c0562r705

Director ofCentralIntelligence

National Intehigence Estimate

This Notionol Intehigence Estimate representsthc views of the Director of Central Intelligencewith the advice and assistancc of theUS Intelligence C.ommunity.',

nL-J

;,50;.NiE Z3/ I

ii:Ei; i ETn ySE'\tiOR i-iEViEt{jViA D.li r.:E,rii0r-tE

Combatant Forces in theFormer Yugoslavial-l

Volume I-Ihe Estimate

r3

FA'\i@Tny-f

i

4ii-{iii

NIE 93.23/IJune 1993

Copy 41,L

I

(b)(1)(b)(3)

PPROVED FOR RELEASETIDATE: 01-31-2011

c0r:2I7 05bnot-

Director ofCenta!Intelligence

Volume I-The Estimate

NIE 93-23 /I

Combttant Forces in theFormer Yugoslavia (c NF)

-sEtts

June 1993

c0552I705\tLlnt\ :r-----

I. L_ -__J

Figure fEthnic Composition in the Former Yugoslavia

Undessified

C-ombatent fortcs in lhe staGr of ttc foroerYqgoshvir

Cloefn Bcnbanl Hcrg?oJim Scrbiaandl&4ggCrootftmArocdForccs S."da1s"tt@ Vugoet vAIDGdFotEGa-Kniine Scrb Army Bosoilu Army (Mutrm)

C,mdiao Dcfcrrc Fottcs GM)In &itiot+ gltu ld0,m t&rls W' fu, odlilttslin inegiars an or'Yr,vc h M otut AWtAo.

c0562I705-Sgerct

Key Judgments

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goals and ethnic rivalries, thebelligerents in the former Yugoslavia are capable of continuing thefighting for at lcast another yearrl-l

The offensive capabilities of the Yagoslav, Armed Forces are superiorto those of its neighbors:

. The capabilities of Yugoslav armored and mechanized forces surpassthose of neighboring republics; Belgrade would enjoy air supremacyin renewed fighting.

. Except against Macedonia,.limited logistic capabilities would con-strain Yugoslav ground force operations beyond border areas.l.-,]

Despite substantial impiovcments, Croatian Ground Forces lack heavyweapons and suffer from training and leadership weaknesses; Croatiahas virtually no air force:

. The Crcatian Armcd Forces can retake portions of Serb-held territo-ry but cannot completely defeat Serb forces.

. Croatian forces would have difficulty resisting Yugoslav airstrikes orfederal attempts to seize additional territory.f----l

The Bosnian Sefi Army(BSA) can hold virtually all its gains in Bosniaagainst local forces. It can take all remaining Muslim-held areas,.butpn[qt significant military and political costs it prefcrs not to incur.

Crmtian Defense Forces (HYO) can, with the help of the Croatianarmy, hold current gains and take additional territory from theBosnian Government.

TIrc Bosnian Army can neither hold its territory against determinedoffensives nor rctake lost ground; without substantial external support,it will slowly deteriorate |

--ljugoslayia" and "Yugoolav" relcr to the rump fcdcral statc comprising Scrbia and Montcnegro.

br*NrE 93-23fiJune 1993

lll

c0562I705

lVestern InterventionWestern intervention to enforce an agreed peace plan, to create andprotect safehavens, or to enforce a partition of Bosnia could requiremilitary action to roll back territorial gains andf or disarm combatantforces. These rolcs would require a large-scale deployment of ground

' forces.f--l

' The BSA would resist a Western intervention to roll back Serbterritorial iains or disarm the BSA but would quickly disintegratc;some of its forces would bcgin sustained guerrilla action againstWestern forces:

. The BSA would harass but tolerate an intervention that left its forcesin place.,f-l

The Bosnian Army views Western intervention as its bcst hope forsurvival; under some circumstances local Bosnian forces could clashwith Western forces, but they would be quickly overwhelmed.l----l

Croatian and HVO forces would avoid confronting Western forces, butlocal clashes could occur as they exploited outside intervention for localadvantage.

In the event of Western military intervention in Bosnia, Belgradewould engage Western forces directly only if they attacked Yugoslavterritory or forces.f-l

ivBEcIEF

c05 62I7 05

Scope Note

In May, 1993,2 the Intelligence Community judged that implementa-tion of the Vance-Owen Plan would require a large, open-endedcommitment of ground forces rivaling in scale and duration the postarmistice effort in Korea by the United Nations and that:

Nonc of thc partics can match a NATO-lcd force opcrating under rulcs of engagementtbat allow all ncccssary means to enforce the Plan. Under such circumstances, assumingcarly challcngas wcrc mct with forcc, fighting would bc reduccd and humanitarianproblcms mitigatcd.. But tcrrorist campaigns are possiblc within and outsidc thc lormerYugoslavia. Evcn a single attack could causc a targc numbcr of casualticsf-l

International military operations in Bosnia undcr any plan will bc difficult to organizeand deploy:

. Issucs of command and control, rulcs of engagcment, levels of troop contributions, andcost sharing rcmain unresolved.

. Whilc capablc of making modest additional contributions, NATO allics would cxpcctthc United States !o commit a major sharc of troopa to an international force, as wellas logistic, strategic lift, and intclligencc support.

. UN forcag will have to supewisc and cnforce demilitarization and troop withdrawalsand monitor hcavy wcaponry, intcrnal routcs, and cxtcrnal fronticrs.

. UN forccs also will havc to assumc major rcsponsibilitics for rcfugccs and displaccdpcrsons, civil administration, and rcbuilding effOrts in thc arcas theV occunVfl

This National Intelligence Estimate does not assess specific scenariosin comparable detail but rather examines the.armed forces of thecombatants in the Yugoslav conflict and prcscnts summary assess-ments of their current military capabilities against one another, againstneighboring states, and against a large-scalc Western intervention.Additional details conccrning the capabilities of the combatant forceswill be.presented in Volume II, Supporting Analysis, to be published.

tt

2 sec NIE g}zzM May I 993, prospects for nor-ol--l

3aror

c0562I705al

Sources for the Estimate

Our ability to asseJ.r the status and cnpa-bilities of the armed forces in Yugoslaviahas improved substantially since early1992. In the cases of the Croatian ArmedForces, Bosnian Serb Army, BosnianArmy, Croatian Ddense Forces, and theKrajina Serb Army, obsenation of over ayear of combat has increased our under-standins of how each force is organizedand its strengths and weaknesses..simi-larly, the Yugoslav army's interyention ineastern Bosnia and support for the Bosni-an Serbs afforded additional iruights intoits operational capabilitiesl

I

vibtq

c0562L705

o

ISCUSSTOn

Eer'ch

Motivated by irreconcilable territorial goalsand ethnic rivalries, the belligerents in theformer Yugoslavia can continue fighting forat least a year. The capabilities of theirforces, however, vary greatly. Even withinindividual armies some units may consist ofwell-trained, professional soldiers, whileothers are poorly trained militias that dependon reservists and irregulars. Moreover, nei-ther the warring republics nor factional lead-ers within Bosnia have firm political or oper-ational control over these armed groups.

[----]L___l

Capabilities Against One Another

The Yugoslav MilitaryThe Yugoslav military's offensive capabili-ties are superior to those of the armed forcesof any other forrner Yugoslav republic inlarge part because the federal military hasrnore rnen and equipment and the only effec-tive air force. The federal government hasoverhauled the arrned forces after their ineptperforrnance in l99l-92 to introduc e a com-bined arms structure, replace aging equip-ment, and improve training, Belgrade hasalso created an ethnically cohesive force bypurging non-Serbs from rnilitary ranls. Themilitary logistics system, however, remainscapable of providing only limited support tomobile or extended operations.l---l

The Yugoslav military doctrine no longerdepends on a partisan war by the civilianpopulation. Against an invading force, themilitary intends to employ the army's

increasingly professional light infantry andmotorized brigades in protracted infantryoperations. fn combat against Croatia,Yugoslav ground forces would be most effec-tive in Slavonia, where they could take ad-vantage of good roads, flat terrain, and easyaccess to supplies and reinforcements innorthern Serbia. Although small federalunits have intervened in Bosnia and Herze-govina and in the Krajina, larger federalformations would have difficulty fighting inthe Krajina or invading Albania and otherneighboring states because of distanco, ter-rain, and poor lines of communication. Fu-ture ground force operations would be moreeffective than in l99l-921

|

The Yugoslav Navy was most affected bythe breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Withthe loss of rnore than 90 percent of itscoastline, Yugoslavia was forced to relocatevirtually the entire fleet to two bases in theKotor Bay. Personnel losses resulting fromthe breakup affected all ranks-from spe-cialists to the senior leadership. The Navywas inactive for most of I 992, but has inrecent exercises been able to sortie most ofits ships sirnultaneously, suggesting that it'has overcome many of its logistic and person-nelproblerrnThe Yugoslav Air Force controls almost allof the former federal aircraft. Its leadersclaim to have two pilots for each aircraft,and reports indicate an adequate pool oftrained support personnel. Most pilots are

c05511R5

unfamiliar with advanced air combat, buttraining sorties have increased in recentmonths, suggesting an arnelioration of logis-tics and aircraft readiness problems. The AirForce also has sought to improve aircraftsurvivability through dispersal and has in-creased training for night operations.

__lThe Bosnian Serb Armywith its superior firepower and organization,the Bosnian Serb Arrny (BSA) controls thedirection and scope of the conflict in Bosniaand Herzegovina. The BSA took over rnostof the arrns and munitions of the formerYugoslav People's Army (JNA) stored inBosnia, and these stockpiles are sufficient formonths of combat at current levels. The BSAis largely self-sufficient in most other mili-tary consu.rnables, but it has relied on Bel-grade-mostly for deliveries of fuel andtransportation assistance. If Belgrade followsthrough with its recent prornise to cut off aidto the Bosnian Serbs, the BSA's mobilitywould gradually decline.f--l

BSA military capabilities and rnorale havenot yet been tested by a capable enemy.Most BSA fighters are not military profes-sionals; rather, they are locally recruitedtroops whose morale is only fair, particularlywhen they are deployed away from theirhomes. Morale in engaged BSA units fellsharply in the face of unexpectedly strongMuslim attacks in eastern Bosnia earlier thisyear. The BSA suffers from a shortage ofinfantry, which is spread thin across Bosniaand Herzegovina, conducting a series ofsieges chara cterized by thin siege lines sup-ported by overwhekning artillery superiority.Consequently, BSA leaders follow a cautiousstrategy, avoiding direct attacks in favor of

Jolsgistlv or tactically complicated sieges.tl

Sanctions and the Yugoslav ArmedForces

International sanctions on Yugoslaviaare having little effect on the federalarmy. Belgrade apparently has suffi-cient fuel for its forces and has largestocks of weapons and munitions.Moreover, the reduction of the armyand creation of a large surplus of equifment provided Belgrade with a substan-tial stock of replacement systems andparts. Belgrade cnn call on civilian as-sets, especially trucks and vehicles, tokeep its forces going. SAnctions, even tfrisidly enforced, will not begtn to biteunless the army operates a large prbportion of its forces in combat for anextendtllg4od, depleting milit aryspares

A Yugoslav military response to West-ern naval sanctions and embargo optera-tions in the Adriatic would be con-strained by Yugoslav naval inferiorttyand would focus on operations thatpenetrate their territorial waters. Theymight attempt to confront Western na-val forces by escorting sanctions viola-tors, mining their territorial waters, orusing coastal cruise missile batteries tothreaten Western naval units. On theDanube, surrounding states are vulner-able to Yugoslav political and economiccounterpressures; they also have beenimplicitly threatened with Yugoslavmilitary retaliation-a threat they findcrediblt.l_]

c0562I705

The Yagoslav Militot!, the State,and the People

Although the Yugoslav federal constitu-tion asserts civilian control of the mili-tary, the armed forces remain an indepen-dent center of power. The federalpresident is nominally commander inqhid, exercising power through a SupremeDefense Council consisting of himseU andthe republic presidents. In fact, he hasIittle control over the armed forces. Con-sequently, the military has wide latitudeto pursue its own concepts of Yugoslavnational int e res t s. [jConditioned to centralization and au-thoritarianism, the officer corps is sympa-thetic to nationalist hardliners, who Arecompeting for their support. The AirForce is the most stridently nationalistand aggressive of Belgrade's armed forces,and has taken an inueasingly independentstance. Preservation of the military's priv-ileged status is, however, also a principalconcern, and the ofrcer corps probablybelieves Milosevic will guard the mili-tary's interests. The military leadershiphas avoided becoming the arbiter of drmestic political disputes.r r

Commanders are taking steps to enhancepublic support for the armed forces. Themilitary leadership believes popular willto resist aggression is the bedrock ofYugoslav ddenrer. Early in 1992, pollinsdata suggested substantial popular sup-port for the armed forces-over 50 percenlof the Serb population were very satitfiedwith the army's operations; more than 55percent voiced confidence in the army inDecember 1992, a hisher approval ratingthan that of any political party. Support isstrongest, however, for the defense of ter-ritory, which the Serbs view as clearlytheirs, and would almost certainly in-crease, should the West attack Serbiaproper. As in 199/,, however, public sup-port would undoubtedly fall, should themilitary become mired in a cortflict overregions in which Serbs are in the minority.

t__l

Nevertheless, the BSA can hold virtually allof the territory it currently controls in Bosniaand Herzegovina. It is also capable of con-quering remaining Muslim-held areas, al-though only at a substantial military andpolitical cost. Because the Serbs controlmuch of the flow of civilian supplies intoMuslim areas, they can starve both residentsand defenders. The Serbs can concentratetheir forces and firepower and reduce Mus-lim pockets one at a time, as they have been

doing in eastern Bosnia since early Febru ary1993. They can follow this strategy untilonly Tuzla, Bihac, and Sarajevo are left andthen take these towns one at a time after aprolonged siege. This approach would takemany months, involve a level of casualtiesgreater than the BSA has so far been willingto accept, and risk Western intervention.Consequently, the Bosnian Serbs will notattempt to conquer all of the remaining

Rucrcr

c0 5621T5

Figure 2Controlled Areas in Croatia and Bosnia and Hemegovina

tu

c05 62I7 05

Muslim-held territories but will maintainpressure on them. At the sarne tirne, theywill continue operations to seize rnilitarilycritical objectives, such as the Posavina Cor-ridor near Brcko[___j

The Bosnian Serbs have the only fixed-wingcombat capability in Bosnia and Herzegovi-na. Before the implementation of the "no-flyzone," the Bosnian Serbs used their air forceprimarily in support of their siege activities.They would be easily overwhelmed by West-ern air power.L__]

The Bosnian ArmyConsisting mostly of Muslims from localmilitia, reserre, and paramilitary units,Bosnian Army units vary widely in man-power, organizatiotr, and military capability.Command and control is loose. Becausefighting takes place in isolated pockets, localcommanders are virtually autonornous. Bri-gades-which vary greatly in size and com-position-are incapable of shifting areas ofoperation or undertaking coordinated tacti-cal maneuvers. The army is further crippledby desperate shortages of all types of weap-ons, rnunitions, transport, and military sup-plies. For example, up to one-third of thetroops in sorne units reportedly lack personalweapons. Nevertheless, morale is high, andcapable local commanders have emergedduring combat.t__] i

Without outside help, the Bosnian Army willsteadily deteriorate. Underequipped andpoorly trained, the Bosnian Army cannothold territory against determined Serb orCroat offensives. Because they lack mobility,heavy weapons, and ammunition, the Bosni-ans can rarely reply to enemy artillery,counter armor, or use massed firepower tostop infantry attacks. Local Bosnian unitshave frequently attacked Serb-held areas

near Sarajevo and in eastern Bosnia, forexample, taking and holding ground for shortperiods. Invariably, however, the Serbs re-group, counterattack, and eject the Bosnians.

L_lThe Croatian Defense ForcesThe Croatian Defense Forces (HVO)-theindigenous Croatian force in Bosnia-is a

light infantry force lacking striking powerand mobility:

. Equipment and training are inadequate forunassisted offensive operations.

o The HVO's transport, communications,and command structures do not perrnitmobile operations.

With the help of the Croatian army, howev-er, the HVO can hold the regions it now

. occupies indefinitely against the BosnianSerb Army or Bosnian forces. fn joint action,the two forces could also take additionalterritory from the Bosnian Government.-tI ___J

The Croatian Armed ForcesCroatian Ground Forces are likely to im-prove slowly, but currently they are unableto completely defgat Croatian Serb forces.Zagreb has streamlined its command struc-ture and bolstered its offensive capabilitiesby organizin g a small number of Guardsmobile brigades as attack forces. Overall,however, the Croatian Armed Forces lackstriking power and suffers from training andleadership weaknesses:

o The army lacks sufficient heavy weap-ons-tanks, armored vehicles, and artil-lery-to conduct or defend against a largearmored attack.

c0562I705\rf'UF\l

a

Estimated Manpower and Equipment Inventories

YugoslavArmedForces

CroatianArmedForces

BosnianArmy

BosnianSerb Arrny

CroatianDefenseForces

Krajina SerbArrny

Personn el (thousands) 100 60-80 60-80 50-75 40-50 Up to 40Tanls 1,300- 1,900 250 <50 400-750 <25 300Artillery (> 100 mm\ 1,200-2,000 200-300 < I00 700-800 <50 430 a

Combat aircraft (fixed wing) 240-250 b 2lHelicopters l l l-t l7 r-2l3 30

Surface-to-air missilclaunchers "

306 r5-21 3E-40

Ships a 29-30Subrnarines Jea Includes artillery with a caliber equal to or greater than75mm.b Some 100 additional older aircraft are in opcrationalstora ge

This table irlaxc1|.-

o Air and naval capabilities are minimal.

Enlisted training is inadequate, and fewofficers have commanded complex orlarge-scale operations. f__]

Zagreb's military can retake portions ofSerb-held territory in Croatia. In limitedmilitary operations, the'Croatian forceswould have their best opportunity to retakelands along the borders of the Krajina.Zagreb cannot defend against federal airattacks and would have difficulty copingwith a Yugoslav armored assault in easternSlavonia. The Croatian rnilitary position inBosnia and Herzegovina remains stroDg,however, and only the direct intervention offederal ground forces can threaten Croatian-occupied areas there.t-- It_J

" Includcs SA-2, -3, -6, -9, and -13 launchers; in addition,all forces have some shoulder-fired SAMs.a Includes frigatcs, missile boats, and torpedo boats.

" Excludes five Una M 100-D minisubs.

The Krajina Serb ArrnyHeary weapons provide the Krajina SerbArmy an advantage over Croatian GroundForces, but command, discipline, and organi-zational problems constrain its effectiveness.Most of their equipment-which includestanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artil-lery---currently is operational but theKrajina Serbs probably cannot maintain itover the long term without external assis-tance. Moreover, political turmoil within theSerb comrnunity reportedly has prompteddissent within the officer corpq 3!4_4i!grga-nization at the tactical levrl.l ]The Krajina Serbs have little ability to shiftforces between widely separated areas. Serbtroops, largely mobilized reservists, are illdisciplined and fight poorly. Krajina Serb

bcil.-

c0562r705

authorities will continue to look to the Bosni-an Serb Army for the supplies and reinforce-ments with which to repulse Croatian at-tacks. Acting in concert, the Krajina Serbforces and Bosnian Serb or Yugoslav armywould pose a significant threat to theCroatian army.t-----l

Potential Threats to lVestern Forces

The reactions of the combatants to a large-scale Western intetrention would vary. TheSerbs would pose the most direct threat toWestern forces in Bosnia, but an]' of thecombatants could threaten outside forces.Violence almost certainly would continue aseach side attempted to use the Westernpresence for its own ends. In such circum-stances, attaclcs on Western forces wouldoccur. Western intervention also would af-fect the dynamics of current conflicts andcould spark new ones.

All parties to the conflict believe that West-ern nations will not endure the casualties andpolitical costs of a prolonged guerrilla war,Consequently, armed opposition to Westernforces would likely take the form of sniperfire, hit-and-run attacks on bases and con-voys, and mining of roads. Local reactions toWestern forces would reflect the conditionsunder which these forces were introduced,including:

. The announced purpose of intervention andthe rules of engagernent.

o The rapidity, rnanner, and location of ini-tial deployment.

o The size and weapons of Western forces.

o The announced duration of the Westernpresen.r.[--l

The Bosnian Serb ArmyThe aggressiveness of the Bosnian Serb reac-tion to a Western intervention would dependon the extent to which they saw that inter-vention as threatening their territorial gains

The Context of Western MilitaryIntemention

In assessing reactions ef t';he combatantforces to Western military intervention,the Intelligence Community consideredintenention of Western forces on alarge scale<ither:

. To enforce an agreed peace accord-the Vance-Owen PIan or a variantthereof.

. To create and protect sqfehavens on alarge scale or to enforce a partition ofBosnia.

Such roles could require military ac-tion to roll back territorial gains andfordisarm combatant forces and would, inour judgment, require deployingthroughout Bosnia and Herzegovina70,000 to 80,000 troops with the heavyweapons and mobility needed to dealwith outbreaks of fishting, includingattacks on Western forces, which al-most certainly would occur. A cease-fire that wos achieved with the concur-rence of-and was obsert ed by-allparties could require a much smallerforce.

c0552r705

or the integrity of the BSA. If an interven-tion force wers charged with irnplementing acease-fire that left BSA forces in place, theBSA would harass it but tolerate its pres-ence. The BSA also probably would attemptto consolidate territorial gains in areas whereWestern forces were not present. Violencestill would be endemic in the countryside as

scores were settled, and each side maneu-vered for local advantage.r i

The BSA would oppose a Western interven-tion charged with rolling back Serb terd-torial gains or disarming the BSA but wouldquickly disintegrate in the face of a deter-mined Western operation. Lirnited mobilityand comrnunications would make it difficultfor BSA units to coordinate their operationsor to avoid air and ground attacks by West-ern forces, and those units that attempted toresist would be overwhelmed quickly. MostBSA soldiers would surrender, desert, or fleeto Yugoslavia. Thousands of other BosnianSerbs would, however, conduct guerrilla war-fare against Western occupation forces,probably with support from Belgrade. Wherethey could, the guerrillas would use Bosniaand Herzegovina's rugged terrain and thesympathetic Serb population to conceal theiractivities, avoid Western pursuit, and obtainintellisence.[__]

The Yugoslav MilitaryIn response to a large-scale Western peace-keeping presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,Belgrade would increase its defensive readi-ness. Political and military authorities inBelgrade believe the United States and itsNATO Allies, bent on dominating the post-Cold War world, intend to subdue, if notdismember, their Serb state. Federal au-thorities would step up recruitment andtrainiDg, disperse their supplies and forces-including naval elements from the Kotor

The Yagoslav Ground-BasedAir Ddense Network

A coordinated heavy Western air attackwould overwhelm Yugoslavia's ground-based air ddense network. Federalforces seized most of the nation's ra-dArs, surface-trair missiles, and con-trol equipment when Yugoslavia brokeup. The Yugoslav air defense system tsnow operating in Serbia and Montene-gro and probably remains tied to re-maining assets in Serb-controlled areasof Bosnia and Herzegovina. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia, however,resulted in the loss of facilities and upto 50 percent of the technically trainedpersonnel required to operate medium-range (SA-2, SA-3) and tactical (5A-6,SA-9, and SA-I 3) missiles. TheseIosses cunently limit the air def,ense

network's capabilities. Yugoslavia's in-ventory of older SAMs con be ddeatedby evasive tactics, countermeasures,and electronic warfAre. Coruequently,the principal ground-based air defensethreat is likely to be shoulder-firedsurface-tbair missiles (SA-7, SA-'1 4,and possibly SA-16) and air def,ense

artillery.[_]

Bay, and occupy alternate command sites inresponse to what they perceived as a height-ened Western threat to Yugbslavi..L__]

Yugoslav officials probably would respondindirectly if Western forces intervened to endthe fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Al-though Belgrade would want to avoid pro-voking Western retaliation, it probablywould attempt covertly to supply the Bosnian

-.$EIlt\

c0552r705

Irregalar Forces in Bosnia andHerzegovina

Theie are some 100,000 indigenous Serb,Croat, and Muslim imegalars in Bosniaand HerzegovinA, including armed politi-cal party militants, Yugoslav and Territorial Ddense Force troops, ond poorlyarmed locals. Irregulars receive outsidesupport but are not under external opert-tional control. They are motivated almostexclusively by ethnic nationalist and localt errit orial cons ider ations :

. Some 30,000 Serb irregalars receivematerial aid, especially fuel and ammu-nition, from the Bosnian Serb and Yuguslav Armies. Their dependence on thesesupplies gives the Bosnian Serb Armyand Yugoslavs limited irtfluence overtheir activities.

. Approximately 40,000 Croat irregtlarsin Bosnia and Herzegovina receiveequipment and funds from Croatia andfrom emigre sources in North Americe,Europe, and Australia, but most operateindependently of Zagreb.

. Some 30,000 Musltm irregulars receiveequipment and money primarily fromMuslims in other countries

With inadequate weapons, maintenance,training, and fuel, the irregalar forces arenot strong enough to conduct major ofen-sive militarl e,fforts and probably do notwant to. Their objectives focus instead onholding their immediate surroundings andtrying to create ethnically pure regions inBos nia and Herzegovina.l--l

Serbs with weapons, ammunition, and "vol-unteers" to drive up the human cost ofWestern intervention. f_]Belgrade would forcefully resist any Westernattack on Yugoslavia. In such circumstances,the federal government anticipates heavylosses among its forces. Yugoslav leadersbelieve, however, that their nation can suc-cessfully withstand an air campaign and thatto subdue the Serbian natiotr, Western forceswould be forced to invade their territory. Ifso, the bulk of Yugoslav resistance would befrom ground forces. The federal leadershipbelieves war is likely to come only withample warning after a prolonged crisis, andBelgrade would use such a period to rnobilizefully, disperse its forces, and hide key assets.The army would deploy thousands of lightinfantry for prolonged operations in the

country's interior. The Yugoslav navy's vul-nerability in Kotor Bay and inabiiity todefend the Montenegrin coast suggest thatthe navy would attempt to attack Westernnaval forces in the Adriatic, although thepossibility of a successful attack would below

The Croatian Armed Forces and HVOBoth Croatian arrny and HVO units arelikely to view any foreign intervention asdisabling their strongest enemy, and theywould exploit the presence of Western forcesto take contested areas and improve theirdefensive positions. In doing so, Croatianarmy and HVO forces would seek to avoidconflict with Western forces; small localclashes resulting from weak command andcontrol could occur, however.t-l

c0562L705\'Ell TTD||,'

Figure 3IJN Forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegoyina'

Unclassified

10

c0562I705

The Bosnian ArmyThe Bosnian army would welcome Westernforces. Sarajevo undoubtedly views Westernmilitary intervention as its best chance forsurvival. The Bosnians would try to occupyareas vacated by BSA units and probablywould step up guerrilla attacks on Serbforces. Should Western forces oppose suchactions, local Bosnian units probably wouldrespond violently, while trying to make theiracts appear to be the work of SerUrl_]

Effect on Regional DynamicsWestern military intervention could igniteconflicts elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia:

. Radical Kosovars might be tempted byWestern intervention to launch an uprisingin their province. The federal army hasunits stationed in Kosovo that could movequickly, in concert with internal securityforces, to suppress civil disorder or insur-rection. Ethnic Albanian opposition forcesin Kosovo are few and not well arrned.

o In Croatia, the Croatian army probablywould take advantage of Western opera-tions to launch limited local offensivesalong the borders of Serb-held regions,threatening UN Protection Forces alreadythere. A Western offensive against theSerbs, either in Bosnia or Yugoslavia,would strongly tempt Zagreb to try toretake the entire KrlUgg_end all of Slavo-nia from the Serbs. I It__J

The Threat to Neighboring States

The Yugoslav military is the most potentforce in the region, but it cannot operate farbeyond the borders of the Yugoslav state.Designed for static area defense, the federal

command and control structure and logisticsystem can provide only limited support tomobile operations or to operations over ex-tended distances. Yugoslav armored andmech anized brigades, nevertheless, canthreaten the border areas of surroundingstates, while Belgrade's air force couldquickly win air superiority over virtually anyof its immediate neighbors:

. Macedonia's military is little more than apolice force. Almost completely disarmedwhen federal forces withdrew in 1992, theMacedonian arrned forces would havetrouble coping with internal ethnic unrestand could not oppose Yugoslav cross-bor-der operations.

o Small, poorly equipped Albanian forceswould be no match for the Yugoslav arrny.Poor roads and rough terrain, howevcr,would limit Belgrade's ground operationsto border areas.

o Bulgaria's armed forces, hampered byobsolete equipment, inadequate training,and logistic shortfalls, would require exter-nal assistance to repel a Yugoslav invasion.

o Romanian forces are capable of defendingtheir nation against a Yugoslav attack.Romania's L72,000-man army is morethan 70 percent larger than the Yugoslavground force.

. Hungary's small armed forces lack ade-quate air defenses, and the army confrontssignificant logistic and equipment short-falls. Budapest could defend against minorborder incursions, but would require out-

Jtaeqelp to repel a large Yugoslav attack.tt

ll TEcr€{-

c05 6 2I7 O5

n(a*n tz LEFT Bma)\/urtrltrioatarT

c0562L705a

I

Eerct-

Figure 4Military Terrain of Former Yugoslavia

tUetersr- H,ll.., *OMguntainst6m1.2m

80c

A 150

Approxirnate rertical exaggeration 3O: 1

Northcrn Plains

Dattube !"7Srd

300 3so:.:.gs*i:J 0

Kiloneters BSarlps; DfrlA OilC -

6,O@

4.m

2.O@

7?a732 (A046460 6;93Unclassified

l3

c0552l-705

lVerning Notice

Nationel SecurityInformation

Informetion evailable es of 3 June 1993 was used

in the preperation of this Nationel Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participatedin the preparation of this Estimete:

The Central Intelligence AgencyThe Defense Intelligence AgencyThe National Security AgencyThe Bureau of Intelligence and Research,Department of State

also participating:

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Departmcnt of thc ArmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the NarryThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,Department of the Air ForceThc Director of Intelligcnce,Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was spproved for publication by theNetiondEgreien lntelligence Board.

UnaE