New imperatives for Israeli–Palestinian peace

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New Imperatives for Israeli–Palestinian Peace 73

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Nomi Bar-Yaacov is a Visiting Fellow at the IISS and a participant in Track II talks on therole of third-party intervention in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. She has heldvarious posts with the United Nations Headquarters in New York and UN peacekeepingmissions, and with the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE). Research for thisarticle was funded by a John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research andWriting Grant.

Survival, vol. 45, no. 2, Summer 2003, pp. 72–90 © The International Institute for Strategic Studies

New Imperatives for Israeli–

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Palestinian PeaceNomi Bar-Yaacov

In the run-up to the Iraq war, President George W. Bush promised arobust US engagement in settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The besthope for doing so lies in the ‘Road Map’, a peace plan put forward by theso-called Quartet, which includes the United States, the United Nations,the European Union and Russia.1 The Road Map calls for a commitmentto a two-state solution, not only from the parties to the conflict but alsofrom international actors. The key to the success or failure of the newplan lies in the degree of third-party involvement in advancing theimplementation of the agreement and in monitoring and verifying it.Given the bitter trajectory of violence since the second intifada of the2000-2003, this eventually might have to include a bold, hithertounthinkable insertion of a US-led peacekeeping force.

The Road Map is based on the vision of an independent, democraticand viable Palestinian state by June 2005, outlined in US President GeorgeW. Bush’s speech of 24 June 2002.2 As such, it is the first formal Israeli–Palestinian peace plan to articulate that the appropriate outcome for thePalestinians is an independent sovereign state. Briefly, the Road Mapenvisages a comprehensive final settlement by 2005, to be achieved inthree phases. The initial phase, which would extend through the first half of2003, entails the Palestinian Authority meeting performance-based criteriafor comprehensive security reform, Israeli withdrawals to the positions ofSeptember 2000 as security improves, and support for the Palestinians tohold free, fair and credible elections. The first phase would also include aministerial-level meeting of an ‘Ad Hoc Liaison Committee’ to review thehumanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in theWest Bank and Gaza, and to identify priority areas for donor assistance,

74 Nomi Bar-Yaacov

including support for the reform process, before the end of 2003. Thesecond phase would focus on the creation of a Palestinian state withprovisional borders based on a new constitution, as a transition to apermanent-status settlement. The third phase, from 2004 to 2005,contemplates Israeli–Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent-statussolution in 2005. Specifically, any such solution would involve the cessationof the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 by virtue of a settlementnegotiated between the parties and based on UN Security CouncilResolutions 242, 338 and 1397 with Israeli withdrawal to secure andrecognised borders. Thus, the document builds on numerous terms ofreference agreed upon in previous bilateral agreements, calling for an endto Israel’s 1967 occupation; the negotiation of the so-called final statusissues including borders, refugees, settlements and Jerusalem; and acomprehensive agreement between Israel, Syria and Lebanon.3

By its terms, the Road Map itself represents the very lowest commondenominator between the two parties to the conflict, as well as the lowestcommon denominator among the members of the Quartet. But while it is aweak document, it is the only consensual peace plan on the table that hasbroad international backing. There are no feasible alternatives at present.Nevertheless, given the traps and gaps in the document and chronicdestabilising conditions on the ground, a military intervention of apeacekeeping mission in the West Bank and Gaza will probably be required,eventually, to give the Road Map a realistic chance of producing a workableand equitable settlement.

Traps and gaps in the Road MapThe principal procedural difficulty with the Road Map is that it does notprovide for effective dispute-resolution procedures in the event ofdifferences that will inevitably arise over the performance of requirements– most glaringly, in the security area. As a consequence, the plan permitstoo many easily generated pretexts for the parties to escape theirobligations. The plan lists each party’s obligations, noting that they are tobe carried out in parallel and to be monitored by the Quartet. Mutualperformance is supposed to determine the rate and degree of progress inimplementing substantive obligations. But it is still not clear how muchpower the monitors will have in resolving disputes between the parties asto performance, in order to move the process from one benchmark to thenext. For example, at the beginning of Phase One, the PA must not onlydeclare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism, but it must alsoundertake ‘visible efforts on the ground to prevent violent attacks onIsraelis anywhere’. At the same time, Israel must end actions underminingtrust, such as ‘proactive security operations, attacks on civilians,


confiscation and demolition of Palestinian homes and property’. Israelmust also dismantle settlement outposts and freeze settlement activity,including settlement growth, in accordance with the Mitchell report’.4

The current Road Map draft and unpublished accompanying monitoringdocument do not provide sanctions or remedies for foreseeable claims oflack of compliance from both sides. For instance, it is unlikely that the newPalestinian prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, elected in April 2003, will beable to reform the security services to a degree that will satisfy Israel. TheIsraelis are likely to demand a complete halt to attacks against civilians,soldiers and settlers, a task that may take Abbas a long time to achieve, ifindeed it is possible at all. There are thousands of illegal weapons in thehands of militant groups, including the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades of Fateh,Tanzim, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamasand Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and they are unlikely to give up their armedstruggle without considerable resistance and demands for improbableIsraeli prior concessions. A suicide attack was carried out in Tel Aviv onthe eve of Abbas’ taking office, a day after he said in his inaugural speechthat the unauthorised possession of weapons was a major concern thatwould be relentlessly addressed.5 Militant groups reacted furiously, withHamas officials declaring that it would not disarm until Israel ended itsoccupation.

In addition to these procedural flaws, there is ambiguity in theAmerican response to Israeli reservations to the Road Map and the scopeof the monitoring mechanism. The Road Map could be seriouslyundermined if the US considers accepting any ofIsrael’s reservations at any stage, since that wouldmake the document unacceptable to the Palestinians.6

The Israeli government has said it will only carry outwithdrawals after attacks against Israelis end,undermining the principle of simultaneous mutualperformance as a benchmark for progress. In a similarvein, the government has said that it will consider alimited freeze on settlement activity only following ‘acontinuous and comprehensive security calm’. Suchcalm is unlikely, even if the new Palestinian leadershipengages in serious efforts to curb violence. Israel hasalso sought to modify the clause referring to thecreation of an ‘independent Palestinian State’ and replace it withPalestinian territories that have ‘certain attributes of sovereignty’ thatmust be ‘credible’ and ‘law abiding’.7 In addition to questioning thetiming of a settlement freeze, Israel also challenged its scope, saying that thefreeze on settlements will not include their ‘natural growth’. Further, Israeli

Thousandsof illegalweapons arein the hands ofmilitantgroups

76 Nomi Bar-Yaacov

withdrawal from the West Bank to ensure territorial continuity of thePalestinian state was categorically rejected by the Israeli government.

The main substantive shortcoming in the Road Map is the lack ofclarity surrounding the concept of a provisional Palestinian state. Aprovisional state, as outlined in the second phase, would not beacceptable to the Palestinians unless they have an internationalcommitment to a fully fledged independent sovereign state. This was akey element missing in previous peace agreements; it remains vague inthe current plan and problematically subject to varying interpretations byeach side. For instance, the Road Map provides that at the outset of thepreamble to Phase Two ‘efforts are focused on the option of creating anindependent Palestinian state with provisional borders’. The nextparagraph discusses the ‘possible creation of an independent Palestinianstate with provisional borders in 2003’. This phase also calls for Quartetmembers merely ‘to promote international recognition of a PalestinianState, including possible UN membership’ [author’s emphases]. The RoadMap also has no standing in international law. It has been suggested thatthe plan should be adopted by the UN Security Council, and that a clausecommitting both parties to abide by international law, specifying whichinternational treaties apply, should be added. Its adoption by theSecurity Council will both raise its profile and give it legal standing, anda clause on applicable law would discourage conflicting legal readings ofthe situation by both parties, a major problem in the implementation ofprevious agreements.

Problems on the groundIsrael rejects the concept of simultaneous, mutual performance, andinstead insists on a complete cessation of violence, full disarmament ofterrorist organisations and their infrastructure, and the completecollection of illegal weapons, before it carries out any of its obligationsunder the Road Map.8 Yet, since Palestinian militant groups would notremotely make any such move without significant reductions in Israelitroop presences in the West Bank and Gaza and a complete halt toretaliatory and pre-emptive operations (including targeted killings), it isclear that a ‘performance-based’ process must be a mutual one, involvingparallel steps, not one conditional on prior Palestinian concessions.9 IsraeliPrime Minister Ariel Sharon has also demanded that the PA give upPalestinian refugees’ ‘right of return’ to Israel in exchange for Israelirecognition of the creation of a Palestinian state. This is a so-called‘permanent status’ issue, which is to be negotiated in Phase Three of theRoad Map and therefore one the Palestinians cannot be expected to giveup in advance. It is one of the thorniest final-status issues.10


There are a number of broadly negative trends in Israeli society that arelikely to militate against implementation of the Road Map. Israeli PrimeMinister Ariel Sharon was re-elected in January 2003 in alandslide victory and formed a coalition with threeright-wing religious parties and one secular party.Unlike his previous national unity coalition, thegovernment Sharon formed in February 2003 did notinclude the left-leaning Labour Party. Some ministers inhis cabinet have called for further construction of Jewishsettlements in the Palestinian territories of the WestBank and Gaza. Avigdor Lieberman, head of theNational Union Party and current Minister ofTransportation, openly advocates the ‘voluntarytransfer’ of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.11

The National Religious Party, which holds the Housingand Construction ministerial portfolio, states in itsplatform that ‘the State of Israel alone shall exist betweenthe Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. No Palestinian state or otherforeign sovereign entity shall be established in this area. Jewish settlementthroughout the land of Israel is the foundation of our hold on the countryand of Israel’s security. Therefore, it must be fortified, and any politicalagreement must ensure that no Jewish settlement be uprooted’.12

Sharon, who is considered one of the more moderate and pragmaticmembers within his own Likud Party, has spoken in favour of thecreation of a Palestinian state, although he has remained vague on itsterritorial scope. In an interview he gave the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz inApril 2003 he hinted at the possibility of evacuating a number ofsettlements as part of a peace deal, but on the key question of territorialconcessions, he was still evasive.13 The new government continues tosupport a heavy Israeli Defence Force (IDF) presence in Palestinianoccupied territories, daily closures and curfews in the West Bank, frequentincursions into the Gaza Strip, targeted killings, house demolitions andthe continued settlement of occupied land. These measures seriouslyundermine trust and serve only to show the Palestinians that the policybehind them is not aimed at preventing terror, but rather at prolongingthe occupation and the accompanying humiliation. To similar effect,Israel’s overt political demands appear unrealistic and, therefore, unfair.Israel says that the IDF will not withdraw from the West Bank until thePalestinians reform the PA. Yet their ability to do so is seriouslyhampered by IDF presence in Palestinian territories.14 Likewise, Israel’smeddling in Palestinian politics produces Palestinian resentment that cutsagainst fruitful negotiations.

Israel’s overtpoliticaldemandsappearunrealisticand, therefore,unfair

78 Nomi Bar-Yaacov

It is of grave concern that the government has approved theconstruction of a ‘Separation Fence’ in the West Bank, originally aimed atpreventing terrorist attacks inside the Green Line; however, serious doubtwas cast over this when Sharon voiced his support for the expansion of thefence to areas in the Jordan Valley alongside the Jordanian border,effectively encircling the West Bank.15 This expansion does not have a clearcounter-terrorism purpose. The approved section of the fence, which isunder construction, will isolate over 11,000 Palestinians living in 13communities west of the fence; around 130,000 Palestinian residents from19 communities will be enclaved east of the fence; and tens of thousands ofPalestinians will be separated from their farmland.16 The fence, coupledwith a number of new bypass roads constructed for the easy access ofsettlers to their settlements, is creating aid-dependent communities in theWest Bank. Israel is also planning to implement what is known as the E-1plan, which will link a number of West Bank settlements to Jerusalem andencircle a large number of Palestinian areas.17 Palestinian leaders are likelyto construe these measures as attempts to shrink any prospectivePalestinian state. This problem becomes more intractable as time goes by.

The underlying problem is that the Israeli leadership does not acceptthat there are legitimate Palestinian claims for which concessions must bemade, and believes that more force is a necessary step to help resolve theconflict. From a Palestinian point of view, however, the massive forceused only reinforces perceptions that Israel is not interested in peace, butrather in controlling and humiliating the Palestinian people.Psychologically, then, tough Israeli counter-terrorism policies – includingoccupation and targeted killings – tend to fuel more terrorism. At thesame time, operationally, at least in the short term, some of these policieswork. Thus, Israelis understandably believe that re-occupying thePalestinian territories helps to ensure their safety.18 Indeed, the collapseof the peace process and the outbreak of the second intifada have causedthe Israeli Jewish population to shift sharply to the right. Some 98% ofthat population supported the re-occupation of parts of the West Bank inOperation Defensive Shield in late March 2002. In fact, many Israelis nowbelieve that the majority of Palestinians are not interested in a stateadjacent to an Israeli state, but rather, a state in historical Palestine, whichincludes Israel.

The Palestinians, for their part, have contributed to Israeli suspicionand mistrust. Overall, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has been leadinghis people towards an abyss since he returned to Gaza in 1994.19 He haslost political credibility, not only with the Israelis but also with theinternational community. Israel and the US view him as the instigator ofthe second intifada. Any American sympathy towards him vanished


when Israel seized the Karine-A, a ship loaded with arms bound for Gazain January 2002, proving that the PA was procuring arms from Iran withArafat’s sanction. More concretely, Palestinian attacks inside Israel havebeen carried out not only by extreme Islamic movements like Hamas andthe Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but also by certain factions within Fateh.Further, documents seized by the IDF during its punitive raid of Arafat’sheadquarters in Ramallah in autumn 2003 demonstrated that Arafat, orhis staff, has known of and approved Palestinian terrorism.

More broadly, Israelis believe that the Barak government offered thePalestinians an unprecedentedly generous deal, involving painfulconcessions, at Camp David in July 2000, to which the Palestinianscynically responded with violence. Consequently, Israelis find it hard tobelieve that the Palestinian people or leadership are interested in peace.Continued Palestinian hostility and terrorism only bolster this view.Israelis feel that they have been living under siege since the second intifadastarted in September 2000. Virtually every day since then there havebeen attacks on Israelis, ranging from shootings at soldiers and settlers tosuicide bombings in crowded cafes, malls and markets inside the GreenLine. Israelis are worried mainly about the large and potentially infinitenumber of young would-be Palestinian suicide bombers, and thewillingness of a larger cross-section of the Palestinian population –including imams in mosques as well as the official Palestinian media – tosupport and even incite terrorist violence. Arafat’s wife, Suha, said that ifshe had a son he would be a suicide bomber,20 and such so-called martyrsare a source of pride for their families. Even within Fateh, there are plentyof men who approve of suicide attacks. Marwan Bargouti, Fateh’s leader inthe West Bank, is on trial in Israel for advocating them. Hamas andthe Palestinian Islamic Jihad views them as legitimate military tactics. Insum: Israelis have a very good reason to be concerned.

These trends suggest that the problems in Israeli society andPalestinian society are serious enough to obstruct a purely diplomaticimplementation of the Road Map, and that only with outside interventionwould there be a possibility of moving forward. The question is still, as ithas always been, whether the Israelis would accept such intervention,and whether the US would commit to upgrading the intervention to thenecessary degree required on the ground. Arafat’s political eclipse hasimproved chances that Sharon’s pragmatic thinking will prevail. While theextent to which Arafat will allow Abbas to operate independently is yetunclear, Abbas is known for his honesty and commitment to peace, aswell as his determination to reform the PA and his conciliatory approachto Israel. With his appointment as prime minister, it is possible thatIsraeli attitudes towards the PA will gradually change. Since Sharon can

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claim the appointment as his own victory – it was he who pushed the USand other members of the Quartet to facilitate Abbas’ appointment – hemay be more inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt. Much willdepend on the degree to which Abbas will be able to curb violenceagainst Israel. Further, the majority of Israel’s population still supports atwo-state solution. So does the majority of the Palestinian population.According to a poll conducted in April 2003, 77% of the Israeli populationand 65% of the Palestinian population support reconciliation between thetwo sides after a peace agreement is reached and a Palestinian state isestablished and recognised by Israel.21 In addition, many Israelis arefinally beginning to link their disastrous economic situation togovernment policies on the security front. Israel simply may no longer beable to afford the occupation, and will not get the financial aid it needs inorder to maintain a presence in the Palestinian territories.

Given Arafat’s marginalisation and the economic reality that Israelcannot rule over the Palestinian people forever, Sharon may be open tonew ways to disengage from the West Bank and Gaza. Ultimately,intervention could be Israel’s only exit strategy from an economically andpolitically impossible situation. Some form of interim stabilisationagreement may provide Sharon with the political cover he deemsnecessary to permit such intervention. In fact, Sharon has appeared keen

to reach such an agreement. He would need to giverelatively little and could avoid making demands thatthe Palestinians could not easily meet. At the same time,he would gain substantial credit as a man of peace if anagreement were reached.

The political climate within Israel may also be gettingmore conducive to a bolder initiative. At the beginningof April 2003, National Infrastructure Minister YossefParitzki of the secular Shinui Party said that he was

considering disconnecting illegal outposts in the occupied territoriesfrom water and electricity grids.22 Interior Minister Avraham Poraz saidhe would not continue his predecessor’s policy of revoking thecitizenship of Palestinian citizens of Israel involved in terrorist activities.23

Grassroots movements calling for a full withdrawal from the West Bankand Gaza are also very active. A growing number of soldiers andreservists are refusing to serve in the occupied territories,24 and the PeaceNow movement continues to monitor settlement activity and is a majorlobby against it.25

Palestinians, for their part, read re-occupation coupled with settlementactivity as a strategy aimed at destroying their dream of an independentPalestinian state and wish to see an immediate and full withdrawal. They

Sharon maybe open tonew ways todisengage


have always welcomed the idea of international intervention if it will helpthem get rid of Israeli occupation. Now, with the situation as desperate asever, they would presumably embrace intervention even more warmlythan before. Recent Israeli incursions, closures, curfews as well as thefrequent house demolitions and targeted killings, have contributed to theprogressive deterioration of the economic situation in the Palestinianterritories, which has become desperate. In the West Bank and Gaza,63% of the population live below the poverty line of $2 a day. Even if theamount of humanitarian aid is increased from $1 billion to $2bn per year,it will only reduce the poverty rate to 54%.26 Thus, humanitarian aidcannot be a solution to the deteriorating economy.

With the appointment of Abbas, there is hope that the PA will be ableto meet some of the requirements of the Road Map. But it is highlyunlikely that even the PA’s best efforts will be able to stop all theterrorist operations of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and oppositiongroups within Fatah like the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades. Whether Sharonwill budge thus will depend primarily on whether Abbas succeeds inpersuading Israel that he is making every possible effort to halt violence.Unrealistically, and therefore disingenuously, Israel has been demandinga ‘100%’ effort, something that is virtually impossible to prove. But ifAbbas carries out the required reforms within the PA, he may developsome bargaining power. In the final analysis, Israel has to make astrategic choice in deciding whether to deal with the PA as a partner. Theoutside actor that will most profoundly influence that choice is theUnited States.

Making the Road Map workWhile US political influence and military power are uniquelyindispensable to a successful new peace process, the US must treadcarefully in the area of dispute-resolution. The clarity in the definition ofeach party’s obligations, coupled with the Quartet’s monitoringmechanism, is appropriately aimed at avoiding the ambiguity of the Osloprocess that ultimately brought it to a halt after Israelis and Palestiniansaccused the other of breaching the agreement. The unpublishedmonitoring mechanism that accompanies the Road Map, while salutary,reflects a ‘minimalist’ approach that is insufficient to tackle thecomplexities and sensitivities of the chronically intractable Israeli–Palestinian conflict. For the Israelis, concessions to Palestinians will bewidely viewed as ‘rewarding Palestinian terror’. The main problem forthe Palestinians is their ability to meet the Road Map’s requirements,especially since many militant groups in Palestinian territories would liketo undermine it.27 The first order of business, then, must be to strengthen

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the mechanism by making it ‘maximalist’ and as objective as possible.Objectivity requires that monitoring not be US-dominated. Exclusive USmonitoring of previous agreements has failed to ensure compliance. Amultilateral body like the Quartet, which is the plan’s official monitoringbody, is likely to be seen as more neutral and accorded more credibilityby the Palestinians and the Arab world.28

Progress will be based on ‘consensus judgement of the Quartet’ aboutwhether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account bothparties’ performance. The Palestinians, under pressure from theinternational community, accepted the Road Map without reservations.They have also carried out many of their obligations for Phase One. As ofMay 2003, however, the Israeli government had raised a number ofreservations, debated at length by the US and other members of theQuartet. Yet it is unlikely that Israel and the Palestinians will agree on thedegree of effort made by the PA to halt terror and carry out the requiredreforms, and it is unrealistic to expect the PA to be able to stop all violenceagainst Israelis. Thus, there should be no room for haggling over the plan,and a third-party arbiter is required to ensure that there is not. Indeed, inthe second phase, the plan envisages an ‘enhanced international role inmonitoring transition, with the active, sustained and operational supportof the Quartet’.29 Such an enhanced role is vital in all phases of the processand should consist of an effective dispute-resolution mechanism withserious sanctions on the parties who fall short of compliance. Themonitoring teams should also oversee security reforms as well as securitycooperation, Israeli withdrawals from specified areas in the plan,evacuation of illegal outposts and the freezing of settlements, Palestinianinstitutional reform, and humanitarian assistance.

Substantively, the US remains the only country powerful enough tomeaningfully influence Israel’s policy. Without serious and proactive USengagement and commitment, the implementation of the Road Map doesnot stand a chance. The US is under pressure from Arab countries as wellas the UK to force Israel to make concessions towards the Palestinians.This is an opportunity for the US to show a more even-handed approachto the conflict. However, it will not be easy for the US to change itsacquiescent policy towards Israel. Bush is deeply committed to Israelisecurity and believes that Israel is a valuable strategic partner.30 In the2004 presidential election, he also needs to capture the vote in key stateslike Florida, where there is a disproportionate share of American Jewishvoters, the majority of whom view any concession towards the PA as areward for terror.31 The US president is also known to identify withIsrael’s democratic culture and believes that in the post-11 Septemberstrategic environment, both the US and Israel are fighting a common


enemy.32 The US Congress also firmly backs Israel. Finally, within theExecutive Branch, several influential senior officials take a hard line onIsraeli security consistent with that of the Sharon government. ElliotAbrams, National Security Council Senior Director for Near East,Southwest Asian and North African Affairs with responsibility for Arab–Israeli issues, and Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith, to take twoexamples, were opposed to the principle of ‘land for peace’ and did notbelieve in the Oslo process.33 Given these currents within the Bushadministration, it will be difficult to generate sufficient US pressure onIsrael to ensure that the Road Map is implemented. Such pressure,however, remains indispensable.

Planning for international interventionEven if strengthened by tighter monitoring provisions, the failure ofprevious peace processes that were not backstopped by the threat offorce to ensure compliance strongly suggests that the Road Map can workonly as the thin edge of a sustained and more robustinternational military intervention. As noted, however,the Bush team is averse to taking political risks thatcould alienate the Sharon government. Yet its audacious– and indeed risky – military intervention in Iraqindicates its commitment to changing the status quo inthe Middle East. In addition, its pointed decision todelay reinvigorating the Israeli–Palestinian peace process until firstousting Saddam Hussein has increased international pressure onWashington to act decisively now that this has been accomplished. Thesefactors could overcome American risk-aversion as long as the US retainedsubstantial control over a new peace process. In this regard, the best hopeis arguably to plan ahead for a military intervention to accompany acivilian peacekeeping mission.

Israel would accept such a force only if it were led by the US. Butpeacekeeping forces are not unknown to Israel. In 1948, the UN SecurityCouncil mandated the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation(UNTSO) to ‘assist the United Nations Mediator and the TruceCommission in supervising the observance of the Truce in Palestine’.34

Since then, UNTSO has been mandated by the UN Security Council tosupervise the Armistice Agreement of 1949 and the observation of theceasefire in the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights following the 1967 war.In addition, in 1956 the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) wasestablished to monitor the ceasefire following the Sinai Campaign.UNEF II in Sinai and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force(UNDOF) were further authorised to ensure the separation of forces.35 As

Israel wouldaccept only aUS-led force

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part of the Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt, MultinationalForces and Observers (MFO) were deployed in Sinai in 1982.36 The UNInterim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed in 1978.37 Israel’sexperience with UNIFIL was very negative: the mission failed to preventPLO, and later, Hizbollah, attacks on Israel, and limited the IDF in itsability to attack targets in Lebanon. By contrast, the MFO – a non-UNmandated force led by the US and charged with monitoring the securityarrangements of their 1979 Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt –has been a success story. In light of the realisation that the parties cannotresolve the conflict themselves and that the IDF may not be able towithdraw from the occupied territories without an international force toguarantee Israel’s security, there is a growing awareness of the need foran external force – although there is no consensus about its nature andscope. A number of Israeli and Palestinian Track II forums are alreadyworking on the subject of international intervention. Indeed, the questionmay no longer be whether the conflict will be internationalised, but how.

In the January 2003 election, the two left wing parties spoke to varyingdegrees of the need for intervention. Meretz called in its Knesset Platformfor a ‘[w]ithdrawal of Israeli soldiers from the territories and theirreplacement by a temporary international security and civil monitoringforce’.38 Some members of the Labour party called for the US to ‘lead aninternational force to take responsibility for territories in the PA, and thusenable Israel to withdraw from Palestinian populated centres’.39 Somegroups are advocating an international trusteeship for Palestine.40 Throughunofficial channels, Israel has suggested to the US that a force of 50,000troops will be necessary in order to allow Israel to ‘disengage’ (which, inprevailing diplomatic code, would not entail full withdrawal) from thePalestinian territories. While a sustained contribution of that size appearsunrealistic, there are other extant proposals that are more promising.

At present, an international facilitating, or capacity-building role inimplementing the Road Map is being discussed by international actors.41 Amore ambitious intervention has already been suggested by the UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan, who called for a Chapter VII intervention inPalestine in April 2002. The tasks that Annan outlined for the force overlapwith the plan of action set out in the Road Map: it would work with theparties to end violence; monitor the redeployment of IDF troops to the 28September 2000 lines in accordance with the Tenet Security Work Plan; andfacilitate the exchange of security information. It would also graduallycreate secure conditions in Palestinian territory for the resumption ofnormal economic activity, and would work with the donor community andassist in institution-building. The force would also deal with therestructuring of the Palestinian security forces. In the context of the Israeli–


Arab conflict, the deployment of international forces have a better chanceof success if they are tasked specifically to separate hostile forces.42 Thisis why MFO and UNDOF have been more successful than UNIFIL.43

As for the principal outside actors themselves, there is at least a roughconsensus that there should be coordination among them on the ground.The Road Map states that ‘relying on existing mechanisms [and] on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives [will] begin informalmonitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formalmonitoring mechanism and its implementation’. The existing mechanismscover a range of issues. One EU team deals with Palestinian micro-security issues, another with promoting and facilitating ceasefire talks. AUS team is training security forces with the assistance of Egypt andJordan. The Ad Hoc Liaison Committee is providing humanitarian aid andassistance, as well as support for institution-building. The multinationalTemporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), established after themassacre of 29 Palestinians by a Jewish settler in 1994, is in the West Bankcity of Hebron.44 Its main task is to ‘monitor and report on misconduct byeither side in the conflict’. The TIPH has been largely ineffective as a resultof the same deficiencies in the monitoring standard that threaten toundermine the Road Map. Monitors who report on the situation have nopower to intervene in incidents and they have no police or militaryfunctions. Their reports to governments of contributing countries aresecret, and have had no apparent influence on the parties.

These third-party elements described above could be strengthenedand coordinated under one overarching umbrella organisation with aclear mandate for intervention and peacekeeping. The Quartet would bean appropriate body to oversee and coordinate the implementation ofthis mandate. Planning for a more robust force must also provide for thecontingency of failure to implement the Road Map. Contributing statesacceptable to both Israel and the PA could include the US, UK, Canada,Australia and New Zealand. Potential contributing states, in consultationwith the parties to the conflict, should formulate the overall mandate,and determine the appropriate composition of military forces and civilianmonitors, in accordance with Annan’s recommendations.

Robust engagementTo get peace in the Middle East back on track, keener engagement isrequired on multiple fronts. The Road Map, as putatively formulated, isunlikely to yield conditions on the ground that will lead to a settlementof the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the broadly desired two-statesolution. To make the Road Map more efficacious, its ambiguities shouldbe clarified and its monitoring facilities strengthened. The monitoring

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arrangement should include a conflict-resolution mechanism withappropriate sanctions to facilitate the move from one Road Map benchmarkto the next. This mechanism should not be rigidly symmetrical, sincesanctions that can work in favour of one party work against the other. TheRoad Map should also be adopted by the United Nations Security Counciland given clear legal standing.

These remedies alone, however, will not be sufficient. Heightenedinternational intervention – operationally enhanced by a militarypeacekeeping capability – has been rendered necessary by negativepolitical trends in both Israel and the Palestinian territories. This capabilityshould build on the existing third-party elements on the ground and on astrengthened Quartet monitoring mechanism designed to ensurecompliance by both parties with the provisions of the Road Map.

The success of any revived Middle East peace process will dependcritically on constructive and bold US policy. However risky US policy inforcing regime-change in Iraq may have been, a consolidated reversion ofUS Middle East policy to risk-averse realism with respect to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict would be fatal to the prospects of resolving it. Whilethe other members of the Quartet cannot fill the United States’ shoes inthe Middle East, they would do well to redouble diplomatic efforts topersuade the US to assume a proactive role that will culminate in pro-active and effective monitoring of the Road Map, as well as makingcontingency plans for a military intervention to secure the success of theplan, or as a fallback in case it fails.


Notes1 The full text of the Road Map can be

found at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm

2 ‘President Bush calls for NewPalestinian Leadership’,http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020624-3.html

3 The Road Map builds on the terms ofreference of the Madrid Conferenceof 1991, UN Security CouncilResolutions 242 of 22 November 1967,UN Security Council Resolution 338 of22 October 1973 and UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1397 of 12 March2002, which affirms ‘a vision of aregion where two states, Israel andPalestine, live side by side withinsecure and recognised borders’. Italso recognises the principle of anexchange of land-for-peace, noted inthe Israel–PLO Declaration ofPrinciples of 1993, known as the OsloDOP the Mitchell Report (30 April2001, http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm, Tenet Plan (14 June2001, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0khz0), and Zinni Plan(26 March 2002, http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/zinni.html), as well as Saudi CrownPrince Abdullah’s peace initiative, asendorsed by The Arab League inBeirut in March 2002 (http://www.mideastweb.org/saudipeace.htm).

4 Briefing by the United Nations SpecialCoordinator for The Middle EastPeace to the UN Security Council, 19March 2003; http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm

5 Abbas’s inaugarual speech can befound athttp://www.nad-plo.org/speeches/abumazen5.html (unofficial Englishtranslation).

6 The US has, thus far, not accepted anyof Israel’s reservations. US Secretary

of State Colin Powell said on 11 Mayin Jerusalem that ‘although the US iswilling to hear the comments andreservations both sides have on theRoad Map, the process should notwait until all the comments andreservations have been dealt with’.Herb Keinon, ‘Powell: Let’s move onroad map now’, The Jerusalem Post,11 May 2003, p. 1.

7 Aluf Benn, ‘Israel’s Response to theRoad Map: No “Independent”Palestinian State, Ha’aretz, 16 March2003, www.haaretzdaily.com

8 Ibid.9 Jeff Halper, ‘Time to Engage: The

People’s Road Map, Outlines of anInternational Lobbying Campaign’.To be published on www.icahd.org

1 0 See Aluf Benn, ‘Has Sharon Crossedthe Line?’, Ha’aretz, 18 March 2003,www.haaretzdaily.com

1 1 http://www.knesset.gov.il/vip/zeevi/eng/zeevi.htm

1 2 The National Religious Party (NRP)Platform; Peace and Security,Platform for Elections to the 14thKnesset May 1996,(unofficialtranslation) http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH01fx0

1 3 Sharon stated that: ‘Our wholehistory is bound up with these places.Bethlehem, Shiloh, Beit El. And Iknow that we will have to part withsome of these places. There will be aparting from places that areconnected to the whole course of ourhistory … One has to view thingsrealistically. Eventually there will be aPalestinian state. I view things firstand foremost from our perspective’.Ha’aretz, 13 April 2003.

1 4 See Menachem Klein, ‘The Origins ofIntifada II and Rescuing Peace forIsraelis and Palestinians, Foundationfor Middle East Peace: CurrentAnalysis’, text of lecture delivered inWashington on 2 October 2002 at theFoundation for Middle East Peace.

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1 5 For details of the expansion, see AlufBenn, ‘Defence Ministry wants fencemoved deeper into West Bank,’Ha’aretz, 23 March 2003; Aluf Benn,‘Treasury insists budget problemswon’t delay fence’, Ha’aretz, 7 April2003; and Herb Keinon and AmotzAsa-El, ‘Sharon to Post: Jews Will StillLive in Silo and Beit El’, JerusalemPost, 13 May 2002.

1 6 See, Behind The Barrier: Human RightsViolations As a Result of Israel’sSeparation Barrier, Position Paper,April 2003,http://www.btselem.org/Download/2003_Behind_The_Barrier_Eng.rtf

1 7 The E-1 plan would appropriate 3,110acres and link Maale Adumim, theFrench Hill and Pisgat Zeev toJerusalem. See, http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/news50.html#_ftnref9

1 8 See Avishai Margalit, ‘The SuicideBombers’, New York Review of Books,16 January 2003, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15979.

1 9 For a full analysis of Arafat’s politics,see Yezid Sayigh, ‘Arafat and theAnatomy of Revolt’, Survival, vol. 43,no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 74–60; YezidSayigh, ‘The Palestinian StrategicImpasse’, vol. 44, no. 4, Winter 2002–03, pp.7–21.

2 0 Comment made by Suha Arafat to aLondon-based Saudi weeklymagazine Al Majalla, issue published12 April 2002.

2 1 Palestinian Center for Policy andSurvey Research (PSR), SurveyResearch Unit: Public Opinion Poll #7 ,http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p7a.html

2 2 See, Nadav Shragai, ‘ParitzkiThreatens to Pull the Plug on IllegalWest Bank outposts’, Haaretz, 3 April2003.

2 3 See, Tovah Lazaroff, ‘Poraz nixesrevoking terrorists’ citizenship’, TheJerusalem Post, 2 April 2003, p. 1.

2 4 See http://www.seruv.org for details.

2 5 Peace Now have a series of reportsunder the heading ‘Settlement watch’which can be found at http://www.peacenow.org.il/

2 6 The Ermelo Report,www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/index.asp

2 7 A detailed examination of Israeli,Palestinian and US policies followsbelow.

2 8 The US is not viewed as a neutralbroker, and repeated and conspicuouspronouncements by US officialsreassuring Israel that Washington willbe the main broker are politicallyunhelpful. Statements like the onemade by US National SecurityAdviser Condoleezza Rice – that ‘weknow you [Israelis] are worried aboutthe Quartet, but we are in the driver’sseat’ – threaten to undermine theobjective appearance of the Quartet.It is vital for other Quartet membersto participate more substantively andpublicly in this process if it is tosucceed.

2 9 Author’s emphasis.3 0 See, US Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian

dispute: Re-engagement after Iraq?Strategic Comments, IISS, Volume 9Issue 2, March 2003.

3 1 Ibid.3 2 Ibid.3 3 Ibid3 4 See, http://www.un.org/Depts/

dpko/missions/untso/mandate.html3 5 See, http://www.un.org/Depts/

dpko/missions/undof/mandate.html3 6 For information on the MFO see

www.mfo.org3 7 See, Shlomo Brom, ‘International

Forces in an Israeli-PalestinianAgreement’, Jaffee Center forStrategic Studies, vol. 5, no. 4, p. 2.

3 8 Essentials of the Meretz Platform2003: Peace and Security, http://www.meretz.org.il

3 9 See, Tsahar Rotem, ‘Labour PartyTeam Plans Details of Gaza


Withdrawal’, Ha’aretz, 1 January 2003,www.haaretzdaily.com. This articlecites a document drafted by LabourMK Danny Yatom and former primeminister Ehud Barak’s bureau chief,Gilead Sher. The author thanks Sherfor providing a full text of thedocument that was submitted toMitzna on 4 January 2003, but notofficially endorsed by him.

4 0 See, Martin Indyk, ‘A Trusteeship forPalestine?’, Foreign Affairs, May/June2003.

4 1 See, for example, The Ermelo Report,ibid., and follow-up: PlanningConsiderations For InternationalInvolvement in the Israeli-PalestinianConflict, same web site.

4 2 www.bitterlemons.org, 7 April 2003.4 3 See also, Brom, ‘International Forces

in an Israeli-Palestinian Agreement’.4 4 TIPH is staffed by personnel from

Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden,Switzerland and Turkey. For moreinformation on the mission,see http://www.tiph.org/.

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New imperatives for Israeli–Palestinian peace

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