnormal PRT parameters.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: B C B DCA B C C B

Source If Ban1e

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:23 PM 9


5. 008 G2.4.8 080INEWIIHIGHERJISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081


• Unit 1 was at 100% power when off-site power was lost.• 1J EDG failed to start, and CANNOT be started.• The crew is preparing to transition from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.• The switchyard is reenergized.• Off-Site power is available from RSS transformers.• The following plant conditions exist:

• RCS pressure is 950 psig and lowering.• Containment pressure is 23 psia.• PZR level is 100%

•

• RCS subcooling indicates 0 degrees F.• AFW flow is 360 GPM.• SG narrow range levels are off-scale low.• SG pressures are 1000 psig and slowly lowering.

Which ONE of the following describes the procedure entry required upon transitionfrom 1-E-0, and the method of re-energizing 1J 4160 volt emergency bus?

A. Enter 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; 1J Emergency Bus will berestored upon exit from the EOP network.

B~ Enter 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; 0-AP-10, Loss of ElectricalPower, will be performed concurrently to restore off-site power to the emergencybusses.

C. Enter 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation; 1J Emergency Bus will be restoredupon exit from the EOP network.

D. Enter 1-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation; 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power,will be performed concurrently to restore off-site power to the emergency busses..

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 10


A Incorrect. Plausible because it is true that plant design basis is met with only 1 bus,and also because the step in E-O for restoration of busses is already past. Theapplicant must know that E-1 provides for this action.

B Correct. E-1 is entered because RCS pressure is causing SG pressure to lower.(SGs are heat source) PZR level at 100% indicates a vapor space break. ,E-1 directsimplementing 0-AP-10 for restoration if emergency busses are not energized fromoff-site power.

C Incorrect. Plausible for same reason as A, and also because SG pressures arelowering, but SRO must determine that pressure drop is due to RCS pressure lowering.

D Incorrect. Procedure entry same as C, but actions related to restoration of off-sitepower are correct.Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used inconjunction with EOP's.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

11


Technical Reference: E-O, E-1


Learning Objective: U 13683

Question History:


Comments:KA match: Item evluates use of AOPs associated with a PZR vapor space break. In this case,E-1 will be performed for PZR LOCA, and restoration of off-site is determined in E-1. O-AP-10is 1 of 2 AOPs that may be performed while in E-1.


NORTH ANNA

Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: B A B B B C B A C A

Source If Ban1e

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the applicant must assess plant conditions and determine appropriateprocedure based on entry conditions present for 2 EOPs, and also because AOP strategy isevaluated by the given conditions.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 11


6. 012 A2.04 081lNEWIIHIGHERlISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1K-G1, SFGDS PROT SYS TR A TROUBLE has been alarming intermittently.

Instrument Department has determined a 48VDC power supply in Train A is degradingand will most likely fail completely in the near future.

Which ONE of the following describes the correct response?

Reference Provided

A. Online replacement of the power supply is NOT permitted; make notifications andpreparations for plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby within 24 hours.

B. Online replacement of the power supply is NOT permitted; make notifications andpreparations for plant shutdown and be in Hot Standby within 48 hours.

C~ Online replacement of the power supply is permitted; following power supplyreplacement the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker may be closed for up to 4 hours toperform 1-PT-36.1A, Train A Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation LogicTest.

D. Online replacement of the power supply is permitted; following power supplyreplacement the Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker may be closed for up to 8 hours toperform 1-PT-36.1 A, Train A Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Actuation LogicTest.

a. Incorrect. This is an infrequent evolution governed by an Instrument Shop procedurevice an operations procedure, the candidate may not be aware that online maintenanceis possible since most maintenance of this nature is performed during outages. The 24hour action time is reasonable since it is the mode 1&2 action time for one traininoperable.

b. Incorrect. This is an infrequent evolution governed by an Instrument Shop procedurevice an operations procedure. The candidate may not be aware that online maintenanceis possible since most maintenance of this nature is performed during outages. The 48hour action time is reasonable since it is the mode 3-5 action time for one traininoperable.

c. Correct. Tech Specs specify 4 hrs for full train testing but only 2 hrs for breaker orbreaker trip device testing.

d. Incorrect. On-line replacement is allowed however the action time of 8 hour~ (whichcoincides with other action times for different item in TS 3.3) is incorrect.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 12


Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b)based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences ofthose malfunctions or operations: Erratic power supply operation

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

21


Technical Reference: 1K-G1, TS 3.3.1, RPS LP1-PT-36.1A and O-ICM-SSP-PW-001

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: TS 3.3.1 & BASIS


Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.2,43.5

Comments:KA Match: The item evaluates the impact of a power supply malfunction on the RPS, and theactions required for mitigation. A low voltage power supply failure meets the criteria for therequired topic.


NORTH ANNA

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the SRO must determine that the maintenance activity is permitted.Additionally the SRO must have knowledge of procedural requirements during testing.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: CDCADDDDB D

Source If Banle

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 13


7. 017 A2.02 082lNEWIIHIGHERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081


• A LOCA is in progress on Unit 1.• All RCPs are stopped.• RVLIS Full Range is 270/0.• Core Exit TCs are reading 1250 degrees F.• ALL SG NR levels are OFF-SCALE low.• NO source of SG feed has been established.• NO source of ECCS has been established.• The crew has attempted secondary depressurization in accordance with FR-C.1,

Response to Inadequate Core Cooling, but the attempt was ineffective.• The crew is evaluating start of one RCP.

Which ONE of the following describes the remaining strategy for mitigation of thisevent?

A. Remain in FR-C.1 , start ALL available RCPs, and evaluate Core Exit TCs todetermine if core cooling has been established.

B. Start one RCP and immediately transition to SACRG-1, Severe Accident ControlRoom Guideline Initial Response.

C~ Remain in FR-C.1 , open PZR PORVs and Block Valves, and other RCS Vent Pathsif necessary. Re-attempt secondary depressurization and evaluate Core Exit TICsto determine if core cooling has been established.

D. Open PZR PORVs and Block Valves, and other RCS Vent Paths if necessary.Re-Attempt secondary depressurization while referring to SACRG-1 , SevereAccident Control Room Guideline Initial Response.

A Incorrect. RCP will not be started because SG level must be >11 % to constitute anavailable loop. Plausible because no other method of core cooling has succeeded andstarting an RCP will initiate forced circulation of any remaining RCS fluid.

B Incorrect. Will not start an RCP due to unavailability of loop. Plausible because ifRCPs were started and temperature did not trend down, the crew would transition toSACRG-1.

C Correct. Without an available loop, RCP start will not be performed. RNO is to openprimary vent paths and re-attempt secondary depressurization to initiate accumulatorinjection.

D Incorrect. Plausible because action is correct, but wrong because SACRG-1 wouldonly be entered if available RCPs were running and ineffective at reducing RCStemperature.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 14


Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits)associated with operating the ITM system controls including: Core damage

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


22

4.1

FR-C.1 step 20 and 21


Learning Objective:

Question History:

U 11670


Comments:KA Match: Item evaluates observation of parameters displayed on the ICCM, and predicts theimpact by testing knowledge of effectiveness of RCP start on an inadequate core coolingsituation against the actual success path that would be attempted under these co·nditions. Useof procedures is tested as expalined above.

SRO level because the SRO must assess conditions during a severe accident and determineEOP strategy, including selection of controlling procedure for the event or conditions observed.(10CFR55.43(b) 5

MCS Time:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Points:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: C B D C CDC CAD Scramble Range: A - D

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant: NORTH ANNA

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 15


8. 025 AA2.03 083INEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

• The crew observes 1B RHR Pump discharge flow and motor ampsoscillating.

• The crew enters 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR, isolates known RCS drain paths, andmaximizes Charging flow.

• RCS level continues to decrease.• The following alarm is subsequently received:

• 1E-A7, RHR .pp 1B AUTO TRIP

• Containment Sump Pumps 1-DA-P-4A and 1-DA-P-4B are running continuously.• An operator leaving Containment reports leakage observed from the PZR.Surge

Line.

Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the event in progress?

A. Remain in 1-AP-11 and ensure that RCS level is +10 inches above centerline; start1A RHR pump and ensure that RHR flow meets the requirements of Attachment 3.(Determining Acceptable RHR Flow Reductions)

B. Remain in 1-AP-11 and vent both RHR Pumps; start either RHR pump, and verifythat RCS level is adequate for the indicated RHR flow per Attachment 2. (MinimumRCS Level for Indicated Flow)

C~ Go to 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA; initiate Attachment 7, Cold Leg Injection.

D. Go to 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA; initiate Attachment 8, Hot Leg Injection.

A Incorrect. Would not remain in AP-11 for current conditions because an RCS leak isoccurring as indicated by sump pumps running and makeup at full flow. Actions wouldbe correct if AP-11 were in use and LOCA was not occurring, if the RHR pump did nottrip ue to air binding.

B Incorrect. Same reason as A, and also actions would be correct if AP-11 was in useand the RHR pump tripped due to air binding.

C Correct. If leak. location is on the surge line then it is on hot leg, use Cold LegInjection as directed by AP-17.

D Incorrect. Procedure is correct, but the applicant must know that the strategy is toinject on the legs opposite that of the break location.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 16


Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual HeatRemoval System: Increasing reactor building sump level

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

11


Technical Reference: 1-AP-11, 1-AP-17


Learning Objective: None found

Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43.5

Comments:KA Match: Applicant must use information stem for Containment Sump Pump run time todetermine that a shutdown LOCA is occurring. This implies that sump level is rising.


NORTH ANNA

o 1 234 5 6 7 8 9CCACBDDDCC

Source If Ban1e

Difficulty Level :

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Version:

Answer:

1.00Points:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the SRO is assessing conditions in a shutdown environment that requiredetermination of 2 separate items; which procedure applies and which strategy to use for eachprocedure.MCS Time:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:24 PM 17


9. 026 G2.1.7 084/NEW//HIGHER//SRO/NORTH ANNA/6/2008/

• Unit 1 is at 100% power. Unit 2 is in Mode 5.• Unit 1 and 2 CC systems are split.

• The OATC reports the following alarms and indications:

• 1G-E8, COMP COOL PP 1B AUTO TRIP• 1G-B3, CC HX 1A-1 B CC OUTLET LO FLOW• 1G-C3, CC HX OUTLET LO PRESS• 1C-C4, RCP 1A-B-C CC THERM BARR HI/LO FLOW• 1A-E6, RCP 1B VIBRATION ALERT/DANGER

• RCP Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger flow indicators all read 0 GPM.• RCP Motor Bearing temperatures are 146°F and rising at 5°F per minute.• 1B RCP Vibration readings:

• 2-3 mils Seismic• 8-10 mils Proximity

Which ONE of the following describes the appropriate operator response?

A~ Enter 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling; attempt to restore CC flow, verifyproper Service Waterflow to CC HXs. A TS 3.7.19, CC Subsystems LimitingAction is NOT entered because functions required for cooldown to Cold Shutdownare met.

B. Enter 1-AP-15, Loss of Component Cooling; attempt to restore CC flow, verifyproper Service Water flow to CC HXs. A TS 3.7.19, CC Subsystems LimitingAction is entered because functions required for cooldown to Cold Shutdown aredegraded.

C. Enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection; once the Reactor is verified trippedthen stop 1B RCP. A TS 3.4.5, RCS Loops - Mode 3, Limiting Action is NOTentered because RCS loop operability requirements for decay heat removal aremet.

D. Enter 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection; once the Reactor is verified trippedthen stop 1B RCP. A TS 3.4.5, RCS Loops - Mode 3, Limiting Action is enteredbecause RCS loop operability to support decay heat removal is degraded.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 18


A Correct. For the conditions given, a loss of CC is in progress, and RCPs have notreached trip setpoints on temperature or vibration. Since 3 CC susbsystems arerequired and there are still 3 available between Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS action entry is notrequired.

B Incorrect. TS action is plausible because the applicant may interpret split units asseparate CC systems, and action would be required if one system is OOS.

C Incorrect because tripping the reactor would only be required if Seismic was reading8-10 mils not Proximity as given, but applicant may confuse the two. Action plausiblebecause the distractor include stopping of a RCP and following a trip from 100% powerSG levels will shrink below the narrow range, and the basis for RCP operability inMode 3 is decay heat removal.

D Incorrect for same reason as C, and plausible because SG level would be sufficientto support an operable loop once level is recovered with the AFW system. This optionalso adds balance for determination of action vs. no action lAW TS.Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgmentsbased on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretion.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


11

4.7

1-AP-15, 1-AR-A-E6


Learning Objective:

Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

U 11659

43.2,5

Comments:KA Match: The KA is matched because an evaluation of alarms and indications is requiredduring a loss of CC, as the KA topic requires. The operational judgment is selection ofprocedure and TS applicability.

SRO level is met because the applicant must evaluate indications and alarms and choose fromamong the 2 most plausible procedures, then after selecting the correct procedure, mustinterpret TS applicability by applying TS basis knowledgeMCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: A C D D A C D B C B Scramble Range: A - D

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 19


Source: NEW Source If Banle

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty Level:

Job Position: SRO Plant: NORTH ANNA

Date: 6/2008 Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 20


10. 027 G2.2.25 085INEWIILOWERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081


• Unit 1 is in Mode 3 during a plant cooldown.• Chemistry sample of the Quench Spray System Chemical Addition Tank

determines that NaOH concentration is 100/0 by weight.• Chemical Addition Tank volume is approximately 5510 gallons.• 1-QS-P-1 B, Quench Spray Pump 1B, is out of service.

Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification implications of thecurrent plant conditions?

A. Chemical Addition Tank volume is outside of limits which affects the ability tomaintain Containment within design pressure limits and affects the ability tomaintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.

B~ Chemical Addition Tank NaOH concentration is outside of limits which affects thepH of the resultant Containment sump water solution and the ability to effectivelyremove Iodine following a DBA LOCA.

C. Inoperabilityof 1-QS-P-1 B will result in a Containment peak pressure higher thanthe value calculated in the accident analysis for a DBA LOCA and affects the abilityto maintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.

D. Inoperabilityof 1-QS-P-1 B will result in a Containment peak temperature higherthan the value calculated in the accident analysis for a DBA LOCA and affects theability to maintain Iodine at acceptable levels following a DBA LOCA.

A Incorrect. Volume is not within limits, but within 10 gallons of the upper limit.Plausible because half of the reason is correct, but volume does not apply tocontainment pressure reduction.

B Correct. See TS 3.6.8 and basis. The 10% value given in the stem was chosensince it corresponds to the required range of the spray solution in pH (8.5-10.5). thestudent may not pick this as the correct answer if they confuse the number for therequirements of concentration with those of pH.

C Incorrect. Plausible because 1 QS pump is out of service, but the accident analysisassume that only one will be available so the cntmt peak pressure achieved will not behigher than the calculated value. Also credible because the applicant may incorrectlyassume that with the chem add system in a TS action statement, it could affectoperability of the Quench Spray System. In this case, the TS is not cascaded.

D Incorrect. Plausible because 1 QS pump is out of service, but the accident analysisassume that only one will be available so the cntmt peak temperature achieved will notbe higher than the calculated value.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 21


Equipment Control: Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions foroperations and safety limits.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

22


Technical Reference: TS 3.6.6, 3.6.8, and bases



Question History:


Comments:KA Match because the facility does not have a dedicated Iodine Removal System. Thefunction is provided by spray and by chemical addition. This item evaluates knowledge of TSlimits and basis for limits for the Chemical Addition System as well as for Quench Spray.


NORTH ANNA

o 1 234 5 6 7 8 9BAABAACCAA

Source If Banle

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because it directly evaluates knowledge of the limits and basis for limits according toTech Specs. The SRO must choose between valid bases for each option, and valid operabilityissues for each option. This is a memory level item that discriminates at the correct level basedon 3 different TS action. statementsMCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version:

Answer:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 22


11 . 034 A2.03 086INEW//HIGHER//SRO/NORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• Unit 1 core off-load in progress.• The 3 most recently off-loaded irradiated fuel assemblies are stored as follows:

Assembly(Enrichment)

Assembly A (4.6%)Assembly B (3.20/0)Assembly C (3.2%)

Burnup

30,000 MWD/MTU30,000 MWD/MTU20,000 MWD/MTU

Location

Non-Matrix locationLow-Reactivity 5X5 matrixLow Reactivity 5X5 matrix

Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification implications of thefuel assembly arrangement stated above?

Reference Provided

A. ONLY ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5X5matrix configuration. The'other 2 assemblies may remain as-is. This ensures thatKeff will remain <0.95 for all postulated conditions with NO soluble boron in theSpent Fuel Pool.

B. ONLY ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5X5matrix configuration. The other 2 assemblies may remain as-is. This ensures thatKeff will remain <0.95 for all postulated conditions with soluble boron in the SpentFuel Pool at the TS minimum LCO limit.

C. ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5 X 5 matrix;ONE fuel assembly must be moved to either a non-matrix location OR a HighReactivity location in a 5X5 matrix configuration. This ensures that Keff will remain<0.95 for all postulated conditions with NO soluble boron in the Spent Fuel Pool.

D!' ONE fuel assembly must be moved to a High Reactivity location in the 5 X 5 matrix;ONE fuel assembly must be moved to either a non-matrix location OR a HighReactivity location in a 5X5 matrix configuration. This ensures that Keff will remain<0.95 for all postulated conditions with soluble boron in the Spent Fuel Pool at theTS minimum LCO limit.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 23


A Incorrect. Two assemblies must be moved. Assembly A is in an unacceptableconfiguration and must be moved to a 5X5 matrix configuration in a high reactivity area.Assembly C must be moved either to a non-matrix location or a 5X5 matrixconfiguration in a high reactivity area. Basis is plausible because Keff<0.95 is forconditions where soluble boron is at TS minimum, but normal configuration will ensureKeff <1.0 with NO soluble boron.

B Incorrect. See A above, and basis is correct for conditions presented.

C Incorrect but plausible because TS action is correct. TS basis is incorrect, butplausible as in A.

D Correct. See A for explanation of required moves. Basis is correct.Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the FuelHandling System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, ormitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Mispositioned fuel element

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

22


Technical Reference: TS 3.7.18 and basis

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: TS 3.7.18, figures3.7.18-1 and 3.7.18-2

Learning Objective:

Question History:


Comments:KA is matched because knowing the basis predicts the impact of the condition, and usingprocedures is satisfied by TS action required for the condition presented for mispositioned fuelassemblies. This is the guidance provided for this event at this facility


NORTH ANNA

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because a technical specification entry must be made on given conditions (Also useof reference) and knowledge of the basis is required in accordance with technical specificationsMCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: DBDBDDADB B

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 24


12. 038 EA2.15 087/MODIFIEDIIHIGHER/ISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081

• Unit 1 is experiencing a Steam Generator Tube Rupture.• Containment pressure is 11 psia.• The crew has completed 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.• The crew is performing 1-ES-3.1, Post-SGTR Cooldown Using Backfill.• 1C RCP is running and the crew commenced depressurizing the RCS using

normal pressurizer spray.

• The following conditions exist after closing spray valves:

• RCS Pressure• AVG of 5 highest CETs• Pressurizer level

380 psig and lowering375 degrees F38% and lowering

Which ONE of the following correctly describes an advantage of the backfill method ofpost-SGTR cooldown, .

AND

Assuming RCS temperature remains constant and the remaining trends continue,which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy?

A. Facilitates processing of contaminated primary coolant.

Stop 1C RCP when #1 sealleakoff decreases to 0.9 gpm; enter ECA-3.1, SGTRwith Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressurereaches 260 psig.

B. Allows for faster cooldown of ruptured SG.

Stop 1C RCP when #1 sealleakoff decreases to 0.9 gpm; enter ECA-3.1, SGTRwith Loss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressurereaches 220 psig.

C~ Facilitates processing of contaminated primary coolant.

Stop 1C RCP when seal DIP decreases to 200 psid; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR withLoss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressurereaches 220 psig.

D. Allows for faster cooldown of ruptured SG.

Stop 1C RCP when seal DIP decreases to 200 psid; enter ECA-3.1, SGTR withLoss of Reactor Coolant - Subcooled Recovery Desired, when RCS pressurereaches 260 psig.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:25 PM 25


A Incorrect. See background document. Both seal dip and leakoff will decrease withRCS pressure. Leakoff of .9 is below the normal operating range, but allowable for lowpressure conditions.

B Incorrect. Basis is incorrect but plausible because it is the basis for using steamdump for post-SGTR cooldown. Values used for transition is correct and again sealleakoff is plausible since it is below the range allowed during normal plant operation.

C Correct. Basis correct and RCP seal DP must be maintained at >200 psid forcontinued operation. Subcooling must be maintained >25 F to prevent transition.

D Incorrect. incorrect basis and transition value for pressure requirement for RCP sealDIP correct however.Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: Pressure at which tomaintain RCS during S/G cooldown

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

11


Technical Reference: ES-3.1 CA Page, Background Doc



Question History: Modified from North Anna 2006 exam - FJE


Comments:KA Match because the item evaluates knowledge of RCS pressure setpoints where action isrequired in relation to SG cooldown with a SGTR.


NORTH ANNA

MODIFIED

HIGHER

SRO6/2008

Source:Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the applicant must assess conditions and select procedure as well as knowthe basis for use of the procedure in progress.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: CADDCAAABD

Source If Bank:Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 26


13. 051 G2.2.44 088INEWIILOWERJISRO/NORTH ANNA/6120081


• Unit 1 is at 100% power.• The following alarm is received:

• 1B-A5, CW PP 1A-1B-1C-1D AUTO TRIP

• CW Pump 1B motor indicates 0 amps• CW Pumps 1A, 1C, and 1D motors indicate 300-310 amps.• Condenser vacuum is 3 inches and degrading.

Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the event in progress?

A. Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; reduce CW Pumpamps to prevent motor damage.

Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; guidance for estimating RCS borationflow rates during a load reduction is provided in 1-AP-14.

B. Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; reduce CW Pumpamps to prevent motor damage.

Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction, mustbe used to estimate required RCS boration flow rates during the load reduction

C~ Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; 'contact HP todetermine if liquid waste release must be secured.

Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; guidance for estimating ReS borationflow rates during a load reduction is provided in 1-AP-14.

D. Perform 1-AP-13, Loss of One or More Circulating Water Pumps; contact HP to. determine if liquid waste release must be secured.

Perform 1-AP-14, Low Condenser Vacuum; 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction, mustbe used to estimate required RCS boration flow rates during the load reduction

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 27


A Incorrect. Plausible because 1-AP-13 is performed, but CW Pump amps are notquite high enough to require reduction. 340 amps is the limit. Second half is correct byuse of attachment 3.

B Incorrect because 1-AP-2.2 is not required due to attachment 3 of AP-14 beingavailable. Plausible because AP-2.2 is used for fast load reductions. Also see A.

C Correct. Procedures will "be performed in parallel, and each procedure will havespecific goals based on current indications.

o Incorrect. Reason for use of AP-13 is correct, but reason for use of AP-14 isincorrect but plausible. See B.Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operationof a system, and understand how operator actions and directives effect plant and systemconditions.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

12


Technical Reference: 1-AP-13, 1-AP-14


Learning Objective: U11409,U11411

Question History:


Comments:KA is matched because an interpretation must be made for status and operation of condenserair removal and Circ Water systems. Understanding of directives and actions (procedures) isevaluated by the use of procedures for AP strategy.


NORTH ANNA

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the applicant must assess conditions and determine procedures used aswell as mitigation strategy for use of procedures. One procedure is given and strategy isevaluated. The other procedure is given and a determination must be made as to whether theappropriate strategy requires use of another procedure or whether the in-use procedure willprovide the strategy (1 OCFR55.43(b) item 5)MCS Time; 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: C CDDADAACA

Source IfBan1c

Difficulty Level :

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 28

QUESTIONS REPORTfor NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 1108

14. 056 G2.2.36 089lNEWIILOWERJISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081


• Unit 1 is at 100% power.• 120 VAC Vital Bus Inverter 1-11 has failed 8 hours ago.• Maintenance Department now reports they estimate repairs and PMT will take

approximately 2 days.

Which ONE of the following describes the relationship of the estimated repair time tothe Action Time and the Basis for the Action time?

Reference Provided

A~ Repair time is within the allowable action time; Action time is based on a balancebetween reliability of AC power sources and potential to challenge safety systemswith a plant shutdown.

B. Repair time is within the allowable action time; Action time is based on an additionalsingle failure which would render certain ESF equipment incapable of performingtheir design functions.

C. Repair time exceeds the allowable action time; Action time is based on a balancebetween reliability of AC power sources and potential to challenge safety systemswith a plant shutdown.

D. Repair time exceeds the allowable action time; Action time is based on anadditional single failure which would render certain ESF equipment incapable ofperforming their design functions.

A Correct. TS 3.8.7 and bases discuss the 7 day time frame (this is a change to TechSpecs that makes other distractors more plausible since a candidate may rely on pastknowledge).

B Incorrect. Correct but basis applies to the deenergized 120 VAC vital bus that has a2 hr action time, plausible since the bases of electrical system tech specs are oftenconfused or misunderstood.

C Incorrect. Action time being exceeded would be correct based on past knowledge,as noted above basis is correct.

D Incorrect. Action time being exceeded would be correct based on past knowledge,as noted above same justification for basis applies here.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 29

QUESTIONS REPORTfor NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 0411 08

Equipment Control: Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degradedpower sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

11


Technical Reference: TS 3.8.7,3.8.8,3.8.9,3.8.10

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: TS 3.8.7 & 3.8.9and BASIS


Question History:


Comments:KA is matched because it evaluates the impact of a maintenance activity (time to repair thefailed inverter) on LCOs.


NORTH ANNA

Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: A A B B DAD C C A

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

1.00Points:

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

SRO is matched because the applicant must determine if repairs can be completed withinallowable action time and also make a call on correct basis for operability in the current Modeof operation.MCS Time:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 30


15. 059 G2.1.23 090/MODIFIEDIIHIGHERIISRO/NORTH ANNA/6/20081


• 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is in progress.• Attempts to establish Aux Feedwater flow are unsuccessful.• RCS Bleed and Feed has NOT been initiated.

• Main Feedwater flow has just been established and SG levels are as follows:

• '1 A' 400~ wide range and rising• '1 B' 40% wide range and stable• '1 C' 29% wide range and lowering

• Core exit TCs are stable.• Containment pressure is 19.2 psia.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the appropriate operator action?

A. Return to procedure and step in eff~ct and continue efforts to establish AFW flow.

B. Perform Steps 14 through 23 of 1-FR-H.1 to initiate RCS bleed and feed.

C..., Remain in 1-FR-H.1 until Core Exit TCs indicate a decreasing trend.

D. Remain in 1-FR-H.1 until all SG wide range levels indicate an increasing trend.

A Incorrect. Return to step in effect when AFW is restored lAW FR-H.1, after verifyingminimum AFW flow requirements are met. This transition only applies to AFW flow, notMain Feedwater flow; for main feedwater SG level and core exit TC trends must beverified in order to exit prior to meeting 11 % NR level criteria. Plausible because it isthe first and most logical transition from FR-H.1.

B Incorrect. Feed and bleed criteria are not met for the given conditions. ONE SG islower than the feed and bleed setpoint for adverse containment conditions, but 2 of 3are required below the setpoint to initiate feed and bleed. Plausible because setpoint ismet for 1 SG.

C Correct. SG level trends are acceptable however Core exit TC trend must also beacceptable (decreasing) to exit FR-H.1.

D Incorrect. Wide range levels rising are part of the RNO step for establishing MainFeedwater, but transition is not allowed until NR level is >11 % or core exit TCs areverified decreasing. Plausible because' it is a condition of the procedure step.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 31


Conduct of Operations: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant proceduresduring all modes of plant operation.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

21


Technical Reference: FR-H.1 step 3



Question History: Modified from Harris 2007 NRC Exam (See attached)

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43.5

Comments:KA Match: This item evaluates operation of the system (Main Feedwater) in emergencycircumastances (integrated plant procedure), specifically, performance of an EOP underconditions where transition is or will be required based upon observation of parameter trends.

SRO level because the SRO must assess conditions and determine when transition to anappropriate procedure may occur, based on 4 plausible options for transition

Items Not Scrambled

NORTH ANNA

MODIFIED

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Item- was modified in accordance with NUREG 1021, as conditions were changed (MFWinstead of AFW restored) and change in conditions resulted in a different correct answer. Onedistractor was also significantly modified.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: C C C C C C C C C C

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level :

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 32


16. 061 AA2.04 091INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081


The Unit is in Mode 6.

Rod Unlatching is in progress.

Manipulator Crane radiation monitor, 1-RM-RMS-162, suddenly pegs high.

The following alarms are received:

• 1K-D2, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI RAD LEVEL• 1K-D3, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI-HI RAD LEVEL

HP has confirmed that radiation levels on the refueling deck are normal and Operationshas declared 1-RM-RMS-162 inoperable.

Which ONE of the following describes the required actions?

A. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation; rod u'nlatching may continue withoutinteruption.

B~ Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation; rod unlatching may resume providedcontinuous HP coverage is present at the manipulator crane.

C. Verify Control Room Bottled Air dump; rod unlatching may continue withoutinteruption.

D. Verify Control Room Bottled Air dump; rod unlatching may resume providedcontinuous HP coverage is present at the manipulator crane.

A Incorrect. Automatic action is correct; allowing the activity to continue is plausiblesince the candidate may not consider that rod unlatching does constitute a corealteration.

B Correct. Automatic action is correct; continuous HP coverage is required since rodunlatching constitutes a core alteration.

C Incorrect. Automatic action is incorrect, botttied air will not dump as a result of thefailure of this RM channel; allowing the activity to continue is plausible since thecandidate may not consider that rod unlatching does constitute a core altertation.

D Incorrect. Automatic action is incorrect, botttied air will not dump as a result of thefailure of this RM channel; continuous HP coverage is required since rod unlatchingconstitutes a core alteration so this portion of the distractor is correct.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:26 PM 33


Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring(ARM) System Alarms: Whether an alarm channel is functioning properly

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

12


Technical Reference: 1-AP-5



Question History:


Comments:KA Match: The KA is matched because the applicant must determine what actuations will occurbased on the malfunction.


NORTH ANNA

Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: B DABABDAC C

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the applicant must have knowledge that rod unlatching constitutes a corealteration and must be knowledgable of the actions required to continue the activity(1 OCFR55.43(b) item 2MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 34


17. 062 AA2.05 092INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• Both units are at 100% power.• Service Water Reservoir level is 314 feet.• 1-SW-P-1 A and 1-SW-P-1 B are running.

• The OATCs reports.the following alarm and indication:

• 1J-D3, SW PP 1-P1A, 2-P1A, AUTO TRIP• Breaker position for 1-SW-P-1A has GREEN and AMBER lights lit.

• The crew enters 0-AP-12, Loss of Service Water.• 2-SW-P-1 B breaker fails to close when operators attempt to start the pump.

Which ONE of the following describes the action required, and the TechnicalSpecification implications of this event?

A. Align Service Water to both headers using Attachment 4; Service Water to CC HeatExchangers must be throttled within 1 hour to avoid pump runout conditions.Ensures design flows to the RS Heat Exchangers may be achieved following aLOCA with one additional worst case failure.

B~ Align Service Water to both headers using Attachment 4; Service Water to CC HeatExchangers must be throttled within 1 hour to avoid pump runout conditions.Ensures design flows to the RS Heat Exchangers may be achieved following a .LOCA with no additional failures.

C. Place Aux Service Water Pumps in Service using Attachment 8; The unit must beplaced in Mode 3 within 6 hours because the Service Water System cannot performits safety function, making CC and RHR also inoperable.

D. Place Aux Service Water Pumps in Service using Attachment 8; The unit must beplaced in Mode 4 within 12 hours because the Service Water System cannotperform its safety function, making CC and RHR also inoperable.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 35


A Incorrect. Statement is correct except that a single failure has already occurred.Design basis is LOOP and 1 single failure. At this point there are 2 SW Pumpsinoperable, so the action, is to throttle within 1 hour to ensure design on RSS with noadditional failures. (See basis)

B Correct. Correct action and correct compensatory measure per procedure.

C Incorrect. Aux Service Water Pumps would be started if no SW pump could be runon the header. At this point, since there are 2 pumps available, Aux Service Water isunnecessary. Plausible because it is the next procedure step. TS basis is correct forconditions where time requirement cannot be met. Plausible if applicant chooses thisaction.

D Incorrect. See C, and action plausible because this is action taken with SW loopsnot available (E). Plausible because it wiould be a correct choice if the applicant chosethe action to start Aux SW Pumps, depending on circumstances of SW inoperability.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear ServiceWater: The normal values for SWS-header flow rate and the flow rates to the componentscooled by the SWS

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


11

2.5

O-AP-12


Learning Objective:

Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:

U 11657

43.2,5

Comments:KA Match: KA is matched because the action taken base9 on the given conditions is designedto ensure that design basis flow rate to RSS Heat Exchnagers will be maintained in the event ofa large break LOCA. There is no actual GPM number for this value, but throttling CC ensuresthat adequate SW Pump discharge pressure can be maintained and that if a CDA occurs, RSSHX flow from SW will be adequate.

SRO level is met because the applicant must select between 2 plausible actions, and alsoselect between plausible bases in technical specifications for why the action is required.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: B B B B A CDC D A Scramble Range: A - D

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 36


Source: NEW Source If BanlcCognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty Level:Job Position: SRO Plant: NORTH ANNADate: 6/2008 Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 37


18. E13 G2.4.20 093INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• A reactor trip has occurred on Unit 1.• Following transition to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the STA reports all

CSF status trees GREEN with the EXCEPTION of Heat Sink, which is YELLOW.• The following SG conditions are observed:

• A SG pressure 1050 psig and stable.• A SG level 25% NR and rising.

• B SG pressure 1150 psig and stable.• B SG level 92% NR and rising.

• C SG pressure 1050 psig and stable.• C SG level 20% NR and rising.

• B MSIV indicates CLOSED.• AFW flow is 160 GPM to each SG.• The crew determines that entry to a Yellow Path procedure will help mitigate the

event.

Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy used to restore the HeatSink Critical Safety Function to GREEN?

A. Perform 1-FR-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure; Isolate AFW flowto B SG and do not restore AFW flow until a steam release path is established.

B. Perform 1-FR-H.2, Response to Steam Generator Overpressure; Verify MainFeedwater Isolation. Dump steam from B SG to reduce Hot Leg temperatures.

C. Perform 1-FR-H.3, Response to Steam Generator High Level; Verify MainFeedwater Isolation. Dump steam from B SG to reduce Hot Leg temperatures andinitiate blowdown from B SG.

DY- Perform 1-FR-H.3, Response to Steam Generator High Level; isolate AFW flow toB SG. Initiate blowdown from B SG and DO NOT dump steam from B SG.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 38


A Incorrect. If pressure was high but level was below 900/0, this strategy would beconsistent with the objectives of the EOP network. Plausible because it is action thatmay be taken for a yellow path on heat sink based upon pressure.

B Incorrect. If pressure was high but level was below 90%, this strategy would beconsistent with the objectives of the EOP network. Dumping steam to Thot below 542would ensure that the affected SG pressure ws below the low set safety valve setpoint.Plausible because this is action performed if level was below 90%.

C Incorrect. Combination of actions from FR-H.2 and FR-H.3. Incorrect because at92% NR level, steam will not be released until an overfill evaluation is performed.Additionally, if the applicant believed that actions of FR-H.2 were applicable for theseconditions, they may choose this because FR-H.2 requires this action.

D Correct. Pressure above 1135 psig, FR-H.2 entry conditions are met, but if thatprocedure was used, it would direct the crew to FR-H.3 based upon SG level >90%.The strategy" as contained in a caution in FR-H.3 is to perform an overfill evaluationprio~ to releasing steam.Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings,cautions, and notes.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


12

4.3

FR-H.2, FR-H.3


Learning Objective:

Question History:

U 11307


Comments:KA Match: This item evaluates the requirements for mitigation of SG High Pressure and SGHigh level. High pressure (FR-H.2) is the required topic, and that procedure may be used formitigation of this event. Part of that strategy is to use FR-H.3 when level is high. There arenotes and cautions in both of these procedures being evaluated in this item.

SRO level because the applicant must evaluate plant conditions, and choose the correctprocedure as well as procedure strategy to mitigate the event. The knowledge required toanswer is specific to the SRO.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: D A A A B B B D B C Scramble Range: A - D

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 39


Source: NEW Source If Banlc

Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty Level:Job Position: SRO Plant: NORTH ANNA

Date: 6/2008 Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 40


19. G2.1.4 094INEW//LOWER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• The date is 6/5/2008.• Both Units are in Mode 1.• Shift complement is at MINIMUM allowed by Technical Specifications.• One of the Reactor Operators becomes ill and must be transported to the

hospital.• TWO potential replacements are identified for call-in.• BOTH replacements have been assigned to OPS Support for the last year.

The last times they were on shift are as follows:

Operator A

• 12 hours on March 24 BOP• 12 hours on February 23 BOP• 12 hours on February 22 BOP• 12 hours on January 19 RO• 12 hours on January 18 RO

Operator B

12 hours on March 21 BOP12 hours on March 20 BOP12 hours on March 19 BOP12 hours on March 18 RO12 hours on December 31 RO

. Which ONE of the following describes the Technical Specification requirement toinitiate action to replace the Reactor Operator, and which operator will be selected asthe replacement?

A~ Action must be taken to ensure the Reactor Operator is replaced within 2 h.ours;Operator A will be selected.

B. Action must be taken to ensure the Reactor Operator is replaced within 2 hours;Operator B will be selected.

C. Action must be initiated within 2 hours to find a replacement for the ReactorOperator; Operator A will be selected.

D. Action must be initiated within 2 hours to find a replacement for the ReactorOperator; Operator B will be selected.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:27 PM 41

QUESTIONS REPORTfor NORTH ANNA NRC exam SRO ONLY REV.O 04 1-1 08

A Correct. Operator A has an active license. Operator B has 4 12 hour shifts in theprevious quarter, so his license has gone inactive. 5 12 hour shifts per quarter arerequired. TS 5.2.2 requires action tQ be initiated immediately and a replacement to bein place in less than 2 hours.

B Incorrect. Operator B is inactive. Plausible because Operator B has stood the 4 mostrecent shifts, and also because to reactivate a license, 40 hours under instruction isrequired. If the applicant confuses the time requirements, Operator B will possible bechosen.

C Incorrect. The replacement must be in place in 2 hours. The TS does not allow 2hours to begin the search.

o Incorrect. Same as C, plausible for reasons given in Band C.

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related toshift staffing, such as medical requirements, "no-solo" operation, maintenance of active licensestatus, 10CFR55, etc.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

31


Technical Reference: TS 5.,2.2, VPAP 2702



Question History:


Comments:KA Match: Maintenance of active license is a required topic covered by this generic KA. Theapplicant must determine the active license from among a selection of 2 operators. Furtherdiscriminates by requiring knowledge of TS time to replace a member of the shift.

NORTH ANNA

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because 1OCFR55.43(b) item 1 and 2 are met because plant staff is a condition ofthe facility license, and minimum staff is a TS administrative requirementMCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: A B D A C D A C B A . Scramble Range: A - D

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 42


20. G2.1.6 095INEWIIHIGHERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081


• The Shift Manager is in the control room discussing an upcoming evolution withthe Unit 2 Unit Supervisor.

• The Unit 1 Unit Supervisor is on a plant walkdown when the following eventsoccur:

• Unit 1 experienced a spurious Turbine runback.• While stabilizing the unit at 65% power, a turbine trip occurs.• The Unit 1 reactor does NOT trip, either automatically or manually from the

control room.• PZR PORV, 1-RC-PCV-1455C, is stuck OPEN.• The associated block valve will NOT close.• Safety Injection is actuated.• The Unit 1 Unit Supervisor is injured returning to the control room and needs

medical assistance in the Turbine Building.

Which ONE of the following identifies who will be the EOP 'Reader', and describes theEOP flowpath upon exiting 1-FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS?

A. Shift Manager; return to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when directed.

B. Shift Manager; transition directly to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant;actions of 1-E-0 were performed in parallel with 1-FR-S.1 due to safety injectionactuation.

C~ Unit 2 Unit Supervisor; return to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, andtransition to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when directed by 1-E-0.

D. Unit 2 Unit Supervisor; transition directly to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or SecondaryCoolant; actions of 1-E-0 were performed in parallel with 1-FR-S.1 due to safetyinjection actuation.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 43


A Incorrect. An ATWS will result in the SM performing duties as the EmergencyManager, he/she will be unable to perform as the reader. Plausible because it is theonly other SRO on the unit, and also because the SM could be the reader if noemergency classification was required.

B Incorrect. Same reason as A, but also because procedure use is incorrect. Upon exitfrom FR-S.1, crew will return to proceduire in effect (E-O, step 1). Plausible becausesteps of E-O are performed in parallel with FR-S.1 if SI actuates.

C Correct. Unit 2 SRO or an RO with no other duties may perform as the reader. STAand SM (if Emergency Manager) are excluded from performing this task.

D Incorrect. Same reason as B, except that the position of reader is correct.Conduct of Operations: Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

31


Technical Reference: DNAP-0509, FR-S.1



Question History:


Comments:KA is matched because' it places the SRO in an abnormal position of having to replace theperson assigned to fill the SRO function during an EOP event. The KA is further matched byrequiring the SRO to determine procedure use (crew mgmt) for a specific event


NORTH ANNA

o 123 4 5 6 7 8 9

CBCBCADABA

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level because the applicant must determine a suitable replacement for an injured SRO,and also dtermine appropriate procedure flowpath strategy for a given set of conditions.(10CFR55.43(b) item 5)MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version:

Answer:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 44


21 . G2.2.11 096INEWIILOWERIISROINORTH ANNA/6/20081


• Unit 1 is operating at 100% power.• The following alarm is received several times in a 10 minute period:

• 1D-H5, HIGH CAPACITY S/G BLOWDOWN TROUBLE

• Local indication at the High Capacity S/G Blowdown Control Panel is normal.• The Instrument Technician investigating the alarm determines that the

comparator card for the annunciator is failing.• A replacement comparator card is unavailable and assistance has been

requested from Engineering.• To restore functionality of the alarm in the interim a jumper must be installed.

Which ONE of the following procedures will govern the installation of the jumper, andwho, by title, must provide FINAL approval of the jumper?

A. OP-NA-200-1 001, Equipment Clearance Process; Shift Manager.

_8. OP-NA-200-1 001, Equipment Clearance Process; FSRC.

C. VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications; Shift Manager.

DY- VPAP-1403, Temporary Modifications; FSRC.

A Incorrect. Equipment Clearance process is used for removing equipment fromservice. Since this equipment is inoperable, it is plausible to believe this process couldbe used to restore operability of the annunciator. Additionally, when the annunciator isrepaired, a clearance will be used for the work performed.

8 Incorrect. Same reason as A, but approval authority is correct for conditionsprovided.

C Incorrect. Correct procedure but the Shift Manager has an approval signature priorto the FSRC. The Shift Manager also has other responsibilities relating to theinstallation of the change..

D Correct. Final approval for Temporary Modifications lies with FSRC. A lifted lead orjumper qualifies as a Temporary Modification.

All distractors are plausible because they either contain the correct approval authority,a required signature for the approval process, and the governing procedures for eitherinstalling the jumper or replacing the card.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 45


Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

32


Technical Reference: VPAP-1403



Question History:

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43 item 3 and 5

Comments:KA Match: The KA is matched because the SRO must determine that a lifted lead or jumperfalls under the Temporary Modification procedure, and the process for approval requires a finalapproval from FSRC.


NORTH ANNA

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

SRO level is met because processing of Temporary Modifications is an SRO responsibility andthe SRO has a signature in the approval process. ROs do not have a role in the proces exceptfor being cognizant of the effect of the Temporary Modification on plant operation.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: D DAB C B C A A D

Source If Banle

Difficulty Level:

Plant:Previous NRC?:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 46


22. G2.2.35 097INEW//HIGHERI/SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• A Unit 1 RCS heatup is in progress.• RCS temperature is 342 degrees F.• 1H Emergency Diesel Generator is declared INOPERABLE due to failure of the

Shutdown Relay.

Which ONE of the following correctly lists (1) the OPERATIONAL MODE that Unit 1 iscurrently in, and (2) the requirements for Mode change that apply for the current plantconditions?

A. (1)(2)

B. (1)(2)

C. (1)(2)

D~ (1)(2)

Mode 3Mode Change may be performed without restriction as long as the actionrequirements related to the 1H EDG inoperability are met.

Mode 3Mode Change may be NOT performed without a risk evaluation andpermission from the NRC.

Mode 4Mode Change may ,be performed without restriction as long as the actionrequirements related to the 1H EDG inoperability are met.

Mode 4Mode Change may be NOT performed without a risk evaluation andpermission from the NRC.

A Incorrect. Hot Standby is Mode 3, which is >350 degrees F. Additionally, Modechange is plausible because some tech specs indicate TS 3.0.4 is not applicable. Inthis instance, 3.0.4 does apply, and even though action requirements are met, the LCOdoes not have an indefinite time requirement as defined by TS section 3.0.

B In·correct Mode as described in A, but action for Mode change is correct.

C Incorrect. Correct Mode is identified, but incorrect Mode change action is applied.Plausible as in A, and reference indicates situations where Mode change may beperformed.

D Correct. See descriptions above

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 47


Equipment Control: Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

32


Technical Reference: TS 3.8.1, TS 3.0.4



Question History:


Comments:KA is matched because the applicant must determine the mode. Additionally enhanceddiscriminatory value requires interpretation of TS 3.0.4 for applicability to Mode Changeallowance.


NORTH ANNA

NEW

HIGHER

SRO

6/2008

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

SRO level is met lAW 10CFR55.43(b) item 2 because the SRO must determine TSrequirements for Mode Change given equipment inoperability and mode applicability, as well asunderstanding of where action requirements apply to the Mode Change (3.0.4).MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: DBA A A C C C B C

Source If Ban1e

Difficulty Level:

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 48


23. G2.3.6 098INEW//LOWER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/

Which ONE of the following describes the process for obtaining a Release Permit for aWaste Gas Decay Tank AND the Bases for the maximum curie content in each gasstorage tank?

A':" Operations initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes therelease permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem totalbody exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.

B. Chemistry initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes therelease permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 0.5 rem totalbody exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.

C. Chemistry initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes therelease permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 2.5 rem totalbody exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.

D. Operations initiates the release request and Health Physics (HP) authorizes therelease permit; an individual at the exclusion boundary will not exceed 2.5 rem totalbody exposure in the event of an uncontrolled release of a tanks contents.

A Correct. Operations is responsible for initiation and HP authorizes. Basis for TS limitcorrect.

B Incorrect. Initiator is incorrect, but authorization is correct. Basis for TS limit correct.

C Incorrect. Initiator is incorrect, but authorization is correct. Basis incorrect butplausible since it is a small fraction of 10CFR50.67 limits.

D Incorrect. Initiator is correct and authorization is correct. Basis incorrect but plausiblesince it is a small fraction of 10CFR50.67 limits.

All are plausible since both Chemistry and HP have roles and responsibilities dealingwith sampling, surveying, and analyzing. A candidate who is unfamiliar with theprocess/Bases is likely to consider any of the distractors plausible. The 2.5 rem valueis reasonable since it represent a fraction (100/0) of the 1OCFR50.67 AST limit of 25rem.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:28 PM 49


Radiation Control: G2.3.6 Ability to approve release permits.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


33

3.8

ProcedureTRM 3.10.3 and Bases


Learning Objective:

Question History: New

10 CFR Part 55 Content: 41.13 / 43.4 / 45.10

SRO level because it evaluates the process for initiating and authorizing gas releases alongwith knowledge of the Bases of the TRM limit of curie content; RO candidates are not requiredto know this level of detail from memory.

Note: At NAPS the Shift Manager does not have a specific authorization or approval signatureon release forms. Demonstration of understanding the process including the approvalsrequired and Bases of the TRM limit meets the intent of the KA.

MCS Time:

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Points:

NEW

LOWER

SRO

6/2008

1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: AAAAAAAAAA Items Not Scrambled

Source If Bank:

Difficulty Level :

Plant: NORTH ANNA

Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 50


24. 02.4.27 099INEW//HIOHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/

Initial conditions:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 3 shutting down for a scheduled refueling.• A fire is in progress in the Motor Driven AFW Pump House.• The Fire Brigade is at the scene.

Current conditions:

• The fire was burning for 12 minutes and is now extinguished.• The 1B MDAFW Pump motor was destroyed by the fire.

Which ONE of the following describes the impact on Safe Shutdown Functions, andwhether E-Plan action is required in accordance with O-FCA-O, Fire Protection Operations Response?

A':I The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 4 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, EmergencyManager Controlling Procedure MUST be implemented.

B. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 4 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, EmergencyManager Controlling Procedure MAY be implemented at the discretion of the ShiftManager.

C. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 5 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, EmergencyManager Controlling Procedure MUST be implemented.

D. The Reactor Heat Removal for Mode 5 function is affected; EPIP 1.01, EmergencyManager Controlling Procedure MAY be implemented at the discretion of the ShiftManager.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 51


A is Correct. Degredation of the AFW system due to a fire will affect safe shutdown toMode 4 (350 degrees F) conditions. Additionally, the fire affects safety relatedequipment and has been burning for >10 minutes, so an emergency classification willbe required.

B is incorrect because the Shift Manager must follow the' requirements of FCA-O andinitiate the Emergency Manager procedure. Plausible because if the fire was <10minutes or did not affect safety related equipment, it would be SM determination of'whether a classification would be required. Also, with plant conditions beginning inMode 3, the applicant could believe that the requirements do not apply as in Mode 1.

C is incorrect because loss of AFW only affects safe shutdown to Mode 4. Theapplicant should be able to determine that AFW is required in Modes 1-3, and thereforeAFW should not be required below 350 degrees F when RHR will be placed in service.E-Plan implementation is correct for this option.

D is incorrect but plausible for reason stated in C as well as E-Plan implementation asstated in B.

Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedures.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


34

3.9

FCA-O Att 2 and steps 13, 14


Learning Objective:

Question History:

U 13390


Comments:KA matched because the item evaluates knowledge of the Fire implementation procedure andassociated attachment for safe shutdown considerations. It also evaluates knowledge of plantconditions requiring E-Plan implementation.

SRO level is met because it is the SRO responsibility to know plant conditions required forE-Plan implementation, and also plant conditions required for Safe Shutdown Monitoring andpotential performance of other FCA procedures.MCS Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: A B B B B B B 'C D C Scramble Range: A - D

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 52


Source: NEW Source If Ban1<:Cognitive Level: HIGHER Difficulty Level:

Job Position: SRO Plant: NORTH ANNADate: 6/2008 Previous NRC?:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 53


25. G2.4.6 IOOINEW//HIGHER//SROINORTH ANNA/6/2008/


• A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.• RCS pressure i·ndicates 190 psig and stable.• RCS temperature is 260 degrees F and lowering.• .Containment pressure is 27 psia.• Low Head SI flow indicates 1200 gpm on each train.• All equipment is operating as designed.• The crew is performing 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation.• SI has been reset.• NO other actions have been performed.• A RED path on the INTEGRITY CSF Status Tree is received and verified by the

STA.

Which ONE of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the existing plantconditions?

A. Immediately transition to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized ThermalShock; perform actions of 1-FR-P.1 to stabilize RCS temperature, and return to1-ES-1.3 when directed by 1-FR-P.1.

B. Immediately transition to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized ThermalShock; verify that RCS pressure is below the limit required for implementing1-FR-P.1, and return to 1-ES-1.3.

C. Remain in 1-ES-1.3 until transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is complete throughstep 8; go to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock andperform actions of 1-FR-P.1 to stabilize RCS temperature, then return to 1-ES-1.3when directed by 1-FR-P.1.

D~ Remain in 1-ES-1.3 until transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is complete throughstep 8; go to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock andverify that RCS pressure is below the limit required for implementing 1-FR-P.1, thenreturn to 1-ES-1.3.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 54


A Incorrect. Once ES-1.3 is entered, FR procedures are not performed until theswapover is complete. Plausible because standard EOP use would require transition toFR-P.1 A Actio'ns are plausible because the applicant may miss the fact that adversecontainment conditions exist, and RCS presure above 225 would require use of theprocedure to stop the cooldown and stabilize pressure.

B Incorrect procedure transition but correct action once FR-P.1 is entered. ES-1.3would be followed through step 8 prior to transition.

C Incorrect because the use of FR-P.1 is incorrect. Transition point is correct, but withadverse containment, 300 psig is below the value that requires checking LHSI flow>1000 gpm for transition to procedure and step in effect. Normal containment value is225 psig, whuich would require use of FR-P.1 with the current RCS pressure indication.

o Correct, alignment of the recirc path initially takes presedence to ensure a suctionsource to ECCS pumps after which FRPs may be addressed. Once it is verified thatplant conditions will not support a PTS type event, P.1 will return the operator to theORP in effect to continue event mitigation.Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Question Number:

Tier:Group:

Importance Rating:


34

4.7

ES-1.3 Note prior to step 1, FR-P.1, step 1


Learning Objective:

Question History:

U 13689, U 13011


Comments:KA Match: Generic knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies, this item is a match because itevaluates the use of FRPs in special circumstances that are outside of normal EOP useguidelines.

SRO level because it meets 1OCFR55.43(b) item 5 for assessment of multiple plant conditionsand selection of procedures, and discriminates at a higher level because the applicant mustdetermine specific procedure strategy based on abnormal plant conditions.

This is a new item. We have seen similar items in other bank questions about use of ES-1.3but do not have any containing this strategy. No other bank question was used to develop thisitem.

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 55


NORTH ANNA

NEW

HIGHER

SRO6/2008


Time: 1 Points: 1.00 Version: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Answer: DACACAB BAD

Source If Banle

Difficulty Level :

Plant:

Previous NRC?:

MCS

Source:

Cognitive Level:

Job Position:

Date:

Monday, June 30, 2008 3:35:29 PM 56

North Anna, Exam 05000338/2008301 - DRAFT Senior Reactor ...

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Transcript of North Anna, Exam 05000338/2008301 - DRAFT Senior Reactor ...