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Irans 1953 Coup Revisited:

Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue

Fariborz Mokhtari

Fity-fve years ago a coup dtat ended Prime Minister Muhammad Mosadd-

eqs government in Iran on August 19, 1953. Numerous books and articles have

analyzed the event but oten have overlooked Irans domestic dynamics. What

is presented is nearly always a conspiracy theory that suggests American and

British masters o intrigue subverted Iran entirely through their shady operators.

The picture portrays Iranians as little more than inanimate objects a nation

o potted plants. Even now over hal a century later, and three decades ater the

all o Irans monarchy, misperceptions persist. A review o the coup and what

precipitated it may oer some needed clarity.

Irans history during and ater World War Two is rich with myths, disinormation,misinormation, and unexpected policy consequences. One myth, that a popular, dem-

ocratic government in ull bloom was aborted by a US/UK coup in 1953, has been

particularly persistent. The emotional and material devastation that oreign military

occupation (1941-46) had caused made Irans political climate unstable. That history,

real enough, became ertile grounds or mythmaking, while viewing Iranians as mere

observers o the events that aected them. Russo-British meddling in the countrys a-

airs in the 19th century, Russian instigations to set up Soviet Republics in Iran in the1940s, and subversive activities by the Iranian Tudeh Communist Party in the 1950s,

had politicized the population and created discord, suspicion, and conrontation among

societal actions. The Tudeh had organized much o the industrial labor and inuenced

the youth, the intellectuals, and the students, with aspirations o building a classless

society under its tutelage. The upper middle class, the proessionals, businessmen, and

nationalists had joined a number o political parties in a loose parliamentary coalition

called the National Front held together by a yearning or national independence that

reached back to the Constitutional Revolution o 1906. Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq, a

seasoned Member o Parliament, eloquently expressed the National Fronts longing orgenuine sovereignty.1 Muslim clerics, particularly the activists lead by Ayatollah Abol-

Qasem Kashani, inuenced the traditional merchants, shopkeepers, lower middle class,

Proessor Mokhtari teaches at the Near East South Asia Center or Strategic Studies, National Deense

University. Opinions expressed in this article are the authors own and do not reect the ofcial policy or

position o National Deense University, the Department o Deense, or the US government. The author is

indebted to Dr. William J. Olson or reviewing the article and oering much appreciated comments.

1. The 1953 coup in Iran has been the subject o numerous opinions and interpretations, requently

avoring one side or the other in the conict. This essay attempts to present the sequence o events

as they occurred and were reported daily in the Iranian news media, and to leave the interpretationto readers themselves. The daily reports are cross-reerenced with the journal o daily news reports

compiled by Dr Baqer Aqeli in Roozshomaar e Trikh e Iran az Mashrooteh ta Enqelaab e Eslaami

Middle East Institute. This article is or personal research only and may not be copied ordistributed in any orm without the permission o The Middle East Journal.


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458 MMIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

CastofCharaCters

Due to the large number o persons reerred to in this article, the ollowing Whos

Who may be o use to readers.

Dean Acheson (1893-1971): US Secretary o State, 1949-1953. Hossein Ala (1882-1964): Prime Minister, March 12-April 30, 1951, immedi-

ately preceding Mossadeq.

Princess Ashraf: Twin sister o Muhammad Reza Shah

Ibrahim Hakimi (1869-1959): Prime Minister three times: May-June 1945;

October 1945-January 1946; and December 1947-June 1948.

Abdol-Hossein Hazhir (1899-1949): Prime Minister in 1948; served as cabi-

net minister numerous times, assassinated by Fadaiyan-e Islam in 1949.

Loy Wesley Henderson (1892-1986): US diplomat who served as Minister

to Iraq (1943-1945), Ambassador to India (1948-1951), and Ambassador to Iran

(1951-1954). Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani (1885-1961): Powerul Shia Ayatollah,

known or anti-British and anti-communist stances. Nationalist. Founder o the

Warriors o Islam in the Majlis.

Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946): writer and secular reormer, critic o the clergy,

assassinated in 1946 by the Fadaiyan-e Islam.

George Middleton: British Charg dAaires.

Abdollah Moazzemi: Speaker o the Majlis.

Muhammad Mosaddeq (1882-1967): Leader o the National Front; Iranian

Prime Minister 1951-1953.

Ahmad Qavam (1876-1955): Prime Minister o Iran fve times, in 1922, 1942,1946-1948, and 1952. During his 1946-1948 term, he crated the oil concession

agreement with the Soviet Union that the Majlis rejected ater Soviet occupation

orces had let Iran. He replaced Mosaddeq in July 16, 1952, but was removed fve

days later on July 21 or Mosaddeq to return to ofce.

Muhammad Reza Shah (1919-1980): Son o Reza Shah; ruled 1941-1979.

Briey ed the country in 1953; deposed 1979.

Major General Haj-Ali Razmara (1901-1951): Appointed Prime Minister by

the Shah in June 1950; assassinated March 7, 1951.

Reza Shah (1878-1944): Shah o Iran rom December 1925 to September 1941.

Kermit Roosevelt (1916-2000): Grandson o Theodore Roosevelt. Chie o theNear East and Arica Division, CIA; organized the coup against Mosaddeq.

Navab Safavi (1924-1955): Leader o the Fadaiyane Islam. Executed 1955.

Khalil Tahmasebi: Assassin o Razmara. Member o the Fadaiyan-e Islam.

Major General Fazlollah Zahedi (1897-1963): Iranian general who held sev-

eral military and police commands and served as Interior Minister in Mossadeqs

Cabinet. Apppointed Prime Minister Mosaddeq in August 1953 to replace Mos-

sadeq, with British and American support. Served as Prime Minister 1953-1955.

Movements

Fadaiyan-e Islam: Sacrifcers o Islam, an Islamist movement established in

1946 by Navab Saavi to fght secular trends


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IRAN'S 1953 cOUp REvISITEDM 459

and many others oended by the oreign domination o the nation. The armed orces

in general, and the senior ofcer corps in particular, had maintained their admiration

or the late King, Reza Shah a ferce nationalist and were loyal to the Crown.

The upper classes, industrialists, and landowners supported the monarch, but vacillated

back and orth between the National Front and the clerics. The constant jockeying or

power and political dominance had poisoned the air, turning legitimate political dis-agreements into bitter personal attacks and lasting animosities. Iranian tribes, whose

local exercise o power was traditionally inversely related to the strength o the central

government, were rumbling. The uproar in Irans Parliament mirrored the greater chaos

in the country.

Political tension coupled with economic anxiety had aicted the nation with

ears o renewed oreign imperialist intentions. Yet the unolding o the Cold War that

had begun to change the international environment quickly drew Iran into global ri-

valries and politics that validated Iranians ears but took little heed o the countrys

internal realities. Nevertheless, Iranians were ar rom mere bystanders in the events o

1953. Those events had their origins in circumstances brought to Iran in WWII, but also

in a subterranean political disagreement that had plagued Iran or at least two centuries.

The constitutionalist movement o 1906 brought together two groups with essentially

dierent belies: nationalist modernists and religious traditionalists, both o whom had

concluded that the Qajar dynasty had become an instrument or Irans oreign domina-

tion. Reza Shahs rule may have satisfed the nationalists, some o whom had clerical

roots, but it alarmed the traditionalists.2 Dismantling Reza Shahs government, coupled

with the economic and political consequences o WWII, made the ault-line between

modernists and traditionalists noticeable again. Despite attempts at cooperation, the

two groups did not wish a strong monarchy resembling Reza Shahs strong-man ruleo 1925-1941. The result was a three-way divide, with some nationalist modernists

and some religious traditionalists suspicious o the crown. The division is illustrated in

Ahmad Kasravis critical essays on democracy and Islam and Ayatollah Abol-Qasem

Kashanis Pan-Islamist ideology.3 By 1953, the ault-line had become a dividing gul,

2. Reza Shahs regime asserted nationalism rather than religion, and citizenship rather than re-

ligious allegiance, as means o national identity. Many ardent supporters o Reza Shahs national-

ist government were prominent Qajar fgures and learned intellectuals with a clerical background.

Sayyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Kazemzadeh Iranshahr, Ali Akbar Siasi, and Mostaa Adl all had clericalbackgrounds.

3. Kasravi wrote: Love o reedom and hard work have disappeared rom the undamentals o

Islam. The situation in Shia Iran is even worse. We, as Shias, do not serve our country, do not pay

taxes, rerain rom military service. We have sacrifced the essence o our religion to strengthen only

its worldly symbols. Instead o creating a democratic state, our mullas encourage the people to pray

to a super-national authority. Instead o participating in building a national economy, they urge the

populace to make unnecessary pilgrimages to the Shia shrines. And worst o all, they preach an

anti-democratic political theory, claiming that power and sovereignty belong to the Imam and not to

the people. Kashani added several principles o his own to those produced by the Muslim League o

Pakistan. Chie among them are: Political unifcation o all Muslim states in a conederation; coopera-

tion among Muslim governments to assist in the liberation o Muslim countries under colonial rule;recognition o Arabic as the language o communication by member states; establishment o direct

air naval and postal links among Muslim states; expanded economic cultural and social relations;


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realistically understood only in the context o the time.

OCCUPATION

British orces occupied Iran in concert with the Soviet Red Army on August 25,

1941 disregarding Irans declared neutrality in WWII and almost immediatelyarrested some 250 Iranians suspected o harboring anti-British and pro-German sen-

timents. Major General Fazlollah Zahedi and Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani were

among them.4 The invaders used the label pro-German liberally to arrest nationalist

ofcers and civilians who aspired to rid their country o oreign domination.5 They

arrested Major General Zahedi who commanded the Isahan Garrison in 1941 and

shipped him to Palestine as a prisoner. The British alleged that he headed a nationalist

organization that with a German agent, Franz Mayr, had planned military operations

against British orces.6 Zahedi had played an instrumental role in a military campaign

to abort the secession o Irans oil-rich Khuzestan Province on the Persian Gul in 1924.He had led 15,000 soldiers to Khuzestan against Shaykh Khazal, whom the British

government had granted the GCIE decoration (Knight Grand Commander o the In-

dian Empire), British protection, and shares in the Anglo Persian Oil Company (later

[Continued from previous page]

Century Iran, with particular reference to Ayatollah Haj Sayyed Abol-Qasim Kashani (Doctoral Dis-

sertation, University o Wisconsin, 1978), pp. 87-88, 147.

4. Abol-Qasem Kashani was born in Tehran in 1882 and ater making the Haj to Mecca with his

ather, moved to Karbala and Naja to study Arabic and theology. His ather Mostaa, born in Kashanin 1844, moved to Iraq at a young age to study theology in the centers o Shia learning in Naja and

Kazemain. With the disintegration o the Ottoman Empire and British control over Iraq and much

o Arab (Muslim) territories, the senior Kashanis actively opposed British inuence in Iraq. In time,

Abol-Qasem too gained a reputation or his knowledge o Islamic law, Arabic language, and poetry,

and his anti-British sentiments. Both ather and son were deeply involved in the Kut al-Amarah crisis

in which it took British orces 140 days and 1,025 dead to subdue the town on April 29, 1916. The

senior Kashani was killed, but the son managed to ee to continue anti-British activities among the

tribes o the lower Euphrates. The Balour Declaration and its implications or Palestinian Muslims

added to the regions anti-British sentiments. He returned to Iran ater residing with tribes along the

Iran-Iraq border or a time when he was about 35 years old, perhaps in 1917-1919. His grandather,

Hossein Kashani, was known as a religious teacher in Kazemain in the 19th

century.5. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 255; Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran

(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 43. The arrests were undoubtedly inuenced by the concerns o

the war, German invasion o the Soviet Union, and clandestine operations to gain or deny control o

petroleum resources in the Caucasus and the Persian Gul, but settling old scores also may have been

a actor.

6. The organizations name was stated as Nehzat-e Melliyoun-e Iran (Nationalist Movement o

Iran). The arrest is widely reported to have occurred on a city street. Zahedis amily and the local

police report claim that John Gulet, the British Consul in Isahan, had inormed General Zahedi that a

British general passing through the city wished to pay him a visit at his home. A general and a major

arrived at the house in the aternoon and were ushered into the reception room. As Zahedi walked

in to greet his visitors, the major pulled his sidearm and told Zahedi they had to go to the consulateimmediately. Two truckloads o British soldiers had in the meantime appeared in ront o the home.

Zahedi was driven to an airfeld and own to Palestine The major then returned to Zahedis home to


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renamed Anglo-Iranian) in 1917. Sir Shaykh Khazal surrendered and Zahedi was ap-

pointed governor-general o the province by the central government in short order.7

Major Fitzroy Maclean, who arrested Zahedi in 1941, proudly claimed that:

He was a really bad lot: a bitter enemy o the Allies, a man o unpleasant per-

sonal habits he ound himsel looking down the barrel o my Colt automatic Without urther ado, I invited the General to put his hands up and inormed him that

I had instructions to arrest him and that i he made any noise or attempt at resis-

tance, he would be shot.8

Kashanis earlier anti-British activities in British-controlled Iraq had earned him

a death sentence there in absentia as ar back as 1919. He subsequently had ed to Iran

and abstained rom politics during Reza Shahs monarchy. The British orces that oc-

cupied Iran arrested Kashani in Shemiran, north o Tehran, on June 18, 1941.9 He read-

ily admitted at his trial o having had contacts with German agents in Iran, pro-Axis

Prime Minister Rashid-Ali al-Gailani o Iraq, and Hajj Amin al-Hussayni o Palestine.His overwhelming sentiment judged by his background reected his objection

to British imperialism a lot more than his admiration or Germany. British occupiers

promptly exiled him frst to Araak, a town in western Iran, then to Rasht on the Caspian

Sea, where he remained confned without visitation by even his amily members

until 1945.10

In the decade beore WWII, clerical inuence in Iran, in part because o vigorous

state action, had signifcantly subsided. The inuence re-emerged as the Allied orces

dismantled Reza Shah Pahlavis government, and burgeoned as the occupiers let the

country in 1946. Chie among the activist clerics was Ayatollah Kashani, whose well-known anti-British and anti-communist credentials enhanced both his popularity and

political inuence. Each political party or movement had its own ootsoldiers that it

7. Cyrus Ghani,Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power(London:

I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 344.

8. Fitzroy Maclean,Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), pp. 271-77, as quoted

in William Roger Louis,Ends of British Imperialism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. 776. Moir Ezri,

Israels envoy to Iran rom 1958-1974 reers to the arrest o the Iranian ofcers and dignitaries, their

numbers, and the treatment they received in his memoirs. See Moir Ezri, Yadnameh [Memoir], Vol. I(Jerusalem: Sel-published, 2000), p. 50. Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 13.

9. Khordad 28, 1320 o the Iranian Hejira solar calendar. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 260. Kashani

was arrested in Golaab-Darreh o Shemiran, where he had sought reuge. The Iranian calendars 12

months and our seasons begin on the frst day o spring (Norouz), oten on March 20 or 21. Constitut-

ing spring are the months Farvardin, Ordibehesht, and Khordad. Summer ollows with Tir, Mordad,

and Shahrivar. Autumn brings Mehr, Aban, and Azar, ollowed by the winter months o Day, Bahman,

and Esand.

10. Abol-Qasems teachers in Naja, Muhammad-Kazem Khorasani, Mirza Hassan Khalili-Teh-

rani, and Mirza Khalil Kamarehi instilled in him revolutionary activism. Abol-Qasem achieved the

rank o Ejtehad at the age o 25, in 1907, and began advocating pan-Islamic ideas. His anti-British

pro-German anti-imperialist sentiments may be traced back to Britains expanding inuence in Iranand Mesopotamia on the one hand, and the German challenge to British imperialism on the other. The

British denied his amilys repeated requests to visit Kashani while in exile See Faghoory The Role


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called upon or street demonstrations. The Tudehs were better organized i not more

numerous than the rest. The Fadaiyan-e Islam (Devotees o Islam), headed by the cleric

Sayyed Mojtaba Mir-Louhi, a.k.a. Navab-Saavi, served as local activists and enorcers

under Ayatollah Kashanis general guidance.11 Their alliance began upon Kashanis re-

turn rom British exile to Tehran in 1945. Fadaiyan leader Navab Saavi, ater a lengthy

visit to Kashani, declared that I am prepared to stand by you and assist you in yourholy struggle against British Imperialism.12 Kashanis frst post-WWII oray in poli-

tics was to oppose Prime Minister Ibrahim Hakimis government over a press bill in-

troduced to the Majlis by Minister o Education Dr. Abdol Majid Zangeneh in January

1945. The bill called or governmental authority to ban a journal i it denigrated the

principles o Islam, insulted the institution o monarchy, or caused public unrest. The

press opposed the bill and Kashani positioned himsel at the oreront o the opposition

to condemn the government or having sponsored the legislation. Ironically, Ahmad

Kasravi, a noted journalist and publisher was assassinated in Tehran on March 11, 1946

or criticizing the Muslim clergy. Fadaiyan-e Islam acquired notoriety ater murder-

ing Kasravi and his assistant in a court o law at the Ministry o Justice. 13 As protests

escalated into public unrest, Hakimis government collapsed on June 6. Hakimi had

been Irans seventh Prime Minister since the countrys invasion in August 1941. All

governments since the invasion aced relentless opposition. Ten other administrations

would ollow Hakimis government beore Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq would orm his

on March 12, 1951. Irans governments lasted on average a mere seven months in the

decade o 1941-1951. Political leaders and elected members o Parliament were more

likely to obstruct rather than help a Prime Ministers government. Forcing governments

to all was in this period more requent than enabling them to weather the crises Iran

aced. Kashani, having opposed Hakimis government, opposed the next one headedby Ahmad Qavam over establishing a Senate, as prescribed in the Constitution. As the

controversy continued, security agents arrested Kashani on July 17, 1946 or having

instigated a bloody conrontation in Semnan, a town to Tehrans east. The incident

11. Navab Saavi (1923-1956) was born to a poor amily in Tehran, lost his ather when he was in

eighth grade at a German vocational school, dropped out to seek employment to support his amily,

and ound a job with AIOC, but the inerior status o native employees so aected him that he quit.

He let Iran or Iraq, where he was deeply politicized. The Fadaiyan grew rom a small gathering in

the poor areas o southern Tehran to a powerul political movement that at its peak claimed 7,000members. The group targeted the countrys ruling elite and secular reormists whom they viewed as

supported by the West, and thus irreligious traitors to Islam. Fadaiyan appealed to the lower classes,

bazaar merchants, and the religious lower and middle classes. See Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama,

pp. 167-170, 183.

12. The Fadaiyan sought protection through Kashanis governmental power and inuence ater

his election to Parliament. Kashani in turn assumed the role o mentor or the Fadaiyan. Kashanis

mentoring brought the Fadaiyan into an alliance at least or a time not only with Kashanis

supporters, but with Mosaddeq, the National Front, and even the communists. The assassination o

Hassan al-Banna o al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) o Egypt in 1949, and Israels

independence in 1948, strengthened the alliance. Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 189.

13. Esand 20, 1324. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 276. Kasravi was also a scholar, historian, attorney, andcritic o the Shia clerics. His criticism was particularly poignant or he had a clerical background, a

theological education and a comortable command o both Arabic and Persian Kasravi engaged the


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involved communist sympathizers whom Kashani opposed, and their opponents that

he supported. Ayatollah Kashani was exiled to Qazvin, west o Tehran, but was sub-

sequently elected to Parliament rom Tehran. He returned to Tehran triumphantly and

ormed a parliamentary action named Mojahedin-e Islam (Warriors o Islam) under

the nominal leadership o his protg, Shams Qanatabady.14 Crises and conrontations

energized ambitious political leaders who ound political instability ertile ground orprescribing simplistic solutions to gain public support. Institutionally weak political

parties resembled movements around, and dependent on, single personalities vying or

political prominence. The resulting competition among numerous parliamentary ac-

tions maniested itsel in requent changes o government rather than in producing a

permanent ruling coalition. Government policies were oten reactive, preoccupied with

new crises day by day, and annual budget appropriations oten voted on or a month at

a time.15

Forming a new government required our phases: nomination o a candidate by a

simple majority o the lower House (the Majlis); royal appointment o the nominee as

Prime Minister; introduction o the Prime Ministers cabinet to the House and the Sen-

ate where the Prime Minister would present the new governments plans and priorities;

and fnally confrmation o the new government by a parliamentary vote o confdence.

Majlis representatives were all elected by popular vote, but o the 60 senators 30 were

elected by voters and 30 appointed by the Crown.16 Weak parliamentary support and

shiting alliances resulted in weak governments susceptible to downall whenever they

were aced with a crisis. World War II and occupation disrupted international com-

merce, reduced government revenue, caused ination, and strained the nations capac-

ity to eed the occupiers as well as itsel, but most o all undermined the authority o

the central government. Psychologically, the occupation deeply aronted the Iranianssense o independence, which they had regained in 1921 ater years o Russo-British

meddling through much o the 19th century.17

On June 13, 1948, Kashani organized a demonstration in Tehran at Baharestan

Plaza acing the Parliament Gate to oppose Abdol-Hossein Hazhirs nomination by a

parliamentary majority to orm a government.18 Hazhir was said to be a champion o

Westernization and a riend o Britain. He was accused o having initiated negotiation

with AIOC or having the intention to do so. He also allegedly enjoyed the support o

the Crown and Princess Ashra, the Shahs twin sister. Fears that a Parliament domi-

nated by the Crown would reduce clerical inuence as had happened under RezaShahs rule incensed activist clerics. Responding to the Parliament Speaker Sardar-

Fakher Hekmat who had suggested to reporters that the Ayatollah ought to convince

14. Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 210, 211.

15. The countrys economic uncertainty resulted in passing the government budget in one-twelth

increments, at times just beore government employees salaries were to be paid.

16. The Senate, called or in the 1906 Constitution, was not convened until 1950. O the 60 sena-

tors, 30 were appointed by the Crown (15 rom Tehran and 15 rom the provinces) and 30 elected (15

rom Tehran and 15 rom the provinces).

17. From Brigadier Reza Khans ascendance to power in 1921, the government asserted nationalsovereignty and countered oreign meddling in Iran, until the country was invaded in August 1941.

18 Mohammad Saed Maraghei and Baqer Aqeli eds Khaterat e Siasi [Political Recollections]


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the Majlis Deputies rather than cause commotion, Kashani openly opposed Hazhir

with a blistering declaration on June 15, in which he attacked the representatives who

had voted or him. Two days later, thousands o demonstrators, led by Fadaiyan leader

Navab Saavi, responded to Kashanis declaration. Holding copies o the Quran on

their heads, they demonstrated at Baharestan Plaza, denouncing Hazhir and his par-

liamentary supporters.19 The event ended in violence in which numerous demonstra-tors and security guards were injured. Despite Kashanis opposition, Hazhir sought

a parliamentary vote o confdence and received it on June 29, 1948.20 He repeated

his request once more on August 23, and received another vote o confdence with a

greater margin.21 Yet, daily demonstrations paralyzed his government, orcing him and

his cabinet to resign on November 6, 1948, irrespective o his overwhelming support in

both Houses o Parliament.22

The next parliamentary elections in autumn 1949 were hotly contested but

Kashanis supporters were not elected. The National Front, the Tudeh Party, and the

Fadaiyan joined Kashanis supporters to successully press the Shah to dismiss theelection results and call or new elections. Then on February 4, 1949, the young King

Muhammad Reza Pahlavi survived an assassination attempt at Tehran Universitys

College o Law while attending a scheduled annual celebration. The assailant, Nasser

Mirakhraii, appeared to have been a member o the Tudeh Party and a photojournal-

ist or Parcham-e Islam (Banner o Islam), a paper closely associated with Fadaiyan-e

Islam.23 He fred a handgun at the Shah fve times beore a security guards return fre

killed him. The Shah sustained minor injuries and reacted by asking the government to

convene a constitutional convention. The convention was to amend the Constitution to

enhance the monarchs powers, ostensibly to break continuous parliamentary logjams.

The government reacted to the assassination attempt by outlawing the Tudeh Party and

the Fadaiyan organization. Two days ater the attempt on the Kings lie, Ayatollah

Kashani, who had condemned the government or Fadaiyans suppression was himsel

arrested and exiled frst to Khorram-Abad in east-central Iran, and then to Lebanon.24

Although his political activities continued, Kashani bitterly blamed the Army Chie o

Sta Major General Haj-Ali Razmara or his arrest and exile.

The next month, in March 1949, Iran elevated its inormal relations with Israel

19. The gesture, holding the Quran on the head, rather than waiving it over the head, has anemotional signifcance implying ones willingness to oer his head (thus lie) in deense o Gods

words.

20. Tir 8, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 297. O the 96 members present, 88 voted or him.

21. Sharivar 1, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 298. This time 93 deputies voted or him.

22. Aban 15, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 298.

23. Bahman 15, 1327. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 299. In an emergency cabinet meeting the government

declared the Tudeh Party illegal and ordered all its ofces and clubs seized immediately throughout the

country by law enorcement ofcers. Nasser Mir Fakhraie was said to have been a reporter or Par-

cham-e Islam, the organ o the Fadayan Organization. See Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 184.

24. Majlis deputies visited the Shah at the royal palace on February 24, 1949 (Esand 5, 1327) and

received a tongue-lashing that might have marked a turning point in the monarchs relationship withthe legislature. You bring and dismiss governments, yet I get shot at or it! I have determined to seek

additional powers or mysel I have ordered the government to convene a constitutional council


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by establishing diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv. De facto recognition ollowed

in 1950, ostensibly to protect property rights o Iranian citizens in Palestine. Eight

months later on November 4, 1949, a Fadaiyan-e Islam assassin killed ormer Prime

Minister Abdol-Hossein Hazhir at the Sepahsalar Mosque adjacent to the Majlis com-

pound.25 The assassin, Hossein Emami, readily conessed to having carried a gun or

two months in anticipation o a chance to kill Hazhir. New parliamentary elections toreplace the one dismissed in the all o 1949 were held the same month.26 The country

was in a downward spiral and nearing chaos. As the crisis deepened, the Soviet-backed

Tudeh Partys inuence soared. The Soviet Union continued meddling in Irans aairs

through threatening demands, hostile radio broadcasts, and the reusal to return 20 tons

o Iranian gold bullion reserve that it had looted during the occupation.27

When the election results were announced in May 1950, all National Front can-

didates and Ayatollah Kashani (still in exile in Lebanon) had won parliamentary seats.

At Prime Minister Ali Mansours invitation Kashani returned to Tehran on June 10,

1950 amidst welcoming crowds o clerics, members o the National Front (a coali-

tion o parties headed by the Majlis Representative Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq), trade

associations, and bazaar merchants.28 Eight days later on June 18, Dr. Mosaddeq, in

keeping with the newly orged political alliance, read a statement by Ayatollah Kashani

at an open session o Parliament. The statement declared that: 1) Irans oil belonged to

Iranians; 2) those who had exiled him had to be punished; 3) the death o Mirakhraii

(killed by a guard ater having shot the Shah) had prevented identifcation o a trai-

torous conspiracy; 4) Iranians would not accept dictatorship; and 5) the decisions o

the recent Constitutional Convention (called ater the Kings attempted assassination)

were invalid. The welcome Kashani received reected the emergence o a dominant,

although not cohesive, political coalition consisting o activist Muslim clerics and theirollowers, bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, trade associations, middle class proession-

als, several political parties, and the communists. The coalition was united in support

o wresting Irans oil industry rom British control through parliamentary means i pos-

sible, and extra-parliamentary manipulation or bullying i necessary.

In a constitutional monarchy the King is the head o the state, the Parliament

through a majority block supports and sustains a Prime Minister, and the Prime Minis-

ter is the head o government. One does not expect open rits among these three institu-

tions under normal circumstances. But Irans conditions were not normal. On June 26,

1950, the Shah appointed Major General Haj-Ali Razmara Prime Minister. Razmarahad distinguished himsel during the Azerbaijan crisis o 1946 (in which a Soviet-

backed attempt to detach the province rom Iran had ailed).29 Razmara was not above

25. Hazhir had been recently appointed the Minister o the Imperial Court.

26. Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama, p. 212.

27. The Soviet Union fnally returned 11 tons o the gold on June 1, 1955, and agreed on August

1, 1955 to deliver an additional $8.75 million worth o goods gradually to settle the debt. Aqeli, Chro-

nology, pp. 347-348.

28. Khordad 20, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 311. Prime Minister Mansours telegram stated: I

am honored to communicate to you His Imperial Majestys respect and my own. Since your absencehas become longer than expected and your immediate return is desired by the nation, I hereby would

like to extend to you my invitation to return home See Faghoory The Role of the Ulama p 213


10/33


meeting with and listening to the lowliest o petitioners. Although an energetic proes-

sional soldier, he was interested in cultural matters and was very close to his brother-

in-law, Irans leading man o letters at the time, Sadeq Hedayat, and Hedayats numer-

ous literary riends.30 Prime Minister Razmara attempted to introduce his cabinet to

Parliament on June 27, but conronted relentless shouting and heckling orchestrated by

Representatives Muhammad Mosaddeq, Mozaar Baqaii, Hossein Makki, AbdolqaderAzad, Allahyar Saleh, Mahmoud Nariman, and Ali Shaygan. The opposition saw Raz-

mara as too closely associated with the armed orces and the Royal Palace. Razmara

was also known as a riend o the West, avoring Irans secularization and moderniza-

tion. Nationalization o the oil industry had become a source o conrontation, and

Razmara was accused o collaboration with the British or having opposed immediate

nationalization. He also was portrayed as a bitter oe o Kashani and the Fadaiyan. 31

Despite the commotion, during which Mosaddeq passed out while screaming and had

to be carried out o the chamber to be revived, the new cabinet was introduced. Ayatol-

lah Kashani and the National Front both issued public statements denouncing the new

government on the same day. Prime Minister Razmara asked or and received a vote o

confdence in the Majlis on July 4, 1950, but as 93 o the 107 representatives present

voted or him, the opponents in the legislative chamber smashed their seats and desks

in protest and rustration. Razmara then requested and received a vote o confdence

rom the Senate on July 10, despite Senators Dr. Ahmad Matin-Datari,32 Muham-

mad Taddayon, Hossein Dadgar, Dr. Mahmoud Hesabi, and Abdol-Hossein Nikpours

strong objections.33 On December 17, 1950 the Parliamentary Petroleum Commission

(composed o Mosaddeq, Baqaii, Makki, Azad, Saleh, Nariman, Shaygan, Abolhassan

Haerizadeh, Mirsayyed-Ali Behbahani, Abbas Eslami, and Kazem Shaibani) recom-

mend nationalization o the countrys oil industry.34 Ayatollah Kashani issued afatwain support o nationalization and called or a grand gathering at the Kings Mosque


viet Ambassador visited the Shah to demand the immediate withdrawal o the orces not to endanger

the peace o the world. The Shah reportedly replied that the peace o the world had indeed been

threatened until a ew days ago, but no longer. He then showed the ambassador the telegram in which

the secessionists had oered their unconditional surrender. The ambassador, stunned, stormed out

speechless. See Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York: McGraw-Hill,

1961), pp. 117-118; Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 52.30. Peter Avery,Modern Iran (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 402, 414, 415. According

to Avery, On becoming Prime Minister Razmara promptly issued a press release underlining the plans

or reorm His frst public utterances seemed so ull o promise or the uture His plans touched

upon so many powerul interests and, i achieved, would be so detrimental to them that it seemed at

once probable that one or other o the groups who would be aected would plot his downall.

31. Kashani blamed Razmara or his own arrest and exile ollowing the attempt to assassinate the

Shah in February 1949. Kashani and Fadayan were united in their hatred o Razmara. See Fagh-

oory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 185-187.

32. Matin-Datary, a close relative o Mosaddeq, had a pro-German reputation. At the outbreak o

WWII, Reza Shah had tasked his cabinet ministers to write an analysis to project the wars outcome.

Matin-Datary, a junior cabinet minister, had argued that Germany would be victorious, and that Iranshould position itsel to protect its national interest at the wars end. Reza Shah named him Prime Min-

ister on October 26 1939 but removed him on June 25 1940 See Aqeli Chronology pp 224 228


11/33


on December 22 at which pro-nationalization speakers addressed a crowd o several

thousand.35 At a closed session o Parliament two days later, Prime Minister Razmara

expressed his reservations. He reasoned that Iran did not have the industrial capacity

to explore its oil independently, nor did it have the ability to market it internationally.

He warned that immediate nationalization o the oil industry in such circumstances

was the greatest treason.36

The ollowing week, on December 29, 1950, thousandsdemonstrated at Baharestan Plaza at the invitation o Ayatollah Kashani, as speaker

ater speaker attacked the government, the Prime Minister, and the Minister o Treasury

or opposing immediate nationalization.37 Similar demonstrations appeared throughout

the country on the same day. Demonstrations continued nearly every week, but two

gatherings, both at the Kings Mosque in Tehran one at the invitation o Kashani on

January 26, 1951, and another sponsored by the Fadaiyan-e Islam on March 3, 1951

stood out or their vitriolic personal attacks on Razmara, and the absolute insistence

on immediate nationalization.38 Razmara appealed to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

(AIOC) to address the points most criticized in the Majlis. They included inspecting

the companys books (Iran owned 20% o the AIOC), supplying oil or Irans domestic

consumption at cost, and inorming Iran where the oil was sold. The US Assistant Sec-

retary o State George McGhee appealed to the British Foreign Ofce to accept Raz-

maras requests, but without success. The British thought Irans oil was by right British

oil, and ound the Iranian demand to reclaim it outrageous. They were convinced that

the oil was theirs because the British had discovered, exploited, refned, transported,

and marketed it. That the oil had been under Iranian soil was o little consequence in

the minds o most British politicians.39 The refnery on the oshore island o Abadan

was Britains largest overseas asset, the largest installation o its kind in the world, and

a source o British pride. It was also obscenely proftable. Winston Churchill boastedthat:

The aggregate profts, realized and potential, o this investment may be estimated

at a sum not merely sufcient to pay all the programme o ships, great and small o

that year and or the whole pre-war oil uel installation, but are such that we may not

unreasonably expect that one day we shall be entitled also to claim that the mighty

eets laid down in 1912, 1913, and 1914, the greatest ever built by any power in an

equal period, were added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to the

taxpayer.40

Even Anthony Eden, who had studied Persian at Oxord and had developed a

35. Thefatwa was published in the national evening dailyEttelaton December 21, 1950. Other

fatwas by leading religious fgures, e.g., Ayatollahs Muhammad Taqi Khonsari, Mahmoud Hossaini

Qomi, Abbas Ali Shahrudi, and Baha-eddin Mahallati, ollowed asserting the necessity o Muslims

to control their property. See Faghoory, The Role of the Ulama, pp. 220-221.

36. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 317

37. Day 8, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 317

38. Bahman 6, 1329 and Esand 12, 1329 respectively.39. Louis, Ends of British Imperialism, p. 731. Louis quotes Sir Donald Ferguson, Permanent

Under Secretary at the Ministry o Fuel and Power who expressed such convictions


12/33


sot spot or Persian culture, had denounced the Iranians in 1951 or stealing Brit-

ish property. Thus Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrisons characteristic contempt or

non-Europeans was typical. Morrison took the lead to teach Iranians a lesson by plan-

ning to launch an attack to seize Abadan ater Iran nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil

Company on May 2, 1952. An armada o the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, and the

British Army were thus assembled under the code name Buccaneer. Interestingly, theUS objection to the plan stopped Buccaneer dead in its tracks. Prime Minister Clem-

ent Attlee, whose own Labour government was dedicated to nationalization in Britain,

told his Cabinet that We could not aord to break with the United States on an issue

o this kind.41 The British attitude towards Iranian national sovereignty was aected

by the view o the Iranian as an inerior human being.42 The British disposition and the

psychological reaction it caused among Iranians weighed heavily on every segment o

negotiation between them.43 Mosaddeqs popularity was to a great extent related to the

genuine distaste Iranians held or the Anglo-Iranian Oil Companys conduct.44 Finally,

ater the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) announced in January 1951 a con-

tract granting Saudi Arabia 50% proft, the British sotened their position in late Febru-

ary to re-open negotiations with Iran.45 The British change o heart came too late as a

Fadaiyan assassin struck Prime Minister Razmara at Ayatollah Qomis uneral in the

Soltani Mosque on March 7, 1951, beore the deal could have been announced.46 The

assassin, Khalil Tahmasebi, proudly stated: I killed Razmara because he was a traitor.

The ollowing day, March 8, 1951, Ayatollah Kashani declared the murderer a na-

tional hero [monji-e mellat] at a press conerence, and the murder a religious require-

ment [vajeb]. That aternoon, at yet another demonstration at Baharestan Plaza, and

in a surrealist atmosphere, Majlis representatives Hossein Makki and Mozaar Baqaii

congratulated the nation or the Prime Ministers demise.47 Thus the elected memberso government publicly celebrated the murder o the governments Prime Minister.48 A

week ater Razmaras assassination, on March 15, 1951 at an open meeting o the Ma-

jlis at which the representatives had to stand up to announce their votes in public, the

nationalization bill passed unanimously.49 A oreign correspondent reported:

I a secret ballot had been possible, the vote probably would have gone against

immediate nationalization. But the members had to stand up and be counted

with the eyes o Fadaiyan-Islam upon them. A spectator in the gallery shouted,

41. Cabinet Minutes Vol. 60, No. 51, September 27, 1951, CAB 128/20, quoted in Louis,Ends of

British Imperialism, p. 736.

42. The Iranians knew that the British regarded them as inefcient, even incompetent even,

perhaps, as inerior human beings. This was a psychological reality that bore as much on the actual

negotiations as did the abstract debate about the validity o the 1933 agreement and the practical

amount o compensation to be paid to the company. See Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, p. 754.

43. Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 731, 735-736, 754, 756, 760.

44. Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, p. 739.

45. Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 83.

46. Esand 16, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 319.47. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 317-320.

48 The event reected Irans domestic crisis and had little to do with British Russian or Ameri


13/33


Eight grains o gunpowder has brought this about.50

As celebratory demonstrations were held throughout the country, another Fadai-

yan assassin killed Dr. Majid Zangeneh, Dean o Tehrans Universitys College o Law.

Zangeneh had served in Ibrahim Hakimis Cabinet as Minister o Education.51 Sadeq

Hedayat wrote to Peter Avery a noted British scholar o Iranian history and literature ater his brother-in-laws assassination that the vileness and political obscenity o

Tehran had become intolerable. There was no hope any longer that political reedom

or decency might prevail, and he was leaving never to return. A ew months later he

committed suicide in Paris in despair.52

On March 20, 1951, the Shah appointed Hossein Ala Prime Minister. Ala was

known to be a nationalist, moderate, pro-Western statesman with parliamentary sup-

port. As Ambassador to the United States, Ala had heroically presented Irans case

at the United Nations Security Council against the USSR ater Stalin had reused to

withdraw the Red Army rom Iran in 1946. He introduced his cabinet to Parliament

promptly, but aced with overwhelming pressure to quickly transer the oil industry

assets rom AIOC to the government, resigned less than two weeks later.53 In an open

session o the Majlis the day ater Alas resignation on April 28, 1951, Representative

Jamaal Emami nominated Dr. Muhammad Mosaddeq to replace Ala. Mosaddeq ac-

cepted the candidacy immediately, and o the 100 representatives present, 79 supported

the nomination.54 In the days between Alas resignation and Mosaddeqs appointment,

Kashani issued a declaration calling Mosaddeq the only legitimate candidate or the

premiership, and urged parliamentary colleagues to join the National Front to support

his appointment. The Fadaiyan-e Islam organization pulled out all the stops, actively

seeking and gathering support or Mosaddeq on the streets. By the time the Shah ap-pointed Mosaddeq Prime Minister on April 30, 1951, the Fadaiyans inuence had

reached its peak, prompting its leaders to seek a power-sharing arrangement in the new

administration. Kashani had approved Fadaiyans terrorist activities or as long as it had

suited his political aims, but the demand to share governmental power signaled that his

control had slipped. Fadaiyans number two, Abdol-Hossein Vahedi, accompanied by

several others in the organizations leadership, visited Kashani at his residence to dis-

cuss power-sharing the day ater the nationalization bill had passed into law. Kashani

50. Youso Mazandi and Edwin Muller, Government by Assassination: The story behind the

headlines about Iran, The Readers Digest, September 1951, p. 30. Peter Averys description is simi-

lar: the majles approved the nationalization proposal o Dr. Musaddiqs Oil Commission without

any appreciable show o opposition, or who was going to risk being shot? See Avery,Modern Iran,

p. 418.

51 Esand 24, 1329. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 320.

52. Avery,Modern Iran, p. 449.

53. The external pressure was rom the British government that owned 80% o Anglo-Iranian (later

British Petroleum) Oil Company with its lucrative concessions. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 320, 322.

Faghoory provides the dates o appointment and resignation as March 11 and April 27, 1951.

54. Ordibehesht 7, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 322. Mosaddeq had been oered the ofce onNovember 12, 1944 (Aban 21, 1322) and received in the Royal Palace on November 14 (Aban 23),

but declined unless assured o the condition that he would be returned to Parliament ater premier


14/33


rejected the demand but promised to help ree Fadaiyan members in custody. His visi-

tors let dissatisfed, eeling used and urious. The threads that had bound Kashani and

his parliamentary action to the National Front, Mosaddeq, and the Fadaiyan as

subsequent events showed had suddenly begun to ray.

MOSADDEQS GOvERNMENT

Prime Minister Mosaddeq announced in the Majlis two weeks later on May 13,

1951 the ormation o a Committee o Expropriation (khal-e yad) composed o Mu-

hammad-Ali Varasteh, Mehdi Bazargan,55 Abdol-Hossein Aliabady, Muhammad Bayat,

and Kazem Hasibi, to wrest rom Britain the control o Irans oil industry.56 At the same

Majlis meeting, Mosaddeq claimed that a (Fadaiyan) conspiracy had been aoot to kill

him and announced that he would not leave the premises to asure his own saety. Two

days later, on May 15, 1951, the Prime Minister, in an executive order to all govern-

mental agencies, declared the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company irrevocably dissolved.57

Toconvince Mosaddeq that he had not had a part in the threat against him, Kashani openly

broke with the Fadaiyan and criticized it or having strayed rom the right path. The

Fadaiyan responded by denouncing both Kashani and Mosaddeq, accusing them o

being oreign tools and threatening them with the same treatment given Razmara.

When police arrested the Fadaiyan leader Saavi on June 4, 1951, he had in his pocket

a list naming those the group had marked or assassination. The list included Kashani,

Mosaddeq, Princess Ashra, and Dr. Manuchehr Eqbaal (a ormer Interior Minister),

among others. A Fadaiyan statement issued two days ater his arrest warned: i a

single hair is shed rom Navab Saavis head, we will kill a lot o people!58

Ayatollah Kashani, in a public expression o support or Mosaddeq on June 5,

1951, threatened ajihadagainst the British i assets o the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

were not surrendered to Irans government voluntarily and at once.59 However, the

Tudeh Party used the occasion to incite oil workers to strike or better working condi-

tions, creating a new problem or the government at that critical time. Since Mosaddeq

had assumed control o the oil industry, the Tudeh instigation would at the very least

destabilize the government. Kashani moved quickly to help Mosaddeq by successully

appealing to the workers to end the strike. To ortiy domestic clerical support or his

government and tap into Arab anti-British sentiments, Mosaddeq recalled Irans envoy

rom Israel.60 The split between the Fadaiyan and Kashani on the one hand, and Tudehand Mosaddeq on the other, hinted at the inherent weakness o the earlier grand alli-

ance. Parliamentary opposition to Mosaddeqs policies reected his weakened coali-

tion. To stie opposition to Mosaddeqs policies, Ayatollah Kashani declared Septem-

ber 30, 1951 a public holiday and exhorted the nation to demonstrate support or the

55. Bazargan became the Islamic Republics frst post-Revolution Prime Minister in 1979 but

resigned ater nine months.

56. Ordibehesht 22, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 324.

57. Ordibehesht 24, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 324.58. Faghoory, The Role of Ulama, pp. 183, 188, 192, 194, 198.

59 Khordad 14 1330 Aqeli Chronology p 326


15/33


prime minister, and disgust for his parliamentary opponents.61

Mosaddeq led a delegation to New York on October 7, 1951 to address the UN

Security Council on October 11.62 Iran had ignored a World Court injunction not to re-

possess the oil industry. Iran successully argued that the 1933 agreement had been be-

tween the Iranian government and a private company (AIOC), and thus Iranian courts

held exclusive jurisdiction in the matter. The World Court upheld Irans position inJuly 1952. Britain then appealed to the UN Security Council without success.63 While

Mosaddeq was in the United States, George McGhee, the US Assistant Secretary o

State, came up with an ingenious ormula64 to resolve the dispute. Dean Acheson, the

Secretary o State, supported McGhees proposed solution. In their meetings with Mo-

saddeq (in New York and Washington), the two American politicians persuaded him to

accept the proposal and he acquiesced. When Acheson personally suggested the deal to

Anthony Eden however, the British Foreign Secretary dismissed it out o hand.65 The

crux o the dispute was what George Middleton, who had served as Charg dAaires

at the British Embassy in Tehran in 1952, called the sanctity o treaties. The British

could not aord to admit the imposition o past unequal treaties, or doing so would

invite nationalists to abrogate all British concessions around the world. Acheson was

later moved to state, Never had so ew lost so much so stupidly and so ast.66 Negotia-

tions in New York and Washington ultimately ailed and the Prime Minister returned

home to ace a fnancial crisis. National bonds were issued in the name o patriotism

to und the governments mounting defcit, and Iranians, to their credit, stepped up to

purchase the promissory notes in large numbers. On the day o the issue, December

23, 1951, the Shah purchased two million rials o the bonds. Mosaddeq, an aristocrat

rom the ormer Qajar dynasty and one o the richest eudal landowners in the country,

purchased 250,000 rials.67When election results or the 17th Parliament were announced on January 24,

61. Mehr 7, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 328. Authors emphasis.

62. Mehr 14, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 328. He traveled to Washington on October 23 and

while accompanied by Irans Ambassador Abdollah Entezam met with US President Harry S. Tru-

man. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 324, 326, 328, 329.

63. The oil concession was originally granted in 1901 to William Knox DArcy, a British subject.

The British government became a major shareholder when the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later

renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) was ormed in 1909. A refnery was built in Abadan in1913, but Iran cancelled the 1909 concession in 1932. A new concession in 1933 limited the area o

concession, guaranteed a minimum royalty and a specifed tax payable to Irans national government

through 1993.

64. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the State Department(New York: W.W.

Norton & Company, 1969), p. 510. The ormula, described by Dean Acheson as ingenious included

compensation based on current market prices, recognition o Irans sovereignty over its oil resources,

and nationalization. On the other hand, the nationalization would not include the Abadan refnery

which could be operated by a neutral company (the Dutch were mentioned). The British (Anglo-Ira-

nian Oil Company) would then get oil or export on the 50/50 basis already in eect in the Persian

Gul. Mosaddeq would not agree to the British demand o compensation or uture profts, nor accept

the validity o the 1933 concession.65. Homa Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds.,

Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 2004) p 7


16/33


1952, Kashani had been re-elected, having received the second highest number o votes

rom Tehran.68 Hossein Makki, a colorul member o the previous Majlis, had received

the highest.69 The total number o ballots cast in Tehran, however, seemed too low, sug-

gesting that many eligible voters may have declined to vote.70 On February 15, a mem-

ber o Fadaiyan-e Islam struck again, seriously injuring Dr. Hossein Fatemi, a newly

elected Member o Parliament and a newspaper publisher. The assassination attempthad been planned by Fadaiyans second in command, Abdolhossein Vahedi, and carried

out by a teenager.71 On April 27 the Shah inaugurated the 17th Majlis by delivering a

customary Royal Address that Prime Minister Mosaddeq had conspicuously chosen not

to attend. When the government submitted its resignation to the new Majlis in keeping

with parliamentary tradition (to allow the new legislature to either express confdence in

the government or nominate a new Prime Minister), 52 o the 65 representatives present

voted to re-install Prime Minister Mosaddeq. The Senate on the other hand postponed

its vote, awaiting the governments program also a parliamentary tradition. Rather

than submit his program, Mosaddeq resigned in defance on July 7 and accused the

Senate o obstruction. Senators reacted on July 9, when 22 o the 36 Senators present

withdrew their support rom Mosaddeqs government. On July 10, Ayatollah Kashani

harshly condemned the Senate or having withdrawn its support.72 The Senators elt

threatened enough to reconsider their decision the same day and voted to confrm the

Prime Minister despite not having received his governments program.

Emboldened by his victory, Prime Minister Mosaddeq escalated the crisis on

July 13 by requesting unprecedented extraordinary powers rom the Majlis to enorce

government bills by decree beore they were enacted into law. Then on July 16 he

demanded to wrest the control o the armed orces rom the King the Commander-

in-Chie.73 When the Shah declined, Mosaddeq resigned in protest. In a closed session

68. Bahman 3, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 331.

69. Makki was an eective orator. A ormer non-commissioned ofcer, he called himsel Sar-

baaz-e vatan [Soldier o Motherland] and repeatedly claimed he would trade all he owned or a

stick o rock candy (yek shaakhe nabaat), to highlight that he was not wealthy or corrupt. Yet some

considered him a manipulating political operator. Once he conronted a wealthy land-owning repre-

sentative in the Majlis and accused him o having so much that he could not care about the countrys

well-being. The wealthy representative replied that on the contrary, because he owned so much o the

country he worried about its uture constantly, whereas Makki who had nothing could aord tobe oblivious to national interest! The wealthy representative was Ali Amini, who became Ambassador

to the US and later Prime Minister. Makki would invite and accept contributions rom his supporters.

Once an advertisement appeared in newspapers asking contributions destined or Hossein Makki to

be mailed to a new address. The new address, as it turned out, belonged to another man by the same

name another Hossein Makki unrelated to the Majlis representative.

70. Ofcial records reported Tehrans population at 1,010,000 in 1949. The number o votes cast

in Tehran in the 1952 election, despite the politicized atmosphere, was 143,163. Aqeli, Chronology,

p. 331.

71. Bahman 25, 1330. Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 331-332. Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad

Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 66. Dr. Hossein Fatemi was a newspaper publisher who did

not hesitate to attack his opponents venomously in his paper,Bakhtar-e Emrouz. He openly accusedthose opposed to oil nationalization o treason. He later became Foreign Minister in Mosaddeqs

Cabinet His assailant was Mehdi Abd Khodaii a 14 year old boy


17/33


o Parliament the next day, 40 o the 42 representatives attending nominated Ahmad

Qavam to replace Mosaddeq, and he was named Prime Minister the next day on July

18, 1952.74 On July 19 the nation ound its major cities in convulsion. Twenty-eight

Majlis deputies declared Mosaddeq the only acceptable prime minister, and the Na-

tional Front called or a nationwide strike on July 21 in his support.75 Qavam asked the

Shah or emergency powers and dissolution o the Parliament. The King denied bothrequests, and the National Fronts strike day turned bloody, claiming 79 lives.76 The

Crown and Parliament dismissed Qavam and reinstated Mosaddeq the ollowing day.

Despite appearances o spontaneity, the anti-Qavam demonstrations were well planned

and coordinated with the Tudeh Party. The British Charg dAaire, George Middle-

ton, wrote in his notes the next day that:

It seems clear to me that the bloody riot o 21st July was a highly organized aair

The National Front demagogues, notably Kashani, gae an outward aearane

of a sontaneous oular surge of feeling to these riots. But in fat I beliee

these were almost ertainly organized by the Tudeh. Reorts reahing me are

that the demonstrations were as muh anti-monarhial as anti-imerialist

Moreoer there was a old determination and ruthlessness behind the manifes-

tations whih is tyially ommunist.77

A string o bizarre developments ollowed as the pace o events quickened and

the national mood became increasingly charged. Mosaddeq sent a message to the King,

handwritten on the inner back-cover o a copy o the Quran that: I will be the en-

emy o Quran i I act contrary to the Constitution, and to accept the presidency i the

Constitution is compromised and the countrys regime altered.78 The message wasdelivered to the Imperial Court on July 23, 1952, the day that Mosaddeq had ordered

the Kings brothers and sisters to leave the country.79 Four days later, Deputy Premier

Baqer Kazemi introduced the new Cabinet to Parliament and announced that Prime

Minister Mosaddeq had assumed the duties o the Minister o National Deense him-

sel.80 The next day the Majlis gave the government a unanimous vote o confdence

and passed the bill granting it extraordinary powers. A week later a bill introduced in

the Majlis called Ahmad Qavam a corruptor on earth or having been instrumental

74. Tir 27, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 337.


76. Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, p. 748. The Shahs reasons or reusing Qavams requests

may have been one or several o the ollowing: a) he did not want Qavam to have dictatorial powers

such as Mosaddeq had sought; b) he simply did not like or trust Qavam; c) he was politically too weak

to involve himsel without endangering the Crown; or d) he wished to remain true to the Constitution

he had sworn to uphold.

77. Minute by Middleton, July 22, 1952, FO 248/1531, as quoted in Louis,Ends of British Impe-

rialism, pp. 749-750.

78. This message reects a tradition o recording a compact with God as witness. Aqeli, Chro-

nology, p. 338.79. Mordad 1, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 338. Expelling the Shahs relatives may have been done

to isolate the young king thus making him more susceptible to manipulation


18/33


in the massacre o 30th o Tir and armed rebellion against the nation.81 Qavam had be-

come a subject o controversy or he was Mosaddeqs political rival. The bill required

the confscation o Qavams entire property, including his personal belongings. Four

days later on August 7, 1952, Ayatollah Kashani, then Speaker o the Majlis, showed

a thaw in his relations with the Fadaiyan when he introduced a bill to ree Khalil Tah-

masebi (Razmaras assassin) and to absolve him o all charges with triple urgency.82

The bill stated that Since Haj-Ali Razmaras treason and support or oreigners is

certain, Khalil Tahmasebi, even i alleged to have been Razmaras murderer, is in the

eyes o the nation innocent and not guilty.83 On August 11, the Senate passed the bill

to grant Mosaddeq the extraordinary powers he had sought on July 13, but a month

later on October 17, rejected the bills to pardon Khalil Tahmasebi and seize Qavams

property. The Senates rejections enraged the lower House. It retaliated within ten days

by passing a bill on October 23, 1952 to reduce the Senatorial term o ofce rom our

to two years in eect dismissing the Senate while in session.84 When senators at-

tempted to meet on October 26, 1952, they ound the Senate doors locked.85 That day

Dr. Hossein Fatemi, the controversial newspaper publisher who had become Foreign

Minister on October 11, 1952, wrote a blistering article in his newspaper Bakhtar-e

Emrouz in which he called the senators servants o the British Foreign Ofce.86 On

November 15, Khalil Tahmasebi was reed rom prison.87 Tahmasebi, ater a brie visit

to the shrine o Hazrat Abdolazim in Ray on the outskirts o Tehran, rushed to Aya-

tollah Kashanis home to pay his respects. On January 8, 1953 Mosaddeq asked the

Majlis to renew his extraordinary powers or an additional year.88 Despite objections

by numerous representatives, including Mosaddeqs ardent supporters Hossein Makki,

Abolhassan Haerizadeh, Mozaar Baqaii, and most signifcantly Ayatollah Kashani

(who called the bill unconstitutional), it passed on January 13 with double urgency.89The legislation marked the end o Kashanis cooperation with Mosaddeq, and more sig-

nifcantly the alliance that had once made Mosaddeqs coalition a ormidable orce.90

81. July 21, the National Fronts day o national strike against Qavam. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 337.

The charge corruptor on earth was used repeatedly ater the Iranian Revolution to execute oppo-

nents in 1979, the ormer Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda among them.

82. Mordad 16, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 340.

83. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 340.

84. Aban 1, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 342.85. Aban 3, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 342.

86. Mehr 19, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 341. One o Fatemis early decisions as Foreign Min-

ister was to re-open the charges o alleged embezzlement and illegal conduct against Abdol-Hossein

Sardari, the diplomat stationed in Paris throughout WWII, known or having saved numerous Jewish

amilies during the German occupation o France.

87. Aban 24, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 345.

88. Day 18, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 344.

89. Day 23, 1331. Aqeli, Chronology, p. 344; Fakhreddin Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq: The Con-

fguration and Role o domestic Forces, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad Mosaddeq and

the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 57. Azimi has argued that although Kashani had disapproved o numerous

decisions by Mosaddeq ater the July 21, 1952 uprising that had toppled Qavam, he had denied anyriction between them. However, when in December 1952 Mosaddeq sought the renewal o extraordi-

nary powers or a year Kashani tried to block him and their dierences became public


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Mosaddeqs supporters claim that the delegated powers he secured were not dicta-

torial. The powers, they charitably argue, were delegated to him or a brie period to

implement reorms. They reason that even democratic countries (such as Britain in

World War II) have on occasion suspended their constitutions.91

That line o reasoning overlooks that it had been Mosaddeqs government that

conducted the elections or the 17th

Majlis, and it had been that very legislature that hadconfrmed Mosaddeq and his cabinet by a vote o confdence and overwhelming sup-

port. It also turns a blind eye to Mosaddeqs parliamentary manipulation. Aside rom his

request or extraordinary powers, he introduced a bill in late December 1952-January

1953 to increase the number o Majlis representatives rom 136 to 172. Yet at election

time he delayed balloting in over 50 electoral districts. Thus the 17th Majlis convened

with only about 80 elected representatives. Two o Mosaddeqs closest associates, Dr.

Karim Sanjabi, a ounder o the National Front and Minister o Education and Dr. Ghol-

am-Hossein Sadiqi, the Minister o the Interior advised against dissolving the Majlis and

holding a reerendum. Both argued that the Majlis had supported Mosaddeq and that it

had been the King who had appointed Prime Ministers since the Constitutional Revolu-

tion o 1906 subject to parliamentary approval. Without the Majlis, the Shah would be

ree to oust the Prime Minister and appoint another. Mosaddeqs reply to both had been

the same: Shah jorat-e in kar ra nadarad[The Shah would not dare].92

A COvERT OPERATION

The United States had gradually concluded by late 1952, particularly ater the

upheaval that ousted Qavam, that Mosaddeqs government could not resolve the oildispute and that its policy o excessive defcit fnancing had endangered the nation.

Viewing matters rom the perspective o the Cold War events in Czechoslovakia and

Korea, the United States eared Iran to be at risk o alling behind the Iron Curtain. 93

Concerned, in March 1953, the US Secretary o State John Foster Dulles asked the

Central Intelligence Agency (headed by his brother Allen Welsh Dulles) to devise a

plan to acilitate Mosaddeqs removal. Yet the United States insisted that Britain ac-

cept the reality that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would not be returned to it.94 The

British government, bitter at having lost the lucrative oil concession, was nevertheless

delighted at the US governments new determination.95 The plan to be carried out by the

CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) ater consultation with the US

91. Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad Mosad-

deq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 12-13.

92. Sanjabi and Sadiqi recollections, as well as Kashanis son Sayyed Mahmoud Kashani are

quoted in Ahrar, ed., The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi, pp. 282-283.

93. Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, pp. 756, 757, 758, 730, 736.

94. Donald N. Wilber, Clandestine Serice History: Oerthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, No-

ember 1952-August1953, The Secret CIA History o the Iran Coup, 1953, National Security Archives

Electronic Briefng Book No. 28, p. 17. See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB.NSAEBB28/index.html. The New York Times frst published excerpts in its April 16 and June 18, 2000 editions and

posted them on its website at http://www nytimes com/library/world/Mideast/041600iran cia index


20/33


Ambassador to Iran was completed by June 10, 1953. The US envoy to Iran, Ambas-

sador Loy Wesley Henderson, had conveniently arrived in Washington or an extended

visit on June 3, and the plan was presented to the Secretary o State on June 19.96

The architects o the covert operation were distinguished intellectual scholars

Ann K.S. (Nancy) Lambton, Robin Zaehner, and Donald Newton Wilber the ormer

two rom England and the latter rom the United States. The aair ultimately orged acompact among Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden,

President Dwight Eisenhower, and Secretary o State John Foster Dulles on the one

hand, and with Irans King Muhammad Reza Pahlavi on the other. Yet the Kings in-

volvement in the aair code named TP-AJAX, but now commonly known as Ajax

was limited. At a meeting at the US Secretary o States ofce on June 25, 1953,

CIA Director Allen Dulles, US Ambassador to Iran Henderson, Under Secretary o

State Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, and several others heard the CIA Chie

o the Near East and Arica Division admit that no one had been able to coner on the

matter with the Shah. Subsequently, the Shah proved reluctant to dismiss Mosaddeq

without a parliamentary recommendation. Thus considerable pressure had to be ap-

plied beore two Royal Orders Farmans to dismiss the Prime Minister and ap-

point another were signed on August 15.97 The plotters thought the Shahs twin sister,

Princess Ashra, was capable o persuading him to sign the decrees. A top British AIOC

ofcial, Gordon Sumerset, and SIS representative Norman Matthew Darbyshire met

with Princess Ashra on the Riviera on July 16 to request that she assure her brother o

American and British support against Mosaddeq. She agreed to y to Iran to do so, but

warned that her arrival would precipitate a strong reaction by the Prime Minister. She

ew to Tehran on a commercial ight on July 25, but her unauthorized return home in-

uriated not only Mosaddeq but also the Shah. She orwarded a note to her brother, buthe reused to see her until the evening o July 29, hours beore her departure or Europe

on July 30.98 Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkop, who had served as the head o

US Military Mission to Irans Gendarmerie rom 1942 to 1948 and gained the Shahs

respect, was asked on June 26, 1953 to intervene to obtain the desired Royal Orders. To

avoid suspicion, Schwarzkop embarked on a cover mission to tour Lebanon, Paki-

stan, and Egypt, making his Tehran visit to appear to be a mere stop-over. He let the

United States or Lebanon on July 21 and fnally met with the Shah on August 1, two

days ater Princess Ashra had let Iran. The Shah declined to sign the decrees, but told

Schwarzkop that should Mosaddeq dissolve the Majlis as he already had threatened,the Head o the State would then have the constitutional authority to replace the Prime

Minister.99

96. Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. 12. Roosevelt has suggested that the Dulles brothers had already

decided to support the plan, thus objections were generally muted.

97. Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 12, 19; Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. x, 5, 732. The

Shahs reluctance to dismiss Mosaddeq without a parliamentary recommendation was consistent with

his reluctance to grant Qavams request in July 1952. Western critics have accused the Shah o vacil-

lation and indecisiveness while others have insinuated weakness and conspiracy with oreign inter-

ests. It is reasonable not to dismiss the obvious possibility that he might have tried to act within hisconstitutional authority.

98 Roosevelt Countercoup pp 145 146 Wilber Clandestine Service History pp 22 23 24;


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The CIA Director, the Secretary o State, and the US President had approved TP-

AJAX on July 11, 1953 with authorizations to commence the operation in mid-August.

The Director o SIS, the Foreign Secretary, and the British Prime Minister already had

approved the operational plan ten days earlier.100 Winston Churchill, who had played

a major role in persuading the British government to purchase the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company in the frst place, relished direct involvement in the operation when Edenbecame ill. It was Churchill who authorized Operation Boot, the British term or

Operation TP-AJAX, to proceed.101

Iran had been enguled in a new wave o intimidation ater January 8, 1953 when

several leading legislators unsuccessully had opposed Mosaddeqs request to renew his

extraordinary powers.102 On February 13, Navab-Saavi, head o Fadaiyan-e Islam, was

reed. Coercion through assassinations and mass demonstrations had cast a pall over the

nation. Disruptive street demonstrations and invective-laden slogans had become daily

occurrences in major cities. Textile workers in the industrial city o Isahan would gather

around the Shahs statue on the Statue Square Maydan-e Mojasameh every day

ater work to repeat slogans shouted out by their leaders or a couple o hours beore

mounting their bicycles to go home. Grafti had covered almost every wall exhorting

death to the Shah and much worse. Night letters appeared pasted on electricity poles

and city light-posts listing the names o those who were to be hung rom them. Rumors

that military ofcers loyal to the Shah would be shot were also rampant.103

On February 25, 1953 Major General Fazlollah Zahedi and a number o others

suspected o disloyalty to Mosaddeqs government were arrested. Many other ofcers

already had been dismissed, adding to distrust over Mosaddeqs intentions. Prime Min-

ister Mosaddeq visited the Royal Palace in Tehran on February 28, 1953 to bid arewell

to the Shah and Queen Soraya on their way to a European vacation. 104 While Mosad-deq was inside, a crowd gathered at the palace gate to urge the King not to leave the

country. The increased inuence o the Tudeh Party coupled with continued economic

and political crises had fnally rightened prominent religious leaders, merchants, and

politically silent segments o the population. The perceived prospects o a Soviet domi-

100. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, pp. iii-vi.

101. Louis,Ends of British Imperialism, p. 775.

102. Both Makki and Kashani were persuaded to change their positions ater a ew days andexpressed support or Mosaddeq, but Baqaii resigned rom the National Front in protest. Makki had

been the frst to speak against the bill in Parliament, had submitted his resignation in the Majlis pub-

licly, and had likened Mosaddeq to Hitler at a press conerence. He announced he had changed his

mind and would support Mosaddeq, on January 18, but the parliamentary coalition had irreparably

cracked. See Aqeli, Chronology, pp. 341-345.

103. Wilber, Clandestine Service History, p. 54. A childs memory o those days is poignant. His

mother had been alerted that a shop had stocked imported nylon children socks. At a time o shortages

and particular dearth o imported goods, receiving a pair o brightly colored nylon socks was a major

git. The child had held the careully wrapped socks in one hand while holding on to his mothers

by the other on the way home when a despicable insult to the King appeared painted on a wall. The

mother tried to wipe it by her hand and her handkerchie without success. Mother and childs eyes metas they looked at the little package. Their country deserved better no words were necessary. The

child oered his precious socks The mother used the package to rub o the insult The socks were


22/33


nated Peoples Republic o Iran, or worse, an Iranistan Soviet Republic had indeed

cast a dark cloud over the nation.105 As the crowd milled at the gate, Ayatollah Muham-

mad Behbahani and several others arrived to ask the Shah not to leave. Even Ayatollah

Kashani asked the public to prevent the kings departure. When the Prime Minister

attempted to leave the palace he aced a dangerously hostile crowd. He was scurried

away by the palace guards and sent o to saety through a dierent gate. Finally theShah stepped out to address the demonstrators. He announced to the cheering crowd

that he had heard their request, and that he had cancelled his trip abroad. As the crowd

gradually dispersed, another began to gather around Mosaddeqs home. Calling to see

the Prime Minister, some fnally scaled the walls into his residence in the evening.

Mosaddeq ed rom the rootop to the US Point-4 ofce next door in nightclothes and

escaped to the army headquarters and fnally to the Majlis compound to seek reuge.

Violent demonstrations in support o and in opposition to the Prime Minister continued

through the ollowing day in Tehran and other cities. The government reacted by arrest-

ing numerous dignitaries, including retired ag ofcers. Major General Zahedi, who

had been arrested on February 25 and later released, was detained yet again.

Some have asserted that Mosaddeq had counseled the King against the Euro-

pean trip. The Shah had insisted on it to seek medical treatment or Queen Sorayas

inertility, but asked that the departure date to remain a secret. Mosaddeq, it is argued,

suspected treachery when the departure date appeared to be public knowledge on Feb-

ruary 28, and that Kashani and Behbahani gave the impression that Mosaddeq had

been pushing the Shah out. Kashani is quoted as having appealed to the public to stop

the Kings departure, saying that i the Shah goes, everything we have will go with

him.106 The February episode, some have alleged, destroyed the last vestige o trust

Mosaddeq had in the Shah. Blaming the Shah and the Court or deceiving him, he sub-sequently reused any audience with the Shah.107 On March 2, Zahedi and Mozaar

Baqaii were ordered arrested again, this time charged with conspiracy in the murder o

the National Police Chie Brigadier Muhammad Ashartoos, whose body had just been

ound ater a mysterious disappearance a week earlier. To avoid arrest, House Speaker

Ayatollah Kashani helped Zahedi to arrive at the Majlis where he granted him protec-

tion. In the same chaotic days, and at American insistence, Britain reluctantly oered

a fnal proposal to settle the Anglo-Iranian dispute, but Mosaddeq rejected it on March

10.108 The open session o Parliament on May 8, 1953 illustrated the rising tension in

Iran as a heated debate between supporters and opponents o Mosaddeqs governmentdegenerated into a shouting match ollowed by a fst-fght.109 On May 11, on the Prime

105. The newly arrived Soviet Ambassador to Tehran was Anatol Lavrentiev, noted or having

staged the Communist takeover o Czechoslovakia in 1948. Whether coincidence or conspiracy, Ira-

nians perceived a sinister correlation.

106. Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad Mosad-

deq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, pp. 14-15.

107. Fakhreddin Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq: The Confguration and Role o Domestic Forces,

in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p. 81. Mosaddeq

already had snubbed the King at the opening o the 17th Parliament on April 27, 1952 by not attendingthe Royal Address. See Aqeli, Chronology, p. 334.

108 Louis Ends of British Imperialism p 773


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Ministers order, all Crown properties were turned over to the government in return

or 60 million rials annual payment to the Imperial Organization or Social Services.

It has been argued that Mosaddeq demanded the Shah restrict himsel to a govern-

ment-designated budget without access to the revenues o the Imam Reza Shrines

endowment o which the King was the trustee, give up Crown properties to the state,

transer command o the armed orces to the Prime Minister, decline audiences withthe governments opponents, and earmark the revenue rom the Crown properties or

public welare. The Shah seemed amenable; he also oered to take a vacation abroad,

which Mosaddeq initially rejected but later approved.110

As the country aced one crisis ater another, Mosaddeqs coalition came irrepa-

rably apart when Ayatollah Kashani lost the Speakers gavel to Dr. Abdollah Moazami

on July 1, 1953.111 Moazami had received 41 votes against Kashanis 31, but 40% o

the House had supported neither o them. Two weeks later at Mosaddeqs instruction,

52 Members o Parliament representing the much weakened National Front coalition

resigned to make a legislative quorum impossible. Mosaddeq told an associate, Ka-

zem Hasibi, in late July 1953 that he eared the Majlis would topple his government.

Some scholars have opined that dissolving the Majlis through a reerendum, justif-

ably described as Mosaddeqs political masterpiece, was an ingenious countermeasure

adopted by him to deprive his opponents o a quasi-legal vehicle or his ouster.112 Yet,

the dissolution was unconstitutional or only the Head o State the King had the

authority to dissolve the legislature. The maneuver was thus to avoid the governments

dismissal, and to call or new elections in pursuit o a more accommodating Parlia-

ment.113 In the meantime Major General Zahedi, who had gradually gained recognition

as a credible Mosaddeq opponent, agreed at the new House Speaker Moazamis me-

diation to leave the Majlis where he had ound sanctuary since March. The next dayon July 21, 1953 the Tudeh Party and Mosaddeqs supporters displayed a show o orce

to commemorate the Thirtieth o Tir Massacre the anniversary o the toppling o

Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam on July 21, 1952.114 The anniversary demonstrations

o July 21, 1953 shocked the nation, including many o Mosaddeqs supporters. The

spectacle o the Tudeh demonstrators in much greater numbers than the National Front

loyalists had a sobering eect. The Tudeh, having outnumbered the National Front

coalition, reected the strength o the communists in Mosaddeqs coalition a reality

that the populace clearly grasped.115

Kermit Roosevelt, Chie o the Near East and Arica Division o the CIA in chargeo TP-AJAX, had entered Iran on July 19 under an assumed name and may have per-


Majlis insisted on June 11, 1953 (Khordad 21, 1332) that the Soviet Union return Irans 20 tons o

gold bullion.

110. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, p. 79. This account contradicts the previous assertion by

Homa Katouzian, Mosaddeqs Government in Iranian History, pp. 14-15. Both appear in the same

volume by Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran.


112. Azimi, Unseating Mosaddeq, p. 95.113. Mark J. Gasiorowski, The 1953 Coup, in Gasiorowski and Byrne, eds.,Mohammad

Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran p 248


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sonally witnessed the Tudehs display o strength on the 21st. The CIA-Tehran Station

had not contacted Zahedi directly beore July 21, although his son Ardeshir may have

served as a conduit since April.116 By the end o July many National Front partners,

the Toilers Party, the SUMKA, and the Pan Iranist

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