New Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference Abstracts · 2014. 7. 14. · – Śāntarakṣita...

Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference

Abstracts

Heidelberg, 26–30 August, 2014

Crowne Plaza Hotel

Abstracts are arranged in alphabetical order according to the speaker’s last name.Please consult the conference program, available from the conference websitehttp://idhc5.uni-hd.de, for information on the order of presentations.

The organizers gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Liudmila Olalde-Rico inthe production of this document.

1 Balcerowicz, Piotr: Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra

University of Warsaw; [email protected]

The paper analyses certain doctrinal points in the oeuvre of the Jaina Śvetāmbarathinker Samantabhadra who seems to respond to, to criticize and to be influenced byDharmakīrti.

The issues involve the idea of identity, the use of the delimiting particle eva in thesense of vyavaccheda (exclusion, delimitation), and certain passages in some ofSamantabhadra’s works which reveal his knowledge of the Pramāṇavārttika.

Samantabhadra – the author of such works as Āptamīmāṁsā, Devāgamastotra, Yuk-tyanuśāsana, Svayambhūstotra, Stutividyā – is traditionally considered to have livedaround 500–550, maybe slightly later. Sometimes he is also thought to be contem-poraneous with Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa, alias Vādimukhya (before 600 CE), theauthor of the Dvādaśāranayacakra, the source of plethora of quotations fromDiṅnāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, who had apparently had no knowledge of Dhar-makīrti.

The analysis of the historical correlation of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra mayhave possible implications for the dating of Dharmakīrti.

2 Choi, Kyeongjin: The indeterminate role of bādhakapramāṇa in the Pramāṇaviniścaya

University of Tokyo; [email protected]

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http://idhc5.uni-hd.de/

No one may be suspicious of the thought that bādhakapramāṇa validates pervasion(vyāpti) of sattvānumāna or dispute the idea that it materialized in complete formfor the first time in the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Dharmottara proclaims the former in hiscommentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya, and we also have Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāyawhere he makes the proof of momentariness based on sattvānumāna whose perva-sion is certified by bādhakapramāṇa. If this were the case, the traditional proof ofmomentariness, which is supported by the idea of nirapekṣatva, that is, the cause-lessness of extinction, would be nothing more than a redundant demonstration in thePramāṇaviniścaya.

But if one does not have a biased impression of bādhakapramāṇa and just relies onthe sentences which Dharmakīrti actually set forth in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, is itpossible to see the position on bādhakapramāṇa pointed out by Dharmottara?

In this paper, I would like to reconsider the aforementioned popular belief regardingbādhakapramāṇa and the proof of momentariness in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, with theassistance of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab’s commentary. rNgog understands the cause-lessness of extinction as the primary reason for the establishment of pervasion inthe proof of impermanence. Further, in his opinion, bādhakapramāṇa is a secondarysupportive attestation which works to stabilize the validity of the logic of causeless-ness. That is why he denies Dharmottara’s assertion, saying his stance on the cause-lessness of extinction is contradictory to Dharmakīrti’s intention.

My aim in this paper is to indicate that the role of bādhakapramāṇa cannot be de-termined only based in the Pramāṇaviniścaya since Dharmakīrti did not yet makethe purpose of bādhakapramāṇa clear in that text. I would like to carefully suggestthat we must presume that this issue was still developing in Dharmakīrti’s mind atthe time when he wrote this work. I will point out that, instead, what he mainly in-tended to establish is the effectiveness of svabhāvahetu as a logical reason, and thathe only refers to the proof of impermanence based on the idea of causelessness as aprototypical example, not simply for the sake of proving impermanence, itself.

3 Chu, Junjie: Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi

University of Leipzig; [email protected]

In this paper the author presents an analysis of Jitāri’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, a shortphilosophical treatise that is up to now unknown.

In this work, Jitāri refutes the bahirarthavāda with regard to the image of object(ākāra). At the start of the treatise, Jitāri divides bahirarthavāda into sākāravijñāna-vāda and nirākāravijñānavāda. He does not pay much attention to the sākāra-vijñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda, saying that it is not in conformity withthe whole set of the generally established worldly communicative convention and isnothing but a false determination (mithyābhiniveśa). In the remaining part he con-centrates on refuting the nirākāravijñānavāda-branch of the bahirarthavāda.

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The refutation begins with a formal reasoning: “What illuminates [in cognition] iscognition [itself], such as the conceptualization of a blue thing; and [a sensory ob-ject] like visible matter illuminates [in cognition, therefore, it is cognition with theimage of object]. This is the essential reason.” Then, he sets forth a long discussionto prove that the reason is valid, as he does in many other works of him, in the formof proving that the reason is not non-established (asiddhiḥ), is not contradictory(viruddhatvaṃ), and is not inconclusive (anaikāntikatā). In proving that the reason isnot inconclusive, Jitāri tries to prove that the shining of cognition is exclusively aself-shining, not in the sense that an external thing is illuminated by cognition; heuses the pattern of “four alternatives” (catuskoṭi) to discuss the relationship betweenshining and object, i.e., “shining is different from the object-referent,” “shining isnon-different from the object-referent,” “shining is both different and non-differentfrom the object-referent,” and “shining is neither different nor non-different fromthe object-referent.” The conclusion of this discussion is: “Since it is not correct thatone thing is illuminated by another thing, the necessary conclusion (ekānta) is: Thatwhich shines is exclusively itself, that which is not itself does never shine.”

In the last part of the treatise, in order to explain that the shining of cognition isonly self-shining, a further discussion is advanced on the temporal relationshipbetween the cognition and the shining of object as the cause and effect from gram-matical point of view; in doing so, the opinions of Kumārila (ŚVK pratyakṣasūtra54–55 quoted in TS 2923–2924) and Śubhagupta (BS 192b2: quoted in JNĀ 23,23–24, 351,17–18; TSP(K) 569,15–17; TSP(Ś) 486,14–17) are also refuted.

4 Coseru, Christian: Consciousness and causal explanation– Śāntarakṣita against physicalism

College of Charleston; [email protected]

The Buddhist epistemologist’s justification for taking reflexivity as the condition forthe possibility of warranted states of cognitive awareness is simply an extension oftheoretical commitments to a certain conception of the mental. One place where thistheory comes into particularly sharp focus is Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s chal-lenge of Cārvāka physicalism (in the chapter XXII of Tattvasaṅgraha). The Cār-vāka’s objection to any presumed continuity of reflexive self-awareness is framed bysome easily recognizable arguments. First, if an individual is nothing but a bundleof aggregates that are in turn reducible to more basic material substrata (viz.,atoms), then conscious awareness must be an emergent property (that is, conscious-ness must be regarded as nothing more than a product of the type of material organ-ization that is constitutive of biological organisms). Second, since consciousnesstakes the form of an apprehension of objects (that is, since it is inherently inten-tional), and apprehension only occurs in specific modes of cognizing such as per-ceiving or reasoning, consciousness cannot be present either when the sensory sys-tems are not yet developed (as in the embryonic stage) or when they are not re-sponsive (as in a state of comatose). Finally, the physicalist argues for what seemslike an obvious point: different types of bodies (for instance, those of humans and

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nonhuman animals), and different tokens of the same human body, manifest differ-ent types of consciousness. Assuming otherwise would be akin to postulating thatconsciousness can apprehend that which is contrary (viruddha) – a problematic pos-ition (for the Buddhist) given our lack of direct access to the minds of others (and tothe interior life of nonhuman animals). In this paper, I review the Cārvāka argu-ments and Śāntarakṣita’s response, and consider whether the Buddhist can answerthe challenge of physicalism without undermining the explanatory function of caus-al explanation. I then offer an innovative way to conceive of the notion of materialcausation (upādānakāraṇa) that builds on some recent debates at the intersection ofphenomenology and philosophy of mind.

5 David, Hugo: Maṇḍana Miśra on omniscience (sarvajña-tva) and the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa) – On the early appropriation of a few Buddhist concepts in the Mīmāṃsā tradition

University of Cambridge (UK); [email protected]

Philosophical reflection on the nature of the perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa), aswell as on its quality of being “valid knowledge” (pramāṇa), stems back to the veryearly stages of the “epistemological” school of Buddhism, to the works of Dignāgaand, above all, Dharmakīrti. It is not, however, until a much later date that this topicreceived a systematic treatment as part of a proof of the Buddha’s omniscience(sarvajñatva) by Indian Buddhist thinkers like Kamalaśīla, Jñānaśrīmitra or Rat-nakīrti. An explicit articulation of these two areas of reflection is neverthelessfound, prior to the 8th century, in several Brahmanical texts, which therefore con-stitute, in spite of their often polemical tone, an invaluable source for the study ofthe early developments of Buddhist thought on these matters. Our knowledge ofthese texts is still very unequal, though. If Kumārila’s arguments against the possib-ility of both omniscience and yogic perception in the Ślokavārttika (1.1.2/1.1.4) andBṛhaṭṭīkā are now reasonably well known, this is not the case for those of his mostimmediate successor within Mīmāṃsā, Maṇḍana Miśra (660–720?), who devotes awhole section of his Vidhiviveka (k. 15–25 and svavṛtti) to a critique of the possibil-ity of an omniscient being, involving an extensive discussion of Dignāga and Dhar-makīrti’s teachings on perception. In this presentation, I shall give an overview ofMaṇḍana’s arguments against omniscience and yogic perception, considering themin their own philosophical and historical context, whenever possible regardless oftheir much later reformulation and development in Vācaspati Miśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā(second half of the 10th century). Particular attention shall be paid to Maṇḍana’scritical use of the works of Dharmakīrti – of whom he proves to be an early andvery careful reader –, and to the theoretical plausibility of a denial of both yogicperception and omniscience in the framework of a Vedāntic soteriology (propoun-ded both in the Vidhiviveka and in the presumably later Brahmasiddhi) finding itsachievement in the apprehension of the Absolute (brahman) in a direct, perceptiveknowledge.

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6 Eltschinger, Vincent: Buddhist philosophy as critical examination (parīkṣā) – From Buddhist canonical literature to Dharmakīrti

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected].

Buddhist sūtra and vinaya literature often portrays the (future) Buddha as being dis-satisfied with and rejecting, sometimes on the basis of ad hoc philosophical argu-ments, the doctrines and practices of “contemporary” religio-philosophical tradi-tions (the views expressed in the Brahmajālasūtra, etc.) and/or masters (the six“rival masters,” Arāḍa Kālāma, Udraka Rāmaputra, etc.). Elaborating on these earli-er biographical narratives, Aśvaghoṣa (early 2nd century CE?) consistently repres-ents the (future) Buddha as subordinating his choices in soteriological matters to athorough critical examination (parīkṣā, vicāra, etc.) of the competing salvationalmethods (in fact, and quite anachronically, those available in first- to second-centuryIndia, especially Sāṅkhya, but also Vaiśeṣika, Vedic ritualism, proponents of time,nature, etc., as ultimate principles, etc.). The notion of parīkṣā also plays a promin-ent role in early Indian Buddhist literature of polemical as well as “meditational” in-tent. Thus it is that the Yogācārabhūmi (early 4th century CE?) makes critical exam-ination the driving principle of its polemics against sixteen Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist religio-philosophical doctrines and practices (Sāṅkhya, Jainism, Sar-vāstivāda, materialism, claims to socio-religious superiority, ritual violence, purific-ation practices, etc.) and a key component of its definition of logic and dialectics(hetuvidyā, vāda). As for meditational handbooks such as Saṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārab-hūmi (early 2nd century CE?) and the so-called Yogalehrbuch, they also allot an im-portant place to parīkṣā while describing the intellectual practices and the early ca-reer of a bodhisattva. In these and other texts, the appraisal of concurrent religio-philosophical streams through independent and allegedly value-free reasoning ismade one of the conditions of the Buddha’s paradigmatic salvational experience andthe very hallmark of Buddhism. After an introduction to the treatment of parīkṣāand related notions in Indian Buddhist works from the 1st half of the 1st millenniumCE, this paper will attempt to exhibit the Buddhist epistemologists’ indebtedness tothese earlier uses and interpretations of parīkṣā by focusing on the first chapter ofDharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, especially PVSV 108,2–109,3, a passage in whichthe celebrated logician presents his philosophical enterprise in an apologetic and so-teriological perspective.

7 Franco, Eli: The determination of causation and the similarity between cause and effect

Leipzig University; [email protected]

The determination of a causal connection is one of the major issues in Dharmakīrti’sepistemology. The usual depiction of this topic is based on PV I 34 and similar pas-sages where it is stated if all other conditions remain the same and upon the intro-

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duction of a new element a certain effect arises, while when this element is removedthe effect does not arise, this new element is the cause of that effect. Further, somescholars (e.g., Taber, Dharmakīrti against Physicalism; Steinkellner, Dharmakīrti’sEarly Logic) state that such cause and effect have to be similar to each other, thoughthe exact type of similarity remains contested.

In my paper, I will argue that various studies of the determination of causation ac-cording to Dharmakīrti have neglect to examine Dharmakīrti’s own practice in de-termining causation. When doing so, it becomes clear that the above depiction ofthe determination of causal relation can be true, but does not have to be true. In oth-er words, it forms a particular case, to which a general validity cannot be attributed.For instance, Dharmakīrti allowed a determination of causation even if a certain en-tity is constantly present (and thus cannot be added to or removed from a causalcomplex), and even if cause and effect are entirely dissimilar from each other, atleast on the level of everyday practice.

8 Fukuda, Yoichi: Reinterpretation of the compound svabhāvapratibandha in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory

Otani University; [email protected]

It seems to me that many scholars agree that svabhāvapratibandha forms the basis inreality of the logical nexus in Dharmakīrti’s logical theory. However, there are differ-ent opinions on what svabhāvapratibandha means.

Professor Steinkellner wrote in his “Svabhāvapratibandha Again” that “since theword pratibandha has only a formal meaning, the word svabhāva is responsible forconnecting the reality needed” (Acta Indologica, 6, 1984). He does not distinguishthe meaning of sambandha from that of pratibandha, and translates them with“connection” in formal meaning. However, in many cases, Dharmakīrti in fact usesthe term pratibandha without mentioning svabhāva in the sense of the basis in real-ity. Therefore, we must examine the meaning of pratibandha independent of svab-hāva in all of these cases.

Before researching the use of this word in Dharmakīrti’s texts, I would like to con-sult the usage of pratibandha/pratibaddha in Mahāvyutpatti and Abhidharmakośa,two authoritative texts of Buddhist terminology. Mahāvyutpatti lists “phyir ’jil ba’ambgegs byed pa’am bar chad byed pa” as the Tibetan equivalents for pratibandha,which mean hindrance or obstruct. The case is the same in Abhidharmakośa, wherepratibandha is translated into Tibetan as “gegs byed pa/bgegs su gyur pa” and intoChinese as “障, 障礙, 遮.” On the other hand, in Mahāvyutpatti, “rag lus pa’am ’brelba’am bgegs su gyur pa” are listed as the equivalent Tibetan words to pratibandhaand in Abhidharmakośa, “X-pratibaddha” is translated in four cases into Tibetan as“A la rag lus/las pa,” and in one case as “X dang ’brel ba.” In five cases, it is trans-lated into Chinese as “繋属, 属, 随.” The translations in Abhidharmakośa all mean

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“dependence upon.” In these traditional texts, pratibandha is never used to meanconnection, and it is used chiefly to mean dependence.

In one-third of the cases where pratibandha is used in Dharmakīrti’s PVSV, themeaning of the word is “obstruct,” translated as gegs/gags byed (pa) in Tibetan. Intwo-thirds of the cases, however, where the word pratibandha is used, and in allcases of the use of the word pratibaddha, the translations are ’brel ba or rag las/luspa, which in Tibetan provide no distinction between pratibandha and pratibaddha.The difference between them is only the Sanskrit syntax and not the word’s meaning.As we will see later, Dharmakīrti paraphrases svabhāvapratibandha with pra-tibaddhasvabhāvatva, meaning that something has its svabhāva depending upon an-other thing; in other words, that the svabhāva of something is dependent upon anoth-er thing. There are about 60 examples of pratibandha/pratibaddha in PVSV, and ofthese, I believe that none conflicts with the meaning of dependence.

To understand the meaning of the compound svabhāvapratibandha, I would like todiscuss the role of svabhāva, the first component of the compound. Until now, therehave been three interpretations of this compound: instrumental tatpuruṣa, genitivetatpuruṣa, and locative tatpuruṣa. The first interpretation is the predominant one ac-cording to how Dharmottara paraphrases the compound in NBT (svabhāvena prat-ibandha). However, we could not find any textual evidence confirming that prat-ibandha is used with a word in the instrumental case. Dharmakīrti mentions prat-ibandha with one word in the genitive case and another word in the locative case;the former word indicates a possessor of pratibandha and the latter word indicatesan object upon which that possessor depends. The similar thing can be seen in theexample of pratibaddha, which is used with a word in the locative case indicatingthe object of dependence and a notional subject in the appositional case, as in NB,below:

svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho(X) arthaṃ(Y) gamayet. (NB, 2.19)tad(Y)-apratibaddhasya(X) tad(Y)-avyabhicāra-niyama-abhāvāt. (NB, 2.20)sa ca pratibandhaḥ sādhye arthe(Y) liṅgasya(X). (NB, 2.21)[liṅgasya(X)] vastutas tād(Y)ātmyāt tad(Y)-utpatteś ca. (NB, 2.22)atad(Y)-svabhāvasya(X) atad(Y)-utpatteś(X) ca tatra(Y) apratibaddha-svabhāvatvāt.(NB, 2.23)

In these statements, X is hetu and Y is sādhya. According to NB, 2.23, X (hetu) is anotional subject of the bahuvrīhi compound pratibaddhasvabhāva, and according toNB, 2.21, X (hetu) is a notional subject of pratibandha (or svabhāvapratibandha).Therefore, X has pratibaddhasvabhāva upon Y (that is, X has the svabhāva that de-pends upon Y). All of these statements in NB are found in Dharmakīrti’s majorwork, PVSV. Therefore, it is possible to speculate that this pragmatics of prat-ibandha reflects Dharmakīrti’s fundamental understanding.

Finally, I would like to make a suggestion about the meaning of the dependence ofX (hetu) upon Y (sādhya). Because Dharmakīrti himself does not discuss the mean-

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ing of pratibandha explicitly, we must speculate on this term in its textual context. Itis a word very closely related to ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti (PVSV, 10.23; PV, I.24), theimproved version of avinābhāva, which is a traditional notation of a logical nexus.While avinābhāva means the inevitable absence of one thing (X = hetu) in thesphere of the absence of another thing (Y = sādhya), ekanivṛttyānyanivṛtti meansthat the disappearance of one thing (X) causes the disappearance of another thing(Y). This causality of disappearance is expressed by the instrumental case, while theinclusion relation of the absence of two things is expressed by the locative case.Dharmakīrti introduces this causality of disappearance as a condition of inevitablelogical nexus, and insists that the causality of disappearance necessarily requires thepratibandha relation, meaning the dependence of the existence of one thing (X =hetu) upon another thing (Y = sādhya). If there is this dependence of X upon Y, thedisappearance of Y will inevitably cause the disappearance of X. Such dependenceis, in itself, a connection in reality and, because of this, Dharmakīrti does not needto mention the word svabhāva.

9 Gillon, Brendan: Ṣaṭkoṭivāda in the Upāyahṛdaya

McGill University; [email protected]

The text thought to be the earliest on debate in Classical India is preserved only in atranslation into Chinese. Known in Chinese as the Fang Bian Xin Lun and found inthe Taishō, the great Chinese collection of Buddhist texts (T 1632: v. 32, pp. 23.2–28.3), it was retranslated into Sanskrit, under the Sanskrit title Upāyahṛdaya, by thegreat Italian Indologist Giuseppe Tucci and the translation published in 1929. Notranslation into a European language has, ever appeared. The author of this text isunknown, though the Japanese Indologist, Yūichi Kajiyama, has presented argu-ments for its attribution to the famous Indian dialectician Nāgārjuna.

A puzzling dialectical, or perhaps logical, term found in the opening verses ofNāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī is the term ṣaṭkoṭivāda. This term seems to apply towhat is set out at length in the third chapter of the Fang Bian Xin Lun. The talk willexplain what this term applies to.

10 Gorisse, Marie-Hélène: Jain conceptions of non-apprehension – A criticism of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference

Ghent University; [email protected]

Whereas Buddhist conceptions of non-apprehension as a source of knowledge havereceived detailed attention of scholars in the past years, Jain ones are still to be stud-ied. Yet, they depart from a dialogue with Buddhist philosophers on what count as acorrect evidence within an inference. And, as such, Jain conceptions of non-appre-hension as a source of knowledge can be seen as a relevant part of the studies onBuddhist theories of inference as well.

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The discussion concerning the number of types of relation that can ensure certaintyconcerning the relative absence or presence of their members is a stylistic mnemon-ic way to present philosophical considerations concerning one’s conception of infer-ence. For example, the fact that Jain philosophers accept four types of evidence,namely evidence grounded on identity of nature, causality, co-existence and suc-cession, is a way to say that they consider as relevant whatever evidence ensures theuniversality of the conclusion of the inference at stake (because the evidence is al-ways seen with the target-property). Whereas the fact that Buddhist philosophersaccept only two types of evidence, namely the ones grounded on identity of natureand on causality, means that they consider inference as relying on necessity (theevidence is always seen with the target-property because there is an underlying ne-cessary relation).

The same apply to the discussions concerning the number of types of non-appre-hension: this presentation in the form of a list of accepted non-apprehensions is astylistic mnemonic way to present philosophical considerations concerning one’sconception of what ensures certainty in an inference.

The aim of this paper is in a first part to present and compare the types of non-apprehension ensuring inferential knowledge for Buddhist and for Jain philosoph-ers, as well as to indicate the philosophical relevance of these lists.

And in a second part, I will show that the divergences between the types of evid-ence accepted by each school are rooted in the divergences between their respectiveconceptions of non-apprehension. More precisely, the possibility of acquiring know-ledge of a presence of a property by means of the non-apprehension of an incompat-ible property can be seen as what led Jain philosophers to distinguish between fourtypes of evidence.

I will present Dharmakīrti’s views and implicit attacks to the Jains as they are foundin his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. As for Jain views, I will focus on Māṇikyanandi’sParīkṣāmukham. This work consists in a digest of the final and mature epistemologyof Akalaṅka reworked by Vidyānanda. Akalaṅka was a Jain Digambara philosophercontemporary of Dharmakīrti who devoted core parts of his work at giving a sys-tematic answer to Dharmakīrti’s criticisms to Jain philosophers. But following hisBuddhist opponent’s style, he gave very concise answers, which explains our re-course to his commentators.

11 Guerrero, Laura P.: Pramāṇa as conventional truth in thework of Dharmakīrti

Utah Valley University; [email protected]

This paper scrutinizes the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth inthe work of Dharmakīrti. In particular, this paper raises a challenge for the interpret-ation that Dharmakīrti employs a sliding scale of analysis whereby he dialectically

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progresses from claims that are soteriologically useful but strictly speaking false, upto the ultimate truth of the Yogācāra. In the spirit of recent work conducted with re-spect to conventional truth in the Madhyamaka tradition of Buddhism, this paper ar-gues that the sliding-scale interpretation fails to take conventional truth seriouslyenough as truth. By bringing to bear work in analytic metaphysics, as well as thework conducted with respect to Madhyamaka, this paper shows why a more robustsense of conventional truth is necessary and why the sliding-scale interpretationcannot account for it. The paper concludes by suggesting that Dharmakīrti’s accountof pramāṇa should be read as consistent with the ultimate Yogācāra position. Readin this way, the account of pramāṇa can be understood as itself providing an explan-ation of the sense in which conventional truth is true (and conventional falsehood,false) despite the ultimate metaphysical rejection of the objective existence of theexperienced world.

12 He, Huanhuan/van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J.: Turning the Wheels – Yet another look at the *Hetucakra[ḍamaru]

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; [email protected]/

Harvard University; [email protected]

Attributed to Dignāga, the Hetucakra[ḍamaru] or HC has been studied a number oftimes, even when so far no truly reliable edition exists of the only extant version,namely the Tibetan translation by most likely Śāntarakṣita and the Tibetan Lo tsā baChos kyi snang ba [Dharmāloka]. Some nine decades ago, the redoubtable Buddhistscholar Lü Cheng (1896–1989) published a Chinese translation in his“Diagrammatic Explanation of the Wheel of Reason [in Chinese]” ([Journal of]Neixue 4, 1928, 1–6), which he accompanied with brief but exceptionally insightfulcomments. In his “Translation of the Tibetan Translation of the Hetucakra; theLogic of the Nine Reasons [in Japanese],” Bukkyōgaku kenkyū 8–9 (1953), 100–110,Takemura Shōhō mentioned Lü Cheng’s paper, and, virtually following Lü in hisanalysis, offered the very same two diagrams of the sapakṣa and vipakṣa squares. Asfar as we are aware, Lü was the first (modern) scholar to have clearly explained thethree wheels that are articulated in the text, that is, the sapakṣa-wheel and thevipakṣa-wheel, and that these two make up the final cakra-wheel of nine reasons.

Inspired by Lü’s concise annotated translation, in this paper, we would like to give acomplete critical Tibetan edition of the text, an annotated English translation, and afew diagrams to show how the cakra-wheel actually works. How it can be turned orrotated as a drum (ḍamaru) is quite literally described by the HC’s author, but hasbeen considered a puzzle of the text for some time. Finally, we will discuss ques-tions bearing on the authorship and the transmission of the HC, and venture to offera different interpretation of HC 8 and 9 than what was recently given by E. Francoand L. Schmithausen.

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13 Hugon, Pascale: Revisiting the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya

Austrian Academy of Sciences; [email protected]

The surfacing of new textual material is playing a significant role in our better un-derstanding of Dharmakīrti’s thought and its Indian and Tibetan reception. In my pa-per I revisit the prasaṅga passage of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin-Skt 3 4,4‒6,12;PVin-Tib D188a5‒189a5; P286a5‒287a5; N300a6‒301b) and its interpretationsbased on the now available Sanskrit version of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya andDharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā and on early Tibetan commentaries, with a fo-cus on the ones by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109‒1169) and his student gTsangnag pa brTson ʼgrus seng ge (?‒after 1195).

A major point of dissension among Indian commentators regarding this passage iswhether the example provided by Dharmakīrti illustrates a prasaṅga or its reverseform (prasaṅgaviparyaya), and what are the conditions for arriving at a reverse formthat constitutes a correct proof, in particular the conditions pertaining to the statusof the subject. Whereas Phya pa follows Dharmottara’s interpretation for the mostpart, he also introduces divergent explanations for single terms and compounds thatreflects a different understanding of the original text.

In my presentation I first discuss Phya pa’s general understanding of this passage inconnexion with his two extensive excursuses on prasaṅga (Tib. thal ’gyur/thal ba)found in the Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and in the section that precedes the explana-tion of the prasaṅga passage in his commentary of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. Further, Iconsider Phya pa’s deviations from Dharmottara’s interpretation, raising the questionwhether they are due to Phya pa’s reliance on a Tibetan translation of the PVin andPVinṬ, the influence of other interpretative traditions, or simply reflect a personalunderstanding of the text. I also examine his criticism of two alternative interpreta-tions of the example given by Dharmakīrti in this passage (interpretations that echopositions already mentioned in Dharmottara’s commentary) and explore their fluctu-ating attributions, to Prajñākaragupta and Vinītadeva by Phya pa, to Śāntabhadraand Vinītadeva by Zhang thang sag pa and Bu ston. Finally, I compare Phya pa’scommentary on this passage with that of his student gTsang nag pa brTson ’grusseng ge and raise the question of the compatibility of gTsang nag pa’s views onprasaṅga with the Candrakīrti-oriented Madhyamaka standpoint he is known tohave adopted.

14 Inami, Masahiro: Two kinds of causal capacity – sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ

Tokyo Gakugei University; [email protected]

Buddhist logicians advocate that there are two kinds of causal capacity, i.e.,sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. According to some studies, they mean to say

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that external objects, such as pots, have two different causal powers: one is the caus-al power common to other objects of the same kind, and the other is the causalpower that is not common to any other object. For example, a pot has the causalpower or capability of containing water, which is common to other pots, and, at thesame time, it has the unique power of producing its own particular perception.

However, Dharmakīrti and his followers mean otherwise by the concept of the twokinds of causal capacity. They explain that because the entire pot does not exist dis-tinctly from its parts, the pot is nothing but the aggregate of multiple atoms such ascolor atoms. Then, they state that the atoms that constitute the pot have two differentcausal capacities. For example, the color atoms that constitute the pot have both thepower of yielding those results such as containing water, which is common to all theconstituents of the same pot, and the power of producing a visual sensation, whichis not common to the other constituents such as the smell atoms. The point is that, inthe case of a causal complex, each cause shares the ability of producing a single ef-fect and has separately defined abilities as well.

Some modern scholars mistakenly attribute this theory to Prajñākaragupta, a com-mentator of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV), and not to Dharmakīrti. BeforePrajñākaragupta, Devendrabuddhi, an earlier commentator of PV, lucidly explainsthe theory by using the terms sāmānyā śaktiḥ and pratiniyatā śaktiḥ. Besides, theconcept of the two kinds of causal capacity is clearly seen in Dharmakīrti’s workssuch as PV I (with svavṛtti), PV II, and Hetubindu. Commentators such as De-vendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta described Dharmakīrti’s concept in more detail.

15 Ishida, Hisataka: The exclusion of superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda)

Tokyo University; [email protected]

In his apoha theory, i.e. the theory of exclusion, Dignāga insists that a word ex-presses its meaning through the exclusion of others. Consequently, what is excludeddecides the meaning of words and is, according to Dignāga, decided by the intentionof the speaker (PSV ad PS 43b). Dharmakīrti following his predecessor admits theimportant role of the speaker’s intention. He develops the apoha theory, which as-serts that one employs words or inferences, more precisely the inferential mark(liṅga), to eliminate the superimposition (samāropavyavaccheda) that results fromother sources of confusion. A typical example of such superimposition is when onefalsely recognizes a string as a snake or a small shell as silver, which should beeliminated by inference.

A question arises here as to whether the exclusion function of words or inference isrestricted to the case when one falsely recognizes the object. Okada (“On the objectof exclusion in case of the cognition immediately after the perception,” 2007) treatsthis problem, and he, consulting the commentary of Śaṅkaranandana and othersources, concludes that the word or inferential mark excludes the “future” possibil-

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ity of superimposition in such a case. I think, however, the point is to consider whatis excluded by words or by inference when there is no superimposition at all in con-ceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti explains that the word or the inferential mark can beregarded as having already excluded that which has not been superimposed (PV1.48cd: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram). Consequently, Dharmakīrti ex-tends the function of the word or the inferential mark, i.e. the other-exclusion, to allconceptual cognition.

This idea is expressed in his later work Hetubindu as “To determine it is to excludethe other than it” (tat paricchinatti, tadanyad vyavacchinatti). This passage is laterquoted by Jñānaśrīmitra, and Katsura (“Jñānaśrīmitra on apoha,” 1986) refers to itin showing the essential consistency between Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory and theideas of Jñānaśrīmitra.

I would also like to discuss that other-exclusion could justify the validity of concep-tual cognition as determining cognition (niścaya), since Dharmakīrti definitelystates that the latter denies superimposition (PV 1.49ab: niścayāropamanasorbādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ).

16 Kanō, Kyō: On viparyayabādhakapramāṇa

Kobe Women’s University; [email protected]

In his Īśvarādhikāre vārttikasaptaślokīvyākhyānam Jñānaśrīmitra states: “the validmeans of cognition which establishes a pervasion are of only two kinds, perceptionand non-cognition or viparyayabādhakaṃ, because both of these have perceptionand inference as their essential properties (tac ca pramāṇaṃ vyāptisādhakaṃdvividham eva. pratyakṣānupalambhaṃ vā viparyayabādhakaṃ vā. anayoḥpratyakṣānumānasvabhāvatvāt).” This statement admits of two interpretations. First,both of them, perception and non-cognition, and viparyayabādhakaṃ, have percep-tion and inference as their essential properties. Secondly, the former, perception andnon-cognition, has perception as its essential property and the latter, viparyayabād-hakaṃ, has inference as its essential property. Jñānaśrīmitra suggests in another pas-sage that viparyayabādhakaṃ is an inference. If Jñānaśrīmitra’s intention is thesecond, is it Buddhists general idea at that time or only his original? Moreover, thisstatement seems to suggest that the former, perception and non-cognition, corres-ponds to kāryahetu and the latter, viparyayabādhakaṃ, to svabhāvahetu. Does hereally intend this correspondence? Is it Jñānaśrīmitra’s idea that all pervasions withreference to svabhāvahetu can be established only by viparyayabādhakaṃ? If so,what kind of pramāṇa does it represent? Does it include prasaṅga and prasaṅgavi-paryaya, or it is different from these two? My paper will deal with these issues re-lated to viparyayabādhakapramāṇa (correctly sādhyaviparyaye bādhakapramāṇa)mainly discussed in the texts after Dharmakīrti which have not been hitherto dir-ectly discussed upon.

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17 Kataoka, Kei: How does one cognize a cow? A dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga

Kyushu University: [email protected]

In PS V 39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of apoha replying to a Sāṃkhya theorist.PSV ad V 39 begins with words yas tv āha and the commentator Jinendrabuddhiidentifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “a destroyer.” As Pind (2009: 286, n. 506)comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist, Mādhava, who iselsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, a destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, becausehis unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets. As Pind observes inhis note 506 on PS V 39, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of apoha byquoting from Dignāga’s lost work, probably either the Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā or theSāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. The main scenario of PS V 39 can be depicted as follows:

1. Dignāga criticizes Sāṃkhya views in his earlier work.

2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of apoha.

3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

PS V 41ab refers to a view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observationof dewlap, and so on (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ). Pind (2009: 291, n. 516)ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basisof Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam. He also ascribes theview presented in PS V 41d (bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ) to Mādhava. The presentauthor reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PSṬ, and shows that the firstview is ascribed not to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava and that the second viewis ascribed not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.

18 Kawajiri, Yohei: The Pratyabhijñā school’s criticism of the Buddhist concept of svalakṣaṇa

Chikushi Jogakuen University; [email protected]

It is well known that Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, who are respectively a sys-tematiser and an expounder of the Pratyabhijñā school, are surprisingly familiarwith Dharmakīrti’s logic and epistemology. They often refer to the typical termino-logy of Buddhist epistemologists, for example, to svalakṣaṇa, arthakriyā, svas-aṃvedana, apoha, svabhāvahetu and so on. Of these terms, they utilize svalakṣaṇa inorder to establish their theory of remembrance. However, the view of svalakṣaṇa en-tertained by the Pratyabhijñā school is not in complete accord with what is held bythe Buddhist epistemologists.

For the Buddhist epistemologists, svalakṣaṇa is the object only of perception, whathas causal efficiency, dissimilar to anything else, not the object of words, the source

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of knowledge, real because what has causal efficiency is real, and the entity whichhas a unique character. However, though Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta considerthe svalakṣaṇa as something determined in space, time and form, they criticize theBuddhist view of svalakṣaṇa in that it is the object only of perception and real. For,in the Pratyabhijñā school, what is called svalakṣaṇa is not the object only of per-ception and conceptual. The view of svalakṣaṇa entertained by the Pratyabhijñāschool is called ābhāsanikurumbhātmakasvalakṣaṇavāda. According to this view,what is called svalakṣaṇa is a mixture of manifestations (ābhāsa).

This paper will show how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta reinterpret what is calledsvalakṣaṇa by the Buddhist epistemologists in terms of the Pratyabhijñā school, tomake clear how the theory of manifestation and a valid means of knowledge(pramāṇa) held by the Pratyabhijñā school is reflected in the argument.

19 Kobayashi, Hisayasu: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on svalakṣaṇa

Chikushi Jogakuen University; [email protected]

When Dharmakīrti says that a valid cognition (pramāṇa) is a cognition which doesnot deceive our expectation toward its object (avisaṃvādi jñānam), he confronts thefollowing problem: If the Buddhist theory of momentariness claims that an object-moment to be cognized by a cognition should be differentiated from an object-moment to be obtained through a practical activity, how can one establish the valid-ity of the cognition?

In this paper I shall show that, in order to solve the problem of time-gap between anobject-moment to be cognized and an object-moment to be obtained, Dharmottaraand Prajñākaragupta adopt two different strategies. From the point of view of whatis to be cognized by a cognition at the time when the cognition takes place, theformer holds that an object of a valid cognition should be divided into two types: adirect object (grāhya) and an object to be obtained (prāpaṇīya, adhyavaseya); while,from the point of view of what is to be obtained through a cognition, the latter holdsthat it suffices to say that a cognition of a present object-moment is an erroneouscognition with respect to a future object-moment.

20 Lasic, Horst: What is the effect of what and how can onedetermine it?


Steinkellner’s recently (2013) published translation of those parts of the first chapterof the Pramāṇavārttika and its Vṛtti that deal with logic is certain to receive muchattention among scholars of South Asian philosophy and will without doubt have amarked impact on future investigations into Dharmakīrti’s thought. Steinkellner’sclose familiarity with Dharmakīrti’s work and its intellectual environment, which he

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gained through intensive research over roughly half a century, allows him to chal-lenge traditional interpretations and find new understandings of crucial passages. Acase in point is Steinkellner’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s explanation on how onecan establish something as being the effect of a specific cause. In this special case,however, some of Steinkellner’s proposed understandings seem to ask for further re-consideration. I therefore plan to investigate the relevant materials anew andpresent arguments in support of or against Steinkellner’s interpretation as necessityarises.

21 Mc Allister, Patrick: Form and content in Ratnakīrti’s writings

Heidelberg University; [email protected]

The paper explores the content of some of Ratnakīrti’s writings from the perspectiveof his distinctive style. Already Anantalal Thakur noted that Ratnakīrti’s texts areorganized around principles of Buddhist logic (e.g., pseudo-reasons). In light ofcloser examinations of those texts by various scholars, it has become apparent thatthey are very literally organized around inferences: each text is structured around aguiding inference, either one that an opponent upholds, or one that Ratnakīrti him-self endorses.

I would like to investigate whether this method is simply a literary device, or wheth-er this formal strategy has implications also for the actual content of the discussions.The answer to this question requires an investigation of the structure of his texts,and an estimation of how some of the arguments he makes fit into the Buddhisttradition, especially as upheld by Jñānaśrīmitra, his teacher, and also by Pra-jñākaragupta.

22 McCrea, Lawrence Joseph: Balancing the scales – Dharmakīrti inside and out

Cornell University; [email protected]

Recent years have witnessed much debate about the best way to make sense ofDharmakīrti’s apparent diversity of philosophical positions regarding the status ofmind-independent objects: at some times he appears to argue in ways that presup-pose the existence of such objects, while at others he argues against them. Severalapproaches have been proposed to account for this apparent contradiction in Dhar-makīrti’s various statements regarding ontology. Most famously Dunne (2004) hassuggested that we should see such positions as ranged along a “sliding scale” ofhierarchically arranged stances, in which “more accurate descriptions of what weperceive and think supersede less accurate ones.” On this view, the externalist or“Sautrāntika” arguments Dharmakīrti often relies upon are there only as prelimin-ary, conditional positions, as stepping stones which invariably give way through aspecific kind of “transition argument” to the more accurate and more soteriologic-

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ally beneficial internalist or Yogācāra position which represents Dharmakīrti’s realviews. Certain features of this overarching vision of Dharmakīrti’s philosophicalmethodology have been further investigated and in some respects questioned, forexample by Arnold (2008) and Kellner (2011). This paper will seek to extend thisdebate, and to reexamine some of its main premises, especially in the light of addi-tional evidence provided by the recently recovered Sanskrit text of Dharmakīrti’sPramāṇaviniścaya and not yet considered in discussions of Dharmakīrti’s stance onthe realist/idealist question. In particular, I will seek to show that the purported hier-archical ordering of the realist and idealist positions is not as clear or as unambigu-ous as has sometimes been claimed, and that the “Sautrāntika” view Dharmakīrti of-ten seems at least conditionally to present as his own may be meant as far more thana pedagogical straw man or stepping stone to an ultimately preferred Yogācāra view.On the contrary, there is evidence in several passages of Dharmakīrti’s major worksto suggest that he wished, at least for certain polemical and pedagogical purposes, topresent his own versions of the externalist and internalist positions as two irrecon-cilable but alternate and viable ontologies, rather than one less accurate stance de-signed to give way in the end to a higher and more accurate one, and therefore thatthe traditional classification of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s works as belonging to the“Sautrāntika-Yogācāra School” may not be as misguided as some contemporary ac-counts have suggested.

23 Miyo, Mai: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta on the non-distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala

Waseda University; [email protected]

My paper will examine the concept of vyavasthā in the theory of the non-distinctionbetween pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala by contrasting Dharmottara’s interpretation inhis Nyāyabinduṭīkā and Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā with Prajñākaragupta’s Pramāṇavārt-tikālaṃkāra, and then returning to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PV) andPramāṇaviniścaya. The Buddhist logico-epistemological school holds that there isno distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala, that is, the means of valid cog-nition and its result. According to Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika III 301–319,pramāṇa is cognition’s nature of having the form of the object (meyarūpatā), andpramāṇaphala is cognition’s function of understanding the object (prameyādhigati).Thus both, being aspects of a certain cognition, are distinguished from each otheronly from the viewpoint of aspects, but not of real entities. Moreover, previous re-search, along with Manorathanandin’s commentary on PV and Dharmottara’sNyāyabinduṭīkā on NB I 21, has pointed out that pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala are re-lated in the manner of vyavasthāpaka and vyavasthāpya, that is, that which differenti-ates the cognition and the cognition to be differentiated.

However, Dharmottara’s interpretation is not so simple because he uses two mean-ings of the word vyavasthāpaka, as Durvekamiśra suggests in his sub-commentary:(1) the cause of differentiation (vyavasthānimittaṃ vyavasthāpanam) with -aka suffixused in the sense of karaṇa, and (2) the agent of differentiation (vyavasthāpayatīti

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vyavasthapakaḥ). Dharmottara uses the word in the first meaning when the me-yarūpatā is called vyavasthāpaka, and asserts that ascertaining cognition (niś-cayapratyaya) that arises after direct perception is the agent of differentiation. It fol-lows that direct perception is differentiated by later conceptual cognition, not by thedirect perception itself.

In this regard, we can find another interpretation of vyavasthā in Prajñākaragupta’sPramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra. In PVA on PV III 311, he criticizes a theory that is similarto Dharmottara’s interpretation, denying that ascertaining cognition intervenes inclose relationship between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala.

24 Nakasuka, Miyuki: Dharmakīrti’s apoha theory, perceptual judgement and lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka)

Hiroshima University; [email protected]

In the apoha section in the svārthānumāna chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika, Dhar-makīrti starts by characterizing apoha as difference among real entities from an on-tological point of view (PV 1.40–42) and then as the exclusion of superimposition(samāropavyavaccheda) from an epistemological point of view (PV 1.43–58). Hedefines as a determinate cognition (niścaya) inference (anumāna) and a perceptualjudgement, the latter of which is precisely a conceptual cognition that follows a per-ceptual cognition (pratyakṣapṛṣṭhabhāvivikalpa), arguing that both have for theirobjects the exclusion of superimposition. It is important to note that Dharmakīrtimeans by the word vyavaccheda “exclusion” differs from inference to a perceptualjudgement. In the case of inference, the word in question means that function of ex-cluding superimposition which is carried out by inference when there occurs an er-roneous cognition with respect to the subject of inference. In the case of perceptualjudgement, on the other hand, it means lack of superimposition (samāropaviveka).Dharmakīrti states:

PV 1.48:kvacid dṛṣṭe ’pi yaj jñānaṃ sāmānyārthaṃ vikalpakam /asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram //

PV 1.48cd: asamāropitānyāṃśe tanmātrāpohagocaram is superficially clear but verydifficult to understand. Steinkellner (1971: 190, n. 71) gives the following inter-pretation:

Die vorstellende Erkenntnis, welche ein Allgemeines zum Gegenstand hat, richtetsich, wenn irgendein [Ding] wahrgenommen wurde, ohne daß [auf dieses Ding] einTeil eines andern [Dinges] übertragen worden ist, bloß darauf, diesen [fremden Teil]fernzuhalten [...]

According to Dharmakīrti, in the case of the perceptual judgement the determina-tion of a perceived object is concurrent with the absence of superimposition. For in

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Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception there can arise two kinds of cognitions: erro-neous and determinate, after a perceptual cognition occurs. This implies thatwhenever there arises a perceptual judgement, there does not arise an erroneouscognition. Thus, we have to read the line in question as follows:

with reference to a part (say, non-blue) which is different from a determined one (say,blue) and which is not superimposed, [the conceptual cognition] has for its object thelack (apoha) merely of that [part].

The aim of this paper is to consider what leads Dharmakīrti to identifying the exclu-sion of superimposition with the lack of superimposition, by means of giving a reas-onable interpretation of the verses in question.

25 Nemoto, Hiroshi: Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of Buddhahood


The purpose of this paper is to examine Dharmakīrti’s notion of permanence (nitya),as found in his Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd, and its impact on the Tibetan Buddhistdoctrine of Buddhahood. As is well known, Dharmakīrti holds the view thatwhatever exists is momentary (yat sat tat kṣaṇikam eva), which literally means thateverything is impermanent; and this view is accepted by later Indian commentators,as well as by many of his Tibetan successors like Sa skya paṇḍita (1182–1251), Globo mkhan chen (1456–1532), and many others. However, Tsong kha pa blo bzanggrags pa (1357–1419), the founder of the Dge lugs school, considers that Dhar-makīrti himself admits the existence of the permanent when the latter says: “Wisemen speak of the thing which itself does not disintegrate as the permanent” (PV II204cd). Moreover, Tsong kha pa asserts that to be permanent (rtag pa) does not ne-cessarily mean to be always existing (dus thams cad pa), and hence that there arepermanent phenomena which exist only at a particular moment (res ’ga’ ba): forexample, the emptiness of a clay pot, which is permanent by definition, is existentonly when there exists a clay pot, and it disappears when the pot disappears. Suchan idea of permanence is peculiar to Tsong kha pa and his followers. And it plays animportant role especially in their analysis of Buddhahood, for it enables them to ex-plain why Buddhahood is permanent in spite of the fact that it is embodied onlywhen one attains enlightenment. Rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen (1364–1432), devel-oping Tsong kha pa’s idea, says that Buddhahood is permanent even though it is ab-sent when one is still an ordinary being, and becomes present only when one attainscomplete enlightenment. He remarks that Buddhahood is an unconditioned phe-nomenon occurring at a particular moment (’dus ma byas res ’ga’ ba). A similar lineof discussion is offered by ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa ngag dbang brtson ’grus (1648–1721), who explicates Rgyal tshab’s doctrine of Buddhahood on the basis of Dhar-makīrti’s statement about permanence. Thus we see that Dharmakīrti’s notion of per-manence has survived in the Dge lugs pa’s exposition of Buddhahood. This paper

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gives an analysis of Tsong kha pa’s idea of permanence, as well as his interpretationof the Pramāṇavārttika II 204cd, and then examines how Tsong kha pa’s idea servedto establish the Dge lugs pa’s doctrine of Buddhahood.

26 Ogawa, Hideyo: Dignāga on the view of a generic term as denoting a relation


In the apoha chapter of his Pramāṇasamuccaya Dignāga, who advocates the apohatheory, argues that a generic term like ghaṭa “pot” cannot denote an individual(bheda), a generic property (jāti), a relation between the two (yoga, sambandha), oran individual qualified by a generic property (tadvat). The third kārikā of the apohachapter is devoted to adducing the conclusive reason that a generic term cannot de-note a relation. The kārikā goes as follows:

PS V.3: (A)sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate /tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate // (Pind 2009: A 2)

(B)sambandho ’py atra sambandhidharmavācyo ’bhidhīyate /tathā bhāvīkṛtyocyate bhāvo ’py anyena yujyate // (NĀA 607)

(C)sambandho ’py atra sambandhidharmā [or, sambandhidharmo] vācyo ’bhidhīyate /tathā bhāvīkṛtyocyate bhāvo ’py anyena yujyate // (Emendation by Ogawa)

Pind (2009: 78) gives the following translation of the kārikā:

And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the prop-erty of the relatum (sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate).That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action(bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ); and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum](bhāvaś cānyena yujyate).

Hattori (1975: 27.1–3) explains:

Dignāga, after rejecting the theory that a class-property (jāti) is a denotatum of aword, goes on to refute the theory that a word denotes a relation (yoga, saṃbandha)between a class-property and an individual belonging to a class. According to him,since a relation is the property of a relatum (saṃbandhin), it is impossible that aword, which cannot denote either the individual or the class-property that are relata,denotes the relation alone. (English translation mine)

I have given variants of the kārikā so that we may grasp the point more fully. In myopinion, Hattori seems to miss the point. Pind’s interpretation of the kārikā, on the

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other hand, is well-grounded. But I have to say that, relying even on Pind, it is al-most impossible to fathom out what Dignāga intends to say in the kārikā.

Dignāga here simply brings out the point Bhartṛhari makes about the denotation ofa relation. According to Bhartṛhari, there is no nominal that denotes a relation quarelation; a nominal such as sambandha “relation” cannot denote a relation in its ownproperty (svadharmeṇa) but simply as a substance (dravya), because an act (bhāva)denoted by an action noun (bhāvasādhana) is treated like a substance (dravyavat).

The aim of this paper is to give a plausible interpretation of the kārikā by takinginto consideration arguments Bhartṛhari brings forward about the denotation of arelation in his Vākyapadīya and thereby to show clearly the reason for whichDignāga argues that a generic term cannot denote a relation.

27 Okada, Kensho: A way of communication between a speaker and a listener similar to the way in which two persons with eye disease equally see double moon, in thelight of the apoha theory of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla

University of Tsukuba; [email protected]

We experience the practical use of words in our daily activities 1) when a persongrasps/understands an object through a word and 2) when a person tells another per-son something. The latter presents a scene in person-to-person relation. There, themeaning of a word is conveyed from one to another. According to the apoha theory,which Buddhist logicians propound, however, the object of a word is not real entitybut exclusion (apoha). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla explain the exclusion whosenature is cognition (buddhi) as image (pratibimba). This image is said to appear en-tirely differently in the cognitions of individuals. How can we communicate eachother based on different images? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present an explanationwith regard to this question in the śabdārthaparīkṣā chapter of their Tattvasaṅgraha(TS) and its pañjikā (TSP). By examining their view, this paper aims to clarify howthey solve this question.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the manner that a speaker and a listener sharethe same notion when they communicate, although they speak on the basis of theirrespective images. For them, their respective images are the primary object denotedby a word. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla discuss the question of whether it is properto apply verbal convention to such an image. In this context, they illustrate the man-ner that a speaker informs something to a listener by the example, “two sick personssuffering eye disease see equally double moon.” Just as two persons share the causeof the erroneous image of double moon and see the same double moon, a speakerand a listener, sharing the same cause of an erroneous cognition (that is latent dis-position or vāsanā), can mutually convey and receive a notion, even if they respect-

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ively cognize images appearing in their own cognitions. Śāntarakṣita andKamalaśīla assert that a verbal communication is based on these different images inour respective cognitions, while they accept that it works because we grasp a verbalobject erroneously in the same manner by virtue of latent disposition.

This example, i.e., “two sick persons suffering eye disease see equally doublemoon,” on which the present paper focuses, has already been used by Dharmakīrtiin his Santānāntarasiddhi, by Vinītadeva in his Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā as well as byŚākyabuddhi in his Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (PVṬ ad PVP ad PV III 377). Of these,Vinītadeva in particular seems to express a similar view to that of Kamalaśīla.These earlier scholars adduce the example in their discussions irrelevant to theapoha theory. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, there is no mention of the sameexample or similar descriptions in the Buddhist epistemological treatises that dealwith the apoha theory as central issue, except for the TS, TSP, and Karṇakagomin’sPramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā. I would also like to attempt a brief historical survey ofthe usage of this example and indicate its peculiar use in the TS and TSP.

28 Ono, Motoi: On pramāṇabhūta – The change of its meaning from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta

University of Tsukuba; [email protected]

An epithet of the Buddha, pramāṇabhūta, appearing in the maṅgalaśloka of Dig-nāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya is the key concept explaining the relationship betweenthe pramāṇa as valid cognition, i.e. perception and inference, and the Buddha’s au-thority in the Buddhist pramāṇa school. Prof. Vetter claimed that this word must betranslated as “who is a pramāṇa,” and the translation “who has become a pramāṇa”based on Dharmakīrti’s interpretation cannot be justified in Dignāga’s context.However, if pramāṇabhūta means “who is a pramāṇa,” then one must ask: how canthe Buddha as a person be called a pramāṇa which is supposed to mean valid cog-nition? In response to this question, Prof. Ruegg investigated the usage of the wordin the Sanskrit literatures and proposed the translation “who is like a pramāṇa” forpramāṇabhūta in Dignāga. Thereafter, Dr. Krasser criticised Prof. Ruegg’s opinionby investigating the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā.

By examining additional materials, this paper shall show that in Dignāga’s contextRuegg’s translation “who is like a pramāṇa” for pramāṇabhūta is acceptable and thatthe meaning of this word has been changed from Dignāga’s original one by his suc-cessors. In contrast to Dharmakīrti who never used the pramāṇabhūta as a com-pound word in his works, Prajñākaragupta used the term as a key concept in his reli-gio-philosophical system. According to Prajñākaragupta, the word pramāṇabhūtameans “true/ultimate pramāṇa.” By observing the change of the meaning ofpramāṇabhūta from Dignāga to Prajñākaragupta, we can recognize that the relation-ship between the pramāṇa as valid cognition and the Buddha’s authority has drastic-ally changed in the history of the Buddhist pramāṇa school.

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29 Pecchia, Cristina: Dharmakīrti on the role of rituals


The efficacy of initiation (dīkṣā) as a means to liberation is the subject of a passageof the pramāṇasiddhi chapter in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika. His discussion,which is especially polemical against a Śaiva type of initiation (the “scales-initi-ation,” tulādīkṣā), is also about the reliability of scriptures (āgama). His argument-ation, which is based on the nature of faults relating to transmigration, correspondsto a critique of the role of rituals in paths to liberation and a re-assertion of the roleof knowledge in the Buddhist path. The present paper offers some reflections con-cerning the type of practice that a Buddhist philosopher such as Dharmakīrti con-sidered adequate in view of liberation. Furthermore, featuring Kṣemarāja’s explicitreply to Dharmakīrti – reply that appears in his commentary (Uddyota) on the Svac-chandatantra – the paper also examines how the Tantric tradition represented inKṣemarāja’s text understood and elaborated on Dharmakīrti’s arguments.

30 Prets, Ernst: Śāntarakṣita and the Naiyāyikas – On the references to “fragments” of the so-called lost Naiyāyikas in the Vādanyāyaṭīkā and the Tattvasaṅgraha


Śāntarakṣita in his Vādanyāyaṭīkā called Vipañcitārthā on Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāyaquotes textual evidences of the so-called lost Naiyāyikas of whom only names,name of works, and fragments survived. Śāntarakṣita frequently quotes in the Vi-pañcitārthā passages of Aviddhakarṇa’s and Bhāvivikta’s works who are both said tohave written a Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā. In addition, both of them are said to have com-posed also commentaries on the Bṛhaspatisūtra called Tattvaṭīkā. This raises thequestion of whether Aviddhakarṇa, obviously a kind of nickname, and Bhāviviktamight be the same person. Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta are neither referred to inthe Vipañcitārthā nor in the Tattvasaṅgraha by Śāntarakṣita to the same topic. Themain purpose of the paper is to compare the “quotations” of the “two” authors’ frag-ments in the Vipañcitārthā and in Kamalaśīla’s Commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha.Additionally, the relation of the “fragments” of the “two lost” authors to Uddyota-kara’s Nyāyavārttika will be investigated.

31 Przybyslawski, Artur: The notion of valid cognition (tshad ma) in karma bka’ brgyud tradition of Tibetan Buddhism

Jagiellonian University; [email protected]

In Western studies of the Tibetan pramāṇa tradition the approach of karma bka’brgyud school has not been discussed. The paper aims at presenting the notion of

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valid cognition it this particular sect addressing the famous Tshad ma rigs gzhungrgya mtsho – a commentary to Dharmakīrti’s PV by the 7th Karmapa Chos gragsrgya mtsho – and the manual sKye dgu’i bdag po la rigs lam gsal byed by Yongs ’dzinrnam rgyal grags pa (the principal teacher of 9th Karmapa). In the light of these twotexts not only the particular notion of tshad ma in this tradition is shown (conver-gent with tshad ma rigs gter) but also some new light is shed upon the concept ofBuddha as embodiment of valid cognition (tshad ma skyes bu, tshad ma gyur pa).The article also offers a new explanation of the requirement of novelty in the tradi-tional definition of valid cognition.

32 Saccone, Margherita Serena: Śubhagupta’s theory about reality in the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā

University of Naples “L’Orientale”; [email protected]

Śubhagupta (720–780 CE), a philosopher connected with the logico-epistemologicalschool of Buddhism, is the author of the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK) “Verseson the Establishment of the External Object,” where he mainly aims at proving thereality of external objects of cognitions. In doing so, he presents his view on thenature of atoms and their aggregates as well as on the cognitive process related tothem. At the same time, though not always explicitly stated, Śubhagupta expresseshis conceptions about dravya and what can be considered real, ultimately and con-ventionally.

As a way of proving his own standpoints, Śubhagupta deals with some of the majorideas of important Buddhist thinkers such as Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrtiin order to refute them. However, as already noticed by some scholars – amongothers, Hattori (1960); Eltschinger (1999) –, Śubhagupta was indicated byHaribhadra Sūri as a vārttikānusārin, a follower of Dharmakīrti.

In this paper, I shall examine Śubhagupta’s theory about reality as expressed in somekārikās from BASK, with a special reference to his views on dravya and arthakriyā.Moreover, I shall also try to highlight when and how Śubhagupta refers back to oth-er philosophers (and works) from the logico-epistemological school and to whichextent he can be considered a follower (or an opponent) of Dharmakīrti’s theories.

33 Saito, Akane: Maṇḍanamiśra’s arguments against Dharmakīrti’s ideas on language – Different definitions of the convention

Kyoto University; [email protected]

Maṇḍanamiśra (8 th c.), who inherited the philosophy of language promulgated byBhartṛhari (5 th c.), has advanced the sphoṭa theory in his Sphoṭasiddhi (SS). In thelatter part of the SS, he shifts the focus of his criticism from the varṇa theory ofKumārilabhaṭṭa (7 th c.) to the Buddhist theory of non-eternality of phonemes. After

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narrating Dharmakīrti’s position from the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika(PV/PVS) (7 th c.), Maṇḍana rejects the Buddhist’s theory which criticizes and in-tends to replace the Mīmāṃsā theory that eternal phonemes manifested in a givensequence convey the meaning. According to Dharmakīrti, what makes phonemesdistinct from each other is the prior-posterior relation, which is equivalent to thecausality of mind-moments of the speaker and hearer. As Omae (1999: p. 299,l.16 ff.) pointed out, it is the convention (saṅketa) which plays an important role inhis language theory. Maṇḍana, however, criticizes convention by asking whether thecausality of mind-moments of the speaker and hearer is really needed at the timethe convention is established. Maṇḍana’s argument at this point is quite similar tothe one he gives when he accepts Kumārila’s varṇa theory partially, in the process ofperception. In other words, whether there is a causal relation or distinction of phon-emes in the middle of perception, Maṇḍana basically makes a concession to theirideas as “unessential but not impossible” before repelling them in the end as con-trary cognitions (viparyāsa). In this presentation, I shall analyze the conventions ofMaṇḍana and Dharmakīrti and show their differences.

34 Sakai, Masamichi: Dharmottara on the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa and trairūpya in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna

Kansai University; [email protected]

As did his teacher, Dharmākaradatta, i.e. Arcaṭa, Dharmottara takes on a major in-terpretational task concerning Dharmakīrti’s inference of momentariness(kṣaṇikatva) from the property “being existent” (sattvānumāna), namely that, in thistype of inference of momentariness, the so-called threefold characteristic (trairūpya)of a good reason property, which is essential for Buddhist logicians, seems to be ofno use.

According to Dharmakīrti, in this inference, pervasion (vyāpti) of the reason prop-erty (hetu) “existence” (sattva) by the target property (sādhya) “momentariness” isproved by the so-called viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, the source of knowledge thatdefeats the occurrence of a reason property in any inferential site (pakṣa) where theopposite of the target property is present. In his Hetubindu, Dharmakīrti asserts thatthis existence-momentariness pervasion is inclusive of everything (sarvopa-saṃhāravat). If this is the case, then it should be concluded that for the purpose ofproving the momentariness of a certain inferential site, e.g. sound (śabda), it is suffi-cient to simply present the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, since the site “sound” is in-cluded in the domain of the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa, which is itself an inferen-tial argument that defeats the occurrence of “existence.” But this results in thethreefold characteristic becoming useless. This is because 1) an example of a simil-ar case (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta), e.g. a pot (ghaṭa), is no longer needed for proving asite to be momentary – the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa itself is capable of doing so,without an example – and because 2) given that the site is included in the category

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of “everything,” it becomes useless to point out that the particular site possesses thereason property of “existence” (pakṣadharmatā).

In contrast to Arcaṭa, who appears bold enough to accept this undesirable con-sequence for Buddhist logicians and who even explains the reason why this must bethe case in Dharmakīrti’s sattvānumāna, Dharmottara argues that dṛṣṭānta and pa-kṣadharmatā are nonetheless of service. That is to say, Dharmottara, on the onehand, agrees with his teacher that the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa itself is capable ofproving any inferential site to be momentary and thus a dṛṣṭānta is of no use forproving a site to be momentary, and he also agrees that the existence-momentarinesspervasion established via the viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa is inclusive of everything.On the other hand, he insists that dṛṣṭānta and pakṣadharmatā are still needed.Compared to Arcaṭa’s consistency, this position of Dharmottara seems to be ambigu-ous. It appears that Dharmottara is struggling to find some significance for thetrairūpya theory in order to defend his Buddhist intellectual tradition.

In my presentation, basing myself on Dharmottara’s own statement in his Pramā-ṇaviniścayaṭīkā, I would like to introduce and clarify his method of insisting on thesignificance of the trairūpya theory in Dharmakīrti’s inference of momentarinessfrom existence. In addition, I will also try to situate Dharmottara’s unique position inthe larger history of Indian Buddhist logic with regard to the so-called antar-vyāpti/bahirvyāpti discussion, which is well documented in Mokṣākaragupta’s Tark-abhāṣā.

35 Sasaki, Ryō: The significance of the Vādanyāya in the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept

Waseda University; [email protected]

Indian philosophers developed their ideas in debates from ancient times, provingand refuting each other’s statements. The purpose of the debate, however, had notbeen necessarily fixed through the history of Indian thought because the concept ofthe debate and its purpose had changed in different periods and positions. Therefore,when Dharmakīrti’s view of the debate in the Vādanyāya is evaluated, we shouldplace his work in the context of the historical transition of the ‘debate’ concept.

Dharmakīrti distinguished “the disputation for good men” (satāṃ vādaḥ) from “thedisputation for men with the desire to win” (vijigīṣūṇāṃ vādaḥ) and defined theformer as the good debate, the purpose of which is the benefit of others, and criti-cized the latter as the vicious debate which is held by means of cowardly actions.But even if “the disputation for good men” is considered to be recommended, it ulti-mately determines victory or defeat of the debaters just as “the disputation for menwith desire to win,” so that the criticism of the latter type of the debate may beequally applied to the former type of the debate. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti redefinedthe term “victory” (vijaya) in “the disputation for good men” as “conferring benefitson others by means of declaring the truth.”

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This idea of the Vādanyāya can be traced back to the Upāyahṛdaya, where “confer-ring benefits on others” is mentioned as the part of purposes of the debate and “de-siring to win” in the debate is censured. Both of these works share approximatelythe same opinion about this matter. Subsequently, the Nyāyasūtra defined jalpa andvitaṇḍā under the influence of Upāyahṛdaya, and these two types of debates are heldfor the purpose of victory according to the commentary in the Nyāyabhāṣya and theNyāyavārttika. The debate criticized as the vicious method by Dharmakīrti is pre-cisely the jalpa and vitaṇḍā. Thus, Dharmakīrti showed the new ideas of the ‘debate’concept and its revised purpose through criticizing and unifying the previous views.Furthermore, I found out that the philosophical works of the Nyāya school followingafter the Vādanyāya (e.g. the Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, the Nyāyabhūṣana and soforth) are influenced by Dharmakīti’s position in which the benefit of others in thedebate is regarded as important.

In this way, we can grasp the significance of the Vādanyāya in the history of Indianthought by means of placing this work in the context of the historical transition ofthe ‘debate’ concept.

36 Shiga, Kiyokuni: On the meaning of bāhyārtha in Dignāga’s and Jinendrabuddhi’s theories of inference

Kyoto Sangyo University; [email protected]

In my previous paper, “Remarks on the Origin of All-Inclusive Pervasion” (here-after Shiga 2011), I highlighted that the theory of all-inclusive pervasion (sarvo-pasaṃhāravyāpti), considered to have been newly created by Dharmakīrti, in factoriginated in Dignāga’s theory of inference. Dignāga’s statement in the third chapterof the Pramāṇasamuccaya and its vṛtti (hereafter PS and PSV, respectively), “theco-existence of a logical reason with what is to be proved is understood by means oftwo types of exemplification that include external things (bāhyārthopasaṃhṛta)(PSV on PS 3.36b),” coincides with Dharmakīrti’s statement in his Hetubindu re-garding all-inclusive pervasion. Considering other factors and grounds, I concludedthat the idea that pervasion is established by including individual cases was sharedby both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. This presentation aims to further investigate theunsettled issues in Shiga 2011. As I mentioned there, the term bāhyārtha appearsseveral times in the fourth chapter of the PS, PSV and Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā(hereafter PSṬ). At the first instance, the expression bāhyārtha is used in the defini-tion of exemplification: “The main purpose of exemplification is to present externalthings.” Furthermore, we can find expressions such as “when external things are notincluded” (bāhyārthānupasaṃhāre) and “exemplification that relies on externalthings” (bāhyārthāpekṣam nidarśanam). These examples clearly show the close rela-tionship between the term bāhyārtha and exemplification (nidarśana or dṛṣṭānta).The problem here is what do Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi mean by this term. Doesit denote “property-possessors outside [the property-possessor to be proved]” as Jin-endrabuddhi interprets it in his PSṬ, or does it literally denote “external objects,”i.e. “things in the external world”? To solve this problem, we will observe relevant

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examples of bāhyārtha found in the PS, PSV and PSṬ, including those in the firstchapter dealing with perception. If we compare Dignāga’s theory of pervasion withDharmakīrti’s, we have to consider in which property-possessor pervasion is to begrasped or established, and how universal the pervasion is. It has been commonlybelieved that, at Dignāga’s stage, pervasion is hypothetical and exposed to a possibledenial due to an appearance of a counterexample. However, it is possible that notonly Dharmakīrti but also Dignāga aims for the establishment of pervasion that isuniversally true. As evidence to support this, I mentioned in Shiga 2011 thatDignāga introduced the term “a general substratum” (ādhārasāmānya) in the secondchapter of the PSV, which implies his assumption that pervasion is to be universal.This study will also examine the context and significance of this term with the aidof Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.

37 Steinkellner, Ernst: Closing a gap in the interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s logic


This presentation is anchored on three papers published in the proceedings of theSecond International Dharmakīrti Conference 1991: Brendan Gillon’s with a cri-tique of Dharmakīrti’s proposal, in PV 1.34ab with PVSV 22,2–4, on how to ascer-tain a causal relation. Gillon argued, and in this was followed by Tom Tillemans,that Dharmakīrti’s method does not successfully hold back the ever lingering “in-duction problem.” The two other papers by Tadashi Tani and by myself dealt withDharmakīrti’s method of how the concomitance (vyāpti) in the case of a svabhāva-hetu can be determined as being necessary. Tani was able to show that in Dhar-makīrti’s first work, the *Hetuprakaraṇa, a prasaṅga assumes this function. In mypaper, I examined the meaning of the formulation in his last work, the Vādanyāya,where it is termed (sādhya)viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa. By experiment I was able toshow that this later method, developed on the basis of the sattvānumāna, is applic-able to all svabhāvahetu-inferences. The question left open at the time of writing mypaper was: “…whether the different treatments of the svabhāvahetu and thekāryahetu in this respect were not also resolved in a certain sense in order to designa homogeneous logical system, or at least, whether there are no indications to befound in Dharmakīrti’s work that he was aiming in this direction.”

Based on PV 1.23’cd and Hetubindu passages, Tani already gave this question a pos-itive answer and was able to summarize: “The kāryahetu too can be interpreted bythe same model …” And: “The necessary relation can be determined by SVB-pramāṇa.” He also added: “Nevertheless, Dharmakīrti did not explicitly explain so.”Thus, Tani only very closely missed the mark.

On a new interpretation of PVSV 22,2–4 and under full consideration of PV 1.34cdwith PVSV 22,6f it can be seen that Dharmakīrti provided a consistent method forascertaining concomitance for both kinds of possible logical reasons, svabhāva aswell as kārya, already in his first work.

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38 Taber, John: The structure of Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhaniyama argument

University of New Mexico; [email protected]

Although excellent historical work has been done on Dharmakīrti’s sahopalambhan-iyama argument (by Iwata), there have been only a few attempts (by, e.g., Chakra-barti and, most recently, Arnold) to evaluate it as a piece of philosophical reasoning.In this talk I shall consider what I take to be the strongest possible formulation ofthe argument that is consistent with Dharmakīrti’s statements and assess its strengthsand weaknesses. First, I shall show how the argument might be schematized interms of premises and conclusion. Then I shall assess whether the argument, soschematized, is valid; that is, does the conclusion follow from the premises? (I thinkit does.) Finally, I shall reflect on the soundness of the argument, that is, whether itspremises are vulnerable to objections. (I believe they are.) We shall see that, indeed,the most telling philosophical objections are those that were historically raisedagainst the sahopalambhaniyama argument.

39 Tamura, Masaki: The truth, the Buddha’s words, and inference – Bhāviveka’s theory of two truths


The Buddhist truth, which was directly realized by the Buddha, is beyond verbaliza-tion in itself. For it is precisely his personal, direct experience of reality. TheBuddha, fully aware that the truth is ineffable, taught it to us by resorting to words.

No Buddhist can deny the authority of the Buddha’s words. But the critical problemhas arisen that they are susceptible for various interpretations. The following servesas an example. In the Daśabhūmikasūtra the Buddha states that the three realms aremind-only (cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam). According to Bhāviveka, theYogācāra school interprets the statement to mean that an external object does notexist independently of the mind (Viṃśatikā 1), while the Mādhyamika school inter-prets the same statement to mean that the self serving as agent of an action and asenjoyer of the fruit of the action does not exist independently of the mind (Madhya-makahṛdayakārikā [abbr. MHK] V 28cd). A question comes up: What is the meansfor arriving at a real understanding of the Buddha’s statement? According toBhāviveka, it is scripturally based inference or the inference which follows theBuddhist scriptures (āgamānuvidhāyyanumāna). Bhāviveka argues that the truth isbeyond the reach of inference and that inference plays the role of removing the mis-conception about the truth which arises from the Buddha’s statement (MHK V 107).It is important to note the following two verses:

MHK V 109: pratijñāmātrakeṇeṣṭā* pratipakṣanirākriyā /aniṣiddhe vipakṣe ca nirvikalpā matiḥ kutaḥ // ([*-mātrakeṇeṣṭā ] em.; -mātrakā neṣṭāLindtner ed.; dam bcas tsam gyis ji ltar ’dod Tib.)

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“How can one admit that what is opposed to [the knowledge of the truth] is negatedmerely by means of stating one’s own thesis? In addition, insofar as what is opposedto [the knowledge of the truth] is not negated, how can there arise a non-conceptualcognition?”

MHK V 110: satyadvayam ataś coktaṃ muninā tattvadarśinā /vyavahāraṃ samāśritya tattvārthādhigamo yataḥ //

“And, since reality is realized on the basis of vyavahāra, the Muni, the Seer of thetruth, taught two truths.”

Hoornaert (2003: 168) and Eckel (2008: 296) render the term vyavahāra here as“conventional [truth]” and “conventional usage,” respectively. I do not think thatthey catch the point. The given context clearly r

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