NFL v. NFLPA - A KEY to Understanding the Lock-out

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NFL v. NFLPA - A KEY to Understanding the Lock-out

Background

In its simplest terms, the NFL is in the business of hiring players to play professional football for its member teams and the National Football LeaguePlayers Association (“NFLPA”) is the advocate and union of those players. TheNFLPA is the exclusive labor union made up of all of the players in the NationalFootball League. When it was founded, it originally considered being a part of or was made offers to join other traditional labor unions like the Teamsters or

AFL/CIO. It has had an interesting development.

The NFLPA was founded in 1956, but only achieved recognition and a CollectiveBargaining Agreement (“CBA”) in 1968. The NFLPA formed when players on theGreen Bay Packers and Cleveland Browns unionized to demand that the clubsprovide players with a minimum league-wide salary, per diem pay, uniforms,equipment paid for and maintained at the clubs' expense and continued paymentof their salaries while they were injured and unable to play. Unable to win theNFL’s attention by organizing, the association threatened to bring an antitrustlawsuit against the league. Again, simplistically, there are laws in the US that forcefair play and fair dealing by companies, particularly those that have a “monopoly”on a particular trade, like the NFL. That threat became much more credible whenthe United States Supreme Court ruled in Radovich v. National Football League,

352 U.S. 445 (1957), that the NFL did not enjoy the same antitrust immunity thatMajor League Baseball did.

Rather than face expensive litigation and (even worse) a potentially adverseprecedent, the owners granted most of the players' demands (including minimalinsurance and pension plans and a basic salary for all players), but did not enterinto a Collective Bargaining Agreement with the NFLPA or formally recognize it asthe players’ exclusive bargaining representative. The players continued to use thethreat of antitrust litigation over the next few years to win better benefits,including a pension, health insurance plan and payment for exhibition games.

The NFLPA ultimately won recognition from the owners and its first CollectiveBargaining Agreement. However, the Union faced many uphill battles during theprocess such as in 1968, after talks with NFL owners stalled. The NFLPA voted to

strike, and the owners countered by declaring a lock-out. On July 14, the ownersrelented and the brief strike was over. Although the players could celebrate winning a Collective Bargaining Agreement from the owners, the concessions they received were small.

The NFLPA found itself in an equally weak a position as it had been in before. Aftera brief strike during training camp in July 1970, the NFLPA won the right forplayers to bargain through their own agents with the clubs, improvements in basicsalaries and pensions, dental care, and impartial arbitration for injury grievances. Yet, by 1977, the NFLPA still strived for true free agency and a goal of winning 55



percent of league revenues for players.

That desire largely led to the 1982 NFL strike, which began on September 21,1982 and lasted 57 days until November 16, 1982. During this time, no NFLgames were played. The essential cause of the strike was over a dispute over thepercentage of gross revenues that the league gave to its player, as the NFLPA wanted the percentage increased as mentioned. As a result of the strike, the

season schedule was reduced from 16 games to 9.

One particular major byproduct of that strike is pretty telling about the power andcontrol the NFL and its owners had at that time. The NFLPA’s negotiators won theright to obtain copies of all individual contracts entered into by the players. Before1982, salaries were unknown and largely confidential, so the disparity was vast. According to the 1982 directory, there were $50,000 backups and $40,000starters. For example media cited the contrast of salaries of Minnesota'squarterback, Tommy Kramer, who threw for 3,912 yards in 1981, and SanFrancisco's Guy Benjamin, a backup, who threw for 171 yards. Kramer got$100,000 and Benjamin $130,000.

Still fighting with a booming NFL, the NFLPA struck for a month in 1987. On thisoccasion, only one week of the season was canceled. For the next three weeks, the

NFL staged games with hastily assembled replacement teams made up of non-NFLPA members (called “scabs” by some). They were made up of several playerscut during training camp, as well as a few veterans who crossed the picket lines.Many switched sides over fear that owners would cut off their annuities- 89players crossed the picket line.

Faced with cracks in union support, the willingness of the networks to broadcastthe replacement games, and hostile public sentiment, the NFLPA voted to go backto work on October 15, 1987 without a Collective Bargaining Agreement. They hadto wait another week to get back on the field, however, since they hadn't come back by the owners' deadline. The NFLPA filed a new antitrust suit that same day.

The Court of Appeals ultimately rejected that suit, the Union decertified itself andPlayers filed various actions against the NFL. Ultimately, the parties settled on a

formula that permitted free agency. In return, the owners demanded and receiveda salary cap. The agreement also established a salary floor- a minimum payrollthat all teams were obligated to pay. The NFLPA and the league have extended the1993 agreement five times, most recently in March 2006 when it was extendedthrough the 2011 season after the NFL owners voted 30-2 to accept the NFLPA'sfinal proposal. Either side could opt out with 2 years notice.

In May 2008, the owners unanimously decided to opt out of this CBA and play the2010 season without a bargaining agreement in place. The 32 owners of the NFLargued that stadiums and expenditures are getting more expensive to build andoperate, that they are bearing a huge share of infra-structure in contrast in past years when taxpayers helped fund it, that they bear substantial risk and,accordingly, asked the players to reduce the pool of money used to calculate theirsalaries by an additional $1 billion (called a “credit”). The union asked the league

to prove it needs the money by opening its books. The league has declined therequest to an unknown extent.

So, the 2010 season is being played with no salary cap (or floor), and there is thelooming possibility of no play at all in 2011 if an agreement cannot be reached.The CBA expires on March 3 in its entirety, although the 2011 NFL Draft will beheld thereafter on April 21-23. After the Draft, everything stops and the Playersare “locked-out” from play with no salaries and virtually no benefits.



NFL v. NFLPA

Source of Dispute

From 1996 to 2007, the average NFL owner increased his/her franchise’s value by $693 million (338 percent). Average values increased again in 2008 and 2009,

and dipped slightly in 2010, landing the average NFL club value at $1.02 billiongoing into 2010. This valuation makes the average NFL club worth more thandouble an average Major League Baseball club and nearly triple that of NationalBasketball Association and National Hockey League clubs— all leagues withguaranteed player salaries and substantial post-career benefits.

Contrarily, the owners, particularly the more aggressive, entrepreneurial ones(such as Jerry Jones, Robert Kraft, Pat Bowlen, and Jerry Richardson), want a CBA that accounts for the high-risk investments they’ve made on new stadiumsand other capital expenditures. For the most part, the owners are unified in their belief that they agreed to a lousy deal when the current CBA was extended in2006, and that the players currently receive too great a share of their adjustedgross revenues. The Players want a 55-60% of proceeds and better protection inthe form of benefits and guaranteed dollars.

Many owners believe that the late Gene Upshaw, who served as the NFLPA’sexecutive director for a quarter-century, caught then-NFL commissioner PaulTagliabue in a weak moment and muscled through an extension to the CBA that was, in essence, a resounding victory for the players. Upshaw, owners believe,knew that Tagliabue (who was preparing to step away after a 17-year stint ascommissioner which included unprecedented labor peace) did not want to tarnishhis legacy by ending his tenure with a messy fight between the players andowners. He also understood that several of the league’s most powerful owners were unwilling to entertain thoughts of a work stoppage because of expensivestadium plans (such as “Jerry World”). So, Upshaw successfully got Tagliabue tosell a deal that gave the players 59.6 percent of total revenue and implemented a revenue-sharing plan in which the league’s 15 highest-earning franchises

subsidized the 17 teams that earned the least. Those that are spending money are,in a sense, possibly financing both huge stadiums and capital expenditures and arecarrying some of the burden of supporting other franchises. The money isn’t asequally lucrative as it was.

Under the current deal, owners receive a credit of slightly more than $1 billion foroperating and investment expenses off the top of an annual revenue pool that isapproximately $9 billion before the remainder of the money is divided. The ownersare seeking an increase to about $2.4 billion in credits, a number they say reflectsthe changing economic realities of the era. Taxpayers less commonly partly or wholly subsidize stadiums and owners are now pouring much more capital intostate-of-the-art facilities. The owners believe that the players should account forsome of this risk. Players, conversely, argue that they are not in a true

partnership absent an ownership stake in franchises whose values have increasedexponentially over the past decade and a half, not to mention the fact owners alsostand to gain in the property investments they are making.

NFLPA’s Stance and the War of Words

George Atallah is the Assistant Executive Director of External Affairs of the NFLand a top member of the NFLPA. He is keen on the issues and very concernedabout the current situation. He has been very vocal about the lock-out, recently



stating, “The question I have for owners is why do you keep telling the fans theplayers get 60 cents of each dollar when it's just not true.”

The NFLPA Executive Director is DeMaurice Smith (known as “De”), whosummarized the NFL’s position, as “The league proposed an 18 percent reductionin the first negotiation session. They haven’t moved off of their request for anadditional billion dollars (in credit) from the players.”

Also De said: “We’ve seen no justification for a rollback. Players can’t make moremoney without the revenue going up. And the reality is we are receiving about 49percent of all revenue, not 60. We were always receiving about 50 percent of allrevenue. But it’s actually gone down because of the cost credits owners are taking off the top. In 2006, we were getting about 50.1 percent. Today it is about 48.7percent of all revenue. The league keeps saying that the players are getting 60percent. The league likes to tout that 60 percent number in order to tell peopleplayers are getting more than the owners. Total revenue is all revenue, minus costcredits off the top. So what has happened since ’06 is the cost credits to ownershave gone up.”

In fact, these are the NFLPA’s numbers:

2002–51.87 %

2003–50.23 %2004–52.18 %2005–50.52 %2006–52.74 %2007–51.84 %2008–50.96 %2009–50.06 %

And De iterated, “they (the NFL) know America is not being told the truth.”

And in summary, De stated, “I believe we should have an exchange of the rightinformation. The profits over the last 10 years either justifies an 18 percentrollback or it doesn’t. If it does, well, we have already pledged to fix the CBA.”

Over the last several months, the NFLPA has instituted an enormous publiccampaign to get the public, legislators and anyone that will listen on its side. It isan unusual negotiation strategy, at best.

For instance, the NFLPA sent letters to each NFL city’s governmental entities,touting the losses to be experienced if an NFL lock-out takes place. De estimates,“The magnitude of the loss would be at the very least about $160 million to $170million per team-city,” Smith said. “That is a conservative estimate of theeconomic impact.

The NFLPA has also turned to Congress for help in preventing team owners fromlocking out union members next season. Steps the union has taken includedrafting letters for lawmakers to send to the league and holding a briefing formembers of Congress and their aides on the economic impact of a labor dispute,according to the Associated Press. Yet, it also accuses the NFL of having its ownlobbyists and interests in Congressional circles.

And then there are the NFLPA cartoons…



And, the NFLPA’s released a “list” of actions that the NFL undertook, which wehave in part redacted and revised. It includes the following actions the NFL hastaken:

- Imposed lockout clauses in coaches’ and executives’ contracts that gaveclubs the right to reduce compensation in the event of a lockout, including language that will reduce, terminate, or suspend the contract on 20 days’notice, reduce salary by 50 percent if a lockout continues for more than 90days, terminate the employee without pay on 60 days’ notice, and extendthe contract another year at the same terms as 2011 if at least eight NFL

games are canceled due to a lockout.- Retained Bob Batterman, veteran labor-relations attorney and

orchestrator of the 2004-2005 NHL lockout, as outside counsel.- Began a strategic and premeditated course of action designed to reduce

expenses by laying off 15% of staff.- Passed a resolution allowing all NFL teams to opt out of a defined benefit

pension plan for NFL coaches and executives.- Got DirecTV to renew its deal to serve as the NFL's exclusive satellite

carrier through the 2014 season. Deal should be worth at least $1 billion



annually and right’s fees need to be paid to the league notwithstanding a lockout in 2011.

- Got Fox and CBS to renew their broadcasting rights deals with the NFL.The deals, which should be worth more than $712 million a year from Foxand $622 million a year from CBS, need to guarantee payment even if there is a lockout.

- Solidified war chest in the event of a lockout by securing $4.5 billion fromTV networks even if games aren’t played.

- Rejected the player’s union’s proposal to keep playing under an extensionof the existing CBA. Five Times.

- Proposed an 18 percent giveback of net revenue by the players to offsetteam costs.

- Ended obligation to fund players’ healthcare in the event of a lockout.- Negotiated contracts of the 2010 first-round draft picks to reflect the belief

there will be a lockout in 2011 by changing the payment date of option bonuses from the first two weeks of the league year, which begins inMarch, to around the time the first regular-season game is played in 2011, whenever that may be.

- Rejected the NFLPA’s proposal for a Proven Performance Plan (rookie wage scale).

- Five months prior to the implementation of a lockout, informed employeesof three-phase plan that will require many employees to take unpaid leavesof absences as well as pay cuts.

- Required banks lending to teams to extend the traditional six-month graceperiod for declaring a default to instead stretch through to the end of the2011 season in preparation for a lockout.

- Announce that it will stop providing health care for players and theirfamilies in March when the current CBA expires.

- Solidified war chest in the event of a lockout by building a $900 millionpool of money from savings from not paying player benefits.

And, the NFLPA focuses on the salacious and sensational- “So, you know, we havea number of players who have children in need of critical care, of heart

transplants, of kidney dialysis. The NFL sees a couple of bad hits on a Sunday anddecides to fine players in the cause of player safety. But then you have players who have done nothing but play and work as employees and they have to go homeand tell their wives and children they are going to have their health insurancecanceled in March.” The NFL correctly points out that under federal COBRA law,players will be able to continue their coverage either at their own or the union’sexpense.

The NFLPA has also created websites, constantly issues Twitter updates and is“rallying” everyone who can be “rallied.” It has been asked to stop revealing negotiations to the media. As is very clear here, some NFLPA releases andstatements have explicitly accused the NFL of lying and hiding information. Forinstance, one of the cartoons depicts a NFL owner hiding and lying to a Player’s

face. It is, as I said, a salacious and sensational frenzy of activity.

NFL Stance and the War of Words

The NFL owners and Commissioner aren’t talking nearly as much as the NFLPA representatives, although the Commissioner took a tour of many of the NFL teamsduring training camp to mixed acclaim. Owners are largely keeping opinions andnegotiations closer to the vest.

The NFL’s stance is that owners are willing to consider alternatives to the core



economic proposal it made to the players’ union, but the NFL wants the pace of talks to quicken, according to the league’s top internal negotiator, Jeff Pash. TheNFL has publicly suggested it is not wed to its core demand of holding back 18percent more in league revenue from the players in order to pay for costs likestadiums, NFL Network and team stores. The league says it made that proposal inDecember 2009, and while it feels the NFLPA has “mischaracterized” its positionas an 18 percent pay cut, it is open to an idea to simply decrease player pay untilrevenue accelerates. It is a circular argument because the NFLPA wants to view the accounting of each team.

It also stated, "Our collective bargaining agreement gives the union extensiveaudit rights and access to an enormous amount of financial data on each club. Thisincludes total revenue, total player compensation and many stadium and othercosts. We have provided substantial additional information on expenses we areasking to be recognized in a new CBA.”

And, "Our proposals recognize economic reality and will build on a system that has been good to all of us. We can improve by substituting two meaningful games fortwo lower quality preseason games, making further investments in player safety and shifting money from untested rookies to proven veterans and deserving

retired players — a win for players, fans and clubs."The NFL has also been highly critical of the actions of the NFLPA:

“The union’s request for state and local political leaders to intercede in thenegotiations ignores and denigrates the serious and far more substantial problemsthat those leaders, and that state and local workers across the country face. Wecan resolve our own issues as we have done many times in the past.”

“We need is to have sustained engagement. We need to be meeting regularly, weneed to leave meetings not worried about how we are going to characterizemeetings, whether we are gloomy, whether we’re upbeat, whether we are excited, whether we are exhausted. We need to get past that. … But it has got to be a sharedcommitment. One side cannot do it alone.”

“I think you don’t have to look any further than the basketball negotiations, wherethey did produce, as I understand it, all of their financial statements, thatdocument losses in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and the union’s response was quote, it’s baloney, close quote.”

“It is a series of numbers pulled from thin air in a misguided attempt to injectpolitics into the collective bargaining process,” Aiello said in an e-mail. “There is a fair deal to be done and soon if the union will bargain with the same fervor itdisplays in creating economic fairy tales.”

“Every governor, mayor and state legislator understands the need to balancerevenue and labor costs. That is why all over the country state, county andmunicipal employees are facing layoffs, salary cuts, benefit reductions, and otherchanges in working conditions far more severe than anything proposed by the NFL

in these negotiations. In fact, NFL player compensation has doubled over the pastdecade and will continue to grow under our proposal. And we have offered toincrease jobs and improve benefits.

“Now that the union leaders have concluded their decertification ‘going-out-of- business sale,’ arranged for form letters to be sent to NFL owners by other unions,and issued press releases about their letter-writing campaign to mayors andgovernors, we are hopeful that they might find more time to talk to us. The union’srequest for state and local political leaders to intercede in the negotiations ignoresand denigrates the serious and far more substantial problems that those leaders,



and that state and local workers across the country face. We can resolve our ownissues as we have done many times in the past but the NFLPA has to want toparticipate in resolving them.”

“Nobody—least of all NFL owners – wants to shut down our business. The best way to ensure uninterrupted NFL football in 2011 is for the union to stop asking everyone else to solve its problems and to sit down and engage in serious,constructive bargaining. If the union does so, we can and will reach anagreement.”

Negotiation 101

As someone who has studied labor law and the intricacies thereof, practiced on both sides of the table of civil and commercial litigation for 10 years, has attended100’s of formal mediations and arbitrations and settled over 1000 disputes, I don’tget it. I have read and studied everything from Sun Tzu’s Art of War to DaleCarnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People, including seeing some of the best negotiators work their magic. Nowhere in the book does it say offend youropponent. Nowhere.

Proper battle, or in this instance negotiation, is waged first with knowledge and a deep fundamental understanding of the opponent so you can better achieve yourobjectives. Secondly it is more important to outwit your opponent than to out fightthem. Sun Tzu says, “To win 100 battles is not the height of skill. To subdue theenemy without fighting is.” Another ancient concept teaches, “Avoid what isstrong. Attack what is weak.” I suggest anyone try and stand in his/her opponent’sshoes first to understand his/her weaknesses. Being open is tough, but it is thekey to understanding and conveying your strongest points. Dale Carnegie’s bookmay very well be the opposite of Sun Tzu’s but it teaches the same thing-

Why prove to a man he is wrong? Is that going to make him like you? Why not let him save face? He didn't ask for your opinion. He didn't want it. Why argue with him? You can't win an argument, because if you lose, you lose it;and if you win it, you lose it. Why? You will feel fine. But what about him?

You have made him feel inferior, you hurt his pride, insult his intelligence,his judgment, and his self-respect, and he'll resent your triumph. That willmake him strike back, but it will never make him want to change his mind. A man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still.

Dispute resolution is not easy, but the formula is. It starts with knowledge andunderstanding. What are your facts and what is your opponent’s version of thosesame facts? Respect the core values of negotiation by not trampling the otherside’s autonomy or ego; treat the other side respectfully as a colleague; and



respect that they have a reason for their position, financial or otherwise.

Then listen. Hearing something doesn’t involve thinking about it. Listening does.Other important considerations to artful negotiation are-

-(1) Sit Down, in person, with the other side- this signals to the other person that

time will be spent to hear their side. Never ask someone to talk if there isn'tenough time to listen. It is the repeated chorus by the NFL- “if the NFLPA findstime to talk to us…” I am not sure how true it is, but all parties to a dispute need tooffer up as much time as the other sides reasonably need, as long as it isproductive. No amount of time will necessarily convince those that do not want toor are not in the position to deal.

-(2) Find a common ground. Negotiations that start off with a show of good faithand some agreement operate better. Sometimes the parties are just hurt orresentful. I do not know how many times I have sat in a room either defending oradvocating for a client who either accidentally killed a loved-one or had a lovedone-killed. Passion is great, but interferes with negotiation. There is at least onemajor common ground here- a rookie salary scale. It is clear that both sides canagree to this and will result in “apparent” savings that can be spent elsewhere.

-(3) Avoid empty threats, as intimidation can be powerfully detrimental. Use suchattempts sparingly, as implausible threats rarely influence. If you have the upperhand or items in your favor, feel free to prominently point them out. Slander, libeland defamation make people close off to you or lose respect for you. Calling someone a liar at the bargaining table or at the same time you are bargaining isnever effective.

-(4) Don't yield by sacrificing on important issues. Instead, look for compromises.Compromise is a form of stretching. Often both sides ultimately have to stretch both desires and detriments and sacrifice to get a deal done that both sides willlive with. There are areas of compromise here- for instance an 18 game schedule.It seems that the NFLPA has already yielded some willingness for this to happen.

It yielded this as an option, when this is a key lynchpin to the negotiation. If theNFL has an 18 game regular season schedule, it has an ability to raise profitsconsiderably. It is a major domino to this deal being done. If it falls too soon or without proper reward/sacrifice, the power shifts enormously.

A Layman’s Look

My personal opinion is both sides are operating aggressively (an unprofessionally)toward each other and haven’t spent enough time “collectively bargaining” to finda middle ground. It is clearly there. Although the NFLPA is the one publicly insulting, defaming and bafooning the NFL, the NFL owners started the wholesituation by opting out early and digging trenches around the stadiums. The NFLsays it simply wants to get to the table and work it out, but clearly there is a lot

more going on at, or on the way to, the negotiation table. Yet, there is NO reason why this deal cannot be done. Why? There are many bargaining chips on bothsides.

Both sides are armed with $100’s of millions of dollars in war chests, advocatesand lawyers, brilliant minds and tough fighters. Yet, the NFLPA is losing the battle because it is focused on discrediting the NFL and its owners and is waging a “public” dispute. It is also not very orderly in its concessions and concerns, atleast as I see it. Meanwhile, the owners and the NFL are focused on the reputation



they have with the Players, rather than giving the Players what they truly need-more protection in one of the most violent sports in the modern world.

I was asked how I saw the labor strife ending several months ago and I admittedthen, and state now, that I am naïve to all of the issues and am a rookie comparedto the veterans hired by both sides, but it is clear that both sides have too much tolose from a work stoppage and need a remedy to it if it is at all possible. I expectedand expect it will be worked out in time.

The NFLPA and NFL can agree to a Rookie wage scale. More money should go tothe Veterans as well as to benefits and protections. A rookie scale “saves” massiveamounts of money that can then be used elsewhere.1 Veterans deserve it and willstand to, essentially, get pay raises if distributed properly. I am not enough of aneconomist to figure out how to extrapolate an NBA type system to the NFL, but itis readily feasible. This money must then be spent upon Veterans and, possibly,expanded free agency. If Veterans are assured of making the same (orrealistically “greater” money), plus better benefits, I see this as somewhat as a win-win. Obviously, rookie contracts have to be limited in years, as with anaverage career of only 3.5 years, there is some mathematics that must go intomaking sure a salary minimum prevents teams from relying too heavily on more

minimum salaries or making hold-outs more common.

Next, if an 18-game season can be worked out, that “creates” additional revenuethat can be used elsewhere.2 Yet, it requires obvious, major concessions from theNFL of future health benefits, insurance and (we’d advocate for) research andmoney spent to prevent and focus on head injuries, including new helmet designs(such as the Xenith model), and the CTE/ALS link. A problem arises from a mere2 game pre-season, as it hurts the ability to properly evaluate and prepareplayers, so rosters would need to be expanded and other resources would need tofocus on making this a viable option. A 58-man roster will add over 150 jobs. Yes,that requires more distribution of current income, but is a fantastic thing forplayers.

So, is it really about %’s of distribution or what is best for players, owners andfans? What is it that built the NFL into the world’s most popular sports franchise? Why does a % matter if the Veterans are happier, players are far more protectedand secure and there are more jobs to go around. The devil is in the details. Yet, we don’t seem there yet. Not even close.

Conclusion

I know I am over simplifying everything, but every President, CEO and majorleader will tell you everything starts with the concept of simplicity or “KISS,” which refers to the phrase, “Keep it simple, stupid.” It was coined by the creatorsof the Lockheed U-2 and SR-71 Blackbird spy planes. The principle is also wellfounded in Occam's razor (“the simplest explanation is more likely the correctone”) and in Albert Einstein's maxim, “Everything should be made as simple as

possible, but no simpler” Leonardo Da Vinci's said, “Simplicity is the ultimatesophistication” and Antoine de Saint Exupéry said, “It seems that perfection isreached not when there is nothing left to add, but when there is nothing left to

1 It also, in part, may help with some of the “agent issues,” as many of the

less qualified and more desperate agents will go on to more lucrativehustles and leave the 22 year-old victim alone because the $’s are less. 2 I am not a fan of the 18 game schedule as a Player advocate, but see littlealternative in this instance. It can be done more fairly.



take away.”

There is no more name calling to be done. The “P” in Players depends on the unionto advocate for them. If the NFL is unwilling or unable to strike a deal RIGHTNOW, I’d advise the NFLPA to walk away from the table and sue over anti-trust violations. Don’t insult your opponent with silly cartoons or ask “big brother” totake your side. It shows weakness. It shows a crack in the armor. There is

enough out there to get the deal done. De Smith is one of the most charismatic andsharpest people I have met. As a player-advocate, I hate to see an 18 gameschedule, but if 5 more people per team get jobs and players receive desperately,long-needed guaranteed healthcare and security, then it is an option.

I am just a simple Alabama-born lawyer/agent, who loves football with a passionand those that play it with great compassion. I think its time for the NFL andNFLPA to K.I.S.S. and make up.

John M. Phillips Attorney / AgentBTSA- The Breakthrough Sports Agency Morgan & Morgan

www.mybtsa.com [email protected]

NFL v. NFLPA - A KEY to Understanding the Lock-out

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