New Beijing, Great Olympics- Beijing and Its Unfolding Olympic Legac

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Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs

1 Alan Abrahamson, New Beijing, Great Olympics: 2008 Games Represent a Chance to Bring about a Dramatic Turning Point in

Chinese History,Los Angeles Times, July 13, 2001, D10.2 Major Landmarks of 2008 Bid, See You in Beijing (Beijing: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee, February 2001), 28;

Olympic Bid Election History Voting Records and Results, .

New Beijing, Great Olympics: Beijing

and its Unfolding Olympic LegacyRyan OngSchool of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The Johns Hopkins University

For many months in early 2001, Beijingwas a city obsessed with the dream of theOlympics: its city streets were filled withposters and slogans, its newspapers focusedon the Games, and its leaders monitored

developments within the InternationalOlympic Committee (IOC) with greatanticipation. When IOC President JuanAntonio Samaranch finally announced onJuly 13 that Beijing had won the right to hostthe 2008 Summer Olympic Games, the entirecity erupted into a flag-waving, horn-honking, music-jamming, firecracker-exploding party.1 For Beijing and for Chinaas a whole, the IOC announcement came as aform of redemption, especially after the failed1993 bid for the 2000 Games.2 For the rest of

the world, the Chinese victory was morecontroversial. Some critics, including manyfrom the United States, argued that Chinaspoor record on human rights made itincapable of upholding the ideals of peaceand freedom embodied in the OlympicCharter. For others, though, a ChineseOlympics was an eventual necessity, due toChinas economic power and its growingstature within the Olympic movement. Thedebate still rages today, focusing on theimpact of the 2008 Games on Beijing, on

China, and on global politics.

This article will examine Beijings bidand the current state of its preparation for theGames and will address some of theOlympics political and economic effects onBeijing. To address economic issues, this

paper will draw on Beijings current efforts inurban planning and economic informationabout Beijings Olympic budget. Inexamining possible political lessons thatChinas leaders may be able to draw from thisexperience, this article will look at previousSummer Olympic Games held in MexicoCity (1968) and Seoul (1988), which provideimportant insights into the political natureand long-term ramifications of the hostingprocess.

Beijings Bidding ProcessChinas decision to bid for the 2008

Summer Olympic Games was officially madeby the State Council in November 1998, butits desire to host the Games began as early asthe late 1980s. In 1993, when Beijing first bidto host the Games, Beijings detractors, ledby many in the United States, focused onChinas human rights record, considered tobe especially poor in the light of theTiananmen Square demonstrations only fouryears before. This mindset was balanced by

the desire of many within the IOC and the

Ryan Ong 35China

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3 Ezra Vogel, How Can the United States and China Pursue Common Interests and Manage Differences?, in Ezra Vogel, ed., Living

with China (New York: WW Norton, 1997), 25-6; Dwight H. Perkins, How Chinas Economic Transformation Shapes Its

Future, in Ezra Vogel, ed.,Living with China (New York: WW Norton, 1997), 143.4 Heidi Haugen, The Construction of Beijing as an Olympic City (University of Oslo: proposed Masters thesis, 2003), 1-2.5 Matthew J. Burbank, Gregory D. Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying, Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega-Events on Local

Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 158.6 Major Landmarks of 2008 Bid, 28.7 Ibid.

New Beijing, Great Olympics36

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world community to fully bring China intothe Olympic movement. Though Beijing lostthe 1993 bid, the Chinese government wasdetermined to win the right to host. Afterdeclining to bid for the 2004 Games, theChinese government in 1998 again offeredtheir candidacy for the 2008 Games.3

The motivations behind the governmentsmost recent bid were largely the same asthose behind its earlier attempts to host theOlympics. Like many other nations, Chinasaw the Olympics as a developmental enginethat could spur growth in Beijing and thesurrounding area for years to come. TheOlympics could also increase Chinas

international prestige and project an image,both domestically and internationally, ofnational strength and unity. The need forinternational prestige has long been a key partof Chinas foreign policy thinking, as itsleaders remember all too well Chinascentury of humiliation in the 1800s.Chinas foreign policy also rests on the needfor projection of national strength, sincemuch of the ruling Chinese CommunistPartys (CCP) legitimacy rests on itscommitment to national strength and

continued economic growth.4 The Olympicswould also provide the government with anopportunity to improve Beijingsinfrastructure, as well as the rationale todevote significant funds to the project.5

The Olympics thus presented animportant opportunity for China to achievemany goals simultaneously. In November1998, Chinas Central Committee formallydecided that Beijing should bid for the 2008

Olympics, and solicited a formal applicationfrom the Beijing city government. Beijingsubmitted its application to the ChineseOlympic Committee (COC) on November25, 1998, and the COC then forwarded to theIOC. After Beijings acceptance as acandidate city on April 7, 1999, the IOC thensent local officials a detailed questionnairethat addressed every major area of Olympicplanning. From this point, Beijing couldprepare itself as an official applicant, andChinas State Council approved the Beijing2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee(BOBICO) on September 6, 1999. Membersof the new body included officials from the

Beijing municipal government, the StateCouncil, the State Sport GeneralAdministration, and several other nationalagencies with a stake in Olympic planning.6

After a great deal of planning, BOBICOsubmitted the completed questionnaire inJune 2000. On August 28, 2000, the IOCExecutive Board formally announced thatBeijing had been accepted as a candidate cityto host the 2008 Olympics, along with Osaka,Istanbul, Toronto, and Paris.7

Throughout the latter half of 2000, 28

delegations from international sportsfederations visited China to examine closelythe existing facilities and facilities plans.Official Olympic visits by the IOCEvaluation Commission to candidate citieswere scheduled for early 2001. During theirFebruary visit, the Commission toured all ofBeijings major sporting facilities and metwith city planners. They also visited severalother non-sporting facilities in Beijing,

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8 International Olympic Committee Evaluation Commission,Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of the XXIX

Olympiad in 2008 (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2001), 99, 103.9 Ibid., 95-6.10 Major Landmarks of 2008 Bid, 28.11 Beijing Presents Itself to the World, See You in Beijing (Beijing: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee, February 2001), 29.12 Zest for Foreign Languages, See You in Beijing (Beijing: Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee, February 2001), 64;

International Olympic Committee Evaluation Commission,Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission for the Games of the

XXIX Olympiad in 2008, 60.13 Kate Snow, Chinese envoy urges Congress not to block Olympic bid, CNN, April 10, 2001,

.14 International Olympic Committee Evaluation Commission,Report of the IOC Evaluation Commission, 95.

including a local hospital and theheadquarters for China Central Television.8 Inthe Commissions official report, Beijingsbid was recommended as excellent, alongwith the bids of Paris and Toronto. It notedpossible environmental and traffic problems,but felt these concerns could be easilyovercome with Beijings ambitious planningefforts and its strong governmental capacity.9

From the beginning of its bid process, theChinese government attempted to garnerbroad domestic support, from both key publicfigures and the general population. Forinstance, in April 2000, BOBICO announcedthat Zhang Yimou, a Chinese director famous

internationally for films such asRaise the RedLantern and Red Sorghum, would direct avideo supporting BeijingsOlympic bid. This occurredin spite of the many years ofofficial criticism that Zhanghad faced for his filmssatirizing Chinese societyand government.10 Othernotable public figures signedon to support the bid,including Fu Mingxia, a

three-time gold medallist inwomens diving.11 China alsoattempted to mobilize popular supportthrough various public relations campaigns,both domestically and abroad. Thegovernment established Olympic servicegroups to encourage public support forBeijings bid through events and programs.Some of the most widely publicized

programs were those that dealt with citybeautification and foreign languageinstruction. Polls conducted by IOC researchteams during the bidding period found that 96percent of Beijings population supported theOlympics.12

As in 1993, however, world opinion wasdivided over the issue of Beijings bid.Chinas environmental problems, includingBeijings poor air quality, were of concern toenvironmentalists, medical specialists, andathletes. Officials in many governmentsargued over Chinas human rights record, andmany international human rightsorganizations claimed that rewarding China

with the hosting of the Olympics would onlyexacerbate the countrys human rightsproblems. A bipartisancoalition of Americancongressmen introducedresolutions to the House andSenate in March 2001,demanding that the IOCreject Beijings bid becauseof its poor record on humanrights.13 Prevailing worldopinion in 2001, however,

was more in favor ofengagement than it had been

eight years before, arguing that the Olympicmovements continued growth and successdepended upon Chinas involvement. TheIOC Evaluation Commissions official reportnoted that a Beijing Olympics would leave aunique legacy to China and to sport.14 Theseproponents of engagement also framed

Ryan Ong 37China


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58 David B. Kanin,A Political History of the Olympic Games (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 92; Christopher R. Hill, Olympic

Politics, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 119-120.

loss casts a shadow on the future andviability of Beijings development plans.

Political Ramifications for China

The impact of the 2008 Games on theBeijing landscape is not limited to itsinfrastructure. Many have speculated, withgood reason, that the Olympics could play arole in shaping Beijings political future. Thedebate in 2001 over Beijings bid provides aperfect example, as the two sides paintedstarkly different pictures of a post-OlympicsChina. Critics claimed that Chinas poorrecord in areas such as population policy andhuman rights should disqualify it from the

honor of hosting the Olympics and fearedthat the Olympics could even give thegovernment a freer hand for oppressiveaction in areas like human rights. Thegovernment, for example, could cite the needfor stability and order in repressing publicdemonstrations or an independent media.Rewarding China, they argued, would onlyencourage repressive behavior and stuntpolitical reform.

Supporters of a Beijing Olympics, incontrast, advocated the policy of

engagement, claiming that the increasedinternational exposure brought by the Gamescould contribute to Chinas internationalintegration. This integration could leadChinas leaders to seek greater worldinvolvement in other areas, thus encouragingthe country to be a responsible world powerwith a stake in international norms andinstitutions. Advocates also claimed thatamplified media attention could constrain thegovernment from acting against its citizensand could empower the public voice, leading

to political reform and greater politicalfreedom. Beijings supporters point to themarked changes in Chinas political system

that have taken place since Chinasrapprochement with the United States andthe West in the 1970s.

Which prognosis is correct? It may stillbe too early to predict the impact of theOlympics on China, but some clues may befound about the current situation with thehelp of two previous Games as examples.Mexico City (1968) and Seoul (1988), likeBeijing, were host cities in less developedcountries, which won the right to host theSummer Olympic Games for partly politicalpurposes. Mexico City represented the firsttime that the Olympics were held in LatinAmerica, and Seoul marked the first Asian

Olympics outside of Japan.58

Theirexperiences provide key insights into whatBeijing and the rest of the world mayrealistically expect in the coming years. Inboth Seoul and Mexico City, major protestsled by university students occurred shortlybefore the Games opened and posed aserious threat to the operation of the Gamesthemselves. These protests occurred,however, in different social contexts. InMexico City, the students and the people ingeneral had little role to play in the Games

preparations, and were frustrated at the largesums that were spent on Olympicpreparations instead of on social welfare.The government, fearful that the Gamescould be cancelled or moved, respondedquickly and harshly with a violentcrackdown, known as the TlatelolcoMassacre. The suppression temporarilyended public debate and strengthened thegovernment through the Olympics. In thelong run, however, Tlatelolco strengthenedthe public voice and widened factions within

the ruling party, the InstitutionalRevolutionary Party (PRI). This facilitatedMexican political reform and the eventual

Ryan Ong 45China


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New Beijing, Great Olympics46

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end of PRI electoral dominance.In Seoul, protests were a final spark that

ignited the fires of political reform. Thestudent-led protests in 1988 were precededby the events of the Seoul Spring, a periodof relative political liberalization in 1980 thatended with the government harshlysuppressing riots in Kwangju (the so-calledKwangju Massacre.) Unlike in MexicoCity, however, the government understrongman Chun Doo-hwan made realattempts to include the South Korean publicin the Olympic preparations, throughpropaganda campaigns and public programs.Therefore, all sides the students,

government, and the middle class felt thatthey had a stake in the success of theOlympics. This constrained any radicalaction, and gave both sides a shared concernand a common time frame. The students thusconfined their demands to their political aimsof free elections and a new constitution, andprotests were largely non-violent. Chunsgovernment, mindful of Kwangju, wasaverse to political violence and so soughtmore peaceful means of resolution. The shiftaway from political violence, coupled with

the urgency of action prescribed by theOlympics, helped to pave the way forcompromise and substantive political reform.

Based on the experiences of theseprevious Games and Beijings own politicalcontext, the Beijing government is likely toconfront political activity, possibly protest, inthe run-up to the Games. Protests, especiallystudent-led ones, have a history in China;university students have taken an importantrole in several periods of major politicalchange in China, including the Republican

Revolution and the Cultural Revolution. TheFalun Gong, largely under control, couldattempt to spark such protest, or a new

political actor could arise. Protests or othermanifestations of political dissent are farmore likely in the event of slowing economicgrowth in China. Such a situation is possiblebut unlikely, considering both the strongattention that the CCP pays to continuedgrowth and the economic effects of BeijingsOlympic construction. Chinese economistshave estimated that the additional investmentand consumption associated with theOlympics could boost GDP by as much as1.67 percent annually until 2007.59

If it materializes, political dissent isunlikely to be anywhere near as big orimportant politically as it proved in Mexico

City or in Seoul. The trouble in Mexico Cityarose when students felt alienated from thepreparations. Through both the bidding andpreparation periods, Beijing has made realefforts to involve the public and stress theimportance of the Olympic Games forChina. According to Beijings OlympicAction Plan, one of the three key elements ofBOCOGs overall strategic concept is theconcept of a Peoples Olympics, with thewidest possible participation of the peoplein the preparation for Games.60 By giving

the people a stake in the preparationsprocess, Chinas leadership has attempted toblunt political dissatisfaction with theGames. In Seoul, the impetus for protestsarose from the events of the Seoul Springand memories of the Kwangju Massacre.Although China also has a violent incident inits recent past Tiananmen Square thisincident does not figure as prominently in theChinese public discourse as Kwangju did inKorea. The leaders of Tiananmen, unliketheir Korean counterparts, are also now

largely abroad and thus have little publicvoice within China.

In terms of political reform, the

59 Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, The Olympic Games and the Development of Beijing, online.60 Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games, Beijing Olympic Action Plan, I.1.

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Olympics will, in the short-run, help the CCPsolidify its control over China and willstrengthen CCP claims as the defender of astrong China and Chinese nationalism. TheCCP, however, cannot hope to control theforces that an international event like theOlympics will bring to China. Such a mega-event, simply by its scale and itsmultinational nature, focuses internationalattention and political pressure on China in away that few other events can. The publicvoice and public participation that thegovernment and the BOCOG have attemptedto encourage during the bidding andpreparations process paradoxically may help

to inculcate an independent public voice thatendures after the Olympics. If this publicvoice grows and trulybecomes independent, it canpush for governmentaccountability or evenreform. In this sense, theOlympics could contributeto long-term political reformin China and further changesin the CCP.

Lessons for BeijingThe Beijing government thus faces the

Olympics knowing the seriousness of its taskand the significance of the events it isplanning. The Olympics have the potential toremake Beijing, both politically andphysically and they have already started todo so. The ruling CCP wants to run a smooth,successful Games with a minimum ofpolitical protest. They hope that the Gameswill allow them to broaden their internationalcontacts and that an incident-free Games will

cause a shift in worldwide opinion in favor ofChina and away from the human rightsregime advocated by many in the West. TheSeoul and Mexico City Games give them acourse of action to follow, a number of

distinct lessons to study, and a primer for theoutcomes of government tactics in handlingthe Olympics and their preparation. Whatlessons can the national government underHu Jintao draw from these examples?

First, the CCP should take care to framethe Olympics in the public consciousnesscarefully. They should use public projectsand propaganda campaigns to presentthemselves as the driving force behind theOlympic bid and preparations. The CCPshould also attempt to frame the publicdialogue to advocate that a successfulOlympics are important, if not vital, toChinas stance as a major world power. If

successful in this regard, this will allow themto avoid the mistakes of the Mexico CityGames. By continuing toimplement small-scale,decentralized projects forhandling micro-areas ofBeijings Olympicpreparations, thegovernment could makepolitical protest less likelyby empowering the citizenswithin the Chinese Olympic

movement. To this point, theChinese government has shown that itrecognizes the importance of this step andhas garnered support from a broad coalitionof Chinese. Government officials have beensurprisingly savvy in public relations,through speeches, personal contact, and theiruse of information channels like the Internet.The government has spent substantial sumson public relations campaigns through thebidding process. The estimated Olympicbudget includes an additional US$60 million

for advertising and promotion during thepre-Games period. While some of thesefunds are intended for internationalaudiences, domestic advertising is andshould be a critical priority for the Beijing

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