NicholasEdwards_ChanceandUncertainty_Wargames

What considerations exist in the

design of the elements of chance and

uncertainty in wargames utilised for

educational and training purposes?

Nicholas Edwards

MA War Studies ‐ King’s College, London

Supervisor: Professor Philip Sabin

Submission: 27 August 2014

Word Count: 14,997

The author of this report may be contacted via either:

[email protected]

or

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Nicholas Edwards – MA War Studies – Dissertation

1

DECLARATION:

This dissertation is the sole work of the author, and has not been accepted in any

previous application for a degree; all quotations and sources of information have been

acknowledged.

I confirm that my research [x] did or did not [ ] require ethical approval.

KCL/13/14-54 - What considerations exist in the design of the element of chance in wargames utilised for training purposes?

I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the WSG Research Ethics Panel. Any specific conditions of approval are laid out at the end of this letter which should be followed in addition to the standard terms and conditions of approval, to be overseen by your Supervisor:

o Ethical approval is granted for a period of one year from 21st January 2014. You will notreceive a reminder that your approval is about to lapse so it is your responsibility to apply foran extension prior to the project lapsing if you need one (see below for instructions).

I confirm that all research records (e.g. interview data and consent records) will be held

securely for the required period of time and then destroyed in accordance with College

guidelines. (The department will assume responsibility for this if you send your research

records to the Senior Programme Officer Panagiotis Stasinopoulos.) [x] Yes

Signed: Nicholas Edwards Date: 27 August 2014


2

Abstract

This study investigates the considerations for the designer of a wargame for military

education and training purposes in handling the elements of chance and uncertainty.

The nature of uncertainty as a concept in both war and games is considered, before

reviewing how these two aspects are aligned to form the decision‐making environment

required to meet training objectives. Utilising Sabin’s trinity of influences on a wargame

as a basis, the role of chance and uncertainty within the mathematical model of the game

is reviewed not in isolation, but in balance with the influence of both skill and reality. The

needs of a model of chance and uncertainty that meets training objectives in theory is

compared to the application of the wargame in practice, specially how the training

audience react to both this model and how it is presented. The central discovery of this

study has been that a large gulf exists between theory and practice for the elements of

chance and uncertainty, as the considerations for developing a mathematical model and

how players react to this model in practice can often misalign.

To bridge this gulf between theory and practice this study recommends designers provide

players with a positive skill‐chance balance, as whilst not a panacea, was proven to help

minimise this issue. Rather than leaving players passive to the influence of chance and

uncertainty, by instead offering players meaningful decision‐making opportunities, the

decision‐making purpose of the game may be emphasised, bringing chance into balance

with skill.

Nevertheless, this study ultimately accepts that the most important consideration is the

context. The designer must clearly conceptualise both training objectives and training

audiences to utilise chance and uncertainty within the model, and present in such a way,

that aligns the concerns of both theory and practice.


3

Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 4

2. Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts ....................................................................... 9

2.1 Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts in War ........................................................... 9

2.2 Chance and Uncertainty as Game Mechanics........................................................ 15

3. Developing the Wargame Model ........................................................................... 21

3.1 Developing the Decision‐Making Environment ..................................................... 21

3.2 Explicit Realism and Fidelity ................................................................................... 37

4. Player Reactions to Chance and Uncertainty ......................................................... 46

4.1 Player Reactions to the Model ............................................................................... 46

4.2 Player Reactions to Presentation ........................................................................... 52

5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 69

6. Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 74


4

1. Introduction

Peter Perla defined a wargame as ‘a warfare model or simulation in which the flow of

events shapes, and is shaped by, decisions made by a human player or players during the

course of those events’.1 Perla’s definition helps expose the two constituent parts of a

wargame. First is a mathematical model that produces a simulated representation of

reality.2 This pre‐determined system quantifies elements of the battlefield, such as forces

and terrain, alongside a series of rules governing the interaction between these

components.3 The second element is the role of the player, specifically their interaction

with this model through their decision‐making inputs.4 A wargame does not simply

consist of the model and its representation of reality, but is driven by the outputs

developed through the player making iterative choices.5 Players interact with the game

system through these choices, generating game events, which they in turn respond to,

guided in pursuit of a specified goal.6 This relationship between player decisions and

game events the model generates in reaction provides the feedback loop that

differentiates wargaming from purely computer‐driven simulation.7

McHugh identified three main methods of evaluating the game results that provide the

basis of this feedback loop. The first are “Rigid” games, where all outcomes are resolved

1 Perla (2011), p.2802 Sabin (2012), p.43 McHugh (2013), pp.2‐54 Sabin (2012), p.45 Ibid6 Ibid7 Perla (2011), p.23


5

through the fiat of a pre‐determined rule‐set.8 Second are “Free” games, where outcomes

are instead resolved through the judgements of an umpire utilising their professional

experience.9 Finally, “Semi‐Rigid” games are a combination of Rigid and Free games,

where outcomes may be judged through Rigid means, but also modified or have new

events injected at the behest of the umpire.10

Guiding design decisions on the structure of the model, method of evaluation, and focus

of player decision‐making, is the purpose for which the wargame is being played.11 A

professional military wargame has two main objectives, providing the player either

decision‐making experience or decision‐making knowledge, often gradients of both, that

is applicable to their real‐world role.12 These objectives each form the basis of the two

main purposes wargaming is utilised for. The first are “Analytical” games, generally

focusing on providing decision‐making information to underpin real‐world decisions on

force structure, operations assistance, and so forth.13 The second type, and the focus of

this study, are “Training” and “Educational” games, providing decision‐making experience

to educate and familiarise players with the operations, concepts, and battlefield

complications, required to prepare them for real‐world command.14

8 McHugh (2013), pp.14‐59 Ibid10 Ibid

11 Ibid, p.8

12 Ibid

13 Ibid, pp.223‐4

14 Ibid

Nichola

A game

principle

applying

against

course f

confide

follow t

stimulat

are aim

requirin

15 Mouat

16 Ibid

17 Ibid

18 Frank (

19 Mouat

s Edwards –

designed fo

es, giving an

g basic doct

a pre‐progr

for the proc

nce in them

hose proced

ting them to

ed at teach

ng them to o

t (Interview)

(2011), p.3 t (Interview)

– MA War St

or a “Trainin

n inexperien

trinal skills.1

ramed oppo

cedure being

mselves and

dures.17 An

o explore th

ing the play

out‐think a r

F

tudies – Dis

ng” purpose

nced player

15 Such a ga

onent whose

g trained to

the proced

“Education

heir decision

yer how to u

reactive, rat

Figure 1: Lon

ssertation

6

e strives to i

an opportu

me will com

e role is to a

o succeed.16

ures, where

nal” game of

ns within a d

utilise their

ther than co

ngley‐Brow

imbue in p

unity to bec

mmonly invo

allow a play

Training ga

e losing only

ffers the pla

dynamic env

training to d

ompliant, op

wn (2011)

ome comfo

olve decision

yer who follo

ames aim to

y occurs if th

ayer a choic

vironment.1

defeat the e

pponent.19

layers specific operati

ortable in

n‐making

ows the cor

o give player

hey failed to

e of actions

18 These gam

enemy,

onal

rrect

rs

o

s,

mes


7

The aim therefore of any wargame designer is to develop a decision‐making environment

that enables the game to meet its purpose.20 When players interact with the model, the

game must ensure they encounter the dilemmas that will drive them towards gaining the

experience or knowledge required by the game objective.21 Wargame design is though

more art than science, with no formal rules for meeting certain game objectives, nor are

wargames rigorously repeatable exercises due to the active human decision element.22

Rather, a designer must utilise their own judgement in modelling their assumptions of

reality, where the player, often in ways unforeseen by the designer, dictates the path the

game proceeds.23

Sabin referred to chance as the greatest liability of wargaming, as it provides a focal point

for sceptics of the method to dismiss its validity.24 A study that investigates the impact

that introducing mechanics relating to chance and uncertainty into the wargame model

has on the ability of an educational or training game to meet its objectives is therefore

required. By investigating designer choices on how chance and uncertainty influences the

decision‐making environment, how players will interact with the game, and the decisions

made by the Control Group, a set of considerations may be produced on how to handle

this aspect of wargame design. The aim shall be to investigate the importance of

20 Perla (2011), p.218

21 Sterrett (Interview)

22 Perla (2011), p.173

23 Ibid

24 Ibid, p.118


8

considering chance and uncertainty, how the designer can best utilise this design

element, what pitfalls to avoid, and how the purpose of the wargame influences these

decisions.


9

2. Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts

2.1 Chance and Uncertainty as Concepts in War

This study must first consider how uncertainty influences decision‐makers in an actual

combat environment to understand what chance and uncertainty within a wargame is

aiming to represent.25 As the focus is the influence of the combat environment upon the

decision‐maker, aligning with the decision‐making purpose of wargaming, this review

shall revolve around the concept of Situational Awareness.26

Endsley defined Situational Awareness as ‘the perception of the elements in the

environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and

the projection of their status in the near future’.27 Good Situational Awareness is

dependent on the quality of received information and when this information is

incomplete, ambiguous, or conflicting, a state of uncertainty exists.28 The cause of this

battlefield uncertainty, and the resulting effect on Situational Awareness, must be

detailed to appreciate how the decision‐making calculus of the commander is

influenced.29

In On War Clausewitz placed a particular focus on the concepts of chance and

uncertainty, terming war ‘the realm of uncertainty’ where ‘three quarters of the

25 McCloskey (1996), p.194

26 Herbig (1986), p.100

27 Endsley (1995), p.36

28 Chancey & Bliss (2012), p.582; St. John et al. (2000), p.1

29 Herbig (1986), p.100


10

factors…are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty’.30 The environment of war

becomes a dynamic interplay of shifting possibilities and probabilities, where fluctuating

levels of uncertainty expose the decision‐maker to luck both good and bad.31 The result is

that war becomes a gamble for those who take part, approximate to a game of cards.32

The source of this uncertainty is Clausewitz’s notion of general friction, a concept

grouping the diverse factors that coalesce to impede the effective use of military force at

every stage of its application.33 To Clausewitz general friction best conceptualised the gap

between war as it occurs on paper with war as it ultimately transpires, bridging abstract

theory and practice.34 It is this gap, filled by general friction, where the influence of

uncertainty in disrupting the efficient use of force can be most felt, distorting the

information upon which Situational Awareness depends.35 Whilst a diverse range of

factors collate under the heading of general friction, a few major categories still emerge.36

Luttwak defined narrow, or incidental, friction as the impediments to the smooth

implementation of military action occurring through unforeseen organisational failure,

rather than just direct contact with enemy forces.37 Any action in war is not just the

seamless result of the decision‐makers will, but enacted through the numerous

30 Herbig (1986), p.95; Clausewitz (1993), p.117

31 Watts (1996), p.96

32 Clausewitz (1993), p.97

33 Ibid, pp.138‐40; Watts (1996), p.2; Waldman (2010), pp.354‐5

34 Watts (1996), p.10

35 Waldman (2010), p.337

36 Watts (1996), p.30

37 Luttwak (2001), pp.8‐9


11

individuals within the system.38 Human and mechanical fallibility within this system of

individuals can cause minor incidents of friction, from breakdowns, miscommunication,

fatigue, fear, and other uncountable sources.39 Individually, these minor incidents create

localised difficulties, but through the nature of incidental friction, these minor incidents

accumulate and multiply in severity, turning numerous localised accidents into a major

incident.40

The multiplication of narrow friction is not though equal to the sum of these minor

incidents as unnoticeably small sources interact with other incidents and multiply in

unforeseeable directions, causing an effect out of scale with the initial sources.41 The

multiplication of incidental friction contrives to make what in theory was simple difficult,

as efficient execution is stalled, delayed, or halted entirely, through the accumulation of

small organisational failures.42 Ultimately, this limits the ability for the decision‐maker to

extrapolate fully the consequences of an action and their ability to make informed

decisions.43

Intelligence uncertainty exists when information on the current state of battlefield, such

as men and materials, locations and force levels, or weather forecasts, is missing,

38 Watts (1996), p.29

39 Waldman (2010), p.354

40 Ibid

41 Beyerchen (1992), p.70

42 Herbig (1986), p.105



12

unreliable, or unobtainable.44 The decision‐maker must feed information into their

Situational Awareness perception to evolve the mental image they have of the

battlefield.45 If any gaps exist then their Situational Awareness shall be inadequate and

the perception that decision‐making relies upon shall be faulty.46 Greater Intelligence

gathering capabilities can help, but ultimately the notion of a perfect Intelligence picture

is unobtainable due to the limits on how much information can be processed whilst still

allowing a timely response.47

The adversarial nature of warfare, the contest between two opposing forces attempting

to force their will upon the other and the requirement to consider possible enemy

reactions, is another source of general friction.48 Clausewitz stated that war is never an

exercise of applying intent upon an inanimate or passive object, but an interdependent

activity against a reactive opponent acting on their own intent.49 Whilst clues on the

intent of this reactive foe may be gathered from the developing Intelligence picture, the

nature of human interaction prevents exact knowledge of another’s thought process,

leaving the ways in which the combat situation shall evolve as a result to remain

inaccessible.50

44 McCloskey (1996), pp.194‐5

45 Chancey & Bliss (2012), p.582

46 Watts (1996), pp.28‐9

47 Waldman (2010), pp.344‐5

48 Gray (1999), p.10; Herbig (1986), p.103

49 Clausewitz (1993), p.86

50 Herbig (1986), p.111


13

These sources of general friction are not however mutually exclusive, instead coalescing

and interacting with each other, leading Watts and Beyerchen to conclude that war

follows a non‐linear logic.51 If war followed a linear logic, deterministic cause and effect

relationships could be formed and the end result of any action predictable if the initial

state of the variables known.52 General friction though compasses what Watts and

Beyerchen feel makes war non‐linear, as the different sources form small unexpected

incidents through the interaction between the adversaries and the variables shaping the

battlefield.53 The small complications caused by general friction make cause and effect

relationships impossible as the impact of each incident multiplies out of proportion to the

scale of the original source.54 Even if the initial state of the battlefield is known

completely, the ways in which the associated variables shall interact through incidents of

general friction is unpredictable and wide‐ranging, making the end state inaccessible.55

The subsequent complexities of the system results in the decision‐maker never able to

construct a perfect mental picture of the battlefield, and are instead forced to rely upon a

simplified model of reality based on abstract concepts such as probability.56 The

consequence of any decision becomes impossible to comprehend fully as the non‐

linearity of system and overwhelming complexity of information prevent a fully informed

51 Watts (1996), p.115; Beyerchen (1992), pp.60‐8

52 Watts (1996), p.106

53 Ibid, p.115; Beyerchen (1992), pp.60‐8

54 Ibid


56 St. John et al. (2000), p.1; Rowe (1994), p.747; Taleb (2010), p.133


14

cause and effect model being produced.57 Instead, the unperceivable results of the

interaction between the various variables of conflict are abstractly characterised as

“chance events”, where luck becomes the only term to explain a murky cause and effect

process in which interaction makes perfect prediction impossible.58 An example would be

Taleb’s concept of “Black Swans”, the abstract notion of unforeseeable events resulting

from the limits of human knowledge and inability comprehend complex systems.59

Without clear linear cause and effect relationships, the system of war becomes

impossible to comprehend as a whole and uncertainty becomes a central feature.60 The

causes of general friction have roots in the fact that war is a human activity, susceptible

to their fallibility and cognitive limits, and as long as this remains the case, war shall

remain non‐linear.61 New technologies may improve the rate at which Intelligence is

gathered, but the human element and interactive nature of warfare shall still contrive to

prevent linearity.62

If general friction is therefore an irreducible element of warfare that all parties in combat

experience than the perception of its role in warfare cannot just be negative.63 The

alternative to eliminating general friction is instead to gain a relative frictional advantage

57 Watts (1996), p.115

58 Beyerchen (1992), pp.71‐2

59 Taleb (2010), pp.213&330

60 Jobbágy (2008), p.170

61 Watts (1996), p.78

62 Ibid, p.122; Pitt (2008), p.58

63 Waldman (2010), p.354; Herbig (1986), p.106


15

over the opponent.64 The adversarial nature of warfare leads to opportunities to exploit

and magnify an opponent’s own failures from general friction through utilising surprise.65

Paret concluded that this was the real mark of what Clausewitz believed when he termed

“genius”, the ability to exploit chance events, and is why Clausewitz viewed chance as an

‘interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad’.66 By exploiting those

possibilities, a decision‐maker can turn their frictional advantage into decisive effects.67

2.2 Chance and Uncertainty as Game Mechanics

Uncertainty in games constitutes the elements of game design that reduce the

predictable consequences of any action taken within the game system.68 Salen and

Zimmerman divide this uncertainty into two distinct categories, that at the “macro” level

and that at the “micro” level.69

Macro‐level uncertainty concerns any doubt that exists over the end state of the game.70

Salen and Zimmerman state that an amount of macro‐level uncertainty is vital to every

game if it is to remain engaging to players and offer the choices required to match its

64 Jobbágy (2008), p.172


66 Paret (1985), p.373; Waldman (2010), p.356

67 Watts (1996), pp.33‐4

68 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174

69 Ibid

70 Ibid


16

decision‐making focus.71 A game in which the outcome, or path towards it, is near certain

or predetermined will have made the decision‐making element redundant, instead

reducing the game to a deterministic mathematical model.72 Micro‐Level uncertainty

instead concerns specific operations of chance and uncertainty within this game system.73

The focus at the Micro‐Level is directed towards what impact these specific operations of

chance and uncertainty mechanics shall have upon individual instances of player decision‐

making.74

Whilst macro‐level uncertainty is required, the nuanced application of micro‐level

uncertainty to achieve the desired influence on player decision‐making requires a more

complex set of considerations.75 Therefore, this study is more concerned with the

questions that surround micro‐level game mechanics and the decision‐making

environment developed by the application of individual chance and uncertainty game

mechanics.

Three broad categories constitute the methods by which micro‐level uncertainty may be

introduced. The first form of micro‐Level uncertainty is from randomness.76 By utilising

randomness, outcomes are made subject to probability, introducing an element of luck,

or chance, into player success and failure, leading to player uncertainty over the


72 Ibid; Costikyan (2013), p.16


74 Ibid

75 Ibid

76 Bjӧrk & Holopainen (2005), p.379


17

consequences of actions taken.77 This form of uncertainty may be either stochastic, where

previous results have no impact on later ones, for example dice, or non‐stochastic, where

each result shall influence later ones, such as cards where the remaining outcomes

depend on cards left in the deck.78 A deterministic system alternatively omits any

randomness, instead offering only one set possibility to outcomes.79

The second form of micro‐level uncertainty is informational, where players lack certainty

on the current state of the game system.80 Players may have information hidden from

them, leaving them with an incomplete picture of the game state, or faulty information

from deliberate deception or misinterpretation.81 Furthermore, this information may be

known to one player, both players, or neither and known only to the game system.82 The

effect of such uncertainty is again to negate the ability for the player to predict the

consequences of their actions and make informed decisions because of a reduced ability

to foresee and judge the value of a plan of action.83 Similarly, a game can allow players

perfect information, such as in chess, where all information on the games state is visible


78 Costikyan (2013), p.83

79 Rubel (2006), p.120


81 Ibid


83 Costikyan (2013), p.94


18

to both players at all times and available so that the entire game state can be taken into

account when decision‐making.84

The final category of micro‐level uncertainty is adversarial, the uncertainty from facing a

reactive opponent.85 Whenever an opponent is involved, a measure of uncertainty exists

over what actions they may or may not take next, in reaction to those of the player.86

Players unable to read an opponent’s intent shall again be unable to comprehend the full

consequences of their actions.87 Returning to chess, a game where outcomes are not

subject to randomness and where all information on the game state is visible, still offers

this uncertainty over an opponent’s future decisions.88 Alternatively, a solitaire game may

omit this uncertainty, where no reactive, thinking, opponent is present, just the player

completing against the game system.89

As mentioned, all games require uncertainty at the macro‐level to be a game that allows

meaningful decision‐making and not simply a pre‐determined mathematical model.90 The

challenge for the games designer then is how to utilise the three categories of micro‐level

uncertainty to ensure the game meets design objectives.91 Every decision‐making

dilemma within a game shall be formed from a mixture of these three categories, even if


85 Costikyan (2013), pp.28‐9

86 Ibid

87 Ibid, p.81

88 Sabin (2012), pp.110‐1

89 Ibid, pp.112‐5; Perla (2011), p.166


91 Ibid


19

some situations are left completely deterministic, have perfect information, or are one‐

sided.92 The question therefore is not whether a game includes any chance or

uncertainty, but instead what types, at what points, to what mixture, and to what

extent.93

Sabin states that a key design decision is how to balance the skill and chance aspects of

the game.94 Skill and chance are not two diametrically opposed influences, but rather a

spectrum exists between the two based on the balance between the influence of player

decision‐making and the extent their success or failure is attributable to “luck”.95 The

common theme running through the categories of micro‐level uncertainty, and the

gameplay concept that binds them, is the effect on player decision‐making and skill

caused by limiting their ability to make informed decisions.96 By limiting foresight through

unpredictable consequences and imperfect information, an element of luck will now

define player failure or success to some extent.97

Roger Caillois describes luck as something the player becomes passive to and is unable to

influence, but Salen and Zimmerman disagree, for they feel a well‐designed game should

allot the player some amount of choice in their actions.98 Salen and Zimmerman instead


93 Costikyan (2013), p.113

94 Sabin (2012), pp.117‐8

95 Ibid


97 Ibid


Nichola

feel the

allowing

is when

passiven

Chance

outcom

and unc

conside

underst

99 Salen &

100 Ibid, p

101 Sabin

s Edwards –

alternative

g players to

players hav

ness, that m

forms one

e of a warg

certainty can

r them in ba

tanding of th

& Zimmerman

p.179

(2012), p.117

– MA War St

e is for chan

manipulate

ve this abilit

meaningful d

part of Sabi

ame, alongs

nnot theref

alance with

he main des

n (2004), p.185

7

tudies – Dis

ce and unce

e the variab

ty to take ca

decision‐ma

Figure 2: Sa

n’s trinity o

side skill an

fore be anal

the other t

sign conside

5

ssertation

20

ertainty to b

bles underpi

alculated ris

aking may e

abin (2012)

of the main s

d reality (Fi

ysed in isola

two influenc

erations is to

be as they te

nning unce

sks, rather t

merge.100

), p.117

sources tha

gure 2). 101 T

ation, but in

ces, if a com

o be achiev

erm “strate

rtainty and

than Calliois

t influence

The elemen

nstead this s

mprehensive

ved.

egised”,

take risks.99

s’ state of

the course

nts of chanc

study must

e

9 It

and

e


21

3. Developing the Wargame Model

3.1 Developing the Decision‐Making Environment

The role of chance and uncertainty, in balance with the skill element, in forming the

specific decision‐making environment required to meet game objectives must first be

analysed.102 The design of any wargame must begin with a clear conceptualisation of

what training objectives the sponsor wishes the game to meet.103 James Sterrett

identifies the “PDI Model”, the “Purpose” of what the student should learn from the

game, what “Decisions” and dilemmas the student should face, and what “Interactions”

the game model should provide to assure those dilemmas occur.104 The exact model of

chance and uncertainty used by the game is one of the central components to forcing the

player to face the dilemmas required by the training objectives.105

The first identified category of chance and uncertainty was randomness, the use of a

random number generator or a non‐stochastic method, to develop what McHugh

referred to as the “chance device”, adding uncertainty to results within the system.106

Randomness offers a top‐down method of enforcing the overall influence of general

friction’s non‐linearity upon a game event through a moderated range of potential

outcomes.107 The central motivation thus of utilising a chance device is a need to

102 Perla (2011), p.218

103 Longley‐Brown (Interview)


105 Ibid

106 McHugh (2013), p.223

107 Heilmann (Interview)


22

introduce the inherent unpredictability of warfare through an abstract unified

mechanic.108

Rather than attempting bottom‐up modelling of all the countless influences causing

general friction, randomness allows the designer to focus upon producing the overall

effect of this uncertainty upon situational awareness.109 It was discussed earlier that

decision‐makers are forced to develop simplified mental models of reality to make sense

of the non‐linear complexity of general friction by distilling the effects into concepts such

as “chance events”. Randomness does not simulate all the unknown factors that cause

these chance events, but instead directly forces players to perceive game events through

the similar abstracted notions of probability.110 Overall, randomness is a method by which

to increase the level of pressure placed upon player decisions by reducing the predictable

consequences of any action they take.111

If the designer is to utilise randomness in a way that aligns with their objectives then it is

crucial they understand the basics of distribution, as this shall greatly determine to what

extent luck shall influence results.112 The first consideration is that between individual and

compound probabilities. If a single six‐sided dice is thrown then the distribution is flat as

108 Heilmann (Interview)

109 Sabin (2012), p.25

110 Ibid

111 Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sterrett (Interview)

112 Sabin (Interview)

Ni

ea

re

re

oc

di

Si

av

m

113

114

115

116

icholas Edw

ach result ha

epresent a c

esults fall to

ccurring, co

ce, but only

Figure

milarly, the

verage of al

ore dice are

3 Sabin (2012)4 Ibid5 Ibid6 Sterrett (Inte

wards – MA W

as the same

compound p

the averag

mpared to o

y one way to

e 3: Two, six

more dice

l these resu

e rolled to g

), pp.270‐1

erview)

War Studies

e one‐sixth c

probability,

e.114 For exa

one for a tw

o get twelve

x, and twen

rolls that ar

ults shall also

generate ea

s – Dissertat

23

chance of o

creating a n

ample with

welve, as the

e.115

nty, six‐side

re generated

o fall to a no

ch result, o

tion

occurring.113

normal “bel

two six‐side

ere are six w

d dice distr

d over the c

ormal distri

r over the g

3 Multiple si

l curve” dist

ed dice, sev

ways to mak

ributions. So

course the g

bution.116 T

game as who

x‐sided dice

tribution wh

ven has six c

ke seven wit

ource: Auth

game, the m

The impact i

ole, the less

e

here

chances of

th two

hor

more the

s that the

s random


24

the system shall be, compared to fewer die rolls with a greater relative spread of

results.117 The spread of successful results is the other side to distributions, with luck

having a heavier influence on results if successful results are reduced to narrow odds.118

In comparison to an even spread of results, players having to roll a six to succeed will

have few opportunities to apply their skill, as any progress becomes reliant on an unlikely

die‐roll.119

Nevertheless, even with a distribution that produces the desired spread of results on

paper, in practice the designer must also consider the impact of fluke results.120 A die roll

may for example land on a six three times in a row in a game, which may accurately

represent the non‐linear processes general friction can take121, or an extreme that

overestimates this effect122. Either way, considering what influence these outliers and

having such luck shall have on gameplay and training objectives, shall be crucial.123 A

string of results that led the course of the game in a direction that avoids desired

dilemmas, or where an opponent who simply has just had good fortune has left the player

without the capabilities to react, may ruin the training experience.124 Graham Longley‐

117

Sabin (2012), p.272 118

Ibid 119

Ibid 120

Ibid (Interview) 121

Allen (1989), p.332 122

Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20 123

Longley‐Brown (Interview) 124

Brynen (Interview)


25

Brown is clear that if a die roll might lead to a result that prevents meeting a training

objective, then that die roll simply has no place in the game model.125

An alternative is a deterministic system, where rather than utilising randomness for

calculating outcomes, results are decided through pre‐determined formulas for each

scenario with only one outcome.126 An example would be calculating combat results

through the ratio between the attacker’s “Attack Value” and defender’s “Defence Value”,

with the same outcome occurring whenever this ratio exists.127 The designer must instead

of sampling the immense variation in reality, find the statistical average of these events

and reflect just this average in game results.128 The benefit of such an approach is that

certain instances of chance, where results may distract or lead to training objectives being

missed, are removed and replaced by more controllable determinism.129

However, a clash emerges in deterministic systems, between the established non‐linear

nature of warfare and the certainty such a system emphasises. To some, removing this

element of randomness creates too great a disconnect between the game and the reality

the student is being prepared for.130 Without the chance that an encounter may go better

or worse than expected, a completely rational cost‐benefit form of decision‐making may


126 Rubel (2006), p.120

127 Ibid

128 Curry (2012b), p.13


130 Heilmann (Interview); Sabin (Interview)


26

be encouraged, rather than the weighing of probabilities.131 Determinism does not

therefore simulate the effect on Situational Awareness that general friction was

previously demonstrated to create, the sheer unpredictability of the result of any decision

taken by the commander. The resulting experience may thus be of lesser value or even

misleading in the lessons it imbues.132

James Sterrett though stresses the importance of causality, feeling it develops a clearer

link between the quality of decision‐making and success within the game.133 His approach

ensures that player decisions only fail in situations where they would be expected to do

so because of obvious faults in their planning.134 This does result in removing part of the

inherent uncertainty of reality through reducing the influence of chance, but Sterrett feels

using this as a criticism misses the point of designing for the training objective.135 Simply

including randomness because such bouts of bad fortune may occur in reality is not

automatically a legitimate motivation.136 To Sterrett, that the reality of war is uncertain

and that friction may prevent a plan succeeding is common knowledge and thus not a

productive lesson to teach.137 Instead, by ensuring plans unfold exactly as the player

envisaged, the game shall clearly highlight the quality of their planning and the role of any


132 Ibid; Brynen (Interview)

133 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), pp.150‐1; Sterrett (Interview)

134 Leser & Sterrett, (2010), p.151

135 Ibid


137 Ibid


27

particular decision on the outcome.138 By developing a clear link between decision and

outcome, a mistake may be quickly identified and learned from.139 If randomness blurs

this link however, or leads to a bad decision coming good due to luck, then achieving the

training objective may be severely affected.140

However, as has been previously demonstrated, a game requires an element of

uncertainty to offer decision‐making opportunities, whilst randomness is not the sole

method available. Sterrett’s approach does not disregard the influence of either

informational or adversarial uncertainty and indeed now requires it.141 Through utilising

uncertainty from these sources, a similar effect may compliment, or potentially even a

substitute, for the uncertainty of randomness.142 Just as with randomness, the player

must contend with a level of uncertainty over the consequences of their individual and

cumulative actions, because of the inability to perceive either perfect clarity.143 An

element of guesswork exists in player decisions, as whilst both may permit an element of

deductive reasoning on this hidden information, or possible avenues of enemy decision‐

making, there is no guarantee their deduction was correct.144



140 Ibid



143 Ibid

144 Ibid


28

In an “Open” game, information would be available to all players, from Order of Battle,

deployments, capabilities, and so forth.145 Far more common in professional educational

environments though are “Closed” games, hiding some or all the information on game

state that each side predicate their decisions upon, to one, some, or all players.146

Graham Longley‐Brown went as far as to say that he could not conceive of a wargame

with an educational purpose that was an Open game, the impossibility of such a state of

affairs in reality limiting the use of this to any training objective.147 The player in a Closed

game must instead either earn their intelligence through their actions, or be provided it

by the system, the concern in both cases being how the training objectives require the

player utilises this information in their decision‐making.148

Adversarial uncertainty allows the designer to apply pressure to player decision‐making

through the presence of an opponent reacting to the actions they take.149 The main

benefit of adversarial wargaming are the unpredictable and creative plans that the player

must confront from an opponent who may be another student, both attempting to stress

and defeat the other.150 Also common are the use of “Red Cells”, an organised opposition

led by the Control Group.151 Rather than being truly adversarial by actively striving to

defeat the player at all cost, Red Cells are often limited to forcing certain player reactions

145 McCarry (1991), p.48

146 Ibid



149 Mouat (Interview)

150 Ibid; Elg (Interview)



29

to guide the exercise towards its objectives.152 Thus the level of adversarial intent of a

Red Cell is adjusted, anywhere from a near‐passive opponent allowing the player to room

to become accustomed to their role, to an opponent thinking creatively in a genuine

attempt to defeat the player.153

Similar to the choice between stochastic and deterministic systems therefore, the

difference between a real player and Red Cells is the ability to control the games

direction.154 The use of a Red Cell allows the Control Group a far greater amount of

control over the course the game takes by following courses of action that force player

decision‐making towards situations that align with training objectives.155 Red Cells though

shall rarely reach the true level of intensity and inventiveness that another genuine player

shall offer.156 Indeed, a Red Cell trying too hard to win and doing too well may be asked to

exercise restraint if it risks derailing game progress towards meeting the training

objectives, by over‐stressing players and leaving them unable to effectively make

decisions.157

This role of the Control Group, led by the umpire or “Game Controller”, presents an

additional angle to the considerations surrounding chance and uncertainty. Umpires are

not an absolute requirement, as rigid games with a self‐contained rule‐set can be played




155 Ibid

156 Ibid

157 Ibid


30

between students under less supervision.158 For semi‐rigid gaming however, the Control

Group shall play a greater, more fundamental role in guiding chance and uncertainty in

the game.159

Much of semi‐rigid wargaming is predicated on the capability to moderate randomness

through the ability for umpires to overrule fluke results.160 By controlling randomisation,

an outcome that may derail training objectives due to a disproportionate influence of luck

may be avoided by altering results or their gameplay effects.161 This may be done openly,

if the result is usually generated in front of the players.162 Alternatively, if results are

generated behind the scenes, it may simply be that the information on outcomes sent

back to players is moderated in advance.163 In this case generated results will often begin

as provisional, until the Game Controller can upgrade it to a firm result with or without

moderation, once assured it shall continue game progress towards meeting training

objectives.164

Moderating the results of randomness cannot though be regarded as a panacea. If an

adversarial game where both sides are expected to strive for victory at all costs is desired,

too much intervention in moderating outcomes may be a dangerous course of action as



160 Elg (Interview)

161 Jethu & Jain (2004), pp.412‐3


163 Ibid; Elg (Interview)



31

the significance of victory may evaporate.165 Sabin also believes that too much umpire

inference shall eventually undermine the purpose of utilising uncertainty if doing so

evaporates the consequences of risk‐taking in an uncertain environment.166 It is essential

therefore that the umpire has the training and experience to know exactly when and how

the rules of the game are going to be disregarded to avoid undermining the purpose for

which chance and uncertainty are utilised.167

Another tool available to Control Groups are injects, explicit “chance events” that the

Control Group may force to occur within the game whilst it is in progress.168 The Control

Group are able to feed these incidents of narrow friction or new information into the

game, forcing the players to adjust their decision‐making to a new situation.169 Injects

therefore become another source of uncertainty to the players, with general friction now

applied directly into the game in way fully controllable by the Control Group.170 These

injects are also another way as well of applying pressure to the players in order to force

them to deal with situations or utilise information that is in line with the decision‐making

dilemmas required to meet training objectives.171

165 Rubel (Interview); Sabin (Interview)


167 Elg (Interview)

168 von Hilgers (2012), p.63; Allen (1989), p.35


170 Ibid

171 Ibid


32

Albert Praun, active in 1930s German wargaming, saw it as ‘the main art of the director’

to utilise injects of general friction and new information, to put player decision‐making

under pressure.172 Praun envisaged injects arranged like a screenplay, a meticulously

planned arrangement for when to insert these events.173 The modern equivalents are

what NATO term MEL/MILs, similar lists of military events and incidents to inject into the

game.174 Like Praun’s screenplay a storyboard is developed, either entirely pre‐scripted

with events that must occur to achieve training objectives, or dynamic in reaction to

player decisions to change the direction of play.175 These events are injected as required

during gameplay, creating chance events of varying difficulties to fit the situation and

keep the requisite level of pressure on players.176

Overall, chance and uncertainty mechanics therefore provide the designer with a method

of introducing the decision‐making dilemmas caused by general friction into the

educational or training environment of the wargame.177 By utilising chance and

uncertainty in this manner, the designer can put player decision‐making under pressure,

forcing them to weigh the shifting possibilities and probabilities of differing courses of

action, with varying levels of uncertainty over the outcome.178 The player, now unable to

perceive an optimum course of action, may be forced into the decision‐making dilemmas

172 von Hilgers (2012), pp.63‐4

173 Ibid

174 Di Marzio (2009), p.9

175 Ibid



178 Ibid


33

the training objectives require from the game.179 The other variable is control, firstly that

awarded to the umpire in assuring chance and uncertainty continue to drive the game in

the right direction. Controlling chance to meet training objectives is common,

demonstrated through the range of random probability, the moderation of results, Red

Cells, injects, and omitting certain types of chance and uncertainty.

For the player, the notion of control refers to the ability they have to manipulate the

variables comprising each instance of chance and uncertainty.180 Chess represents one

extreme, where players have high levels of control with no randomness or hidden

information, with uncertainty only through adversarial intent.181 Player skill is emphasised

because the player has full control over their progress as they can manipulate their pieces

as desired, with only opponent reaction forcing any guesswork.182 The other extreme

would be snakes and ladders where players have no control over the game as die rolls

they cannot influence determine their entire progress, with player skill utterly replaced by

pure luck.183

A wargame of pure luck, where players have no control over their progress would not

necessarily be an unrealistic experience as many aspects of warfare are more dependent



181 Sabin (2012), p.110

182 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.225‐6&337

183 Ibid, p.179


34

upon luck than any skill on the part of the decision‐maker.184 Nevertheless, the central

purpose of an educational/training wargame is the decision‐making experience offered to

players.185 Once the player loses control over manipulating game variables through luck

they cannot influence, the ability for the game to offer this experience shall be lost.186

Even when the player does have control, if their success comes down to luck the danger

exists of teaching false lessons as the causality between decisions and results may blur.187

Frank mentions the requirement for some level of cause and effect to be present to give

the game a logical structure from which players may draw lessons.188

However, to conclude that both chance and uncertainty should be utterly minimised for

clear causality, and emphasis on pure player skill against purely adversarial uncertainty, is

problematic. Including the pressures of general friction on decision‐makers is a commonly

desired method of presenting players with the dilemmas of the real‐world battlefield.189

To advise that chance and uncertainty should be minimised may allow clearer causation,

but at the price of reducing the relevance of the game experience to the reality it is

preparing players for.

To view the element of chance and uncertainty in such negative terms is however a

fallacy that has been previously dismissed. Clausewitz saw general friction as something


185 McHugh (2013), p.224

186 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174‐5


188 Frank (Interview)



35

offering possibilities that genius may exploit, whilst Salen and Zimmerman dismissed

Callois' view of chance as an element towards which the player is passive.190 It is a

positive view of chance that complements rather than opposes skill where a solution lies.

Mouat is clear that players require the ability to make decisions related to the skills the

training objectives aim to teach, as failure resulting from unforeseeable events teaches

little.191 By strategising chance and uncertainty through giving players the ability to

manipulate the associated variables, the designer may create a balance between skill and

chance.192 Rather than players remain completely passive to the influence of chance and

uncertainty, they instead may have the ability to take calculated risks.193 This may be

through overloading combat force ratios, taking step losses for greater combat odds,

exploiting opportunities to earn information, or through the ability to deceive the

opponent.194

The key point is that players are allotted meaningful decision‐making opportunities when

facing situations developed by chance and uncertainty through an ability to influence the

odds or increase their information of the state of the game.195 By allowing players to

manipulate the variables surrounding chance and uncertainty, rather than remain

completely passive to their effects, an experience offering meaningful decision‐making

190

Paret (1985), p.373 ; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.179 191

Mouat (Interview) 192

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.185‐6 193

Ibid, p.179 194

Sabin (Interview) 195

Ibid


36

may exist alongside the pressures of general friction.196 The designer must comprehend

just how much control to afford the player over manipulating which variables,

acknowledging where the skill‐chance balance shall lie.

The actual training objectives shall always be the final arbiter over the chance‐skill

balance, levels of pressure applied, and control afforded to the player. Games that fall

towards the training purpose will be more likely to offer greater player control and put

players under only a small amount of pressure.197 As training simply aims to imbue

procedural information and have players who follow these procedures succeed more

often than not, a prominent level of chance and uncertainty could provide problematic.198

Too much pressure and too little control, both to players in following procedures and for

the Control Group in driving the game in the direction of those procedures, may simply

blur the required clarity of the lesson.199

Similarly, the level of experience of the training audience is significant, with different

considerations existing for different stages of the curriculum.200 Sterrett states that when

he emphasises causation the key reason is that he is running wargames for students who

are fresh and not ready for the full spectrum of general friction.201 Thus, the context

under which the game takes place is central for the required chance and uncertainty

196 Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.185‐6


198 Ibid

199 Ibid


201 Ibid


37

balancing. Frank mentions how the influence of uncertainty may be slowly increased

linear to the learning curve as the player gains experience.202 A spectrum of training and

education thus exists, affording less experienced students more control with less pressure

as they learn procedural lessons, moving up to mission rehearsal where the relation of

control and pressure to reality becomes more important.203

3.2 Explicit Realism and Fidelity

These game design considerations of balancing skill and chance handle these two points

of Sabin's trinity, but balancing with the third point, the explicit “realism” of the model

developed and how vital it is generating valid knowledge and experience must now be

considered.204 Any game that represents reality requires a level of abstraction, a

simplification of the elements that constitute the model due to an inability to include

every facet of the phenomenon.205 Eddington et al., defined simulation as a model

representing the central features of reality, with Salen and Zimmerman finding the use of

‘central features’, rather than just “reality” significant as it highlights the inability for a

202 Frank (Interview)


204 Rubel (2006), p.115; Sabin (2012), p.117

205 Juul (2007), p.1; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.439


38

model to be a comprehensive representation.206 Games represent reality metaphorically,

not literally, and cannot be both broad and deep in their modelling.207

The reasoning behind this emphasis on simplicity is twofold. The first is the role of the

player and the need to balance with playability.208 A system too convoluted may make it

hard for players to make clear decisions, potentially leading to artificial decision‐making

or prohibit meaningful decision‐making entirely.209 The second is the lack of correlation

between the complexity of a wargame and the resulting realism.210 Perla was clear that

the technical accuracy of a wargame and the realism produced are not synonymous.211

The reason returns to the notion previously presented of war being nonlinear and the

attribute of such a system where the sum of its components does not equal the whole. As

a result, bottom‐up modelling, where every quantifiable input is simply incorporated into

the system, shall not automatically guarantee a realistic model.212

Instead of focusing on bottom‐up modelling, Sabin favours a top‐down approach where,

rather than concentrating on inputs, the outputs the game system produces are

prioritised, allowing better representation of the unquantifiable elements of warfare.213

Randomness was previously demonstrated to be a common tool for the abstraction

206

Eddington et al. (1982), p.10; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.423 207

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.457 208

Sabin (2012), p.19 209

Perla (2011), p.263; Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.425 210

Curry (2012a), p.12 211

Perla (2011), p.138 212

Sabin (2012), p.25 213

Ibid


39

process, allowing the designer to represent the influence of general friction as simple

probability.

Whilst chance mechanics may be utilised to represent the notion of the uncertain non‐

linear dynamics that shape the undercurrent of war, there is one significant limitation to

their ability to do so. Games are environments are structured around a limited rule‐set,

restraining the number of outcomes and interactions, only representing chance and

uncertainty within a narrow cross‐section.214 Taleb termed the “Ludic Fallacy” to highlight

this limitation of game‐like modelling, specifically dice, as methods of modelling the

uncertainty that exists in reality.215 Taleb felt that such approaches domesticated the

effects of uncertainty in reality as the “bounded” nature of games leaves open only a

certain number of possibilities and sterilises any risk faced.216 The RAND study “Surprise!”

also highlighted this when talking of “contrived” environments, where a specific set of

rules govern and limit the possible interactions between participants, reducing the level

of chaos in the environment.217 The study contrasts the difference between a military

professional, in a non‐linear environment, with a sports coach, who can effectively

visualise all possible scenarios that can occur due to the bounded nature of a game

system.218

214

Perla (2011), p.251 215

Taleb (2010), pp.128‐30 216

Ibid 217

Baiocchi & Fox (2013), pp.46‐8 218

Ibid, p.15


40

The use of randomness as a valid abstraction for the uncertainty of warfare shall thus

require justification. One method to justify this abstraction is through explicit references

to military history of similar scenarios to the exercise as a basis.219 Graham Longley‐

Brown, in order to prove that data on chance mechanics is valid and accurate, mentions

utilising historical analysis developed by an official source, for him Dstl.220 Whilst not

predictive, such data provides a odds average for cases under certain force‐ratios or

stances.221 By deriving combat result data and the degree of random variation from this

data, which importantly shall undergo further verification and validation scrutiny before

being judged fit for purpose, Longley‐Brown feels random generation can be proven

valid.222

Robert Rubel however is less convinced that randomness can justifiably portray

unmodelled factors of reality.223 This is not to say that Rubel feels all uses of randomness

are invalid, accepting technical applications, like radar detection or weapon reliability,

that are probabilistic in nature having odds that he feels are more easily validated.224 To

aggregate wide ranges of unmodelled variables, such as the complex interaction of large

forces, or factors dependant on human performance such as morale, logistics, and

219

Elg (Interview) 220


Ibid 222

Ibid 223

Rubel (2006), p.117 224

Ibid; Ibid (Interview)


41

training, into die rolls, though, is far more strenuous to Rubel.225 To him the fact that dice

are unpredictable does not make them synonymous with the inability to perceive the full

complexities underlining general friction on the real battlefield.226 Notions of luck and

chance are a special phenomenon unto the dice themselves, which can cause a greater

correlation of unmodelled factors than how likely they will align in reality, casting doubt

on their validity.227

Rubel still recognises necessity of the abstraction process and feels to conclude that

wargaming must have unsparing fidelity in the number of variables simulated, rather than

any abstraction of chance, would be untenable.228 Ultimately, the notion that war follows

a non‐linear process prevents all relevant factors being included and can only therefore

be an imperfect copy of warfare directed towards a purpose.229 To attempt to include

every variable would not only be impractical, but the increased fidelity would become

increasingly expensive, preventing the benefits to costs games aim to achieve.230 Rubel

accepts the need to distillate factors seen as extraneous, and that in fact this process may

cover for the damage caused by lowering the level of fidelity by helping highlight the

factors central to the purpose, demonstrating to the player causation and cause‐effect

225

Rubel (2006), p.117; Rubel (Interview) 226

Ibid 227

Rubel (Interview) 228

Ibid (2006), p.114 229

Frank (2011), p.3 230

Sabin (Interview); Sterrett (Interview)


42

relationships where desired.231 For random methods within this, Rubel concludes that

chance only provides the appearance of fidelity, acceptable for specific aspects of the

model, but never a shortcut for actually injecting fidelity or realism.232

Longley‐Brown and others though underline that the absolute level of realism is of

secondary importance to developing an environment that achieves training objectives,

meaning the ability of a wargame to achieve its purpose will not depend on the absolute

levels of fidelity.233 The mathematical representation of reality may in reality be stretched

to one that ensures players are given a specific decision‐making experience and

confronted with particular dilemmas.234 Nevertheless, the abstraction of reality into

distilled game mechanics can also lead to “game artefacts” if the relation between the

decision‐making experience and reality is stretched too far.235 The risk of teaching false

lessons exists if player decision‐making is grounded on the artificialities of the game,

rather than the considerations of a real combat situation.236 The difficulty for chance and

uncertainty is developing the connection between the unquantifiable nature of general

friction and the concrete forms of game mechanics.237

231

Rubel (2006), p.114 232

Ibid (Interview) 233

Sterrett (Interview) & Fox (1985), p.48 234

Rubel (2001), p.62 235

Ibid (2006), p.115 236

Perla (2011), p.237 237

Elg (Interview)


43

If realistic decision‐making can be achieved however, some feel that wargaming may be

used to prepare students to handle the influence of general friction on operations as a

credible training objective in of itself.238 This concept is predicated upon the notion that

by forcing players to experience general friction directly they may develop new

perspectives on its influence, intentionally stressing players to the point of inoculation.239

Evidence exists that the key element to dealing with unpredicted events is experience of

dealing with uncertainty, reducing the size of the “surprise space” as decision‐makers can

more readily recognise consequences and best courses of action in response.240 Perla

feels that having this intellectual and emotional preparation to respond to the

unexpected is the best way to deal with the inherent unpredictability of war itself.241

Wargaming has a role therefore in developing the synthetic experience required to

prepare player mind‐sets to respond to uncertainty in reality through exposure to it in

games.242 This logic dictates that to deal with the unpredictability of non‐linear processes,

preparedness is a better solution than prediction, and that someone unacquainted with

the stressors of chance events will not survive when they encounter them for real.243 This

feeling is not mutual however, as discussed previously, Sterrett feeling the notion that

chance events occur is common knowledge and thus not a particularly useful lesson or a

238

Frank (2011), p.15 239

Perla & McGrady (2011), p.122; Beaumont (1984), p.16 240

Baiocchi & Fox (2013), pp.35‐7 241

Perla (2011), p.285 242

Ibid 243

Taleb (2010), pp.208&326


44

productive use of student time.244 Nor it is a widespread training objective currently

within educational wargaming to make such explicit references to general friction.245

One method of applying such pressure is through the system of injects.246 Praun centred

his concept of a screenplay of injected frictions upon a methodology aimed to stress‐test

battalions as preparation for the real battlefield.247 Another who advocated this approach

was Lieutenant General Raymond Furlong, who saw it an explicit purpose of educational

wargaming to prepare the ‘intuition and determination’ required to develop the presence

of mind to deal with uncertainty.248 Furlong felt that a well‐developed wargame must

always immerse the players ‘in a sea of poor information and faulty or inadequate

intelligence’.249

The ultimate aim of Furlong’s method was for the influence of chance and uncertainty to

be so overbearing, put players under such pressure, and leave them with such little

control, that defeat was far more common than victory.250 The events would be unfair on

players, resulting in them finding the game frustrating, unpleasant, with Furlong stating,

‘a properly developed war game may well be not only an unpleasant experience for most

244

Sterrett (Interview) 245

Elg (Interview) 246

von Hilgers (2012), pp.63‐4 247

Ibid 248

Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 249

Ibid 250

Ibid


45

participants but also an unpopular feature of one's military career’.251 Player enjoyment

was to be secondary to this goal of inoculating them to uncertainty.252

Furlong’s goals may have been an extreme example, but it does raise questions over the

utilisation of chance and uncertainty. Firstly, by leaving the player in such a state of

passiveness the designer shall struggle to emphasise the games decision‐making purpose

or offer meaningful decision‐making dilemmas. Secondly, returning to Perla’s definition,

wargames are not just a model of warfare with definite expectations of what players will

learn, rather the actual interaction of the players plays an equally dominant role.

Furlong’s notion of deliberately causing negative player reactions through unfair

applications of chance and uncertainty has clearly conceptualised the link between the

model and training objectives. However, players are a reactive, not passive, part of any

wargame and Furlong’s concept spurs a requirement to appreciate the importance of

player reactions to chance and uncertainty.

251

Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 252

Ibid


46

4. Player Reactions to Chance and Uncertainty

4.1 Player Reactions to the Model

Considering how players react to chance and uncertainty within the model shall be a vital

requirement as the formal system of rules shall never exclusively determine, nor can be

separated, from the way players interact with the model in practice.253 Whilst therefore

the previous section reviewed the theoretical design considerations of the model on

paper, this study must now analyse the effect of design decisions concerning chance and

uncertainty on how players shall actually react to this model.254 This study must

understand the risk of when and how players may react to the game model in ways

unanticipated by the game designer and what the consequences may be.255

An important factor is ensuring players are motivated to engage the exercise with the

positive mind‐set required to achieve training objectives.256 Motivation will not guarantee

this alone, but absent, ensuring players are receptive and buy into the learning process

will become arduous.257 The player must accept that the game is a credible model of

reality, suspend their disbelief, and understand the relationship between reality and the

abstractions of the rule‐set.258

253

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.187; Perla (2011), pp.23&241 254

Jones (1998), p.315 255

Frank (2011), p.2 256

Perla (2011), p.21; Ozcelik et. al. (2013), p.13 257

Caspian Learning (2008), p.80; Rubel (Interview) 258

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.94‐9; Frank (2012), p.120


47

Anders Frank identifies that players must adopt two coexisting attitudes towards the

game.259 The first is a “lusory” attitude, a commitment to playing the game in accordance

with the boundaries and restrictions of the rule‐set.260 In a professional wargame, this

must be balanced with the second, a “professional” attitude, where players accept the

representation of reality as legitimate and when interacting with the game make

decisions as if it were reality.261 Any mismatch in player attitudes may instead spawn

what Frank terms “Gamer Mode” where players treat the wargame not as an exercise to

be taken seriously, but as just a frivolous game.262 When this occurs, and players no

longer see the wargame as legitimate exercise or a proper representation of reality, the

risk of disengagement exists.263 Johan Elg is clear that if player involvement is lost because

they stop taking the game seriously, then the exercise is effectively over.264

The first consideration must be the range of player reactions to the role chance and

uncertainty have within the model. A major reason for players to lose their professional

attitude is for them to dismiss the exercise as just a “dice game”, or one dominated by

luck.265 With randomness especially, players may have a tendency to dismiss a bad result

and blame the system for their failure, whilst simultaneously accepting successes as their

259

Frank (2012), p.120 260

Ibid 261

Ibid 262

Ibid 263


Elg (Interview) 265

Ibid


48

own.266 Many may as a result see any element of randomness as unacceptable because,

rather than representing general friction, it is seen as simply turning the game into one of

all luck and no skill.267 The player, rejecting the mechanic as just a die roll, does not make

the connection between the instance of randomness and the notion of unpredictability,

even if they understand well the uncertainty of war in reality.268

The use of randomness to generate outcomes can be particularly problematic if it causes

players to reject the internal logic of the game as a true abstraction of reality.269 One

reason may be that the result was simply unexpected and outside what the player

perceived as a plausible range of outcomes in reality, rather than simply just being

surprising.270 An unanticipated event may break the legitimacy of the wargame to the

player and develop the attitude that it is just a game, not an accurate simulation of

warfare.271 An alternative scenario can exist according to Frank if unexpected results

occur to players with the right attitude who instead see a gap in their knowledge and

actively challenge their own assumptions and faults in their decision‐making.272 Despite

266

Sterrett (Interview); Allen (1989), pp.200‐1 267


Longley‐Brown (Interview); Heilmann (Interview) 269

Frank (2011), p.2 270

Ibid, pp.2‐3 271

Ibid, pp.7&13 272

Ibid, p.14


49

this, the danger of a complete rejection of the model with the resulting loss of

professional attitudes can make unexpected results a risky occurrence.273

Expanding on this rejection of the models legitimacy is another concern where

occurrences of chance become scapegoats for player failure.274 Results are not necessarily

unforeseen, but it is another breakdown in player perception of the connection between

the mechanic and the reality it ostensibly represents.275 This again has roots in the fact

that many players have an asymmetrical view of randomness, attributing success to skill

and failure to factors that they feel they have little control over.276 The player, under such

circumstances, may attribute their failure to a system they deem unfair, rather than

themselves, again slipping from a professional attitude.277 If randomness gives the player

an excuse, by allowing them to shift blame, achieving training objectives will become

difficult as player decision‐making becomes artificial.278

Rubel demonstrates this issue vividly with his example of a student reacting to a die roll in

frustration by saying, ‘this is a dice game, not a capabilities game!’279 The issue the player

was referring to was one discussed previously, that of fluke results from randomness.280

Players may potentially see fluke results as proof that the logic underpinning the game

273

Frank (2011), p.13 274

Perla (2011), p.230 275


Taleb (2010), p.152 277

Perla (2011), p.230 278

Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sterrett (Interview) 279

Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20 280

Ibid


50

system is flawed and use it as an easy target to hook any failure upon.281 A negative

player attitude is thus at risk if the quality of their decision‐making is perceived by the

player as being secondary to such flukes of luck.282

This issue of flukes is exacerbated if the value placed upon the use of wargaming within

the student curriculum is tenuous with little time for more than one exercise to occur.283

As previously noted, the nature of stochastic randomness is its tendency to fall back to

the mean the more results that are generated.284 Elg previously mentioned that a reason

he never runs a game fewer than twice is for the reason that players cannot be left to

form their experience from just one case with the risk of fluke results.285 However, for

Longley‐Brown within the British army, any previous suggestions for even a second run

have been dismissed as subordinate to other concerns.286 Available time for multiple

plays does not always exist, even if it may have a major effect on player attitudes.287

This issue of players developing a non‐professional attitude that rejects the reality of the

wargame as just a game will though be hardest felt when it actively interferes with player

decision‐making. There is a risk to training objectives if players no longer enquire to why

their plan has failed in a manner akin to reality, especially if their decision‐making was at

281

Rubel (2006), pp.119‐20; Frank (2011), pp.3‐4 282

Rubel (2006), p.119; Perla (2011), p.236 283

Frank (2012), p.129 284

Rubel (2006), .120 285

Elg (Interview) 286


Frank (2012), p.129


51

fault.288 If a player maintains that that their plan or decision‐making was not at fault and

instead feel that the only liability was an unlucky die roll, then they may stand to learn

little.289 A player who rejects the role of chance and uncertainty in game outcomes may

simply contend that their failure was not due to mediocre decision‐making, but that the

game itself is simply just a pointless dice‐rolling game.290 Longley‐Brown feels most

military players he has worked with are not particularly aware of the element of chance

within a training environment and as such will blame failure on it, often the computer

that generates the outcomes.291 Seldom though will their natural reaction be to revisit

their plan or consider any decision‐making mistakes.292

In theory, player failure due to an unforeseen event may teach a good lesson on how to

deal with the influence of uncertain outcomes in reality, and that an unfair game is simply

the reflection of an often unfair reality.293 In practice however, the potential apparently

exists for players to lose their professional attitude in reaction.294 Dismissing the system

as unrealistic or unfair is unfortunately a seemingly more natural reaction for many,

casting doubt on the ability for players to consider the aspect of such uncertainty

realistically in their decision‐making or learn from its occurrence.295 In reality, luck is both

288

Perla (2011), p.223 289


Ibid 291


Ibid 293

Furlong (1984), pp.5‐6 294

Elg (Interview) 295

Longley‐Brown (Interview)


52

undeniable and happened; it cannot be changed and must be accepted as what

transpired.296 A game however is deniable, as it is a single outcome of a repeatable

experience, differing if the exercise started again, an imbalance leaving sufficient room

for dismissal.297

The balance, between a mathematically plausible simplified model of reality and player

acceptance, becomes important if players are to hold the professional attitude required

to treat the game seriously and make decisions realistically.298 The rejection of the games

internal logic due to the elements of chance and uncertainty thus is an important issue to

consider. If players do not feel chance events could have occurred, view them as unfair,

the product of luck, do not link to their perception of what might occur in reality, or reject

them simply to save face, then elements of chance and uncertainty may become a liability

that prevents a professional attitude.299

4.2 Player Reactions to Presentation

Player reactions to chance and uncertainty however may not always be congruent with

the actual mathematical model.300 The overlapping components of chance and

uncertainty provide one reason. Informational and adversarial influences for example

296


Ibid 298

Perla (2011), pp.263‐4 299

Sterrett (Interview); Elg (Interview); Longley‐Brown (Interview); Sabin (Interview) 300

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), p.174


53

may increase the complexity of the system and alter the predictability of any randomness,

leading players to perceive the model is more random than it may actually be.301

However, more importantly, and what now must be considered, is the second major

consideration of player reactions, the influence of how chance and uncertainty is framed

and presented to the player.302

The first concern surrounding presentation is the actual method by which chance and

uncertainty have been modelled. This study has previously considered player reactions to

randomness, whether from unexpected or fluke outcomes, but the specific use of physical

dice presents an important case study. Indeed, much of the impression of a wargame as

an exercise dominated by luck comes from a decision to utilise dice to represent

chance.303 Many military audiences have an instinctively negative reaction to any

introduction of dice into a wargame used for educational or training purposes.304

The stigma surrounding the use of dice is one encountered to varying degrees globally,

but Longley‐Brown and Mouat see the British army as having an aversion to dice at an

intensity unrivalled elsewhere, failing any test of credibility.305 Players may accept the

notion of wargaming as an exercise but when presented with dice they often disengage,

Longley‐Brown reporting an incident endured by another instructor where after first

301


Ibid, p.175 303

Sabin (2012), p.118 304

Brynen (Interview) 305

Longley‐Brown (Interview); Mouat (Interview)


54

displaying dice some players simply walked out of the game.306 An entire event with a

British army audience, or any with the same issues, may be derailed simply by the

introduction of a physical dice.307

The issue of rejecting dice returns to the requirement for players to maintain a

professional attitude towards the game, as the connotations surrounding dice may cause

the loss of this attitude.308 For many players their reaction is coloured by prior association

developed before the exercise between the use of dice in popular games seen as

dominated by luck or a frivolous children’s pastime, such as Ludo, Snakes and Ladders,

and Monopoly.309 Alternatively, dice also have connotations to stereotypically “geeky”

games such as Dungeons and Dragons and Warhammer, which for some shall also trigger

a negative reaction.310 Neither of these outlooks are correlative to a professional attitude,

both inspiring a juvenile perception of the game, due to a pre‐existing notion of what dice

represent.311 Nevertheless, the stigma of dice is a problem dependent on the particular

training audience, with Johan Elg able to openly using large quantities of dice with his

own wargames for a Swedish Army audience with few of the same problems Longley‐

Brown and Mouat have encountered.312 The designer must identify the training audience

306


Ibid 308


Ibid; Sabin (Interview) 310

Longley‐Brown (Interview); Mouat (Interview) 311

Ibid 312

Elg (Interview)


55

and their likely reaction to certain methods like dice to gauge whether such issues of

perception may dominate how the players shall approach the game.

Another issue is signalling what randomness represents. Whilst the designer may have a

clear concept of how the mechanic relates to the non‐linearity of general friction,

whether the player recognises this is a separate matter.313 Perla considered wargaming an

act of communication and a challenge for abstract methods like dice is the lack of

inherent narrative or connection between result and reality, as rolling a one just

communicates a numeric.314 An independent dice roll will be just that, it may tell players

whether things went right or wrong, but does not communicate the details or the trail of

logic behind why it happened or what actually occurred.315 Without giving players a clear

understanding of how the roll of a dice, or other method of randomisation, relates to

their conception of reality, an unprofessional attitude is at danger of occurring.316

An alternative solution is to utilise other methods of generating randomness.317 Longley‐

Brown remarks that, curiously, utilising computer‐generated randomness, on an Excel

spreadsheet or even a smartphone die roller, will produce different reactions from those

who react negatively to dice.318 The underlying probabilities may be equal to if a dice was

utilised, but the likelihood of positive attitudes being developed has increased

313

Brynen (Inteview) 314

Perla (2011), p.173; Brynen (Interview) 315

Brynen (Interview); Sabin (Interview) 316

Ibid 317

Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.205‐6 318

Longley‐Brown (Interview)


56

dramatically.319 The reason is again presentational; a computer‐generated outcome has

the appearance of something far less frivolous and far more scientific.320

Similarly, a deck of cards may be utilised to produce some form of randomness, at the

expense of reverting to a non‐stochastic system.321 The non‐stochastic nature of cards

draws may lead players to perceive the result differently to randomness, justified or not,

as the order seems pre‐determined and more akin to chancing upon an event.322 The

cards may also overcome the explanation issue through simply stating what has occurred,

providing players with context.323 The inject system also offers this benefit of ready‐made

explanations, though both require greater amounts of care and preparation compared to

an easily reusable stochastic system.324 In any of these cases, a way of presenting

concepts that helps prove the method of randomness as valid shall be vital to having a

better chance of ensuring a professional attitude.

Furthermore, the source of the underlying data was mentioned as having an important

role in ensuring the validity of the model, but it may be equally significant in developing

player respect for the model of chance and uncertainty.325 The example of utilising

analysis by Dstl is a good illustration as the players may be less likely to question the

319



Salen & Zimmerman (2004), pp.205‐6 322


Ibid 324


Sabin (Interview)


57

integrity of the model if it is from what they consider a respectable source.326 This

compared to if their complaints were against a “finger‐in‐the‐wind” guess by the

designer, with a perception of randomness being introduced for the sake of

randomness.327 If players feel assured of the validity of the model of chance and

uncertainty, through both reputation and lack of designer guesswork, the games

presentation may help produce a professional attitude.328

A related issue to the source of the data is the terminology used to describe game events

and mechanics, specifically any lapse into gaming terms like “step losses”.329 It is often

imperative that terminology relating to the players real‐world role is utilised as an

important prerequisite to ensuring professional attitudes.330 It will be relatively easy for

players to slip into game‐playing attitude if something like dice, already seen as a sign of

frivolity, is described in such terms as well.331

Player perceptions of informational uncertainty is less contested and may compliment, or

as previously discussed, even replace the role of randomisation, and in either case is

usually seen as more acceptable.332 The notion of Fog of War is a more easily envisaged

condition of warfare, which more importantly generates a feeling of personal

326




Perla (2011), pp.265‐6 330


Ibid 332

Sabin (Interview)


58

responsibility over outcomes.333 If the player guesses wrong, then the fault of this mistake

lies firmly in their hands from a decision they have made, rather than having an easy

scapegoat, creating a strong perceived link with skill element of the game.334

Adversarial uncertainty may at first glance seem to draw the same conclusion, maybe

even greater for the direct focus on player skill, thus leaving fewer opportunities for

scapegoating. The complication though is again cultural.335 In a direct player versus player

adversarial wargame one must lose, and thus the risk of a player losing face may lead to

possible rejection of the exercise.336 Tom Mouat went as far to call this type of direct

adversarial gaming as culturally inconceivable in the British army due to dangers of losing

face.337 Again, exceptions exist and Johan Elg with a Swedish army audience encounters

fewer issues, with Elg himself seeing directly adversarial gaming as vital.338

Player reactions to chance and uncertainty thus have a decisive influence over achieving

the desired training objectives, increasing the importance of the umpire in managing

player reactions.339 Similar to the reputation of the source of the underlying data, military

and operational experience provides credibility to the judgement of this figure.340 The

major benefit of an umpire is the linkage they can develop between the abstractions of

333


Ibid 335


Ibid 337

Ibid 338

Elg (Interview) 339


Mouat (Interview)


59

the exercise and the reality it portrays, within the minds of the player.341 Central shall be

handling situations when players take exception to the model of chance and uncertainty

and explaining to them what exactly the model represents, whilst maintaining their

professional attitude.342

By building a dialogue, communicating what chance and uncertainty represents, the

umpire may develop a narrative that connects the dry result of a dice roll with player

perceptions of reality.343 Rather than simply informing students that they failed or

succeeded due to randomness through game‐like terms, an umpire can instead explain

the result in professional terms relating to the military experience of the player.344 If

chance and uncertainty causes events outside player expectations, from a fluke, or from

new information, that lies outside their perception of reality, the umpire may present an

adequate explanation, before players dismiss the exercise as just a “game”.345 Umpires

may discuss player experiences surrounding chance and uncertainty as a game

mechanism, and translate this gaming viewpoint into one the player perceives in the

relation to their real‐world role.346

This communication expands the role of the umpire past their previously defined position

in free and semi‐rigid gaming, tasked now with guiding player reactions towards the

341


Frank (2011), p.14 343


Ibid 345

Perla (2011), p.372; Brynen (Interview) 346

Elg (Interview); Sabin (Interview)


60

required professional attitude, partially by overcoming the presentational flaws of chance

and uncertainty.347 For the umpire to achieve this however they must have a clear

understanding of how cause and effect led to certain outcomes if students are to benefit

from the decision‐making experience a wargame is ostensibly designed to develop.348

Another part of reason James Sterrett favours causation is the ease of which it allows the

umpire to demonstrate the link between a player mistake and the result.349

These reasons underlie why Johan Elg feels umpires are a vital component of any

educational or training wargame.350 Elg states that he could not imagine having two sides

with dice playing through an exercise unsupervised, as he feels arguments would quickly

occur over rules and representations, making a professional attitude impossible.351 Philip

Sabin though, whilst appreciating the importance of umpires, states they are not an

absolute requirement as a well‐designed self‐contained wargame can still teach relevant

lessons.352

Indeed, caveats do exist on the use of an umpire. Firstly, umpires are an expensive

commodity for limited budgets and not all situations will garner the resources required

for an optimum number of umpires.353 As was earlier demonstrated with the number of

347

Elg (Interview) 348

Sterrett (Interview) 349

Ibid 350

Elg (Interview) 351

Ibid 352


Frank (2011), p.14


61

times a game will be played, wargaming is often currently seen as a complementary, not

vital, part of a student’s education.354 Budgets are often constrained, leading to common

use of self‐contained wargames, frequently those based on computer games, which

multiple students can play simultaneously with fewer instructors required.355

Nevertheless, as Frank demonstrated in his study on player attitudes, negative player

reactions to chance and uncertainty often occurred because no instructors were

nearby.356 This prevented them detecting these reactions, explaining the underlying logic

of chance and uncertainty in the model, and redirecting players towards the purpose,

resulting in numerous occasions where players dropped their professional attitude.357

Secondly, whilst in theory semi‐rigid methods afford the umpire greater control over the

direction of chance and uncertainty, they potentially may just transfer the target of

negative player reactions.358 Rather than the dice or the computer acting the scapegoat, it

is instead the umpire and their judgement who take the blame.359 Heilmann highlights a

particular issue in directly adversarial wargames where one side shall inevitably see the

umpire as biased against them if they perceive any moderation is in their opponents

favour.360 Unless the umpire has significant experience and is able to develop a clear

354

Frank (2012), p.129 355

Ibid 356

Ibid (2011), p.14 357

Ibid 358

Rubel (Interview) 359

Ibid 360

Heilmann (Interview)


62

dialogue with players, semi‐rigid methods have the potential to simply shift the source of

the problem.361

Many of the issues surrounding player reactions are however outside the confounds of

the wargame. The framing of the player experience of the game shall often be

determined by pre‐existing attitudes developed prior to playing, which may dominate the

mind‐set they bring to the game.362 It is an unfortunate fact that some chance devices,

such as dice, have a pre‐existing association with childishness and frivolity, leading to the

need to seek alternatives if a professional attitude is to be maintained.363 Similarly, an

earlier reason for potentially avoiding directly adversarial wargaming was the fear of how

players would react to losing face, and is a symptom of a culture if does not allow safe

failure.364 If wargaming does not take place within an environment that allows safe failure

then the search for a scapegoat will become instinctive, amplifying the potential of

negative player reactions to chance and uncertainty.365

The player’s approach will also be drawn from their professional understating of concepts

such as risk and probability, which if lacking shall increase the likelihood of rejected those

elements of the model.366 It will be difficult to explain to players the link between bad

decision‐making and a bad result if chance and uncertainty had an influence if an officer’s

361

Brynen (Interview); Elg (Interview) 362


Ibid 364

Caspian Learning (2008), p.65 365

Ibid; Howard‐Jones (2011) pp.34‐5 366

Mouat (Interview)


63

previous training had developed little comprehension of this element of warfare.367

Whilst the model may be adapted to chosen training objectives, and presentation

modified to fit the training audience, the cultural background of that audience will shape

much of their perceptions and the requirements of ensuring they hold a professional

attitude.

If an environment is produced that ensures professional attitudes, despite the

considerable hindrances that exist, some educational advantages can occur. If players

accept dice, their physical presence may be utilised to engage players with the risk they

are taking and the role of luck in their performance, this being the reason Elg has his

players roll their own dice.368 Heilmann also finds that having players physically hold and

roll the dice can far greatly immerse them with the risk they are taking.369

Another potential benefit of chance and uncertainty exists in growing research on their

neurological influence upon motivation and future recall of experiences, a benefit as

providing that experience is an aim of educational wargaming.370 As previously discussed,

learning potential is not just down to motivation but it is still a vital component.371 The

potential for chance and uncertainty to increase this motivation and future recall, if a

367


Elg (Interview); Heilmann (Interview) 369

Heilmann (Interview) 370

Howard‐Jones (2011), pp.36&29 371

Caspian Learning (2008), p.80


64

professional attitude exists, has potential for future investigation.372 Professor Paul

Howard‐Jones has conducted a number of studies on the neurological benefits of chance

and uncertainty in enhancing the educational utility of games, though for traditional

educational audiences where professional attitudes provided a lesser challenge.373

Howard‐Jones builds upon existing evidence on the processes of mid‐brain dopamine,

where the discrepancy between an expected result and what occurred will lead to

dopamine release in scale with the prediction error.374 Dopamine release itself plays a

critical role in deep learning, where the learner makes sense of new information rather

than simply memorising facts, as its release heightens the brain’s attention to the

stimulus and promotes greater memory formation.375

Howard‐Jones demonstrated that the level of dopamine release during a gaming activity

was in correlation with the ability of players to later recall and utilise their experiences

gathered from playing the game.376 Howard‐Jones concludes that by making player

reward subject to chance and uncertainty the learning potential of the game shall

increase alongside the vividness of the experience.377 Whether this applies to the

decision‐making experience driving educational wargaming provides a rich source for

372

Caspian Learning (2008), pp.74‐5 373

Howard‐Jones (2011), p.36; Howard‐Jones & Demetriou (2009), p.519 374

Fiorillo et. al. (2003), pp.1898‐9; Shizgal & Arvanitogiannis (2003), p.1857 375

van der Spek (2013), p.158 376

Howard‐Jones (2011), p.36 377

Ibid


65

future study, but still a potential benefit that cannot be realised until player attitudes are

consistently professional in response to chance and uncertainty.

To ensure positive, professional player attitudes a return is required to the comment of

Rubel's student, ‘This is a dice game, not a capabilities game!’378 This point on ensuring

player skill is not overwhelmed by chance has already been discussed for a model that

achieves training objectives, but is a further consideration for player reactions. This is

especially important in the relation to the notion of games stressing for reality, where the

players view of the skill‐chance balance may be crucial to achieving a professional

attitude.379 The question of levels of pressure applied and control given, that players will

accept, requires a return to the decision‐making purpose of wargaming.380 A game where

players have little control, but under a lot of pressure from chance and uncertainty, has

the potential to develop a sense of hopelessness and unfairness in players leading to a

rejection of the exercise.381

The notion of strategising chance through the ability manipulate related variables was

also previously discussed as a method of creating a skill‐chance balance which emphasises

the games decision‐making purpose. Sabin, Heilmann, and Frank all feel that this also is

an important part of making chance and uncertainty acceptable to players.382 If players

378

Rubel (2006), p.119 379



Schell (2008), p.169 382 Sabin (Interview); Heilmann (Interview); Frank (Interview)


66

feel they have an influence over their progress within the game, rather than a sense of

passiveness, the danger that the player perceives the exercise as a dice game, rather than

one focused on capabilities, diminishes.383

The inject system has a potentially important role in ensuring professional attitudes if

utilised. As discussed, injects endow the Control Group with greater control over chance

and uncertainty, allowing them to develop situations based more upon risk‐taking than

pure uncertainty. Longley‐Brown states that MEL/MIL lists must be must be carefully

considered, conceived, and injected, if they are to help develop positive player

reactions.384 Events are usually grouped into easy, medium, and hard categories, each

applying different levels of pressure upon players to garner certain reactions and force

particular dilemmas.385 Whilst easy events can quickly inspire certain reactions, medium

and hard events are scheduled in advance to inspire long‐term planning and planning

from the player.386

These injects require careful planning so that players can react and make a decision, as an

event appearing suddenly and unexpectedly will offer players little decision‐making

experience without this time to react.387 Whilst Longley‐Brown accepts such a sudden

turn of events may occur, from weather or losing communication, if the player feels

383



Ibid 386

Ibid 387

Ibid


67

ambushed with little time to react they commonly complain the inject is random and

unrealistic, causing disengagement.388 Instead, information signalling the events future

possibility is bread‐crumbed, with players given time to notice signs of the possibility an

event may occur, so that they may choose to react or take a risk, engaging with the games

decision‐making purpose in a professional manner.389 Through use of selectively feeding

information in preparation for the inject, a player may both be faced with the desired

dilemmas whilst maintaining their perception of having a level of control over their own

failure or success.390

A delicate balance therefore exists between the needs of developing a model as a simple

simulation of reality to fit the training objective, against that of player psychology.391

Players must engage with the purpose of the exercise and be motivated to approach the

game with the professional attitude required to make decisions as they would in

reality.392 The theoretical requirements of developing an abstract model for the purpose

must align with the practical, psychological, requirements that the training audience

force. However, the particular training audience shall define the considerations required

388


Ibid; Mouat (Interview) 390



Ibid


68

for this balance.393 Indeed, the particular training audience is what allows Elg’s

experiences to contrast many others.394

The balance between skill and chance, as well as control and pressure, is required for not

only what dilemmas and decisions it is desired players will make, but that they shall

inspire positive reactions.395 No single set solution exists for finding this balance other

than a clear understanding of the training objective and identifying the training audience

with their varied views of acceptability, often differing between different members of

that audience.396 Designers, umpires, and Control Groups, must identify the nuances of

the training audience, whether sceptical of concepts associated with games, or having a

narrow perception of possibilities due to inexperience, each requiring a unique set of

priorities in design considerations.397 Brynen feels the differing subcultures between

groups, often within the same training audience, are a major variable to consider over

reactions to chance and uncertainty.398 If present, a major role of the umpire is to oversee

the differing considerations of these groups to produce an experience that is acceptable

to all players, a difficult challenge for much associated with chance and uncertainty.399

393

Schell (2008), p.183 394


Schell (2008), p.183 396

Bloom (1985), p.105; Fox (1985), p.59 397

Elg (Interview) 398


Ibid

Ni

5.

Th

en

de

w

el

di

ch

sk

A

fo

ef

ca

re

icholas Edw

. Conclusio

his study ha

nsuring the

ecision‐mak

argame des

ement of ra

fficult comp

hance has b

kill.

core motiva

ocused and c

ffect this ha

aused by ge

educing the

wards – MA W

on

s analysed t

elements o

king environ

sign has pro

andomness

ponent for t

een reviewe

ation for uti

chess‐like w

s on real‐wo

neral frictio

potential fo

War Studies

the design c

f chance an

nment for an

oven to prov

in particula

the designe

ed not in iso

Figur

ilising chanc

wargames, is

orld decisio

on prevents

or high fidel

s – Dissertat

69

consideratio

nd uncertain

n education

vide a large

r demonstr

r to manage

olation, but

re 4: Sabin (

ce and unce

s the promi

on‐making. H

clear cause

ity, bottom

tion

ons the desi

nty can be u

nal or trainin

number of

rated to be a

e. By utilisin

in balance

(2012), p.11

ertainty, rat

nence of ge

However, th

e‐effect relat

‐up modelli

igner must t

tilised to de

ng wargame

consideratio

an especiall

ng Sabin’s tr

with the ele

17

her than de

eneral frictio

he non‐linea

tionships be

ing of this a

take into ac

evelop the d

e. This aspec

ons, with th

ly complex a

rinity, the el

ements of re

eveloping pu

on in warfar

ar nature of

eing develo

spect of wa

ccount in

desired

ct of

he

and

lement of

eality and

urely skill‐

re and the

f warfare

ped,

arfare.


70

Luck and chance in reality are simply mental abstractions for the complex, interactive,

underlying processes that lead to unforeseeable events. Rather than an unfeasibly high

level of fidelity, chance and uncertainty mechanics are in themselves abstractions,

offering top‐down methods of applying the overall effect of this uncertainty on decision‐

makers. The greater issue for chance and uncertainty therefore has proven to be the how

it may be utilised to create a balance with skill that produces the decision‐making

environment that meets training objectives.

The use of chance and uncertainty allows the designer to force the player to face the

same pressure on decision‐making caused by the impact of general friction. The pressure

of having to juggle the conflicting possibilities and probabilities is a key method of putting

players into the decision‐making dilemmas required by the training objectives. A clear

conceptualisation of these training objectives is thus a vital first step to ensuring chance

and uncertainty are utilised through the right combination of elements, to the right

distribution, to the develop the desired pressures on player decision‐making.

Complementing pressure is the level of control the player has over the variables that

comprise any individual chance event or bout of uncertainty, and is where the balance

between the aspects of skill and chance exists. The higher the level of control the player

has, the greater the influence of their skill has in relation to chance, and vice‐versa.

Despite the ability for chance and uncertainty to develop an abstracted environment to

meet training objectives, questions do still exist on whether “contrived”, rule‐based,


71

environments can expose players to the real‐world influence of general friction on

decision‐making. A major disconnect was demonstrated between the bounded, abstract,

representations of uncertainty in games and the non‐linear nature of warfare caused by

general friction. Whether Taleb’s notion of the ludic fallacy is a relevant concern for

wargaming, and whether the “domesticated” version of uncertainty represented in games

provides a valid decision‐making environment that inspires realistic decision‐making from

players, may require further study.

Nevertheless, alongside these theoretical concerns of utilising chance and mechanics, has

been the frequent disconnect with how players react to this element in practice. Players

are required to hold a professional attitude if they are to make decisions in a realistic

manner. Anecdotal evidence however has demonstrated that the elements of chance and

uncertainty, in particular randomness, may instead cause player reactions that dismiss

the exercise as just a frivolous game, however much it may align with training objectives.

The model, especially the perceived skill‐chance balance, was one source of disagreement

as players may term the exercise a game of luck or unfair, however valid the

representation of uncertainty may be. More curiously however is the revelation that the

way chance and uncertainty are framed and presented to the player shall have a decisive

effect on their attitude towards the game. That simply producing dice may cause certain

training audiences to dismiss the exercise as dominated by luck, or just a game of fun,

demonstrates the extent to which presentation shall be a major complicating factor.


72

The gulf between theory and practice therefore presents many challenges for the

designer in aligning the chance and uncertainty considerations of both. To overcome

these considerations, this study proposes three main recommendations.

The first is the importance of maintaining a positive skill‐chance balance. The ability for

players to strategise chance and uncertainty can allow the decision‐making element of

the wargame to be emphasised by giving players the opportunity to exercise their skill.

This also extends to ensuring positive player attitudes, as a game where the player

perceives they have the ability to influence chance and uncertainty through meaningful

decision‐making choices has some, though not total, protection against rejection and

scapegoating.

This study also cautiously recommends a prominent role for umpires. The direction in

which chance and uncertainty drive the wargame may be moderated through semi‐rigid

moderation, or crafted entirely through a system of injects following a methodology.

Furthermore, the presence of an umpire can help ensure players maintain a professional

attitude towards the exercise through discussion of how the model of chance and

uncertainty relates to reality and training objectives. Whilst not a panacea, umpires

provide a reactive solution to the many of the challenges of chance and uncertainty

highlighted by this study.

Umpires are not mandatory and a self‐contained wargame may still effectively manage

the design considerations of chance and uncertainty. Nevertheless, without the active


73

presence of this figure, a more cautious approach to chance and uncertainty may be

required. Self‐contained wargames produce a rigid, unchanging model, rather than a

semi‐rigid one model with the flexibility of adapting to the circumstances and the

challenges of chance and uncertainty as they occur. Caution must though still be taken.

Firstly, the target of player scapegoating may just transfer from the mechanic to the

umpire, as perceptions of bias or unfairness develop. Secondly, risk‐taking dilemmas may

be undermined if moderation simply leads to the removal of any consequences. When

and how results are moderated or injects introduced shall require careful consideration

and experience to avoid these downsides.

Any design decisions on chance and uncertainty though shall always be ultimately subject

to the context under the exercise takes place. A spectrum of training and education

exists, which along with specific training objectives, determine the required skill‐chance

balance, the pressure to put the player under, and what dilemmas they shall face.

Differing training audiences shall then react to the model produced for this purpose and

the presentation, based on perceptions of fairness, relation to reality, and pre‐existing

associations with methods like dice. Any one‐size solutions to this shall be impossible, as

wargaming is more art than science. Instead, clearly understanding the training

objectives, the training audience, and the considerations for both, shall allow the designer

to adapt chance and uncertainty to a model that fits the concerns of both theory and

practice.


74

6. Bibliography

Books, Monologues, and Papers

Allen, Thomas B. (1989), War Games: Inside the Secret World of the Men Who Play at

Annihilation (London: Mandarin)

Baiocchi, Dave & D. Steven Fox (2013), Surprise! From CEOs to Navy SEALs: How a Select

Group of Professionals Prepare for and Respond to the Unexpected (Santa Monica, CA:

RAND Corporation)

Bjӧrk, Staffan & Jussi Holopainen (2005), Patterns in Game Design (Hingham, MA:

Charles River Media)

Burns, Shawn (2013), War Gamers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional War Gamers

(Newport, RI: War Gaming Department, Naval War College)

von Clausewitz, Carl (1993), On War. Trans. and ed. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(London: Everyman’s Library)

Caspian Learning (2008), Serious Games in Defence Education (Sunderland: Caspian

Learning)

Cohen, Marvin S., Bryan B. Thompson, Leonard Adelman, Terry A. Bresnick, Lokendra

Shastri, & Sharon L. Riedel (2000). Training Critical Thinking for the Battlefield, Volume I,

II, III (Arlington, VA: Cognitive Technologies)

Curry, John (2012a), Innovations in Wargaming Vol. 1: Developments in Professional and

Hobby Wargames (Bristol: John Curry)

Dunnigan, James F. (2000), Wargames Handbook: How to Play and Design Commercial

and Professional Wargames (San Jose, CA: Writers Club Press)

Dupuy, Trevor (1985), Numbers, Predictions & War: Using History to Evaluate Combat

Factors and Predict the Outcome of Armed Conflict, 2nd edn. (Fairfax, VA: HERO Books)


75

Durschmied, Erik. (2002), The Hinges of Battle: How Chance and Incompetence Have

Changed the Face of History (London: Hodder & Stoughton)

Eddington, Henry, Eric Addinall, & Fred Percival (1982), A Handbook of Game Design

(London: Kogan Page Limited)

Ekeland, Ivar (1991), The Broken Dice, and Other Mathematical Tales of Chance. Trans.

Carol Volk. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago press)

Fox, Daniel B. (1985), A Conceptual Design for A Model to Meet the War‐Gaming Needs of

The Major Commands of The United States Air Force (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air

University Press)

Gee, James Paul (2008), ‘Game‐Like Learning: An Example of Situated Learning and

Implications for Opportunity to Learn’, in Pamela A. Moss, Diana C. Pullin, James Paul

Gee, Edward H. Haertel & Lauren Jones Young, eds., Assessment, Equity, and Opportunity

to Learn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 200‐221.

Hays, Robert T. (2005), The Effectiveness of Instructional Games: A Literature Review and

Discussion (Orlando, FL: Naval Air Warfare Center Training Systems Division)

von Hilgers, Philipp (2012), War Games: A History of War on Paper. Trans. Ross Benjamin.

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press)

Kahn, Herman & Irwin Mann (1957), War Gaming (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation)

Koster, Raph (2005), A Theory of Fun for Game Design (Scottsdale, AZ: Paraglyph Press)

Leonhard, Robert R. (1998), The Principles of War for the Information Age (New York, NY:

Presidio Press)

Leser, Jeffrey & James Sterrett (2010), ‘A Battle in Every Classroom: Gaming and the U.S.

Army Command & General Staff College’, in Nina B. Huntemann & Matthew Thomas

Payne, eds., Joystick Soldiers: The Politics of Play in Military Video Games (Abingdon:

Routledge), pp. 146‐159.


76

Lind, William S. (2005), Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 1st Indian edn. (Dehra Dun: Natraj

Publishers)

Luttwak, Edward N. (2001), Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: The

Belknap Press of Harvard University Press)

McCarry, P. J. (1991), This is Not a Game: Wargaming for the Royal Australian Air Force

(Canberra, ACT: RAAF Air Power Studies Centre)

McHugh, Francis J. (2013), U.S. Navy Fundamentals of War Gaming (New York, NY:

Skyhorse Publishing)

Owen, Martin (2004), An Anatomy of Games: A Discussion Paper (Slough: FutureLab)

Paret, Peter (1985), Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press)

Perla, Peter

(2011), The Art of Wargaming: A Guide for Professionals and Hobbyists (Bristol:

John Curry)

(1987), Design, Development, and Play of Navy Wargames (Alexandria, VA: Center

for Naval Analyses)

Perla, Peter & Darryl L. Branting (1986), Wargames, Exercises, and Analysis (Alexandria,

VA: Center for Naval Analyses)

Perry, David & Rusel DeMaria (2009), David Perry on Game Design: A Brainstorming

Toolbox (Boston, MA: Course Technology)

Sabin, Philip (2012), Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation Games

(London: Continuum)

Salen, Katie & Eric Zimmerman (2004), Rules of Play: Game Design Fundamentals

(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press)


77

Schell, Jesse (2008), The Art of Game Design: A Book of Lenses (Burlington, MA: Morgan

Kaufmann Publishers)

Setear, John K. (1989), Simulating the Fog of War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation)

Smith, Roger D. (2009), Military Simulation & Serious Games: Where We Came From and

Where We Are Going (Orlando, Fl: Modelbenders Press)

St. John, M., J Callan, & S. T. Holste (2000), Tactical Decision‐Making under Uncertainty:

Experiments I and II (San Diego, CA: Space and Naval Warfare System Center)

Storr, Jim (2009), The Human Face of War (London: Continuum)

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas

(2010), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd edn. (New York:

Random House)

(2007), Fooled by Randomness: The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the

Markets (London: Penguin Books)

Thompson, Jim, Barnaby Berbank‐Green & Nic Cusworth (2007), The Computer Game

Design Course: Principles, Practices and Techniques for the Aspiring Game Designer

(London: Thames & Hudson)

Watts, Barry D. (1996), Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Washington, DC: Institute

for National Strategic Studies)

Journal Articles and Conference Papers

Amory, Alan, Kevin Naicker, Jacky Vincent, & Claudia Adams (1999), ‘The Use of

Computer Games as an Educational Tool: Identification of Appropriate Game Types and

Game Elements’, British Journal of Educational Technology, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 311‐321.


78

Beaumont, Roger A. (1984). ‘Certain Uncertainty: Inoculating for Surprise’. Air University

Review, 35 (July‐August 1984) pp.8‐16.

Beyerchen, Alan (1992), ‘Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War’,

International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 59‐90.

Bloom, Richard. W. (1985). ‘On Inoculating for Surprise’. Air University Review, 38

(January‐February 1985) p.105.

Brewster II, Frank W. (2002), ‘Using Tactical Decision Exercises to Study Tactics’, Military

Review, Vol. 82, No. 6, pp. 3‐9.

Chancey, Eric T. & James P. Bliss (2012), ‘Unreliable Information in Infantry Situation

Awareness: Improvement Through Game‐Based Training’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol.

43, No. 5, pp. 581‐599.

Crookall, David & Warren Thorngate (2009), ‘Acting, Knowing, Learning, Simulating,

Gaming’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 8‐26.

Cunningham, J. Barton (1984), ‘Assumptions Underlying the Use of Different Types of

Simulations’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 213‐234.

Curry, John (2012b), ‘The Hunt for the Fletcher Pratt Naval War Game and the Fletcher

Pratt Air War Game: Onside Report’, The Nugget: The Journal of Wargame Developments,

No. 251, March 2012, pp. 12‐14.

Di Marzio, Giulio (2009). ‘The MEL/MIL Development System’, NATO Rapid Deployable

Corps (Italy) Magazine, No. 14, pp. 9‐10.

Dorn, Dean S. (1989), ‘Simulation Games: One More Tool on the Pedagogical Shelf’,

Teaching Sociology, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1‐18.

Downes‐Martin, Stephen (2013), ‘Adjudication: The Diabolus in Machina of War Gaming’,

Naval War College Review, Vol. 66, No. 3, pp. 67‐80.


79

Endsley, Mica R. (1995), ‘Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems’,

Human Factors, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 32‐64.

Fiorillo, Christopher D., Philippe N. Tobler & Wolfram Schultz (2003), ‘Discrete Coding of

Reward Probability and Uncertainty by Dopamine Neurons’, Science, Vol. 299, pp. 1898‐

1902.

Frank, Anders

(2012), ‘Gaming the Game: A Study of the Gamer Mode in Educational

Wargaming’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 118‐132.

(2011). ‘Unexpected Game Calculations in Educational Wargaming: Design Flaw or

Beneficial to Learning?’, in Proceedings of DiGRA 2011 Conference: Think Design

Play, September 14 – 17 2011, Hilversum. Hilversum: DiGRA/Utrecht School of the

Arts.

Frühling, Stephan (2006), ‘Uncertainty, Forecasting and the Difficulty of Strategy’,

Comparative Strategy, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 19‐31.

Furlong, Raymond B. (1984), ‘Clausewitz and Modern War Gaming’, Air University

Review, 35 (July‐August 1984) pp.4‐7.

Gray, Colin S. (1999), ‘Why Strategy is Difficult’, Joint Force Quartly, No. 22, pp. 6‐12.

Herbig, Katherine L. (1986), ‘Chance and Uncertainty in On War’, Journal of Strategic

Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2‐3, pp. 95‐116.

Howard‐Jones, Paul (2011), ‘Toward a Science of Learning Games’, Mind, Brain, and

Education, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 33‐41.

Howard‐Jones, Paul A. & Skevi Demetriou (2009), ‘Uncertainty and Engagement with

Learning Games’, Instructional Science, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 519‐536.


80

Howard‐Jones, Paul A., Rafal Bogacz, Jee H. Yoo, Ute Leonards, & Skevi Demetriou

(2010), ‘The Neural Mechanisms of Learning from Competitors ’, NeurolImage, Vol. 53, pp.

790‐799.

Jethi, S. C. & R. K. Jain (2004), ‘Simulation of Naval Wargames’, Defence Science Journal,

Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 407‐415.

Jobbágy, Zoltán (2008), ‘Scrutinising Effects‐Based Operations: On Military Genius,

Causality and Friction in War’, Academic and Applied Research in Military Science, Vol. 7,

No. 1, pp. 167‐174.

Jones, Ken (1998), ‘What Are We Talking About?’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 29, No. 3,

pp. 314‐320.

Juul, Jesper (2007). ‘A Certain Level of Abstraction’, In Situated Play: DiGRA 2007

Conference Proceedings, September 24 – 28 2007, Tokyo, pp.510‐515. Tokyo: DiGRA

Japan.

Kasperson, Roger E. (1968), ‘Games as Educational Media’, Journal of Geography, Vol. 67,

No. 7, pp. 409‐422.

Kobus, David A., Sherry Proctor, Tim Bank & Steven Holste (2000). ‘Effects of Experience

and Uncertainty during Dynamic Decision Making’, in Proceedings of the Human Factors

and Ergonomics Society 44th Annual Meeting, July 29 – August 4, 2000, San Diego, pp.

177‐180. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

McCloskey, Michael J. (1996). ‘An Analysis of Uncertainty in the Marine Corps’, in

Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 40th Annual Meeting,

September 2‐6, 1996, Philadelphia, 194‐198. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society.

Medina, Eliana (2005). ‘Digital Games: A Motivational Perspective’, in Proceedings of

DiGRA 2005 Conference: Changing Views – Worlds in Play, July 16‐20, 2005, Vancouver.

Merrill, M. David (1997). ‘Instructional Strategies That Teach’, CBT solutions, Vol. 2, No. 6,

pp. 1‐11.


81

Ozcelik, Erol, Nergiz Ercil Cagiltay & Nese Sahin Ozcelik (2013), ‘The Effect of Uncertainty

on Learning in Game‐Like Environments’, Computers & Education, Vol. 67, pp. 12‐20.

Pavlas, Davin, Wendy Bedwell, Samuel R. Wooten II, Kyle Heyne & Eduardo Salas

(2009). ‘Investigating The Attributes in Serious Games That Contribute to Learning’, in

Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 53rd Annual Meeting, October

19‐23, 2009, San Antonio, pp. 1999‐2003. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and

Ergonomics Society.

Perla, Peter P. & E. D. McGrady (2011), ‘Why Wargaming Works’, Naval Warfare Review,

Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 111‐130.

Pitt, Roger S. (2008). ‘Realities of Space Age & the Realties of Carl von Clausewitz’s

Theories of “Fog and Friction”’. Army Space Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.54‐59.

Rowe, William D. (1994), ‘Understanding Uncertainty’, Risk Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp.

743‐750.

Rubel, Robert C.

(2006), ‘The Epistemology of War Gaming’, Naval War College Review, Vol. 59, No.

2, pp. 108‐128.

(2001), ‘War‐Gaming Network‐Centric Warfare’, Naval War College Review, Vol.

54, No. 2, pp. 61‐74.

Sabin, Philip (2011), ‘The Benefits and Limits of Computerization in Conflict Simulation’,

Literary and Linguistic Computing, Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 323‐328.

Saperstein, Alvin M. (1995), ‘War and Chaos’, American Scientist, Vol. 83, No. 6, pp. 548‐

557.

Shaffer, David Williamson, Kurt R. Squire, Richard Halverson, & James P. Gee (2005),

‘Video Games and the Future of Learning’, Phi Delta Kappan, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 104‐111.


82

Shattuck, Lawrence G., Nita Lewis Miller, & Kacey E. Kemmerer (2009). ‘Tactical Decision

Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty: An Empirical Study’, in Proceedings of the

Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 53rd Annual Meeting, October 19‐23, 2009, San

Antonio, pp. 242‐246. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.

Shizgal, Peter & Andreas Arvanitogiannis (2003), ‘Gambling on Dopamine’, Science, Vol.

299, pp. 1856‐1858.

Simon, Herbert A. (2000), ‘Observations on the Sciences of Science Learning’, Journal of

Applied Developmental Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 115‐121.

Smith, Roger (2010), ‘The Long History of Gaming in Military Training’, Simulation and

Gaming, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 6‐19.

Squire, Kurt (2006), ‘From Content to Context: Videogames as a Designed Experience’,

Educational Researcher, Vol. 35, No. 8, pp. 19‐29.

Thompson, Frederick (1982), ‘Did We Learn Anything From That Exercise? Could We?’,

Naval War College Review, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 25‐37.

van der Spek, Erik D. (2013), ‘Introducing Surprising Events Can Stimulate Deep Learning

in a Serious Game’, British Journal of Educational Technology, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 156‐169.

van Sickle, Ronald L. (1978), ‘Designing Simulation Games to Teach Decision‐Making

Skills’, Simulation and Gaming, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 413‐428.

Vizhakat, Mohan (2002), ‘Expert Systems for Computerised Wargames’, Defence Science

Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 95‐100.

Waldman, Thomas (2010), ‘’Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz’s Timeless Analysis of

Chance in War’, Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 336‐368.

Whitney, Susannah J., Philip Temby & Ashley Stephens (2013), ‘A Review of the

Effectiveness of Game‐Based Training for Dismounted Soldiers’, Journal of Defense

Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology, (Published Early

Online).


83

Websites

Longley‐Brown, Graham (2011). ‘What is Wargaming?’. [Online] Available from:

http://lbsconsultancy.co.uk/our‐approach/what‐is‐it/. [Accessed: 10th January 2014]

Interviews

Brynen, Rex [Professor of Political Science, McGill University & Co‐editor of PAXsims].

Interview by author. Tape recording. King’s College London, March 03, 2014. [Recording

in possession of author]

Elg, Johan [Swedish Army Reserve Major and Lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish

Defence College]. Interview by author. Tape recording. Strand Palace Hotel London,

February 12, 2014. [Recording in possession of author]

Frank, Anders [Swedish Defence College]. Interview by author. Email. June 18, 2014 ‐ July

18, 2014.

Heilmann, Uwe [NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre]. Interview by author.

Telephone. July 16, 2014. [Recording in possession of author]

Longley‐Brown, Graham [Professional wargaming consultant at LBS Consultancy].

Interview by author. Tape recording. Kingston Langley, April 16, 2014. [Recording in

possession of author]

Mouat, Tom [British Army Major and current Directing Staff Officer responsible for

Modelling and Simulation at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom]. Interview by

author. Tape recording. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Shrivenham, June 12,

2014. [Recording in possession of author]

Rubel, Robert [Dean of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and previously Chairman of

the Wargaming Department, at the U.S. Naval War College]. Interview by author. Email.

May 15, 2014 ‐ May 23, 2014.


84

Sabin, Philip [Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and author of ‘Simulating

War’]. Interview by author. Tape recording. King’s College London, May 30, 2014.

[Recording in possession of author]

Sterrett, James [Deputy Director of the US Army Command and General Staff College’s

Digital Leader Development Center’s Simulations & Exercises Division]. Interview by

author. Email. March 26, 2014 ‐ May 12, 2014.

NicholasEdwards_ChanceandUncertainty_Wargames

Documents

Transcript of NicholasEdwards_ChanceandUncertainty_Wargames