Privacy Impact Assessment Neoface Technology Facial Recognition 2014 PIA 29 10 2014 2 CONTENTS Why Carry Out a Privacy Impact Assessment 2 Regulatory Considerations2 The Need for Facial Recognition 2 Custody Images4 NeoFace Facial Recognition Technology and the Impact on Privacy 5 Information Flow6 Consultation8 Privacy and Related Risks8 Privacy Solutions9 Security of the NeoFace System9 Location9 Management Operators Use of Neoface10 Risk11 Evaluation12 Sign off12 Integration of the PIA Outcomes Back into the Project Plan12 Action to be Taken12 Date for Completion of Actions 12 Appendix 1 PIA 29 10 2014 3 Privacy Impact Assessment for Facial Recognition 1Why Carry Out a Privacy Impact Assessment 1.1All processing of personal information must be undertaken within a clear legal framework, resulting in the minimum intrusion of an individual's privacy.1.2The Police Service has a statutory duty under the Police Act 1996 and a duty at Common Law to prevent, investigate and detect crime as well as safeguarding the public. Clearly that duty requires the Force to introduce new methods and technology to meet public expectations, but at the same time, ensuring such methods and technology are in compliance with relevant legislation.1.3This Privacy Impact Assessment is an assessment of the privacy risks to individuals resulting from the introduction of facial recognition technology to identify individuals from images presented to it. 2Regulatory Considerations 2.1When processing personal information, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) must be adhered to. The DPA provides the Conditions under which the processing of personal information can occur. The HRA provides information around the privacy considerations which must be taken into account when using personal information, including decisions around proportionality and public interest. 2.2Reference should also be made to the : Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 Common Law Duty of Confidentiality Police Act 1997 Statutory Code of Practice for the Management of Police information2006 and associated Guidance The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 Common Law Duty of a Constable. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 PIA 29 10 2014 4 Policies, procedures and protocols Force and National CCTV Code of Practice Surveillance Camera Code of Practice 3The Need for Facial Recognition 3.1The facial recognition system is focused on the implementation of new technology to enable the Force to identify individuals whose images have been obtained during the perpetration of offences to enable the arrest of the individual. 3.2Asuccessfulinvestigationleadingtotheidentificationandarrestofanindividual suspected of committing an offence or offences isan obligation and duty placed on every Police Constable. 3.3ThepolicingpurposeprescribedunderCommonLawincludesthepreventionand detectionofcrime,theapprehensionandprosecutionofoffendersandthe maintenanceoflawandorder.Identifyinganddealingwithindividualswho perpetrate offences fulfils the first two objectives of Our Duty; a commitment by the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Chief Constable to the people of Leicestershire to deal with those who cause most harm and to protect vulnerable people from future offences. 3.4Theabilitytoidentifyasuspectassoonaspossibleandmakeanearlyarrestis extremely important for several reasons: to secure evidence to ensure the victim is not subject of further offences to ensure no crimes are committed against other victims toremoveanythreatofcrime,furthercrimeorviolencetothepublicat large to ensure public confidence in the police is maintained. 3.5 ThesoftwaretechnologyidentifiedtoassisttheForceintheirpolicingpurposeis NECNeoFace,whichfulfilsafurthertwooftheOurDutyprinciplesnamely effectivelydeployingourpeopleandensuringeffectiveandefficientuseof technology.WiththebudgetaryconstraintsplacedupontheForce,bothprinciples PIA 29 10 2014 5 are becoming ever more important if the Force is to meet its policing obligations and the expectations of the public it protects. 3.6Importantly,suchsoftwaretechnologyprovidestheopportunitytomeetthe requirements at para.2.4 4Custody Images 4.1Custodyimagesarethoseimagesobtainedwhenanindividualisdetainedbythe police. 4.2ThepolicederivetheirpowerstoobtainanindividualsimagefromSection64Aof the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)1. PACE and the PACE Codes of Practiceprovidethecoreframeworkofpolicepowersandsafeguardsaroundstop and search, arrest, detention, investigation, identification and interviewing detainees.Thelegislationlooks toaddressthebalancebetweenthepowersofthepolice and therightsand freedomsofthepublic.Maintainingthat balanceisakeyelement of PACE. 4.3PACEstatesthatwhereapersonisdetainedatapolicestationtheymaybe photographed with the appropriate consent or if the appropriate consent is withheld, or where it is not practicable to obtain it, without consent. 4.4Additionally a person may be photographed at a place other than a police station by a constable, as a result of a relevant event (a) with the appropriate consent; or(b) if the appropriate consent is withheld or it is not practicable to obtain it, without it. 4.5PACE permits the police to photograph an individual where the individual has been:(a) arrested by a constable for an offence;(b) taken into custody by a constable after being arrested for an offence by a person other than a constable;

1 PACE has received a number of amendments including those under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Serious Organised Crime Act 2005, the Police reform Act 2002 etc.PIA 29 10 2014 6 (c) made subject to a requirement to wait with a community support officer; (ca)givenadirectionbyaconstableundersection27oftheViolentCrime Reduction Act 2006 (d) given a penalty notice by a constable in uniform (e)givenanoticeinrelationtoarelevantfixedpenaltyoffencebyacommunity support officer by virtue of a designation applying that paragraph to him ;(f)givenanoticeinrelationtoarelevantfixedpenaltyoffencebyanaccredited person by virtue of accreditation specifying that that paragraph applies to him ;(g)givenanoticeinrelationtoarelevantfixedpenaltyoffencebyanaccredited inspector by virtue of accreditation specifying that paragraph 1 of Schedule 5A to the Police Reform Act2002 Act applies to him. 4.6Thecustodyphotographisthenstoredwithinthepolicedatabaseknownas Custody Image Management (CIM) which holds over 104,000 such photographs. 5NeoFace Facial Recognition Technology and the Impact on Privacy 5.1The NeoFace technology is software that is able to compare images presented to it, which have beencaptured on media such as CCTV and body cams (one data set) against photographs of individuals detained under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (second data set). 5.2NeoFace technology compares the two data sets and identifies matches from facial characteristics. 5.3NeoFacedoesnotbaseitsselectionongender,ageorraceandsowillreturn imagesofallages,gendersandrace.(LeicestershirePolicehaschosennotto incorporate metadata at this time). 5.4Foreachcomparisonsearch,NeoFacewillselectthemostlikelymatches,uptoa totaloftwohundred.Usingnewtechnologytoidentifypotentialsuspectsfroman existing database by automated means, clearly results in a vast amount of personal data being processed, during each search. PIA 29 10 2014 7 5.5The use of this technology is not only new to Leicestershire, but to the police service ingeneralandgiventheextentofprocessingbyautomaticmeans,afullPrivacy ImpactAssessmentwasundertaken.Thisdecisionwasalsobasedontheinterest the technology may attract to ensure that during implementation privacy issues had been identified, recorded and ultimately addressed. 6 Information Flow 6.1Requestsforsearchestoenableimagestobecomparedagainstcustody photographsmayoriginatefromanumberofsources.Itisthereforeessentialthat the provenance of each of the images presented is established to ensure there is a legal basis before the matching process takes place. 6.2Theimagesofunknownindividualsmayoriginatefromanumberofsources, including: CloseCircuitTelevisionCameras(CCTV)before,duringoraftertheperpetration of a crime or incident. Body Cam images taken by an officer when dealing with an incident or crime ( The Force has a Bodycam Use procedure in place) Social Media before, during or after an incident has taken place. E-Fit image taken from a witness or victim of crime Surveillance image. 6.3Aspreviouslystated,itisthe104000photographsheldinCIMthatNeoface compareswiththephotographicimagespresentedtoit.Aprocessfortheuseof NeoFace has been identified and is illustrated in the flow chart below.PIA 29 10 2014 8 Fig 1 6.4TheimageofthesuspecttobeidentifiedisinputintoNeoFace.TheTechnology compares the image of the unknown suspect, to the database containing images of knownpersons,detainedbytheForce.ThoseNeoFaceidentifiesasmatchingthe imageofthesuspectareselected.Asearchcanreturnuptoamaximumof200 images and will include images of both male and females. 6.5TheoperatorwillviewthematchesidentifiedbyNeofaceandmanuallyremove photographs of those whose images do not resemble the image of the suspect. This is the point at which human intervention takes over from automated processing. 6.6Some of the reasons the Operator may eliminate images include: Wrong gender Wrong ethnicity Physical appearance differs Request received by ID unit for Facial Recognition Analysis in one of the following methods: Email sent to IMU Bodycam Image Social Media or Photo from mobile phone Surveillance Image EFIT-V Image quality assessed by ID Unit for suitability to be used on NeoFace software Unsuitable:Inform the requesting OIC.Log on spreadsheet and file image Suitable:ID officer will run the image through NeoFace and check the top 200 returned faces for potential suspects.Images compared against the lawfully held custody database Potential suspect(s) identified No Potential suspects found.Inform requesting OIC. Log on spreadsheet and file image Complete return sheet for OIC with a copy of the image tested and an image of each potential suspect. OIC made aware this is purely an intelligence tool. Log on spreadsheet and file image PIA 29 10 2014 9 7 Consultation 7.1Consultation over the implementation of NeoFace has taken place with: Home Office Office of the Police Commissioner Chief Constable Human Rights Lawyer During the pilot period and subsequently, the technology and the process has been televised, using fictional images. It has also attracted visits from the legal profession, other enforcement agencies and other police forces from around the world. 8 Privacy and Related Risks 8.1TheCIMsystemcontainsover104,000images,allofwhichwereobtainedunder PACE when the person wasdetainedand therefore provides an audit trail showing boththenameprovidedbytheindividualatthetimeandtheirdescriptionalso recorded at the time, which is then held with their image. 8.2Animageandthepersonaldataassociatedwithit,isusedbeforechargeforthe following reasons: To enable a person to be sought, should they fail to answer pre-charge police bail;in the event of an allegation that an individual has given a falsename which has resulted in an innocent party being summoned; intheeventoffurtherpoliceenquiriesrevealingapersondetainedhas provided false details; 8.3Animageandthepersonaldataassociated withit,isusedafterchargebutbefore conviction for the following reasons: to identify an individual when a warrant has been issued by the Court and police officers have a duty execute it as soon as possible 2.To enable a person to be sought, should they have been bailed to appear before a court and failed to do so.

2 If issued under s13 Magistrates Courts Act 1980, it will be valid indefinitely. PIA 29 10 2014 10 Should they have been remanded in custody and after being taken before a court, bailed to re-appear, but have failed to do so.Wherethecourthasissuedafurtherbailnotice(courtbail)andtheperson does not attend the hearing ToidentifyanindividualsubjectofaEuropeanArrestWarrantwhereitis suspected that the person has fled the UK whilst on police or court bail. 8.4Key privacy issues relate to the retention of images whereby the individual, although arrested, did not appear before the court because: CPS decide not to prosecute the case; The case was discontinued; The person was not charged due to lack of evidence. Cases lying sine die. 8.5ImagesofdetainedpersonsareheldonCIM.Therefore,imagesofthosenot convicted will also be retained. 8.6 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act states that photographs taken under s64 may be used by, or disclosed to, any person for any purpose, related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence of the conduct of aprosecution or totheenforcementofasentenceandmayberetainedprovidedtheyareusedfor the same purpose for which they were initially obtained. 8.7Retaining all images of individuals taken under PACE, whether later convicted or not allows Neoface to search across the whole of the data base and may return images found in both data sets. 9Privacy Solutions 9.1Actionbeingtakentoaddressissuesandreducetheriskisalreadybeing undertaken by the Identification Suite (See Data Protection Table). 9.2Security of the NeoFace system. 8.2.1Location The NeoFace system has been installed in the Identification Suite (ID Suite). PIA 29 10 2014 11 TheIdentificationSuiteissituatedinasecurebuildingwhichhaslimited access The Identification Suite is separated from the reminder of the building and is secured. The NeoFace is located on a stand-alone computer. 9.2.2Management NeofaceisownedbytheDeliveringJusticeDirectorate.ADetectiveChief Superintendent is in overall charge. The day to day management is undertaken by the ID Suite Manager. 9.2.3 Operators The number of NeoFace operators is kept to a minimum. TheirtrainingisundertakeninhouseunderthesupervisionoftheIDSuite Manager. 10.3 Use of NeoFace 10.3.1 All requests for the use of NeoFace are submitted to the ID Suite and overseen by the ID Suite Manager. 10.3.2AFormhasbeencreatedandmustbesubmittedwitheachrequest,whichdetails the reason for the request and the provenance of the images being presented. 10.3.3After accepting the image(s), the Operator will undertake the search. 10.3.4OncethematchesarereturnedbyNeoface,theOperatorwillundertakeavisual assessment and remove any that clearlydo not match the image of the individual sought. E.g. different gender etc. 10.3.5TheOperatorwillprovidethematcheswhichNeoFacehasidentifiedandhave beenverified,totheOICaswellasmakingitclearthattheimagesaretobe PIA 29 10 2014 12 treatedasinformationonlyandthatfurtherpoliceenquiriesarerequiredto establish whether the person could be considered as a suspect or not. 10.3.6The OIC will be reminded that the information being provided is sensitive personal informationandthereforemustbetreatedasRestrictedandiftheimages returnedare to besentto theOICbye-mail,thentheOperatorwillensurethee-mail is marked Restricted. 10.3.7TheFormwhichaccompaniesthereturnedimages,remindstheOICthatthe matches are for intelligence purposes only and cannot be used as evidence.They are not informed as to the status of the person in the custody image. 10.3.8Guidance should be issued to ensure the decision making during the public interest test is recorded. 11RiskSee Appendix 1. 12Evaluation 12.1In addition to the assessment around the effectiveness of the Neoface Technology in preventing and detecting crime, the evaluation will take into account the impact on the privacy of individuals. 12.2 Solutions have already been implemented to address compliance issues identified during the early project stages, which are proportionate to the aims of the project. ( 13Sign off and record the PIA outcomes 13.1The Project and the privacy risk have been accepted by D/ Ch. Supt Prior. The privacy risks involved in the project have been accepted by D/Ch. Supt Prior. (Still awaiting the outcome of the two privacy court cases). PIA 29 10 2014 13 14Integration of the PIA Outcomes Back into the Project Plan 14.1The ID Suite Manager will be responsible for integrating the PIA outcomes back into the Project Plan and keeping the Head of the Delivering Justice Directorate informed. 14.2PIA outcomes will be addressed by the ID Suite Manager in consultation with the Head of the Delivering Justice Directorate. 14.3The ID Suite Manager will be responsible for implementing any solutions to issues identified back in to the project. 14.4The ID Suite Manager will confer with Information Management Section regarding future privacy concerns which will then be raised with the SIRO. 15Action to be Taken 15.1As the Data Protection Act 1998 provides the legal framework around the management and use of personal information, recording the implications the DPA has on the use of existing custody photographs with the Neoface technology, will sign post issues to be considered and addressed. 16Date for Completion of Actions 16.1As per the Project Documentation. 17Data Protection Implications 17.1See Appendix 1Appendix 1 Neoface Privacy Impact Assessment implications for the compliance with the Data Protection Act commenced on the 29.10.2014 The following are the Principles of the Data Protection alongside the risk to the Act in relation to the use of Neoface.This is a living document and should be updated and dated accordingly. Principle 1 Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall not be processed unless: a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met, and b) in the case of sensitive personal data, at least one of the conditions in Schedule 3 is also met. Considerations Explanation Additional Considerations/Risks Action/Mitigation/Justification What is the purpose of this technology? To introduce technology to assist in the early identification of a suspect. Photographs of detained persons are collected under PACE and are known as Custody Photographs.. The photograph is used as: An audit trail In the event of an individual failing to report for bail or to court or for the payment of a fine issued by the court. Having been convicted, the photograph is then used: As part of any prohibition order The use of facial technology to compare existing lawfully held information against new information, lawfully obtained and processed; Reduces the chance of the wrong person being arrested Eliminates the need to arrest large numbers of suspects ID Suite Operator overseas the management of PACE Photographs. ID Suite Operator undertakes Human intervention to ensure the photographs identified by Neoface are similar or the same as the image being presented for comparison. Any photographs returned by Neoface which do not match are rejected. Only details of those whose image is identified as being the same or similar are provided to the officer in the case, who will undertake a second sift and again reject any they feel do not match the person they are seeking. PIA 29 10 2014 15 Retained and used to identify recidivists whether by showing them to a victim of a further crime in an effort to identify the perpetrator Access to photographic images in an effort to identify a person suspected of being involved in an incident leading to a crime, or a crime per see is an integral part of any police investigation. Using conventional methods to identify an individual who may be a suspect is time consuming. Due to financial constraints facing the Force, employing police staff to carry out research to identify potential suspects from information held is difficult to justify, when technology is available. Despite reduced funding, the Police Service still has to meet legal obligations under Common Law, the Police Act 1996 and other legislation Reduces the need for additionalwitnesses. Time lapse may result in the suspect disappearing, continuing to commit crime, threatening potential witnesses to ensure they do not come forward. There is a critical period- the Golden Hour-during which a crime should be detected. The greater the delay, the less chance of arresting a person. Reduces the workload of an Operator Provides an audit trail PIA 29 10 2014 16 contained in statute. Pressures to find quicker and more efficient ways of identifying suspects and solving crime are at the forefront of the Police Service. The use of biometric technology to identify potential suspects from existing photographs held by the police is clearly a more efficient, effective and a less time consuming process. The efficiency of the system does increase the privacy concerns surrounding its use. To identify individuals subject of covert operations, where the photographs have been obtained under RIPA Ensures an individual can be identified and sought quickly reducing the chance of them:A disappearing B creating an alibi C committing further offences D Threatening Witnesses How will individuals be told about the use of their personal data in relation to existing custody records? Photographs of those arrested are obtained under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). Section 64A permits the police to obtain photographs of those arrested in circumstances where a person detained at a police station may be photographed with the appropriate consent or if the appropriate consent is withheld or The use of CCTV images by the Force is included in Policy and supported by procedures drawn up, between the Councils and the Force. CCTV systems owned by the Councils are installed for the purposes of Crime reduction. Consider including advice to detainee, Following the CATT case, consider reviewing your photograph retention policy. (date) Following the CATT case, the need to set review dates of photos obtained of individuals who have not been charged. (date) Following the CATT case, the PIA 29 10 2014 17 where it is not practicable to obtain it, without consent. In terms of the images presented to Neoface, these are obtained from a number of sources including CCTV, bodycam, other Forces Custody images (See below). Photographs submitted for comparison as a result of a covert operation, will be unaware. that their photograph will be retained whether charged or not. At closure without charge, consider the rational of retention to ensure it is proportionate. RIPA Authority rationale behind the retention and importantly, the further use of photographs where the individual has not been charged or convicted (date) Consider a review of the photographic policy in relation to: Media release whenattempting to trace an individual suspected of an offence, Day to day policing How will individuals be told about the use of their personal data in relation to the images being presented (other than custody images) The individual will be unaware that the police have their image, until interview/ detention. The CCTV images obtained by the police are mainly from three sources. 1 Council owned 2 Privately owned 3 Commercially owned i.e. shop owner. The responsibility as to the lawful signage relating to the use of the CCTV falls to the CCTV owner. Bodycam images from officers wearing bodycam. The use of bodycam is managed through the procedural documents issued. Websites already provides information re the use of CCTV CCTV Cameras all have notices regarding their use for prevention of crime. Suggest a reminder of the existence of CCTV Policy. Suggest a review of the instructions around the use of CCTV when drawing up shop watch agreements. Useful to remind officers of lawful use of bodycams and to remind them of the policy and procedure around such use. Bodycams are used overtly. Consider a review of the photographic policy in relation to: media release when attempting to identify an individual, Day to day policing PIA 29 10 2014 18 Bodycam may be used where the situation requires them. They must not be left on throughout tour of duty. They will be worn overtly Photographs obtained as a result of a covert operation will not be aware RIPA will apply Can Neoface be used in real time? There is no direct connection between CCTV/bodycam and Neoface. Who will have access to Neoface? Access to Neoface is restricted to the ID Suite staff only under the direction of the ID Suite Manager. There is no intention to allow unrestricted access to Neoface. Ensure procedures are put in place and also that there is an overarching Policy in relation to the use/access of NeoFace.Policy and Procedure implemented. Do you need to amend your privacy notices? The Privacy Notice provides information on the processing of information in connection with the policing purpose. CCTV cameras all have the legal plates describing the reason for their use and their ownership. Privacy Notice is being reviewed in line with the use of Neoface Have you established which conditions for processing apply? Schedule 2(3) Compliance with legal obligations; (5) For the administration of justice (6) (1) The legitimate interests pursued by the Data Controller PIA 29 10 2014 19 Schedule 3(6) Legal Proceedings(7) Administration of Justice SI 417 regarding the processing of sensitive personal information. If you are relying on consent to process personal data, how will this be collected and what will you do if it is withheld or withdrawn? Photographs of those arrested are obtained under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). Section 64A permits the police to obtain photographs of those arrested in circumstances where a person detained at a police station may be photographed with the appropriate consent or if the appropriate consent is withheld or where it is not practicable to obtain it, without consent. Images obtained are either covert CCTV and Bodycam. Obtained as part of the investigation E-Fit. Or by covert means authorised under RIPA Who will have access to the matches produced from Neoface? The matches are provided to the Officer in Case. It is made clear that the matches are for information only and provide a sign post forthe officer to assist in the investigation plan. Ensure the data produced is marked as Restricted. That GPMS is applied whenever it is processed . Ensure the OIC is aware of the handling Ensure the policy procedure reflects the need to ensure the data is kept secure at all times and not accessible to those not involved in the enquiries.PIA 29 10 2014 20 procedures to ensure the information is processed fairly and lawfully and remains so, until destruction. Leaving the information visible/accessible to other officers, could result in the individual being detained if seen on the assumption that they are being sought. PIA 29 10 2014 21 Principle 2 Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification PACE permits the use and retention of photographs obtained lawfully. The further use of the photographs already held is in connection with the policing purpose. Does your use of Facial Recognition cover all of the purposes for processing personal data? Yes at present. Any additional use over and above that outlined in this PIA, if the Project becomes business as usual will need to be risk assessed and a newPIA completed. There is a need to ensure that policies and procedures develop, as the use develops. NB The presence of policies and procedures do not legitimise use. They merely clearly define their parameters. Have potential new purposes been identified as the scope of the technology expands? No. The use of technology over existing procedures to identify those committing offences is purely to ensure more efficient and effective use of the personal data. PIA 29 10 2014 22 Principle 3 Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are processed. ConsiderationsAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification Is the information you are using of good enough quality for the purposes it is used for? The photographs obtained under PACE are of very good quality. The images obtained for comparison are assessed and if they are of poor quality, are not presented to Neoface. Have you considered what personal data should not be used, without compromising the needs of the project? Following the case of The Queen on the application of (1) RMC and (2) FJ and the Commissioner of the Metropolis and the Secretary of State for the Home Office and (1) Liberty and (2) Equality and Human Rights Commission, the retention of photographs held within the existing database, where either the person has not been convicted or the case discontinued or the person found not guilty. The legality of the retention of such data is still being reviewed by the ICOs Legal Team. It was thought that the decision on the retention of photographic information would be included within the Freedom Act, which ultimately addressed and reinforces the rules around the retention of DNA and fingerprints. However, both the Data Protection Act 1998 PIA 29 10 2014 23 and the Statutory Code of Practice for the Management of Information require the Force to manage such information in such a way that it does not breach legislation. It will however, be more likely to capture individuals who are in the group described above, if they have committed the offence, but less likely to involve the arrest of an innocent individual whose image is held, where they have not been previously prosecuted for an offence. PIA 29 10 2014 24 Principle 4 Personal data shall be accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification If you are procuring new software does it allow you to amend data when necessary? Neoface is not a storage system However, Neoface can be used as a search engine in the event of searching for and removing images from the custody system How are you ensuring that personal data obtained from individuals or other organisations is accurate? Photographs taken of a person under PACE will have the name of the individual attached to them. The fingerprints of the individual are also taken under PACE and are subject of checking against the National Database. Any discrepancies found are rectified as soon as they are identified. Any requests for NeoFace to be used by Police Partners, will be submitted on a request form. The form will record the requestors details, the reason for the request and the circumstances by which the image was obtained. How will you differentiate information received from other organisations? Searches are managed individually, so there can be no cross contamination How long will non custody Images obtained for comparison Procedural document in place. PIA 29 10 2014 25 images be retained?against Neoface, will only be retained for as long as is necessary. Where an individual is identified by Neoface, then the original photograph will be provided to the officer, if required for identification purposes and also if the individual is charged, where it will form part of the evidence.The reference number of any match will be kept for audit purposes. How long are Custody Images retained, where a person is either 1 Not charged 2 Charged, but the case is not taken to court 3 Charged and taken to court but discontinued Charged taken to court and found guilty Charged and taken to court and found guilty, but found not guilty on appeal. Case allowed to sit sine die All photographs are originally obtained under PACE. PACE states that such photographs can be retained, provided they are onlyprocessed for the same purpose. Additional advice /guidance following CATT decision. PIA 29 10 2014 26 Principle 5 Personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than necessary for that purpose or those purposes. ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification What retention periods are suitable for the personal data you will be processing? All custody photographs are retained. Old images are not removed when new ones are taken. Historic cases are reported to the police. Are you procuring software which will allow you to delete information in line with your retention periods? The use of biometric technology will not change the existing ability in terms of the NeoFace technology Searches using Neoface are saved on secure network and kept in accordance with MOPI How many duplicate images are there? NeoFace technology has enabled duplicate entries to be identified and dealt with accordingly. PIA 29 10 2014 27 Principle 6 Personal data shall be processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects under this Act. ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification Will the systems you are putting in place allow you to respond to subject access requests more easily? No change If the project involves marketing, have you got a procedure for individuals to opt out of their information being used for that purpose? Process does not involve marketing. Is the documented process for the request for removal of photographs by an individual, up to date? If not, it should be updated. Requests for removal come in via Data Protection and there is a documented process for dealing with requests for removal. Can the system provide information about the searches that have been presented to it, in the event of such a question from a data subject? The system is fully auditable and will keep a record of all searches carried out. Searches are retained in a spreadsheet, along with the details of the returns for monitoring purposes. PIA 29 10 2014 28 Principle 7 Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification Do any new systems provide protection against the security risks you have identified? Access to enable use of the biometric technology is restricted to Identification Suite staff under the supervision of the ID Suite Manager Access is by use of a user name and password, to permit individual access, which is then auditable. What training and instructions are necessary to ensure that staff will operate a new system securely? Access to biographical technology is restricted to Identification Unit Staff only. Each Operator is individually trained in the operation of the system and the rules around its use. Each Operator is reminded of the general requirements around security: Logging on and off Password composition of Prevent shoulder surfing Ensure use and privacy requirements are reiterated. Ensure the policy and procedure reflects the requirements of the Operator, to ensure this is continued if and when new staff are employed. Ensure policy and procedure is in existence for the day to day monitoring around use. Consider fittinga security screen. PIA 29 10 2014 29 Positioning of the screen to prevent it being viewed by others Staff are reminded of the legislation surrounding the use of custody photographs.Will your actions interfere with the right to privacy under Article 8? Under Article 8 there is the exemption from interference with private life, where the interference is in relation to the investigation in relation to the commission of an offence. Have you identified the social need and aims of the project? The social pressing need to deal with those who commit crimes against victims and society. You need to consider the justification for the use of technology to identify individuals involved in other crimes/incidents. The justification may include the fact that individuals who start by committing low level crime i.e. theft from washing lines, can move on to commit further and more serious crimes, if not identified and dealt with. Are your actions a proportionate response to the social need? Our Duty has identified the expectations of the public to protect the vulnerable and to deal with those who cause most harm. Failure to do this effectively,may also attract disciplinary Included in Policy PIA 29 10 2014 30 action, if it can be shown that a delay was caused by any neglect to investigate a crime, where the identity of the suspect could have been established and as such the officer may be disciplined under the Police Act 1996. Dealing with staff who have failed to carry out the requirements of their roles, can bring the Force into disrepute and reduce publicconfidence. PIA 29 10 2014 31 Principle 8Not Transferred out of Europe ConsiderationsExplanationAdditional Considerations/RisksAction/Mitigation/Justification Is there an intention to transfer any of the data out of the European Union No