J . S c h e e r e n s 2 0 1 7

Netherlands

Country Case Study

This paper was commissioned by the Global Education Monitoring Report as background information

to assist in drafting the 2017/8 GEM Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments.

It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the

author(s) and should not be attributed to the Global Education Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The

papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the 2017/8 Global

Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments”. For further

information, please contact gemreport@unesco.org.

ED/GEMR/MRT/2017/C1/26

Country case study prepared for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report

Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments

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1. Accountability in the Dutch language

There is no term in the Dutch language that captures all that is meant by the English term “accountability”. When we take the three defining characteristics of accountability, as defined by Glass (1972)i, namely, a) disclosure concerning a product or a service that is being provided, b) product or performance testing, and c) redress for poor performance, the Dutch language has some terms that mostly refer to the second facet. These terms are “inspection” or “supervision” and (to a lesser extent) monitoring. “Disclosure” is maybe the predominant element in public media publishing annual school rankings based on their student achievement results. The third element, “redress for poor performance” is hardly present, although, quite recently, the Inspectorate of Education may advice budget cuts and in extreme cases school closure to the competent authorities. In case we would start out from a somewhat broader definition of accountability, namely as “a policy that delineates actors, their responsibilities, and to whom they are responsible, in an effort to reach a desired outcome” the Dutch equivalent for “being held responsible for” (namely verantwoordelijk gehouden worden voor” could be considered. Yet this term is used in many situations where reference to “a desired outcome” does not come into the picture. As educational policy started to emphasize output control, since the late nineteen eighties, performance indicators became more prominent at all educational levels, tertiary education included. The pejorative term to refer to that policy, by those that oppose it, is “pay-up culture” (Dutch: afreken cultuur). All in all the term used in Dutch language that comes closest to accountability is “supervision” (Dutch: Toezicht).

2. Introduction; country profile

Political process

The Netherlands is a parliamentary democracy. A permanent sub-committee of Parliament is responsible for day-to-day educational policy making. The voice of others, notably parents, occurs via the mechanisms of the Parliamentary Democracy, elections in particular. Voice of others

In this section reference will be made to organizations and pressure groups in Dutch education outside the formal rules of play of the parliamentary democracy. Traditionally organizations representing stake holders have played a very important role in decision-making in Dutch education. Organizations in which school boards and teachers were united were traditionally arranged according to denomination: there were Protestant, Catholic and Public “pillars”. All together they formed a strong “mid field” in educational decision-making, that some analysts have called “corporatistic” (Leune,2007)ii. At one time an overarching board in which all these organizations were represented was mockingly called a “second parliament” for educational matters. Currently this mid-field has been streamlined and “de-confessionalized” (no longer arranged according to denomination) into powerful boards for each educational sector (primary, secondary, secondary vocational and two boards for tertiary education). Parents have voice by taking part in school boards. National parent organizations exist, but play a rather weak role among the other stake-holders in the organizational mid-field (cf Scheerens, 2015)iii.

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Educational system structure and responsibilities

The school structure in the Netherlands is depicted in the diagram presented in ANNEX 1. There are perhaps two features that are particularly worth mentioning. The first is that there is a strong vocational strand, manifested by specialized vocational schooling at the lower primary level (VMBO). The second, related feature is the strong structural differentiation or tracking at the secondary level, combined with relatively early selection into a particular school category. The policy making process is well captured in the following quotation from a recent OECD review: “The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy. The monarch is the head of state and the prime minister is the head of government. The executive power is exerted by the Council of Ministers, which is the deliberative council of the cabinet. The cabinet is responsible to the bicameral parliament. Dutch policy-making has a long tradition of power-sharing and consensus decision-making. The government is typically formed by a coalition of political parties. Both trade unions and employers organisations are consulted in economic and social decisions and meet regularly with the government within the Social-Economic Council” (Sociaal-Economische Raad, SER) Nusche et al. (2014)iv The Netherlands has one of the most devolved education systems among industrialized countries with schools enjoying a high degree of autonomy. Responsibility for education is shared almost entirely between schools and the central government, with no significant formal intermediate level of educational administration. Shared responsibility between the central government and the school boards is differentiated in the sense that the government establishes “non-negotiable” norms with respect to educational content, attainment targets, examinations and teacher qualifications, while the school boards have much leeway in implementing the rather open curriculum frames. With regards to ensuring teaching quality, the Dutch Government describes the distribution of responsibilities for educational reform as follows: “the government will establish the objectives of the policy measures (‘what’) while the field itself will decide how best to pursue those objectives (‘how’) OECD (2016)v”. The Inspectorate of Education supervises education, on facets of compliance with regulations and quality. The Inspectorate has the authority to suggest changes for improving school policies, deliver fines and closing schools (in cases of severe mal-functioning) How accountability emerged as an issue in education

When accountability emerged in the 1980’s, it could build on some historically grounded assets, namely central examinations at the end of the various tracks in secondary education and school inspection. During the nineteen eighties educational policy changed, from a brief period of central stimulation of innovatory programs to a more incremental system-wide development orientation and was matched by an evaluation approach that left the model of program evaluation, turning to a more “systemic” evaluation approach, based on key data streams and continuous monitoring (Scheerens et al., 2013)vi. In this period major instruments for system level evaluation were developed: the periodic assessment project (PPON), the cohort studies in primary and secondary education as well as a gradual development of policy relevant educational statistics and educational indicators, the latter strongly stimulated by the active participation of the Netherlands in the OECD indicators projects and in initiatives from the EU, more particularly EURYDICE (Scheerens et al.2012)vii. Both the periodic assessment project and the cohort studies had a core of outcome indicators. At present, both programs have ended for the time being and it is uncertain if, and if yes, how they might be continued.

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In the wake of these developments in system level evaluation, systematic student evaluation and school evaluations (in that order) were gradually getting off the ground. Despite of the large autonomy of schools, the Netherlands traditionally has had central examinations at the end of secondary schools. In primary schools, a school leavers test, the so called CITO test has been used as a basis for supporting the choice of a secondary school track since 1976. During the nineteen eighties, school inspection was structured and shaped in an empirical analytic way. Partly based on knowledge from school effectiveness research, and also partly following similar orientations of Her Majesties’ Inspectorate in the United Kingdom, an elaborate supervision framework was developed, and applied in school inspection. All these evaluation and assessment types slowly tended to be used for accountability purposes, but in a rather “soft” development oriented way. Education challenges

The Netherlands is generally doing well in education; see for example the recent OECD country review of the Netherlands (OECD: Netherlands 2016; Foundations for the Future; OECD, 2016)viii. This relatively strong position is evident from results on TIMSS and PISA, but also from results on OECD’s adult skills international survey, PIAAC. Moreover, generally positive outcomes are also evident from national studies as documented in Scheerens, Luyten and Van Ravens (2011); see note XI. Major challenges are improving the position of disadvantaged learners in primary and secondary schools, particularly those from cultural minorities, and aspirations to improve excellence of students scoring in the higher segment of the performance distribution in primary and secondary education. Some of these challenges, and the way to address them, are associated with the accountability policies of the Inspectorate. The new emphasis on excellence has led to more emphasis on higher performing schools in the Inspection Frameworks (see subsequent sections).

3. Actors and Accountability

Actors in education have different roles and functions in accountability. First of all, they can be the objects of accountability policies and measures (e.g. education providers, school leaders, and teachers). Secondly they can be the agents of accountability measures and policies; (those who hold other organizations or persons accountable (e.g. Parliament, the Ministry of Education and the Inspectorate of education), and thirdly, they can be just more or less passive recipients of the results of accountability oriented assessment (e.g. the general public, the international community, parents). Sometimes an actor can be the object of accountability in some context, and the agent of accountability in another. For example, the part of the government that is responsible for education, i.e the Ministry of Education, is held accountable by Parliament (object of accountability), while it is the agent of accountability when it considers information on the functioning of the educational system as a whole, or particular sectors of it. Agents of accountability policies and measures employ different assessment methods and instruments to collect the information on which judgments of successful or unsuccessful performance can be made. Examples, as applied in the Netherlands, are performance indicators, examination results, results of high stakes tests, accreditation and review studies, school rankings in public media and informal supervisory reviews. Table 1 provides an overview of actors in accountability in the Netherlands, in the respective roles of “accountability object”, “accountability agent”, and “accountability recipient”. In addition, the main methods and instruments for each actor combination are included in the second column of the table.

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A cursory review of the table shows that schools and other education providers are the main objects of accountability; other actors are not, are hardly assessed and held accountable; this applies to middle level governing bodies, organizations in the educational support structure, school leaders and teachers. The “accountability chart” of the Netherlands has quite a few blank spots. In the sequel the contents of the table will be described in more detail, indicating for each actor/method combination.

- How actors (objects) are held accountable (which method, which standards, which implications) - Enabling and constraining environments - Influence of the larger context on the success of actors

It should be noted that, in the Netherlands, information on accountability is most prominent on Glass’s first two facets of accountability, namely the disclosure of a service and its performance testing; in many cases in the Netherlands this information is just distributed, without a sharp design of “high stakes use” in the sense of rewards and sanctions. Table 1: Objects, methods, executive agents and recipients of accountability information in The Netherlands

Accountability object WHO IS ACCOUNTABLE?

Instruments and methods HOW IS ACCOUNTABILITY APPLIED?

Assessed by (agents) WHO APPLIES THE METHODS?

Recipients of info ACCOUNTABLE TO WHOM?

Government Procedures of Parliamentary democracy

Parliament Population at large

Educational system as a whole

National Indicators International studies and reviews Annual report Inspectorate

Ministry of Education Inspectorate

General population International community

Middle level governing bodies (sector councils)

? ? ?

Organizations in educational support structure

? ? ?

Schools Inspection frameworks Test and examination results “Horizontal accountability” School rankings in public media Accreditation in higher education by the Dutch-

Inspectorate Local supervision councils Parents Teachers

Central government School boards Public at large

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Flemish Accreditation Organization (NFAO)

Private schools/education providers

Inspection frameworks, test and examination results. Accreditation

Inspectorate, Accreditation Organization

General population, parents

Teachers Informal reviews School principals ? teachers

Parents Keeping administrative records on student behaviour and truancy

Schools. Municipal officers

Inspectorate

School leaders ? ? ?

Students High stakes tests and examinations

Examination boards and schools

Student, parents, School leaders Teachers Inspectorate, general public

3.1 Government

In the Netherlands the Ministry of Education is responsible for legislation and control of the educational system. Proposals for laws and policy measures are judged and can be amended by Parliament. A permanent parliamentary committee for education takes care of the day to day monitoring of government action in the field of education. A relevant environmental feature is the elaborate mid field of educational organizations, particularly those concentrated in the sector councils described in an earlier section. Apart from these organizations there are also smaller pressure groups that sometimes express strong (negative) feelings with respect to accountability and educational testing. One current example is an organization called the “Teachers’ Cooperation”ix, which sees accountability as anti-teacher empowerment. 3.2 The education system as a whole

The government is the main actor that is held accountable, when it comes to monitoring and evaluation of the education system as a whole. In the Netherlands there is an abundance of actual and relevant evaluative information on the functioning of the education system. Major “carriers” of system level evaluative information are produced close to the main users (i.e. the Ministry of Education) in the form of the Inspectorate’s Annual Report and the annual publications Key Figures and Trends. In addition the Netherlands has taken part in international studies like TIMSS and PISA, the results of which are increasingly being used as quality benchmarks (Scheerens, 2016)x. Monitors and smaller scale evaluation studies are also used to periodically inform the government, i.e. the Minister and Parliament. Cases in point are the various monitors on teacher policies. Finally, current educational policy is increasingly being formulated in terms of measurable targets and standards, which can be seen as another favourable condition to the use and impact of system level evaluation and assessment. An important enabling condition for system evaluation and accountability is the well-developed infrastructure for educational testing and educational research in the Netherlands (Nusche et al., 2014)xi. A constraint is formed by the reluctance of schools to respond to surveys and international assessments, which in its turn, can be seen as a consequence of high school autonomy in the Netherlands (Scheerens et al., 2012)xii.

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Currently the larger societal context is relatively favourable with respect to protecting the educational budget against austerity policies. 3.3 Middle level governing bodies and educational support structure

Although these organizations play an important role in education, particularly primary and secondary education, and consume considerable budget , they are not assessed and subject to other than financial accountancy checks. 3.4 Schools

From the late nineteen nineties onwards school inspection became more systematic and guided by explicit supervision frameworks, in which quality aspects and quality indicators were defined. The Inspectorate also issued quality cards, in which school functioning was rated on a number of indicators. School quality cards were made publicly available and were meant to support school choice (Scheerens et al.2012)xiii At about 2005 new concepts on educational and school governance brought about changes with respect to both school self- evaluation and school inspection. The legislation about “Good Education, Good Governance” (Dutch: Goed Onderwijs, Goed Bestuur; Parliamentary year 2004-2005) set about to create new governance relationships, intended to give more space and responsibility to schools, deregulation and to diminish administrative burdens. The school boards’ responsibility for educational quality were underlined, urging for a clear delineation of (internal) supervision tasks, which ultimately led to the prescription for the creation of separate supervision boards. In correspondence with these changes the role of internal supervision and “horizontal accountability” by schools was underlined and distinguished from external supervision and vertical accountability, through school inspection. New instrumentation for horizontal accountability was developed, resulting in “Windows for Accountability” (Dutch: Vensters voor Verantwoording), which consists of a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators (Scheerens et al. 2012). “Windows” lead up to information dossiers about individual schools, which schools can use to inform their direct environment and stakeholders. The project is aimed at the development of quality standards that allow, among others, to compare schools with each other (benchmarking). The idea is to connect vertical accountability (towards the Inspectorate of Education) and horizontal accountability, (towards parents, local stakeholders and other school sectors). The horizontal element, informing the stakeholders of the school, is predominant (VO-Raad, 2011)xiv The adapted governance arrangements opened the possibility for a new interpretation of selective inspection, which played into the stronger positioning of school boards and their responsibility for horizontal accountability. Risk based inspection was initiated, from 2006 onwards, and consists of a first screening of all schools, based on a relatively limited set of information sources, (among which educational achievement indicators), on the basis of which one of two inspection arrangements is chosen. An arrangement can be: basic (no risks for the quality of education), or adapted (weak or very weak quality). Next, more intensive supervision and improvement stimulation occurs for the schools that are classified as (very) weak. Apart from receiving support, weak schools are also urged to improve by the threat of sanctions, which may go as far as holding back the complete budgetary funding of the school. This policy of risk based inspection proved to be effective, (De Wolf et al, 2011)xv and can be seen as enhancing equity. More recent developments in school inspection will be described in the small case study, in the next section. Crucial evidence in the forms of school assessment described above is data from the “end test” at primary school level and data from the central examination at secondary level. These performance data are also used in various publicly available school rankings. These rankings are published by various newspapers

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and television (RTL). School accountability in the Netherlands can be qualified as “mild”; there are few hard sanctions in administrative accountability (inspection). Probably the most influential form of accountability is market oriented accountability by making school performance public through newspapers and television (Scheerens, 2014)xvi. Enabling conditions are well developed tests and examinations and a strong education Inspectorate. An important limiting condition is the resistance against the use of high stakes tests in education. The larger societal context is not particularly compelling as far as school functioning and school accountability is concerned. In the sense there are currently no compelling statements and high profile concerns ventilated about the quality of education by important societal groups like employers, the media, and the public at large. 3.5 Other education providers; non state providers in the private sector

The Dutch school system is characterized by a large segment of government dependent private schoolsxvii. About 2/3 of all primary and secondary schools are government dependent private schools, often based on a certain religious denomination. School governance and responsibilities for specific domains of functioning are largely similar for the public and (government dependent) private schools. At the level of primary and secondary schooling “real” private schools are quite small in number. An estimate dating from 2005, amounted to 48 schools, more or less equally divided over primary and secondary levels.xviii To provide some basis for comparison with government dependent and public schools taken together: in 2010 there were 6848 primary schools and 646 secondary schools (VMBO –category). Private schools are submitted to the same, perhaps even somewhat stricter, regime of Inspection supervision. Each private school is visited each year and has to produce an annual report. In case of low performance closing down a private school is easier than closing down a public, or government dependent private school. At tertiary level there are a handful of private business schools, some of them at University level and other at polytechnic (HBO) level. These education providers are assessed by the NVAO, (Dutch: Nederlands Vlaamse Accreditatie Organisatie) the Dutch Flemish Accreditation Agency, just like the state universities and regional polytechnics. The Inspectorate of Education assesses the quality of the higher education system; including the monitoring of the accreditation of separate institutes by the NVAO. Early childhood education consists of different arrangements. Firstly there is organised child care paid for by parents, firms and tax credits. The primary aim of child care is to facilitate the combination of paid employment with care for children. This kind of child care is indicated in Dutch with the term “kinderdagverblijf”. Secondly. there are early childhood intervention programs and day-care centers (Dutch: peuterspeelzalen) financed by municipalities. Day care centers combine child care with a more pedagogical aim. Early childhood intervention programs have a compensatory function as they are aimed at children who lag behind in their language development. Child care belongs to the policy domain of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, while early childhood education and day-care centers are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. In 2013, 284,000 children aged 0 to 4 were in child care (including day care centers). This is 39% of all children in this age group. Between 2011 and 2013, the use of child care decreased: in 2011, 44% of the children in the age 0 to 4 were in child care (CBS 2014).xix The Inspectorate of Education is responsible for the supervision of early childhood programs and the day-care centers. The Inspectorate has developed a provisional Quality Framework xx Child care that resorts under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is supervised by the municipal services for health and care (Dutch: GGD, which stands for Gemeentelijke Gezondheidsdienst)

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Currently early childhood education faces problems with respect to doubts about the pedagogical quality, different financial regimes (parents pay less for day-care centers than for privately organized child care), and lack of a uniform system of quality care. One of the priority issues for action is the creation of a uniform quality assessment framework for all types of early childhood education (not just for early childhood education programs and day-care centers (peuter speelzalen) but also covering day-care).xxi 3.6 Teachers and school leaders

There is no systematic evaluation, nor inspection of individual teachers in the Netherlands. The school leader is expected to take care of annual conversations on each teacher’s functioning. Currently a national “teachers’ register” is being implemented, which takes stock of a teacher’s participation in professional development. Nor is there systematic evaluation of school principals. In theory school boards and their supervision councils might exercise a kind of quality control over principals and teachers, but this is weakly developed. Horizontal accountability, as described in earlier sections, focuses on the school as a whole, and not on individual functionaries like school leaders and teachers, and the same applies to vertical accountability exercised by the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate considers teacher personnel policy and school leadership as school functions, and does not appraise individual functionaries. Professional autonomy is strongly protected in the Netherlands and supported by important stakeholders, like the teacher unions and the sector councils. The larger context of traditionally strong school autonomy in the Netherlands supports this view. Although this culture is often seen as favourable for educational innovation and improvement, it also has elements of immunization of schools and teachers against outside control and external evaluation (Scheerens et al 2012, Nusche et al. 2014)xxii 3.5 Students

The backbone of accountability policies in education in the Netherlands are a high stakes test at the end of primary education (formerly the CITO test) and examinations for each of the tracks of secondary education. Performance indicators based on these tests and examinations had a key place among the indicators that are part of the Inspection Frameworks. Recently this central place is being contested in the new inspection framework that is in development (see the small case study). In this new framework facets of student behaviour are also used as quality indicators. The CITO test had a specific core purpose, which is closely tied to the highly tracked system of secondary schooling in the Netherlands, namely to provide an objective basis for guiding students’ choices for a particular secondary school track. Apart from facilitating school choice in this particular context, the CITO test is also being used for other purposes. Municipalities have used the test to assess schools, and even have used specific average score levels as attainment standards for schools. Within the framework of the Better Performance Action plan, the Minister, together with the PO and VO council have agreed to set higher targets for the national average on the end test. New legislation, initiated in 2014, made several changes with respect to the primary school end test. The test became mandatory, but other tests than the CITO test may be used. Next, the end test was given less weight in advising on secondary school choice than the advice given by the school. This condition actually took away the core function of the original CITO test, namely an objective basis for school choice. This policy change, actually a political compromise to ease the criticism of “test frenzy”, was severely criticized

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as it was seen as detrimental to unbiased decision making with respect to school choice of students from disadvantaged backgrounds (OECD, 2016)xxiii. In a general sense high stakes tests and examinations must be seen as a lever for performance improvement, in the sense of stimulating extrinsic motivation, given focus to teaching and providing feedback at system level. The threat of undesired side effects, such as cheating and “teaching to the test” is less severe under conditions of “mild” accountability. Although the accountability climate in the Netherlands is mild, there is a strong countermovement against “narrow” performance measures. At the same time, the larger societal context appears to look favourable on educational accountability (compare, for example, a recent policy advice from the Central Planning Bureau (CPBN, 2016)xxiv. In tertiary education examinations are under the control of each education provider, monitored by the Inspectorate and the Accreditation Agency (NVAO)

4. Small case study: from risk based to differential school inspection

General description

The Inspectorate of Education is charged with the external control and evaluation of schools at pre-primary, primary, secondary level and tertiary level. It is important to note that the Dutch Inspectorate holds schools accountable, and not individual teachers or principals. The Education Inspectorate is an independent executive agency, under the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. The Education Inspectorate performs its tasks on the basis of the provisions in the Educational Supervision Act. The inspection framework contains a description of both the way schools are inspected and the indicators and standards used to evaluate schools. These standards are derived from the aspects of quality described in the Supervision Act. The standards include the legal requirements as prescribed in the Act on Primary Education (WPO and WEC), the Act on Secondary Education (WPO and WVO) and the Act on ‘Good Education, Good Governance’,xxv and include additional quality standards describing the output as well as the process and prerequisites for teaching and learning (e.g. curriculum, school climate, monitoring of students) of schools. These quality standards were developed in close cooperation with schools and their stakeholders (i.e. representatives of teachers, parents and educational organisations) to ensure maximum support for school inspections of these standards. The revision of the Supervision Act in 2012 also assigned the evaluation of the quality of teaching personnel, the quality of governance of schools and financial compliance of schools to the Inspectorate of Education. According to the Supervision Act of 2002, adapted in 2012, the Inspectorate performs its investigations guided by six domains of quality and also guided by all regulations schools have to comply to on the basis of any educational law. The original quality domains were: outcomes, teacher personnel policy, teaching and learning, quality care, financial compliance and other legal requirements (further details are provided in table 2, in ANNEX 2). The Act also requires the Inspectorate to publish their assessments of schools. Supervision should stimulate the implementation of excellent quality care as well as a permanent improvement of quality. Due to the law Good Education and Good Governance, an approach was developed that addressed school boards (as competent bodies) more, as opposed to the earlier practice (before 2012). Risk based inspection

Describing the approach as risk-based, means that the investigation starts with a first screening on a limited number of quality domains and ends with a broader investigation when the risk analysis suggests

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that quality is insufficient. In these analyses, called “primary detection”, information is collected on possible risks of low educational quality in all schools, such as student achievement results on standardized tests, and financial reports of schools, complaints of parents and news items in the media. The quality of schools is evaluated during additional inspection visits in case the primary detection shows potential risks. Also, after this data-based phase, an expert analysis is performed by the team of inspectors on additional data (not for schools that show no risks). Then it decided if a quality investigation will be performed. During these visits, school inspectors observe classes, interview the principal, teachers, parents and students and analyze additional documentation. Schools are assessed to be failing when student achievement results are below standards for three or more years and when two or more norm indicators in the teaching-learning process or pupil monitoring and support are evaluated as insufficient (e.g supportive teaching and student assessment). Schools at risk are scheduled for additional monitoring (expert analysis) and interventions. Additional monitoring includes desk research of additional results and school documents (for example, test scores in intermediate grades or annual reports), interviews with the school board and potentially also quality investigations where the inspection framework is used to assess educational quality in the school as sufficient, failing or highly underdeveloped. This amounts to a supervision arrangement, which can be an “Adapted Arrangement” or a “Basic Arrangement”. Schools with an adapted arrangement are put under some form of intensified supervision. An arrangement for weak schools implies preventive supervision: the school must not become weak. An arrangement for very weak schools leads to the inspectorate monitoring the improvement plans. The school board has to formulate an improvement plan to address insufficiencies that have been identified by the Inspectorate. The inspectorate monitors the implementation of this plan. Internal evaluation studies by the Inspectorate, carried out in 2010 (Inspectie 2010 a and b)xxvi pointed out that schools rated the work of the inspectorate positively (on average 80% satisfied or very satisfied). Risk based inspection was also judged positively on a number of criteria, such as effectiveness and efficiency. Initial figures show as decline of the number of very weak schools, and efficiency gains were noted for both schools and the Inspectorate (a lower administrative burden for schools, and efficiency gains for the Inspection organization). A declining number of (very) weak schools can be seen as an important benchmark for the quality of education in the country, and can also be seen as a central criterion for evaluating the success of the current version of risk-based inspection (De Wolf et al., 2011)xxvii.Quantitative details are provided in Nationale Onderwijsgids (2014) .xxviii The official figures are contested, however, by Dronkers (2014)xxix, who, on the basis of re-calculations concentrated on cognitive outcome data, concluded that there was even a small increase in very weak schools. The proportion of very weak schools is relevant criterion for equity (as well as for quality) as weak schools are frequently characterized by a high proportion of low SES students. Revisions in school inspection after 2012

After 2012 several revisions to Inspection were proposed. These changes comprised: a transgression from risk-based inspection to “differentiated governance oriented inspection” (in Dutch: Gedifferentieerd Bestuurlijk Toezicht, abbreviated as GBT)xxx; a revision and broadening of the Inspection Frameworks, and an adapted orientation to school inspection concerning an evaluators and a counselling role. The new Inspection approach is being piloted in the period between 2014 and 2016, and is to be officially implemented in 2017.

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Given the fact that the ongoing practice of risk-based inspection functioned rather well, it is interesting to reflect on the motives for these changes. Influenced by PISA results that showed that, despite good average performance, the Netherlands did relatively less well in the higher segment of the score distribution (Van der Steeg et al.2011)xxxi Excellence became a new favourite in education policy. The Inspectorate was challenged to pay more attention to excellence in schooling, next to the existing priority that was given to prevent school failure at the lower end of the performance distribution. This challenge was taken up by giving more attention to average and good school functioning in the Inspection Framework (see Annex 2) A second influence was the high profile that was given to resistance against educational testing in this period (2012 -2016). As far as the Inspection frameworks for primary and secondary schools were concerned these sentiments were directed at the central place of performance indicators based on the CITO test and examinations. This challenge was taken up by considering inclusion of more process indicators and a broader set of outcome indicators in the inspection frameworks (see Annex 2, table 3). Thirdly, inspired by a broad resistance against a “pay-off culture”, the Inspectorate reconsidered the emphasis on an evaluation and decided to relatively inforce the advisory role. The mandatory role of the Inspectorate includes quality stimulation, so that there is also a legal basis for a more stimulating role. A final contextual element that is probably relevant for the changes that the Inspectorate started to prepare and initiated after 2012 is the development of “horizontal accountability” under the heading of “Windows for accountability”xxxii. This instrument, described in an earlier section, is an evaluation procedure controlled by the sector councils for Primary and Secondary Education and the autonomous schools. In a certain sense horizontal accountability is in competition with inspection as vertical accountability.xxxiii The mission of the new inspection approach is described as guaranteeing that schools deliver “basic quality” and stimulate “an improvement oriented culture” (Ehren et al. 2016)xxxiv. Revised Inspection is characterized by a broadened set of quality standards. This is illustrated by comparing the currently applicable set of standards, and the new draft standards in tables 2 and 3 in Annex 2; the new framework has additional outcome and process indicators. Next the supervision process now classifies schools in three categories “good”, “sufficient” and “in need of improvement”. Market research has pointed out that schools and teachers appreciate the broadening of the Inspection framework; the respondents welcomed the broader set of process and outcome indicators and approved of the facilitator role of inspections (Oberon, 2016)xxxv A critical comment could be that the Inspectorate is pushed into a direction of less emphasis on the core cognitive mission of schools, and a “softer” stance on the continuum between their role as external evaluator and advisor/counsellor to schools. Undesired side effects could be inefficiency because of the doubling of school evaluations (school inspection and Windows for accountability), and slackening of performance stimuli to schools to excel on cognitive outcomes.

5. Policy recommendations

“Evidence based” educational policy in the Netherlands got a boost from the recommendations of a Parliamentary Advisory Committee, chaired by Jeroen Dijsselbloem, in 2008xxxvi. These recommendations led to Quality Agendas for primary, secondary and vocational education and output control in tertiary education. Attainment targets, program evaluations and quality monitoring had a clear place in these policies, and could build on a longer tradition of examinations, a high stakes end-test in primary education

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and an Inspectorate of high international reputation. Recent policy measures erode this relatively solid basis for educational accountability. An advisory committee that proposed a design for the curriculum in 2032 proposed to de-emphasize cognitive development, diminish school time for basic subjects, and a redesign of examinations to adapt to these changes (Onderwijs 2032)xxxvii. The position of the end-test at primary level is obscured because of weakly grounded changes, which are much disputed (cf OECD, 2016)xxxviii. Finally, the new Inspection orientation erodes its own straightforward outcome oriented supervision approach, by succumbing to political pressures and the indistinct ideology of continuous improvement, mainly directed at continuously changing school organizational arrangements (the dictum “do not fix anything that is not broken”, is unknown in Dutch educational policy making). The existing relatively strong outcome based evaluation and accountability policies in Dutch education can be seen as the most probable explanation for the degree to which the Netherlands does very well on international assessments (Scheerens, 2016)xxxixRecent policy changes and plans, which touch upon testing and examinations, are changes for the worst as far as educational accountability are concerned. Hence my policy recommendations are as follows:

- Protect the quality and high stakes nature of the end test at primary level (because its status has become unclear and standardization suffers from the policy measure that alternative tests may be used)

- Do not tinker with the central examination in basic subjects (such as is proposed by the “Education 2032 Committee for curriculum reform)

- Reconfirm the independence of the Inspectorate and underline the centrality of achievement and attainment indicators of school performance (see the case study on School Inspection and the broadening of the Inspection frameworks)

- Assure the continuity of the publishing of rankings of school performance in public media (because this is a performance incentive to schools, as a result of market-oriented accountability).

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6. ANNEX 1 STRUCTURE OF THE DUTCH SCHOOL SYSTEM

BAO Mainstream primary education HAVO General secondary education HBO Higher professional education MBO Vocational education PRO Practical training SO Special education VMBO Pre-vocational secondary education VVE Early childhood education VWO Pre-university education WO University education Source: Scheerens et al. (2012)xl

Age 12

Age 4

Age 18

Com

pu

lsory

ed

uca

tion

Fu

ll tim

e

Part-time

WO

HBO

VO 1/2

VWO HAVO VMBO

PR

O

VS

O

BAO

SB

AO

/SO

MBO

Age 0

VVE

15

7. ANNEX 2 Quality Frameworks of the Inspectorate of Education

Table 2: Quality framework Inspectorate since 2012

Quality domain Quality aspects per domain

Outcomes 1. Learning results in basic subjects 2. Progress in student development

Teaching personnel policy 3. (if necessary) 4. requirements with respect to

competencies 5. sustainable assurance of of the

quality of teaching personnel

Teaching and Learning 6. Subject matter coverage 7. Time 8. Stimulating and supportive teaching

and learning process 9. Safe, supportive and stimulating

school climate 10. Special care for children with

learning difficulties 11. the content, level and execution of

assessments and exams

Quality care 12. Systematic quality care by the school

Financial compliance 13. financial continuity 14. financial compliance

Other legal requirements 15. Law on parent participation in school decisions (e.g.)

16

Table 3: Draft new Quality framework Inspectorate, 2016

Quality domain Quality aspects per domain

Educational process Content offered

Perspective on development

Didactic actions

(Extra) support

Cooperation (with other schools and stakeholders)

Assessment

School climate Safety

Pedagogical climate

Outcomes Results

Social and societal competencies

Success in follow up education

Quality care and ambition Quality care

Quality culture

Accountability and dialogue

Financial monitoring Continuity

Effectiveness

Lawfulness

17

8. Endnotes

i Glass, G.V. (1972) The many faces of educational accountability. Phi Delta Kappan, 53, 636-639 ii Leune, J. M. G. (2007). Verstandig onderwijsbeleid. Antwerpen; Apeldoorn: Garant. iii Scheerens, J. (2015 Case study the Netherlands, in EFEE Professional Autonomy, Accountability and Efficient Leadership. Utrecht: VO Council, The Netherlands iv Nusche, D., Braun, H., Halasz, G., and Santiago, P.. (2014), OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment

in Education: Netherlands 2014,Paris: OECD publishing. v OECD (2016) Netherlands 2016.Foundations for the Future, Reviews of National Pollicies for Education.OECD Publishing: Paris vi Scheerens, J., Glas C., and Thomas, S.M. (2003) Educational Evaluation, Assessment and Monitoring. A systemic approach. Lisse: Swets and Zeitlinger. vii Scheerens, J., Ehren, M., Sleegers, P., and de Leeuw, R. (2012) Educational Evaluation and Assesment in the Netherlands. Country bacground report for the OECD study on Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes. Enschede: University of Twente viii OECD (2016) Netherlands 2016.Foundations for the Future, Reviews of National Pollicies for Education.OECD Publishing: Paris ix The Education Cooperation (Dutch: Onderwijscooperatie) was founded by the most important teachers unions, and has stimulation of the professional position and discretion of teachers as its mission. Van den Nergh, D., Hoogeveen, Y and CAOP Research (2013) Attention for professional space. Literacy reviews about the state of affairs concerning professional space of teachers in primary education. The Hague. http://www.fvov.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Literatuuronderzoek-prof-ruimte-po-def.pdf x Scheerens, J. (2016) The Netherlands. In : Volante, L. (Ed.) The Intersection of international achievement testing and educational policy. Global perspectives on educational reform) New York and London: Routledge. xi Nusche, D., Braun, H., Halasz, G., and Santiago, P.. (2014), OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Netherlands 2014,Paris: OECD publishing xii Scheerens, J., Luyten, H., & Van Ravens, J. (2011) Perspectives on Educational Quality. Illustrative

Outcomes on Primary and Secondary Education in the Netherlands. Research Briefs, Springer. xiii Scheerens, J., Ehren, M., Sleegers, P., and de Leeuw, R. (2012) Educational Evaluation and Assesment in the Netherlands. Country background report for the OECD study on Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes. Enschede: University of Twente xiv VO Raad(2011): Werkboek Horizontale Verantwoording VO. VO Raad, april 2011. xv Wolf de , I., & Verkroost, J. (2011). Evaluatie bsn de theorie en praktijk van het nieuwe onderwijstoezicht.

Tijdschrift voor Toezicht, 2(2), 7-24. xvi Scheerens, J. (2014) Evaluation, assessment and feedback stimulate educational effectiveness. In: De Roo: One hundred % success. The way to excellent education in the Netherlands. De Roo Management and Advice: Utrecht

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xvii Public and Government Dependent Private schools in the Netherlands have exactly the same similar regimes as far as financing and supervision are concerned. Competent authorities (school boards) have a somewhat different basis, as municipalities have a special responsibility for public, but not for government dependent private schools. Next, gdp schools have the right to refuse students who do not share the religious denomination of the school. Nationale Schoolgids (2016): Openbare en bijzondere scholen. https://www.nationaleonderwijsgids.nl/basisonderwijs/paginas/openbare-en-bijzondere-scholen.html xviii Research voor Beleid (2005) De omvang van het particulier onderwijs in Nederland. Amsterdam: Research voor Beleid” xix Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) (2014), ‘Minder kinderen naar kinderdagverblijven’, CBS

Webmagazine http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/dossiers/jongeren/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2014/2014-4024-wm.htm

xxInspectie van het Onderwijs (2015) Voorlopig waaderingskader voorschoolse educatie, (Provisional evaluation framework for pre school education) March 2015. Utrecht: Inspectie van het Onderwijs. https://www.onderwijsinspectie.nl/onderwijssectoren/voor-en-vroegschoolse-educatie/documenten/publicaties/2015/03/01/voorlopig-waarderingskader-voorschoolse-educatie

xxi SZW (2013), ‘Kabinetsvisie: een betere basis voor peuters’, Ministerie voor Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2013-0000166225 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/12/01/peuterplan.html

xxii Scheerens, J., Ehren, M., Sleegers, P., and de Leeuw, R. (2012) Educational Evaluation and Assesment

in the Netherlands. Country bacground report for the OECD study on Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes. Enschede: University of Twente. xxii Nusche, D., Braun, H., Halasz, G., and Santiago, P.. (2014), OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: Netherlands 2014,Paris: OECD publishing.

xxiii OECD (2016) Netherlands 2016.Foundations for the Future, Reviews of National Policies for Education.OECD Publishing: Paris xxiv Centraal Planbureau (CPB) Kansrijk Onderwijsbeleid. The Hague: Central Planning Bureay xxv Menting, D. (2012) De kwaliteitsnormerende functie van deugdelijkheideisen; waarborgen voor goed

onderwijs. Den Haag: Onderwijsraad. Onderwijs Raad. (2012). Geregelde ruimte. Den Haag. xxvi Tevredenheidsonderzoek Periode juni- october, 2010. Utrecht: Inspectie van het Onderwijs, 2010 a.

Risico gericht toezicht beoordeeld. Utrecht: 2010b. Inspectie van het Onderwijs

xxvii Wolf de , I., & Verkroost, J. (2011). Evaluatie bsn de theorie en praktijk van het nieuwe

onderwijstoezicht. Tijdschrift voor Toezicht, 2(2), 7-24. xxviii Nationale Onderwijsgids (2014) Percentage zeer zwakke scholen neemt af.(maart, 2014) https://www.nationaleonderwijsgids.nl/basisonderwijs/nieuws/22135-percentage-zeer-zwakke-scholen-neemt-af.html

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xxixxxix Dronkers, J. (2014) De onderwijsinspectie is inderdaad te soft (The educational Inspectorate is too soft, inded) SRV (Stuk Rood Vlees) http://stukroodvlees.nl/de-onderwijsinspectie-is-inderdaad-te-soft/ xxx Inspectorate of education (2016) Research framework for Inspection Supervision in pre-schools and primary schools (draft, April, 2016) Utrecht: Inspectorate of education xxxi Van der Steeg, M., Vermeer, N., & Lanser, D. (2011). Niveau onderwijs daalt. Vooral beste leerlingen

blijven achter Nederlandse onderwijsprestaties in perspectief. ( The level of education is going down. The highest scoring pupils are lagging behind) The Hague: CPB

xxxii http://www.venstersvoorverantwoording.nl/nl-NL/pages/147/Onderzoek.aspx xxxiii The inspectorate and the Educational Midfield (in this case particularly the PO and VO Councils) can be seen as public services competing for work and good publicity. Windows for Accountability, seen from this perspective, is an instrument of countervailing power launched by the Councils, to weaken the predominance of the Inspectorate in supervision. In my view the competition plays out as an “ingratiation match” towards schools, in which the Inspectorate tries to score by broadening the range of quality indicators and being more friendly and supportive rather than just evaluative. xxxiv Ehren, M., Honigh, M., and Montfoort C. (2016) Outline for an evaluation design for Differentiated Governance oriented Inspection Supervision. London: London Institute of Educaiton. xxxv OBERON (2016) Evaluatie van het Toezichtskader 2013. Utrecht: Oberon Educational evaluation and assessment in the Netherlands xxxvi Parlementair onderzoek Onderwijsvernieuwingen (2008).Kamerstukken II 2007-2008, 31 007. xxxvii http://onsonderwijs2032.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Analyse-consultatiefase-Onderwijs2032.pdf xxxviii OECD (2016) Netherlands 2016.Foundations for the Future, Reviews of National Pollicies for Education.OECD Publishing: Paris xxxix Scheerens, J. (2016) Educational Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness. A critical review of the knowledge base. Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer xl Scheerens, J., Ehren, M. Sleegers, P. and De Leeuw, R. Country background report for the OECD study on Evaluation and Assessment Frameworks for Improving School Outcomes http://www.sici-inspectorates.eu/getattachment/caf46482-5270-4bc6-b985-2bdf75b57e5f