Nonviolent Public Protest in the USSR, December 1, 1986 ...NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST...
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NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : NONVIOLENT PUBLIC PROTEST IN THE USSR December 1, 1986 - December 31, 198 9 AUTHOR : Mark R . Beissinger CONTRACTOR : University of Wisconsi n PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Mark R . Beissinge r COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 804-1 4 DATE : October 199 0 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author .
Transcript of Nonviolent Public Protest in the USSR, December 1, 1986 ...NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST...
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H
TITLE : NONVIOLENT PUBLIC PROTEST IN THE USSRDecember 1, 1986 - December 31, 1989
AUTHOR : Mark R. Beissinger
CONTRACTOR : University of Wisconsin
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Mark R. Beissinger
COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 804-14
DATE : October 1990
The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b ythe National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Theanalysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o fthe author .
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S
This project could not have been carried out without th e
assistance of a number of people . Above all, research assistants Da n
Geller and Shelly Sandel provided able support in tracking dow n
materials in the library . Dan participated in practically every ste p
of the creation of the database, including interpretation of material s
and data entry, and deserve special thanks . Jon Cebra also provide d
help with computer programming and with the statistical analysis o f
the material . Special thanks go to Mario Corti and the staff a t
Arkhiv samizdata at Radio Liberty in Munich, who graciously provide d
me with the opportunity to peruse their rich holdings of unofficia l
newspapers and publications . Needless to say, all errors an d
shortcomings in the project are solely the fault of the Principa l
Investigator .
a
r
CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 6
Description of the Data 1 0
General Patterns of Protest Activity 1 7
Temporal Variations in Demonstration Activity 2 9
Demonstration Activity by Type of Demand 3 6
The Impact of Regime Regulation and Coercio nAn Initial Investigation 5 2
The Agenda of Future Research 62
Appendix A : Sources Directly Usedin the Data Base 6 6
Appendix B : Definition of Demand Types 68
Appendix C : Statement on the Distributio nof the Data Base 7 3
Database Structure 7 5Definitions 79Coding 83
Endnotes 94
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report analyzes the general contours of non-violen t
protest activity in the Soviet Union during the glasnost '
period .' It is based on information collected from a larg e
variety of official, unofficial, emigre, and Western source s
covering 2,161 non-violent mass protest demonstrations tha t
occurred in the Soviet Union from December 1st, 1986 throug h
December 31st, 1989 . According to official MVD statistics ,
therefore, this report analyzes information on somewher e
between a fourth and a third of all demonstrations that too k
place in the USSR during this period . Although data on violen t
mass protests, strikes, and non-violent protest demonstration s
before December 1986 were collected, they are still in th e
process of coding and systematization and are not included i n
this study .
The report documents the radical transformations that hav e
taken place in the Soviet Union in recent years in the spher e
of public protest and political participation . It is shown
that high levels of of protest mobilization have occurre d
especially in Transcaucasia, the Baltic, Moldavia, and wester n
portions of the Ukraine, although almost a quarter of al l
events actually took place within the RSFSR . The discrepancy
has much to do with the varying sizes of demonstrations amon g
different groups . Thus, while Russians have protested often,
the mobilizing power of Russian groups has not been very high ,
with over 60 percent of demonstrations in the RSFSR being les s
than a thousand in size . By contrast, more than 45 percen t
(113) of the demonstrations recorded for Armenia involved mor e
than 100 thousand people . Of the approximately 60 millio n
person-days of protest accounted for in this study, more tha n
half (53 percent) took place in Armenia, and slightly less than
a fifth (19 percent) occurred in Azerbaidzhan .
Three distinct periods in the development of Sovie t
protest during the time under study are identified : an early
period of low mobilization and testing of the political water s
(from December 1986 to February 1988) ; an intermediate perio d
involving great volatility in mobilizations among relativel y
few groups (from February 1988 to February 1989) ; and a thir d
period characterized by more constant and less volatile level s
of demonstrations and the mobilization of new groups into
protest politics . The timing and development of protest i n
twelve republics are compared, as well as the extent to whic h
different republics displayed a constant versus a punctuate d
pattern of mobilization . It is shown that towards the end o f
the period under study in this report (i .e ., the end of 1989 )
high levels of mobilization were becoming increasingly constan t
in a number of republics, including the RSFSR, Ukraine ,
Azerbaidzhan, Armenia, and Moldavia . In other words, th e
political system was facing a growing explosion of protes t
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participation among an increasing number of groups that, i f
left unaccomodated, was likely to undermine politica l
stability .
Differentiating protest by the types of demands put forth ,
it is shown that the mobilizing power of liberal groups wa s
consistently greater than that of conservative groups . Only
Russians displayed a significant degree of ideologica l
divisioning in their patterns of protest mobilization . Both
protest in favor of liberal demands and protest in favor of a
multi-party system grew considerably in the second half o f
1989, particularly among Russians, explaining in part th e
decision of the CPSU to abandon its monopoly over the part y
system in February 1990 . Liberal protest, ecological protest ,
protest in favor of secession, protest over non-secessionis t
territorial demands, protest over linguistic and cultura l
demands, protest against regime coercion, and (more recently )
religious protest have all displayed more or less constan t
patterns of mobilization, while protest over social an d
economic issues, anti-military protest, and protest ove r
foreign policy issues have been intermittent . Anti-militar y
protest, while displaying a punctuated pattern of mobilization ,
grew in significance towards the end of the period studied
here, as did protest over foreign-policy issues . Thus ,
internal protest increasingly impinged on national securit y
decision-making in the Soviet Union .
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The enormous variety of causes for protest in the USSR
made the search for a general explanation for protes t
mobilizations impossible ; neither education, nor part y
membership, nor ethnic assimilation, nor urbanization turned
out to be connected with overall levels of protes t
mobilization . For non-Russians, a relationship betwee n
linguistic Russification and protest in favor of conservativ e
demands was found, as well as a strong association between th e
availability of native language newspapers and secessionis t
protest . Thus, measures of ethnic assimilation appear to b e
important as explanations for selected protest issues, but no t
for protest overall . Protest over social and economic issue s
was found to be related with the level of urbanization of a
province, but subsequent analysis found it to be negatively
associated with city size . Consequently, protest over socia l
and economic issues was most likely in small towns in highl y
urbanized areas of the country . In the RSFSR the larger th e
city, the more likely it was that a demonstration expressed
liberal demands, expressed approval for a multi-party system o r
for religious freedom, expressed racist or violentl y
nationalistic demands, or expressed sympathy with the demand s
of other national groups . Thus, like ethnic assimilation ,
urbanization would seem to have an important impact on selecte d
issues of protest in particular places, but not on protes t
overall .
The penultimate section of the report analyzes efforts b y
national and local authorities to contain non-violent protes t
through regulation and coercion . It is found that in mos t
parts of the USSR laws governing the conduct of demonstration s
have remained a dead letter, largely ignored by protest groups ,
and often unenforceable by the police . A large proportion o f
protest demonstrations taking place in the country have no t
been authorized by the authorities . Nor have efforts t o
contain demonstrations by violence proved successful in mos t
cases . Indeed, the evidence presented in this study indicate s
that the use of violence against demonstrators actually
stimulated greater protest . Coercion has been highest in thos e
parts of the country that have exhibited low levels of protes t
mobilization in general, but the causal flow of th e
relationship is unclear .
A final section of the report outlines plans for futur e
research using the database and related materials .
INTRODUCTIO N
Comparative research on protest behavior has been an d
continues to be a major area of political inquiry . 2 Such
research has focused on the causes and mechanics of socia l
protest, the impact of regime violence on protest activity, th e
influence protest exercises on public policy, the relationship
between violent and non-violent forms of protest, tempora l
patterns of change in the volume of protest, and the role o f
competition and cooperation among groups within the so-calle d
social protest sector of the population . In general, researc h
on protest behavior has taken place at three separate levels o f
analysis . The lowest level has concentrated on specific ,
issue-oriented protest movements (such as labor movements ,
ecology movements, anti-nuclear protests, etc .) and on th e
mechanics of protest mobilization . While such research ha s
been useful in uncovering factors associated with the succes s
or failure of protest movements, like all case-study researc h
it is often limited by a lack of generalizability . At th e
highest level of analysis have been broad-ranging, quantitativ e
cross-national studies of protest and collective violence .
These have been useful in testing hypotheses about the cause s
of and relationships between different types of protes t
activities, but have often suffered from a lack o f
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comparability and problems in the collection of comparabl e
cross-national data . At the intermediate level of analysi s
stand country-specific studies that focus on a range of protes t
activities within the social protest sector of a society .
Utilizing the group, the locality, or the movement as thei r
unit of analysis, such studies seek to combine the advantage s
of comparability with those of generalizability .
This project clearly falls into this intermediate level o f
analysis . The wave of protest that has engulfed the Sovie t
Union since shortly after the inauguration of Gorbachev' s
policy of glasnost' presents a unique opportunity to stud y
protest behavior within a comparative yet focused framework .
The demographic variety of the country and the enormous numbe r
of social movements that have arisen over the past severa l
years provide ample opportunity for comparison . The explosio n
of protest activity has affected different sectors of societ y
to various degrees, allowing one not only to compare th e
intensity and character of protest mobilization betwee n
different segments of the population, but also to examine the
relationship between different types of protest events an d
their impact on public policy .
Soviet citizens frequently refer to their country today a s
a "meeting democracy" (mitingovaia demokratiia), in which
political issues are decided on the streets rather than i n
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government offices . In many respects the USSR has come t o
resemble Kornhauser's classical model of a mass society ; 3
participation has dramatically increased, but elites no longe r
possess the capacity to buffer the state from popular demands .
This vast transformation in mass attitudes and behavior toward s
politics has been one of the most spectacular of the change s
that accompanied Gorbachev's reforms . As one Soviet autho r
wrote in 1988 :
Several years ago we knew exactly what a rally wa sand what a demonstration was . The former was when w egathered together in one place to hear someone speak .The latter was when, on a holiday, we passed by areviewing stand in an orderly column . . . [But now ]there has been a real explosion of socia lactiveness . 4
With the onset of glasnost' the availability o f
information on Soviet protest events, not only in emigre an d
Western sources, but also in Soviet official and unofficia l
publications, has grown exponentially . In the past studies of
Soviet protest behavior were subject to distortion due to th e
regime's systematic censorship of information on protes t
events . By contrast, today it is possible to gathe r
information on a significant number of protest events fro m
official Soviet sources themselves . Before glasnost', th e
Soviet regime's repressive policies towards dissent of any sor t
made the risks of mass protest relatively high and th e
frequency of mass protest relatively low . An earlier study o f
protest demonstrations in the USSR from 1956 to 1983 uncovere d
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a total of 406 events of all sizes, ranging from a fe w
participants to tens of thousands . 5 Yet another study found a
total of 497 protest demonstrations of various sizes that too k
place from 1965 to 1978 . 6 In a follow-up study of 32 1
demonstrations by Soviet ethnic groups from 1965 to 1978, thi s
same author found that most demonstrations during these year s
were small, with 58 percent having had less than a hundre d
participants, and most of these having less tha n fifty.7
While both of these studies are testimonies to the fact tha t
mass protest in the Soviet Union did not begin with glasnost' ,
the extent of their coverage of events is unclear, and th e
quality of the information about these events is limited .
This report analyzes 2,161 non-violent protes t
demonstrations in the USSR from December 1st, 1986 to Decembe r
31st, 1989 . The very size of the sample, the extent of it s
actual coverage of events, and the quality of the informatio n
contained allows for a confidence of analysis concerning Sovie t
protest behavior that was hitherto impossible . It is not th e
intention of this report to probe all aspects of protes t
demonstrations in the Soviet Union or even to develop model s
based on Soviet protest behavior . Rather, its goals ar e
limited to providing a summary of the data, a characterizatio n
of trends in Soviet protest over space and time, and a
preliminary examination of some of the relationships that lur k
within the data and that warrant further investigation .
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DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
A non-violent mass protest demonstration was defined as a n
event that met the following six criteria : 1) it was a
voluntary gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in
a collective display of sentiment for or against publi c
policies ; 2) it involved a minimum of 100 persons ; 3) it was
bounded by space and time (i .e ., occurred in a specific
location during a limited time period) ; 4) the number o f
participants was not restricted by the organizers of the even t
(i .e ., was not a conference, convention, or other restricte d
organized meeting) ; 5) it did not have as one of its purpose s
the infliction of violence by its participants (i .e ., was no t
an event of violent mass protest) ; 6) it was not in itself a
refusal to work (i .e ., a strike) . The Russian vocabulary fo r
events of this type is rich, including such terms as
demonstration (demonstratsiia), meeting (miting), protes t
(protest), manifestation (manifestatsiia), and funera l
procession (panikhida) . These terms should be contrasted with
the vocabulary used to describe events of violent mass protest ,
such as disorders (besporiadki), pogrom (pogrom), fight (drak) ,
disturbances (volneniia), and clashes (stychki), or those used
to describe strikes (zabastovki) .
While strikes and violent mass protests were excluded fro m
this analysis, the possibility that these types of events migh t
overlap with non-violent demonstrations was recognized i n
compiling the database . Strikes can (and often do) involve
non-violent mass demonstrations, and non-violent mas s
demonstrations can (and at times do) evolve into violent mas s
protest . In such cases, the demonstration dimension of thes e
events was included in the database .
Demonstrations which did not involve voluntary participation
but which rather were mobilized by the political authoritie s
and were ritual in character (i .e ., official May Day o r
Revolution Day parades) were excluded . Mass demonstrations
sponsored or encouraged by the political authorities that wer e
voluntary and non-ritual in nature were included .
Demonstrations, like all events, are unique in space an d
time . However, it should be noted that multiple events ofte n
occurred in the same city on the same day . For instance, o n
May 28th, 1989 four separate and unrelated demonstrations took
place in Moscow . A thousand Armenians met at the Armenia n
Cemetary to commemorate the independent Armenian republic o f
1918 to 1920 ; a hundred Crimean Tatars gathered outside th e
Bulgarian embassy to protest against the treatment of Turks i n
Bulgaria ; a hundred thousand Muscovites participated in a
demonstration sponsored by Memorial concerning the Congress o f
People's Deputies, which was then in session ; and a thousand
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Muscovites demonstrated in Pushkin Square at a rally sponsore d
by the Democratic Union . Each of these events occurred i n
different locations in the city and were organized by differen t
groups ; nor was there any evidence of overlapping membershi p
among the participants . In such cases, every effort was mad e
to untangle these events as separate events . However, often in
large demonstrations a portion of the participants break of f
from the main group and hold separate marches or protests .
Alternatively, small groups that hold their own demonstration s
later join large crowds . In cases in which either of thes e
conditions were detectable, the events were counted as on e
large event rather than a series of separate events . The
difficulties presented by this fluid character of protes t
behavior were somewhat finessed by the use of protest person -
days as an indicator for analyzing protest activity . 8
A minimum size limit was imposed for several reasons .
Information on smaller protest events is less likely to b e
available and is less likely to be accurate than information o n
larger protest events . Demonstrations in the Soviet Union hav e
been as small as a single person . But in a period in which
some protest events included as many as a million participants ,
reporting on smaller events tended to be scarce . So long a s
protest activity was measured in protest person-days, omissio n
of smaller events was unlikely to have a perceptible o r
significant influence on overall estimates of protes t
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mobilization . A minimum size of a hundred was imposed afte r
examining reports of hundreds of events . Information on event s
smaller in size than a hundred was actually collected, though
it was not included in the database because of the spottines s
of the data . Events involving a hundred persons, however ,
appear to have been fairly well reflected in the sources used
in this study . 9
Hundreds of sources were examined by the author and tw o
research assistants . These sources included not only Wester n
sources (such as newspaper and wire service reports ,Foreign
Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, and Radi o
Liberty/Radio Free Europe reports), but also emigre source s
(such as VestiizSSSR, ELTA Information Bulletin, and
Turkistan Today), official Soviet sources (most central and al l
republican newspapers, TASS wire service reports, independentl y
monitored Soviet shortwave broadcasts), and unofficial Sovie t
sources (Russian-language newspapers of major oppositio n
political movements, unofficial wire services, and report s
published in Radio Liberty's Arkhiv samizdata) . For a mor e
detailed listing of those sources that were directly used i n
compiling the database, see Appendix A .
Coverage of the actual number of protest demonstration s
that took place in the USSR during the period under study was
of course incomplete, but nevertheless quite substantial .
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According to official MVD statistics, in 1989 there were 5,30 0
demonstrations of all sizes in the entire Soviet Union . 10
The database includes information on 1,424 of these, or abou t
27 percent of all demonstrations in the USSR for that year .
Considering that the official MVD statistics also cove r
demonstrations that were less than a hundred in size, th e
coverage offered by this database can be said to be extensive .
Certainly, in terms of large demonstrations there were few tha t
occurred during this period that were missed, particularl y
given the wide range of sources used . Coverage o f
demonstrations that took place in 1988 was slightly better tha n
for 1989 . 11 According to official MVD statistics, there wer e
2,328 protest meetings throughout the Soviet Union in 1988 ; 1 2
665 of these events, or 29 percent, are reported on in the
database .
After compiling and organizing the material, the data wa s
entered; each source of information was jointly examined by
both the Principal Investigator and a research assistant wit h
reading fluency in Russian . Each record includes informatio n
not only on the date and place of the event, but also on th e
number of participants (at times, several estimates), th e
nationality of the participants, the organizers of the protes t
(if any), the demands put forth by the protesters (coded int o
145 separate categories), whether the authorities had give n
their permission for the demonstration to take place, the us e
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of coercion by the authorities against protesters (both i n
terms of numbers of arrests, injuries, and deaths, as well as a
scale of violence based on this information), and the source s
from which the information came . 13 Thus, the databas e
functions not only as a source of information for analyzin g
protest behavior, but also as a bibliographic reference fo r
future historians of the glasnost' period .
While information on earlier events was collected, th e
database begins its coverage of demonstrations with Decembe r
1st, 1986 . December 1986 was chosen as a starting date because
what are generally considered the first major demonstrations o f
the glasnost' era began at that time--the Alma-At a
demonstrations and riots of December 17th and 18th, in which u p
to ten thousand participants took part . While othe r
demonstrations were close in preceding and following these
events, there is some justification to the claim made by Kazak h
writer Olzhas Suleimenov before the Congress of People' s
Deputies in June 1989 that "the Alma-Ata students and worker s
were the first in the country to conduct unsanctioned
meetings," 14 if only in the sense that these demonstration s
were the first largescale demonstrations to rock the country in
the aftermath of Gorbachev's initiation of glasnost' .
Of course, as is the case with any material dealing with
contemporary affairs, the data utilized in this study i s
limited by the problem of "right-censoring" 15 --i .e ., th e
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large number of demonstrations that have occurred since the end
of 1989 . According to MVD statistics, in the first fifty-fou r
days of 1990 alone, more than 1500 demonstrations took place i n
the Soviet Union, with the participation of 6 .4 million
people . 16 The Azerbaidzhani insurrection of December 1989 -
January 1990 was only in its beginning stages at the point i n
time that the data in this study ends . All this points to the
need to update the study to cover events beyond the end o f
1989, as well as the other events that will undoubtedly occu r
during the remainder of the current cycle of protest in th e
USSR . 17
GENERAL PATTERNS OF PROTEST ACTIVIT Y
Table I presents the general distribution of demonstratio n
person-days by republic and province . The results are als o
weighted by population (person-days per 1000 population) fo r
more accurate comparison of the degree of mobilization i n
particular localities . Essentially, the data show extremel y
high levels of protest mobilization in Transcaucasia and th e
Baltic, somewhat lower yet not insignificant levels in Moldavi a
and Ukraine, and relatively low levels in the RSFSR ,
Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia . In Armenia, eac h
inhabitant of the republic spent on the average 9 .8 days a t
protest demonstrations--a rate that considerably exceeded that
for Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast', the next highes t
score, with about seven days of demonstration participation pe r
inhabitant . Again, the statistics presented here reflect onl y
one type of protest activity . Official Soviet strik e
statistics for 1989, for instance, show that 13 .6 percent o f
all person-days lost in the Soviet economy as a result of labo r
walkouts occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast', as
opposed to only .3 percent in Armenia proper . 18 Obviously ,
forms of protest have varied considerably from place to place ,
and all that is being reported here are statistics for one form
of protest, not protest activity in general . For one republic ,
Turkmenia, no instances of non-violent protest demonstrations
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TABLE I . PERSON-DAYS OF NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATIO NBY
REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 198 9
TOTA LREPUBLIC/PROVINCE
PERSON-DAYSPERSON-DAYS PE R1000 POPULATION
NUMBER OFPROTESTS
RSFSR 2016557 13 .68 530
(24 .5% )Karelian ASSR 700 0 .8 8Komi ASSR 51000 40 .3 8Arkhangel'sk 3000 1 .9 1Vologda 0 0 .0 0Murmansk 0 0 .0 0Novgorod 0 0 .0 0Pskov 0 0 .0 0Leningrad 235850 35 .3 1Briansk 0 0 .0 0Vladimir 0 0 .0 0Ivanovo 1650 1 .2 5Kalinin 400 0 .2 4Kostroma 0 0 .0 0Orel 200 0 .2 2Riazan' 650 0 .4 8Smolensk 560 0 .4 8Tula 0 0 .0 0Yaroslavl' 14633 9 .9 5Moscow 1134280 72 .4 6Mari ASSR 3000 4 .0 0Mordvinian ASSR 0 0 .0 0Chuvash ASSR 0 0 .0 0Gor'kii 3300 0 .8 9Kirov 0 0 .0 0Belgorod 0 0 .0 0Voronezh 0 0 .0 0Kursk 0 0 .0 0Lipetsk 0 0 .0 0Tambov 100 0 .0 8Kalmyk ASSR 0 0 .0 0Tatar ASSR 51850 14 .2 4Astrakhan 1100 1 .1 0Volgograd 5000 1 .9 3Kuibyshev 112533 34 .4 6Penza 0 0 .0 0Saratov 1400 0 .4 8Ul'ianov 0 0 .0 0Dagestan ASSR 700 0 .3 9Kabardino-Balkar ASSR 0 0 .0 0Northern Ossetian ASSR 6000 9 .4 6Chechen Ingush ASSR 72000 56 .3 8Krasnodar krai 33650 6 .5 8Stavropol krai 2150 0 .7 5Rostov 11500 2 .67
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REPUBLIC/PROVINCETOTA L
PERSON-DAYSPERSON-DAYS PER1000 POPULATION
NUMBER OFPROTESTS
RSFSR (cont . )Bashkir ASSR 2000 0 .5 1Udmurt ASSR 0 0 .0 0Kurgan 0 0 .0 0Orenburg 0 0 .0 0Perm 2600 0 .8 4Sverdlovsk 25975 5 .5 0Cheliabinsk 16000 4 .4 1Altai krai 0 0 .0 0Kemerovo 148300 46 .7 1Novosibirsk 28425 10 .2 2Omsk 17700 8 .2 7Tomsk 3900 3 .9 0Tiumen' 0 0 .0 0Buriat ASSR 1000 0 .9 6Tuva ASSR 0 0 .0 0Krasnoiarsk krai 7050 1 .9 6Irkutsk 10600 7 .6 9Chita 0 0 .0 0Yakut ASSR 1000 0 .9 3Primorskii krai 1000 0 .4 4Khabarovsk krai 200 0 .1 1Amur 0 0 .0 0Kamchatka 0 0 .0 0Magadan 2100 3 .8 7Sakhalin 1000 1 .4 1Kaliningrad 500 0 .5 7
UKRAINE 2587417 50 .04 368
(17 .0% )Voroshilovgrad 0 0 .0 0Dnepropetrovsk 11100 2 .8 6Donetsk 63900 11 .9 9Zaporozh'e 3300 1 .5 9Kirovgrad 0 0 .0 0Poltava 9800 5 .5 9Sumi 1000 0 .7 0Khar'kov 32200 10 .0 8Vinnitsa 1500 0 .7 8Volynia 23000 21 .6 6Zhitomir 26000 16 .8 3Transcarpathian 24000 19 .17Ivano-Franko 457500 321 .2 8Kiev 370783 81 .6 3L'vov 1286400 468 .1 2Rovno 13625 11 .6 5Ternopol' 177633 151 .9 5Khmel'nitskii 0 0 .0 0Cherkassy 0 0 .0 0Chernigov 0 0 .0 0Chernovitsa 31000 33 .05
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TOTALREPUBLIC/PROVINCE
PERSONDAYSPERSONDAYS PER1000 POPULATION
NUMBER OFPROTESTS
UKRAINE (cont . )Crimea 50575 20 .5 9Nikolaev 400 0 .3 0Odessa 3100 1 .1 7Kher'son 600 0 .4 8
BELORUSSIA 188500 18 .48 21 (
1 .0% )Brest 1700 1 .17Vitebsk 2000 1 .42Gomel' 8000 4 .7 8Grodno 0 0 .0 0Minsk 176800 55 .2 7Mogilev 0 0 .0 0
LITHUANIA 3039283 823 .65 194 (
9 .0% )
LATVIA 2447300 912 .83 90 (
4 .2% )
ESTONIA 1326450 843 .26 59 (
2 .7% )
GEORGIA 3501652 642 .62 217 (10 .0% )Abkhaz ASSR 135290 251 .9 4Adzhar ASSR 37000 94 .1 5Southern Ossetian AO 141629 1430 .6 0Georgia
(non-ASSR/AO) 3187733 721 .2 1
ARMENIA 32247340 9822 .52 247 (11 .4% )
AZERBAIDZHAN 11312650 1609 .43 214 (
9 .9% )Nakhichevan ASSR 132200 448 .1 4Nagorno-Karabakh AO 1312600 6981 .9 1Azerbaidzhan
(Other) 9867850 1507 .4 6
MOLDAVIA 1234150 284 .30 91 (
4 .2% )
KAZAKHSTAN 203300 12 .29 42 (
1 .9% )Aktiubinsk 1000 1 .3 6Alma-Ata 48000 22 .7 5Eastern Kazakhstan 0 0 .0 0Gur'ev 38900 51 .5 2Dzhambul' 0 0 .0 0Dzhezkazgan 0 0 .0 0Karaganda 12100 8 .9 5Kzyl'-Orda 0 0 .0 0Kokchetava 0 0 .0 0Kustanai 0 0 .0 0Pavlodar 0 0 .0 0Northern Kazakhstan 0 0 .0 0Semipalatinsk 103000 122 .9 1Taldy-Kurgan 0 0 .00
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REPUBLIC/PROVINCETOTAL
PERSON-DAYSPERSON-DAYS PER1000 POPULATION
NUMBER OFPROTESTS
KAZAKHSTAN (cont . )Turgai 0 0 .0 0Urals 300 0 .4 8Tselinograd 0 0 .0 0Chimkent 0 0 .0 0
UZBEKISTAN 343583 17 .26 82 (
3 .8% )Karakalpak ASSR 0 0 .0 0Andizhan 3000 1 .7 4Bukhara 0 0 .0 0Dzhizak 0 0 .0 0Kashkadar'in 0 0 .0 0Navoi 0 0 .0 0Namangan 100 0 .0 7Samarkand 8300 2 .9 9Surkhandarin 1000 0 .8 0Syrdarin 400 0 .3 0Tashkent 306183 72 .2 8Fergana 24600 11 .4 3Khorezm 0 0 .0 0
KIRGIZIA 100 0 .02 1 (
0 .0% )Issyk-Kul' 0 0 .0 0Naryn 0 0 .0 0Osh 0 0 .0 0Talas 0 0 .0 0Kirgizia
(Other) 100 0 .0 7
TADZHIKISTAN 2600 0 .51 5 (
0 .2% )Kuliab 300 0 .1 8Kurgan-Tiubinsk 0 0 .0 0Leninabad 200 0 .1 3Tadzhikistan
(Other) 2100 1 .2 0
TURKMENIA 0 0 .00 0 (
0 .0% )
TOTAL 60450880 210 .84 2161 (100%)
with at least a hundred participants were found during th e
period under examination, although it is known that violen t
mass protest events did take place there during this period .
Non-violent demonstrations were also rare in Kirgizia an d
Tadzhikistan--areas where significant violent protest also too k
place .
Protest politics in the RSFSR have been characterized by a
concentration of demonstration mobilization in relatively few
provinces (in order of magnitude, Moscow, Chechen-Ingush ASSR ,
Kemerovo, Komi ASSR, Kuibyshev, Leningrad, Tatar ASSR, and
Novosibirsk) . No demonstrations with at least a hundre d
participants were found for 28 out of 70 RSFSR provinces . In
the Ukraine, protest mobilization was centered in the Western
Ukrainian provinces of L'vov, Ivano-Franko, and Ternopol', with
less but still significant activity taking place in Kiev . No
demonstrations with a hundred participants or more were foun d
for five Ukrainian provinces . Protest demonstrations in
Belorussia were relatively rare during the period unde r
examination, with most having been concentrated in Minsk . In
Kazakhstan, non-violent demonstrations were centered i n
Semipalatinsk, Gur'ev, and Alma-Ata provinces, while in
Uzbekistan Tashkent and Fergana provinces were the main sites
of non-violent protest .
Table II presents much the same information, only fo r
-22-
TABLE II . PERSON-DAYS OF NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIO NMOBILIZATION FOR SELECTED NATIONALITIES, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBE R
198 9
NATIONALITYPERSON-DAYS OF
PROTEST MOBILIZATIONPERSON-DAYSPER 100 0
POPULATION
Russians 2511920 (
4 .2%) 17 .3 1Ukrainians 2652417 (
4 .4%) 60 .1 0Uzbeks 219317 (
0 .4%) 13 .1 4Belorussians 188500 (
0 .3%) 18 .7 9Kazakhs 189917 (
0 .3%) 23 .3 4Volga Tatars 27300 (
0 .1%) 4 .1 1Azerbaidzhanis 10012050 (16 .6%) 1474 .3 1Armenians 33566461 (55 .5%) 7254 .4 8Georgians 3362050 (
5 .6%) 844 .1 0Moldavians 871550 (
1 .4%) 259 .7 8Tadzhiks 2500 (
0 .1%) 0 .5 9Lithuanians 2832233 (
4 .7%) 923 .1 5Turkmen 0 (
0 .0%) 0Germans 0 (
0 .0%) 0Kirgiz 0 (
0 .0%) 0Jews 2760 (
0 .1%) 2 .0 0Chuvash 0 (
0 .0%) 0Latvians 2295650 (
3 .8%) 1573 .4 4Bashkirs 1000 (
0 .1) 0 .6 9Mordvinians 0 (
0 .0%) 0Poles 86710 (
0 .1%) 77 .0 1Estonians 1196150 (
2 .0%) 1164 .7 0Chechens 41500 (
0 .1%) 43 .3 2Udmurts 0 (
0 .0%) 0Mari 0 (
0 .0%) 0Ossetians 73762 (
0 .1%) 123 .3 5Koreans 0 (
0 .0%) 0Lezgins 0 (
0 .0%) 0Crimean Tatars 186925 (
0 .3%) 694 .8 9Buriats 0 (
0 .0%) 0Yakuts 0 (
0 .0%) 0Ingush 33500 (
0 .1%) 140 .7 6Gagauzy 7100 (
0 .1%) 36 .0 4Kalmyks 0 (
0 .0%) 0Kurds 100 (
0 .1%) 0 .6 5Meskhetian Turks 10700 (
0 .1%) 51 .6 9Abkhaz 61440 (
0 .1%) 596 .5 0
TOTAL 60450882 (100 .0%) 210 .84
nationalities . It shows that Armenians, Latvians ,
Azerbaidzhanis, Estonians, Lithuanians, Georgians, Crimean
Tatars, Abkhaz, and Moldavians (in that order) were the mos t
mobilized of groups in terms of demonstration activity pe r
thousand population . Indeed, Armenians and Azerbaidzhani s
together accounted for over 70 percent of the demonstratio n
person-days in this study . Other nationalities that exhibite d
significant demonstration mobilization relative to thei r
population sizes were the Ingush, the Ossetians, the Poles, th e
Ukrainians, the Meskhetian Turks, the Chechens, and the
Gagauzy . Groups with extremely low levels of mobilizatio n
relative to their populations included the Volga Tatars, Jews ,
Kurds, Bashkirs, and Tadzhiks. During the time period unde r
consideration, no non-violent demonstrations with a hundred
participants or more were found for the Turkmen, Germans ,
Kirgiz, Chuvash, Mordvinians, Udmurts, Mari, Koreans, Lezgins ,
Buriats, Yakuts, and Kalmyks, although some of these groups did
engage in violent protest action during this period .
Demonstrations have varied considerably in size from plac e
to place and from group to group . To a large extent ,
variations in the size of demonstrations among groups explain s
much of the differences in their overall levels of protes t
mobilization . Table III reports the general size o f
demonstrations by republic, broken down into size categories .
It shows that demonstrations in the RSFSR, though relativel y
-24-
frequent in number, were generally small in size, with ove r
three-fifths having less than a thousand participants . By
contrast, demonstrations in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan tended t o
be relatively large ; approximately three-tenths of all
demonstrations recorded for Armenia and a tenth of al l
demonstrations recorded for Azerbaidzhan had over 200 thousan d
participants . Thus, the high levels of protest mobilization in
Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were due less to the sheer numbers o f
demonstrations than to the mobilizing capacities of thos e
groups organizing these demonstrations .
A number of statistical tests were carried out to prob e
the possible existence of relationships between severa l
variables that might be expected to be connected with protes t
activity and non-violent demonstration mobilization amon g
nationalities . Given the strong relationship that has bee n
known to exist between political participation and education ,
it might have been expected that education per thousan d
population (based on 1970 census data) would be related to th e
degree to which protest groups mobilized their populations .
Party membership per thousand population (based on 1989 data )
is an indicator of the degree to which a population activel y
participated within official Soviet institutions, and might
have been expected to have been negatively associated wit h
protest activity . Linguistic Russification (constructed as a
weighted scale based on 1989 census data) has at times bee n
-25-
TABLE III . SIZE OF DEMONSTRATIONS, BY REPUBLI CDECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1989
SIZE CATEGORY (SEE KEY BELOW )REPUBLIC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
TotalRSFSR 61 .1% 24 .5% 7 .0% 2 .5% 1 .7% 1 .3% 1 .3% .6% - -
100 .0%(324) (130) (
37) (
13) (
9) (
7) (
7) (
3) (530 )
UKRAINE 32 .9% 34 .8% 15 .2% 6 .0% 2 .7% 5 .2% 2 .7% .3% .3% 100 .0%(121) (128) (
56) (
22) (
10) (
19) (
10) (
1) (
1) -
(368 )
BELORUSSIA 14 .3% 33 .3% 23 .8% 14 .3% - 14 .3% -- -
100 .0%(
3) (
7) (
5) (
3) (
3) (
21 )
LITHUANIA 29 .4% 30 .4% 12 .4% 12 .4% 4 .6% 1 .5% 5 .7% 3 .1% -- .5% 100 .0%( 57) ( 59) (
24) (
24) (
9) (
3) (
11) (
6) (
1)
(194 )
LATVIA 45 .6% 25 .6% 8 .9% 1 .1% 3 .3% 1 .1% 5 .6% 3 .3% 4 .4% 1 .1% 100 .0%(
41) (
23) (
8) (
1) (
3) (
1) (
5) (
3) (
4) (
1)
(
90)
ESTONIA 23 .7% 44 .1% 8 .5% 6 .8% 3 .4% 3 .4% 3 .4% 1 .7% 5 .1% -
100 .0%(
14) (
26) (
5) (
4) (
2) (
2) (
2) (
1) (
3) (
59 )
GEORGIA 30 .9% 39 .2% 11 .1% 8 .8% 2 .8% 1 .8% .5% 2 .8% 1 .8% .5% 100 .0%(
67) (
85) (
24) (
19) (
6) (
4) (
1) (
6) (
4) (
1)
(217 )
ARMENIA 13 .8% 20 .6% 2 .4% 5 .3% 2 .4% 6.1% 3 .6% 15 .4% 22 .3% 8 .1% 100 .0%(
34) (
51) (
6) (
13) (
6) (
15) (
9) (
38) (
55) ( 20)
(247 )
AZERBAIDZHAN 9 .3% 25 .2% 23 .4% 7 .0% 4 .2% 14 .0% .5% 5 .1% 7 .9% 3 .3% 100 .0%(
20) (
54) ( 50) (
15) (
9) (
30) (
1) (
11) (
17) (
7)
(214 )
MOLDAVIA 22 .0% 37 .4% 8 .8% 13 .2% 5 .5% 3 .3% 8 .8% - 1 .1% -
100 .0%(
20) (
34) (
8) (
12) (
5) (
3) (
8) (
1) (
91 )
KAZAKHSTAN 45 .2% 26 .2% 19 .0% 2 .4% 2 .4% - 4 .8% - -
100 .0%(
19) (
11) (
8) (
1) (
1) (
2) (
42 )
UZBEKISTAN 32 .9% 47 .6% 4 .9% 7 .3% 2 .4% 4 .9% - --
100 .0%(
27) ( 39) (
4) (
6) (
2) (
4) (
82 )
KIRGIZIA 100 .0% -- --
100 .0%(
1) (
1 )
TADZHIKISTAN 80 .0% 20 .0% -- 100 .0%
TURKMENIA
(
4) (
1) (
5 )
34 .8% 30 .0% 10 .9% 6 .2% 2 .9% 4 .2% 2 .6% 3 .2% 3 .9% 1 .4% 100 .0%(752) (648) (235) (133) (
62) (
91) (
56) (
69) (
85) (
30)
(2161)
-26 -
TABLE III (cont . )
KEYTO TABLE IIIEvents were classified along the following scale, ranging from 1 to 10, base d
on the the average of various estimates for the maximum number of participants foun din multiple sources . The following scale was used :
AVERAGE # OF PARTICIPANTS SIZE CATEGORY
100-999 : 11000-4999 : 25000-9999 : 310000-19999 : 420000-29999 : 530000-49999 : 650000-99999 : 7100000-199999 : 8200000-499999 : 9Greater than 500000 : 10
For 28 .1% of the records in the database, no precise size estimate wa savailable . In these cases, a size category was estimated based on two types ofinformation. First, if the number of participants was listed in a source as bein gin the hundreds [sotni], the thousands [tysachi], or many-thousands[mnogotysachnyi], these were generally assigned categories 1, 2, and 3 respectively .Second, if no other information was available, the closest event in time that too kplace in the same city or location, that was organized by the same group, and tha tconcerned the same demands was used as a basis of size estimation .
Two divergent size estimates were available for 13 .8 percent of the sample, andthree were available for 3 .6 percent of the sample . In cases in which multiple sizeestimated existed but did not diverge, they were not recorded .
used as an indicator of the loyalty of a population to th e
Soviet state, 19 and might have been expected to have bee n
negatively associated with demonstration mobilization . None o f
these variables showed any statistically significan t
relationships with protest mobilization, nor was an y
statistically significant relationship found between the degre e
of urbanization of a province and demonstration
mobilization. When only RSFSR provinces were examined, a wea k
positive association (r= .24, p= .04) was found between the leve l
of urbanization of a province and the degree of protes t
mobilization that was statistically significant at the .0 5
level . Clearly, Soviet protest activity is too complex and to o
diverse to be explained systematically and in aggregate by
simple hypotheses . Satisfactory explanations of why som e
groups protest and others not must instead seek to disaggregat e
protest events down to more discrete forms and types o f
behavior and to place them within their' specific contexts .
TEMPORAL VARIATIONS IN DEMONSTRATION ACTIVIT Y
Soviet demonstration activity has experienced significan t
fluctuations over time, although the general trend in 1989 wa s
towards more constant and less fluctuating levels o f
mobilization . In general, three periods of demonstratio n
activity can be distinguished . Figure I presents two graphs o f
protest mobilization for the USSR as a whole over time .
Figures I-a and I-b show that until February 1988 demonstratio n
mobilization in the USSR as a whole remained at relatively lo w
levels, generally in the 5 to 20 thousand person-day per mont h
range, particularly after May 1987 . Soviet demonstratio n
activity during this early glasnost' period was largely drive n
by the protest activity of six national groups : Russians ,
Armenians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Crimea n
Tatars . Beginning in February 1988, with the exception of two
brief respites 20 Soviet demonstration mobilization fluctuate d
between one-million and eight-million person-days per month .
This second period of demonstration activity, characterized b y
great volatility, witnessed massive but sporadic mobilization s
of Armenians, Azerbaidzhanis, Latvians, Lithuanians, an d
Estonians . A third period began with the onset of the electio n
campaign to the Congress of People's Deputies in February an d
March 1989 . This period was characterized by more constan t
levels of protest and the mobilization of new groups int o
-29-
FIGURE I .USSR DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION OVE R
TIME, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 198 9
protest politics : Georgians, Russians, Ukrainians, Moldavians ,
Uzbeks, and Kazakhs, as well as other groups . From April 198 9
to December 1989 demonstration activity was relatively constan t
and less prone to extreme variations, ranging largely from two -
million to four-million person-days per month .
The extent to which mobilization was punctuated (i .e . ,
intermittent) or relatively constant varied considerably a s
well from group to group . Figure II presents a series o f
graphs of demonstration activity during 1988 and 1989 for th e
most active twelve republics of the USSR . It shows tha t
punctuated mobilization was characteristic of demonstratio n
activity in the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Belorussia ,
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan . The causes of such patterns ,
however, appear to be varied . In the case of the Balti c
republics, the peaks of mobilization center around simila r
month-points for all three--February, March, June, and Augus t
(all months of anniversaries of events connected with the
incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR or thei r
independence from Tsarist Russia) . Thus, symbolic dates play
an important role in mobilizing the population for the type o f
secessionist protest that has been common in the Baltic . I n
the case of Georgia, and to a lesser extent the cases o f
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, peaks of mobilization were ofte n
associated with periods of rising interethnic tensions an d
violence . Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan displaye d
-31-
FIGURE II . DEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION IN SELECTE DSOVIET REPUBLICS, JANUARY 1988 TO DECEMBER 1989
punctuated patterns of protest activity simply due to thei r
lower levels of protest mobilization in general . In thes e
republics demonstrations were sporadic and relatively limited
in size, with few exceptions almost invariably having less than
20 thousand participants . Thus, punctuated mobilization i n
these cases was a sign of the weakness of local protes t
movements .
Only one republic followed a pattern of near-constan t
mobilization during the 1988-1989 period : Armenia . However ,
its levels of mobilization varied significantly . In fact ,
demonstration mobilization in Armenia was considerably less i n
1989 than it was in 1988, perhaps the result of the exhaustio n
of society due to the very high levels of mobilization that
have characterized the republic . After a long period o f
quiescence, Moldavia experienced a relatively constant level o f
mobilization from January 1989, though at a much lower level o f
activity than Armenia . At least three republics--the RSFSR ,
Ukraine, and Azerbaidzhan--experienced mixed pattern o f
punctuated mobilization followed by relatively constan t
mobilization . In the RSFSR, protest mobilization wa s
intermittent until May 1989--coinciding with the opening of th e
first session of the Congress of People's Deputies . An earlie r
peak in protest activity in the RSFSR in July 1988 coincide d
with Nineteenth Party Conference and the convening of th e
legislative organs of the party. Still another peak appeare d
in October 1989, at the time of the second session of th e
-34-
Congress of People's Deputies . Such patterns suggest tha t
national legislative activity and convocations of majo r
national significance acted as lightning rods for protest among
Russians, even more than among other groups . Only the Ukraine
showed some evidence of similarly timed peaks in protes t
activity . In both the Ukraine and the RSFSR, significan t
increases in demonstration activity also took place at the tim e
of elections to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies i n
February and March 1989 . Ukrainian politics was characterize d
by punctuated protest until that time, and afterwards witnesse d
a steady increase in protest mobilization, which peaked i n
September at the time of the first Rukh Congress . In
Azerbaidzhan, protest activity followed a punctuated pattern
until August 1989, when, under the influence of the Popular
Front of Azerbaidzhan, a more constant level of mobilization
appeared .
DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY BY TYPE OF DEMAN D
Soviet protest has varied considerably by the types o f
issues protested, both over time and among different groups .
An examination of these patterns provides a fascinatin g
overview of Soviet politics under Glasnost' . Figure II I
illustrates the evolution of Soviet demonstration mobilizatio n
for ten different types of issues over time . It shows tha t
protest in favor of liberal demands (Figure III-a) gre w
considerably over 1989, becoming a permanent part of the
political landscape . By contrast, support for conservative
demands (Figure III-c) was relatively weak, following a
punctuated pattern . In general, the mobilizing power o f
conservative groups in Soviet politics has lagged considerabl y
behind that of liberal groups . Not only did the development o f
largescale liberal protest pre-date th e
development of mass conservative protest by eight months, bu t
liberal groups have consistently mobilized anywhere from two t o
sixteen times the number of protesters that conservative group s
have been capable of mobilizing every month . Demands for a
multi-party system (Figure III-b) first obtained a mass protes t
base at the time of the first session of the Congress o f
People's Deputies in May 1989 . By the end of 1989, suc h
protest had grown to the point where it had become a majo r
force in Soviet politics, undoubtedly influencing the CPSU' s
-36-
FIGURE II IDEMONSTRATION MOBILIZATION OVER SELECTED ISSUES
a
JANUARY 1988---DECEMBER 1989
a For definitions of demand classification, see Appendix B .
decision in February 1990 to allow legal party competition .
Table IV, on liberal and conservative demands b y
nationality, offers further confirmation of the weakness o f
conservative protest . In total, protests at which libera l
demands were raised accounted for 12 .1 percent of all person-
days of protest from December 1986 to December 1989, in
contrast to conservative demands, which accounted for only 1 . 6
percent . Among Soviet nationalities, only the Russian s
displayed a clear pattern of ideological divisioning in terms
of their protest demands . However, the mobilizing capacity o f
liberal demands among Russians was considerably greater tha n
conservative demands . Ukrainians also showed a small degree o f
ideological divisioning in their protest behavior, althoug h
among Ukrainians the mobilizing capacity of liberal demands was
more than four times greater than conservative demands . As fo r
other groups, only among Poles, and to a lesser extent Kazakhs ,
have conservative demands had a significantly greate r
mobilizing power than liberal demands . 2 1
Protest over economic and social demands (Figure III-h) ,
anti-military protest (Figure III-k), and protest over foreign
policy issues (Figure III-1) displayed punctuated patterns of
TABLE IV . SIGNIFICANCE OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE DEMAND SAMONG ALL DEMANDS RAISED AT PROTESTS, BY NATIONALITY
(PERSON-DAYS OF PROTEST IN WHICH LIBERAL OR CONSERVATIV EDEMANDS WERE RAISED, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1989 )
NATIONALITY
TOTALPERSONDAYSOF PROTEST
TOTALLIBERALDEMANDS
TOTALCONSERVATIVEDEMANDS
# % # %
Russians 2511920 (100%) 1086695 (43 .3%) 647550 (25 .8% )Ukrainians 2652417 (100%) 870425 (32 .8%) 205800 (
7 .8% )Uzbeks 219317 (100%) 31500 (14 .6%) 0 (
0 .0% )Belorussians 188500 (100%) 116733 (61 .9%) 0 (
0 .0% )Kazakhs 189917 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 32000 (16 .9% )Volga Tatars 27300 (100%) 550 (
2 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Azerbaidzhanis 10012050 (100%) 2228350 (22 .3%) 0 (
0 .0% )Armenians 33566461 (100%) 800950 (
2 .4%) 0 (
0 .0% )Georgians 3362050 (100%) 253400 (
7 .5%) 0 (
0 .0% )Moldavians 871550 (100%) 129800 (14 .9%) 0 (
0 .0% )Tadzhiks 2500 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) o
(
0 .0% )Lithuanians 2832233 (100%) 546250 (19 .3%) 0 (
0 .0% )Jews 2760 (100%) 460 (16 .7%) 0 (
0 .0% )Latvians 2295650 (100%) 1102383 (48 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Bashkirs 1000 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Poles 86710 (100%) 10460 (12 .1%) 86250 (99 .5% )Estonians 1196150 (100%) 48950 (
4 .1%) 0 (
0 .0% )Chechens 41500 (100%) 28000 (67 .5%) 0 (
0 .0% )Ossetians 73762 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 2000 (
2 .7% )Crimean Tatars 186925 (100%) 44100 (23 .6%) 0 (
0 .0% )Ingush 33500 (100%) 27000 (80 .6%) 0 (
0 .0% )Gagauzy 7100 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Kurds 100 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Meskhetian Turks 10700 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Abkhaz 61440 (100%) 0 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )Other 11370 (100%) 3850 (
0 .0%) 0 (
0 .0% )
TOTAL 60450882 (100%) 7329856 (12 .1%) 973600 (
1 .6%)
For definitions of liberal and conservative demands, see Appendix B .
mobilization . Protest mobilization over economic and socia l
demands, while generally low relative to other protest issues ,
began a punctuated pattern in 1989, largely in connection wit h
the working class unrest of that year . Anti-military protes t
generally peaked in April and in September, in anticipation o f
the spring and fall call-ups for military service .
Significantly enough, these peaks grew rapidly over time .
Anti-military protest had become a regular feature of th e
Soviet political scene from February 1989, although the level s
of protest mobilization varied wildly . Protest on foreign
policy issues, a new form of protest for Soviet politics ,
displayed its first significant mobilization in June 1989 in
reaction to the crackdown against the student movement i n
Peking . Though exhibiting a punctuated pattern, levels o f
mobilization over foreign policy issues increased rapidl y
towards the end of 1989, particularly in connection with th e
issue of border permeability raised by the Azerbaidzhan i
insurrection . Based on these patterns and the genera l
trajectories of anti-military protest and protest over foreign
policy issues, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion tha t
internal protest has become an important factor in nationa l
security decision-making in the Soviet Union .
Six areas of protest (in addition to protest in favor o f
liberal demands) exhibited more constant and self-sustainin g
patterns of mobilization : ecological protest (Figure III-d) ;
-41-
protest in favor of secession (Figure III-e) ; protest over non -
secessionist territorial claims (Figure III-f) ; protest ove r
linguistic and cultural demands (Figure III-g) ; protest agains t
regime-sponsored coercion (Figure III-i) ; and protest in favo r
of religious freedom (Figure III-j) . Ecological demand s
reached the peak of their mobilizing power in autumn 1988, bu t
gradually began to decline after that . Nevertheless ,
throughout most of 1989 between 75 thousand and 750 thousan d
person-days were spent monthly in protesting ecological issues .
Protest in favor of secession has displayed a more or les s
constant pattern since August 1988, normally fluctuatin g
between 300 thousand and 1 .75 million person-days per month .
Non-secessionist territorial demands, by contrast, wer e
characterized by two more or less constant periods o f
mobilization, the first (May to November 1988) considerabl y
larger than the second (May to November 1989) . Whereas in 198 8
non-secessionist territorial protest exhibited greate r
mobilizing power than secessionist protest, throughout 1989 th e
two displayed roughly similar levels of mobilization- -
indicative of the growing challenges to the territoria l
integrity of the country .
In general, protest over linguistic and cultural demand s
fluctuated between 50 thousand and 400 thousand person-days pe r
month, with extremely large mobilizations taking place in Jun e
and August 1989 over language policy . Since May 1988, protest
-42-
mobilization against regime-sponsored coercion largely staye d
within a range between 100 thousand and 900 thousand person-
days per month, with two exceptions : a sharp drop in the
aftermath of the earthquake and imposition of martial law in
Armenia in December 1988 ; and a sharp rise in April and Ma y
1989 in connection with Tbilisi massacres . Protest in favor o f
religious freedom originally followed a punctuated pattern, bu t
since May 1989 fluctuated between 25 thousand and 275 thousand
person-days per month . It reached a peak in September 1989 ,
when the issue of the legalization of the Uniate Church
occupied center-stage in the Ukraine .
Table V analyzes the mobilizing capacity of selected type s
of issues among various nationalities of the Soviet Union . As
such, it provides a summary portrait of the concerns of th e
politically-active portion of the population for each nationa l
group . It points to unique features of protest within eac h
group . While the Balts generally protested in large number s
over similar types of issues (in particular, secession an d
national symbolism), cultural-linguistic, anti-military, and
ecological issues were of more consistent concern to Estonians ,
while Lithuanians were more likely to demonstrate over issue s
of religious freedom . Among Slays, the character of protes t
differed radically . Of the issues analyzed here, Russians wer e
mobilized primarily over cultural-linguistic, ecological ,
symbolic, and socio-economic issues, with smaller number s
-43-
mobilized over issues of religious freedom . Ukrainian protest ,
by contrast, focused on national symbolism and religiou s
freedom, with secondary mobilizations over cultural-linguistic ,
ecological, and secessionist demands . Belorussians wer e
primarily mobilized over ecological and symbolic demands, wit h
smaller mobilizations over secessionist, socio-economic, and
religious freedom issues . Among Central Asians, Uzbeks and
Tadzhiks largely mobilized under the banner of cultural -
linguistic demands, with smaller numbers protesting ecologica l
and symbolic issues, whereas Kazakhs largely protested
ecological and anti-military issues revolving around nuclea r
testing, with smaller numbers protesting socio-economic issues .
A number of statistical tests were performed to explor e
relationships between various types of protest, as well as
factors associated with various levels of protest on particula r
issues . It was found that among nationalities empathetic an d
secessionist demands tended to be highly correlated (r= .72 ,
p= .001), suggesting that in most cases solidarity with th e
demands of other nationalities had self-interested motives .
Those nations that scored high in terms of protest ove r
secessionist demands also scored high in terms of protest ove r
symbolic demands (r= .70, p= .001), further confirming th e
importance of a well-developed sense of national symbolism in
fueling secessionist protest . The geographic concentration of
TABLE V . MOBILIZING CAPACITY OF SELECTED TYPES OF DEMAND SBY NATIONALITY (PROPORTION OF PERSON-DAYS OF PROTEST
IN WHICH DEMANDS WERE RAISED, DECEMBER 1986-DECEMBER 1989 )
VIOL .RACIST
DEMAND TYPES (SEE KEY BELOW)NON-
ANTI-MIL . REL .
SOC .ECON .
EMPA-
CULT .
SEC .THETIC LING . ECOL . SYMBOL . SECESS . TERR .
NATIONALITY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Russians 0 .6% 0 .7% 20 .3% 16 .1% 16 .7% 0 .1% 0 .7% 0 .2% 6 .8% 14 .7%Ukrainians 0 .0% 0 .4% 12 .6% 8 .2% 44 .2% 22 .0% 0 .0% 0 .2% 36 .8% 2 .4%Uzbeks 6 .8% 0 .0% 85 .2% 13 .3% 10 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .1% 0 .1%Belorussians 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .1% 63 .6% 68 .5% 38 .5% 0 .0% 0 .0% 2 .7% 4 .2%Kazakhs 20 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 72 .5% 0 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 72 .5% 0 .1% 20 .3%Volga Tatars 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 87 .9% 11 .0% 2 .8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 10 .1% 0 .0%Azerbaidzhanis 13 .2% 0 .1% 0 .0% 8 .7% 0 .0% 14 .6% 30 .1% 12 .3% 0 .0% 0 .1%Armenians 0 .0% 0 .1% 4 .8% 6 .6% 9 .5% 12 .9% 70 .2% 6 .2% 0 .5% 0 .0%Georgians 3 .1% 0 .3% 8 .2% 3 .9% 26 .8% 57 .6% 1 .3% 2 .2% 1 .0% 0 .1%Moldavians 0 .0% 3 .3% 77 .3% 2 .9% 33 .1% 55 .1% 13 .9% 10 .8% 2 .0% 0 .1%Tadzhiks 0 .0% 0 .0% 84 .0% 12 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 4 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Lithuanians 0 .0% 31 .4% 8 .1% 4 .1% 76 .4% 73 .6% 0 .1% 14 .1% 5 .6% 0 .4%Jews 0 .0% 0 .0% 10 .9% 0 .0% 81 .5% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Latvians 0 .0% 14 .9% 0 .0% 1 .0% 89 .9% 52 .6% 0 .1% 0 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0%Bashkirs 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Poles 0.0% 0 .0% 68 .0% 0 .0% 9 .2% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .5% 0 .0%Estonians 0.0% 19 .8% 10 .5% 21 .1% 41 .5% 39 .8% 0 .0% 50 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0%Chechens 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 4 .8% 2 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 22 .9% 24 .1 %Ossetians 0 .0% 0 .0% 5 .1% 84 .1% 2 .7% 0 .0% 8 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Crimean Tatars 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 1 .7% 25 .6% 0 .0% 97 .7% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Ingush 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 6 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 9 .0% 0 .0% 28 .4% 0 .0%Gagauzy 0 .0% 0 .0% 98 .6% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 85 .9% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Kurds 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 100 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Meskhetian Turks 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%Abkhaz
0 .3% 0 .0% 65 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 9 .8% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%
KEY: 1=Racist or Violently-Nationalistic Demands2=Empathetic Demands
3=Cultural or Linguistic Demands4=Ecological Demands5=Symbolic Demands6=Secessionist Demands7=Non-secessionist Territorial Demands8Anti-Military Demands9=Demands for Religious Freedom
10=Economic and Social Demands
For definitions of demand-types, see Appendix B .
-45 -
particular forms of protest was also evident . For the USSR as
a whole, liberal protest tended not to occur in those province s
where racist and violently nationalist demands were promimen t
(r=- .21, p= .04), whereas conservative protest tended to occu r
precisely in those provinces where racist or violently -
nationalist demands were also put forth (r= .62, p= .001) . The
relative presence or absence of tolerant political attitudes
would seem to be a key factor in determining the mobilizin g
capacities of liberal and conservative movements withi n
particular territories .
For non-Russians, a positive association (r= .35, p= .03 )
was also found between the degree of linguistic Russificatio n
of a nationality22 and protest in favor of conservativ e
demands . Ethnic assimilation would seem to play a major rol e
in determining the degree to which particular types of protes t
movements have been capable of mobilizing their populations .
For non-Russians, for instance, a strong positive associatio n
(r= .74, p= .001) was found between the print runs of native -
language newspapers per thousand population and secessionis t
protest . This suggests that factors associated with lack o f
assimilation--i .e ., the extent to which a nationality has bee n
able to utilize its native language--have an important effec t
in galvanizing secessionist sentiments .
Not surprisingly, within the USSR as a whole a positiv e
-46-
correlation was found between the level of urbanization of a
province and the degree of protest over economic and socia l
issues (r= .35, p= .001) . Yet paradoxically, subsequent analysi s
revealed that protest over social and economic issues wa s
inversely related to city-size . 23 Assuming both of these
findings are true, then mobilization over social and economi c
issues would seem to be concentrated in small towns withi n
highly urbanized provinces .
Within the RSFSR ecological protest and liberal protes t
appeared to take place in different places, being negatively
related (r=- .56, p= .001) by province . Indeed, furthe r
investigation revealed that city size appeared closely relate d
to both types of demands, though in opposite ways (See Tabl e
VI) . Thus, in the RSFSR liberal demands were not prominent i n
small towns less than 100 thousand in size, while they wer e
quite prominent in large cities over a million in size (64
percent of all person-days) . By contrast, in small town s
ecological protest was the major concern of protestors, being
associated with 81 .5 percent of all person-days of protest ,
whereas in large cities ecological demands were relatively les s
significant in overall protest activity, accounting for only 8
percent of all person-days . Within the RSFSR mobilization ove r
liberal demands, in favor of a multi-party system, ove r
representative demands, for religious freedom, over empathetic
TABLE VI . DISTRIBUTION OF DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITY BY TYPE SOF DEMANDS FOR CITIES OF VARIOUS SIZES WITHIN THE RSFSR
(PROPORTION OF PERSON-DAYS OF PROTES TIN WHICH DEMANDS WERE RAISED) a
SIZE OF CITIES IN THOUSAND SDEMAND TYPE <100 100-499 500-999 >=1 million
FOR MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 0 .1% 2 .6% 7 .4% 18 .0 %LIBERAL DEMANDS 4 .6% 48 .3% 50 .9% 64 .3 %CONSERVATIVE DEMANDS 0 .2% 0 .2% 0 .0% 3 .5%REPRESENTATIVE DEMANDS 0 .2% 21 .5% 26 .0% 36 .8%SYMBOLIC DEMANDS 5 .0% 1 .2% 22 .5% 16 .4%ECOLOGICAL DEMANDS 81 .5% 36 .3% 28 .9% 8 .0 %RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 0 .0% 0 .8% 3 .9% 11 .0%FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 0 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 3 .9%RACIST/VIOL . NAT . 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .9%EMPATHETIC DEMANDS 0 .0% 0 .2% 0 .3% 1 .1%SOCIAL/ECONOMIC ISSUES 45 .0% 36 .5% 12 .5% 4 .1 %AGAINST REGIME VIOL . 1 .8% 19 .3% 14 .1% 16 .8 %
NUMBER OF EVENTS
33 77 56 33 0NUMBER OF PERSON-DAYS 178510 300875 58583 1478588
aFor definition of demand-types, see Appendix B .
-------------------------------------------------------------- -
demands, and over racist or violently nationalist demands al l
seemed fairly closely related with city size . While research
at the individual level would be necessary to delve into thes e
patterns more closely, within the RSFSR urbanization or factor s
associated with urbanization seem to have played a major rol e
in fostering a variety of forms of protest, spurring on
populations to be more assertive vis-a-vis local politica l
elites, making them more likely to identify with the nationa l
aspirations of other groups, and making those who ar e
-48 -
intolerant more likely to express their views as well .
Assuming that incidence of religious belief within the Sovie t
context tends to be negatively related to urbanization, the n
the fact that protest in favor of religious freedom within the
RSFSR was positively related to city size suggests tha t
urbanization may indeed have a very strong impact on certain
types of protest behavior . Yet, no relationship between cit y
size and protest in favor of religious freedom was found fo r
the USSR as a whole . Religious policy, it appears, acts as a n
important intervening variable . In the Ukraine, for instance ,
it was found that the urbanness of a province was negativel y
associated with protest in favor of religious freedom (p=- .44 ,
p= .05) . The ban on the Uniate Church meant that religiou s
protest in the Ukraine was largely a phenomenon of les s
urbanized provinces of the republic, where Uniate believer s
were concentrated . Not surprisingly, within the Ukrain e
protest in favor of religious freedom and protest in favor o f
secession tended to occur in the same provinces (r= .45, p= .02) ,
suggesting a linkage between these two protest constituencies .
Much the same point about the contextual nature of protes t
is illustrated by an examination of variations in protes t
behavior within a single national group in different contexts .
Table VII portrays the mobilizing capacity of particular type s
of demands for Russians in selected republics and provinces .
Essentially, it shows that the protest agendas of Russians in
-49-
the RSFSR, Ukraine, and Baltic differed fundamentally from eac h
other . Whereas Russians in the RSFSR protested most frequentl y
over liberal and representative demands, Russians in the Balti c
protested most frequently over conservative an d
linguistic/cultural demands, and Russians in the Ukraine mos t
frequently over ecological demands, conservative demands, and
socio-economic issues . In the case of the Russians ,
ideological and situational factors, even more than ethnicity ,
appear to be driving protest behavior . Table VII also point s
to significant differences in the character of protest i n
Moscow and Leningrad . While the mobilizing capacity of libera l
demands were greater in Moscow and the mobilizing capacity o f
conservative demands greater in Leningrad, in general protes t
politics were more extreme and more radical (on both sides o f
the political spectrum) in Leningrad than in Moscow . The
mobilizing capacity of racist or violently-nationalist demands ,
demands in favor of a multi-party system, of protest agains t
regime-sponsored coercion, and of symbolic demands were greate r
in Leningrad than in Moscow . Thus, Leningrad's politics appea r
to be more ideologically divided than Moscow's, perhaps th e
result of it close proximity to the Baltic or the conservativ e
traditions of its party leaders .
TABLE VII . PERCENT OF DEMONSTRATION PERSON-DAYS DEVOTED T OPARTICULAR DEMANDS FOR RUSSIANS I NSELECTED REPUBLICS AND PROVINCE S
DEMAND-TYPE RSFSRLOCATION OF PROTES T
MOSCOW LENINGRAD UKRAINE BALTI C
FOR A MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM 15 .1% 15 .7% 35 .7% 0 .9% 0 .1 %LIBERAL DEMANDS 57 .8% 71 .7% 58 .2% 11 .1% 2 .9 %CONSERVATIVE DEMANDS 2 .8% 3 .1% 7 .4% 35 .4% 98 .0%REPRESENTATIVE DEMANDS 33 .5% 34 .6% 51 .2% 6 .8% 29 .5 %SYMBOLIC DEMANDS 13 .7% 11 .8% 39 .7% 3 .4% 33 .5%ECOLOGICAL DEMANDS 19 .5% 0 .7% 26 .1% 42 .0% 0 .0%RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8 .8% 14 .3% 0 .0% 0 .0% 0 .0%FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 3 .0% 4 .9% 0 .4% 0 .0% 0 .0%RACIST OR VIOL . NAT . 0 .8% 0 .8% 2 .1% 0 .0% 0 .0%EMPATHETIC DEMANDS 0 .9% 0 .9% 2 .4% 0 .3% 0 .1 %LING . OR CULT . DEMANDS 0 .1% 0 .2% 0 .0% 0 .3% 83 .4 %SOCIAL OR ECON . DEMANDS 13 .3% 2 .8% 2 .7% 32 .6% 20 .3 %AGAINST REGIME COERCION 13 .9% 15 .4% 27 .7% 0 .5% 0 .1%
For a description of the classification of demands, see Appendix B .
------------------------------------------------------------------- -
AN INITIAL INVESTIGATION :THE IMPACT OF REGIME REGULATION AND COERCIO N
Precisely how regime coercion affects protest has been th e
subject of considerable investigation in the literature o n
protestbehavior . Such studies have generally concluded tha t
neither the coercive capacity of the state nor the state's us e
of coercion against protesters systematically deter s
protest . 24
The Soviet case presents an interesting
opportunity to examine this relationship . Policies toward s
demonstrations have varied considerably throughout the USSR, a s
has local legislation governing the holding of officially -
sanctioned demonstrations . Article 50 of the Sovie t
Constitution guarantees Soviet citizens the right to assembl y
and demonstration . However, in the absence of all-unio n
enabling legislation, this right was subject to abuse . Onc e
demonstrations became common, regulations governing thei r
conduct largely developed from below, initially promulgated b y
local governments . In late August 1987, after a wave o f
demonstrations in downtown Moscow by Crimean Tatars, the Mosco w
City Soviet banned demonstrations in the city center an d
established rules for holding meetings elsewhere in the city .
Soon regulations were passed in Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, an d
other cities, each with their own peculiarities . 25 By the
end of 1987, as one Soviet correspondent noted, the extent t o
which citizens were capable of exercising their right t o
-52-
demonstrate "still depends to a large extent on the specific
position of specific officials in the localities ." 26 Suc h
diversity of policies was reinforced by guidelines issued b y
the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in July 1988 (an d
subsequently passed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1988) ;
they essentially placed decision-making authority in the hand s
of republican and local governments over whether to permit
particular demonstrations, at the same time as establishing
standard penalties for holding unsanctioned demonstrations . 2 7
Violators were potentially liable to fines of up to 2000 ruble s
or arrests of up to two months (up to a year for repeated
violations) . This was soon followed by a series of laws passe d
by republican legislatures to enforce the guidelines .
In the end, the regime's efforts to regulate demonstratio n
activity almost invariably failed . A growing gap appeared
between the intentions of the authorities and their ability t o
enforce those intentions . The authorities were extremel y
reluctant to grant authority for demonstrations by oppositio n
groups, at the same time as the followings of those groups were
increasing dramatically . In many places, significantly mor e
applications for holding demonstrations were rejected than wer e
granted, forcing those who were rejected to take the law int o
their own hands . In Leningrad, thirty applications were mad e
for conducting demonstrations in the first nine months of 1987 ,
only eleven of which were approved by local authorities . 2 8
-53-
The following description of developments in Georgia was fairl y
typical of what occurred elsewhere :
the holding of unauthorized rallies had become ageneral rule in the republic largely because th eauthorities did not authorize the holding of an yrallies . Having failed to obtain permission to hol dofficial rallies, representatives of the public an dinformal organizations opted for holding unauthorizedrallies . . . Following the adoption of the wel lknown legislative acts on the procedure for holdin grallies and demonstrations in August 1988, th erepublic's local organs of power received 3 3applications for permission to hold sundry mas sevents, but local Soviet executive committees gavepermission for only 6 such events . Despite this, 2 8unauthorized rallies were held, and the holding o fsuch rallies became the general rule from thenon . 2 9
Once the authority of the law had been punctured, it wa s
practically impossible to reestablish it . In Lithuania, fo r
instance, the violence unleashed by the authorities i n
September 1988 in trying to enforce republican laws o n
demonstrations led to massive revolt and eventually to th e
overthrow of republican leaders . Essentially, from that momen t
on republican authority to regulate demonstrations evaporate d
entirely . Throughout 1988 and 1989, the proportion o f
unauthorized rallies increased steadily . In the first si x
months of 1988, 246 unauthorized demonstrations took place i n
Moscow, undoubtedly a large proportion of the total number o f
demonstrations in the city . 30 In the following four months ,
the number of unauthorized demonstrations in Moscow had climbe d
to 398 . 31 Out of the 724 "mass events" that took place i n
the Ukraine in the first nine months of 1989, 338 (46 . 7
-54-
percent) were unauthorized . 32 There were even times when th e
authorities officially suspended existing legislatio n
regulating demonstrations because they realized tha t
enforcement actually incited protest rather than contained it .
Such was the case in Moscow (and in other cities) during th e
first session of the Congress of People's Deputies in May 1989 ,
when, following an attack by the militia on a Democratic Unio n
demonstration of 2,000 people, the Congress suggested that th e
Moscow City Soviet set aside Luzhniki Stadium as a fre e
gathering spot for demonstrators during the remainder of th e
Congress's sessions . 3 3
Nor did force prove successful in containing the spread o f
protest . Table VIII presents information on the degree o f
coercion applied towards demonstrators, ranging on a five-poin t
scale from no known coercion to the use of major violence o n
the part of authorities, in different parts of the country . I t
shows considerable variation not only between republics, bu t
within them as well . Within the RSFSR Krasnoiarsk krai ,
Novosibirsk province, and Rostov province
stand out as some of the more repressive provinces with respec t
to demonstrations . Leningrad had a considerably worse recor d
than Moscow, while the Tatar ASSR and Irkutsk were some of th e
most tolerant territories . In the Ukraine, Poltava and Crime a
were cases of high repression ; Khar'kov, Kiev, and L'vov ha d
greater histories of repressive policies than Ivano-Franko o r
-55-
TABLE VIII . COMPARISON OF SELECTED REPUBLICAN AND PROVINCIA LPOLICIES TOWARDS DEMONSTRATIONS (PROPORTION OF DEMONSTRATION S
DRAWING COERCIVE REGIME RESPONSES )
REPUBLIC/PROVINCESCALE OF COERCION (SEE EXPLANATION BELOW )
3
4
Tota l0 1 2
RSFSR 71 .5% 10 .8% 9 .8% 6 .0% 1 .9% 100 .0%(379) (
57) (
52) (
32) (
10) (
530 )
Leningrad 63 .2% 8 .0% 16 .1% 9 .2% 3 .4% 100 .0%(
55) (
7) (
14) (
8) (
3) (
87 )
Moscow 72 .8% 11 .4% 6 .9% 6 .4% 2 .5% 100 .0%(147) (
23) (
14) (
13) (
5) (
202 )
Gorkii 66 .7% 11 .1% 22 .2% 100 .0%(
6) (
1) (
2) (
9 )
Tatar ASSR 87 .5% 6 .3% 6 .3% -- 100 .0%(
14) (
1) (
1) (
16 )
Kuibyshev 76 .9% 7 .7% 7 .7% 7 .7% 100 .0%(
10) (
1) (
1) (
1) (
13 )
Krasnodar krai 73 .7% 21 .1% 5 .3% 100 .0%(
14) (
4) (
1) (
19 )
Rostov 55 .6% 11 .1% 33 .3% 100 .0%(
5) (
1) (
3) (
9 )
Sverdlovsk 66 .7% 20 .0% 6 .7% 6 .7% 100 .0%(
20) (
6) (
2) (
2) (
30 )
Novosibirsk 55 .6% 11 .1% 5 .6% 27 .8% 100 .0%(
10) (
2) (
1) (
5) (
18 )
Krasnoiarsk krai 27 .3% 27 .3% 45 .5% -- 100 .0%(
3) (
3) (
5) (
11 )
Irkutsk 87 .5% 6 .3% 6 .3% 100 .0%(
14) (
1) (
1) (
16 )
UKRAINE 69 .6% 7 .1% 15 .8% 6 .3% 1 .4% 100 .0%(256) (
26) (
58) (
23) (
5) (
368 )
Dnepropetrovsk 88 .9% 11 .1% -- 100 . 0(
16) (
2) (
18 )
Donetsk 94 .1% 5 .9% 100 . 0(
16) (
1) (
17)
-56 -
LEVEL OF COERCION (SEE SCALE BELOW )REPUBLIC/PROVINCE 0 1 2 3 4 Tota l
UKRAINE (cont . )
Poltava 12 .5% 12 .5% 50 .0% 25 .0% 100 .0 %(
1) (
1) (
4) (
2) (
8 )
Khar'kov 65 .5% 10 .3% 24 .1% 100 .0 %(
19) (
3) (
7) (
29 )
Ivano-Franko 84 .6% 3 .8% 3 .8% 7 .7% 100 .0 %(
22) (
1) (
1) (
2) (
26 )
Kiev 65 .7% 9 .0% 22 .4% 3 .0% 100 .0%(
44) (
6) (
15) (
2) (
67 )
Lvov 76 .6% 5 .3% 11 .7% 4 .3% 2 .1% 100 .0%(
72) (
5) (
11) (
4) (
2) (
94 )
Ternopol' 69 .2% 7 .7% 15 .4% 7 .7% 100 .0%(
9) (
1) (
2) (
1) (
13 )
Crimea 53 .7% 7 .3% 9 .8% 22 .0% 7 .3% 100 .0 %(
22) (
3) (
4) (
9) (
3) (
41 )
BELORUSSIA 52 .4% 9 .5% 23 .8% 4 .8% 9 .5% 100 .0%(
11) (
2) (
5) (
1) (
2) (
21 )
Minsk 47 .1% 11 .8% 23 .5% 5 .9% 11 .8% 100 .0%(
8) (
2) (
4) (
1) (
2) (
17 )
LITHUANIA 93 .3% 1 .5% 2 .6% 1 .5% 1 .0% 100 .0%(181) (
3) (
5) (
3) (
2) (
194 )
LATVIA 82 .2% 3 .3% 8 .9% 4 .4% 1 .1% 100 .0 %(
74) (
3) (
8) (
4) (
1) (
90 )
ESTONIA 88 .1% 3 .4% 8 .5% 100 .0%(
52) (
2) (
5) (
59 )
GEORGIA 88 .0% 2 .8% 3 .7% 4 .6% .9% 100 .0%(191) (
6) (
8) (
10) (
2) (
217 )
ARMENIA 86 .6% 4 .5% 3 .6% 4 .0% 1 .2% 100 .0%(214) (
11) (
9) (
10) (
3) (
247 )
AZERBAIDZHAN 93 .9% 1 .9% 1 .9% 1 .4% .9% 100 .0%(201) (
4) (
4) (
3) (
2) (
214 )
MOLDAVIA 79 .1% 3 .3% 8 .8% 6 .6% 2 .2% 100 .0%(
72) (
3) (
8) (
6) (
2) (
91)
-57 -
LEVEL OF COERCION (SEE SCALE BELOW )REPUBLIC/PROVINCE 0 1 2 3 4 Tota l
KAZAKHSTAN 59 .5% 9 .5% 23 .8% 100 .0 %(
25) (
4) (
10) (
42 )
Gur'ev 41 .7% 16 .7% 41 .7% 100 .0 %(
10) (
4) (
10) (
24 )
UZBEKISTAN 65 .9% 17 .1% 7 .3% 3 .7% 6 .1% 100 .0%(
54) (
14) (
6) (
3) (
5) (
82 )
Tashkent 64 .1% 20 .3% 6 .3% 1 .6% 7 .8% 100 .0%(
41) (
13) (
4) (
1) (
5) (
64 )
TOTAL 79 .4% 6 .2% 8 .3% 4 .4% 1 .7% 100 .0%(1715)
( 135)
( 179)
( 95)
( 37) (2161)
-------------------------------------------------------------------- -
EXPLANATION OF SCALE OF COERCION
A five-point scale was used to summarize coercive measures take nby the authorities against demonstrators . The following coding wa semployed :
0=No known coercion1=Physical harassment of demonstrators or summoning o f
participants to police2=Low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or beatings )3=Substantial coercion (10 to 75 arrests or 10 to 4 0
injuries )4=Major violence by authorities (more than 75 arrest s
or more than 40 injuries )
Ternopol', and Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk had relativel y
tolerant attitudes towards demonstrators . Among republics ,
demonstrators were treated most harshly in Belorussia an d
Kazakhstan--areas where there were relatively fewe r
demonstrations . By contrast, in the Baltic and Transcaucasia ,
where there was an abundance of demonstrations, loca l
authorities were generally more lenient . However, this shoul d
not be interpreted to mean that coercion was necessaril y
effective in inhibiting protest . The direction of the causa l
flow is unclear . It may be that there was more coercion i n
those republics with fewer demonstrations because th e
populations of those republics were less mobilized and
therefore more easily coerced . In fact, most of the republic s
that exhibited relatively low levels of coercion went throug h
periods in which high levels of coercion were used agains t
demonstrators, usually in the early stages of the developmen t
of protest . Whatever prophylactic effect regime violence had ,
that effect often proved temporary and ineffective against
massive waves of mobilization .
Indeed, a closer analysis of the evolution of repressiv e
measures over time confirms that the use of violence against
protestors actually stimulated protest rather than preventin g
it . Figure IV presents information on number of arrests o f
demonstrators, total demonstration mobilization (in millions o f
person-days), and demonstration mobilization against regim e
coercion (in thousands of person-days) from January 1988 t o
-59-
FIGURE IVARRESTS OF DEMONSTRATORS, PROTEST OF RE -
GIME VIOLENCE, AND PROTEST MOBILIZATIO N
(JANUARY 1988-DECEMBER 1989)
December 1989 . It shows that, almost invariably, the total
number of protest person-days increased sharply in th e
subsequent month or two after a peak in the number of arrest s
of demonstrators (for instance, June-July 1988, August -
September 1988, March-May 1989, August-September 1989, and
October-November 1989), indicating that increased coercion di d
not lead to a decrease in demonstration activity overall, bu t
rather had the opposite effect . This is suggested as well by
the data on demonstration mobilization against regime coercion ,
also superimposed on Figure IV. In most cases, whenever a ris e
in arrests of demonstrators occurred, this stimulated a sharp
rise in the volume of protest against regime violence, which in
turn accounted for a significant proportion of the increase i n
protest found in months following periods of high coercion .
Only for two periods was there evidence of coercion having a
perceptible effect on protest mobilization : February-March
1988 and December 1988-January 1989 (this latter case being
aided as well by the impact of the Armenian earthquake) .
However, both periods were soon followed by sharp rises i n
levels of protest, in part fueled by rises in protes t
mobilization against regime coercion . The effect of coercio n
on levels of protest was at most temporary . Coercion was an
effective strategy against protest only so long as oppositio n
groups were incapable of mobilizing the population against it .
Overall regime coercion tended to stimulate protest rathe r
than prevent it .
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THE AGENDA OF FUTURE RESEARC H
The aim of this report was to summarize general pattern s
of non-violent protest in the USSR from December 1986 t o
December 1989, exploring potential relationships o f
significance that merit further investigation rather than
systematically testing hypotheses about protest behavior . In
part, this agenda was imposed by the richness of the data ,
which simply in terms of the detail of its description add s
considerably to our knowledge of Soviet protest behavior an d
our ability to characterize it . In part, this was due t o
problems of data availability for a number of independen t
variables necessary to explore certain theoretica l
propositions . Constraints of space and time also conspired t o
leave many avenues of exploration unexplored .
Future research will concentrate on several directions .
First, more sophisticated and systematic efforts will be mad e
to test the impact of those variables that displayed some for m
of association with various types of protest (in particular ,
urbanization and ethnic assimilation), as well as to explor e
the role of a number of variables not examined here (such a s
education, degrees of openness or closedness of local politica l
systems, or regime concessions) . However, a trade-off betwee n
the availability of data for independent variables and th e
level at which the protest data is aggregated should be noted .
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Much data is currently available at the level of republics, bu t
the small number of republics makes statistical analysis o f
such data difficult . Moreover, too high a level of aggregatio n
tends to hide important relationships in the data . It i s
desireable to break the data down to the smallest possibl e
unit--both by ethnic group and by location . Unfortunately ,
data for interesting independent variables are rarely published
in such form .
Second, the role of protest traditions as a factor in
sustaining high rates of protest mobilization in the curren t
period will be explored . Information on several hundre d
demonstrations occurring between 1965 and November 1986 wa s
collected for this project, but has not yet been entered int o
database form . Once this has been done, it will be possible t o
explore possible relationships between past levels of protes t
and current levels of protest .
Third, future research will concentrate on exploring th e
relationship between different types of protest events :
between non-violent and violent forms of protest ; between
strikes over social and economic demands and strikes ove r
nationalist demands ; and between various types of protes t
events and the degree of non-protest participation in the
political system by the population . As Charles Tilly has note d
with regard to violent protest, "To understand and explain
S
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violent actions, you must understand non-violent actions ." 3 4
Much the same could be said about all forms of politica l
participation, which are inherently related . Information o n
strikes and violent protests has been collected, though it ha s
yet to be entered in database form .
Fourth, future work will focus on regime policies toward s
particular political and social organizations and th e
mobilizing capacities of those organizations . Information o n
the organizers of demonstrations, while collected
systematically, was not included in this report largely becaus e
there was no time to prepare this variable for analysis .
Examining changes in the mobilizing capacities of particula r
political movements and ultimately explaining such change s
might help better understand the forces of evolution at work i n
the Soviet political environment . Changes in regime policies
towards demonstrations by particular political movements als o
require explanation .
Fifth, the database will be used to explore why protes t
has had an impact on public policy in one environment and ha s
not in another . This will involve the collection of time -
series data on regime concessions towards demonstrators .
Finally, data collection on protest events will b e
extended to cover the end of the current cycle of protest i n
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the USSR . Thus, not only will it be possible to examine thos e
factors that give rise to various forms of protest behavior ,
but also those factors that tend to dampen protest and lead t o
political quiescence .
APPENDIX A : SOURCES DIRECTLY USED IN THE DATABAS E
Hundreds of sources were consulted in the process o fcompiling the database . The following sources were directl yused :
Western Source s
AP Wire Servic eBoston Glob eCMD Wire Service
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report : Sovie tUnio n
Current Digest of the Soviet Pres sNew York TimesRadio Free Europe Background Report sRadio Free Europe Baltic Area Repor tRadio Liberty Research Bulleti nReport on the USSR (Radio Liberty )Reuters Wire Servic eThe Guardia nThe London Times
Washington Pos tWisconsin State Journa l
Official Soviet Source s
Bakinskii rabochi iBelorusskaia tribuna (Minsk )Izvestii aKommunist (Yerevan )Kommunist Tadzhikistan aKomsomol'skaia pravd aLiteraturnaiagazetaMolodezh Gruzi iMoskovskie novost iPravda UkrainyRadio Vil'nius (Shortwave Broadcasts to North America )Sovetskaia BelorussiiaSovetskaia Estonii aSovetskaia Latvii aSovetskaia Molodezh (Latvia )Sovetskaia RossiiaZaria vostok a
Emigre Publications
ELTA Information Bulleti nGlasnost'
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Maintenance of Status of Russian Languag eAgainst SecessionPlace Greater Restrictions on Cooperative Movemen tAgainst Redefinition of Republican Citizenship Right sIncrease Russian Influence Over Institutions of Cultur eIn Support of the CPS UIn Support of the Soviet Arm yFor Greater Income Equalit yGreater Representation for Working Class in Legislature sOther Conservative DemandsAgainst Ruk h
Representative Demands (protest aimed at altering th ecomposition of political or administrative elites, or th eprocess by which they are selected )
Database record includes at least one of the followingentries :
Reform of Electoral Processe sElection of Specific Candidat eRemoval of Specific Officia lDemocratize Selection of Administrative Bodie sImprove Representation of Nationality in Elite Post sCall for Boycott of Election sResignation of Entire Local GovernmentAgainst Factory-Based Election sRecall of Deputies to Congress of People's Deputie s
Symbolic Demands (protest focused on objects or past actions o flargely symbolic significance )
Database record includes at least one of the followin gentries :
Commemoration of Victims of Stalinis mCommemoration of National Events of the Pas tCommemoration of Constitution Day or Human Rights Movemen tProtest of Annexation of Territory to USSR or Russi aPreservation of Historical Monument sRestoration of National Symbols of Pas tPreservation of Soviet State SymbolsCommemoration of Victims of Nazi Atrocitie sFor Change of Place Name sCommemoration of Victims of 1933 Ukrainian Famin eCommemoration of Murder of Tsa rCommemoration of Victims of Red Terro rDestruction or Denigration of Soviet State Symbol sCommemoration of War Veterans
Ecological Demands (protest against pollution and for improvin genvironmental quality )
Database record includes at least one of the followin gentries :
Ecological Demand sInvestigation into Local Accident, Poisoning, or Diseas e
For Religious Freedom (protest for the rights of religiou sbelievers or religious organizations vis-a-vis politica lauthorities )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :For Religious Freedo mFor Return of Church Propert yFor Legalization of Uniate Churc h
Anti-Military Protest (protest aimed against the institutions ,presence, or policies of the USSR Armed Forces) Databas e
record includes at least one of the following demands :For Right to Alternative/Voluntary/Local Military Servic eFor Creation of National Military Unit sFor Withdrawal of Soviet Army from Republi cOther Anti-Military Demand (Close Military Base o r
Training )End to Nuclear Testin gFor Nuclear Disarmamen t
Foreign Policy Protest (protest over issues related t orelations with foreign states or the policies of foreignstates )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :For Right of Emigration from Countr yFor Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanista nFor Free Movement Across Border sProtest of Crackdown in ChinaEnd to Nuclear Testin gFor Nuclear Disarmamen tOther Foreign-Policy-Related Protes t
Racist or Violently Nationalist Demands (protest with racis tslogans or demands, or propounding violence towards anothe rethnic group )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :Racist or Violently Nationalist Demand sExpulsion of Exiled Caucasian Nationalitie s
Empathetic Protest (protest in solidarity with the demands o fanother national group)
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Database record includes at least one of the followingdemands :
Solidarity with Separatist Demands of Other Nationalitie sSolidarity with Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s
(for non-Georgians )Solidarity with Armenian Demands on Nagorno-Karabakh (fo r
non-Armenians )Solidarity with Demands of Other Grou p
Linguistic or Cultural Demands (protest focused on issue sconnected with language or cultural policies )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :Preserve or Extend Non-Russian Linguistic or Cultura l
Right sMaintenance of Status of Russian Languag eAgainst Making Language of Other Group the Officia l
Languag eFor Change of AlphabetsOther Linguistic/Cultural Demand s
Non-Secessionist Territorial Demands (demands aimed at changingor maintaining the status of territories, excluding issues o f
secession )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :In Favor of Irridentist ClaimsAgainst Irridentist ClaimsUpgrade Federal Status of Administrative UnitFor Creation of Autonomous Federal Uni tEliminate Autonomous Status of Territorial Subuni tAgainst Creation of Autonomous Federal Subunit fo r
MinorityAgainst USSR Special Administration in Nagorno-KarabakhFor Separation of Territory from RepublicOther Territorial Disput e
Social and Economic Issues (protest over consumer or working -class economic or social issues )Database record includes at least one of the followin g
demands :For Raise in Wage sImprove Working Condition sDecentralize Economic AdministrationProvide More Consumer Good sProvide Better HousingDemocratize Selection of Administrative Bodie sCurb Rising Price sProvide Employmen tOther Economic or Social Demand sImprove Social Conditions
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For Right to Strike or Independent Trade Union sImprove Work Benefit sFor Greater Income Equalit yGreater Representation for Working Class in Legislature s
Against Regime Coercion (protest against coercion or violenc econducted by the state or its representatives )
Database record includes at least one of the followin gdemands :
For Release of Political Prisoner sAgainst Police Repressio nMourning for Victims of Recent Regime Violenc ePunish Those Responsible for April 1989 Tbilisi Massacres
APPENDIX C
STATEMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF DATABAS E
TO INTERESTED SCHOLARS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATED PROJECT S
The database compiled for this project remains available for us e
by other scholars upon request . Efforts will be made shortly to brin g
the existence of the database to the attention of the scholarl y
community, principally through an announcement in the AAASS Bulletin .
Full documentation for the database has already been compiled i n
distributable form, and users may also want to take advantage of a
special FoxBase Plus program written for manipulating the data .
Otherwise, the data is available in ASCII fixed-field format . A copy
of the documentation for the database is enclosed .
A number of plans for future research are outlined in the las t
section of the project's Final Report . The database will be
supplemented by three additional databases, material for which wa s
already collected under the auspices of this grant : a database o f
violent mass protests ; a database of strikes ; and a database o f
protest events from 1965 to November 1986 . These will be used t o
study the relationship between various types of protest events, a s
well as the relationship between past patterns of protest and curren t
patterns . In addition, materials will be collected on variou s
patterns of political participation during a three-month research tri p
to the USSR this fall under the auspices of IREX and Fulbright-Hay s
grants . These will be used to examine relationships between within -
system and extra-system forms of participation . For examining the
impact of regime concessions on protest and the impact of protest o n
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public policy, it is intended eventually to create a database o f
protest-related regime actions .
It is hoped that additional funding will be found to extend the
database to the end of the current cycle of protest in the USSR--a t
least several more years, given the present trajectory of events . I t
is planned to approach several foundations for funding a t
approximately the same yearly level as this grant . Should the
National Council prove interested in providing additional funding fo r
the project, I would be happy to submit a proposal .
DATA BASE STRUCTURE AND DOCUMENTATIONPROTEST .DBF (Version 1 .1 )
by Mark R . Beissinge rUniversity of Wisconsin--Madiso n
This data base summarizes information on 2,161 non-violen tmass protest demonstrations (sometimes referred to below a sprotests or demonstrations) in the Soviet Union from Decembe r1, 1986 to December 31, 1989 . Violent mass protests andstrikes are not included in this Data base, but will be thesubject of separate data bases that are still being compiled .
A non-violent mass protest demonstration was defined as anevent that met the following six criteria : 1) it was anautonomous gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging ina collective display of sentiment for or against publi cpolicies ; 2) it involved a minimum of 100 persons ; 3) it wa sbounded by space and time (i .e . ,occurred in a specific location during a limited time period) ;4) the number of participants was not restricted by th eorganizers of the event (i .e ., was not a conference ,convention, or other restricted organized meeting) ; 5) it didnot have as one of its purposes the infliction of violence byits participants (i .e ., was not an event of violent mas sprotest) ; 6) it was not in itself a refusal to work (i .e ., astrike) .
The Russian vocabulary for events of this type i srich, including such words as demonstratsiia [demonstration] ,miting [meeting], protest [protest], manifestatsii a[manifestation], and panakhida [funeral service often involvin ga mass procession] . These should be contrasted with thevocabulary used to describe events of violent mass protest ,such as besporiadki [disorders], pogrom [pogrom], drak [fight] ,volneniia [disturbances], and stychki [clashes] .
While strikes and violent mass protests were excluded ,the possibility that these types of events might overlap wit hnon-violent demonstrations was recognized in compiling the dat abase . In other words, strikes can (and often do) involv enon-violent mass demonstrations, and non-violent mas sdemonstrations can (and at times do) evolve into violent mas sprotest . In such cases, the demonstration dimension of thes eevents was included in the data base . Demonstrations which di dnot involve voluntary participation but which rather weremobilized by the political authorities and were ritual incharacter (i .e ., official May Day or Revolution Day parades )were excluded . Mass demonstrations sponsored or encouraged b ythe political authorities that were voluntary and non-ritual i nnature were included .
-75-
Demonstrations, like all events, are unique in space andtime . However, it should be noted that multiple events di doccur in the same city on the same day .
For instance, on May28th, 1989 four separate and unrelated demonstrations too kplace in Moscow .
A thousand Armenians gathered to commemorate ethe independent Armenian republic of 1918-1920 ; 100 CrimeanTatars gathered outside the Bulgarian embassy to protes tagainst the treatment of Turks in Bulgaria ; 100,000 Muscovite sparticipated in a demonstrations sponsored by Memoria lconcerning the Congress of People's Deputies, then in session ;and a thousand Muscovites participated in a demonstratio nsponsored by the Democratic Union . Each of these events tookplace in separate locations in the city . In such cases, everyeffort was made to untangle these as separate events and t ocount them as separate occurrences .
However, often in large demonstrations a portion of th eparticipants break off from the main group and hold separat emarches or protests . Alternatively, small groups that hol dtheir own demonstrations can later join large crowds . In case sin which either of these conditions were detectable, the event swere counted as one, large event rather than a series o fseparate events .
A minimum size limit was imposed for severa lreasons. Information on smaller protest events is less likely t obe available and is likely to be less accurate than informatio non larger protest events . Demonstrations in the Soviet Unionhave at times been as small as a single person . Suc hone-person protests were especially prevalent in th epre-glasnost' period . But in a period in which some protestevents included as many as a million participants, reporting o nsmaller events tended to be scarce . A minimum of 100 wa simposed after examining reports of hundreds of event s(Information on events smaller in size than 100 was actuall ycollected, though it was not included in the data base becaus eof the spottiness of the data) . Events involving 100 person sappear to have been fairly well reflected in the source sconsulted in this study .
The events in the data base are compiled in the form o f1,894 records . Some records include information on events o fmultiple duration (as reflected in the DURATION variable) .Each record is 834 characters wide, and includes informatio nnot only on the date and place of the event, but also on th enumber of participants (at times, several estimates), th enationality of the participants, the organizers of the protes t(if any), the demands put forth by the protesters, whether th eauthorities had given their permission for the demonstration t otake place, the use of coercion by the authorities agains tprotesters, and the sources from which the information cam e(See Short Summary of Data Base Structure and Definition sbelow) . Data on the organizers of demonstrations is no t
-76 -
included in this version, simply because it had not yet bee ncleaned .
Coverage of the type of events analyzed in the data bas eis incomplete, but nevertheless substantial . For instance ,according to official MVD statistics, in 1989 there were 5,30 0demonstrations of all sizes in the entire Soviet Union (Pravda ,March 26, 1990) . This data base includes information on 1,42 4of these, or about 27 percent of all demonstrations in the USS Rfor that year . Considering that the official MVD statistic salso cover demonstrations that were less than 100 in size, th ecoverage offered by this data base can be said to be extensive .Certainly, in terms of large demonstrations, there were fe wthat occurred in the USSR during the period under study thatare not covered in the data base . 1988 official--2328 ; dat abase coverage--665 .
As is the case with any material dealing with contemporar yaffairs, this data base is limited by the problem of "rightcensoring"--i .e ., the large number of demonstrations that hav eoccurred since the end of 1989 . According to MVD statistics ,in the first 54 days of 1990 alone, more than 150 0demonstrations took place in the Soviet Union, with th eparticipation of 6 .4 million people (Pravda, March 26, 1990) .It is hoped that the data base will eventually be extended t ocover to the end of the current cycle of protest in the USSR .
The Coding Process
All data entries were examined and coded upon entry b yboth the Principal Investigator (Mark Beissinger) and aresearch assistant with reading fluency in Russian . Al lrecords were subsequently checked for accuracy . For question sinvolving the data or any of the sources used for specifi centries, contact Mark Beissinger at 608-263-9429 . Upo nrequest, a FoxBase+ program is available for searching andmanipulating the data .
Short Summary of Data Base Structur e
VARIABLE
SOURCE 1SOURCE 2SOURCE 3STARTDATEDURATIONPLACENAMEPLACESIZ E(1979 )PROVINC EPROVNUMBERZONENUMBERREPUBLICREPNUMBEREST1PARTI C
EST2PARTI C
EST3PARTI C
CATGPARTI C
NATPART1
NATNUMPT 1NATPART2
NATNUMPT2PERMITTED
DEMAND 1DEMAND1NUMDEMAND 2DEMAND2NUMDEMAND 3DEMAND3NUMDEMAND 4DEMAND4NUMDEMAND 5DEMAND5NUMARRESTS
ARRESTNUMSANCTIONS
VIOLEVE L
INJUREDNUMDEATHSNUM
SIZE
TYPE
60
CHARACTER
60
CHARACTER
60
CHARACTER
8
DATE
3
NUMERI C
30
CHARACTE R
5
NUMERI C
30
CHARACTER
3
NUMERIC
2
NUMERI C
12
CHARACTE R
2
NUMERI C
6
NUMERIC
6
NUMERIC
6
NUMERIC
2
NUMERIC
30
CHARACTE R
2
NUMERIC
30
CHARACTER
2
NUMERIC
1
CHARACTER
60
CHARACTE R
3
NUMERI C
60
CHARACTER
3
NUMERI C
60
CHARACTER
3
NUMERI C
60
CHARACTER
3
NUMERI C
60
CHARACTER
3
NUMERI C
1
CHARACTER
4
NUMERI C
1
NUMERI C
1
NUMERI C
4
NUMERI C
3
NUMERIC
DESCRIPTION
Sources usedSources usedSources usedStarting date of eventLength of eventPlace of even tPopulation of Plac e
Name of Provinc eProvince Cod eZone Cod eName of Republi cRepublic Cod eEstimate of Number o fParticipant sEstimate of Number o fParticipant sEstimate of Number o fParticipant sCategory of Number o fParticipant sNationality o fParticipant sNationality Cod eNationality o fParticipant sNationality Cod eFlag (Sanctioned byAuthorities? )Demands of Participant sDemand Cod eDemands of Participant sDemand Cod eDemands of Participant sDemand Cod eDemands of Participant sDemand Cod eDemands of Participant sDemand Cod eFlag (Were Arrest sMade? )Number of Arrest sType of SanctionsAgainst ArrestedDegree of Coercion byAuthoritiesNumber of Injurie sNumber of Deaths
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DEFINITIONS
Sources (SOURCE1, SOURCE2, SOURCE3 )Documents published sources of information used in compilin gthe data . For further information, see Bibliography o fNationalCouncil report .
Starting Date (STARTDATE )The beginning date of a demonstration . In only a few cases ,the precise date of the event was not available, though th emonth in which the demonstration occurred was known . Suc hevents were included in the data base at the beginning, end, o rmiddle of the month (whichever seemed the most probable .
Duration of Event (DURATION )The number of days on which the event occurred . In essence ,this is a multiplier, since the DURATION variable was ofte nused to cover periods of protest that could not be broken dow ninto smaller units for lack of information . All protests tha toccurred on a particular day were considered to be a day i nlength, even though in most cases they lasted only for a fe whours rather than a full day .
Place of Event (PLACENAME )The city, town, or village in which the event occurred . In th efew cases in which the event literally stretched across ageographic unit (such as a "human chain" of protest), this wa sindicated by including the end-points of the protest action .
Population Size of Event Location (PLACESIZE )The population of the city, town, or village in which the even toccurred, according to data from the 1979 Soviet census (th elast currently available), in thousands . If an event locatio nhad a population of less than 50 thousand, it was coded as 0 .
Size Estimations (EST1PARTIC, EST2PARTIC, EST3PARTIC )The number of participants in the event, at the moment of it slargest size . The number of participants in a single protes tevent can often fluctuate drastically ; these variables reflec testimates of the largest number of participants . Sinceestimating the size of crowds is an art rather than a science ,multiple and divergent estimates were recorded when available .Two diverging estimates were available for 262 records (13 . 8percent of the sample), and three were available for 69 record s(3 .6 percent of the sample) . In those cases in which multipl eestimates did exist but did not diverge, they were no trecorded . The phrase "several" [nemnogo] was alway s
79-
interpreted to mean 3 .
Size Category (CATGPARTIC )A categorical variable ranging from 1 to 10 reflecting th eaverage of estimates for the maximum number of participants .The following scale was used :
AVERAGE # OF PARTICIPANTS CODE100-999 : 11000-4999 : 25000-9999 : 310000-19999 : 420000-29999 : 530000-49999 650000-99999 7100000-199999 8200000-499999 9500000> 10
For 533 of the 1894 records (or 28 .1% or the records in th edata base), no precise size estimate was available . In thes ecases, a size category was estimated based on two types o finformation . First, if the number of participants was listed i na source as being in the hundreds [sotni], the thousand s[tysachi], or many thousands [mnogotysachnyi], these wer egenerally assigned categories 1, 2, and 3 respectively .Second, a search was made for similar events in the same city ,organized by the same group, and over the same demands . If n oother information was available, the closest such events i ntime were used as a basis for categorization .
Nationality of Participants (NATPART1, NATPART2 )The nationality of the bulk of participants . In some cases ,more than one nationality participated . In such cases, thi sinformation was recorded . In most demonstrations th enationality of participants was self-evident from the demand sput forth . However, in some cases in which the demands wer eless nationalist in character, it was less easy to determin ethe nationality of participants . This was so in particular i nlarge metropolitan centers of the RSFSR and in parts of othe runion republics where the population is mixed (for instance ,east-bank Ukraine) . Here, 1979 census data (broken down fo rurban and rural areas by oblast', and sometimes even for th ecities in question) was used to pinpoint the probable ethni cdistribution of the population in which the protest occurred .Assuming that protest that was non-nationalist in characte rtended to reflect the ethnic distribution of the populatio nfrom which it was drawn, these figures were used as a basis fo rclassifying the nationalities of participants .
Demands (DEMAND1, DEMAND2, DEMAND3, DEMAND4, DEMAND5)The issues over which the demonstration occurred . These wer e
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either voiced in speeches at the event, were implicit in thenature of the event itself, were listed in a formal list o fdemands presented by the demonstrators, or occurred as a for mof behavior at the protest itself . These demands were the nplaced into 144 separate categories . For details on coding ,see below .
Arrests Flag (ARRESTS )A flag indicating whether participants were detained by th epolice (either before, during, or after the event) or had som esanction imposed on them by the authorities for thei ractivities connected with the event . Coded as yes (Y), no (N) ,or unknownU) .
Number of Arrests (ARRESTNUM )The number of participants detained by the police (eithe rbefore, during, or after the event) or sanctioned by theauthorities in any way for their activities connected with theevent . A -1 was used to indicate that arrests did occur, bu tthat the number is unknown .
Punishment of Those Arrested (SANCTIONS )A four-point scale of sanctions imposed against those arrested ,coded in the following way :0=No known sanctions imposed (quickly released )1=Fines imposed, or participant fired from work or expelle d
from cit y2=Minor imprisonment (less than 60 days )3=Major imprisonment (60 days or more )
Degree of Coercion by Authorities (VIOLEVEL )A five-point scale summarizing the coercive measures taken b ytheauthorities against demonstrators . The following coding wa sused :0=No known coercio n1=Physical harassment of demonstrators or summoning o f
participants to polic e2=Low-level coercion (sporadic arrests and/or beatings )3=Substantial coercion (10 to 75 arrests or 10 to 4 0
injuries )4=Major violence by authorities (more than 75 arrests o r
more than 40 injuries )
Number of Injured (INJUREDNUM )The number of injuries (both to participants and to law -enforcement personnel) as a result of the event . A -1 was usedto indicate that injuries did occur, but that the number i sunknown .
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Number of Deaths (DEATHSNUM )The number of deaths that occurred as a result of the event . A-1 was used to indicate that deaths did occur, but that th enumber is unknown .
CODING
Territorial Codes (PROVNUMBER, ZONENUMBER, REPNUMBER )The following is a list of the coding used for territoria l
units (republics, zones, and provinces) . Republic codes(REPNUMBER) are enclosed in brackets /[]/, territorial zone s(ZONENUMBER) are enclosed in parentheses /()/, and province s(PROVNUMBER) are indicated by a number followed by a perio d/xxx . /
RSFSR [01 ]
Northern Region (01 )1. Karelian ASSR2. Komi ASSR3. Arkhangelsk4. Vologd a5. Murmansk
Northwest Region (02 )6. Novgorod7. Psko v
Leningrad Region (03 )8. Leningrad
Central Region (04 )9. Brians k10. Vladimi r11. Ivanovo12. Kalini n13. Kostroma14. Ore l15. Riazan '16. Smolensk17. Tula18. Yaroslav
Moscow Region (05 )19. Moscow
Volga-Viatsk Region (06 )20. Mari ASSR21. Mordvinian ASSR22. Chuvash ASSR23. Gor'ki i24. Kiro v
Central Black-Earth Region (07 )25. Belgorod
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26. Voronezh27. Kursk28. Lipetsk29. Tambov
Volga Region (08 )30. Kalmyk ASSR31. Tatar ASSR32. Astrakhan33. Volgograd34. Kuibyshe v35. Penza36. Saratov37.Ul'ianov
Northern Caucasus (09 )38. Dagestan ASS R39. Kabardino-Balkar ASSR40. Northern Ossetian ASSR41. Chechen-Ingush ASS R42. Krasnodar kra i43. Stavropol kra i44. Rostov
Urals (10 )45. Bashkir ASS R46. Udmurt ASSR47. Kurgan48. Orenbur g49. Per m50. Sverdlovsk51. Cheliabins k
Western Siberia (11 )52. Altai kra i53. Kemerovo54. Novosibirsk55. Oms k56. Tomsk57. Tiumen '
Eastern Siberia (12 )58. Buriat ASSR59. Tuva ASSR60. Krasnoiarsk kra i61. Irkutsk62. Chita
Far East (13 )63. Yakut ASSR64. Primorskii kra i65. Khabarovsk krai
66. Amu r67. Kamchatk a68. Magadan69. Sakhali n
Other70. Kaliningrad
Ukraine [02 ]
Donetsk--Dniepr Region (14 )71. Voroshilovgrad72. Dnepropetrovs k73. Donetsk74. Zaporozh' e75. Kirovograd76. Poltava77. Sumi78. Khar'kov
Southwest District (15 )79. Vinnitsa80. Volyni a81. Zhitomi r82. Transcarpathia n83. Ivano—Franko84. Kiev85. L'vo v86. Rovno87. Ternopol '88. Khmel'nitski i89. Cherkass y90. Chernigo v91. Chernovitsa
Southern Region (16 )92. Crime a93. Nikolaev94. Odess a95. Kherso n
Belorussia [03] (17 )96. Bres t97. Vitebs k98. Gomel '99. Grodn o100. Minsk101. Mogile v
Lithuania [04] (18) 102 .
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Latvia [05] (18) 103 .
(18)=Balti c
Estonia [06] (18) 104 .
Georgia [07] (19 )105. Abkhaz ASSR106. Adzhar ASSR107. Southern Ossetian AO108. Georgia (non-ASSR/AO )
Armenia [08] (19) 109 .
Azerbaidzhan [09] (19 )110. Nakhichevan ASSR111. Nagorno-Karabakh AO112. Azerbaidzhan (non-ASSR/AO )
Moldavia [10] (20) 113 .
Kazakhstan [11] (21 )114. Aktiubinsk115. Alma-At a116. Eastern Kazakhstan117. Gur'ev118. Dzhambul '119. Dzhezkazgan120. Karagand a121. Kzyl'-Ord a122. Kokchetava123. Kustana i124. Mangyshlak125. Pavloda r126. Northern Kazakhsta n127. Semipalatinsk128. Taldy-Kurgan129. Turga i130. Ural s131. Tselinogra d132. Chimken t
Uzbekistan [12] (21 )133. Karakalpak ASSR134. Andizhan135. Bukhar a136. Dzhizak137. Kashkadar'i n138. Navo i139. Namangan140. Samarkand141. Surkhandar'i n142. Syrdar'in143. Tashkent
(19)=Transcaucasu s
(21)=Central Asi a
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144. Fergan a145. Khorez m
Kirgizia [13] (21 )146. Issyk-Kul '147. Naryn148. Os h149. Talas150. Kirgizia--Othe r
Tadzhikistan [14] (21 )151. Kuliab152. Kurgan-Tiubinsk153. Leninabad154. Tadzhikistan--Othe r
Turkmenia [15] (21 )155. Ashkhabad156. Krasnovodsk157. Mary i158. Tashau z159. Chardzho i
Nationality Codes (NATNUMPTl, NATNUMPT2 )Below is the list of codes used for the nationality o fparticipants :
0 . Pan-national in characte r1. Russian s2. Ukrainian s3. Uzbek s4. Belorussian s5. Kazakhs6. Volga Tatar s7. Azerbaidzhani s8. Armenian s9. Georgians
10. Moldavian s11. Tadzhik s12. Lithuanian s13. Turkmens14. German s15. Kirgi z16. Jews17. Chuvas h18. Latvian s19. Bashkir s20. Mordvinians
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21. Poles22. Estonians23. Chechen s24. Udmurts25. Mar i26. Ossetians27. Avar s28. Korean s29. Lezgins30. Crimean Tatar s31. Buriats32. Yakut s33. Komi34. Kabardinian s35. Karakalpak s36. Uighur s37. Ingus h38. Gagauz y39. Tuvinians40. Kalmyk s41. Karelian s42. Karacha i43. Kurd s44. Meskhetian Turk s45. Abkha z46. Peoples of the Nort h47. Othe r48. Unknown49. Only one nationality involved
Coding of Demands (DEMANDlNUM, DEMAND2NUM, DEMAND3NUM ,DEMAND4NUM,
DEMAND5NUM )
Below is the list of codes used for classifying the demands o fprotesters, as well as a list of all entries placed in th e"other "category (#999) :
0 . Unknown1. For End of Monopoly of CPSU (For Multi-Party System )2. Violent Overthrow of Political Syste m3. Freedom of Expression (Rights o f
Speech/Press/Demonstration )4. Freedom of Association and Organizatio n5. Release of Political Prisoners6. General Legal Reform7. Right to Alternative/Voluntary/Local Military Servic e8. Against Police Repression9. Reform of Electoral Processes
10. Democratization of Political Institution s
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11. Election of Specific Candidat e12. Removal of Specific Official s13. Protest Against Corruption by Specific Official s14. Commemoration of Victims of Stalinism15. Commemoration of National Events of the Pas t16. Commemoration of Constitution Day or Human Right s
Movemen t17. Protest of Annexation of Territory to USSR or Russi a18. Preservation of Historical Monument s19. Restoration of National Symbols of Pas t20. Preservation of Soviet State Symbol s21. Ecological Demand s22. Religious Freedo m23. Return of Church Propert y24. Preserve or Extend Non-Russian Linguistic or Cultura l
Rights25. Maintenance of Status of Russian Languag e26. Redefinition of Citizenship Along National Line s27. Racist or Violently Nationalist Demand s28. Protection of Ethnic Group Against Physical or Verba l
Attack29. Limit Migration to Regio n30. Creation of National Military Units31. In Favor of Secessio n32. Against Secession33. Sovereignty for Republi c34. In Favor of Irridentist Claims35. Opposed to Irridentist Claim s36. Upgrade Federal Status of Administrative Uni t37. Unspecified or Other Nationalist Demand s38. Raise in Wages39. Improve Working Conditions40. Decentralize Economic Administratio n41. Provide More Consumer Good s42. Provide Better Housing43. Democratize Selection of Administrative Bodie s44. Curb Rising Price s45. Provide Employment46. Place Greater Restrictions on Cooperative Movemen t47. Greater Development of Cooperative Movemen t48. Other Economic or Social Demand s49. Right of Emigration from Countr y50. Right to Return to Homelan d51. Creation of Autonomous Federal Uni t52. For Punishing Violent Actions Against Ethnic Grou p
Member s53. Mourning for Victims of Interethnic Violenc e54. Solidarity with Separatist Demands of Other Nationalitie s55. Representation of Nationality in Elite Post s56. Against Punishing Those Involved in Interethnic Violenc e57. Against Ethnic Discrimination in Workplac e58. Greater Economic Autonomy for Republic
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interview with V . Ye . Guliev, in Trud, June 22, 1988, p . 2 .
26. Literaturnaia gazeta, December 9, 1987 .
27. For the text of the guidelines, see Izvestiia, July 29, 1988, p .2 .
28. Sobesednik, no . 3, January 1988, p . 7 .
29.Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report : Soviet Union(FBIS), January 9, 1990, p . 71 (Izvestiia) .
30. FBIS, August 5, 1988, p . 45 (TASS) . According to the report ,this was a significant increase over the same period in 1987, when 9 3unauthorized meetings took place . Of course, the figures refer t odemonstrations of all sizes .
31. Moskovskie novosti, no . 46, November 1988, p . 14 .
32. FBIS, November 30, 1989, p . 69 (Radianska Ukraina) . In the firs tten months of 1989, more than 200 unauthorized meetings and rallie stook place throughout Uzbekistan . Reuters, October 30, 1989 .
33. See, for instance, FBIS, June 13, 1989, pp, 39-43 .
34. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA :Addison-Wesley . 1978), pp . 182-183 .
NOTES
1. This project underwent considerable evolution since the origina lapplication to the National Council . Though it was entitled "Ethnic -Based Mass Political Action in the USSR," it was first necessary t ocharacterize mass political action in general before focusing on it sspecifically ethnic component . Upon further examination of events, i toften became difficult to extract specifically ethnic protest fro mnon-ethnic protest . Data collection was broadened to include al levents of a mass character, not simply ethnic protest per se . Also ,the very large number of events made it necessary to concentrate o none form of mass protest--protest demonstrations--and to leav eanalysis of other forms of mass action--specifically, violent mas sactions and strikes--for later study .
2. For a review of the literature, as well as a full bibliography o nthe subject, up to 1980, see Ekkart Zimmermann, "Macro-Comparativ eResearch on Political Protest," in Ted Robert Gurr, ed ., Handbook o fPolitical Conflict (New York : The Free Press, 1980), pp . 167-237 .See also the series of annual volumes on social movements edited b yLouis Kriesberg, ed ., Research in Social Movements, Conflicts an dChange (Greenwich, CT : JAI Press, 1978-
) .
3. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, IL :The Free Press, 1959) .
4. Konstantin Mikhailov, in Sobesednik, no . 3, January 1988, p . 7 .
5. See Ludmilla Alexeeva and Valery Chalidze, "Mass Unrest in th eUSSR," Report No . 19, submitted to the Office of Net Assessment of th eU .S . Department of Defense (OSD/NA 85-2965), August 1965 . Given th eminimum size requirements for a protest demonstration that wer eutilized in the current study (100 or more participants), only 165 o fthe events uncovered in the Alexeeva and Chalidze study would hav equalified for inclusion in this project .
6. See David Kowalewski, "Trends in the Human Rights Movement," i nDonald R . Kelley, ed ., Soviet Politics in the Brezhnev Era (New York :Praeger, 1980), pp . 150-181 .
7. David Kowalewski, "Protest for National Rights in the USSR :Characteristics and Consequences," Nationalities Papers, vol . 8, no . 2(Fall 1980), pp . 179-194 .
8. For the sake of analysis, participation by an individual in ademonstration was counted as a person-day of protest, even though i nthe vast majority of cases demonstrations did not last for more than afew hours at most . The use of person-days as a measurement of protes tactivity is widespread . For one early example of its use, see Te dRobert Gurr and Raymond Duvall, "Civil Conflict in the 1960s," AReciprocal Theoretical System With Parameter Estimates," Comparative
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Political Studies, vol . 6, no . 2 (July 1973), pp . 142-143 .
9 . In terms of number of participants, the demonstrations recorded i nthe data base had the following distribution :
SIZE
# OF EVENTS PERCENT
100-999 : 752 34 .8 %1000-4999 : 648 30 .0 %5000-9999 : 235 10 .9 %10000-19999 : 133 6 .2 %20000-29999 : 62 2 .9 %30000-49999 91 4 .2 %50000-99999 56 2 .6 %100000-199999 69 3 .2 %200000-499999 85 3 .9%Greater than 500000 30 l .4%
TOTAL 2161 100 .0%
10. Pravda, March 26, 1990 .
11. This was due simply to the sheer volume of events that occurre din 1989 . The number of protest events recorded for 1989 was 21 4percent greater than those recorded for 1988 . Official MVD statistic sshow a similar increase in the number of events in 1989 (228 percent) .The evidence in this study suggests that the actual number of person -days of protest was not much different in 1988 and 1989, amounting t o31 .5 million for 1988 and 28 .7 million for 1989, even though th enumber of events was considerably greater in 1989 . This was due tothe fact that demonstrations in 1988 were, on the average, more tha ntwice as large as those in 1989 . Thus, protest demonstrations in 198 8had an average of about 47,500 participants, while those in 1989 ha dan average of 20,200 participants .
12. Kommunist (Yerevan), December 24, 1989, p . l .
13. Those wishing more information on the database, its structure, o rthe rules used in compiling and coding data should consult the genera linstructions on the database, which are available for distributio nfrom the Principal Investigator upon request .
14. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, June 10, 1989 .
15. On the problem of "right-censoring," see Paul D . Allison, EventHistory Analysis : Repression for Longitudinal Event Data (Newbur yPark, CA : Sage Publications, 1984) .
16. Pravda, March 26, 1990 .
17. It should also be pointed out that the use of certain statistica ltechniques that work well with this kind of data (in particular, ARIM Atime-series models) require more time observations than are include d
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Against Participation in Foreign Festival with RSFS RAgainst Perestroik aAgainst Persecution of Meskhetian Turk sAgainst Private Ownershi pAgainst Resettlement of Meskhetian Turks in Georgi aAgainst Split in Lithuanian Communist Part yAgainst Treatment of Turkish Minority in Bulgari aAgainst U .S . Policy Towards ImmigrationAgainst Upgrading Status of Federal Subuni tAid to Russians in the BalticAnniversary of Birth of Nestor Makhn oBoycott of Fall Cotton Campaig nCall for Military Intervention Against Republic Authoritie sCelebration of Armenian Deaths in Earthquak eCelebration of Release of Karabakh Committee Leader sChange Economic Plans for RepublicChange in Leadership and Policies of Rustaveli Societ yChange Leadership of CPSU Central Bodie sCommemoration of Khrushchev's BirthdayCommemoration of Self-Immolation by Nationalis tCommemoration of Victims of Chernobyl Acciden tCommemoration of Victims of Feb . 1988 Sumgait MassacresConcerning Religious Views of Newly-Elected Muft iConcerning Situation in Southern Osseti aControl over Local Water or Land Resource sDiscussion of Abkhaz Situatio nDiscussion of Congress of People's Deputie sDiscussion of Problems of Small Nation sEnd Aid to Other Republic sExamine Issues of Quality of Production at Plan tFor a Meeting with Ryzhko vFor a New Agreement of Union for the USS RFor Liquidating Raion Party Committee sFor Unity of Turkic PeoplesImplementation of July 1989 Agreement with MinersImprove Care for Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre sImprove City Transpor tImprove Lang ./Cult ./Educ . for Tadzhiks in UzbekistanIn Support of Gagauz Demands for Autonomous Republi cIn Support of GorbachevIn Support of Interregional Group of Deputie sIncreased Ties with IranInter-national HarmonyInvestigation into Death of Nationalist Activis tLegalization of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Churc hMourning for Cardinal Sheptitski iMourning for Merab KostavaMourning for Victims of 1988 Armenian Earthquak ePrevent Orphans from Being Sent Beyond Republic's Border sPunish Those Engaged in Strike sPunish Those Fanning National Hatre dPunishment of Those Involved in Stalin's Crime s
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Raise the Price of Cotto nRecall of Republican Supreme Soviet Deputie sRemoval of Gorbache vRemove Monument to Yakov Sverdlo vResignation of LigachevRestore Citizenship to Political Exile sReunification with Ira nReveal Truth About 1962 Novocherkassk MassacresReveal Truth About the Aftermath of Chernobyl Acciden tSolidarity with Palestinians
4a
59. Right of Republic to Separate Representation Abroa d60. Right of Local Residence (propiska )61. Speed Pace of Refor m62. Against Special Priveleges for Bureaucrac y63. Coverage of Issues in Media64. Mourning for Victims of Recent Regime Violenc e65. Withdrawal of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan66. Against Youth Gang s67. Call for General Strik e68. Continue Strik e69. Declare End to General Strik e70. General Human Rights Demand s71. Commemoration of Victims of Nazi Atrocitie s72. In Support of Andrei Sakharo v73. In Support of Gdlian and Ivano v74. In Support of Boris Yel'tsi n75. Religious Servic e76. Call for Boycott of Elections77. Rehabilitation of Those Repressed Under Brezhne v78. Against Neo-Nazi s79. Solidarity With Victims of April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s80. Solidarity with Armenian Demands on Nagorno-Karabak h81. Improve Disaster Relief82. Against Separation of Territory from Republi c83. Against Discrimination Against Members of Ethnic Grou p84. Resignation of Entire Local Governmen t85. Withdrawal of Soviet Army from Republi c86. Against Proposed Changes to USSR Constitutio n87. Change Place Name s88. End Martial Law89. Against Restriction on Migration to Republi c90. Against Making Language of Other Group the Officia l
Language91. Make Language of Group the Official Languag e92. For Change of Alphabet s93. Eliminate Autonomous Status of Territorial Subuni t94. Improve Conditions for Refugees95. Against Redefinition of Republican Citizenship Right s96. Legalize Uniate Churc h97. Improve Social Condition s98. Other Anti-Military Demand (Close Military Base o r
Training )99. Against Anti-Semitic Russian Nationalist s100. Against Creation of Autonomous Federal Subunit fo rMinorit y101. Against USSR Special Administration in Nagorno-Karabak h102. Commemoration of Victims of 1933 Ukrainian Famin e103. Expulsion of Exiled Caucasian Nationalitie s104. Publication or Renunciation of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pac t105. Punish Those Responsible for April 1989 Tbilisi Massacre s106. Return of Citizenship to Paruir Airikia n107. Siberian Regional Separatis m
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108. End Blockade of Group's Territor y109. For Separation of Territory from Republi c110. Increase Russian Influence Over Institutions of Cultur e111. Against Factory-Based Election s112. End to Party and Political Controls Over Educatio n113. Speed Pace of Destalinization114. Free Movement Across Border s115. In Memory of Andrei Sakharov116. Protest of Crackdown in Chin a117. Recall of Deputies to Congress of People's Deputie s118. In Support of Yuri Afanas'ev119. Attention to Problems of Afghan Veteran s120. Commemoration of Murder of Tsa r121. Commemoration of Victims of Red Terro r122. Destruction or Denigration of Soviet State Symbol s123. Dissolution of Komsomo l124. In Support of CPSU125. In Support of Soviet Army126. End to Nuclear Testin g127. For Nuclear Disarmament128. For Introduction of Martial La w129. For Introduction of Private Property and Market Reform s130. For Right to Strike or Independent Trade Unions131. Improve Work Benefit s132. Restrict Consumption or Sale of Alchoholic Beverages133. Against Racketeer s134. For Greater Income Equalit y135. Greater Representation for Working Class in Legislature s136. Investigation into Local Accident, Poisoning, or Diseas e137. Commemoration of War Veteran s138. Other Linguistic/Cultural Demand s139. Other Foreign-Policy-Related Protes t140. Solidarity With Demands of Other Grou p141. Other Conservative Demand s142. Other Territorial Disput e143. Other Liberal Demand s144. Against Ruk h999 . Other [Specify ]
List of Other Demands Entered (999) :Admission of Soviet Role in Katyn Massacre sAgainst Azerbaidzhani Assimilationist Policie sAgainst Cancellation of Rock Concer tAgainst Creation of Georgian Division of Universit yAgainst Creation of Vigilante Groups Aiding Polic eAgainst Formation of Interfron tAgainst Gorbachev's Reaction to Baltic SeparatismAgainst Greater Economic Sovereignty for Republi cAgainst Legalization of Uniate ChurchAgainst Lenin and Leninis mAgainst Meeting Between NKAO and Azerbaidzhani Deputie sAgainst Opening of Polish Consulate
y
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