Daniel Greenberg

Professor Jack Selzer

English 083T

15 November 2011

The Newark Riots of 1967

Newark, New Jersey has been a hub for commercial business, transportation, and

manufacturing since the 19th century, largely because of its coastal location. Although Newark

was plagued with high unemployment and poor living conditions during the 1960s, it was the

largest city in New Jersey in 1967 with 402,000 citizens, according to NJ.com, and still holds the

position as the state’s largest city. Newark was one of the first cities in the country to be home to

a large Negro community, which was almost half of the entire population. With this mix, racial

segregation and discrimination were inevitable, and it was a matter of time before a riot

occurred.

During much of Newark’s history, there was a large shift in the demographics of

Newark’s population, which had a lot to do with what happened in 1967. According to the Report

For Action, an assessment of the riots, “A recent Rutgers University survey of the Newark

population showed that 52% was Negro; 10% ‘other’ (mostly Spanish-speaking); and less than

40% established white residents. The survey also showed that Negroes accounted for only

approximately 45% of the voting population. Whites were a majority when it came to voting and

taxation” (New Jersey 2). Schools had been integrated since 1908 (New Jersey 6), but a large

majority of Newark citizens lived in poverty, white and black. Black migrants from the south

flooded the city as middle-class whites moved into the suburbs. This rush of unskilled and

Greenberg 1

uneducated workers created essentially no competition for jobs as the remaining whites, who

were more educated than the blacks, quickly filled open spots (New Jersey 45). The Commission

that authored the Report for Action said, “Between 1960 and 1966, Newark had changed from 65

percent white to 62 percent nonwhite, as blacks moved in and whites moved out” (Harris 8). The

city government remained predominantly white, though, and that was a problem.

In 1953, Irvine Turner, a former Negro journalist from the Central Ward, was elected to

the city council. African Americans had been running for office since 1941, but no one had ever

made it to office until Turner. With a large population of African Americas residing in the city,

candidates running for office had to please both the whites and blacks of the community in order

to secure a position (New Jersey 4). Although the city government had at least 5 black

representatives and officials, the Negro community soon began to question whether the

administration was sensitive to the black community and whether the Negroes who held office

positions really had the power and authority to voice their individual opinions (16).

Stokely Carmichael’s Black Power movement was making its way into the Central Ward.

Why were riots breaking out in all parts of the country? Who and what triggered these riots in the

northern states? In particular, what sparked the riots that struck Newark in 1967?

Before the riots occurred, African Americans in poor neighborhoods of Newark, like

Clinton Hill and the Central Ward, demanded the end of discrimination and the redistribution of

resources through President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society programs. At this point in the

northern states, as I previously stated, discrimination was more of the problem than was

segregation. The public realm of Newark ended up to be unresponsive to the initiatives that

blacks were making to be better off and to get more involved with the community. Soon enough,

Greenberg 2

the community as a whole drifted away from Martin Luther King Jr’s ideals of non-violence and

became more involved with black radical ideals from Stokely Carmichael, ideas that had been

making their way up to the North (Mumford 105-108).

The Newark Race Riot, which took place between July 12th through July 17th of 1967, is

possibly one of the longest and most devastating riots in the nation. Most agree that the riots

were tipped off Wednesday night, July 12th, when two Newark police officers stopped John

Smith, an African American taxi driver, and brutally beat him. The police claim the cabby was

tailgating the patrol car for about a block and then proceeded to shoot in front of the patrol car

and drive on the opposing side of the road for about another block. The police officers reported

that when they stopped the taxi cab driver, he was talking back and being very rude, as well as

acting out on the ride to the station. Mumford writes in his book, Newark: A History of Race,

Rights, and Riots in America, that the police officers were said to have physically attacked the

driver for no reason, based on bystanders accounts, while the police report outlined that Smith

had brutally attacked the officers. Ironically, the officers had no markings whatsoever and were

completely clean (Mumford 98 -101).

Smith’s account was quite different. He claimed that as he was driving, he came across a

patrol car that was double parked. He assumed that the police vehicle was doing work, so he

went to pass the car. Before he knew it, his taxi cab lit up like a Christmas tree from police lights.

As the officer began to accuse Smith of making an illegal pass, he went on to tell the officer to

do whatever he would like. The police officer took offense to this and immediately arrested

Smith. Smith claimed that the officer then began to physically assault him inside the car, and

Greenberg 3

brutally beat him even more once at the station (New Jersey 106). Smith ended up being charged

with assault and battery, but the charges were eventually dropped.

Later that evening, a resident of the Hayes Homes, a housing project, called Robert

Curvin1, an active civil rights leader in Newark, over to the apartment complex, which was

located right outside of the fourth precinct, where police were holding John Smith. Curvin

recalls, “it was a kind of anxious call that unfortunately is frequently received by me and

members of our organization in the city of Newark on many occasions” (Mumford 127). Other

cabbies found out about the beatings, which created a lot of buzz (Mumford 98 -101). Cabbies

broadcasted the message of the brutality to other cab drivers, who in turn relayed the message to

family and friends. In a matter of hours, a majority of the black community had received the

news of the event and were being shuttled downtown to the fourth precinct station. This

somewhat small but significant stir up caused “the most devastating riots in the history of New

Jersey” (98). The African American community was getting very angry from this incident and

was fed up, and their anger quickly escalated to violence. Cars were set on fire, prompting the

fire department to be dispatched. Fire trucks were vandalized and firefighters were then assaulted

by rioters (128-129).

Wednesday night was the craziest night of the riots, in part because the city government

and police were caught off guard and were unorganized. Once the crowds started to develop,

patrol officers began to monitor the streets. The crowds quickly became violent. Molotov

cocktails were exploded near the 4th precinct police station, and a car was lit on fire near the

Hayes projects; the police and fire department were called in, prompting even more chaos.

Looting began later in the night and by the time the riots were dying down for the night, 23

Greenberg 4

arrests had been made. The Report for Action states that, “by 4 A.M. Newark’s streets were quiet.

Police report showed that damage to the Fourth Precinct was estimated at $2,500 for the

destruction of 102 windows, screens and doors and for miscellaneous damage” (New Jersey

110-11).

Most of the city council had thought Wednesday night was the end of the riots, but they

soon found out they were mistaken. Early Thursday morning, the city council held a meeting and

after confirmation by Mayor Addonizio, the two patrolmen who had arrested John Smith were

taken off of patrol duty and transferred to the administrative department. In addition to the white

officers being ousted from their patrol duty, a handful of Negro police officers were promoted to

captain, and a task force was assembled to investigate the cause of Wednesday nights events.

Thursday afternoon, Negro community leaders distributed leaflets outlining details for a

rally against police brutality for the evening. In preparation for the rally, media crews arrived and

at least 500 police officers were ordered to be available. At around eight PM, a crowd developed

across the street from the precinct and proceeded to throw rocks, stones, bottles, and pieces of

wood at the precinct, resulting in broken windows. The crowds that developed for the rally

became forceful and violent, and police were sent to break them up. Later in the evening,

Springfield Avenue became the site of looting and vandalism. In response, the police set up

containment areas, where they would chase people to keep the crowds small. At around 12:30

AM, the crowd of citizens became significantly larger and the rally quickly escalated to a riot.

The state police recommended that the National Guard be called in. Soon enough, the National

Guard was prepared to enter the city with a game plan (New Jersey 112).

Greenberg 5

Early Friday morning, the state police, the Newark police, and the National Guard

collaborated to create a plan on how to combat and eradicate the violent crowds. The biggest

issue at hand was that each department communicated on different frequencies so it was very

difficult for each branch to discuss plans with each other. In the National Guard’s report on their

effort, they stated that there was a big error in timing because of the Newark police department’s

hesitance to step in at the right time. By 9:30 AM, about 50 people had already been arrested

(New Jersey 114). Governor Hughes “issued an emergency proclamation under the National

Defense Act of New Jersey” (116), stating that no motor vehicle traffic could take place between

ten o’clock PM and six o’clock AM, except for the use of major highways. The proclamation

also prohibited the sale and possession of alcohol between 11 PM and six o’clock AM (117).

Checkpoints were created at city limits for vehicles, and blockades were put up at intersections.

A New York Times article reported that the US Postal Service had to reroute mail to Philadelphia

because it was too dangerous to send mail trucks into downtown Newark (Newark Mail). Large

retail stores and small businesses located downtown temporarily closed because they were

receiving no business. Some bars and liquor stores claimed to close under orders from New

Jersey Governor Hughes (Gansberg).

Looting created gunfire on Springfield Avenue, which led to about a dozen deaths that

night. At the end of the day, the Guard had sent in almost 3,500 men, the state police had sent in

about 600 men, and 906 people were arrested. Many blacks were beginning to testify that the

police were brutally beating people without probable cause. One credible example was published

in the Report for Action: “The Reverend Herbert G. Draesel, an Episcopal priest, testified that on

Friday evening, July 14th, he was standing on a corner when several police cars drove down the

Greenberg 6

street, stopped in front of the Colonnade Bar and began firing into the bar for no apparent reason.

Suddenly, Father Draesel said, the policeman changed their firing from the bar to the group

standing in the corner....Two men were wounded in this encounter” (New Jersey 119). This

police brutality at its peak was one of the key issues behind why the riots continued for so long.

Towards the last day of the riot, Mayor Addonizio agreed to ease the forces. He realized

that in order to make the African community cease in violence, he had to end the brutality and to

return to normal day to day schedules. In a thesis on the architecture of the riots, a Princeton

University student writes:

At 3 p.m. on Monday, July 17, Governor Hughes agreed that the time was right to “pull

out.” He said the “primary mission to restore order has been accomplished.” Soon,

electricity was restored, garbage removed, roads cleaned, mail delivered, businesses

opened, public transportation put back on a normal schedule, and so on. Hughes also

predicted that “People will feel safe to walk the streets again.” (Dockray)

Dockray also references a Los Angeles Times article, which in regards to the riots, concluded

that outbreaks must be seen as more of results than the source of the issues, and occur out of

anger and irritation.

The rioting finally began to calm down Saturday. The areas that massive crowds had

occupied were completely contained, spanning 14 square miles. There still was violence; fire

Captain Michael Moran and 6 other civilians were shot and killed. Once the sun went down,

shooting, looting, and vandalism picked back up, but not with the severity that it had before.

Sunday the crowds and anger truly tapered down. Since food stores were closed, finding food in

the wake of the riot in the Central Ward was a problem. The National Guard was charged with

Greenberg 7

delivering food into downtown Newark and distributing it in various locations throughout the

city.

In total 23 people died and more than 1600 people were arrested. Donald Malafronte, an

administrative assistant to the Mayor, refereed to the events on Wednesday night and the days

that followed as “the most serious incident Newark ever had” (111).

There is not a single reason why these riots occurred, but they definitely should not have

been a surprise. A year before the riots, Paul Ylvisaker, a political scientist and a key figure

overseeing civil rights issues in New Jersey, was appointed by Governor Hughes to head a newly

created cabinet post titled Community Relations Advisor. His responsibilities included race

relations and urban issues, primarily within major cities of New Jersey. Ylvisaker saw that the

black community in Newark was in need of help and reform. He tried to urge the President to

forge a grand national coalition to put more money into city problems, particularly through

programs redistributing wealth through taxes and other similar means. The president did not act

fast enough.

Hugh Addonizio, Mayor of Newark, was elected into office with “heavy Negro support,”

and many believed he was honestly interested in African American problems (New Jersey 7).

During his campaign, he took interest towards the Negro community by reaching out to

community leaders and supporting their efforts to improve the community. In 1963, Housing

projects began to spring up, causing anger in the Negro community because of fear of having to

relocate (New Jersey 9). Although this was still quite early before the riots took place, this is

undoubtedly one of the reasons why African Americans became angry and restless.

Greenberg 8

Addonizio turned out to be the stereotypical politician. He knew how to get elected and

how to pursue his self interests. When he was running as a mayoral candidate, almost half of the

population of Newark was African American. Therefore, he had to appeal to the African

American community, and he did. The New York Times published an article on July 14th, 1967

titled, “Newark’s Mayor Calls in Guard as Riots Spread.” As the article states, “Mayor Hugh J.

Addonizio telephoned Gov. Richard J. Hughes...and told the Governor that the rampaging

Negroes who had looted, burned, and smashed their way through the city in the second straight

night of violence had produced an ‘ominous situation’” (Carroll). He almost refers to the African

American community as animals by referring to them as “rampaging Negroes.” In coordination

with Governor Hughes, Mayor Addonizio called the National Guard in to control the riots from

spreading outside of the Central Ward into the downtown area of Newark.

Stokely Carmichael2 of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), a key

figure and leader associated with the Newark Riots of 1967, assisted the efforts of the black

community in retaliating against the Newark police department and government. Carmichael was

perceived by some as a radical civil rights activist. The FBI reported that he was “adopting the

communist tactic of linking the civil rights movement with the Anti-Vietnam war

protest” (Mumford 109). Carmichael compared the black community in America with African

decolonization, arguing that in both situations the black community members were “victim[s] of

imperialism and colonial exploitation” (109). In a way his argument could be seen as true;

African Americans were subject to white power without much say in the situation at all. On the

other hand, it is rather extreme. If his ideals were reality, it would almost be as if the members of

African American community were subjects of the white people. He still played a monumental

Greenberg 9

role in the riots by helping to unite the black community, which was a commonality among most

civil rights campaigns throughout the nation.

Because of his debatably “radical” ideals, Carmichael was banned from a handful of

European governments and was facing many criminal charges in Washington, D.C.. About a year

before the riots, Carmichael went on to address an audience of about 800 high school students in

the Central Ward of Newark, stating that, “the masses can participate in making the decisions

which govern their destiny” (Mumford 109). Additionally, Carmichael spoke to a crowd on

Springfield Avenue in Newark, which would be the future location of the riots a year later,

discussing that black activists are “taking over” Lowndes County, Alabama and that, similarly,

they should be taking over Newark. All of Carmichael’s actions increased black nationalist

sentiment.

From the African American perspective, the riots were brought on because of poor

housing, large unemployment numbers, overcrowding of city areas, and undoubtably police

brutality (New Jersey 3). In the Milwaukee Star, an African American newspaper, the riots are

referred to as the “Newark Holocaust,” and the paper argues that the white leadership and

citizens of Newark itself is unquestionably responsible for the damage because of poor politics.

The Commission on Civil Disorder came to an overall conclusion that “the burden of

responsibility weighs most heavily on those in positions of leadership, power and with control

over the resources that will be needed to produce tangible results” (New Jersey xi). From the

white perspective, the riots were caused by criminals and a search for attention. The white

response to the police brutality was that it was too soft (New Jersey 3). This type of response is

to be expected. One of the problems here is that there were lots of free riders just jumping onto

Greenberg 10

the bandwagon. Most of the white citizens did not want to be ostracized for disagreeing with

their fellow community members for taking the side of African Americans. Yes, not every single

white citizen of Newark discriminated against the Negros, but most of those who didn’t kept

quiet. The white citizens who were indifferent just went along with the status quo. This is most

likely the case throughout the nation in regards with racial discrimination and segregation.

On August 8th, 1967, Richard Hughes, Governor of New Jersey from 1962 to 1970,

appointed seven white members and four black members to a commission to investigate the riots.

The commission presented a summary of its findings, titled the Report for Action, which was

published the following spring (98-99). The Report provides a tremendously detailed and

authoritative review of the riots. It delves deep into every single factor which led to the anger of

the Negro community. It also recounts all of the major and minor disturbances throughout the

five days, going day by day with personal recounts. It provides an exceptional resource for

researching the causes and effects of the riots.

Perhaps among the most significant information found in the report was the commission’s

proposal of the three main causes for the civil disturbance. First was the lack of political

representation within the black community. Unquestionably, the African American community

was unjustly represented and therefore it was very difficult for them to voice their opinions and

problems. Second, police brutality enraged African Americans. Throughout the Central Ward,

Negroes were arrested and assaulted for no specific reason. Third, the worsening social

conditions of the city was a contributing factor. The social and living conditions in the city did

not improve as a result of the riots, and in fact may have just worsened from the event. Newark

was, and still is, one of the most impoverished cities in New Jersey, and suffers high

Greenberg 11

unemployment rates and a poor school system. The African American community wanted to see

change, as did many African Americans nationwide. In establishing these three key causes of the

riots and in gathering and detailing all of the events and data from the riots into one publication,

the commission helped to restore authority of government through its accuracy and detail. The

report helped to prove that racial discrimination was not just exclusive to the south, but was a

pressing issue in the north as well. Very similar riots had taken place in Milwaukee, Detroit,

California, Harlem, and Chicago, Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia. In fact, 28 other cities

experienced similar riots, although a fraction of the length of the one that Newark had

experienced.

This local event that took place miles from my current home plays as an example to the

larger picture of the civil rights movement in the United States, and more specifically the

movement taking place in the northern states, where discrimination and segregation are

sometimes overlooked. Although discrimination in the North was not exactly the same as it was

in the South, there were still numerous examples and situations of police brutality,

discrimination, and inequality.

Greenberg 12

Works Consulted

Dockray, Sean. "Containment: The Architecture of the 1967 Newark Riots." Sean Dockray /

News. 1999. Web. 14 Oct. 2011. <http://spd.e-rat.org/writing/containment.html>.

Gansberg, Martin. "Major Stores Closed in Newark as Few Decide to Go Downtown." New York

Times (1923-Current file): 54. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times

(1851-2007). Jul 16 1967. Web. 15 Oct. 2011 <http://search.proquest.com/docview/

117324423?accountid=13158>.

Giemmevi. "Stokely Carmichael’s “Black Power” Concept – All Black Political Parties." Web

log post. All about Stokely Carmichael, the Black Power Movement and U.S. History. 24

May 2010. Web. 15 Oct. 2011. <http://stokely-carmichael.com/stokely-carmichaels-

black-power-concept-all-black-political-parties/>.

Grant, Joanne. "Stokely Carmichael." Black Scholar 27.3/4 (1997): 39. Academic Search

Complete. EBSCO. Web. 11 Oct. 2011.

Harris, Fred R. "The Kerner Report of 1968." Quiet Riots: Race and Poverty in the United States.

1st ed. New York: Random House, 1988. 5-15. Print.

Kaufman, Michael T. "Stokely Carmichael, Rights Leader Who Coined 'Black Power,' Dies at

57." The New York Times 16 Nov. 1998. Nytimes.com. The New York Times Company.

Web. 16 Oct. 2011. <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/16/us/stokely-carmichael-rights-

leader-who-coined-black-power-dies-at-57.html?pagewanted=all>.

Maidenberg, H.J. "Insurance Adjusters Assess Damage From Riots." The New York Times 18

July 1967. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007). Web. 10

Greenberg 15

Oct. 2011. <http://search.proquest.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/

docview/117398724/pageview?accountid=13158>.

Mumford, Kevin J. Newark: A History of Race, Rights, and Riots in America. New York: New

York UP, 2007. Print.

New Jersey. Governor's Select Commission on Civil Disorder. Report for Action; an

Investigation into the Causes and Events of the 1967 Newark Race Riots. New York:

Lemma Pub., 1972. Print.

"Newark, Cities, United States — Infoplease.com." Infoplease: Encyclopedia, Almanac, Atlas,

Biographies, Dictionary, Thesaurus. Free Online Reference, Research & Homework

Help. — Infoplease.com. The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 2006. Web. 11 Oct.

2011. <http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/us/A0835358.html>.

"Newark Mail Diverted to Philadelphia in Riot." New York Times (1923-Current file): 54.

ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007). Jul 16 1967. Web.

15 Oct. 2011 <http://search.proquest.com/docview/117332207?accountid=13158>.

"The Newark and Detroit Riots: Events." The Detroit and Newark Riots of 1967. Rutgers

University. Web. 13 Oct. 2011. <http://www.67riots.rutgers.edu/n_index.htm>.

Carroll, Maurice. "Newark's Mayor Calls in Guard as Riots Spread." New York Times (1923-

Current file): 1. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007). Jul

14 1967. Web. 15 Oct. 2011 <http://search.proquest.com/docview/117534813?

accountid=13158>.

"Responsibility." Milwaukee Star 22 July 1967: 4. America's Historical Newspapers. Web. 9 Oct.

2011. <http://infoweb.newsbank.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/iw-search/we/

Greenberg 16

HistArchive/

p_product=EANX&p_theme=ahnp&p_nbid=O58S53JIMTMxODcwMjE5MS4zMTg4M

TY6MToxNDoxMjguMTE4Ljg4LjI0Mw&p_action=doc&s_lastnonissuequeryname=10

&d_viewref=search&p_queryname=10&p_docnum=20&toc=true&p_docref=v2:12A7A

E31A7B3CA6B@EANX-12CCE7B1D7DB0670@2439694-12CCE7B1E662F338@2>.

Robinson, Douglas. "Jersey Will Seek U.S. Funds to Rebuild Newark." The New York Times 18

July 1967. ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2007). Web. 10

Oct. 2011. <http://search.proquest.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/

docview/117398724/pageview?accountid=13158>.

Sherman, Ted. "Newark - The Next Chapter." NJ.com. 22 June 2007. Web. 29 Oct. 2011. <http://

blog.nj.com/ledgernewark/2007/06/cities_like_the_people_who.html>.

Stokely Carmichael. United States, Washington, D.C.: National Public Radio, 1998. ProQuest

Research Library. Web. 11 Oct. 2011.

1967 Newark Riots. Web. 13 Oct. 2011. <http://www.1967newarkriots.com/>.

“5 Days in July”. Judahlev. YouTube. 15 Nov. 2007. Web. 7 Oct. 2011. <http://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOTZ7dn_gsg>.

Greenberg 17

Notes

Greenberg 13

1 Robert Curvin was a key figure during the Newark Race Riots. An African American from

Newark, Curvin attended from Rutgers Universty. As a student, he was very interested in getting

involved with the civil rights movement, so he joined the Newark chapter of the NAACP. Curvin

later joined CORE, or the Congress of Racial Equality, a civil rights organization with similar

goals to the NAACP. The Essex County Core did not just include African Americans, and at least

half of the members, and those who participated in the demonstrations, were white. Curvin

worked his way up to a high position in the organization and was the leader of CORE during the

riots.

Greenberg 14

2 Stokely Carmichael, later known as Kwame Ture, had been a civil rights activist since his years

in high school. In 1964, he became an organizer for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating

Committee (SNCC) and later became chairman of the organization. Later that year Carmichael

began to distance himself from the SNCC and later joined the Black Panther Party, an

organization dedicated to the Black Power movement. It has been said that Carmichael himself

coined the term “black power” (Grant). In a blog post, Giemmevi says, “Carmichael stressed that

Black people first of all would need to develop a strong solidarity among themselves. This

solidarity he believed would emerge if Black people would organize themselves politically

without outside support. By doing so they would become aware of their qualities, their political

strength and they would also get to know the United States’ political arena from the inside. In

short, Stokely Carmichael intended to create strong political foundation with enough power to

create equal coalitions.” Carmichael was like most civil rights activists and agreed that the black

community needed to unite to overcome racism. What made him unique was the way he believed

African Americans should unite. An article published in the Times states that Carmichael’s

actions were frowned upon by many well-known civil rights activists such as Martin Luther

King, Jr. and Roy Wilkins, a leader of the NAACP. Carmichael grew fond of black separatism

and became very radical. In 1969, he even resigned from his own party because the Black

Panthers had been aligning too closely, which in reality was not very close at all, with white

activists (Kaufman).