June, 2015

INQUIRY ON PAN-ISLAMIST FEATURE OF THE

RECENT TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY WITH

CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE

OSMAN GÜLTEKİN Bahçeşehir University, İstanbul

ABSTRACT

There are criticisms about recent Turkish foreign policy that Turkey has been moving

from an activist ‘zero problem’ approach to a ‘precious loneliness’. This article aims

to find the most relevant foreign policy or international relations theory to analyze the

paradigm of recent Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East region specifically

during the Justice and Development Party (herein it will be used as AKP). A

constructivist ‘ummah’ identity approach serving for realist purposes is found to be

the most accurate explaining theory for the transformation of the Turkish foreign

policy. It will be examined if AKP followed a continuation of the 1990s’ liberal

activist foreign policies in its first two terms, however a new constructed “ummah

image” in a pan-Islamist contextual framework in foreign relations has been in effect

after 2002. It will be argued that how this constructivist approach is aligned with the

‘strategic depth’ doctrine of Ahmet Davutoğlu, who is assumed to be the main

character in directing the Turkish foreign policy in the AKP governments. It will be

inquired how the new agent-structure relation takes place, how new constructed

‘ummah’ identity, its interests and norms are related to and came into the surface

during the Arab uprisings. After Arab Spring, the new constructed positioning and its

elements are shifted to realize more pragmatist realist purposes in the region.

Key words: Turkish foreign policy, ummah, pan-Islamism, constructivism, Ahmet

Davutoğlu, AKP, Justice and Development Party

Introduction and Historical Background on Turkish Foreign Policy

Although Turkey declared a bold policy of ‘zero problem’ open publicly years ago,

Turkey faced challenges in maintaining its close relationships with some previously

allied countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region recently.

Especially after Arab Spring movements, Turkey seemed to have diplomatic conflicts

with a number of countries that some ambassadors were called back to Turkey and

some bilateral cooperation agreements were cancelled. Turkey used to benefit from

the use of cultural and religious proximity with the countries in the region to increase

trade and influence but with Turkey bordering this region, however, its geographic

proximity pulls Turkey to deal with number of unstable regional developments such

as civil war in Syria and the emergence of ISIS as a violent terrorist group.

Between the years of 1923 and 1991, Turkey never took an active role in Middle

Eastern politics and always followed a low profile and neutral policies. Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk argued for a realistic-rational foreign policy and denounced both pan-

Islamism (unity of all Muslims) and pan-Turkism (unity of all Turkic origin peoples)

as inappropriate goals. 1 During the World War II, Turkey pursued an active neutrality

policy by being in close communication with the both warring sides. A small power’s

diplomacy of a realist balance of power strategy could hope to achieve no greater

success. 2 After the war, the security conditions reinforced Turkey to make alliance

with the USA and become a member of NATO. 3 Also, Turkey was bound to seek a

place in Western alliances with insufficient economic, technical and military sources

to protect itself. 4 Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in the early postwar years made

clear to the Turks that the US’ support would be beneficial and their foreign policy

had been determined by the relations with that country in the Cold War. 5 With the

help of the USA, Turkey gained membership to the North Atlantic Treaty 1 Andrew Mango, “Reflections on the Atatürkist Origin of Turkish Foreign Policy and Domestic Linkages” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 2 Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War:”An active neutrality”, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 3 Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 4 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000) 5 Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the West Since World War II” in Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (eds.), Turkey Between the East and West (Boulder, CO; Westview, 1996)

Organization (NATO) in 1952 and in 1963 established an association agreement with

the then-European Economic Community (EEC). 6 In the Middle East, Turkey was

neutral to any conflicts in the region and never took sides in Cold War years. As a

NATO member, Turkey deliberately didn't develop its relations with the Arab world

due to significant Soviet influence in the Middle East. Arab countries had only

approached Turkey in the Cyprus crisis when they thought Turkey couldn’t get along

well with the Western powers. 7

After the disintegration of the USSR, the transformation of the political and strategic

landscape in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the new conflicts in the Balkans

and the Caucasus changed Turkey’s foreign policy environment. 8 After the Cold

War, with the emergence of eight newly independent states, there was a new structure

in Central Asia and Caucasus. With its strong, historical, cultural, ethnic and

linguistic bonds with new independent states, Turkey wanted to employ some pan-

Turkist ideas over the new Turkic states as a reflexive action. Turkey’s unfulfilling

promises, newly independent countries’ trying to build their own nation and self-

identity caused resentment in the Central Asia and also a disappointment in the

Turkish side. 9 Ultimately, it helped Turkey to realize that they needed to develop a

realistic and pragmatic policy for this region and focus more on economic cooperation

such as the transportation of Caspian energy project.

In the post-Cold War period, the instability in Balkans, Russia’s uncertain future

direction, Iranian fundamentalism, Iraqi aggression and durability of Middle East

peace process reinforced the interest of US policy makers in Turkey again. In those

matters, for the USA, Turkey was one of the few countries in the world that was not a

major player, but had strategic importance. 10 In the 1990s, Turkey and the USA had

convergent approaches in the cooperation in the Middle East; with USA’s help

Turkey and Israel made an agreement for cooperation and that they acted together on

6 Paul Kubicek, “Turkey’s Inclusion in the Atlantic Community: Looking Back, Looking Forward.” Turkish Studies (March 2008) 7 Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yuzyil Siyasi Tarihi, (İstanbul:Alkım Yayınevi, Onsekizinci Baskı, 2012) 8 Sabri Sayarı, ”Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2000) 9 Mustafa Aydın, “Foucault’s Pendelum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus”, Turkish Studies, (Summer 2004) 10 Morton Abramovitz, “The complexities of American Policymaking on Turkey” in Abramovitz (ed.) Turkey’s Trabsformation and American Policy (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000)

the conflicts in Balkans, Bosnia and Kosovo. However, they had divergent

approaches on the issues of Iraq’s territorial integrity and Cyprus issues. 11 The

regional security problems, the decline of American power in a multipolar world, and

the transformation of Turkish domestic policies and new foreign policy were

important factors in the relationship between Turkey and the USA. 12

During the 1990s, Turkish governments realized the importance of the ‘economy’. In

foreign policy, this meant that the Turkish governments had to try to prevent political

conflicts with important trading partners and avoid isolationist policies, which could

have cut them off from international financial markets or potential investors. It was

believed that, increasing regional economic links and dependencies would help secure

greater regional political stability. 13 Powered by a growing private business sector,

the Turkish economy experienced a dynamic growth during Turgut Özal’s tenure.

Turkey’s volume of trade increased due to increased imports and exports. The

percentage of the trade volume in GNP jumped from 15.6% in 1980 to 36.6% in

1998. Turkey’s GNP growth rate saw 8% in 1995, 7.1% in 1996, 8.3% in 1997 and

3.8% in 1998. 14 Kemal Kirişçi claims the ‘trading state’ approach has been very

influential in Turkish foreign policy and it has increasingly been shaped by economic

considerations. Turkish financial markets became sensitive to foreign policy issues,

ranging from relations with the EU to expanding relations with Northern Iraq.

Similarly, he argues that, the Turkish government’s efforts to mediate between Israel

and Syria and to initiate a rapprochement with Armenia are driven as much by

economic considerations as by other reasons. 15 Turkey adopted its trading state

approach mostly in the period after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. AKP continued

and prioritized this approach in the foreign policy of their first and second term. It

was very useful to implement this readily approach, as AKP was a newly established

party. 11 Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues of Convergence and Divergence” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.) Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future (London: Routledge, 2004) 12 Sabri Sayarı, “New Directions in Turkey-Us Relations”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, (June 2013) 13 William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, (London: Frank Cass, 2000) 14 William Hale, Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 15 Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

Turkey’s energy needs, particularly the need for natural gas and increased electricity

use became an issue that could have consequences in the direction of foreign policy in

1990s. Between 1990-1997, Turkey’s total energy demand rose by an average of

almost 10% a year. 16 For natural gas, demand was rising fast. Big cities were

connected to national distribution of natural gas and Turkey started to depend heavily

on Russia and Iran for natural gas. Turkey’s energy dependence has been a matter for

national security, which makes the Turkish economy vulnerable to regional

developments and creates unbalanced trade situations. 17 Turkey’s increased

cooperation with Russia and Iran is based primarily on Turkey’s dependence on the

energy.

It is argued that the trading state approach lasted until the second half of the 2000s as

the economic considerations are the most constant dominant element. However, when

Turkey’s disappointment was observed in EU accession talks, the increase in

Turkey’s involvement with the Eastern countries coincided a change or emerging

multi-dimensional feature of the foreign policy after 2005. It will be examined

whether Turkey has moved away from its pragmatist liberal trading state and

mediator policy to a norm maker and a new ‘constructed’ identity one in the Middle

East region after mid-2000s. It will be discussed whether a ‘constructed’ image of an

Islamic religion-ideological ‘ummah’ or pan-Islamist image is in effect over the

region due to Turkey’s historical, geo-cultural and geo-strategical affinity. As the

reasons for the increased tension with the countries Syria, Egypt, Libya and Israel will

be analyzed in their exclusiveness of each cases with those countries, in the

meantime, it will be tried to find the most defining common characteristics of the new

Turkish foreign policy paradigm with the help of international relation theories and

Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ideas in his ‘strategic depth’ doctrine. It will be answered how the

constructed identity approach employed for realist purposes before the Arab Spring. It

will be claimed, after Arab Spring, Turkey adopted a pragmatist realist perspective

with the mixed sentiments of fear motivations and opportunity seeking behavior. 16 William Hale, Economic Issues in Turkish Foreign Policy in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 17 Kemal Kirişçi “Turkey and the Muslim Middle East” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000)

After observing the Arab Spring, some Turkish foreign policy makers would like to

take the opportunity to exert influence in the region and help designing the domestic

politics of the countries similar to Turkish model, however, at the same time some

Turkish policy makers observed the potential negative spillover effect of the uprisings

in Turkey in the short aftermath of the Arab Spring. Turkey’s fear about this issue

was most prevalent during the Gezi Movement in Istanbul in May 2013. Turkey

inclined to follow a pragmatist realist approach, that this new paradigm would like to

be the continuation of the recent constructivist approach for realist purposes with

constructed identity and values supporting the ‘ummah’ approach. Furthermore, new

paradigm tries to modify the ‘identity policy’ by exerting more emphasis on national

interests and asserting power in the region and the global arena.

Recent Middle Eastern Policy

Turkey pursued a non-interference and non-involvement policy toward the Middle

East for many years by distancing itself from ongoing regional conflicts and by

considering its Middle Eastern policies as an extension of Western allies policies –

shaped by the US foreign and security policy approach toward the region. 18 However,

after the Cold War, Turkey’s pursuit of active and assertive politics had been most

pronounced in the Middle East. The removal of Soviet influence from the Arab’s

world has given more flexibility to Turkish foreign policies in the Middle East,

Turkey’s traditional Middle East policy underwent a significant change, specifically,

with its decision to participate in the Gulf War in 1991. Turkey’s national interests

have become intimately related to the security and stability in all of its surrounding

regions. Turkey is also a Middle Eastern country and its security, stability and

prosperity are closely tied to the developments in the Middle East. The expansion of

Turkey’s role in the Middle East continued after the end of the Gulf War. The

Kurdish issue and the PKK also contributed to Turkey’s decision to forge a new

security cooperation arrangement with Israel. Syria saw the pressures from the North

and South; they didn't host PKK leader Öcalan any longer. His expulsion from that

18 Emel Parlar Dal, “The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?“, Turkish Studies, (June 2012)

country was a notable example of the transition from the reactive foreign policy to a

more pro-active policy of Turkey. 19

In 1980s, Turgut Özal started to follow an increasingly activist and international

approach to the relations in the Middle East. During his period, Turkey’s economic

relations with the Middle East grew significantly. Normalization of relations between

Turkey and Arab/Muslim world was observed. However, in the post-Cold War, some

Middle Eastern countries still used to see Turkey as a Western agent, as Turkey was

an ally with the USA and in NATO. 20 Arab countries had reservations to Turkish

involvement in the region for several reasons: Turkey’s activism and the rise of pan-

Turkist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy in Central Asia, military operations in

Northern Iraq, Turkey’s water problem with Syria and its cooperation with Israel. 21

In the late 2000s, Turkish Middle Eastern policies revealed a noteworthy shift in the

orientation of Turkish foreign policy from a liberal trading state approach to a realist

one with constructive identity. Especially, after 2005, with Ankara’s growing

disappointment in EU candidacy, Turkey wanted to develop its relations with the

Middle East region. That was described as a ‘shift of axis’ by the media and some

academics in Turkish foreign policy. It is believed that it was the result of Turkey’s

self-redefinition of its identity and its desire to exert its influence beyond the

country’s border, over the Middle Eastern. Some scholars claim that it happened

naturally as democracies would have their own ‘demonstrative effects’. 22

Egypt and Turkey, historically, supported peace processes and maintained close

strategic relations with the USA. They perceive similar threats to their national

security from radical Islamic groups. 23 A free trade agreement made between the

19 Sabri Sayarı,”Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism”, Journal of International Affairs, (Fall 2000) 20 Kemal Kirişçi “Turkey and the Muslim Middle East” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 21 Emel Parlar Dal, “The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?“, Turkish Studies, (June 2012) 22 Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol.13 (2011) 23 Kemal Kirişçi “Turkey and the Muslim Middle East” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000)

countries in 2005, military agreement memorandum was signed in 2008 and high-

level strategic cooperation meetings were to be held in 2011. Turkey was openly

supporting one political party in Egypt after Husnu Mubarek’s regime: Mursi’s

Muslim Brotherhood. When Mursi was toppled by a military coup in July 2013, AKP

sided against the military intervention and condemned anti-democratic rule of the

interim government in Egypt although the USA, United Nations and number of

Arabic Gulf countries welcomed the new government. The Egyptian government

reacted directly to AKP. AKP was criticized about intervening domestic politics in a

country. The level of its diplomatic relations with Egypt downgraded reciprocally.

As another important country in the Middle East, Turkey signed an intelligence and

military cooperation agreement with Israel in the mid-1990s. Turkish-Israeli

alignment created shock waves in the region, and Turkey became the focus of

criticism from several regional states, especially from Syria and Iran. With the signs

of normalization and free trade agreement, the trade volume went up dramatically.

Israel accepted Turkey’s intermediary role between Syria and Israel. Economic

cooperation increased and more touristic visits were exchanged between the countries. 24 The countries reached a high level of cooperation in the late 1990s; their relations

declined after 2000 and resulted in a serious crisis in recent years. After the Israel’s

Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, Turkey reacted sharply to Israel and declared

that they will no longer see Israel as a partner for peace. In January 2010, in Davos

Summit, the Turkish prime minister had a verbal spat with the Israeli president. Anti-

Semitist TV series on Turkish national channels, low-couch diplomatic crisis at the

Israeli foreign ministry and finally Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis took the conflict at a

very higher level. On May 31st, 2010, Israeli commandos killed nine activists en route

to Gaza for humanitarian help. The Mavi Marmara crisis overlapped with Turkey’s

veto on the sanctions of Iranian nuclear program. This raised a red flag about

Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation. It caused souring in Turkey – USA relations.

Turkey’s role as an impartial mediator in countries peace talks was finished. 25

24 Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkish Policy toward Israel” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 25 İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish Israeli Relations since 2002”, Turkish Studies (December 2011)

With Syria, Turkey started to develop normalized relations after the expulsion of

PKK’s leader from Damascus occurred and Turkey’s parliamentary rejection on the

motion of US troops in the Iraq War in 2003. In 2004, two countries signed free trade

agreements, military cooperation was planned and visas between two countries were

waived. The countries were planning to hold mutual ministerial meetings regularly.

Turkey was supporting clearly Assad regime’s intentions for the social and

economical development in Syria. The countries relations were closer than ever

before in their history. In 2011, the civil war in Syria started. Turkey condemned the

Syrian government. The diplomatic ties between the countries deteriorated

immediately. Turkey opened its borders to all refugees. Two million refugees moved

to Turkey. Turkey has spent more than five billion Euros in facilitating the refugees.

Turkey called the Syrian government doing ‘savagery’ and asked them to stop the

civil war. Turkish Prime Minister claimed to oust the Assad regime in Syria in a short

time. Turkish authorities had over-confidence in the matter and they believed the

problem would be fixed in a couple of months with a regime change. For this purpose,

Turkey started to support the opposition groups in Syria and helped them build an

armed organization. As a strategy, Turkey only aligned itself with the Sunni political

and armed opposition forces. “Sunnification” of Turkish foreign policy and Sunni

power ascendance was a matter of concern in USA’s considerations who would like

to guarantee religious and ethnic pluralism in the possible new regime in Syria. 26

In the Syrian case, Turkey is criticized to make a miscalculation. The intelligence

information Turkey received had predicted the situation in Syria as an opportunity

that would help Turkey to design the domestic politics in align with the Muslim

Brotherhood elements in the country in a similar way happened in Mursi’s Egypt

before military coup. Turkey assumed the Syrian public would support an outsider

intervention and the West, mainly by the USA, would back them. However, when the

Turkish prime minister, foreign minister and head of Turkish National Intelligence

Service (MIT) met their counterparts in Washington DC in May 2013, the USA

showed no strong signs of support for Turkey’s initiative for Syria. Moreover,

although there was a civil war in Syria, Assad was holding the legitimacy of his rule

in the country as the majority of the people around the capital were supporting him. 26 Halil Karaveli, “The Obama-Erdoğan Partnership Over Syria: Advancing Western Values?”, Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2013)

This majority perceived this war against the Western manipulation and they were

fighting for the independence of their country. The other world powers such as

Russia, China and Iran also made their positioning in support of the Assad regime.

Turkey was left in a position where he solely stood up for the change in the Syrian

regime. The social and economic burden of accommodating millions of refugees,

bloody terrorist attacks inside the Turkish territory, the emergence of uncontrolled

violent groups in the region, the economic loss in trade and the opposition with the

countries over Syria were the negative effects Turkey faced.

The Extent of Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy

Holsti claims there can be many causes of the ‘change’. Trends, great events, great

achievements, significant social/technological innovations can result in changes.

Though, as a concept, change can mean replacement, addition, dialectics, and

transformation after some turning points or discontinuations. 27 In Charles Hermann’s

work, he asserts foreign policy changes can vary indicating the magnitude of the shift

from minor to major: adjustment changes, program changes, goal changes and

international orientation changes. 28 Charles Hermann’s four categories of foreign

policy changes are analyzed in Meliha Altunışık’s academic works. She concludes

that for adjustment changes, Turkey engaged in Northern Iraq, Syria and Iran in 1990s

for security purposes and aligned with Israel. Turgut Özal and Ismail Cem tried to

develop economic relations with the region. This liberal approach also continued in

the first two terms of AKP governments. As program changes, Turkey’s involvement

with the region became more comprehensive, multi-faceted and deeper. Diplomatic

negotiations rather than military strategies started to be used. There was more focus

on soft power assets, engagement, economic interdependence and promoting mediator

roles. As examples of problem/goal change, she claims AKP wanted Turkey to be the

regional leader, continued to support on the Iraq’s territorial integration, competed

with Iran over regional influence and supported a resolution of the Palestinian issue.

Definition of problems and set of strategies are changed. Also, AKP used Turkey’s

relations with the Middle East in domestic politics to consolidate the support from 27 K. J. Holsti, “The Problem of Change in International Relations Theory”, Institute of International Relations, The University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 26 (December 1998) 28 Charles F. Hermann, “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34 (1990)

Anatolia. Hence, the foreign policy was used as an important element for the domestic

policies. For the international orientation change, there are various examples that

Turkey implements more independent and Eastern-looking policies. The incidents of

the rapid deterioration with Israel relations after the Gaza War, Turkey’s improving

relations with Iran and vetoing the sanctions on Iranian nuclear program, close energy

relations with Russia and ordering missiles from China all demonstrated Turkey was

moving away from its traditional Western orientation to a global one or

Islamic/Eastern. 29 There is absolutely a change in the direction of foreign policy

starting with the AKP governments in Turkey. Some scholars argue that a shift of axis

in policy occurred. This shift may not constitute a total reorientation but it tells us that

Turkey is constructing a new position for itself in the Middle East. The details of the

orientation change are now more visible. The new orientation has a deep civilizational

discourse and it is very realist as it can be seen in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s ‘strategic

depth’ doctrine.

Levels of Analysis and Theoretical Framework

The levels of analysis constitute a framework designed to organize and assist in

systematic thinking about international relations. 30 The levels are individual or group,

state and society, the international system as a whole. The foreign policy analysts

disaggregate or break down each case into different parts in order to study and

understand different aspects. It is for the purpose of selecting the most right entrance

point to analysis. The levels of analysis are tools, heuristic devices that help studying

subjects. 31 At the individual level, scholars focus on individual decision makers; how

they make decisions, what perceptions and misperceptions they hold, and the ways

key decision makers interact. At the state level, societal and governmental factors are

examined on the making of foreign policy in a particular state. At the system level

analysis, bilateral relations, regional issues, global issues and multilateral interactions

are explored. At each level of analysis, there is a particular understanding of the

subjects. Our understanding may be quite thorough for one level but will exclude 29 Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkish Policy toward Israel” in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), Turkey’s New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, (Washington, DC: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000) 30 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5th Edition, 2012) 31 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

information that can only be attained by using one of the other levels of analysis.

J. David Singer, describes two broad levels: system and sub-system. This scheme

collapses the individual and state levels into the subsystem category. He says in some

sub-systemic level of analysis, it is likely to produce a richer description and more

satisfactory explanation of international relations, though its predictive power appears

no greater than the systemic orientation. In terms of description, we find that the

systemic level produces a more comprehensive and total picture of international

relations than the national or sub-systemic level. 32

There are four worldviews or grand theories that dominate the study of international

relations: realism, liberalism, Marxism and constructivism. Those theories and their

variants have different but fairly straightforward explanations of ‘how things work’ in

the world. Realism has a pessimistic view of human nature and makes key

assumptions about the ‘nature’ of states and state behaviors. States are self-interested

actors like humans but existing in an international system characterized by the

constant struggle to maintain autonomy from other states. For realists, international

politics is conflictual, by nature. The realist perspective is state-centered. Only states

are the international actors. In liberalism, international politics is characterized by

harmony among international actors. Liberals are pluralists. They conceptualize

politics as the interaction of multiple actors pursuing multiple interests and using

different types of resources and methods of interaction such as bargaining, coalition

building and arm-twisting. Liberals focus on the formation of international law,

organizations, and cooperative arrangements. Liberalism proposes that free and open

trade between countries can decrease the possibility of conflict between them.

Marxism constitutes a response to realism and liberalism. An international system

based on capitalism class system divided is into ‘rich’ and ‘poor’. International

institutions are used to maintain the capitalist system in favor of the wealthy

class/states. 33

32 J. David Singer, “The level of Analysis Problem in International Relations” in G. John Ikenberry (ed.) American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (Glenview, IL, 2008) 33 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

Other than these three main theories, which use their own assumptions and

perspectives in explaining the reality, constructivism offers an alternative tool for

analysis. A constructivist argument is interpretative and it is more related to the

explanation and understanding of social realities. Constructivism does not offer any

alternative vision of the world. Constructivists argue that reality is socially

constructed from the society’s perceptions of it. Society projects a certain

understanding of reality onto the world from the identities, which results to

appropriate behaviors. Constructivist theory claims that agents and structures

continually influence each other inter-subjectively. Constructivists are interested in

the key concepts of norms, rules, identities and how they affect the conceptions and

interpretations of the world. Constructivists view international structure in terms of a

social structure and ideational factors such as norms, rules and law are embedded. The

structure can influence the identities and interests of the agents. Constructivism sees

the world as under construction with continuous interactions of agent-structure, which

leads to the reshaping of identities and interests. People, throughout their interactions

with the structure and other agents, they develop different behaviors, attitudes,

speeches and other social form of actions in line with their giving meanings and

framings to the social structure and the issues. Debates and discussions cannot be

objective as they are bound to the subjectivity of the human beings. 34

In contrast to realist and neoliberal ‘structure’ concept, constructivists argue for the

possibility of the agency’s perceptions and its interaction with the structure. Onuf

argues international politics is a ‘world of our making’. The actors make choices in

the process of interacting with others and with structure and they bring historically,

culturally and politically distinct ‘realities’ into being. 35 In constructivist theory,

structures and norms not only constrain behaviors; they also constitute the identities

of actors. Wendt claims the norms and shared understandings, as well as agent and

structure relations, can result in ‘constructed’ realities.

In international relations, constructivism asks how states construct their interest

through their interactions with one another. The forms, identities and social 34 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5th Edition, 2012) 35 K. M. Fierke, “Constructivism” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)

interactions provide powerful insights in the international relations discipline.

Constructivist explanations depend heavily on the identity principle to describe

international behavior. Identities, that are complex and changing, arise from

interactions with other states often through a process of socialization. Constructivism

is interested in how actors define their national interests, threats to those national

interests, and their interests’ relationships to one another. States decide what they

want based not only on material needs, but also on ‘social’ interaction. 36

Constructivists focus on the actions of the individuals/groups and their relations with

the system structure. The state’s policy makers are individuals and as the structure is

given, how the individuals construct their foreign policy ideas is a matter of concern.

Personality analysis of decision makers becomes important. 37 Different worldviews

focus on different levels of analysis. Realists are focused on the state, thus they study

foreign policy at the Singer’s system level. Realists are not likely to examine the

personal beliefs of leaders. All leaders would pursue the national interests of their

states. Liberals, being pluralists, focus on all the levels of analysis, depending on the

subject of the study. Liberals look at the persons, groups, structures, and cultures

within a state, the international organizations interacting with each other in the world,

and the supranational institutions over all countries controlling the international

regimes. Marxists look at foreign policy from the system and state levels. At the

system level, the asymmetrical relations between states are important. At the state

level, Marxists study the common interests of economic elites in one state with the

elites in another. 38 It is believed that Turkish foreign policy is leader-driven and is

theoretically formulated by an ideologue individual Ahmet Davutoğlu. Hence, in this

research, a more individual level approach is preferred and we will focus on Ahmet

Davutoğlu’s ideas and ideology.

36 Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse, International Relations, (Pearson, International 10th Edition, 2013) 37 Mark Kauppi and Paul Viotti, International Relations Theory, (Longman, 5th Edition, 2012) 38 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003)

What Identity Turkey Used?

The constructivist theory has great emphasize on identity. Identity describes the

country’s national interests and shapes international behavior. Almost all scholars

agree that the substantial change in Turkish foreign policy is based on ‘re-defining’

Turkish identity over regional and global politics. What they don't agree on is the

most defining essential character or the ‘main substance’ of this new constructed

identity. What identity did Turkey want to construct about itself? What are the

features of that identity? Some signify the appearance of Ottoman-Turkish characters

on the ideas of Ahmet Davutoğlu and called the new identity as Neo-Ottoman, some

denote the predominant character of Islam in the ideas and approaches and call it Pan-

Islamist. In the contextual framework of the pan-Islamism, some say Turkey follows

an Islamic-Sunni character and the new identity is a sectarian one. That also was

related to ‘ummah’ approach that Turkey wanted to lead a ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ axis

in the Middle East and could show the compability of Islam with democracy. This

paper welcomes the new identity with ‘ummah’ approach in a pan-Islamist context

over the sectarian and Neo-Ottoman figures.

For a long while Davutoğlu’s vision was called as neo-Ottomanism because the most

of the foreign policy activism was occurring in former Ottoman territories. However,

it was an approach that neither ignoring Turkey’s Ottoman past nor seeking to merely

recapitulate its legacy. According to Bülent Aras, it would be misleading to consider

neo-Ottomanism as the primary motive behind the Davutoğlu’s vision. 39 As neo-

Ottoman idea was ethnic-centric, it was doomed to failure if ever tried. The best

alteration to pan-Turkist ideas would be like-Abdulhamit’s pan-Islamist ideas that

aimed to unify the all Islamic elements around Ottoman Sultan who is the caliphate of

the Islamic world. Leadership of Islamic world would address wider scope of people

in a vast geography. For a country like Turkey, who would like to recover its potential

and be a major player in the world again, Turkey would recognize the fact that the

ummah ideas would be more appealing than any Ottomanist ideas.

39 Bülent Aras, “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009)

Pan-Islamism covers the ideas about the unity of Muslims and in some cases the

expansion of Islamic values. The countries who practice some levels of democracy

and hold elections, there is a chance that the pro-Islamic political parties come to

power and execute Islamic agenda in peace with democracy. They could take Turkey

and the Muslim Brotherhood movement as their inspiring example. These pan-

Islamist tendencies of the countries would constitute a bloc to the Western and to the

global political arena also. The solidaristic character of pan-Islamism can be referred

to the concept of ‘ummah’. Ummah is a concept that is used to emphasize the

sociological unity of the Islamic people and gives a supra-national definition of

Islamic communities beyond nation-states. In general, throughout the article, ummah

implying a pan-Islamist identity will be referred as the identity that Turkey tried to

build with AKP governments in the region rather than neo-Ottoman or sectarian

identities. It is also worth to note here that there is no strong and clear evidence that

Turkey favored a sectarian politics in the region, but Turkey found itself in a sectarian

conflict as a consequence of the foreign policy followed in Syria.

Change in Turkish Foreign Policy in early AKP terms: From Trading State to

Constructivist ‘Identity’ Policy

According to Kemal Kirişçi, the impact of economic considerations in the 2000s is

the major element of Turkish foreign policy. His findings can be extended to the

previous decade. It can be claimed that the 1990s carried the same liberal economic

motivations. Other than the dominant trading state theory, Kemal Kirişçi lists five

alternative explaining theories of the transformation in Turkish foreign policy in his

‘trading state’ article in 2009. 40 First, Europeanization is the impact that the

engagement of Turkey with the EU has had on both domestic politics as well as on

Turkey’s foreign policy. EU’s conditionality principle and the need to meet certain

criteria for starting accession talks and gaining membership has been an important

transformative force. Second, the impact of domestic political developments such as

the rise of AKP to power, together with a new elite and political agenda, is seen as an

important force reshaping Turkish foreign policy. Third, the geopolitical factors

resulting from institutional changes and the altered balance of power after the end of 40 Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

the Cold War played a role in shaping Turkish foreign policy. Fourth, the concept of

soft power is frequently employed by a wide range of politicians, columnists and

academics inside and outside Turkey. The advocates of this approach attribute the

transformation of Turkish foreign policy to Turkey becoming a soft power.

Kemal Kirişçi lists constructivism in international relations as one of the five theories

other than trading state theory. Constructivism attributes the changes in Turkish

policy to a reformulation of how the Turkish state defines its own identity internally

and externally. Some scholars put emphasis on the change of foreign policy culture,

while others point out the transformation of the way in which national security is

redefined and perceived. 41 All of the approaches in the academic works do enhance

our understanding of Turkey’s changing foreign policy and each approach does

capture an aspect of the phenomenon. But, we find one theory does a better job than

others and it is more inclusive: Constructivist explanation, more precisely,

constructivist approach for realist purposes. The constructivist theory is superior to

the others because it has a stronger presence in the recent foreign policy arena. As the

Europeanization influence faded away by the non-frequent negotiation talks with EU,

due to unresolved issues in the chapters, this theory lost its relevancy. Domestic

political developments have been in the same formation with the ruling party in power

for many years and that can’t be explaining the new recent transformation. The

geopolitical factors are the external factor that Turkey had no direct influence but

structure has effect always and pushes for realist attention. Constructivist explanation

is more inclusive and captures the domestic ruling elite’s perceptions and their views

on constructing new identities and interests. It also explains the geopolitical external

structure with agent-structure relation. The soft power idea can be classified as part of

constructivism and also be classified as the façade of the diffusion of the current

constructed Turkish identity image in the region.

The role of economic factors and the rise of the trading state explain how the decision

was made in the early 1980s to open up and liberalize the Turkish economy which led

to the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s trade relations with the external

world. The zero-problem policy with the neighbors of AKP governments could be 41 Kemal Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives in Turkey, (Spring 2009)

considered a blueprint manifestation of the foreign policy of a trading state. However,

it is ironic that the primary author of this policy and the architect of Turkish foreign

policy, Ahmet Davutoğlu made a scant reference to economics and interdependence

as the main factors, which shaped foreign policy. In his substantive book, economics

receives attention very briefly and only in the context of the composition of a

country’s power capabilities. This makes us believe that the main motivation of the

Turkish foreign policy makers in the recent decade is not based on economics but

ideology. We observe that the influence of economic considerations in the 1990s and

2000s is diminished but Turkey now has a different foreign policy orientation –

putting the identity and interests in the central place.

In Kemal Kirişci’s article in 2011, he develops the concept of a ‘demonstrative effect’

and argues that this ‘effect’ makes the Turkish model look more attractive to the

Middle East. He also claims that this ‘effect’ is a function of three developments: the

rise of the ‘trading state’, the diffusion of Turkey’s democratization experience as a

‘work in progress’ and the positive image of Turkey’s ‘new’ foreign policy. The

demonstrative effect of a democracy can be quoted as the soft power of a superior

country over other countries in a region that are not good as in the compared area. 42

Kemal Kirişçi’s ‘trading state’ article was written in 2009 and ‘demonstrative effect’

article was written in 2011. As a trading state country, Turkey should have been

focusing on liberal and pragmatic cooperation with countries for economic benefits,

but recently, there have been other elements that needed to be addressed as well.

There are areas that economic motivations fail to explain. With the demonstrative

effect concept, Kirişçi finds ways to add other social facts and compromise new

developments in his analysis. This is where we see that the trading state and its

dominant effect in foreign policy is being replaced by some other new identity and

interests arguments of constructivist theory. In the recent works of scholars in 2010s,

Turkey is discussed not with economic motivations but with the concepts of

ideologies, identities, norms, ethics, agent-structure relationships and Islamic

character. All those concepts are related to how the new construction of Turkish

identity in the foreign policy is made. 42 Kemal Kirişçi, “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13 (2011)

In Ziya Öniş’ article in 2011, he argues that considerations relating to the culture and

identity became the important elements of Turkey’s new policy orientation moving

beyond the sphere of economics. AKP, with its Islamist roots, was already naturally

receptive to developing strong cultural, diplomatic and economic links with the Arab

Middle East and the Islamic world in general. Also AKP’s foreign policy activism has

proven to be a major economic asset in domestic politics that the foreign policy

outweighed the negative effects of the global financial crisis in 2007. The assertive

and independent style of foreign policy making has had an appeal to nationalistic

sentiments in the nation. 43

In the constructivist theory, there is an emphasis on the agents- that they are the

‘actors’ and they act according to their identities. The leaders’ perceptions of the role

that their states should have in the international system depend on the cultural

backgrounds of those leaders. In AKP’s newly multi-dimensional foreign policy, the

relations with the West have been viewed as more complementary to, rather than a

substitute for, relations with the Islamic world. At the center of this new orientation is

a new foreign policy discourse where Turkey can be a ‘center’ in the regional

subsystem and subsequently a ‘global actor’ in the international system. At the core of

this policy lies a new, sophisticated foreign policy theory called ‘strategic depth’.

Turkey can emerge as a regional power only if it establishes good ties with all the

countries in its proximity. Turkey expressed affinity toward Islamic countries in the

region and showed solidarity with their causes. 44 The first significant signs of the

‘new’ Turkish foreign policy was the close relations that the government had

developed with Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood plus the bitter criticism it has

directed towards Israel in the late 2000s. These developments not only triggered a

major debate in the West but also made Erdoğan particularly popular among the so-

called “Arab street” where Turkey had chance to diffuse its identity and its soft power

over the region easily.

43 Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13 (2011) 44 Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, “Modernity, Identity and Turkey’s Foreign Policy”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10 (2008)

There are changing parameters that define the new Turkish “Middle East” foreign

policy under AKP government that is based on a new civilizational discourse and a

differentiated geopolitical approach. There are new dynamics and ideological and

doctrinal background in Turkey’s new Middle Eastern policy. In Davutoğlu’s

discourse, some concepts started to be used frequently such as a common awareness

in the region that is outside the nation-states, people’s power, democracy, and

promoting alliance of civilizations. Davutoğlu claims that Turkey can act as a security

provider and peace-broker in the region with its civilizational and historical links with

the region and order-instituting poster can help for a stable, peaceful, regional and

international order. Turkey’s newly ‘constructed’ self-perception of Turkish and

Islamic identity was emphasized most often in the Middle Eastern politics. 45

İlker Aktürk conducted research on the recent Turkish foreign policy in the Middle

East and with Israel and he concludes three major dynamics can be discussed in the

Turkish decision-making in the recent years. First, ideology and actors are important.

The AKP leadership has deep roots in Turkey’s Islamist movement and it is anti-

Israel. We know that two main distinct figures shaped Turkish policy: Erdoğan, a

pragmatist and for Ahmet Davutoğlu ideologue. However, the common thing is they

both are realist and act for the maximization of national interest. Second, power

vacuum in the Middle East is an important structural condition. After Israel’s

operation in Gaza in 2009, there were some protests that developed in the Arab world.

In this power vacuum Turkey saw this as an opportunity to return to the Middle East.

Erdoğan was a folk hero in the Arab society with his tense anti-Israel rhetoric. Third,

Turkey started to use a discourse of grandeur. Turkish pro-government think-tanks

and journalists were emphasizing the growing Turkish power in the Middle East. It

was criticized as an exaggeration of Turkey’s image in the region. 46

In line with Aktürk’s findings; we can say in constructivist terms, Turkey, with a new

self-perception of Turkish and ‘ummah’ identity, was setting up new interests of

being the regional leader and promotion of its interests in the Middle East. In the late

2000s and early 2010s, prime minister Recep Erdoğan and foreign minister Ahmet 45 Emel Parlar Dal, “The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?“, Turkish Studies, (June 2012) 46 İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish Israeli Relations since 2002”, Turkish Studies (December 2011)

Davutoğlu were the main actors in Turkish foreign policy. These actors’ perceptions

were extremely important. They had pro-Islamist political background and they

defined the new Turkish identity in the foreign policy. The unstable ‘structure’ and

the power vacuum in the region required Turkey to take a more active role and gave

them to opportunity to do so while it has posed risks for internal dynamics also. The

new agent – structure interaction was very established. The new ‘constructed’

identity, its new ‘ummah’ interests and the tie between the structure and the

constructed new policy were supported by a civilizational discourse using a modern

intellectual language.

Ahmet Davutoğlu: the Architect of the Recent Turkish Foreign Policy

After AKP came to power in 2002, Ahmet Davutoğlu became the advisor to the prime

minister for the foreign policy. He became the minister of foreign affairs in 2009 and

he then became the prime minister of Turkey in 2014. He played the key role in

forming the AKP’s foreign policy and is known as the ‘architect’. His ideas are

collected in the book ‘Strategic Depth’. This book is where his policy doctrine was

manifested. 47 In his book, he argues that, besides geopolitical advantages, Turkey

enjoys strong historical and cultural connections to surrounding regions. This gives

Turkey a geopolitical important leading character. He has advocated the need to

develop an activist foreign policy aiming to engage all countries in these regions.

Subsequently, his ideas position Turkey as a central country and claim that

developing a “zero problem policy” with neighboring countries has indeed left an

imprint on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. As the prime minister’s chief

advisor on foreign policy, Davutoğlu’s ideas have become closely associated with the

transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

In his doctrine, Davutoğlu calls Turkey for an activist engagement with all of the

regions in Turkey’s neighborhood, such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle

East. Davutoğlu pushes for re-engagement with the Middle East, particularly, with

Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf states as a result of Turkey’s

historical legacy of Ottoman Empire where it possesses a great geographical and geo-

47 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001)

historical depth. In his doctrine, he stresses Muslim solidarity and the supra-national

concept of the Muslim community very similar to the ‘ummah’ approach. According

to some scholars, with Davutoğlu’s doctrine, Turkey has been pursued a blend of pan-

Islamist and Neo-Ottomanist vision in its foreign policy, which gives a prominent

place to Islam and Turkey’s imperial history as soft power tools in the conduct of

foreign policy. 48 Some scholars called his doctrines nothing but purely pan-Islamist. 49

In his ‘strategic depth’ vision, Ahmet Davutoğlu claims there should be five

principles in Turkish foreign policy. First, in terms of geography and history, Turkey

is a pivotal country with multiple identities. Second, a balance between security and

democracy should have to be achieved, so that Turkey’s soft power democracy can be

attractive to its neighboring regions. Third, zero problems with neighbors and

maximum cooperation should be established. Fourth, Turkey has to implement a

multi-dimensional foreign policy developing its relations with the neighboring regions

such as the Balkans, Africa and Central Asia. Turkey should position its relations with

global actors as competitive but complementary. Fifth, rhythmic diplomacy should be

presented as Turkey has to increase its diplomatic activities and also has to be

strongly presented in international organizations and forums such as NATO, the UN,

the OIC and other vital institutions. 50

In his doctrine, Davutoğlu stresses that as a major country in the midst of the Afro-

Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that

cannot be reduced to one unified category. Accordingly, Turkey is a Middle Eastern,

Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea

country all at the same time. Davutoğlu notes “a central country” with such an

optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be

seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier or

48 Alexander Murinson, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 97 49 Behlül Özkan, The Collapse of Davutoğlu’s Pan-Islamist Foreign Policy, on June/23/2014 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-collapse-of-davutoglus-pan-islamist-foreign-policy.aspx?pageID=449&nID=68125&NewsCatID=396 50 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Foreign Policy (2008)

ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West.” 51

Davutoğlu proclaimed that Turkey aims to achieve zero problems with its neighbors

by settling the disputes diplomatically and by increasing the economic and cultural

interdependence.

Until 2009, Turkish foreign policy with the AKP governments has been seen as more

of an assertive and self-confident foreign policy. Under Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problems

with neighbors’ policy, Turkey has concentrated its efforts on normalization and

intensification of economic, political and cultural ties with neighboring countries.

These efforts have yielded successes and the country’s relations with Iran, Syria,

Russia, Greece and Iraq have improved significantly. In line with the zero problems

initiative, Turkey has abolished visa requirements with Russia, Syria, Lebanon,

Jordan, Libya, Georgia, Pakistan, Qatar and Albania, among other countries. The

promotion of economic integration and diplomacy, as a means to resolve problems

helped raise Turkey’s soft power profile also. The popularity of Turkish cultural

products - its films and TV series, especially - in neighboring regions has increased

Turkey’s regional attraction. Multilateral platforms have been another area where

Turkey has increased its activism. Turkey attained membership in the G-20, won a

seat on the UN Security Council for the 2009-2010 term, gained observer status in the

African League and participates in the Arab League. 52

According to Behlül Özkan, who made a very extensive research on the intellectual

works of Ahmet Davutoğlu, he asserts that Davutoğlu consistently argues the end of

the Cold War provided Turkey with a historic opportunity to become a global power,

as long as it followed a pan-Islamist foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey

is to dominate the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus and thereby create a

new ‘Lebensraum’ 53 to establish its ideological and economic hinterland. Özkan

claims, Davutoğlu focuses on how to form ‘grand Turkey’ in his ‘Strategic Depth’

book, but he refuses to accept the idea that Turkey is a mid-size regional power as the

Western world defined it. He claims that Turkey must be a global power and the 51 Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Foreign Policy (2008) 52 Sinan Ülgen, “A place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame?: Understanding Turkey’s New Foreign Policy”, Carnigie Europe, Vol. 1 (December 2010) 53 Labensraum means ‘living space’ literally, referring the Hitler’s excuse to expand to other countries before the Second World War and caused agression with the other states.

leader of the Middle East, a key player in Africa and should have influential Asian

policy. According to Özkan, Davutoğlu accepts the idea that, instead of a defensive

policy, expansion of states is a scientific obligation in order to survive or they will be

collapsed by other global powers. Due to geopolitics and the need of expansion, big

countries have ‘geostrategic depth’ and Davutoğlu uses the Hitler’s Germany’s pre-

Second World War expansionist concepts of ‘central country’ ‘Labensraum’ and

‘hinterland’ often. 54

In realist terms, the structure is very important. The most essential part of the

structure is very related to geographical location of the countries. Ahmet Davutoğlu

gives a very big emphasis to geo-strategic importance of Turkey. This feature requires

Turkey to have a multi-regional identity with a multi-faceted and -dimensional

foreign policy in a large territory including Europe, Asia and Africa. In his words:

“In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the

midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with

multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like

Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or

culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional

composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously;

in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs.” 55

Emre Erşen highlights the importance of geopolitics and claims how Ahmet

Davutoğlu is a significant figure in understanding both the ‘formal’ and ‘practical’

geopolitics – one being the formal knowledge produced in strategic institutions and

academia, the other being the everyday forms of the geopolitical reasoning utilized by

policy makers, by his dual identities as an international relations professor and a

foreign minister. Geopolitics claims that geographical assumptions and

understandings are culturally constructed and politically sustained. The works of

political geographers such as Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Alfred Mahan, Halford

Mackinder and Karl Haushofer influenced the geographical tradition. Haushofer 54 Behlül Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 56 (August-September 2014) 55 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth), (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001)

provided Labensraum idea to Hitler, American Kennan and Spykman gave the ideas

of containment policy to US policy makers and Mackinder was also a member of

British Parliament. The theorists’ ‘formal’ works of geopolitics can affect ‘practical’

geopolitics. Likewise, Davutoğlu’s discourse best exemplifies the Turkish

geopolitical codes. Ottomanist geopolitical vision and civilizational geopolitics stems

from here. Davutoğlu’s views about geography, in general, and Turkey’s role in the

Middle East, in particular, are heavily influenced by the realist concepts of balance,

sphere of influence, axes and rims. Davutoğlu believes Turkey will replace Ottoman

Empire as the ‘protector’ of the peoples in the Middle East. It is its historical

responsibility. This part of Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth doctrine sounds very realist

with geopolitical focus. 56

What happened after the Arab Spring?

Arab Spring movements were internally driven processes that ended up with ousting

the well-established autocratic leaders in Libya of Qaddafi, Egypt of Mubarak and

Tunisia of Ben Ali. In Syria, Bashar el-Assad has been able to hold on power with an

ongoing chaos, a civil war and a severe human tragedy in the country. In Egypt,

Mursi government was elected after uprisings against Mubarak, but Mursi’s term has

ended with a military coup. In Libya, the situation is still uncertain, while Tunisia had

significant positive steps for the political liberalization. It is criticized that Turkey’s

ability to influence the path of political change in the Middle East proved to be quite

limited. Moreover, Turkey has been drawn into sectarian conflicts of Sunni-Shiites

rivalry in Syria and its neo-Ottomanist intentions were questioned. The first two years

of the Arab revolutions clearly highlighted the dilemmas raised by Turkey’s grand

ambitions to play a pro-active leadership in the region and the structural limits

imposed on its power in a turbulent region where major global and regional powers

have also been actively engaged. 57 As another dilemma, Turkey struggled in its role

as the promoter of democracy, losing its ‘clarity of vision’ and shifting its position on

nearly a daily basis from supporting the Qaddafi and Assad regimes to supporting the

56 Emre Erşen, “Geopolitical Codes in Davutoğlu’s Views toward the Middle East”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2014) 57 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Middle Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East”, Working Paper, (July 26, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298536 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2298536

protesters. Turkey wanted to seek an opportunity to ride the tide of the ‘Arab Spring’,

Turkish prime minister Erdoğan claimed that the inspiration for popular uprisings in

the Arab world was Turkey and its ‘advanced democracy’. It was related to Turkey’s

‘demonstrative effect’ very much. The electoral successes of Muslim Brotherhood-

affiliated parties and groups, such as Ennahda in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice

Party in Egypt, provided Turkey with an opportunity of creating a belt of moderate

Islamist regimes in the region. 58

There was a widespread speculation that the new political order in countries would

look to Turkey for inspiration, yet, there was an unwillingness to subscribe to the

‘Turkish Model’. 59 Turkey had employed grandeur rhetoric as a part of the

constructed image of Turkey that has tried to impose over the region. Although there

was a common perception on the Turkish side that the Turkish model was very

attractive to the Middle East and there is a demand in the region for it, however, after

Arab Spring, among some Middle Eastern elite, there were already some concerns

about Turkey’s increasing activism in the region. First of all, Turkey is not an ‘Arab’

country and it was impossible for them to follow the leadership of the Turks in the

Arabic Middle Eastern region. There was no demand for Turkey’s political leading in

the region, although the Turkish way of modern life is very attractive to the countries

in the region. The Middle East had a discomfort at Turkey’s ethnic identity rhetoric

over the region. Moreover, they were suspicious about Turkey’s honesty, too. They

observed that Turkey was using its activist policy to look important in the eyes of EU

and USA. Besides this, Turkey increased its benefits of expanded trade and economic

activities in the Middle East through its activist policies. It was also very instrumental

for Turkish leaders to use the relations with the region in domestic politics to get more

support in the elections. 60 Turkey’s over-exploited tension against Israel but at the

same the continuation of the economic activities with that country were the signs of

populism of Turkey to get attraction and support in the Middle East and in the

domestic politics. Also, Turkey’s being Sunni, of course, was not so welcomed by the

other sects, especially the Shiites. By siding with the Sunni and helping some Sunni 58 Alexander Murinson, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 97 59 Richard Falk, “Can the U.S. Government Accept an Independent Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East?”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 16, No.1 (2014) 60 Emel Parlar Dal, “The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: Illusion of Awakening?“, Turkish Studies, (June 2012)

armed combat organizations in Syria, Turkey received criticisms from both the

Middle Eastern region and the West.

According to Ziya Öniş, the Arab Springs challenged not only authoritarian regimes

in the region but Turkey’s foreign policy also. Turkey needed to redefine its

geographical and security environment and deepened its engagement with

neighboring states in 2000s recently. The previous strategy was based on cooperation

with the existing regimes and did not prioritize democracy promotion. It was more

pragmatist – in favor of trade and economic relations. But upheavals in Arab world

created dilemma between ethics and self-interest in Turkish foreign policy, according

to Ziya Öniş. 61 Ethics, here, were meant to the norms and values that Turkey was

championing in the region along with its ‘ummah’ identity policy.

Arab Spring posed uncertainties and possible threats for Turkey and its position in the

region. In the short aftermath, while surpassing the negative effects of the Arab spring

inside Turkey and willing to keep exerting Turkey’s influence in the region, Turkey

wanted to alter its identity politics to pragmatist realist one. In Syria, Turkey was

against Russia and Iran’s perspective but avoided confronting with those countries

directly. In Egypt, Turkey’s position was against the new military coup government

due its ideological ‘ummah’ identity standing aligning with ousted Muslim

Brotherhood. However, the majority of the countries in the world including the USA,

Europe and Arabic countries recognized the new government in Egypt. While keeping

their oppositional standing against the ruling governments in Syria and Egypt, Turkey

avoided confronting with bigger powers over the issues in the Middle East. Turkey

never went over an extensive debate with any other opposing countries such as not

only with Russia, Iran also in some extent with the West and Arabic countries. With

Russia, besides the Syria and Egypt issues, Turkey preferred to express its concerns

very low-key for Crimea where there have been a significant population of Turkic and

Muslim minority. Turkey expressed its ‘heart-brokenness’ when Russia expressed

their support to the Armenian claims for genocide. It was very visible for Turkey that

Turkey moderated its grandeur and norm-maker benign power rhetoric into a

pragmatist realist one that would like to maximize its national interest in the limit of 61 Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 14 (2012)

its bargaining capacity and energy needs in the region. Turkey started to act as more

‘realist’ but still follow ‘ummah’ approach with a number of wealthy Islamic

countries in Gulf region and to gain economic benefits and support.

The need for Pragmatist Realist Perspective

Since 2011, Turkey is a part of the problems in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Whether it was

a deliberate action or choice or not, Turkey has involved in sectarian issues. Turkey

has problems with Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Israel. Turkish ambassadors in Syria, Israel

and Egypt are back to Turkey. Turkish officials called this not-going well and

isolationism as ‘precious loneliness’.62 The Arab Spring movement was an absolute a

turning point in Turkish policy, however, to tell about the magnitude and gravity, we

may need some more time to assess and new developments which may change the

picture.

There is another aspect in Turkish foreign policy that resulted in stagnancy in the

foreign affairs that made Turkey to alter with realist motivations. For Turkish policy

makers, the activism on the religion identity politics in international affairs and the

discourse of Turkey’s leadership in the MENA region was very appealing for Turkish

domestic affairs also. Turkish electorate appreciated and rewarded the AKP

governments’ activism in foreign policy with expanding influence in MENA region

among Islamic countries and Turkey’s norm maker attitude. For the first time in

Turkish history, one party was using the foreign affair issues a tool to increase its

electoral support. Turkey’s amounted tension with Israel meant unconditional support

from the majority of voters. The common external enemy would unify the country

around the incumbent party, and it did. Right after the Davos Summit, where Turkish

prime minister had a verbal spat against Israel, his return to Turkey was a reception

for a hero. That event along with the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis paved way for

Turkey to intensify its claims for the leadership of the region. The more Turkish

electorate requested Turkish high-involvement in regional politics along with

Turkey’s increased political and economic consolidation, their expectations and

62 That term was used by İbrahim Kalın, a foreign policy adviser to the Turkish prime minister. Web link: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-not-lonely-but-dares-to-do-so-for-its-values-and-principles-says-pm-adviser-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53244&NewsCatID=338

demand grew. It also legitimized the actions of the AKP governments. In order to

satisfy that Turkish leaders rhetoric got harsher on the other countries especially

against Israel and Western countries. The over use of foreign affairs in domestic

politics eventually created a vicious circle that more electorate demand for

independent and active affairs, as Turkey as a leader country used a grandeur rhetoric

and created tensions with some countries in return and worsened the relationships.

The resentment of Turkey’s ideas in Syria and Egypt was a great disappointment for

Turkish electorate because they were not expecting such reactions from those

countries although they were sovereign national states. Turkey faced the realities

shortly after Arab Springs.

After seeing the gridlocks and resentment about its constructed religion identity-

ideology based foreign policy, Turkish state needed to revise and transform its foreign

policy recently. In order to achieve a clear understanding of this transition, Turkish

state’s identity and its interests should be analyzed with the realist terms rather than

constructivist terms both in system and sub-system level. The reasons for the need for

transformation of the religion identity based foreign policy with pragmatist realist

perspective can be listed as follows:

- Deterioration of the relations with increasing number of different countries

suggested the gridlocks of the recent Turkish foreign policy. It questioned the

practicability and feasibility of ‘ummah’ or pan-Islamist ideas and values

- Discrepancy between the discourses of harsh rhetoric and actions of Turkish

leaders, Turkey’s taking sides in regional conflicts and domestic affairs in

countries suggested Turkey is no longer a benign liberal power

- Turkey’s energy dependency on Russia and Iran, energy priority in the

international politics deterred Turkey to continue strict confrontation with

those countries over the regional issues such as in Syria, Yemen, Crimea and

Armenia.

- Turkey’s losing the demonstrative effect over the region due to deterioration

of freedoms and democracy in Turkey as confirmed by independent reports

discouraged Turkey to be claiming a role model for the MENA region but

needed to be pragmatic and realist.

Some scholar argue that although Turkey’s zero problem policy between 2002-2011

resembles a constructivist ideology-oriented policy for realist purposes, it was indeed

a pure realist one where it had Realpolitik elements with the interest considerations. 63

In realist terms, when we consider the structure of the political arena in the region,

Turkey’s active diplomacy was welcomed in a world that is more liberal and pacifist,

so Turkey’s initiations and desires were accommodated by the countries. The

structure was multipolar world order and Turkey was let to do things in the region by

the allowance of the big power countries especially the Western powers. There were

no countries flexing muscles to each other except Iran against the USA. The order

after Arab Spring uprisings is multipolar again, however this time, the super powers

are involved in the Middle Eastern politics more. In the Syrian case, a quite perfect

balance of power reached over the Assad regime that Turkey, Sunni Arabic countries

and the USA on one side and the Shiite Iran, Russia and China on the other side. This

realist balance of power politics made the ongoing civil was continuing but at the

same provided a static situation on the status of the Assad regime. The new structure

after Arab Spring helped Turkey to realize that it became a game of power as not only

soft power mattered but the other power indicators such as wealth of countries, their

energy resources, military capabilities and even strength and coherence of their

regimes are important.

Conclusion

Especially with the collapse of the USSR, Turkey had a tremendous change in its

foreign policy. Globalization, the end of the Cold War, the EU membership process,

economic liberalization, the rise of AKP, the “strategic depth” doctrine and the rising

role of civil society shaped this new activist policy over the years. Although

exclusivity of each cases in the relations with different countries are observed, a

constructivist ‘ummah’ approach has been the most defining common character of the

Turkey’s foreign policy in the last decade before Arab Spring. After the Arab Spring,

the policy of constructed ‘ummah’ oriented Turkish identity policy serving for realist

purposes has been reconfigured to a pragmatist realist perspective. This new paradigm

mainly attributed to the fact that Turkey found itself in a sort of ‘isolationist’ position 63 Tarık Oğuzlu, “Komşularla Sıfır Sorun Politikası: Kavramsal bir Analiz” Turkey, Ortadoğu Analiz, Vol. 4-42 (June 2012)

where it loses its multi-dimensional, assertive, benign, self-confident and soft power

character after Arab Spring movements. With Arab Spring, while Turkey was

cautious to prevent the negative effects of Arab Spring in its domestic affairs, Turkey

also had to re-measure its power’s scope and validity in regional politics. This re-

evaluation of the potential and the limit of the potential of the country indeed helped

to develop a more realistic perspective in approaching the regional relations.

Upon the diplomatic challenges with Syria and Egypt, Turkey started to build a realist

policy where it perceives the current challenging structure it faces as a ‘power game’

and seeks to maximize its national interests as much as it can. Although Turkey

partially abandoned the value oriented, humanitarian and liberal approaches, it

continues to use the similar ‘ethic and values’ rhetoric, but also adds on hard power

instruments. Training and armament of Syrian oppositional combating groups are in

very ‘realist’ terms. Although Turkey insists on its harsh rhetoric in Syria, it also tries

to avoid confronting with Turkey’s two main energy partners over the Syria issue in a

pragmatist realist character.