Ndu Prism Vol.2,No.3

8/3/2019 Ndu Prism Vol.2,No.3

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A JOURNAL OF THE CEN TER FOR COM PLEX OPE RAT IONS

Vol. 2, no. 3 06/2011P R I S M


2/186

Publisher

Dr. Hans Binnendijk

editorand research director

Michael Miklaucic

develoPmental editor

Melanne A. Civic, Esq.

managing editor

Dr. Jerey D. Smotherman

contributing editor

David C. Becker

Production suPervisor

Tara J. Parekh

coPy editors

Dr. John J. Church

Calvin B. Kelley

George C. Maerz

Lisa M. Yambrick

internet Publications editor

Joanna E. Seich

advisory board

Dr. Gordon Adams

Dr. Pauline H. Baker

Ambassador Rick Barton

Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex ocio)

Ambassador James F. Dobbins

Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex ocio)

LtCol Frank G. Homan, USMCR (Ret.)

Dr. David Kilcullen

Ambassador Jacques Paul KleinDr. Roger B. Myerson

Dr. Moiss Naim

MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.)

Dr. William Reno

Dr. James A. Schear

Dr. Joanna Spear

Dr. Ruth Wedgwood

P R I S MPRISMis published by the National Deense University Press or the Center or

Complex Operations. PRISMis a security studies journal chartered to inorm

members o U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and

integrated national security operations; reconstruction and nation-building;relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and

education to transorm Americas security and development apparatus to meet

tomorrows challenges better while promoting reedom today.

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CONTRIBUTIONS

ISSN 21570663


3/186PRISM 2, n. 3 FeatuReS | 1

TiTle

FEATURES

3 Forging a Comprehensive Approach to Counterinsurgency Operationsby Robert L. Caslen, Jr., and Bradley S. Loudon

15 Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States: Emerging Alliancesby Douglas Farah

33 Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyondby Robert Killebrew

53 Law Enorcement Capacity-building in Arican Postconlict Communitiesby Bruce Baker

65 International Support or State-building: Flawed Consensusby Stephen D. Krasner

75 Irregular Conlict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies o Imperectionby Franklin D. Kramer

101 Three Lessons rom Contemporary Challenges to Securityby Max G. Manwaring

115 Five Missteps in Interagency ReormAnd What to Do About Themby James Jay Carafano

FROM THE FIELD

125 Stability Operations: From Policy to Practiceby James W. Derleth and Jason S. Alexander

137 Gangs, Netwar, and Community Counterinsurgency in Haitiby David C. Becker

155 The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islandsby Andrew Leith

LESSONS LEARNED

165 Learning While Fighting: Operational Knowledge Management That Makes a Diferenceby Steven Mains and Gil Ad Ariely

INTERVIEW

177An Interview with David Petraeus

BOOK REVIEW

181 How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last BattleReviewed by James N. Soligan



T he United States will ace a myriad o new strategic challenges and opportunities in the21st century that will test its capability and capacity to succeed in an increasingly com-petitive, dynamic, and uncertain operating environment. A key component to success inuture stability operations will be the ability to interpret the seemingly chaotic series o weak globalsignals and environmental stimuli to draw logically valid connections and conclusions to recognizeobstacles and opportunities in advance. Equally important will be the capability, capacity, and willto leverage the appropriate balance o national power in a coordinated, synchronized, and ocusedmanner to mitigate risk and exploit opportunities.

While resourcing will continue to be an important component in this equation, the onusis on the U.S. Government to set the conditions now to shape success in the uture. The singlemost important prerequisite or the assured success o uture stability operations will be the abil-ity to oster the conditions required to achieve a comprehensive whole-o-government approachthat is orged rom unity o eort and purpose across the depth and breadth o the government.

Forging aComprehensiveApproach to

CounterinsurgencyOperationsBy RoBeRt L. CasLen, JR., and BRadLey s. Loudon

Li Grl Rbr L. Cl, Jr., usa, i Cmmr Cmbi armCr Fr Lvr, K. Mjr Brl s. L, usa, i spcrirr Cmmr.


5/1864 | FeatuReS PRISM 2, n. 3

caSlen & loudon

This will require a cultural shit among keygovernmental stakeholders to oster an envi-ronment where mutually vested cooperation

and coordination are the standard, rather thanthe exception.

Context

To oer legitimate and lasting solutions tothis challenge, we must rst examine the con-text and abric o the current environment torame the issues. As the United States entersthe second decade o the 21st century, it acesan uncertain uture that will be strongly infu-

enced by the nature o tomorrows global oper-ating environment. Americas strategic securityposture will be impacted by the emergence oseveral signicant global trends, whose collec-tive impact will urther test Americas capa-bility, capacity, and will to conduct stabilityoperations in support o ragile states. A cen-tral component o American oreign policy willocus on building partner capacity with vulner-able governments whose ailure would representa signicant strategic risk or the Nation. Theway to achieve this strategic goal o buildingpartner capacity will be through the applicationo comprehensive stability operations.

The next decade will likely be dened bypersistent confict, ueled in part by the emer-gence o several global trends.1 These globaltrends will be sources o instability and driverso confict.2

Globalization has served to reduce the tra-ditional barriers, boundaries, and borders thathave historically isolated nation-states rom

events and crises in other parts o the world.Events and phenomena that have historicallybeen contained at the national level, such asnatural disasters and regime change, now havethe potential to collapse the walls o isolationand maniest themselves with global eect.Economic trends such as ree trade agree-ments (or example, the North American FreeTrade Agreement), economic unions amongnations (such as the European Union), and

increased outsourcing o jobs rom devel-oped to developing countries have acilitatedincreased economic interdependence amongnations and the distribution o wealth romdeveloped economies to the rest o the world.3Ominously, this redistribution o wealth hasnot been equitably applied, urther wideningand polarizing the gul that separates the eco-nomically privileged rom the deprived o theworld. Those disenranchised by this processwill be susceptible to indoctrination o extrem-ist thought and ideology as they seek a viablealternative to their plight.

Increased globalization has ushered inan age distinguished by the rapid transer oinormation, ideas, and technologies that haveurther enabled global innovation and prosper-ity. The Internet, cellular communications,and digital technologies have made inorma-

tion readily available to those with the meansto access it. The inormation revolution hasempowered individuals across the globe, oer-ing on-demand access to a plethora o sourcematerials via the Internet and readily availableconsumer technologies that are comparable to,or in some cases better than, those o the state.4

Inormation today knows no geographicalboundaries. A nation-states ability to control

redistribution o wealth has not beenequitably applied, urther wideningand polarizing the gul that separates

the economically privileged rom thedeprived o the world



coMPRehenSIve aPPRoach to counteRInSuRgency oPeRatIonS

and/or restrict the fow o inormation has seriously waned, replaced by individuals and groups intenton exporting terror across the globe. Indeed, Americas adversaries have successully exploited theseinormational and technological advancements to urther their extremist ideology and operations,and will do so increasingly in the uture.5 While these advances have had many benecial eectsglobally, they have also had the converse eect o empowering individuals and groups intent oninficting harm to the state and its people.

The worlds growing population, coupled with a rapid urbanization in developing nations,will stress government capacities to provide essential services to populations, particularly indeveloping nations where expanding reproduction rates are projected to increase developingpopulations rom 5.6 billion in 2009 to 7.9 billion by 2050.6 The ragile and burgeoning govern-

ments o the developing world will be most susceptible to the destabilizing eects o uncheckedpopulation growth due to their immature and/or dilapidated inrastructures. Compounding thisissue will be an increased demand or ever-dwindling natural resources, exacerbated by the grow-ing middle-class demands o China and India,7 which will increase competition and tensionsamong developed nations. The converse eect o these trends is that developing nations willincreasingly struggle to secure the natural resources required to meet their populations basicneedspotentially setting the stage or a Malthusian crisis. 8 Episodic events such as naturaldisasters and pandemics will continue to have the potential to aggravate the destabilizing eectso overpopulation by urther heightening the demands placed on governments, and in some

Irqi b l m gr mri rmi rip irrigi clg

U.S.

Army(VenessaHernandez)



extreme cases may serve to be the proverbialstraw that breaks the camels back.

Changing Character o Conlict

As the world rapidly evolves, so too willthe character o confict. Future conficts willvary in size and scope across the entire spec-trum o confict.9 Combat will likely be wagedby a diverse combination o state and non-state actors. Americas adversaries will pur-sue a dynamic combination o means, shit-ing their employment in rapid and surprisingways. Future adversaries will likely use a tai-

lor-made mix o sophisticated conventionaland unconventional tactics and weaponry tomitigate our advantages and accentuate theirown strengths.

Hybrid threats, epitomized by Hizballahagainst Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006,will increasingly challenge state actors abilityto maintain security domestically and peaceinternationally.10 These hybrid nonstate actorswill possess many o the same trappings as anation-state, such as sophisticated weaponryand tactics, yet will not be handicapped by

bureaucracies or restricted by geographi-cal boundaries. They will be distinguishedby their organizational lexibility, agility,and adaptability. These nonstate actors withdirect or indirect state support, oten operat-ing in riendly or neutral nations, will asym-metrically employ a dynamic combination oconventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminalcapabilities against the United States and its

allies designed specically to counter and neu-tralize our advantages.

Future confict will increasingly be waged

among the people rather than around them.Potential adversaries have taken note oAmericas experience in counterinsurgenciesin Aghanistan and Iraq, learning how irregu-lar orces can successully counter a larger andmore powerul military orce. These confictshave shown that an insurgency can survive,despite constant military pressure, by drawingcloser to a supportive and/or passive popu-lace to conduct operations designed to attrite

national will and counter eorts aimed atlegitimacy.11 As Americas success in Iraq hasdemonstrated, an insurgency can only surviveas long as it maintains legitimacy among, andthus the support o, the indigenous popula-tion. The loss o an insurgencys legitimacywill lead to its eventual deeat. Thereore,gaining and maintaining legitimacy o thehost nation government and the marginal-ization o insurgent groups will continue tobe the primary goal o counterinsurgencyoperations. U.S. Government ability to eldpeople with the appropriate balance o skillsand vision to bridge the cultural divide andstrike a mutually benecial relationship withour indigenous partners will be a vital compo-nent o uture success.

Understanding the

Operating EnvironmentAs the Multi-National DivisionNorth

commander in Iraq rom 20082009, I hadthe opportunity to put theory into practice.The irst step or a successul counterinsur-gency strategy is to develop a clear under-standing and appreciation o the indigenousenvironment, all the while realizing thatstability operations must be consistent with

the irst step or a successulcounterinsurgency strategy is to developa clear understanding and appreciationo the indigenous environment

caSlen & loudon



the historical and cultural norms o the coun-try in which our eorts reside. The web o asociety is made up o numerous historic, reli-

gious, tribal, political, and economic threads,which, taken collectively, constitute the abrico a culture. Much like the abric o a sweater,each thread is interwoven and interdepen-dent on the others to orm the whole. Pullingon an individual thread within a sweater hasan eect on the others and adversely aectsthe entire object. Such is the case with theinterdependent threads o the cultural abrico a society. Consequently, we must be able

to invest the intellectual rigor and restraintnecessary to avoid potentially adverse second-and third-order eects o American actionand inaction.

What conronts our people on the groundis the most complicated battleeld in the his-tory o wararean asymmetrical three-blockwar. On one block, we may be engaged in avicious ight; on the next block, we may bebuilding a school; and on the third block, wemay be restoring water and powerwith allo this being done simultaneously. Each andevery day, U.S. personnel will make lie-or-death decisions within the blink o an eyetoprocess, decide, and take action. It is withinthis complex, uncertain, and unrelentingoperating environment that the most juniorpeople will be making decisions and holdingresponsibilities normally associated with more

senior leaders. They must be reliant on theirwits, values, and cultural understanding tosucceed in this environment.

The most pressing obstacle hinderingour cultural understanding is an arrogant andhaughty attitude. It is critically important tounderstand the abric o the society that we areworking in to cultivate and develop relation-ships with indigenous partners; relationships

must be built on a oundation o mutual trustand respect and then sustained. These trust- andvalue-based relationships are only realized ater

hours and hours o shared hardships, dialogue,and understanding. In orging these types orelationships, we must be aware o our internalbiases and preconceptions, and limit their nega-tive eects on the relationships we are trying tocultivate, develop, and build.

This is a comprehensive issue thattranscends the military and aects all U.S.departments and agencies that support stabil-ity operations. Apart rom the need to orge

relationships based on trust and value, wemust be able to develop agile and adaptivethinkers who are able to sort through thekaleidoscope o societal threads to recognizepatterns and exploit opportunities as neces-sary. These individuals must have the abilityto analyze who and what is truly important,who must be engaged, and which leaders mustbe marginalizedas well as when this mustbe done and to what degree. Above all, theseindividuals must be able to discern the natu-ral hierarchy o order, to include importantsocial patterns, nodes, and networks, andthen draw logical conclusions and predictivepatterns rom these relationships.

A undamental part o this task is identiy-ing and understanding the role o resident net-works within a society. The common denomi-nator in any analysis o these networks shouldcenter on the question o legitimacy. Does thisparticular network have a disabling or enabling

the most pressing obstacle hindering ourcultural understanding is an arrogant an

haughty attitude




impact on legitimacy? Those networks that have a disabling eect, such as vehicle-borne improvisedexplosive devices and hostile third-nation groups, should be the ocus o security eorts to eliminateor mitigate their eects. Those networks that have an enabling eect, such as essential services,businesses, and local/provincial governments, should be supported comprehensively through ocusedU.S. eorts.

For a government to be legitimate in the eyes o its people, it must be able to provide security,essential services, and the rule o law. One o the mental tools that we ound most useul in assessingour progress was the acronym SWEATMTS (sewage, water, electricity, agricultural, trash, medi-cal, transportation, and schools). This simple device helped us identiy and ocus our eorts onxing, maintaining, and improving these enabling networks. By ocusing our eorts, we were ableto continually assess these key nodes, constantly improve them, and x them when necessary. A

air question is: What does one o these enabling networks look like? Take, or instance, an irriga-tion network: to produce crops, a armer needs irrigation, but irrigation can only be accomplishedthrough a robust canal network capable o distributing the water rom point A to points B, C, andD. To ll the canals, the armer will need pumps that can divert water and distribute it throughoutthe extensive canal system. The pumps require electricity to operate. Electricity, in turn, requiresgenerators, which require uel and maintenance. Moreover, all o this requires the expertise o humancapital that needs to be trained to operate the acets o this network properly.

Each individual operational environment requires a subjective analysis, and the tools andrequirements to achieve success will most certainly vary. Yet possessing individuals capable o

caSlen & loudon

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U.S.Army(JeremyCampbell)



bringing clarity to the operational environ-ment has universal application, and only thosenations that can leverage this human capital

will achieve success. Our collective challengeis to harness the vast capacities o the U.S.Government and tap into Americas inex-haustible human capital to identiy, train, andprogressively leverage the adaptable and agilethinkers needed to realize success in the uture.This is an enduring task, or true understandingis an endless pursuit.

Unity o Efort in the

Interagency ApproachThe dynamic, complex, and uncertain

operating environments o the 21st centurywill test the mental agility, adaptability, andcooperative nature o the Nations civilian andmilitary personnel as never beore. It is withinthis context that our ability to plan, coordi-nate, assess, and ocus our collective nationalpower in an ecient and synchronized mannermitigates the conditions leading to instabil-ity. We must always be mindul that regardlesso agency aliation, our mission is the same:to establish the oundations o a lasting peacethrough the instruments o our national power.We must break down the cultural barriers,myopic viewpoints, and parochial agendas thathinder eorts to build a cohesive and ocusedwhole-o-government team.

This requires a undamental cultural shit

in attitudes toward our interagency eorts.Leadership will be a vital component o thiseort. Key stakeholder leaders must promoteatmospheres where the spirit o cooperation,collaboration, and teamwork is encouraged, andwhere the negative eects o suspicion, inght-ing, and sel-interested agendas are eliminated.

This collaborative spirit along with oper-ational lessons learned and best practices must

be comprehensively and robustly inused intoour collective and individual educational andtraining models. To accomplish this daunt-

ing task requires honest and objective assess-ments o internal capabilities, limitations,and redundancies, and a clear delineation othe roles and responsibilities or each organi-zation. Only by achieving a truly united eortcan we hope to eliminate the disparate andredundant eorts that hinder the accomplish-ment o our collective mission and oster acomprehensive approach orged rom unityo eort and purpose.

Our operational role will be to mentor,assist, and enable our host nation partners tomake the best decisions possible or their coun-try as well as ours. To do so, we must have thehumility to give deerence and respect to theknowledge and customs o our indigenous part-nersall the while remembering that Americansolutions to problems will likely not always bethe correct answer. Conversely, we must real-ize that purely indigenous solutions may befawed as well. The challenge will be to arriveat solutions based on consensus, easibility, andoverall eect. When weighing possible courseso action, we must ask ourselves: What is good

or the society as a whole? Merely implementing

a solution that is good or one particular seg-ment o the population runs the risk o alien-ating and marginalizing other segments, thuscreating drivers o instability as a result. It isa leaders job to weigh the possible secondaryand tertiary eects and implement a solution

the operating environments o the 21stcentury will test the Nations civilian and

military personnel as never beore




or the greater good. That is precisely why it isso important that we have the personnel whocan assist our decisionmakers in understanding

the operational environment.

We must be cognizant o the act thatpartnerships are dened by the value o mutual

beneit and developed by the interpersonalskills that seek trust, mutual understanding,and respect. This maxim applies equally toour interagency relationships, as well as toour external relationships and partnershipswith nongovernmental organizations, inter-governmental agencies, multinational allies,and indigenous partners. This outward-look-ing task is all the more daunting when viewedthrough the prism o Western preconceptionsand agency-centric agendas. Predeploymenttraining and education, as well as operationalcoordination and intelligence-sharing, canhelp alleviate some o the adverse eects oour own prejudices. However, they will neverbe enough. Regardless o how brilliant wemay think we are, we can never replicate thepersonal experience and cultural expertise othose who live in a particular society. That is

why every eort should be made to build thepartnerships and relationships necessary or usto lit the cultural veil and enable our eorts.

The dynamic power o relationship-build-ing was impressed upon us while we were inIraq. With the implementation o the SecurityAgreement, American orces were precludedrom conducting unilateral operations. Thestipulations o the Security Agreement

mandated that we conduct bilateral partneredoperations with the Iraqi Security Forces.The quandary that we aced was how we were

to achieve eects on the ground i we wereunable to unilaterally aect the outcome.Iraq was a sovereign country, with a sover-eign military, that no longer needed to heedour advice or requests. This dilemma was ur-ther complicated when American orces wererequired to move out o the cities on June 30,2009. How could we accomplish our missionwhen we were not even alongside our Iraqipartners? The only viable solution was to ully

engage our partners and build the relationshipsthat enabled us to earn their trust. Throughthis trust, we had an eective mentoring andcoaching partnership. The orcing mechanismo the Security Agreement compelled us tobuild the types o relationship that we shouldhave established much earlier, yet had not. Bybuilding relationships based on respect anddened by mutual benet, we were able to getthe Iraqi Security Forces to achieve the eectscalled or.

The true power o relationships was urtherreinorced or us through the special bond thatwe orged with one o the provincial governorsin our area o operations. This rebrand gov-ernor had been an outspoken Sunni opponento the American occupiers, as well as theKurdish presence within Arab lands. Indeed,most saw his position as intractable, and

engagement seemed pointless. Although we hadto work through these concerns, by constantlydeveloping an interpersonal relationship, wewere able to ultimately earn his trust. By clearlylaying out how our eorts could beneit thegovernor politically and improve the lives othe people at the same time, we were able tobreak through his suspicions and establish arelationship built on value and vested interest.

we can never replicate the personalexperience and cultural expertise othose who live in a particular society

caSlen & loudon



This relationship was also able to diuse driverso instability (or example, Arab-Kurd tensionsalong disputed internal boundaries separating

Iraq and the Kurdish regional government) andachieve at least some temporary eects thatbeneted all.

The true lesson o this particular storyis that eective relationships are not devel-oped by happenstance. They are earned.They require people with the interpersonalskills to connect with others, overcome pos-sible hostilities and misconceptions, and earnthe other parties trust. Relationships are

dened by the value they add to each party.The strongest relationships are ones in whicheach party equally benets (that is, success orone constitutes success or the other). Everyeort should be made to develop and maturethe interpersonal skills our personnel need tobuild relationships and orge partnerships. Ourpersonnel should be armed with the negotia-tion and dispute resolution skills required toreach compromise and overcome impasses.12

Relationship-building is not a task that comesnaturally to the military, but it is one that wemust collectively master in the uture i wehope to be successul.

An important component o that eortextends back to strengthening our relation-ships with our joint, interagency, intergovern-mental, and multinational (JIIM) partners. Bybuilding these relationships based on trust and

value, we can ocus collective capabilities ina comprehensive and synchronized manner.These relationships need to be habitual andenduring, rather than established in-theaterwhen the stakes are or real. This particularrevelation occurred prior to our deployment.Despite predeployment training meetings withkey agencies and departments, we still eltinadequately prepared in terms o training and

resources on what was necessary or a practitio-ner to build Iraqi governance and its economy.The bottom line is that we lacked the exper-

tise, experience, and training needed, and thatour JIIM partners were not resourced to assistus in the manner required.

With nowhere else to turn, we came to thesobering realization that we were going to haveto train and educate ourselves or the missionahead. Ater much consideration and exhaus-tive searches, I came across Tell Me How ThisEnds, Linda Robinsons book about GeneralDavid Petraeuss eorts in Iraq.13 This book

served as a roadmap o sorts in ormulating ourplan or economic recovery in Northern Iraq.We also used the agricultural expertise o theUniversity o Hawaii to aid us in our eorts torevitalize Northern Iraqs agricultural indus-try. As incredible as it may seem, our eorts,which represented the tip o American strategiceorts, were based on lessons gleaned rom abook and an American university. The pointis that despite the vast and comprehensivetraining and educational enablers already resi-dent within our national apparatus, it was stillunequipped to help us on the key counterinsur-gency tasks and skills required to build gover-nance and stimulate economic development.

Building Interagency Knowledge and

Training Programs

To remedy this problem in the uture, it isnecessary or the United States to enorce theinterdepartmental cultural changes required

relationship-building is not a task thatcomes naturally to the military, but it is

one that we must collectively master inthe uture i we hope to be successul




by expanding the scope o interagency eortsto establish a more permanent, enduring, androbust education, training, doctrine, materiel,

and organizational approach among the variousagencies engaging in stability operations. Thiscould be accomplished in various ways, someo which would simply require an expansion oexisting eorts. Programs and initiatives suchas embedded training opportunities and theexpansion o interagency educational opportu-nities could help to alleviate cultural miscon-ceptions and streamline agendas. Introducinga common language or interagency eorts

would help eliminate the conusion associatedwith the various terminologies unique to eachagency. Additionally, we must be able to buildour teams prior to deployment by aligning andsynchronizing deployment cycles to be mutu-ally supportive. Above all, we must promotethe social conditions necessary to develop atruly interactive and collaborative atmosphereamong all stakeholders.

To add the necessary order to this process,senior American leaders must have a proes-sional mastery o the projection o nationalpower and a proound understanding o theunderpinnings o the society in which theyoperate. They must be able to identiy theissues, decide the eects needed and their cor-rect sequencing, and direct how this must allbe accomplished. Additionally, they must becognizant o the changing character o confict.

Unlike days past, where combat power wasmassed at a singular decisive point within theoperational depth o the battleeld, in a coun-terinsurgency decisive points maniest through-out society. These leaders must unction as theocal points in interagency eorts, establish-ing climates o collaboration and cooperationby orging the relationships and partnershipsrequired to achieve the desired eects.

A key component to implementing theleaders vision will reside in subordinates whoare astute and adept enough to collaboratively

work within the context o an interagency envi-ronment. These agile and adaptive subordinatesmust possess the interpersonal skills required tobuild consensus and relationships among part-ners and the critical thinking skills to correctlyidentiy and leverage the vast array o resourcesand enablers o national power. To accomplishthis requires a broad graduate-level understand-ing o the unctions, resources, abilities, andlimitations o the various agencies and depart-

ments within the U.S. Government.The creation o an Interagency University

able to produce individuals with a comprehen-sive understanding o the application o nationalpower would help to alleviate bureaucratic, pol-icy and resourcing riction by ostering the condi-tions necessary or the development, acceptanceand application o comprehensive doctrine,language and processes across all United StatesGovernmental Departments and Agencies.14Graduates would serve as a synchronizing ele-ment and enabling inluence or uture inter-agency training, educational, and operationaleorts. These agile and adaptive leaders wouldbe able to leverage all the instruments o nationalpower in a precise and eective manner, unen-cumbered by organizational agendas and bias.This cadre o elite, multiaceted strategic think-ers would serve as a oundation in the Nations

quest to achieve a truly collaborative and coop-erative whole-o-government approach to coun-terinsurgency and stability operations.

Conclusion

Given the complexity o the 21st-centuryoperating environment and the rapidly evolv-ing character o confict, the United States mustestablish and maintain a unity o eort to realize

caSlen & loudon



uture strategic success. Forging a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency operations willrequire the breakdown o cultural barriers, establishment o innovative training and educationalparadigms, promotion o atmospheres o collaboration and cooperation, and establishment o rela-

tionships and partnerships based on trust and value. This will only be realized by sweeping changesto how U.S. departments and agencies plan, train, organize, educate, and develop the next genera-tion o leaders.

Perhaps the most essential area o attention is leadership development. The ocus o theseprograms is to build agile and adaptive leaders who are not only culturally astute with indigenouspopulations, but also astute, knowledgeable, and eective when operating among various agenciesand departments within the government. A key component o this eort will be how we collectivelyaddress this challenge. A good place to start would be in the chartering o an Interagency Universitydevoted to producing the strategic leaders versed in the comprehensive application o nationalpower. These individuals would serve as the oundation or uture interagency eorts.

The uture lies undiscovered. It is up to us to help shape and dene it. This task will requirehard work, sacrice o personal and organizational agendas, and, above all, our collective ocus. Thechallenges conronting us are varied and complex, but together we can successully orge a compre-hensive approach to counterinsurgency operations in the 21 st century. PRISM

Notes

1 George W. Casey, Jr., The Army o the 21st Century,Army Magazine, October 2009.2 Field Manual 307, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department o the Army,

October 2008), 1213.3 Ibid., 1.4 Jarret M. Brachman, High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaedas Use o New Technology, The Fletcher Forum o

World Aairs 30, no. 2 (Summer 2006).5 Ibid., 4.6 United Nations (UN) Department o Economic and Social Aairs, World Population Prospects: The 2008

Revision (New York: UN, 2009); UN Department o Economic and Social Aairs, World Urbanization Prospects:

The 2009 Revision (New York: UN, 2009).7 Ibid., 1.8 Population theory postulated by British political economist Thomas Malthus (17661834), in which the

worlds population outpaces its nite capacity to secure natural resources leading to catastrophic eects. See

Robert Kunzig, Population 7 Billion,National Geographic , January 2011.9 Field Manual 30, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department o the Army, February 2008),

113.10 Ibid., 1.11The United States Army and Marine Corps CounterinsurgencyManual (Chicago: University o Chicago

Press, 2007); Field Manual 324.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department

o the Army, April 2009), chapter 2.12 See Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving

In, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991).




13 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search or a Way Out o Iraq

(New York: PublicAairs, 2008).14 Stean J. Banach, School o Advanced Interagency Studies (SAIS), white paper, School o Advanced

Military Studies, May 2010.

caSlen & loudon



O n July 1, 2010, the U.S. Attorney or the Southern District o New York unsealed anindictment that outlined the rapid expansion o operations o transnational criminalorganizations and their growing, oten short-term strategic alliances with terrorist groups.These little-understood transcontinental alliances pose new security threats to the United States,as well as much o Latin America, West Arica, and Europe.

The indictment showed drug-tracking organizations (DTOs) in Colombia and Venezuelaincluding the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a designated terrorist organi-zation by the United States and European Unionhad agreed to move several multiton loads ococaine through Liberia en route to Europe.

The head o Liberian security orces, who is also the son o the president, negotiated the transship-ment deals with a Colombian, a Russian, and three West Aricans. According to the indictment, twoo the loads (one o 4,000 kilos and one o 1,500 kilos) were to be fown to Monrovia rom Venezuelaand Panama, respectively. A third load o 500 kilos was to arrive aboard a Venezuelan ship. In exchange

or transshipment rights, the drug trackers agreed to pay in both cash and product.What the drug trackers did not know was that the head o the security orces with whom theywere dealing was acting as an inormant or the U.S. Drug Enorcement Administration (DEA) andhad recorded all conversations, leaving the clearest body o evidence to date o the growing tiesbetween established designated Latin American terrorist organizations/drug cartels and emergingWest Arican criminal syndicates that move cocaine northward to lucrative and growing marketsin Europe and the ormer Soviet Union.1 The West Arican criminal syndicates, in turn, are oten

Terrorist-CriminalPipelines andCriminalized StatesEmerging Alliances

dgl Fr i sir Fll Iril am srg Cr.

By douGLas FaRah



FaRah

allied and cooperate in illicit smuggling opera-tions with operatives o al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM), a radical Islamist group that

has declared its allegiance to Osama bin Ladenand al Qaeda.In recent years, the group has relied primarily

on kidnappings or ransom to nance its activitiesand is estimated by U.S. and European ocialsto have an annual budget o about $10 million.

An ongoing relationship with the FARCand other DTOs rom Latin America to protectcocaine shipments into Europe would exponen-tially increase the AQIM revenue stream, and

with it, operational capacity. Other cases showthat AQIM would transport cocaine to Spainor the price o $2,000 a kilo. Had the proposedarrangement been in place or the 1,500-kiloload passing through Liberia, the terrorist groupwould have reaped $3 million in one operation.Had it been the 4,000-kilo load, the prot o $8million would have almost equaled the currentannual budget.

AQIMs stated goal is to overthrow theAlgerian state and, on a broader level, to ol-low al Qaedas strategy o attacking the West,particularly Europe. The ability to signicantlyincrease its operating budget would acilitaterecruiting, purchasing o weapons, and the abil-ity to carry larger and more sophisticated attacksacross a broader theater. It would also empowerAQIM to share resources with al Qaeda andother radical Islamist groups in Arica and else-

where, increasing the operational capacity toattack the United States and other targets.The central aspect that binds these dis-

parate organizations and networks, which inaggregate make up the bulk o nonstate armedactors, is the inormal (meaning outside legiti-mate state control and competence) pipelineor series o overlapping pipelines that theseoperations need to move products, money,

weapons, personnel, and goods. These pipe-lines are perhaps best understood as a series orecombinant chains whose links can merge and

separate as necessary to meet the best interestso the networks involved.Nonstate armed actorsin this article are dened as:

terrorist groups motivated by religion,politics, or ethnic orces

transnational criminal organizations,both structured and disaggregated

militias that control black holeor stateless sectors o one or more

national territories insurgencies, which have more well-

deined and speciic political aimswithin a particular national territory,but may operate rom outside o thatnational territory.

Each o these groups has dierent opera-tional characteristics that must be understood inorder to comprehend the challenges that theypose.2 It is also important to note that these dis-tinctions are ar blurrier in practice, with ewgroups alling neatly into one category or eventwo. Insurgencies in Colombia and Peru are alsodesignated terrorist groups by the United Statesand other governments, and they participatein parts o the transnational criminal struc-ture. These emerging hybrid structures changequickly, and the pace o change has accelerated

in the era o instantaneous communication, theInternet, and the criminalization o religiousand political groups.

What links terrorist and criminal orga-nizations together are the shadow acilitatorswho understand how to exploit the seams inthe international legal and economic structure,and who work with both terrorist and crimi-nal organizations. These groups use the same



teRRoRISt-cRIMInal PIPelIneS and cRIMInalIzed StateS

pipelines and the same illicit structures, andexploit the same state weaknesses. O the 43Foreign Terrorist Organizations listed by the

Department o State, the DEA states that 19have clearly established ties to DTOs, and manymore are suspected o having such ties.3

While the groups that overlap in dierentpipeline structures are not necessarily allies,and in act occasionally are enemies, they otenmake alliances o convenience that are short-lived and shiting. Even violent drug cartels,which regularly take part in bloody tur bat-tles, requently engage in truces and alliances,

although most end when they are no longermutually beneicial or the balance o powershits among them.

An example o the changing balance opower is that oLos Zetas, a group o specialoperations soldiers in Mexico who became hitmen or the Gul Cartel beore branching outand becoming a separate organization, otennow in direct confict with their ormer bosseso the Gul organization.

Another case that illustrates the breadtho the emerging alliances among criminal andterrorist groups is Operation Titan, executed byColombian and U.S. ocials in 2008 and stillongoing. Colombian and U.S. ocials, ater a2-year investigation, dismantled a DTO thatstretched rom Colombia to Panama, Mexico,the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.Most o the drugs originated with the FARC in

Colombia, and some o the proceeds were tracedthrough a Lebanese expatriate network to undHizballah, a radical Shiite Muslim terroristorganization that enjoys the state sponsorshipo Iran and Syria.4

Colombian and U.S. ocials allege that oneo the key money launderers in the structure,Chekry Harb (also known as Taliban), acted asthe central go-between among Latin American

DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primar-ily Hizballah. Among the groups participating inHarbs operation in Colombia were members o

the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramili-tary groups, and Marxist FARC.This mixture o enemies and competitors

working through a common acilitator or inloose alliance or mutual benet is a pattern thatis becoming commonand one that signicantlycomplicates the ability o law enorcement andintelligence operatives to combat, as multiplerecent transcontinental cases demonstrate.

In late 2010, the DEA used conidential

inormants in Mali to pose as FARC represen-tatives seeking to move cocaine through theSahel region. Three men claiming to belongto AQIM said the radical Islamists would pro-tect the cocaine shipments, leading to the rstindictment ever o al Qaeda aliates on narco-terrorism charges.5 Those claiming to be AQIMassociates were willing to transport hundredso kilos o cocaine across the Sahara Desert toSpain or the price o $2,000 per kilo.6 Thatcase came just 4 months ater Malian militaryound a Boeing 727 abandoned in the desertater unloading an estimated 20 tons o cocaine,clear evidence that large shipments are possible.The fight originated in Venezuela.7

In another indication o cross-pollinationamong criminal organizations, in late 2010,Ecuadorian counterdrug ocials announcedthe dismantling o a particularly violent gang

o cocaine traickers, led by Nigerians whowere operating in a neighborhood near theinternational airport in the capital o Quito.According to Ecuadorian ocials, the gang,in addition to controlling the sale o cocainein one o Quitos main districts, was recruit-ing mules or drug carriers to carry severalkilos at a time to their allied network based inAmsterdam to distribute throughout Europe.



The Nigerian presence was detected becausethey brought a new level o violence to thedrug game in Quito, such as beheading com-

petitors. They were allegedly acquiring thedrugs rom Colombian DTOs.8

Because o the clandestine nature o thecriminal and terrorist activities, designed to beas opaque as possible, we must start rom theassumption that whatever is known o specicoperations along the criminal-terrorist pipelinerepresents merely a snapshot o events, not adenitive record, and it is oten out o date bythe time it is understood.

Both the actors and territory (or portiono the pipelines they control) are constantly infux, meaning that tracking them in a meaningulway is dicult at best. As shown by the inter-and intra-cartel warare in Mexico, smaller sub-groups can either overthrow the existing orderinside their own structures or break o and ormentirely new structures. At that time, they canbreak existing alliances and enter new ones,depending on the advantages o a specic time,place, and operation.

The Criminalized State

The cases above show the connectivityamong these disparate groups operating alongdierent geographic parts o the overall crim-inal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than operatingin isolation, these groups have complicated butsignicant interactions with each other basedprimarily on the ability o each actor or set o

actors to provide a critical service to another,while proting mutually rom the transactions.Many o the groups operate in what have tradi-

tionally been called ungoverned or statelessregions. However, in many o these cases, thegroups worked directly with the government orhave become the de acto governing orce in theareas they occupy.

This is an important shit rom the tradi-tional ways o looking at stateless areas, butoers a prism that provides a useul way ounderstanding alternatively governed (non-state) regions and the interconnected threat

that they pose to the United States.There are traditional categories or mea-

suring state perormance developed by RobertRotberg and others in the wake o state ail-ures at the end o the Cold War. The generalpremise is that [n]ation-states ail because theyare convulsed by internal violence and can nolonger deliver positive political goods to theirinhabitants.9 These traditional categories ostates are:

strong, or able to control its territory andoer quality political goods to its people

weak, or lled with social tensions, andthe state with a limited monopoly onthe use o orce

ailed, or in a state o confict, with apredatory ruler and no state monopolyon the use o orce

collapsed, or no unctioning state insti-tutions, and a vacuum o authority.10

This conceptualization, while useul, is lim-ited. O more use is viewing those alternativelygoverned spaces as existing where territorialstate control has been voluntarily or involuntarilyceded in whole or part to actors other than the rel-evant legally recognized sovereign authorities.11

nonstate actors exercise a signiicantdegree o control over the regions,and that control may occasionally becontested by state orces

FaRah



It is important to note that the ungov-erned regions under discussion, as implied inthe deinition above, while out o the direct

control o a state government, are not trulyungoverned spaces. In act, nonstate actorsexercise a signiicant degree o control overthe regions, and that control may occasionallybe contested by state orces. The underlyingconcepts o positive and negative sovereigntydeveloped by Robert H. Jackson are helpul inthis discussion because they give a useul lens toexamine the role o the state in specic parts oits national territory.12

These regions, in act, are governed by non-state actors who have, through orce or popu-lar support (or a mixture o both), been ableto impose their decisions and norms, creatingalternate power structures that directly challengethe state, oten in the absence o the state. TheFederation o American Scientists reers to thesegroups as para-state actors.13 Regardless o theterminology, the absence o a state presence ora deeply corrupted state presence should not beconstrued as a lack o a unctioning government.

This denition allows or a critical distinc-tion, still relatively undeveloped in currentliterature, between nations where the statehas little or no power in certain areas and maybe ghting to assert that control, and nationswhere the state in act has a virtual monopolyon power and the use o orce, but turns thestate into a unctioning criminal enterprise or

the benet o a small elite.The latter is similar to the capturedstate concept developed by Phil Williams,14but diers in important ways. Captured statesare taken hostage by criminal organizations,oten through intimidation and threats, giv-ing the criminal enterprise access to some partso the state apparatus. A criminal state, how-ever, counts on the integration o the states

leadership into the criminal enterprise and theuse o state acilities (or example, aircrat reg-istries, acilitation o passports and diplomatic

status on members o the criminal enterprise,accounts in the central bank, and End UserCerticates to acquire weapons).

A urther variation o the criminal stateoccurs when a unctioning state essentiallyturns over or ranchises out part o its terri-tory to nonstate groups to carry out their ownagenda with the blessing and protection o thecentral government or a regional power. Bothstate and nonstate actors share in the proits

rom the criminal activity.Both o these models, but particularly

the model o states ranchising out their ter-ritory to nonstate actors, are growing inLatin America through the sponsorship othe Bolivarian Revolution (led by HugoChvez o Venezuela, including Evo Moraleso Bolivia, Raael Correa o Ecuador, andDaniel Ortega o Nicaragua) o nonstate armedgroups. The principal criminal activity provid-ing the revenues is cocaine tracking, and themost important (but not sole) recipient o statesponsorship is the FARC.

The traditional our-tier categorizationo states suers rom another signicant omis-sion. The model presupposes that statelessregions are largely conned within the bor-ders o a single state. This is, in reality, hardlyever the case. Alternatively governed spacesgenerally overlap into several states because

alternatively governed spaces generallyoverlap into several states because othe speciic advantages oered byborder regions




o the specic advantages oered by border regions. The denition o a geographic black holeis useul in conceptualizing the use o border regions and the downward spirals they can gener-ate in multiple states without causing the collapse o any o them: A black hole is a geographicentity where, due to the absent or ineective exercise o state governance, criminal and terroristelements can deploy activities in support o, or otherwise directly relating to criminal or terroristacts, including the act itsel.15

For example, Latin America is almost absent rom leading indexes o ailed states. This is in largepart because the indexes are state-centric and not designed to look at regions that spill over acrossseveral borders but do not cause any one state to collapse. For example, only Colombia (ranked 41)and Bolivia (ranked 51) are among the top 60 countries in the Failed States Index 2009, pub-lished by Foreign Policy and the Fund or Peace.16 Yet the governability o certain areas in the borderregions o Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize; the Rio San Miguel border region between Ecuador and

Colombia; the Guajira Peninsula on the Venezuela-Colombia border; most o the border regions oCentral America; and many other regions clearly qualiy as black holes. This prolieration o blackholes in border regions can be explained because o the advantages oered by border regions.

As Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt state, terrorists (and the same thing is true or transna-tional criminal organizations):

seek out the sot spots, the weak seams o the Westphalian nation-state and the international order that

it has created. Sometimes the territorys boundaries coincide with the entire territory o a state, as with

Somalia, but mostly this is not the case. Traditional weak spots, like border areas, are more likely.

FaRah

Vzl r hg Cvz ml crimiliz rciig i rrir cr c FaRC

AgnciaBrasil



Terrorist [and criminal] organizations oper-ate on the ringes o this Westphalian sys-

tem, in the grey areas o territoriality.17

A 2001 Naval War College study insight-ully described some o the reasons or the occur-rence o cross-border black holes in terms ocommercial and political insurgencies. Theseare applicable to organized criminal groups aswell and have grown in importance since then:

The border zones oer obvious advantages

or political and economic insurgencies.

Political insurgents preer to set up in adja-cent territories that are poorly integrated,

while the commercial insurgents avor

active border areas, preerring to blend in

amid business and government activity and

corruption. The border oers a sae place

to the political insurgent and easier access

to communications, weapons, provisions,

transport, and banks.

For the commercial insurgency, the rontier

creates a fuid, trade-riendly environment.

Border controls are perunctory in ree

trade areas, and there is a great demand

or goods that are linked to smuggling,

document raud, illegal immigration, and

money laundering.

For the political insurgency, terrain and

topography oten avor the narco-guerrilla.Jungles permit him to hide massive bases

and training camps, and also laboratories,

plantations, and clandestine runways. The

Amazon region, huge and impenetrable,

is a clear example o the shelter that the

jungle areas give. On all o Colombias bor-

derswith Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, and

Venezuelajungles cloak illegal activity.18


In parts o Guatemala and along mucho the U.S.-Mexico border, these groups havedirectly and successully challenged the states

sovereignty and established governing mecha-nisms o their own, relying on violence, corrup-tion, and largesse to maintain control. As theJoint Operating Environment 2008 rom the

Joint Chies o Sta stated:

A serious impediment to growth in Latin

America remains the power o criminal

gangs and drug cartels to corrupt, dis-

tort, and damage the regions potential.

The act that criminal organizations andcartels are capable o building dozens o

disposable submarines in the jungle and

then using them to smuggle cocaine, indi-

cates the enormous economic scale o this

activity. This poses a real threat to the

national security interests o the Western

Hemisphere. In particular, the growing

assault by the drug cartels and their thugs

on the Mexican government over the past

several years reminds one that an unstable

Mexico could represent a homeland secu-

rity problem o immense proportions to the

United States.19

Control o broad swaths o landincreas-ingly including urban territoryby these non-state groups acilitates the movements o ille-gal products both northward and southward

through the transcontinental pipeline, otenthrough routes that appear to make little eco-nomic or logistical sense.

While the VenezuelaWest AricaEuropecocaine route seems circuitous when lookingat a map, there are in act economic and logis-tical rationales or the shit in drug trackingpatterns. West Arica oered signicant com-parative advantages; transiting illegal products



through the region has been, until recently, vir-tually risk-ree. Many countries in the region arestill recovering rom the horrendous violence o

the resource wars that ravaged the region in the1990s through the early years o this century.

The ragile governments, immersed in cor-

ruption and with ew unctioning law enorce-ment or judicial structures, are simply no matchor the massive infux o drugs and the accompa-nying nancial resources and violence. Guinea-Bissau, the ormer Portuguese colony, has beendubbed Aricas irst narco-state, and theconsequences have been devastating. Duelingdrug gangs have assassinated the president, armychie o sta, and other senior oicials whileplunging the nation into chaos.20

In addition to state weakness, West Aricaoers the advantage o having longstandingsmuggling networks or illicit pipelines to moveproducts to the world market, be they confictdiamonds, illegal immigrants, massive numberso weapons, or confict timber. Those control-ling these already established smuggling pipe-lines have ound it relatively easy and prot-able to absorb another lucrative product, such

as cocaine, that requires little additional eortto move. In addition, there is a long history inWest Arica o rival groups, or at least groupswith no common agenda except or the desireor economic gain, to make deals when suchcontacts are viewed as mutually benecial.

To illustrate how criminal and terrorist net-works operate or mutual benet in a criminal-ized state, we turn to two related cases that shed

light on the relationship among dierent actorsin such an environment.

Taylor in Liberia

At the height o his power rom 19982002, Charles Taylor allowed transnationalorganized crime groups rom Russia, SouthArica, Israel, and Ukraine to operate simulta-neously in a territory the size o Maryland. Atthe same time, the terrorist groups Hizballahand al Qaeda were economically operational inLiberia, raising money or their parent organiza-tions through associations with criminal groups.

Most o the criminal activity revolved aroundthe trade in diamonds (extracted rom neigh-boring Sierra Leone) and in Liberian timber. In2000, al Qaeda operatives entered the diamondtrade, using Hizballah-linked diamond smug-gling networks to move the stones and handlethe proceeds. The relationship lasted until justbeore September 11, 2001.

This was possible largely because the Taylorgovernment pioneered, to a level o sophisti-cation, the model or the criminalized state inwhich the government is an active partner inthe criminal enterprise. The president, directlyengaged in negotiations with the criminalgroups, authorized speciic lines o eort orthose actors, provided protection and immu-nity through the state, directly proted rom theenterprises, and commingled those unds withother state revenue streams, erasing the distinc-

tions among the state, criminal enterprise, andperson o the president.A key to the model was government con-

trol o points o interest to criminal organiza-tions and others operating outside the interna-tional legal system or which they were willingto share prots. These included, among oth-ers, the ports o entry and exit, ensuring thatthose whom Taylor wanted to protect could

West Arica oers the advantage ohaving longstanding smuggling networksor illicit pipelines to move products tothe world market

FaRah



enter and leave unimpeded; the passport reg-istry, giving access to issuing passports, dip-lomatic passports, and nonexistent govern-

ment titles and the accompanying immunity,to those authorized to do business; control olaw enorcement and the military inside thecountry to ensure that the volatile internalsituation did not aect the protected businessoperations; and access to resources that couldbe protably exploited without ear o violenceor unauthorized extortion.

When he became president, Taylor, build-ing on the extensive relationships that he

orged during his years in the bush, developedties to organized criminal groups and terror-ist organizations that allowed him to procurehundreds o tons o weapons rom a broad rangeo groups and individuals. He also enrichedhimsel. According to a 2005 study o Taylorsinances, he generated about $105 million ayear in extra-budgetary revenue to which hehad direct access, some o which was movedthrough accounts opened in his name in NewYork banks and European nancial institutions.

Taylor was, in eect, not president oa country but was controlling what RobertCooper has called the pre-modern state,meaning territory where:

chaos is the norm and war is a way o lie.

Insoar as there is a government, it operates

in a way similar to an organized crime syndi-

cate. The pre-modern state may be too weak

even to secure its home territory, let alone

pose a threat internationally, but it can pro-

vide a base or non-state actors who may rep-

resent a danger in the post-modern world . . .

notably drug, crime and terrorist syndicates.21

The same Hizballah operatives who aidedal Qaedas diamond buying venture in Liberiawere able to acquire signiicant amounts o

sophisticated weapons or Taylor and his alliesthrough a series o transactions with Russianarms dealers based in Guatemala and operating

in Nicaragua and Panama. The primary acilita-tor o the deals was a retired Israeli ocer liv-ing in Panama, who had a personal relation-ship with the Hizballah operative seeking theweapons. Both had worked or Mobutu SeseSeku, the long-ruling head o Zaire (now theDemocratic Republic o the Congo). The Israeliprovided the dictator with security while theLebanese operative moved his diamonds to theblack market.

The ability o Hizballah nancial handlersto deal with a retired Israeli oicer who hasaccess to weapons while their respective orga-nizations were waging war against each otherin their respective homelands demonstrates justhow fexible the pipelines can become.

In addition to this arms low, Taylor usedhis illicit proceeds to buy a signicant amounto weapons rom the ormer Soviet republics.These weapons were procured and transportedby Viktor Bout, a Russian arms dealer dubbed

the Merchant o Death by European ocials.

Bout and the New World Order

Viktor Bout, a ormer Soviet military intel-ligence ocial, became one o the worlds pre-mier gray market weapons merchants, able toarm multiple sides o several conficts in Arica,as well as both the Taliban and NorthernAlliance in Aghanistan. But o particular

rom the mid-1990s until his arrest inThailand in 2008, Bout armed groups inArica, Aghanistan, Colombia,and elsewhere




interest here is his relationship with Taylor andhow he made that connection, and the dier-ent, interlocking networks that made that rela-

tionship possible.Bout made his mark by building an unri-valed air feet that could deliver not only hugeamounts o weapons but also sophisticated weap-ons systems and combat helicopters to armedgroups. From the mid-1990s until his arrest inThailand in 2008, Bout armed groups in Arica,Aghanistan, Colombia, and elsewhere.22

Bouts relationship to Taylor and the WestArican conficts in Liberia and Sierra Leone

sheds light on how these networks operate andconnect with criminal states, and the symbioticrelationships that develop.

Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan citizen oIndian descent who emerged as a key inlu-ence broker in several o Aricas conlicts,introduced Bout into Taylors inner circle, amove that undamentally altered the supply oweapons to both Liberia and the RevolutionaryUnited Front in Sierra Leone, Taylors viciousproxy army that controlled important diamondields. One o the avors Ruprah and Tayloroered Bout was the chance to register severaldozen o his rogue aircrat in Liberia.

Ruprah had taken advantage o operatingin a criminal state and used his access to Taylorto be named the Liberian governments GlobalCivil Aviation Agent Worldwide in order tourther Bouts goals. This position gave Ruprah

access to an aircrat and possible control o it.I was asked by an associate o Viktors to getinvolved in the Aviation registry o Liberia asboth Viktor and him wanted to restructure thesame and they elt there could be nancial gainrom the same, he has stated.23

Bout was seeking to use the Liberian reg-istry to hide his aircrat because the registry, inreality run rom Kent, England, allowed aircrat

owners to obtain online an internationally validAir Worthiness Certicate without having theaircrat inspected and without disclosing the

names o the owners.24

Through his access to aircrat whose own-ership he could hide through a shell game oshiting registries, and weapons in the arsenalso the ormer Soviet bloc, Bout was able toacquire and transport a much desired com-modityweaponsto service clients acrossArica, Aghanistan, Colombia, and elsewhere.The weaponsincluding tens o thousandso AK47 assault rifes, rocket-propelled gre-

nades, tens o millions o rounds o ammuni-tion, antiaircrat guns, landmines, and possiblysurace-to-air missileswere oten exchangeddirectly or another commodity, primarily dia-monds, but also columbite-tantalite (Coltan)and other minerals.

Bout mastered the art o leveraging theadvantages oered by criminal states, regis-tering his aircrat in Liberia and EquatorialGuinea, purchasing End User Certicates romTogo and other nations, and buying protectionacross the continent. For entre into the circleso warlords, presidents, and insurgent leaders,Bout relied on a group o political xers suchas Ruprah.

The exchange o commodities such as dia-monds or weapons moved illicitly in supporto nonstate actors was largely not punishablebecause, while the activities violated United

Nations sanctions, they were not speciicallyillegal in any particular jurisdiction. This vastlegal loophole remains intact.25

Changing Landscapes

While the commodity or weapons tradewas lucrative to the participants and costlyin terms o human lie and the inancing ocriminal and terrorist organizations, recent

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developments in the criminal-terrorist nexushave radically altered the historic equation opower and inluence o nonstate actors and

criminal states. The driving orce in this reshap-ing o the landscape is the overlap o the drugtrade, which increases by orders o magnitudethe economic resources available to criminaloperatives and their allies.

The numbers are striking. The blood dia-mond trade at the peak o the regional wars inWest and Central Arica was valued at about$200 million a year, and was usually signii-cantly below that. Timber added a ew tens o

millions more, but it is probable that the totalamount o the illicit products extracted and soldor bartered on the international market was lessthan $300 million during peak years, and nor-mally was substantially less. Yet it was enough tosustain wars or more than a decade and destroythe abric o society o an entire region.

In contrast, the United Nations Oce onDrugs and Crime (UNODC) conservativelyestimates that 40 to 50 tons o cocaine, with anestimated value o $1.8 billion, passed throughWest Arica in 2007, and the amount is grow-ing.26 U.S. Arica Command and other intelli-gence services estimate the amount o cocainetransiting West Arica is at least ve times theUNODC estimate.27 But even using the mostconservative estimate, the magnitude o theproblem or the region is easy to see. UsingUNODC gures, the only legal export rom the

region that would surpass the value o cocaine iscocoa exports rom Cte dIvoire. I the highernumbers are used, cocaine would dwar the legalexports o the region combined, and be worthmore than the gross domestic product o severalo the regions nations.28

These emerging networks, vastly morelucrative with the introduction o cocaine,undermine the stability o entire regions o

great strategic interest to the United States.The threat is posed by the illicit movemento goods (drugs, money, weapons, stolen cars)

and people (illegal aliens, gang members, drugcartel enorcers) and the billions o dollars thatthese illicit activities generate in an area wherestates have ew resources and little legal or lawenorcement capacity.

As Antonio Maria Costa, the UNODChead, wrote, this epidemic o drugs and drugmoney fooding Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, SierraLeone, and elsewhere has become a securityissue: Drug money is perverting the weak

economies o the region. . . . The infuence thatthis buys is rotting ragile states; trackers arebuying avors and protection rom candidatesin elections.29

Given this history, the broader dangers othe emerging overlap between criminal andterrorist groups that previously did not worktogether are clear. Rather than working in abusiness that could yield a ew million dollars,or these groups the potential gains are now sig-nicantly more.

The new revenue streams are also a lie-line to Latin American nonstate actors thatmerge the criminal and the terrorist. The twoprincipal beneiciaries are the FARC, nowestimated as the worlds largest producer ococaine, and the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico,with the worlds largest distribution network.Both pose a signicant threat to regional sta-

bility in the Western Hemisphere and aredirect threats to the United States.U.S. and regional Arican oicials state

that members o both groups have been iden-tiied on the ground in West Arica and thatthe money used to purchase the product oronward shipment to Europe is remitted primar-ily to these two groups, oten through oshorejurisdictions via European nancial institutions.




This means that even as the U.S. cocaine market remains stable or shrinks modestly, thesenonstate actors will continue to enjoy expanding nancial bases as the European, Arican, andAsian markets expand. For the rst time in the history o the drug war, the U.S. market may not bethe dening market in the cocaine trade, although much o the proceeds o the cocaine trade willcontinue to fow to organizations wreaking havoc in the Western Hemisphere.30

The FARC, Venezuela, and Iran

While the transnational tracking and nancial operations o the Sinaloa Cartel are important,FARC alliances and actions oer an important look at the use o nonstate criminal/terrorist armedgroups by a criminalized state. The well-documented links o Venezuelas Bolivarian Revolution, led

by President Chvez, to both Iran and the FARC, as well as the criminalization o the Venezuelanstate under Chvez point to the evolution o the model described above in which a criminalizedstate ranchises out part o its criminal enterprises to nonstate actors.

More worrisome rom the U.S. perspective is the growing evidence o Chvezs direct supportor Hizballah, along with his ties to the FARC. These indicators include the June 18, 2008, U.S.Treasury Departments Oce o Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designations o two Venezuelancitizens, including a senior diplomat, as Hizballah supporters. Several businesses were also sanc-tioned. Allegations included coordinating possible terrorist attacks and building Hizballah-sponsoredcommunity centers in Venezuela.31

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OFAC has also designated numerous seniorVenezuelan ocials, including the heads o twonational intelligence services, or direct support

o the FARC in the acquisition o weapons anddrug tracking.32

The Chvez model o allying with statesponsors o terrorism such as Iran while spon-soring violent nonstate terrorist organizationsinvolved in criminal activities and terrorismstrongly resembles the template pioneeredby Hizballah. In act, the military doctrine othe Bolivarian Revolution explicitly embracesthe radical Islamist model o asymmetrical, or

ourth generation, warare and its reliance onsuicide bombings and dierent types o terror-ism, including the use o nuclear weapons. Thisis occurring at a time when Hizballahs pres-ence in Latin America is growing and becomingmore identiable.33

The main book Chvez has adopted ashis military doctrine is Peripheral Warareand Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and

Ethics o Asymmetrical Warare by the Spanishpolitician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge.34Although Verstrynge is not a Muslim and hisbook was not written directly in relation tothe Venezuelan experience, it lauds radicalIslam (as well as past terrorists such as IlichRamrez Snchez, better known as Carlos the

Jackal)35 or helping to expand the parameterso what irregular warare should encompass,including the use o biological and nuclear

weapons, along with the correlated civil-ian casualties among the enemy. Chvez hasopenly admitted his admiration or Snchez,who is serving a lie sentence in France ormurder and terrorist acts.36

Central to Verstrynges idealized view oterrorists is the belie in the sacredness o theighters to sacriice their lives in pursuit otheir goals. Beore writing extensively on how

to make chemical weapons and listing helpulplaces to nd inormation on the manuactureo rudimentary nuclear bombs that someone

with a high school education could make,Verstrynge writes:

We already know it is incorrect to limit

asymmetrical warare to guerrilla war-

are, although it is important. However,

it is not a mistake to also use things that

are classied as terrorism and use them in

asymmetrical warare. And we have super

terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism,

bioterrorism (which uses biological and

bacteriological methods), and nuclear ter-

rorism, which means the type o terrorism

[that] uses the threat o nuclear attack toachieve its goals.37

In a December 12, 2008, interview withVenezuelan state television, Verstrynge laudedOsama bin Laden and al Qaeda or creating anew type o warare that is de-territorialized,de-stateized and de-nationalized, a war wheresuicide bombers act as atomic bombs or thepoor.38 Chvez liked the book so much thathe had a special pocket-sized edition printedand distributed to the ocer corps with expressorders that it be read cover to cover.

While there is only anecdotal evidenceto date o the merging o the BolivarianRevolutions criminal-terrorist pipeline andthe criminal-terrorist pipeline o radical Islamistgroups (Hizballah in particular) supported by

Chvez maintains his revolutionarycredentials in the radical axis comprised

o letist populists and Islamicundamentalists, primarily Iran




the Iranian regime, the possibility opens a serieso new security challenges or the United Statesand its allies in Latin America.

What is clear is that Iran has greatlyincreased its diplomatic, economic, and intel-ligence presence in Latin America, an areawhere it has virtually no trade, no historic orcultural ties, and no obvious strategic interests.The sole points o convergence o the radicaland reactionary theocratic Iranian governmentand the sel-proclaimed socialist and progres-sive Bolivarian Revolution are an overt andoten stated hatred or the United States and

a shared view o the authoritarian state thattolerates little dissent and encroaches on allaspects o a citizens lie.

Such a relationship between nonstateand state actors provides numerous benetsto both. In Latin America, or example,the FARC gains access to Venezuelan terri-tory without ear o reprisals, to Venezuelanidentication documents, and, perhaps mostimportantly, to routes or exporting cocaineto Europe and the United States while using

the same routes to import quantities osophisticated weapons and communicationsequipment. In return, the Chvez governmentcan keep up military pressure on its mostvocal opponent in the region, the Colombiangovernmenta staunch U.S. ally whose gov-ernment has been the recipient o signicantamounts o military and humanitarian aidrom the United States.

In addition, Chvez maintains his revolu-tionary credentials in the radical axis comprisedo letist populists and Islamic undamentalists,

primarily Iran. Perhaps equally important, hisgovernment is able to prot rom the transit ococaine and weapons through the national ter-ritory at a time when oil revenues are low andthe budget is under signicant stress.

Conclusion

The trend toward the merging o terroristand criminal groups to mutually exploit newmarkets is unlikely to diminish. Both will con-

tinue to need the same acilitators, and bothcan leverage the relationship with the other tomutual benet. This gives these groups an asym-metrical advantage over state actors, which areinherently more bureaucratic and less adaptablethan nonstate actors.

Given the ragile or nonexistent judicialand law enorcement institutions in WestArica, the state tolerance or sponsorship o thedrug trade by Venezuela and quiescent Aricanstates, and the enormous revenue stream thatcocaine represents, it is likely such loose alli-ances will continue to grow. The human cost inWest Arica, as recent past spasms o violencehave shown, will be extraordinarily high, as willthe impact on what little governance capabilitycurrently exists.

Europe and the United States will ace agrowing threat rom the region, particularly

rom radical Islamist groupsthose aliatedwith al Qaeda and those, such as Hizballah,allied with Iran. Yet given the current budgetconstraints and economic situation, it is highlyunlikely that additional resources rom eithercontinent will be allocated to the threat.

There are ew options or putting thegenie back in the bottle. Transnationalcriminal organizations and terrorist networks

transnational criminal organizationsand terrorist networks haveproven themselves resilient andhighly adaptable

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have proven themselves resilient and highly adaptable, while governments remain ar less so.Governments have also consistently underestimated the capacity o these disparate and non-hierarchical organizations.

Human intelligence, perhaps the most dicult type to acquire, is vital to understanding thethreat, how the dierent groups work together, and what their vulnerabilities are. A major vulner-ability is the dependence o the Latin American drug trackers on local Arican networks. To makethe necessary alliances, cartel operatives are orced to unction in unamiliar terrain and in languagesand cultures they do not know or understand. This creates signicant opportunities or penetrationo the operations, as the Liberian case shows.

Another element that is essential is the creation o unctioning institutions in the most aectedstates that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational criminal organizations. Themost ecient way to do this is through the creation o vetted police and military units and judicialcorps that are specially trained and who can be protected rom reprisals.

The almost universal mantra o judicial and police reorm is valid, but it can only be realisticallydone in small groups that can then be expanded as time and resources permit. Most eorts are dilutedto the point o uselessness by attempting to do everything at once. The Colombian experience inghting drug tracking organizations and the FARC is illustrative o this. Ater years o utility, thepolice, military, and judiciary were able to orm small vetted units that have grown over time and,just as importantly, were able to work together.

Vetted units that are able to collect intelligence and operate in a relatively controlled environ-ment, which can be monitored or corruption, are also vital and ar more achievable than macro-level police reorm. These are small steps, but ones that have a chance o actually working in asustainable way. They do not require the tens o millions o dollars and large-scale human resourcecommitments that broader eorts do. And they can be easily expanded as resources permit.

But human intelligence and institution-building, operating in a vacuum, will have limitedimpact unless there is the will and ability to match the transnationalization o enorcement to thetransnationalization o crime and terror. These groups thrive in the seams o the global system, whilethe global response has been a state-centric approach that matches the 20th century, not this one.

Without this type o human intelligence able to operate in relative saety through vetted units,the criminal and terrorist pipelines will continue not only to grow but also to develop the capacityto recombine more quickly and in ever more dangerous ways. PRISM

Notes

1 Benjamin Weiser and William K. Rashbaum, Liberian Ocials Worked with U.S. Agency to Block

Drug Trac, The New York Times, June 2, 2010.2 These typologies were developed and discussed more completely, including the national security implica-

tions o their growth, in Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard,Armed Groups: A Tier-One

Security Priority, Occasional Paper 57 (U.S. Air Force Academy, CO: U.S. Air Force Institute or National

Security Studies, September 2004).3 Drug Enorcement Agency Chie o Operations Michael Braun, speech to the Washington Institute

or Near East Policy, July 18, 2008, available at .




4 While much o Operation Titan remains classied, there has been signicant open source reporting in

part because the Colombian government announced the most important arrests. See Chris Kraul and Sebastian

Rotella, Colombian Cocaine Ring Linked to Hezbollah, The Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2008; and Por

Lavar Activos de Narcos y Paramilitares, Capturados Integrantes de Organizacin Internacional, Fiscala General dela Republica (Colombia), October 21, 2008.

5 Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Three al Qaeda Associates with Conspiring to Transport Cocaine

through Arica or the FARC, PR Newswire, December 18, 2009.6 Philip Sherwell, Cocaine, Kidnapping and the al-Qaeda Cash Squeeze, Sunday Telegraph, March 7,

2010.7 Jamie Doward, Drug Seizures in West Arica Prompt Fears o Terrorist Links, The Observer, November

29, 2009.8 Quito y Buenos Aires, Ciudades preeridas para narcos nigerianos, El Universo (Guayaquil, Ecuador),

January 3, 2011.

9 See, or example, Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,Failure and State Weakness in a Time o Terror (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, January 2003).

10 Ibid.11 Anne L. Clunan et al., Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era o Sotened Sovereignty

(Stanord: Stanord University Press, 2010), 3.12 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1990).13 The Federation o American Scientists lists 385 para-state actors across the globe; list available at .14 See Bill Lahneman and Matt Lewis, Summary o Proceedings: Organized Crime and the Corruption o

State Institutions, The Inn and Conerence Center, University o Maryland, College Park, MD, November

18, 2002, available at .15 Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, Terrorist Black Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and

Governmental Weakness, Clingendael Centre or Strategic Studies, The Hague, November 2005, 26.16 See The Failed States Index, Foreign Policy (JulyAugust 2009), 8093.17 Korteweg and Ehrhardt, 22.18 Julio A. Cirino et al., Latin Americas Lawless Areas and Failed States, in Latin American Security

Challenges, Newport Papers 21, ed. Paul D. Taylor (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2001). Commercial insur-

gencies are dened as engaging in or-prot organized crime without a predominant political agenda, leaving

unclear how that diers rom groups dened as organized criminal organizations.19 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications or the

Future Joint Force, November 25, 2008, 34.20 Author interviews with U.S. law enorcement ocials. See also James Traub, Aricas Drug Problem,

New York Times Magazine, April 9, 2010.21 Robert Cooper, Reordering the World: Post-Modern States, The Foreign Policy Centre, April 2002, 18.22 For details o Bouts global operations, see Douglas Farah and Stephen Braun, Merchant o Death: Money,

Guns, Planes and the Man Who Makes War Possible (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007). In Novemb

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