Christian-Muslim Relations in Eleventh-Century SpainAuthor(s): Lynn H. NelsonSource: Military Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 1979), pp. 195-198Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986753 .

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Christian-Muslim Relations in Eleventh-Century Spain by Lynn H. Nelson The University of Kansas

T HE opening of the eleventh century saw a re- markable rise in the fortunes of western Europe. Its eastern

frontiers were stabilized, the menace of the Magyars and Slavs diminished, and a mutually beneficial commerce between cent- ral and eastern Europe began to flourish. The Vikings were Christianized and pacified, and trade routes to the Baltic were opened. Innovations in agricultural technology gained greater acceptance, and under the influence of improving climatic con- ditions, production, population, and living standards began to improve markedly. A new tempo of travel, commerce and ur- banization, intellectual endeavor, artistic achievement, and political development was established. Europe had entered a new era of opportunity and growth. The degree to which each region capitalized on these new opportunities and responded to these new conditions determined, in large measure, their later de- velopment. The eleventh century was a watershed in European history, in which the basic characteristics of the great states of medieval Europe were established. In Spain it was a century characterized by a peculiar union of Christian and Muslim states in a system of tribute and production known as the parias.' A proper appreciation of the nature of this system and its impact upon Spanish society is crucial in understanding those charac- teristics which later distinguished the Christian Spanish from their European neighbors.2 The period opened dramatically with a drastic alteration in the

balance of political and military power of the Peninsula. On the surface, at least, the opening years of the century had been sim- ply a continuation of the dominance of the wealthy, populous, and unified Muslim Caliphate of Cordoba over the impoverished, weak and disunited Christian states of the North of the Peninsula. All signs pointed to this. The devastating Muslim raids of the tenth century continued, carrying destruction into every Christ- ian state capable of threatening the frontiers of the Caliphate or of affording the opportunity for plunder. The slave marts of the Muslim South were crowded with Christian captives; the bells of Santiago graced the great mosque of Cordoba. The land was rich and enjoyed internal peace. Among the Christians, by contrast, the economy, rudimentary at best, was shattered; public affairs, both secular and ecclesiastical, were virtually paralyzed;3 and the Christian leaders could do little more than brace themselves for the next onslaught.

In reality, however, it was not the Caliphate that dominated the situation, nor were the Moslems, despite their apparent wealth and security, masters of Spanish affairs. The Caliphate had long been troubled by factional strife. Palace conspiracies, tribal rivalries, theological controversies, regional intransigence, dynastic ambitions, and economic envy all had contributed to a tumultuous and bloody history of civil strife and distrust. This situation was ended by about 980 by the Muslim military com- mander who took the name of al-Mansur4 and established his power through a basic reform of the army.

The army of the Caliphate had been a heterogenous force, consisting of two major groups. The first, the field army, was levied on a seasonal basis and consisted of natives. When the occasion demanded, volunteers were sought from all of the pro- vinces of Muslim Spain, and any deficits were made up by con- scription from the lists of those individuals liable for military

service. Due at least partially to the intermittent nature of such service, the fighting abilities of these troops were mediocre at best,5 and the morale of their formations was not a conspicuous quality. A more reliable force was provided by the chunud, tribal units composed of the descendants of Syrian immigrants who had been granted perpetual property rights in exchange for assuming hereditary military obligations. Although their fighting ability was superior to the standard levies, the chunud constituted a danger to the central government. Fighting under leaders of their own choosing, the internal loyalties of these groups was often greater than their allegiance to the central government. As a consequence of the unreliability of the native forces, the leaders of Muslim Spain quickly followed the precedent of other au- thoritarian rulers in establishing a standing army composed of foreign mercenaries with no loyalties other than to their master. Under al-Hakam (796-822), some 5,000 troops of Frankish, Galle- gan, and even Slavic derivation had been assembled with a per- manent station at Cordoba. As time passed, this standing army became the main support of the Caliphate, and its privileges and perquisites increased in the same measure as the government's dependance upon its loyalty grew.

When al-Mansur assumed the reins of government during the minority of Hisham 11 (976), he was faced with numerous poten- tial enemies. The aristocracy held him in some contempt because of his humble origins, the palatine mercenaries hoped to improve their position still further by manipulating the young Caliph, and the chunud were ready to improve upon troubled times by ex- tending their privileges and diminishing their obligations. Al- Mansur met the situation by extending greatly the system by which potential conscripts could purchase exemptions from military service and using the money thus obtained to import large numbers of Berbers, a group which had hitherto been virtu- ally excluded from military service in al-Andalus.6 With this force behind him, he broke up the tribal organization of the chunud and forced the troops into units with little familial or regional solidarity. In this fashion the field army was made loyal to al-Mansur personally. It soon ceased to be simply a seasonal force as its commander began the custom of conducting regular winter as well as summer campaigns. It was now possible for al-Mansur to increase war taxes and to expand the field force to the point where it overshadowed and isolated the old standing army stationed at Cordoba. The basic roles of the branches of the army had been reversed; it was now the field army, a permanent professional mercenary organization, which formed the backbone of the Muslim military force in Spain.

Paying these troops with Muslim taxes and enriching them with Christian booty, al-Mansur created a force personally loyal to him with which he gathered all power - military, political, and police - into his own hands. His raids against the Christians probably cost more than they gained in booty, but they justified his extraordinary military establishment in the public's estima- tion and obscured his stern repression of any opposition.7 In the opening years of the eleventh century the Christians were not dominated by the Muslims; both were dominated by a military dictator resting his power upon a mercenary army whose only allegiance was to their leader.

This power was a fragile thing, however. The dictatorship of

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al-Mansur and later of his son Abd-al-Malik had been capable of supressing civil strife but only at the price of destroying the political prestige and traditional eminence of the Caliphate. Moreover, by basing the power of the state upon a mercenary army they had destroyed any basis for a sense of civic responsi- bility and common purpose among the Muslim population. Fac- tional strife may have been curbed, but the factions still existed, and whatever considerations may once have acted to limit their excesses had now been removed.8 The instability of the situation was dramatically revealed in 1008 when Abd-al-Malik died, and command of the army passed into the incompetent hands of his younger brother, Abd al-Rahman Sanjul. Encouraged by this development the Countof Castile began to gather forces to at- tempt to pass over to the offensive. Oblivious to the dangers of his situation, Abd al-Rahman proclaimed himself heir to the Caliphate itself. Old rivalries began to surface, and a palace coup was engineered by an anti-Berber faction. Corboda was taken, and a new Caliph established. The army, held together only by its traditions of political supremacy, regular pay, plentiful booty, and easy victories, began to disintegrate, and Abd al-Rahman was killed by his own men. That army's Berber contingents now found themselves leaderless, without finances, among a foreign population, and menaced by a hostile government. They rebelled, advanced their own candidate as Caliph, and a full-fledged civil war was underway.

T is unnecessary to review the complex series of vevents which followed.9 It is sufficient to note that the oppos-

ing forces were evenly enough matched that the issue was in doubt. The Berbers realized this and possessed the resorces to secure the outside assistance necessary to achieve a decisive result. By turning over the Muslim fortifications which had long dominated the frontiers of Castile, they bought the temporary services of the Castilian count and his army. In November of 1009 the Berber-Castilian army entered and sacked the city of Cor- doba, and expelled the Berbers' opponents. Two could play at this game, however. Once the Castilians had retired, the defeated faction returned with the armies of the Christian countries of Barcelona and Urgel and drove out the Berbers. The new victors had had no fortresses to offer and had purchased this aid by offering sizable sums of money to the Christian leaders, regular pay to their troops, and the right to unlimited booty for all. With this, the system of parias was established, with far-reaching effects for both Christian and Muslim Spain.

In the first place, the old system of military dictatorship was permanently wrecked. The economic advantage of part-time Christian mercenary troops over a full-time independent force was so great that any army of al-Mansur's type would never again arise in Muslim Spain. Moreover, a return to the old Caliphate, even with its defects, was impossible. The system of parias had liberated the forces of Muslim factionalism. Caution, compromise, and claims of legitimacy were no longer necessary to seize power. A sum of money sufficient to purchase Christian military services could secure a faction at least local control, and that control could be maintained for as long as adequate revenues were available to retain these troops. Political fragmentation was encouraged to such an extent that there were eventually about half a hundred petty states, or taifa kingdoms, in what had once been a united Caliphate. This fragmentation, the subsidiza- tion of and reliance upon Christian military power, and the necessity of maintaining civic solidarity through taxes rather than personal initiative all exerted a stabilizing influence. By the middle of the century about a dozen more or less stable taifa states had emerged, each corresponding to a traditional geog- raphic, ethnic, or economic region and each paying regular parias to one or another of the Christian states for assistance in maintaining political independence and internal order.'0 On the

Christian side, the parias came to be regarded as both a retainer and as tribute. This tribute did not, however, entail on the part of either Christian or Muslim any sense of political domination. Although the Christians would work or even fight to regulate affairs between taif a states, they refrained from interfering in their internal affairs as long as regular cash payments were made." This situation, a large number of military weak Muslim king-

doms paying massive subsidies to a group of powerful Christian states, has generally been regarded as an unalloyed benefit to the Christians and an unmitigated disaster for the Muslims, but the system was more complex and more equitable than would at first appear. It was a partnership in which the Muslims enjoyed dis- tinct advantages and flourished. Under both the Caliphate and the military dictatorship the leaders of Muslim Spain had pur- sued a policy of authoritarianism and centralism which ran con- trary to the diversity and variety of the land and its people. The result had been constant factionalism and discontent. Now the forces of particularism had been allowed free play, and if the taifa states were small and weak, they enjoyed a homogeneity and sense of community hitherto denied their citizens. Art, ar- chitecture, science, and letters flourished, each in its own f ash- ion, at the various petty courts, and the patronage of the taifa rulers created a cultural milieu not unlike that of Renaissance Italy.2 This situation was maintained, of course, only by the regular

payment of large sums of money, but even this had its advan- tages. The increasing wealth of the Caliphate had been unevenly distributed, and the growth of a powerful wealthy class had weakened any sense of a Brotherhood of Believers and had added economic envy to the many antagonisms already troubling Mus- lim society. The great military establishment of al-Mansur had accustomed the Muslims to war taxes, but the acquisition of Christian booty had done little to lessen the gap between the rich and the common citizenry. In the more restricted economies of the taif a states, however, taxes for the payment of parias fell heavily upon all, and much of the cash paid to the Christians returned through trade. This enhanced the status of the Muslim middle class and acted as an economic leveller, as well as stimu- lated local artisanry and agricultural export. Although it cannot be denied that the paria system constituted a net currency drain on the taif a states, the accelerated circulation of that currency, together with the stimulus provided by new Christian markets, cancelled many of the economic disadvantages which might have arisen. Nevertheless, it could not have escaped the Muslims that they were in fact subsidizing foreign military powers. And yet, taxes had been rising under the Caliphate, and the mercenary armies of al-Mansur had been no more attentive of local needs and aspirations than were the Christians. In fact, since the Chris- tians' aim was simply to profit, and not to dominate, subdue or dictate, the situation was, at the local level at least, a change for the better. The paria system allowed the taif a states diversity without strife, order without domination, and protection from their enemies, and all for a reasonable price.13

On the surface at least, the Christians were the great winners in this peculiar arrangement. Their frontiers were safe from Mus- lim threat, and massive infusions of taifa cash made possible extraordinary advances. Their rulers became ecclesiastical patrons; Spanish gold filled the coffers of Cluny, monasteries and cathedrals proliferated, the great Spanish Romanesque tradition arose under widespread patronage, and the Holy See took a new interest in the spiritual welfare of the Spanish and in their pecul- iar liturgical traditions.'4 Great improvements were made in the pilgrimage routes to Santiago de Compostella, and new throngs from beyond the Pyrenees came to honor the patron saint of the Reconquista. The towns and cities along the way swelled with new settlers from western Europe, and a new, more cosmopoli-

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tan air came over Spain. The sons and daughters of Spanish rulers were now regarded as eminently marriageable, and al- liances soon united the Spanish with noble families from beyond the Peninsula. All appearances indicated that Spain's long isola- tion was ending and that she was being once again drawn into full participation in the development of the western European com- munity.

A PPEARANCES can be deceptive, however. Mas- sive infusions of liquid capital without an adequate

economic infrastructure inevitably subject a society to severe strains. In eleventh century Christian Spain these strains were creating basic and relatively permanent social and political dis- tortions. During this period the Spanish were able to depend upon a regular money income and, due to the weakness of the taifa kingdoms, ready access to more land. The other states of western Europe did not enjoy such advantages and were improving their condition through better utilization of their internal resources. New techniques and institutions were developing to perform these functions. Intensification of agricultural techniques and the clearing and draining of land were increasing production, towns and guilds were facilitating a greater rationalization of artisanry and manufacture, and a new and vigorous merchant class was expanding trade and commerce. A process of political consolida- tion was underway. Smaller states were being absorbed by larger, and lesser nobility were being brought to heel by a new type of monarch backed up by a tightly-organized diocesan church and an expanding professional bureaucracy.

These innovations did penetrate Spain, but in attenuated form. Spain lagged continually further behind the rest of Europe in social and economic development, since there was no impetus to integrate these new institutions and approaches into the fabric of Spanish society. At the beginning of the century, it briefly ap- peared that the Christian states were developing some sort of unity under the hegemony of Navarre, but this soon broke down.'5 While the other states of western Europe were consolidating, Spain experienced continued fragmentation. The Christians in Spain had no need to seek protection in unity, and the possibility of obtaining parias encouraged Christian leaders to pursue inde- pendent policies. While the taifa states enjoyed peace and pros- perity, the Christians contended among themselves for the right to collect tribute from the Muslims. Political development of Christians was arrested, and their economic development se- verely distorted.

Fighting men were at a premium, and the Christian leaders could not afford to alienate their nobles or they would lose them to a more permissive lord.,' No strong central monarchy arose in Spain; indeed, much of the Muslim gold was distributed by the monarchs to the nobility to retain their allegiance. The nobles in turn, with relatively little to purchase, invested in land. Small

land owners were bought out, and great noble estates were formed. The small land owners, in their turn, used the money thus acquired to establish themselves beyond feudal restrictions in free settlements on the frontier.'7 With extensive lands and li- mited labor both great and small land owners devoted them- selves primarily to sheep and cattle-raising. While the rest of Europe was turning to intensified agriculture, Spain became in- creasingly pastoral.,8 Manufacture was not ignored, but it was left largely in the hands of foreigners - French, Jews or Moors - while the Spanish amassed flocks, pastures, and pursued more Muslim gold.19 Despite the advantages enjoyed by the Spanish, or rather because of these very advantages, they failed to partici- pate in the development of those basic institutions which were to shape later medieval society. Superficially the system of parias favored Christian Spain, but fundamentally the costs were high: arrested political and economic development, political frag- mentation, internecine rivalry, the paralysis of the reconquista, and an increasing differentiation from the rest of Christian Europe.

The relationship between the taifa kingdoms and Christian states of eleventh century Spain was a curious partnership. Both sides obtained what they wanted: the taifas independence and peace, the Christians wealth. And yet they were destroying each other's abilities to obtain these ends by their own efforts and on any permanent basis. Once the paria system collapsed, the taifas found that they had lost the capacity to defend their own indepen- dence and passed under the overlordship of a series of North African dynasties. The Spanish, for their part, had failed to de- velop the attitudes and institutions to produce wealth through their own efforts. They continued to seek unearned treasure, whether it be Muslim or New World, only to see it slip through their fingers. The curious and fragile paria system of the eleventh century was a transitory arrangement, but its effects helped to shape Spanish history for centuries.

Lynn H. Nelson has been Professor of Medieval History at the University of Kansas since 174. A graduate of the Univer-

sity of Chicago, he received his doctorate from the University of Texas in 1963. He is the author of The Normans In South Wales, 1070-1171 (Austin, 1966). His re- cent work has concentrated upon medieval Spain, and his article "The Foundation of Jaca (1076): Urban Growth in Early Aragon" appeared in Speculum. This article was accepted for publication in June 1978.

REFERENCES 1. For an overall discussion of the development of the paria

system, see Jose Maria Lacarra, "Aspectos economicos de la sumisi6n de los reinos de taif as, 1010-1102," Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives. I (Barcelona: Universidad de Barcelona, 1965), 255-277. Two written agreements of paria payments have been published by Larcarra in "Dos tratados de paz y alianza entre Sancho 6l de Penalen y Moctadir de Zaragoza, 1069 y 1073," Estudios de historia de Navarra (Pamplona: Diario de Navarra, 1971), 83-102. 2. The importance of this and other formative periods in

Spanish development has been obscured by the historiographical tradition of seeking to explain Spanish national character in terms of more or less monocausational systems. Claudio Sanchez Albornoz, for instance, sees the virtually continuous strife be- tween Christian and Muslim as the touchstone of Spanish history, and regards the period of parias as an aberration, not truly Spanish in character, and of little later influence. Any other in- terpretation would, of course, weaken his position in his polemic

with Amerigo Castro. See Albornoz, Espafla. Un enigma his- t6rico, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires; Editorial Sudamericana, 1956), II, 13ff. 3. This disruption is best demonstrated by the rarity of char-

ters from the periods of the attacks, a sure indication of the paralysis of public affairs. In Navarre, for instance, only a single charter has survived from the years 997-1010, and the persons appearing after the hiatus are of a new generation. There was little continuity in the personnel of the ruling classes. 4. Ibn Abi cAmir, hachib of the Caliphate, took the name al-

Mansur bi-llah, "Victorious through God," in the year 981, and it was by this name that he was mentioned in the prayers of the faithful of Al-Andalus. It was by this assumed title that he was known among the Christians, who transliterated it as Almanzor.

5. See Evariste Levi-Provencal, Espaita muslman. In- stituci6nes y vida social e intelectual, ed. Emilio Garcia G6mez, vol. 5 of Historia de Espafla, ed. Ram6n Menendez Pidal (Madrid, 1965), 41, n. 31 for the poor reputation of the levies of Muslim Spain

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even among Muslim authors. 6. Recruitment of Berbers began late in the reign of al-Hakam.

The reasons for the previous failure to use this source of military manpower are complex and imperfectly investigated. The con- tinued turbulence of those Berber colonies which had been planted in Spain in the early days of the conquest, the prejudice of the Arab aristocracy against their unsophiscated fellow- believers, intermittent hostilities with the Berber leaders of North Africa, and the exclusiveness of the palatine mercenaries are all factors to be considered in this regard. 7. This point is made by Joseph F. O'Callahan, A History of

Medieval Spain (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1975), 128. 8. Al-Mansur realized that all he had really accomplished was

simply to create one more faction in an already badly-divided Muslim Spain. His parting words to his successors were to warn them that only by remaining united could they hope to resist those who would seek to destroy them. See Fernando de la Granja, "El testamento de Almanzor," Miscelanea Jost Maria Lacarra. Es- tudios de historia medieval (Zaragoza, 1968), 25-32.

9. One of the best single accounts of this period may be found in E. L6vi-Provencal, Espana musulmana hasta la caida del Califato de Cordoba (711-1031 de J.C.), translated by Emilio Gar- cia G6mez as Vol. 6 of Historia de Espana (Madrid: Espasa- Calpe, 1957), 369ff.

10. The study of these states has not been much pursued. A notable recent exception is the massive work of Manuel Terron Albarran, El solar de los Aftdsidas. Aportaci6n temdtica al es- tudio del reino moro de Badajoz (Badajoz: CSIC, 1971). Also see Ambrosio Huici Miranda, Historia musulmana de Valencia y su region, 3 vols. (Valencia: Ayuntamiento de Valencia, 1965-1970).

11. This situation did not, of course, endure, breaking up in the 1080s as a result of the expansionist policies of Alfonso VI. See note 13 below. 12. Although the major attention of cultural historians has

been fixed upon the golden age of the Caliphate and upon the later Kingdom of Granada, there is ample evidence of the intellectual vitality of the taifa states. A list of the major intellectual figures of the period might suffice: the poets Ibn Zaydun (1003-1070), Ibn Hazm (994-1064), al-Mutadid (1012-1069) and al-Mutamin (1031- 1083), the lexicographer Ibn Sida (1006-1066); and the scholars Abu Bakr at-Turtushi (1059-1130), Ibn Hazm, Ibn Abd al-Barr (978-1071), al-Humaydi (1025-1095) and Ibn Bajja are worthy of any similar period in the history of Al-Andalus. The list could be extended, but it should be enough to state that Al-Andalus was, during the period of the taifa states, one of the most dynamic and active intellectual communities of Islam. 13. It should be noted that it was in fact the Christians and not

the Muslims who abandoned the paria system. The conquest of Toledo by Alfonso VI in 1085 and his attack upon Zaragoza the following year made it clear to all that the payment of parias offered no permanent protection. In fact the Arab leaders con- cluded that it had become Alfonso's policy to use the parias to drain their strength and, by forcing them to raise taxes to meet these payments, to undermine their local authority. It was only then that the taif a rulers renounced the system and called in the aid of the North African Almoravids. An excellent account of the entire period from the viewpoint of one of the Arab leaders is provided by Evarisle Levi-Provencal, "Les Memoires de Abd Allah, dernier roi ziride de Grenade," Al-Andalus, 3 (1935), 232- 244; 4 (1936), 29-145; 6 (1941), 1-63.

14. This interest eventually became something of an embar- rassment to the Spanish when Gregory VII and his successors attempted to apply the rising ideal of the Crusade to Spain. Con- quest and conversion were attractive to the Spanish, but also threatened the modus vivendi which afforded them considerable advantages. Spanish Christian leaders were often forced to play a delicate game in their attempt to retain Papal and French sup- port while at the same time restraining their allies' zeal and greed.

15. The details of this particular process have been a matter of considerable dispute. Key works in this discussion are Justo Perez de Urbel, Sancho el Mayor and Antonio Ubieto Arteta, Estudios en torno d la divisi6n del reino por Sancho el Mayor de Navarra (Pamplona: InstituciOn Principe de Viana, 1960).

16. El Cid, the Castilian freebooter, is a symbolic figure of the opportunities open to the fighting man of the period. A more representative example is provided by a list of the captives taken

by the Cid in the battle of Morella, when the king of Aragon attempted unsuccessfully to restrain the expansion of the Muslim kingdom of Zaragoza. Among the captives were Count Nuflo of Portugal, Anaya Suarez of Galicia, Nuflo Suarez of Leon, Garcia Diaz of Castile, Flayn Petrez of Pamplona, and Fortuno Garcez of Aragon. All of the major Christian states of Spain, with the possible exception of Cataluria, had been represented in the Aragonese ranks. See Ramon Menendez Pidal, La Espafla del Cid, 2 vols., 5th ed. (Madrid; Espasa-Calpe, 1956), II, 930 and 740-744.

17. Traditional Muslim frontier policy dictated the establish- ment of unpopulated buffer zones (thugr) between neighboring states. Such empty lands along their frontiers constituted a con- stant attraction to the Christians.

18. Charles J. Bishko, "El castellano, hombre de llanura. La explotacion ganadera en el area fronteriza de La Mancha y Ex- tremadura durante la edad media," Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives. I, 208. Bishko notes the increasing preference by the Spanish for pastoralism in the late eleventh century, but em- phasizes other factors contributing to its development. It should be noted that Catalufla pursued a somewhat different path of development. Intensified agriculture and the beginnings of in- dustrial processing linked the region with the movements which were reshaping southern French and northern Italian society. The difference between Cataluna and the other Christian states of the peninsula were only accentuated during the period.

19. A certain amount of economic urbanization occurred in the North of Spain, but it was primarily a French affair; see Jose Maria Lacarra, "La repoblacion del camino del camino de San- tiago," La reconquista espanola y la repoblaci6n del pais (Zaragoza, 1951), 223-232, among other works. By and large, the monarchs of Leon-Castile appear to have been little interested in encouraging these communities as commercial and manufac- turing centers; widespread communal revolts in the twelfth century were the result. It is interesting to note that the most progressive and enlightened system of urban governance was developed by Aragon, the only major Christian state without access to parias; see Lynn H. Nelson, "The Foundation of Jaca (1077): Urban Growth in Early Aragon", Speculum (Oct. 1978), 688-708.

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