Nigeria Ending Unrest in the Niger Delta

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    NIGERIA: ENDING UNREST IN THE NIGER DELTA

    Africa Report N135 5 December 2007

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    TABLE OF CONTENTS

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

    I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1

    II. FALTERING ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THE DELTA UNREST........................ 1A. REACHING OUT TO THE MILITANTS?.....................................................................................1

    B. PROBLEMATIC PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION COMMITTEES.........................................3

    C. UNFULFILLED PROMISES.......................................................................................................4

    III. THE RISING TOLL....................................................................................................... 7

    A. CONTINUING VIOLENCE........................................................................................................7

    1. Attacks on expatriates and oil facilities .....................................................................7

    2. Politicians, gangs and the Port Harcourt violence .....................................................7

    3. The criminal hostage-taking industry ........................................................................8

    B. REVENUE LOSS AND ECONOMIC DESTABILISATION ..............................................................9C. EXPATRIATE AND INVESTMENT FLIGHT ..............................................................................10

    IV. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO THE SECURITY CRISIS .............................. 11

    A. DEPLOYING THE JTF:NECESSARY BUT INSUFFICIENT.........................................................11

    B. DEMOLITION OF THE WATERFRONTS ...................................................................................11

    C. STRENGTHENING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS .....................................................................12

    V. DEALING WITH THE POLITICAL CAUSES........................................................ 14

    A. PREPARING THE SUMMIT.....................................................................................................14

    B. IMPLEMENTING THE DEVELOPMENT MASTER PLAN ............................................................14

    C. URGENT

    REFORMS

    ..............................................................................................................15D. INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT...........................................................................................15

    VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 16

    APPENDICES

    A. MAP OF NIGERIA.................................................................................................................17B. MAP OF THE NIGER DELTA .................................................................................................18C. GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND PERSONALITIES.........................................................................19D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................21E. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA ................................22F. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ........................................................24

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    NIGERIA: ENDING UNREST IN THE NIGER DELTA

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

    The Niger Delta is again at risk of sliding into chaos. The29 May 2007 inauguration of new federal and stategovernments offered an opportunity to resolve longstandingconflicts afflicting the oil-rich, deeply impoverished region.Six months later, the opportunity is unravelling amid newviolence and criminality. Decisive action is necessary to

    stop militant violence and criminal hostage-taking, initiatequick-impact development projects that can build publicconfidence in President Umaru YarAduas administrationand tackle constitutional and legal issues that havefuelled unrest in the region.

    YarAduas early statements and actions raised hopes inthe Delta. The selection of Goodluck Jonathan, an ethnicIjaw and then governor of Bayelsa State, as his runningmate responded to the regions demand for representationin the presidency. YarAdua identified the Delta asone of seven priority areas in his inaugural address and

    followed up by initiating consultations with ethnicand militant organisations and endorsing the regionaldevelopment master plan launched by his predecessor,Olusegun Obasanjo, in March 2007. But none of thishas yet led to a comprehensive and credible strategyfor ending the violence. Repeated postponements of theNiger Delta summit, initially called for June, and lackof clarity over its participants, methods and goals areeroding confidence and threatening a relapse into evenmore intensive conflict.

    Following the 3 September arrest in Angola of one of itsleaders, Henry Okah, the Movement for the Emancipationof the Niger Delta (MEND) resumed attacks on oilinstallations and hostage-taking. On 18 October, itthreatened to extend its bombing campaign beyond theDelta if the federal government agreed to the militarysrequest to raid militants camps.

    Hostage-taking, employed by militants since early 2006to draw international attention to the Delta crisis, hasturned into a lucrative, criminally driven enterprise, withlocal politicians and their relatives frequent victims,instead of just the oil industry expatriates who were theoriginal targets. The practice has also begun to spreadbeyond the core Niger Delta, to Ondo State on the westernfringe of the region and other parts of the country.

    Clashes in Rivers State between politically sponsoredcriminal gangs in August and deepening splits withinthe Deltas major militant groups have worsened thesecurity situation. Divisions within militant ranks havereduced prospects for forging a united front to negotiatewith the government.

    If YarAdua is not to lose his opportunity to resolvethe Delta crisis, he must urgently go beyond drawn-outconsultations with militants and ethnic leaders andtranslate his promises into credible policies which addressthe violence and legitimate demands. The federal legislatureneeds to provide constitutional solutions for the political,economic and environmental grievances that have beenat the roots of ethnic and communal agitation for decades.The Rivers State government, whose territory has seen theworst and most recent violence, must act with restraint toavoid aggravating the already volatile relations between

    ethnic groups in the state.

    RECOMMENDATIONS

    To the Federal Government and PresidentYarAdua:

    1. Appoint an independent presidential envoy of highmoral authority from civil society and outside theregion to lead an inclusive consultation on process,agenda and participation for the Niger Delta

    summit and report back within three months; theenvoy should:

    (a) include armed militants and non-armed civilsociety representatives, including womensgroups, from all Niger Delta states andethnic groups in the consultation;

    (b) revisit the recommendations of the 2005Ogomudia report; and

    (c) review and propose changes to make thepeace and reconciliation committees more

    inclusive and efficient tools for conflictprevention, management and resolution.

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    2. Stop all attempts to divide and co-opt armedmilitants by offering contracts and appointmentsto leaders and instead encourage them to create andarticulate a common and realistic political agenda.

    3. Proceed immediately with security and infrastructuredevelopment assessments as preliminary stepsto holding the Niger Delta summit.

    4. Institute a judicial inquiry into the Port Harcourtviolence and prosecute all political actors identifiedas having contributed to armed conflicts andpolitical assassinations in the Niger Delta since1999.

    5. Appoint a special federal prosecutor to investigatelocal and state government officials involved inhostage-taking.

    6. Clarify the terms and applicability of its amnestyso as to distinguish between politically inspiredmilitants and criminally motivated gangsters, andaccompany it with adequate punishment for themost serious crimes and appropriate compensationand rehabilitation measures for the most affectedvictims.

    7. Strengthen security arrangements in the region by:(a) increasing the manpower and equipment of

    the Nigeria Police Force for constabularyduties on land, and of the navy for patrollingcreeks and waterways;

    (b) requiring improved collaboration betweenthe police and local security, includingprivate and community-based securityorganisations; and

    (c) increasing the means available to the militarypolice, military justice and internal policeservices to arrest and prosecute any officerof any rank involved in oil bunkeringor other organised criminal activities incomplicity with Niger Delta armed groups.

    8. Identify clearly money allocated in the 2008budget for Niger Delta development and releaseall outstanding funds due to the Niger DeltaDevelopment Commission (NDDC) since 2001.

    9. Implement on a fast-track basis those elements ofthe Niger Delta Development Master Plan withpotential for generating jobs quickly.

    10. Provide funding to the Rivers State government, ifit proceeds with the demolition and developmentof the Port Harcourt waterfronts, to ensure that theproject is implemented within a framework ofcomprehensive urban development that minimisesthe suffering of those that would be displaced andprevents the stimulation of new ethnic conflicts.

    To the National Assembly:

    11. Amend the NDDC Act of 2000 to ensure thatall relevant oil-sector corporations in the regioncontribute to funding the commission.

    12. Begin the process of amending the 1999 Constitution,particularly to improve provisions for returningmore oil revenues to the region from which theyare derived, in accordance with recommendationsof the 2005-2006 National Political ReformConference.

    To the Rivers State Government:

    13. Ensure that the demolition and relocation ofwaterfront communities is preceded bycomprehensive preliminary work, implementedwithin a framework of urban development andcarried out in a humane and orderly manner, withminimum humanitarian consequences and duerespect for the cultural rights of the ethniccommunities long resident in those settlements.

    To the European Union (EU), the U.S. and otherInternational Partners of Nigeria

    14. Engage with the YarAdua Presidency and theNational Assembly to encourage a speedy resolutionof the Niger Delta crisis, with emphasis on theroot causes of the conflict as much as its securityconsequences, and give assistance as necessary,including by:

    (a) promoting increased investment andinfrastructure development in the Delta;

    (b) providing greater capacity building aid andenhanced project funding to credible civilsociety and community-based organisationsengaged in civic education, youth programsfor attitudinal change, communal healingand restoration of community governance;

    (c) encouraging the multinational oil companiesoperating in the region to adhere to bestenvironmental practices, evolve moreconflict-sensitive community relationsstrategies and demonstrate greatertransparency in their community developmentprograms; and

    (d) aiding the Nigeria police and security services,bilaterally and within the framework of theGulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy(GGESS), to curb oil theft, money laundering

    and small arms trafficking in the Delta.

    Dakar/Brussels, 5 December 2007

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    NIGERIA: ENDING UNREST IN THE NIGER DELTA

    I. INTRODUCTIONStarting from his 29 May 2007 inauguration, PresidentYarAdua has responded to the Niger Deltas conflictswith a more consultative, conciliatory approach than hispredecessor, Olusegun Obasanjo.1 His government metan important militant demand, freeing prominent Ijawpersonalities Mujahid Asari-Dokubo, leader of the NigerDelta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and DiepreyeAlamieyeseigha, ex-Bayelsa State governor.2 It also begandialogue with militant groups and ethnic organisations,established committees charged with facilitating peaceand conflict resolution and signalled readiness to convenea Niger Delta summit.

    These initiatives have had some calming effects on theinsurgency in the region but they have not yet addressedcore grievances and demands local control of oil andgas resources, greater political representation at the federallevel, infrastructure development, economic empowerment

    and environmental degradation which have fuelledmilitancy in the region. There have been delays in beginningimplementation of a regional development plan andconvening the promised summit. Inertia in translatingintent into action and the arrest of a militant leader ongun-running charges in Angola in September provoked afaction of the Movement for the Emancipation of the NigerDelta (MEND) to resume attacks on oil installationsand abduction of industry personnel. Criminalsmasquerading as militants are beyond the Delta.

    This report examines the YarAdua governments initiatives

    in the Delta, highlights the costs of the crisis and appraisesthe response to insecurity in the wider region as well as tothe Port Harcourt troubles specifically. It analyses themajor issues that need to be addressed urgently in order toend violence, launch regional development and deal withthe root causes of the conflicts.

    1 For background on the conflicts, see Crisis Group AfricaReports N115, The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigerias DeltaUnrest, 3 August 2006; and N118, Fuelling The Niger DeltaCrisis, 28 September 2006.2 In July the government also freed the former speaker of theBayelsa State House of Assembly, Boyelayefa Debekeme, whohad been detained under Obasanjo on charges of terrorism andmoney laundering.

    II. FALTERING ATTEMPTS TOADDRESS THE DELTA UNREST

    A. REACHING OUT TO THE MILITANTS?A first major conciliatory step by the administration wasto concur in the release of Asari, who had been arraignedon 6 October 2005 on charges of planning to overthrow

    the Obasanjo government and provoke Nigeriasdisintegration. On 9 June 2007, a five-member panel ofthe Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals 6 June2006 denial of bail on the grounds that he was a threat tonational security.3 However, in a dramatic reversal fivedays later on 14 June 2007, a Federal High Court in Abujagranted the bail on health grounds.4

    This was viewed not as a technical decision by a court buta political arrangement requested by the new governmentto defuse tensions in the Delta, barely a week after thegovernors of the Niger Delta states had jointly appealed to

    President YarAdua to free the sick prisoner. The actionwas also in line with the argument by the Ijaw nationalistleader, Edwin Clarke, that Asaris incarceration was apolitical issue, which must be treated politically.5

    The governments action was strongly applauded in theDelta6 and soon followed by the release of Alamieyeseigha,

    3 The 6 June 2006 verdict, delivered by Justice OlabodeRhodes-Vivour, had held that: Indeed, the depositions in theaffidavit and interview granted to The Independentnewspaper

    on [10 September 2005] are unanimous and very disturbing.For example, the appellant (Asari) granted [an] interview to thepress wherein he says that he will continue to fight until Nigeriadisintegrates. Evidence available to the trial judge and to us,shows beyond doubt the threat to national security. A closescrutiny of the charge and documentary evidence availablereveals offences that are a real threat to national security.4 Asaris lawyer, Festus Keyamo, told the court his client washypertensive and diabetic. Bail was on condition he would nottake part in any political rally, report to the office of the StateSecurity Service (SSS) weekly and whenever away from hishome area, and ask SSS permission for foreign travel.5 Tobi Soniyi, Asari-Dokubo regains freedom, Punch, 15

    June 2007, p. 5.6 For example by Ledum Mitee, president of the Movementfor Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Patrick Naagbanton,coordinator of the Centre for Environmental/Human Rights and

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    the self-styled Governor-General of the Ijaw nation.Impeached in December 2005 as governor of BayelsaState, then arrested immediately by the Economic andFinancial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and tried forcorruption, he was offered a plea bargain. He pleadedguilty to making a false declaration of assets and money

    laundering, was sentenced to two years in jail and promptlyreleased for time served.7

    The militants had made the release one of their key demandsbut they did not end their attacks on oil installations andhostage-taking. In his first interview after release, Asarisaid he would convene the many faceless groups in theregion to take a stand against hostage-taking but alsohinted that ending the practice could take a longtime because criminal elements were involved.8 Thegovernments gesture may have earned it some goodwill,especially among the Ijaw, but it has had little effect on

    curtailing hostage-taking. This may also partially reflectthe diminished influence of Asari and Alamieyeseigha;there are serious doubts of their ability to manage militancyin the Delta.

    The federal government also sought to defuse tensionswith an amnesty for militants. The offer was intended toencourage the fighters in the creeks to end violence andparticipate in dialogue but has achieved only limited resultsdue to the militants continuing distrust. The Ijaw YouthCouncil (IYC) has demanded that the government issuea formal white paper detailing the terms of its amnesty.

    Recalling the experience of Asari, who was persuaded tohand in 3,000 guns in 2004, then arrested in 2005, IYCPresident Chris Ekiyor said the militants did not wantto be deceived again.9

    The governments offer is problematic for other reasonsas well. First, an amnesty to all who have been involvedin violence under the mantle of the Niger Delta cause ishardly justifiable. It needs to distinguish as a matter ofprinciple between the militants in such groups as MENDand the Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), who can

    Development (CEHRD) in Eleme, Rivers State, and EdwinClarke, an Ijaw nationalist leader.7 Alamieyeseigha was convicted of diverting 1.7 million and$250,000 to foreign accounts through six firms and buying nineproperties in London, Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt. Forfeitedfunds were handed over to the Bayelsa State government. Whilemost of his Ijaw kinsmen acknowledge he was corrupt, thedemand for his release was fuelled by the perception that he wassingled out for impeachment and arrest among similarly corruptgovernors solely because of his political disagreements withObasanjo.8 Dokubo plans to unite militants, The Nation on Sunday,17 June 2007, p. 8.9 Crisis Group telephone interview, Chris Ekiyor, president ofIjaw Youth Council, 28 November 2007.

    claim with some plausibility to be motivated by legitimateDelta grievances, and rogue elements who have engagedin purely criminal acts. Secondly, whether in the contextof legitimate struggle or criminality, violence in the region,including murder, torture, rape and arson, has inflicteddeep physical and psychological wounds on many innocent

    citizens. An amnesty not accompanied by penalties forthe most heinous crimes and some sort of redress forvictims would legitimise impunity and not contribute tothe individual and communal healing needed for genuinepeacebuilding.

    The new governments third major strategy has beendialogue with militant groups. On 28 June 2007, VicePresident Jonathan travelled to the Delta to talk withmilitant leaders at Okerenkoko, in Warri South LocalGovernment Area, Delta State. The visit was highlysymbolic, not only because it was his first official trip

    within the country since his inauguration, but also becauseOkerenkoko, a remote riverine area, is perceived as theheadquarters of Ijaw militants operating in Delta, Bayelsaand Rivers States. Jonathan urged the militants to lay downarms and pledged the visit would herald the start ofdevelopment projects in Ijawland and throughout the Deltabut made no specific commitments.10

    Two weeks later, Jonathan invited Asari to the presidentialvilla in Abuja. The freed NDPVF leader emerged fromthe talks to call on fellow militants to stop hostage-taking and other violence and give the government a

    chance to implement its plans for ending conflicts andreversing decades of injustice in the Delta. Jonathansubsequently met with other senior militants.11

    These talks have not been as productive as the governmentexpected because they have been complicated by themilitants disunity. Soon after Asari was freed, he andOkah, a leading MEND figure, began to trade charges.12In July, after Asari called for cooperation with thegovernment, he was called an informant and a spy forthe Nigerian government.13 Following Okahs arrest inAngola, Asari said he was neither the leader nor evena member of MEND but was hired for N100 million($800,000) monthly by an ex-governor of a Niger Deltastate, had tried to eliminate him while he was in jail and

    10 Shola ONeil, Jonathan tours Niger Delta, preaches peace,The Nation, 29 June 2007, p. 3.11 Madu Onuorah, Asari-Dokubo in Aso Villa, flays hostage-taking, The Guardian, 13 July 2007, p. 5.12 Henry Okah, a MEND factional leader, has been a key figurein supplying arms to Delta militants. Partly based in South Africa,he was also MENDs emailer, responsible for informing the

    mass media of positions and operations. The split between Okahand Asari dates to a 2005 disagreement over an arms delivery.13 MEND email correspondence with mass media organisationsin Nigeria, 22 July 2007.

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    wanted to discredit the Delta struggle: a petty criminaland opportunist, who should be held responsible for manyviolent crimes in the Niger Delta.14

    Asaris comments on Okah and his characterisation ofMENDs threat to launch fresh attacks as criminal have

    drawn fire from other militant leaders, further deepeningcracks in the movement. Comrade Jonjon Oyenife, aformer IYC president who is talking with the government,called Asari-Dokuboa big disappointment to mostof us and his comments a betrayal of Ijaws.15

    Asari has lost much influence among fighters in the creeks.The snatching of his jeep by armed men on the streets ofPort Harcourt in mid-July was indicative. Since 26 July, hehas largely stayed out of the region, saying he does not wantto be drawn into the conflicts in that city. A source asked:If Asari can no longer guarantee his own safety in Port

    Harcourt, how can he venture to meet with the boys in thecreeks? And if he is out of touch with the boys, how canhe claim to be negotiating a peace deal on their behalf?16Recently, a group calling itself Authentic MEND andclaiming responsibility for the movements operationshas emerged. In a statement apparently referring to Asari,it alleged that senior members had betrayed Okah bysetting him up for arrest, had used MEND to talk theirway to power and now were condemning abductions.17

    The federal government and oil companies have beenaccused of fomenting divisions to compromise militants.

    A source told Crisis Group federal officials advised some

    14 Henry Chukwurah, Asari-Dokubo lashes out at arrestedmilitant,Daily Sun, 27 September 2007, p. 4.15 Henry Okah: Ijaw leaders Blast Asari-Dokubo, The Timesof Nigeria, 17 November 2007.16 Asari is now based in Abuja. In a statement he issued on histroubled relationship with Okah on 19 October, he acknowledgedthat he has received housing assistance from governmentofficials: My place in Abujawas paid for with the interventionof Goodluck, but he will testify that when given the option of

    two places, I elected for the cheaper. See Asari Dokubo:Me, Henry Okah, Jomo Gbomo, Judith Asuni and the NigerDelta Insurgency Sah'ara Reporters, nigrianetforum.com, 19October 2007.17 The statement reads in part: Authentic MEND emerges. Theso-called leaders of our group have betrayed our cause usingthe platform to negotiate their ways to offices [and] lining theirpockets with millions, while we remain in the creeks as soldiers ofcircumstance. They say kidnapping is now criminal because theydine and wine with government officials. They betrayed themaster and set him up in Angola, the same man some of themvisited in South Africa. Henceforth, we remain the real MEND.The Federal Government should disband its committee on Peace

    and Conflict Resolution within 72 hours because its leadershipcannot use us to make money and present us as criminals. Allinstallations of economic value to the nation in the Niger Deltastand the risk of attack at the expiration of the ultimatum.

    militant leaders to form companies, which were then givencontracts to protect pipelines and clear bush in the oilregion, and directed oil companies to assign 10 per centin 2008 contracts for senior militants.18

    The government insists it does not seek to reward militants

    for unlawful activities.19

    The oil companies deny anydeliberate strategy favouring militants but concede theyare implementing the governments policy of increasinglocal content in the industry and do not know the realowners of some of the companies they contract with.At the state level, governments controlled by the rulingPeoples Democratic Party (PDP) offer militantschairmanships of local councils via the December 2007elections sure access to public funds which are oftenspent with little accountability.20

    The stated goal is to give militants respectable sources of

    income but the effect has been to create divisions betweenthose who are favoured and others who are not. Thosedivisions are impeding efforts by Delta elites to transformthe militants into a unified pressure group, whose leaderscan guarantee region-wide compliance with agreementsreached with the government.

    B. PROBLEMATIC PEACE AND CONFLICTRESOLUTION COMMITTEES

    On 2 July 2007, the federal government inaugurated a

    peace and conflict resolution committee for the NigerDelta.21 Chaired by Senator David Brigidi, a widelyrespected Ijaw from Bayelsa State, it has twenty members:two from each of the six states of the South-South,22 fourfrom the oil firms in the region and one each from theNiger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the nowdefunct Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC),the Nigeria Police Force and the State Security Service

    18 Crisis Group interview, militant leader, Warri, Delta State19 September 2007.19 Lucky Nwankwere, Talks with militants in order FG,

    Daily Sun, 25 October 2007, p. 7.20 For a detailed study of local government corruption in theDelta, see Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of LocalGovernment Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State,Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, January 2007.21 At the inauguration, Vice President Jonathan lamentedthat Port Harcourt is gradually becoming a ghost town. Theeconomy of Port Harcourt is gradually collapsing, and warnedthat if present regional trends were not halted, the whole

    economy of the Niger Delta will be destroyed. See Jonathaninaugurates peace committee on NDelta, Punch, 3 July 2007.22 The South-South zone comprises six states: Akwa Ibom,Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers States.

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    (SSS).23 Designed to liaise with regional actors andsecurity agencies on conflicts across state bordersand hostage-taking, it also coordinates similar committeesestablished by federal government directive in each South-South state.

    These committees could play important roles in facilitatingresolution, or even preventing conflicts, and have beeninvolved in negotiations with militants to join the peaceprocess and for hostage releases. In late November, theBrigidi Committee obtained a cessation of hostilitiespledge by militants in Ondo State, though the militantssaid they would not disarm until convinced of the federalgovernments actions on unemployment and infrastructureproblems.24 At a 29 November meeting with militants atEzetue (Pennton), Bayelsa State, the committee extracted acommitment from the fighters to join the peace process; buttheir leader (who identified himself as General Boyloaf,

    commanding the Bayelsa Division of MEND) said hismen would observe a twelve-month ceasefire only ifthe federal government facilitated Okahs return fromAngola to Nigeria and respects his human rights.25

    These are modest but significant steps toward endingarmed conflict region-wide. However, the peace andconflict resolution committees have been hampered bythe mistrust between governments and militants, raisingserious doubt about what they can accomplish. UdensEradiri, the IYC secretary general, alleges that somemembers of the Brigidi committee are questionable

    characters, and its composition does not reflect thegovernments stated intention of addressing conflicts:

    They are people who have been involved at variouslevels in sponsoring hostage-taking, yet thesepersons are those used as members of the committee.The committee is evil. It is a committee that willcontinue to perpetuate hostage-taking in the region,and encourage violence in order to have something[to do].26

    The JRC has condemned the Delta committee in full

    terms, called its terms of reference irrelevant to the

    23 The members of the committee are: Senator David Brigidi(chairman); Kingsley Kuku (secretary); George Timinimi andGodwin Ebosa (Delta State); Alhaji Hassan Douglas and JerryNeedam (Rivers State); Chief James Jephtah and JoshuaBenamesia (Bayelsa State); Esoetok Ikpong and Elder BasseyEkpa (Akwa Ibom State); Chief Asaka Umeh and BarristerBassey Okim (Cross River State); and Prince Francis Iyasereand Florence Gbinije Erhabor (Edo State).24 Militants Promise to end the violence in Ondo State in Nigeria,www.africaoiljournal.com, 27 November 200725 Bisi Olaniyi, MEND Gives FG Condition for Ceasefire,Punch, 1 December 2007.26Maureen Chigbo, Gunmen on the Rampage, Newswatch,23 July 2007, p. 19.

    root causes of the regions conflicts and its membershiprife with incompetence, and concluded that the initiativeis doomed to fail. It has vowed never to be party tosuch grim wastage of badly needed funds and show ofincompetence.27 Similarly, on 14 October, AuthenticMEND gave the federal government a 72-hour ultimatum,

    which was ignored, to disband the committee if it wantedto keep the peace in the Delta.28

    The state committees have attracted similar criticism.In Rivers State, the NDPVF spokesperson, OnengiyaErekosima, dismissed its activities as lacking focus.29Militants and leaders of warring gangs ignored thecommittees invitation to its Port Harcourt peace concerton 11 October, where they had been expected to renounceviolence.30 A militant leader told Crisis Group thecommittee was merely a repeat of a similar panel set up byformer Rivers State Governor Peter Odili in October 2004,

    whose only result was the enrichment of its members.31

    C. UNFULFILLED PROMISESThe YarAdua government has made the Niger DeltaDevelopment Master Plan pivotal to its efforts to transformthe region but the presidents statements have createdsome confusion and a sense of betrayal. In an April 2007interview, he said, what I have been advocating is whatthe federal government launched last week. That isthe overall master plan for the development of the NigerDelta.32 At the June G8 summit in Germany, hesaid heenvisaged something similar to the Marshall Plan for thedevelopment of Western Europe after the Second WorldWar.33 But it has never been clear whether more isintended than the Niger Delta Master Plan Obasanjolaunched in March 2007. Nothing new has appeared,and many believe they see a pattern of deception anddashed hopes similar to what they had experienced undersuccessive federal administrations.

    27Cynthia Whyte, spokesperson, Joint Revolutionary Council,wire statement to media, 11 July 2007.28 Femi Folaranmi, MEND gives FG 72-hour ultimatum,

    Daily Sun, 15 October 2007, p. 7.29Okafor Ofiebo, Worsening Violence, The News, 20 August2007, p. 36.30 Kelvin Ebiri, Kidnappers reduce ransom demand for RiversDeputy Speakers father, The Guardian, 12 October 2007, pp.1-2.31 Crisis Group interview, militant leader from Rivers State,Abuja, 1 October 2007.32 Ademola Adegbamigbe, Nobody can hold me hostageTheNews, 2 April 2007, p. 24.33 Madu Onuorah, YarAdua Seeks UN, Others aid on NigerDelta, Electoral Reforms, The Guardian, 9 June 2007, p. 7.

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    The new government is still working on a stakeholderssummit on the Niger Delta, initially planned for 4 June2007, but postponed to allow more extensive consultations.According to a statement signed by Babagana Kingibe,secretary to the federal government, it is meant to considerall ideas and existing initiatives, including the Niger Delta

    Master Plan, and come up with an Action Plan with aview to accelerating an enduring solution to the NigerDelta crisis.34

    Both the process leading to the summit and its goals havebeen criticised, however. With the date already postponedthree times, the government is now accused of foot-dragging.35 The initial consultations with militant orpotentially violent groups, whom the government rightlysaw as posing the greatest threats to the peace process, sentunhelpful signals that only the violent were being engaged,while many civil society leaders were being ignored.

    The government delegated Vice President Jonathan to steerthe consultations, assuming he would inspire confidencebecause he is from the Delta. This has drawn a complaint,however, that it implies the Delta is not the governmentshighest priority. Benjamin Wilcox, a PDP leader in RiversState, said, yes, President YarAdua has told VicePresident Goodluck Jonathan to take charge of theNiger Delta, but everybody knows the role of the VicePresident.The Vice President is a non-starter Whyis it that it is when it comes to the Niger Delta that theymandate to the deputy?36

    Jonathans consultations have been criticised as too focusedon his Ijaw kinsmen. Non-Ijaws cited as evidence of biasthat he visited militants in an Ijaw community in June butnot other ethnic groups. The government has sought todispel complaints by broadening the consultations to drawin leaders of all major groups37 but the impression persiststhat Ijaw interests will dominate the summit agenda. Thegovernment mustensure representation of all interests andtendencies.

    More fundamental is what the summit is designed to

    achieve. Joe Evah, president of the non-governmentalIjaw Monitoring Group (IMG), argued:

    The summit will merely be a repetition of thingsthat have been said again and again over the last

    34 Ahamefula Ogbu, YarAdua Convenes First N/ DeltaSummit, ThisDay, 1 June 2007, p. 1.35 The summit was originally planned for June 2007, then shiftedto October and then to November. Crisis Group was told bypresidency sources that it may now have to wait until early 2008.36 YarAdua should revisit 50% derivation, says Wilcox,

    The Guardian, 5 October 2007, p. 9.37 On 2 October 2007, Vice President Jonathan met with elevenleaders of the Itsekiri ethnic group, led by the Otsodim of Warri,Chief Isaac O. Jemide.

    twenty years. The problems of the Delta and thedemands of its peoples are too well known. Whatmore do they want to discuss? If they want peaceand security in the Niger Delta, all they need isto refer to the Ogomudia Report of 2002,38 whichObasanjo threw aside. If the YarAdua government

    is sincere, then all it has to do is to act on therecommendations of that report.39

    Samuel Ibiye, secretary of the militant Grand Alliance ofNiger Delta (GAND), asked:

    What is the idea behind it? Are they going to take ourissues seriously and implement the recommendationsthis time around? As far as we are concerned, it isnot necessary. How many confabs did they holdbefore they developed Abuja? They already knowthe problems, and so the summit is not necessary.40

    Progress is also being impeded by perceptions ofinconsistency. For instance, leaders of some militant groupstold Crisis Group they are disappointed the governmenthas changed their interlocutor from Jonathan to the secretaryto the federal government, Babagana Kingibe, and thento Defence Minister Mahmud Yayale Ahmed. The shiftto the minister has been interpreted as an indication thatthe government still views the Niger Delta problem as onethat can be resolved within a military context rather than acomprehensive developmental framework.41

    38 See Ogomudia Report: Report of the Special SecurityCommittee on Oil Producing Areas, reproduced by theCommunity Defence Law Foundation, Port Harcourt, 2007.39 Crisis Group interview, Joe Evah, president of IMG, 16October 2007. The Ogomudia Report was submitted to Obasanjoon 19 February 2002 by a Special Security Committee on OilProducing Areas, chaired by the then chief of army staff, Lt. Gen.Alexander Ogomudia. It recommended, among other things,an immediate upward review of the minimum 13 per centderivation to not less than 50 per cent and repeal of some laws,including the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Petroleum Act of1969, which it said dispossess[es] oil producing areas of their

    land. It was not signed by three of its 23 members, including thepresidential adviser on national security, and its revenue-sharingrecommendation was unacceptable to the political elite, especiallyin the northern states. Militants point to Obasanjos failure to acton the recommendations as evidence federal leaders want asummit that generates only talk, not action. The Land UseAct vests all land in the state, to be held in trust on behalf ofthe people, and reduces the rights of traditional landownersand residents to those of mere occupants. The Petroleum Actvests ownership of all petroleum in the state, which has solecontrol over exploration and production licenses and can allocatethese without reference to those on whose traditional land theactivities will be conducted.40 Henry Chukwurah, Youre evil, irresponsible, militants tellPDP, Saturday Sun, 20 October 2007, p. 11.41Crisis Group interview, Bello Oboko, president of FederatedNiger Delta Ijaw Communities, Abuja, 16 October 2007.

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    Militant leaders say the government is not implementingactions that were to precede the summit. A document madeavailable to Crisis Group shows that none of the followinghave begun: an assessment of the Delta security situation toprepare troop withdrawals from certain areas by the secondweek of October; a review of cases of all those detained

    in connection with militant activities, to be carried outfrom 18 September to mid-October; and an assessment ofrehabilitation work needed in eight communities damagedby military operations, to be undertaken from 18 Septemberto 17 October. The failure to meet timelines has raisedquestions whether the government can be trusted to honoursummit commitments. Militant leader Jonjon Oyeinfiesaid: The Federal Government is not serious about thewhole thing. We have been saying this for weeks, andnow everything is going out of control.42

    The federal government and the Deltas militant and civil

    society leaders also differ on what the summits centralissue should be. The government seeks a comprehensiveceasefire agreement that will allow implementation of itsdevelopment plan. The militants and many ethnic activistsinsist the summit should negotiate greater resourcecontrol, a catch-all term referring to the right of statesand communities to exercise political power over naturalresources within their territories.43

    A May 2007 document analysing the demands of allmajor groups in the Delta concluded: Special federalinterventionist agencies have failed lamentably to deliver

    on the promise of development. The old order must giveway.Resource control is the central question in the NigerDelta today.44 Tom Polo, leader of a strong militant groupin Warri South Local Government Area, Delta State, saidthe regions right to control its petroleum and gas resourcesremains a key demand: We want to control our resourcesourselves.45 Resource ownership and exploitation areregulated by the constitution, which cannot be alteredunilaterally by the presidency. To move the peace processforward, however, the federal government could giveassurances it will support an increase in statutory allocationsto the region.

    YarAduas provisions for the Niger Delta, as outlinedin the 2008 appropriation bill presented to the NationalAssembly on 8 November, are also controversial. The

    42 Nigerian Rebels Blow up Shell Oil Pipeline in FreshAttack, Reuters, 15 November 2007.43 For further details on the controversy over resource control,see Crisis Group Report, Fuelling The Niger Delta Crisis, op.cit.44Justice not Charity: Manifesto of the Niger Delta, Community

    Defence Law Foundation, Port Harcourt, May 2007, p. 29.45Gilbert da Costa, Nigeria Oil Militant Criticizes Governmentover Delta Neglect, Voice of America interview, 30 November2007.

    president said N444.6 billion ($3.4 billion), 20 per centof the budget, was earmarked for security and the Delta46but also that he proposed a total allocation of N444.60billion for the military and the police. This has beeninterpreted to mean the only allocation for Niger Deltadevelopment was the N69.8billion ($560 million) specified

    for NDDC projects. Some senators and other leaders inthe region claim the budget prioritises arms acquisitionto suppress legitimate demands for Delta development.Joe Evah of IMG spoke of a provocative act, which hasleft the Niger Delta people dumbfounded.47

    Senate President David Mark attempted to defuse theoutrage by explaining that the budget is for development ofthe region, not exclusively for security48 but he has notbeen convincing. MEND said it regards the budget astantamount to a declaration of war, and its fightersare determined to make the military busy enough to

    justify the huge budget for security in the region.49 Thecontroversy and the consequent hardening of MENDsposition could seriously undermine peace efforts. To avoidthis, the National Assembly needs to rework the budget toensure more attention to infrastructure and human security.While military and police need additional funds, this shouldnot be at the expense of the Deltas pressing developmentneeds.

    46 2008 Budget Speech by President YarAdua, joint session ofthe National Assembly, Abuja, 8 November 2007. Educationwas allocated 13 per cent of the budget, agriculture and waterresources 7 per cent.47 Emma Amaize, N-Deltans shocked by YarAduas N444bn security budget, Vanguard, 17 November 2007.48 Kenneth Ehigiator, N444.6 bn N-Delta vote not for Arms,David Mark clarifies, Vanguard, 17 November 2007.49 Statement in an email to media organisations in Nigeria,signed by Gbomo Jomo, 15 November 2007.

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    III. THE RISING TOLLThe hope that Obasanjos departure and a new governmentwith Delta representation would reduce armed militancyacross the region has been dashed. The persistence of

    insecurity and deepening criminality in the region overthe past half year is continuing to take a toll on Nigeriaseconomy and society, with the effects including loss of oilrevenues, exodus of foreign workers, alienation of capitalinvestment, decline of businesses from the oil service tothe hospitality industry and the spread of hostage-takingto other parts of the country.

    A. CONTINUING VIOLENCEThere are three major trends since the April 2007 elections:

    continuing (though fewer) attacks against expatriates andoil industry facilities by militants driven by a pan-NigerDelta agenda; abductions of hostages by criminals drivenby greed; and violent clashes between gangs originallysponsored by local politicians for electoral purposes,particularly in Rivers State.

    1. Attacks on expatriates and oil facilitiesInstead of reducing militant activity immediately afterthe elections, MEND opted for a defiant show of strength.Militants attacked pipelines supplying the Brass terminal,

    temporarily reducing Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC,a subsidiary of Eni of Italy) production by over 75 percent. Once satisfied it had made its point and in deferenceto moderates who wished to test the new governmentspromise to address Delta grievances, MEND releasedmany of its hostages and declared a one-month ceasefire.After its expiration on 3 July 2007, it threatened to renewattacks, arguing in response to Okahs September arrestthat you [the Nigerian government] cannot frame someonewho is an integral part of a peace process, isolate him andthen not expect trouble.50

    MEND has stepped up its attacks on major oil facilitiessince October 2007. On 12 November, it attacked the QuaIboe terminal in Akwa Ibom State, saying the purpose

    50 Kelvin Ebiri, Security chiefs exculpate MEND in attack onoil firm, The Guardian, 3 October 2007, p. 3. The governmentdenied involvement in Okahs arrest and requested extradition.Official statement by the Nigerian government, signedby Olusegun Adeniyi, special adviser to the president oncommunications, 2 October 2007. Nigeria Requests Extraditionof two militant leaders in Angola,Leadership, 18 November

    2007. Nigeria and Angola do not have an extradition treaty buton 18 November, Angolan President Eduardo dos Santospromised Okah would be released to Nigerian authorities onceLuanda concludes certain legal procedures.

    was to seize guns, ammunition and outboard engines inpreparation for imminent combat against Nigerian troops.51Two days later, it claimed responsibility for an attack on acrude oil pipeline feeding the Forcados export terminal inDelta State, spilling a large volume of oil and forcing theShell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) to reduce

    daily output by 20,000 to 50,000 barrels.

    The movement has threatened that in due time itscampaigns would strategically focus on Angolan concernsin Nigeria, in reprisal for Okahs detention.52 It has alsorepeated a threat first made in late October to bomb majorbridges and other non-oil sector infrastructure outside theDelta. If it succeeds in striking at Angolas embassy or otherinterests in Nigeria, it could produce serious difficulties forbilateral relations. If it carries out its threat to hit targetsbeyond the Delta, and particularly if such attacks causesignificant casualties, it could open new and dangerous

    tensions between the Ijaw and affected ethnic groups.53

    2. Politicians, gangs and the Port Harcourtviolence

    July and August 2007 saw the worst fighting in PortHarcourt since early in the decade. Armed with automaticweapons and rocket-propelled grenade launchers, andtravelling in fast vehicles, two rival groups fought gunbattles across the city, initially without police or localmilitary intervention. At the centre of the violence inwhich more than 100 people died were two figures who

    have led political thuggery in Rivers State for close to adecade: Ateke Tom of the Niger Delta Vigilantes (NDV)and Soboma George of the gang known as the Icelanders.Rivers State government invited the army and police tocrack down but Crisis Group interviewees said these gangleaders are players in the high stakes of Rivers State andNiger Delta politics, and the gangs were formed by andenjoy strong backing from politicians, including some inthe present government.54

    Gabriel Asabuja, an NDPVF leader, said the foundationfor the reign of terror the state experienced in July and

    August was laid by an unnamed former governor andformer minister from the state who funded the import ofno less than four container loads of arms and ammunition,which were distributed to members of a particular gang

    51 The terminal, which handles 420,000 barrels per day (bbl/d),reopened after two days, ExxonMobil Reopens Qua IboeTerminal After Brief Shutdown, Platts Commodity News, 14November 2007.52 MEND statement to mass media organisations, signed byDon Pedro, 21 October 2007.53 MEND says it would warn of attacks outside the Delta so asto avoid or minimise civilian casualties.54 Crisis Group interview, Charles Harry, president of IjawRepublican Assembly, Port Harcourt, 26 September 2007.

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    to fight the opposition during the 2003 elections.55 Thesegangs, allegedly recruited for electoral violence in 2003and again in 2007, were said to have retained their armsto now fight each other for local supremacy.56

    3. The criminal hostage-taking industryApart from the politically motivated hostage incidentsfor which MEND has claimed responsibility, a surge incriminal hostage-taking in the region resulted in at leastseventeen kidnappings involving 60 victims between 1June and 10 October 2007.57 Most hostages were abductedin traffic, between homes and work places; others weretaken after attacks, mostly on oil companies. At least twocivilian workers a Nigerian and a Colombian and anunspecified number of police and military have been killedin the process. Some kidnappers claim to be politicallymotivated militants, demanding a better deal for the Delta,

    but are only interested in extorting ransom. A Port Harcourt-based human rights activist said, militancy has becomea cloak for all forms of criminality in the Niger Delta. TheNiger Delta cause has become everything for everybody.58

    Victims have increasingly included elderly relatives ofprominent persons,59 as well as children. The most notablewas Margaret Hill, a three-year-old Briton snatched on 5July from the car taking her to school and released on 8July.60Others have included relatives of local politicians,

    55 Henry Chukwurah et al, Soldiers foil militants kidnapplot,Daily Sun, 11 July 2007, p. 4.56 Crisis Group interviews, civil society leaders and securityofficials, Port Harcourt, 23-27 September 2007. For a detailedaccount of the role of politicians in sponsoring electoral violencein Rivers State, see Criminal Politics: Violence, Godfathers andCorruption in Nigeria, Human Rights Watch, October 2007.57 Reports obtained by Crisis Group, from headquarters of theRivers State Police Command and media, Port Harcourt.58 Crisis Group interview, Anyakwee Nsirimovu, executivedirector of Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,Port Harcourt, 22 September 2007.59 In July 2007, Hansel Seibarugu, 70-year-old mother ofWenipre Seibarugu, speaker of the Bayelsa State Houseof Assembly, was abducted by gunmen at Akaibiri village,Ekpetiama; she was released fifteen days later, to the leadership ofthe states peace and reconciliation committee, headed by JaphethJames, who said no ransom was paid. On 12 September, 30-month-old Nuseiba Usman was abducted from her parents homeby ten gunmen, who invaded the NNPC estate at Eleme, RiversState; an N5 million ($40,000) ransom was demanded but, underintense pressure from the Joint Task Force (JTF) and SSS,the kidnappers abandoned her on a bush path. Her parentsand security officials said no ransom was paid.60 Her father was married to a Nigerian woman and had lived in

    the country for many years. He died shortly after the traumaticincident. On 26 June, Michael Stewart, three-year-old son ofLinda Somiari Stewart, member of the Rivers State Houseof Assembly representing Okrika Constituency, was seized at

    including the mothers of the former Rivers State governor61and a federal legislator.62

    The shift from targeting foreigners, known in the localhostage industry as white gold or Any Time Money(ATM),63 to Nigerians is partly a result of the mass exodus

    of expatriates from the region and stronger security aroundthe remaining few. It is also related to the April 2007election irregularities. After the elections, the cash fromlocal politicians to gangs dried up, compelling criminalsto seek other sources of easy, illicit money. Seizing relativesof local politicians is also revenge for promises made butnot respected by some candidates. On 12 September, whenMike Okiro, inspector general of police, displayed threesuspected kidnappers of 70-year-old Laura Canus, motherof Bayelsa State legislator Yousuo Amalanyo, he advisedpoliticians always to keep promises to campaign workersto avoid similar troubles.64

    Abductions usually follow a pattern: the victim is releasedin exchange for a ransom that may be reduced from anoriginal demand as high as N150 million ($1.2 million)to some N10 million ($80,000).65 Governments in theregion claim they do not pay and only help those doingthe negotiating with logistics. This is disputed. In Ondo

    Tantua International School, Elelenwo, a Port Harcourt suburb.The kidnappers demanded N10 million to N12 million ($80,000to $96,000). He was released four days later, after a reasonable

    ransom was paid. On 12 July, Samuel Amadi, three-year-oldson of Eze Francis Amadi, traditional chief of Iriebe communityoutside Port Harcourt, was snatched by gunmen while beingdriven to school; an N50 million ($400,000) ransom wasdemanded.61 Celestine Omehia. Other abducted parents of local politiciansinclude: the mothers of the speaker of Bayelsa State House ofAssembly, Wenipre Seibarugu, and Bayelsa State legislator,Yousuo Amalanyo; and the fathers of the Rivers State deputyspeaker, Lawrence Nwile, and Bayelsa State legislator, EbionduKomonibo.62 On 19 October 2007, gunmen abducted Madam GoldcoastDickson, 70, mother of Henry Seriake Dickson, a member of the

    House of Representatives representing Sagbama Constituency,Bayelsa State.63 Compared with other criminal enterprises, ransom forexpatriate hostages is said to come as rapidly as the cash fromthe automated teller machines (ATMs) recently installed byseveral Nigerian banks.64 Kingsley Omonobi and Chris Ochayi, I-G tasks politicianson promises to campaign workers, Vanguard, 13 September2007, pp. 1, 15.65 N50 million ($400,000) was demanded for Mrs Seibarugu,mother of the state assembly speaker, see Godwin Ijediogor andWillie Etim, Speakers Kidnapped Mother regains Freedom,The Guardian, 4 August 2007, pp. 1-2. N50 million was

    also demanded for Margaret Hill but Emma Okah, chief presssecretary to the Rivers State governor, said no ransom was paid;Henry Chukwurah, How kidnappers of British kid lost N50mransom,Daily Sun, 10 July 2007, p. 4.

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    State, the government said it paid none of the N500million ($4 million) demanded by those who abductedeleven PDP leaders; the state chapter of the oppositionLabour Party said N25 million ($200,000) was paid.66

    The need for intermediaries able to negotiate with hostage-

    takers in the remote creeks is generating a shadow industryof conflict merchants,67 who take a substantial slice ofthe ransom. A source said, this new layer of profiteersincludes both local and state government officials, plussecurity operatives. It is going to perpetuate the hostage-taking business and make it even more difficult to curb.68

    Some see the government and its 2005 arrest of theNDPVFs Asari as responsible for this proliferation. JoeEvah argued that:

    It was the government that opened the doors to themultiplicity of militant groups in the Niger Delta

    today. When Asari was in control of the creeksin the Niger Delta before his arrest, we didnt havenumerous militant groups in the region. But peoplehave come to see that hostage-taking can fetchthem cheap money.69

    Criminal hostage-taking has drawn considerable criticism,and the abduction of children has been unanimouslycondemned. MEND denounced Margaret Hills kidnappingas an abomination and vowed to search for the abductorsand mete out suitable punishment at the appropriatetime.70 However, it has never identified the culprits

    and nothing further has been heard about the threatenedpunishment. On 22 August, Meinbutu, a pioneer militantgroup in the Warri flank of the Delta, warned those engagedin commercial hostage-taking and other criminal activities itwould make the region uncomfortable for them.71 Thesestatements reflect concern among the politically motivatedmilitants that such acts can squander what goodwillagitators in the Delta have earned over the years and erodeinternational and national support for their cause.

    But kidnapping is spreading beyond Port Harcourt, usedto blackmail people, extort money, recover debts and

    66 Kidnap: Ondo Govt paid N25 million ransom, LP alleges,Daily Sun, 17 September 2007, p. 7.67 This term was used by the Petroleum and Natural Gas SeniorStaff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), in a communiquat the end of its workshop in Calabar, Cross River State, on 30September 2007.68 Crisis Group interview, militant leader, Warri, Delta State,19 September 2007.69 Onyedika Agbedo, Only Credible People from Niger DeltaShould Be In Government, The Guardian, 7 July 2007, p. 60.70 MEND email to selected media organisations in Nigeria, 6July 2007.71 Lucky Oji, Meinbutu group warns hostage takers, Vanguard,23 August 2007, p. 7.

    exact vengeance. For instance, on 12 July gunmen seizedseven staff of a dredging company in Onitsha, AnambraState.72 On 9 October, workers abducted eleven Indianexpatriate staff to compel the Ajaokuta Steel CompanyLimited (ASCL) in Kogi State (500km from Port Harcourt)to improve work conditions.73 Developments in the Delta

    may be encouraging emergence of a new genre of crimeacross the country.

    B. REVENUE LOSS AND ECONOMICDESTABILISATION

    In May, immediately following the elections, violence inthe Delta cut Nigerias crude oil output by nearly 1 millionbbl/d, plunging production to its lowest level since early2003.74 On 27 June, Ann Pickard, vice president forexploration and production, said Royal Dutch Shell Plc

    had dropped plans to resume operations in the westernNiger Delta in 2007.75 On 8 July, Funsho Kupolokun,then managing director of the NNPC, disclosed the countrywas still losing 600,000 barrels of oil daily because ofconflict and insecurity in the Delta.76

    These disruptions have reduced both export revenue andthe amount going to the federation account. The NationalBureau of Statistics reports that, due to the Delta unrest,merchandise trade for the second quarter of 2007 was2.47 trillion ($19.8 billion), a decrease of N208.4 billion($1.7 billion, 7.8 per cent) from the years first quarter.

    Over the same period, the balance of trade declined6.8 per cent, to N850.5 billion ($6.8 billion). In spite ofsoaring prices, the value of oil exports for the quarter wasN1.61 trillion ($12.9 billion), a decrease of 5.8 percentover the first quarter.77 If this trend persists, it couldeventually affect the countrys economic stability.

    72 John Ameh, Gunmen kidnap seven persons in Onitsha,Saturday Punch, 14 July 2007, p. 12.73 Yakubu Lawal, Ajaokuta workers release kidnapped child, 11expatriates, The Guardian, 15 October 2007, p. 15. For some other

    indications of the recent spread of kidnappings beyond the coreNiger Delta, see for instance: in Calabar, Anietie Akpan, Policeparade suspected killer of kidnapped kid, The Guardian, 19October 2007, p.64; and in Aba, Vincent Ujumadu, Kidnappersabduct dons wife in Abia, Vanguard, 22 October 2007, p. 12.74 Oil Market Report, International Energy Agency, June 2007;Richard Swann and Edward Ugboma, Attacks Shut in 170,000b/d More in Nigeria; Bonny Light Outage Brings Total near900,000 b/d as Violence Escalates, Platts Oilgram News,16 May 2007; and Bumpy Start for Nigerias New President,Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 4 June 2007.75 Hector Igbikiowubo, 500,000 bpd Nigeria crude to remainshut-in through 2007, Vanguard, 28 June 2007, pp. 1, 15.76 Collins Olayinka and Lewis Asubiojo, Niger Delta crisiscost Nigeria 600,000 barrels of oil daily, The Guardian, 9July 2007, p. 3.77 Niger Delta crises cause N208 bn drop in foreign trade

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    Nigeria, Africas biggest producer, has a daily crude oiloutput of 2.6 million bbl/d at peak production78 but unrestin the Delta since the start of 2006 has reduced oil outputby about 17 per cent.79 Less vulnerable offshore productionis growing it currently is 900,000bbl/d but eventuallycould add 500,000bbl/d. The International Energy Agency

    and the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimatethat daily output could exceed three million barrels if thegovernment restores security.80 Meanwhile, however, theNiger Delta crisis is undercutting Nigerias influencein the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC), where under normal conditions, it would be thethird, not the sixth largest producer.

    C. EXPATRIATE AND INVESTMENT FLIGHTThe worsened security situation in the Niger Delta has

    prompted a massive exodus of foreign personnel. Someof the major oil companies have evacuated most of theirexpatriate staff. At the first Rivers State stakeholdersmeeting on 21 August 2007, then Governor Omehia warnedthat the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)was planning to relocate its major businesses from PortHarcourt to Lagos. If the countrys largest oil companypulls its headquarters out of the state, its subsidiaries willfollow, increasing unemployment, poverty and hunger.

    Lonestar Drilling Company, a Shell contractor, did notwait: in early July it evacuated 120 employees from theNembe area of Bayelsa State after five of its expatriateswere abducted from Soku in Akuku-Toru local GovernmentArea, Rivers State.81 In mid-June Nigerian Agip OilCompany (NAOC) evacuated all of its workers fromBayelsa State, following militants threats to attack itsObama flow station and avenge the killings of Ijaw youthby soldiers at Ogbainbiri a week earlier.82 The mostdangerous areas have been abandoned by oil companyoperators, said Francis Perrin of the publicationArab Oiland Gas. Despite the election of a new president in April,we dont have the impression the government has the

    means to find a lasting solution.

    83

    value,Businessday, 23 August 2007, pp. 1-2.78 International Petroleum Monthly, U.S. Energy InformationAdministration, October 2007; in recent years, though, monthlyaverages have not exceeded 2.5 million bbl/d.79 Ibid, comparing peak months in 2005 with the June 2007 low.80 The governments target is four million barrels a day in 2010.81 Kelvin Ebiri, Oil Firm evacuates 120 workers over militantsthreats, The Guardian, 10 July 2007, p. 95.82 Kelvin Ebiri, Agip Evacuates Workers from Bayelsa, TheGuardian, 30 June 2007, p. 7.83 Nigeria loses ground in OPEC in face of unrest, AgenceFrance-Presse, 1 October 2007.

    The exodus is not limited to oil companies. Followingattacks on their residential quarters in March and June,when twelve staff were kidnapped, and after 203 Indianstaff had fled the state, the Eleme Petro-chemical Companyshut operations on 23 June.84Most major road-buildingand construction companies have seen their work in the

    region halted by militants and other gunmen.

    A 9 July 2007 document, prepared for President YarAduaby the permanent secretary in the federal ministry oftransportation, Nuuman Barau Dambatta, indicated thatmilitants and criminals had seriously hampered work onnine major projects, worth N266 billion ($2.2 billion).These were in Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Imoand Anambra States and were now mostly suspendeddue to the deteriorating level of insecurity of lives andproperty in the region as a result of kidnappings and otherviolent activities of the militants and some communities.85

    Citing a 12 June memo informing YarAdua that theconstruction company, Julius Berger Plc, had withdrawnfrom Port Harcourt International Airport, it added thatmost companies now demanded additional payments underthe special risk clause of the Standard Conditions ofContract. Those demands may make it even more difficultfor governments to deliver on the major infrastructureprojects needed to transform the region.

    Banks are increasingly reluctant to give loans to companiesin the region. Kenneth Donye, chairman of the Akewa

    Group of Companies, which recently acquired Burutu Portin Delta State under the Obasanjo privatisation program,says his company has been turned down by seven banksfor the N3 billion ($24 million) needed to moderniseobsolete facilities.86 International aid is also being lost.On 17 October, the Netherlands ambassador, Arie van derWiel, said the insecurity in the Delta is the major obstacleto Dutch efforts to improve infrastructure. Without bettersecurity, the region will not receive the capital it needsto sustain development.

    84 Soni Daniel, 203 Indians Flee Rivers; Eleme PetrochemicalShut Down, Saturday Independent, 23 June 2007, pp. 1-A2.85 Suspension of Work on Major Projects in the Ministry locatedin Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Anambra and Imo StatesDue to Pervasive Insecurity and Youth Restiveness, FederalMinistry of Transport, Memo Ref. No.WR.14505/V.I./216 dated9 July 2007, Abuja. The listed projects are: rehabilitation of thePort Harcourt International Airport; dualisation of the East-WestRoad Sections I, II, III and IV; completion of dualisation work onthe Benin-Warri Road; construction of Eleme Junction flyoverand dualisation of access road to Onne Port; construction ofBodo-Bonny Road; and dualisation of Owerri-Onitsha Road.

    Emeka Madunagu, Insecurity stalls projects in Niger Delta,Anambra FG, Saturday Punch, 14 July 2007, p. 8.86 Emma Amaize, N-Delta Crisis: Banks withhold loans frominvestors, Vanguard, 15 October 2007, p. 10.

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    IV. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TOTHE SECURITY CRISIS

    A. DEPLOYING THE JTF:NECESSARY BUTINSUFFICIENT

    In response to the August fighting in Port Harcourt, thefederal government sent the Joint Task Force (JTF) military, police and other security services to the city.Hundreds of soldiers have been deployed to assist thepolice in maintaining law and order in the city and itsenvirons. Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Luka Yusufindicated this deployment may stretch beyond the initialsix months.87 The state government imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew, which has kept gangs off the streets atnight and ended the nocturnal battles.

    Most Port Harcourt residents applaud these steps. Manybelieve reported cases of human rights abuses by soldiersare an acceptable price for restoring a semblance of peaceto a city under criminal siege. Some, however, argue thatresults have been limited. According to the executivedirector of Civitas Nigeria, the military has done a good

    job, in the sense that it has reduced the power of one of thegroups that featured prominently in the violence, but ithas not solved the problem because there are many groupsinvolved.88 The executive director of the Institute forHuman Rights and Humanitarian Law in Port Harcourt

    notes that:

    None of the leaders of the gangs has been arrested sofar. And this raises the question: how do the kingpinsalways escape before the military storms their bases?Do they get tipped by insiders? As long as these guysare still hanging around, they remain potential threatsto the security of the environment.89

    Ending gang violence in the city and in Rivers State asa whole requires a more comprehensive response thanchasing the criminals out of their Port Harcourt waterfront

    bases. Crisis Group was repeatedly told that fighting thegangs is a superficial response to a deeply rooted problem:

    The gunmen in Port Harcourt are not militants butpolitically sponsored thugs and gangs. Fighting them,without getting to the politicians who formed andcontinually sponsor them is like trimming the leavesand branches of the tree while the stem and roots

    87 Deji Elumoye and Juliana Taiwo, PH: Troops May RemainBeyond 6 Months, ThisDay, 21 August 2007, pp. 1, 6.88 Crisis Group interview, Nimi Walson-Jack, executive director

    of Civitas Nigeria, Port Harcourt, 26 September 2007.89 Crisis Group interview, Anyakwee Nsirimovu, executivedirector of Institute for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,Port Harcourt, 22 September 2007.

    are still left firmly on ground. And unless we getto the roots of the matter, it is only a matter of timebefore more groups will emerge, with probablygreater strength and firepower than we experiencedin the recent past.90

    If there is to be a permanent end to gang violence, ajudicial inquiry is needed into what went wrong in RiversState that led to the mushrooming of these groups from1999 to 2007.

    On 18 September, a largely Ijaw group, the Niger DeltaElders, led by the Ijaw nationalist Edwin Clarke, met withYarAdua to impress on him the need for effective handlingof the Rivers State crisis. It alleged that most of the principalofficers of the state government were known cultists,who recruited and financed the activities of the over 103cult gangs in the state91 and called on the president to

    set up an investigating panel. YarAdua indicated thefederal government was prepared to investigate, askedClarke to put the allegations in writing and promised thatif the need was confirmed, he would set up a judicialcommission of inquiry.

    Many in the region do not think any further investigationis needed for the president to set up the commission: Allhe needs to do is to ask those who served as commissionersof police or directors of the State Security Service (SSS)in the state since 1999 to brief him and then the courageto set the inquiry going. Even if confronted with the

    evidence, it is doubtful YarAdua will support a processthat could reveal much that would be prejudicial aboutgovernance in Rivers State and its post-1999 PDP leadership.

    Yet, an inquiry is imperative. A judicial probe wouldexplain the gangs emergence and put names to some ofthe bloodiest incidents that have occurred in the state overthe past eight years.92 The sponsors need to be publiclyidentified and prosecuted. Such steps would discouragecriminality and violence not only in Rivers State but alsoacross the entire region.

    B. DEMOLITION OF THE WATERFRONTSThe state governments longer-term strategy for riddingPort Harcourt of criminal gangs involves demolishing

    90 Crisis Group interview, civil society leader, Port Harcourt,25 September 2007.91 The cults, as they are called in Nigeria, are essentiallycriminal organisations, some sponsored by, or allied to, localpoliticians; initiation processes usually involve ritual activities

    by which members swear an oath of allegiance, secrecy andsolidarity.92 Crisis Group interview, Charles Harry, president of IjawRepublican Assembly, Port Harcourt, 25 September 2007.

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    the waterfronts, slum communities where most of thecriminals live and violence has occurred. On 21 August2007, then Governor Omehia announced the decision totear down 25 such communities for an urban renewalprogram and to dislodge the hoodlums using them ashiding places and landing points. 93 This announcement

    threatened to rekindle old ethnic animosities.

    The two significant ethnic groups in Port Harcourt andenvirons are the traditionally riverine Ijaws, the majorityof waterfront residents, and the Ikwerres from the upland.The Ijaw perceived the demolition plan as an attempt byOmehia, an upland Ikwerre, to remove them from the city;they warned the demolition would generate large-scaledisplacement and disrupt lifestyles and livelihoods.Leaders accused Omehia and some senior officials of hisadministration of having links to armed gangs involved inthe August fighting; said they had no confidence in his

    ability to manage the crisis; and called on YarAdua toproclaim emergency rule in Rivers State he said it wasnot yet warranted94 to force Omehia to hand power to apresidential appointee for at least six months.95 OmehiasIkwerre kinsmen rejected the call and welcomed theproposal to demolish the waterfronts and rid the city ofmilitia fighters.96

    The Omehia government sought to reassure citizens of itsgood intentions by promising 6,000 new housing unitswould be built in place of the shacks currently in the areato accommodate some of the displaced. The governor

    designated his deputy, Tele Ikoku, an Ijaw, to work outthe details of the project.

    The 50,000 to 100,000 estimated residents of the waterfrontcommunities would face humanitarian difficulties and therisk of human rights abuse if demolition goes ahead. Ourfears stem from the fact that residents of most of thewaterfronts, especially the Okrikas97 who have forgenerations lived all their lives in these waterfronts andfishing settlements as original aborigines, will becomehomeless, explained Miebaka Biapuka, spokespersonof the Okrika Ethnic Nationality Survival Organisation.

    For the residents of these waterfront slums, who have

    93 Address by Sir Celestine Omehia, governor of Rivers State,second session, Rivers State Stakeholders Meeting, PortHarcourt, 21 August 2007..94 Madu Onuorah, YarAdua rules out emergency rule inRivers, The Guardian, 31 August 2007.95 Who are the cultists in Rivers State Why Celestine Omehiashould step down for peace and stability to be restored in RiversState, statement by Niger Delta Elders, signed by Chief Clark

    and secretary of the Forum, Dr M.P. Okonny, 26 August 2007.96 Statement by Committee of Rivers Patriots, signed by TamunoTonye-Princewill, 27 August 2007.97 The Okrika are an Ijaw sub-group.

    borne much of the brunt of the fighting, it would be a cruelblow for them to have to lose their homes as well.98

    In his 18 September meeting with the Niger Delta Elders,YarAdua promised to initiate dialogue with the stategovernment to resolve the issue peacefully. Following

    the nullification of Omehias governorship,99

    the newgovernor, Rotimi Amechi, suspended the demolition plansand promised a review. If the state government eventuallygoes ahead without much wider consultation and credibleplanning, it could drive Rivers State into serious ethnicconflict. The Ijaw leader, Clarke, charged hyperbolicallythat trying to move the people from their ancestral landwould amount to cultural genocide. It would be just likewhat is happening in Sudanand these are some of thethings that led to the outbreak of the First and SecondWorld Wars.100

    One pro-Ijaw group, GAND, has already served noticethat it will invade communities in the upland area if thegovernment proceeds with the demolition and vowed thatits men will defend these waterfronts till we die.101 Anarmed confrontation could transform some of the violentgangs in the region into ethnic armies, earning themlegitimacy among their people and making them evenmore difficult to control.

    Such a confrontation is avoidable. If the Rivers Stategovernment proceeds, it must ensure that the demolitionand relocation of waterfront communities is preceded

    by detailed preliminary work and implemented within aframework of comprehensive urban development. Theproject must also be carried out in a humane and orderlymanner, with minimum humanitarian consequences anddue respect for the cultural rights of the ethnic communitieslong resident in those settlements. The federal governmentshould provide special funds to assist the Rivers Stategovernment in carrying out what would clearly amountto major urban development, so as to minimise thesuffering of the displaced and prevent the initiative fromstimulating new ethnic conflicts.

    C. STRENGTHENING SECURITYARRANGEMENTS

    The government has also taken steps to enhance theeffectiveness of security agencies. The Rivers Statecommissioner of police, Felix Ogbaudu, says the police

    98 Nigeria: Demolition plans bring new ethnic twist to PortHarcourt conflict, IRIN Lagos, 28 August 2007.99 The April 2007 election of Celestine Omehia was nullified

    by an election court.100 Ben Agande and Jemitola Onoyume, YarAdua vows toprobe P-Harcourt crisis, Vanguard, 19 September 2007, pp.1, 15101 Ibid, p. 15.

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    have all they need to stop armed conflict and combat crimein the region: Government has empowered us more thanever before. A lot of logistics support has been provided forus. So, we are a lot stronger now.102 The army, which wasdrafted to help police in quelling the Port Harcourt violence,has redeployed some troops from the now relatively calm

    Warri axis to concentrate on more volatile Port Harcourt.The navy has moved most of its serviceable boats from theeastern port of Calabar to the creeks around Port Harcourt.In recent months, police, army and other security agencieshave shown greater alertness and a more pro-active stance,which has helped block some gang attacks on thewaterways.

    Yet, continuing incidents indicate that more needs to bedone to minimise conflict and improve security. Pointingto the critical deficiencies, a senior police officer in DeltaState told Crisis Group:

    Our numbers need to be increased, our men needto be better trained for operations in the creeks, weneed to be better equipped to carry on our duties,and we need greater cooperation from the localpeople. We say these things over and over againbut we dont ever get the desired response fromthe authorities and the people. I dont mean theInspector General; Im talking about the politicalauthorities and the people in this region.103

    The operation in Rivers State since August 2007 has also

    stretched military resources. In August, the army chiefcomplained to the minister of state for defence, FideliaAkuabata Njeze, that equipment was running low; the forcewas fully involved in internal security but without beingsupported with additional logistics. Brigadier GeneralSarkin-Yaki Bello, commander of the 2 AmphibiousBrigade and chairman of the JTF in Port Harcourt, saidhis operations have been inhibited by lack of equipmentand proper medical arrangements.104

    The navy, which shares with the police the challenge ofcombating crime on the waterways and high seas, is

    similarly handicapped. On 3 October 2007, Chief of NavalStaff Vice Admiral Ganiyu Adekeye testified to a Senatecommittee that it was under-equipped to fight militants andcriminals in the Delta. In small arms, which are mostrelevant to the challenges posed by militants, pipelinevandalism and hostage-taking, our reserve is almostzero.105 The shortfall results from the armys insistence

    102 Anayochukwu Agbo and Klem Ofuokwu, The Battle isNot Over Yet, TELL, 3 September 2007, p. 34.103 Crisis Group interview, senior police officer, Warri, Delta

    State, 18 September 2007.104George Onah, Bakassi: Cameroon hasnt accused Nigeria,says Azazi, Vanguard, 17 November 2007.105 Adekeye elaborated:We don't have any AK-47 rifles in our

    that it must control the weapons for land combat, leavingthe navy and airforce only a minimal number. The situationin the Delta calls for greater flexibility and bettercoordination between the services.

    One way of blocking the creeks and intercepting the

    movements of militants into Port Harcourt would be to usefloating platforms but the navy chief said, most of ourplatforms are aged. Most of them entered the fleet in the1980s, and presently they require repairs and major refitto make them operational.106 The police, army and navyall need better equipment, particularly to intensify anti-bunkering activities and curb the influx of arms. Long-termcommitment to regional security requires specialised policeunits and equipment. The capacity of Delta police alsoneeds to be boosted considerably by development of aspecial marine component to improve security on theinland waterways. This should further be complemented

    by better collaboration with both private and community-based security elements, for example to ensure timelyinvestigation and prosecution of hostage-taking and othercriminal acts.

    reserve.What we do is that any time there is need for us tomake use of these weapons, we run to our sister service, thearmy, for them to loan us these weapons.Navy is alwayshaving casualties in Niger Delta because we are the ones goingafter the militants in the sea and the least equipped. A case inpoint is when our patrol boat went after a group of militants inthe sea. We later found out that while they had five[m]achineguns, our patrol boat had two. Their firepower outweighed ourown and they escaped.We cannot deploy our warships withthe heavy firepower to those areas to combat these problems or

    it will mean wiping out the towns and villages in the NigerDelta. Kingsley Omonobi, Why we suffer casualties in NigerDelta, by Adekeye, Vanguard, 4 October 2007, p. 7.106 Ibid.

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    V. DEALING WITH THE POLITICALCAUSES

    The YarAdua government particularly needs to focusmore vigorously on the issues that have been at the coreof conflicts in the region: good governance, infrastructuredevelopment, economic empowerment of the local people,and legislative and constitutional reforms.

    A. PREPARING THE SUMMITThe Niger Delta summit still represents a good opportunityto craft the political process necessary to ease the tensionsand show the federal governments dedication to endingthe crisis and addressing its root causes. The preparationsneed to be credible and inclusive and avoid the usualpitfalls of communal rivalry and patronage.

    The president should appoint a special envoy mandated toconsult with both the armed and non-armed representativesof the Delta, including womens groups, on participation inthe summit and its agenda. The envoy should have strongmoral authority, be from civil society and, to avoid theappearance of having a direct stake in the conflicts, comefrom another region of the country. He or she should discussin particular the recommendations of the Ogomudia report,which Obasanjo ignored in 2005, along with the declarationsand other manifestos articulated by various groups in theNiger Delta. The envoy should also be mandated to proposechanges to the mandate and statutory composition of thepeace and reconciliation committees, so they bring in allstakeholders, including women, and become an efficienttool for conflict prevention, management and resolutionin the region.

    It is essential that the government simultaneously halt allefforts to divide or co-opt the armed group leaders andinstead encourage them to develop a common positionfrom which to articulate a realistic political agenda during

    the consultations and the summit. The government needsreliable interlocutors and should try to counteractfragmentation of the armed groups and their transformationinto criminal gangs. A confidence-building measure andsignal of commitment to end the Delta crisis would be tobegin infrastructure development, security assessments andother measures already agreed to in the region immediately,as preliminaries to the summit.

    The government should also appoint a federal prosecutorat once to institute a judicial inquiry into Delta violence,including recent events in Port Harcourt, and to target the

    involvement of state and local government officialsin assassinations and hostage-taking, with a view toprosecuting politicians who have sponsored gangs since1999.

    B. IMPLEMENTING THE DEVELOPMENTMASTER PLAN

    To restore the credibility of his pledge to end the crisis,YarAdua needs to act fast on the Niger Delta DevelopmentMaster Plan he inherited from his predecessor and whichis estimated to require about $50 billion over fifteenyears. There is an immediate need to overcome fundingproblems that for six years have hampered the NDDC,the commission that will have to implement it.107 Underthe law that created it, the NDDC should have receivedmore than N500 billion ($4 billion) in that period fromthe federal government and the oil majors operating inthe region. Instead it has received only N239 billion($1.9 billion). The president needs to make good quicklyhis promise to release the outstanding federal funds and torequire the companies to make good on their obligations.108

    A loophole in the NDDCs 2000 law, which states thatcorporate contributors are to be oil and gas processingcompanies, is partly responsible for the $300 millionshortfall in corporate funding. Some companies haveargued they are involved only in shipment and marketing,not processing. For example, the Nigerian LiquefiedNatural Gas Company (NLNG) has never contributedto the commission and has obtained a court ruling inits favour because it is not involved in processing. TheNational Assembly needs urgently to amend the NDDCAct to facilitate collection of future corporate funding;

    specifically, the provision for corporate entities tocontribute 3 per cent of their budget to the commissionshould be extended to cover corporations involved inany oil-related business in the Delta.

    The federal government has declared 2008 the year forstarting implementation of the master plan. A crucial firststep should be to release immediately all outstanding fundsdue to the NDDC since 2001 and clearly identify all moneyallocated to the commission in the 2008 budget. Fast-tracking the work of the NDDC is imperative and willrequire improved collaboration between the commission and

    state governments in the region. It is also essential toprioritise the plans job-creation elements. Evah of theIjaw Monitoring Group suggested the federal governmentshould provide special incentives for establishment of

    107 The commission was set up by the federal governmentin 2001 to fast-track the socio-economic and infrastructuredevelopment of the Niger Delta.108 Chinedum Emeana, NDDC records 52% funding deficit

    in 5 years, Financial Standard, 15 October 2007. The NDDCis owed some $2.1 billion for the past six years, including $1.8billion from the federal government and $300 million from theoil companies.

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    oil-related small- and medium-sized industries.109 Startingsuch projects quickly in areas free of violence would havea positive impact on youth.

    But job creation as a means of weaning youth from crimeand violence will achieve only limited results unless

    accompanied by vigorous programs designed t