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BATTLE OF JUTLAND

INTRODUCTION

1. During World War One Germany faced an age-old problem. How does a land

power can defeat a sea power? Two thousand years earlier, the Spartans faced

the same problem with the Athenians. After 30 years of fighting the Spartans

finally defeated the Athenians, not on land but on the Aegean Sea and Athens fell.

A land empire can only defeat a sea empire at sea. For land power like Germany

the loss of her Navy would be a setback, but not a serious defeat. For sea power

like Britain the loss of her navy would mean complete and utter defeat. This

strategic thought process worked as the main essence of German’s sea war plan

in WWI.

2. When the war broke out between the British and the German Empires in

1914, the world had been in a state of uneasy peace for many years. The all-

powerful British Empire had seen with mounting alarm how the confident young

German Empire was growing in power and ambition. As the interests of these two

great powers clashed in different places, it became obvious that war, the

traditional way of settling rivalries between the empires would soon be called for.

Events following in the wake of the assassination of the Arc Duke Ferdinand in

Sarajevo brought these tensions to a head and the WWI was declared.

3. A bloody and dogged straggle for supremacy developed. Germany tried

new and often daring tactics on land and at sea, whereas the more traditionally –

oriented Allies adopted their well-established methods of Blockade. One such

confrontation between the young and venturesome and the old and tried

belligerents took place in May 1916, around an area known as Jutland Bank, in the

North Sea.

4. Jutland or Skagerrak to the Germans remains one of the most fascinating

and much discussed sea battles of all time.

- It was the first major clash of fleets in European waters since the

Battle of Lissa and

- the only full-scale battle between two fleets in the entire WWI.

- It was also the largest sea battle to date, with 252 ships engaged with

25 admirals flying their flags.

- It was the last sea battle in which all types of classic ships like

battle cruisers, battle ships, armoured cruisers, light cruisers and

destroyers played their parts.

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- It was also the first sea battle in which air power in the form of aerial

reconnaissance made its debut in the maritime environment.

AIM

5. With this little bit of introduction, gentleman the aim of our presentation is

to analyse the ‘Battle of Jutland’ with special emphasis on maritime strategy,

leadership trend, tactical implication and technological perspective of sea warfare

and to derive lessons for future.

SCOPE

6. The presentation will be covered in the sequences as you can see in the

slide:

a. Background of the battle

b. Command and Force Structure

c. Sequences of the Battle

d. Outcome of the battle

e. Analysis of the battle

f. Application of principle of war

g. Lesson learnt

h. Conclusion

7. The background of the battle, Command and Force Structure and the

Sequences of the Battle will be covered by Major Baquing and the Outcome of the

battle, Battle analysis on maritime strategy, tactics and leadership trend will be

covered by Lt Cdr Habib. The analysis on war technology, application of principle

of war and the Lesson learnt will be discussed by me. At the end of our

presentation there will be also a question and answer session, where we will be

clearing your doubts.

BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

8. After the commencement of WWI in 1914, Britain imposed the blockade

against the German’s North Sea ports. Since then, Germany had been

successfully blockaded for two years. Shortages were beginning to affect the

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performance of the army and navy as well as affecting the moral of Germans. The

German High Sea Fleet was not in a position to challenge the British Grand Fleet

in a decisive battle. The Grand Fleet was twice the size, with larger and more

powerful ships. So, the German's planed to get a tactical advantage by trapping a

small portion of the Grand Fleet to reduce its numerical superiority.

9. There was a faction inside the German navy, who wanted a more positive

policy. In February 1916, Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer was appointed to

command the High Seas Fleet. He planed to reduce the numerical superiority of

Grand fleet by a new method of offensive technique. Unfortunately the British

Admiralty since 1914 had been deciphering the majority of German messages.

When, it was realised in London that the High Sea Fleet would be at sea, Admiral

Jellicoe the commander Grand Fleet was ordered to take his fleet out. Thus, the

scene was set for the first and last battle between large fleets of dreadnoughts.

BATTLE PLAN

10. German Plan.

a. After commencement of the World War I, the German naval

strategy was fleet-in-being orientated. The Germans had immense

confidence in their mining and submarine capabilities. However, the

situation on ground was fast changing in favour of the allied troops.

Germans were loosing ground gradually. Two years of successful British

blocked was gradually becoming unbearable. Admiral Scheer’s new

offensive idea was to attain the objectives shown on the slide:

(1) To gain some relief from established blockade.

(2) To reduce the margin of numerical superiority of the Grand

fleet.

(3) To guard the country against assault from sea.

b. Scheer planned a co-ordinated trap for Grand fleet. He planned to

send U-boats to mine the exit routes from Scapa Flow and Rosyath and

then sending Hipper’s First Scouting Group to trail its coat and lure the

Beatty’s battle cruisers into the grip of the whole high sea fleet.

11. British Plan. The British had their own plan too. For the last 250 years

British had been successfully using the tactics of close blocked against French,

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Spanish and Portuguese. However, the British Admiralty was astute enough to

realise that the nature of the sea warfare had changed and that a close blocked

would not be effective because steam ships of British would require a fleet at

least three times as large as the Germans. This was obviously very costly and

inefficient. However, the British fleet based at Scapa Flow had effectively imposed

distance blockade in the North Sea. However, the ‘Hit-and-Run’ tactics of German

ships was really bothering the British fleet during that time. Grand fleet was

looking for an opportunity to level the score with the High Sea Fleet. On receiving

the decipher messages of the High Sea Fleet’s plan, Admiral Jellicoe was ordered

to take the Grand Fleet out to attain the objectives as you can see on the slide:

a. To Eliminate the High Sea fleet.

b. To stop invasion or raids on homeland by German ships.

c. To achieve complete command of the sea.

COMMAND STRUCTURE

12. Grand Fleet. Now, let’s have a look to the command structure of

both the forces. Firstly, The Grand Fleet was positioned in three different places

namely, Scapa Flow, Invergordon and Rosyth. The detailed Command structure of

Grand Fleet is shown on the screen.

Grand Fleet

(C-IN-C Admiral Jellicoe)

Scapa Flow Fleet Rosyth Fleet Invergordon Fleet

(Adm Jellicoe) (Vice Adm Beatty) (Vice Adm Jerram)

1st & 4th Battle Sqn 5th Battle Sqn 2nd Battle Sqn

2nd Cruiser Sqn 1st & 2nd Battle Cruiser

Sqn

1st Cruiser Sqn

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3rd Battle Cruiser Sqn 1st, 2nd & 3rd Light

Cruiser Sqn

Part of 11th Torpedo-boat

destroyer Sqn

4th Light Cruiser Sqn Part of 1st, 9th, 10th,

and 13th Torpedo-boat

destroyer Sqn

-

4th, part of 11th and 12th

Torpedo-boat destroyer

Sqn

- -

13. High Seas Fleet. On the other hand, gentleman, the scouting group

and the main battle squadron of high sea fleet was stationed at willhelmshaven.

The command structure of the High Sea Fleet is shown on the screen.

HIGH SEAS FLEET

(C-IN-C Admiral Scheer)

Admiral Scheer's Fleet Admiral Hipper's Fleet

Cruiser Sqn Battle Cruiser Sqn

Battle Cruiser Sqn

ORBAT

14. Force Comparison. Gentleman lets have a look to the comparative force

structure of the two belligerents in terms of their various types of ships:

Type of Ship Grand Fleet High Sea Fleet

Battle Ship (Dreadnoughts) 28 16

Battle Cruiser 09 05

Battle Ship (Pre-

dreadnoughts)

Nil 06

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Armoured Cruiser 08 nil

Light Cruiser 26 11

Destroyer 77 61

Total Ships 148 99

Total tonnage 1,250,000 660,000

Total Crew 60,000 45,000

SEQUENCE OF BATTLE

15. Prelude. On May 30, 1916, Jellicoe received a signal that the German

High Sea Fleet was massing in strength off Wilhelmshaven. That news was

enough to spur Jellicoe into action. He arranged with Vice Admiral Beatty, the

commander of the British Battle cruisers in the Firth of Forth, to rendezvous with

him in a position to the south of Norway, near the entrance to the Skagerrak, by

May 31, afternoon. British fleet thus set the sail at the night of 30 May to intercept

the High Sea Fleet about four-and-half hours before the high sea fleet had even

left the port.

16. First Encounter. On the other hand, early morning of 01 June, Hipper

with his 1st and 2nd Scouting group steered north. By mid day, both Hipper and

Beatty were abreast to the Jutland bank steaming on parallel courses only 50

miles separated out of each other’s sight. The two forces sighted each other for

the first time when coincidentally both the forces sent their ships to investigate a

Danish merchant ship.

17. Germans Drew First Blood. Within one hour of this sighting, the

battle cruisers of both the fleets opened fire. Hipper’s ships had quickly displayed

a gunnery superiority over their opponents who were very slow to find the

accurate ranges. The Lion, Princes Royal and Tiger had been heavily hit before a

single German ship had suffered any damage. German battle cruisers continued

to shoot with deadly accuracy and were able to sink HMS Indefatigable and Queen

Marry.

18. Grand Fleet Arrival. On receiving the enemy contact report from Beatty,

Admiral Jellicoe had positioned the ships under Admiral Hood and immediately

dispatched to assist Beatty. The sudden appearance of the Grand Fleet took the

Germans by great surprise.

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19. British Onslaught. The British Fleet opened fire on the Germans who

were blinded by the setting sun. Lutzow, The Flagship of Hipper was extensively

damaged forcing Hipper to shift to Moltke. During this phase the high sea fleet

was in a severe disadvantage and suffered heavy punishment. Being

outnumbered and out manoeuvred, Scheer realised that night engagement

offered his fleet the only option to getaway from the Grand Fleet.

20. Night Engagements. The British did not favour night engagements

as it would expose their ships to torpedo attacks by the German destroyers and

the British were not trained in night fighting. Admiral Jellicoe had planned to block

the escape of the Germans and strike them again in the morning. The British

battle cruisers had been stationed to cover the escape route and waiting for

daylight to renew the engagements.

21. German Withdrawal. During the night after making many

desperate and unsuccessful attempts, Scheer managed to break through the

Grand Fleet blockade, at 2330 hrs sinking four British destroyers in the process

and routing home safely through the Horn Reefs passage. Scheer’s gamble

worked at the cost of his major units.

OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE

Physical Outcome

22. Battle Damage. At the end of the battle the losses incurred by both

the forces are shown on he screen:

Type of Ships British German

Battle ships Nil 01

Battle Cruisers 03 01

Armoured cruisers 03 Nil

Light Cruisers Nil 04

Destroyers 08 05

Total 14 11

Total tonnage 112,000 tons 61,000 tons

Killed 6,097 2,551

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Strategic and Tactical Outcome

23. Jutland was undoubtedly a material and moral victory for the German High

Seas Fleet whilst being a strategic victory for the British Grand Fleet.  The

Germans had inflicted heavier losses on the numerically superior Grand Fleet and

had escaped near destruction but had failed to break the British blockade or

control of the North Sea and had not altered the balance of power in any

meaningful way. On the other hand, The Royal Navy had failed to achieve a new

Trafalgar, to both it's and the British public's disappointment, although it had

ended the battle in control of the battlefield and with the balance of power

unchanged.

Far Reaching Outcome

24. The far reaching result of Jutland was that it convinced Scheer and the

German Naval staff that the only way of gaining naval victory was via unrestricted

submarine warfare, and not by defeating the British in battle. By summer 1916,

the German high command decided that a further major naval battle would

involve unacceptable risks. The High Sea Fleet was placed on the defensive, and

their morale suffered badly, which resulted in mutiny in August 1917 and

subsequently a major revolt in 1918.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

Maritime Strategy and the Battle

25. Gentleman now lets analysis the battle from maritime strategic

perspective.

26. British Strategy. British had been successfully using the strategy of close

blockade in the North Sea. British fleet based at Scapa Flow effectively blockaded

North Sea. Distance Blocked proved to be quite effective. British recognised that

the maintenance of the command of the sea was far more vital than the defeat of

the German Fleet. However, Admiral Jellicoe believed that complete destruction of

the High Sea Fleet by decisive battle would ensure the complete command of the

sea. Thus reacted on receiving the news of German’s initiative.

27. German Strategy. German Naval strategy was built on caution and

defensive concepts. They thought the confrontation was unnecessary in any

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events since mines and submarines would tackle the toll of British ships. But the

pressure of the British Blockade was becoming painful. In view of their

deteriorating position, The German began to reassess their naval strategy to gain

limited sea use capabilities by adopting Fleet-in –being strategy. This strategy of

the High Sea Fleet is also reflected in Admiral Scheer’s historical speech, “ The

Fleet would strike when the circumstances are favourable,.............Fleet will

therefore, seek battle with the English Fleet only when a state of equality has

been achieved by the method of guerrilla warfare “.

Tactical Analysis

28. Disposition of Fleet. The British Admirals were in Favour of centralised

command. The primary means of communication was by visual signals. All ships

were fitted with W/T but their use for tactical manoeuvring was not being

exploited. Although the fleet could be divided into squadrons and divisions and

deployed on independent missions,

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29. Gun Engagements. The British tactics during the war were to deploy in

the line ahead formation, at right angles to the enemy’s line of bearing so that

heavy broad side could be used to defeat the enemy. This engagement was only

possible if the enemy continued in line-ahead formation. The British’s always

aimed at crossing the enemy’s ‘T’ in order to engage where as the Germans

knowing their limitations avoided direct engagement with the Grand Fleet.

30. The Battle Turn. The Germans successfully executed the battle turn

and managed to evade the British attacks. In a ‘battle turn’ each ship wheeled

over hard and reversed course in succession beginning from the rear. When this

turn was being executed the German destroyers to hide the movement deployed

smoke screen and subsequently the destroyers would break out to carry out a

torpedo attack on the pursuing enemy.

31. Destroyer Tactics. The Germans exploited poor visibility conditions in

the North Sea, where it is misty most of the time. The German destroyers used to

break out from the smoke screen and launch attack on the pursuing enemy from

ranges of 10,000 yards to 6,500 yards (range of German torpedo 8000 yards). The

only countermeasure the British had was to turn away from the torpedo and open

out in range.

32. Night Attack. The German organisation at night was very good. Their

system of recognition signals was extremely well practised where as the British’s

had no system of recognition at night. The Germans made good use of their

searchlights, which were superior to the British. Their method of firing at night

produced excellent results. The British were poorly trained in the night fighting

capability.

33. Present Day Implication. The tactical concepts adhered by both the

fleets has little significance in today’s warfare. With the advent of long range

radar’s, air cover and the capability to engage enemy at extended range (BVR)

allows flexibility of operations. The modern day fleet can be further subdivided

into various groups, units and elements. These ships although operating

independently can remain in touch with each other due to modern W/T systems,

which were not available to forces in Jutland. Engaging enemy war ships with guns

today would be the last resorts. Major of the surface combatants is fitted with

ultra modern surface to surface missiles and fire control systems.

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Implication of C3I

34. Grand Fleet. At the beginning of the battle, British Naval Intelligence had

captured German cipher and signal book and square maps of North Sea from the

Russians. The Grand fleet had centralized command and the co-ordination

between various commands and units were not achieved. The British trusted on

visual communication.. As a result C-in-C were unable to keep control of the

comperatively modern high-speed fleet in a smoke filled battle zone. The under

commands did also failed to report the positions and movements of enemy ships

in time to the command ship.

35. High Seas Fleet. Although Germans cipher and crypto system was

disclosed by the British intelligence, German’s were unaware of the fact.

However, German’s centralised command and control was quite effective and

they maintained it all through in the Battle.

Leadership Trend

36. Grand Fleet Commander Admiral Jellicoe. The then First Sea Lord

Fisher used to describe Admiral Jellicoe as future Nelson. With a long and

distinguish career, Jellicoe was a genius in his own way. In addition to his firm

belief in the ’line ahead’ and the’ big guns’ his strategy for the fleet emphasised

defence. However, he was found quite rigid in traditional thinking and not flexible

in some occasions. He also was in favour of centralised command, which proved

ineffective in Jutland.

37. High Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Scheer. On the other hand,

Admiral Scheer was appointed as C-IN-C of High Sea Fleet by replacing Admiral

Phol, a man of ill health and ingrained caution. Scheer was a man, young in ideas,

willing to take risking orders that new methods and inventions might be tried. He

was daring and inventive. In this battle he correctly appreciated his formidable

enemy and took a valuable decision of withdrawal at night through enemy.

War Technology

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38. Gentleman, let’s discuss the war technology of time. First of all let us see

the ship design philosophy of both the forces.

a. Ship Design Philosophy. If we see the opposing Flagships of

Hipper and Beatty, SMS LUTZOW and H.M.S. LION.

DESCRIPTION SMS LUTZOW HMS LION

Completed 8 August 1915 May 1912

Dimensions 689’ x 95.1’ 701’ x 89’

Displacement 26,600 tons 26,150 tons

Armour 12” max 9" max

Speed 24 knots 28 knots

Armament 8 x 12" 8 x 13.5"

We find these ships are of almost similar displacement and dimensions

and yet reflect the design philosophies of each nation. The British

emphasis of higher speed and greater armament at the expense of

armour and the German emphasis on greater armour at the expense of

higher speed and armament.

b. Armour Protection Concept. During the battle, it had been

assumed that naval battles would be fought at a maximum of 10,000

yards. At that range shells hit horizontally and vertical armour is of

paramount importance. The 9” armour of the ships was assumed to be

sufficient to protect the ship from German gunnery. Unfortunately, the

range at which battle commenced was almost twice this distance. SMS

LUTZOW opened fire at yards, about 18,500 yards. At this range the shells

trajectory is no longer horizontal, but plunging. The shells are more likely

to hit the ship at angle and hit the deck. No British or German ships had

deck armour. They had protective plating only up to 2.5 inches thick. But,

the German deck plates were made of much superior materials than the

British. So the British ships were more vulnerable to long range plunging

fire and suffered for these material differences to the Germans,

c. Range Finders. It was clearly demonstrated that the British fired

more number of shells but surprisingly received more shots by the

Germans. One of the main reasons behind this was the superior range

finder as used by the Germans. The British range finders where co-

incidence was the Germans were stereoscopic. The British range finders

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were also of a shorter base (9-foot) than the Germans, which made long

distance range, finding more difficult. So the German range finders were

quicker to find the correct range.

d. Cordite. The other problem for the British was the composition

of the cordite charge itself. To prevent the charges exploding and to

reduce the fire hazard the British used Vaseline to stabilize the cordite.

Unfortunately, after Jutland testing would show that the Vaseline had the

opposite effect and made the cordite highly unstable and extremely

vulnerable to fire and explosion. More so, The Germans encased the

cordite in metal containers while the British used silk bags. The silk bag

with unstable cordite was a recipe for further disaster.

e. Shell Design. The British AP (Armour Piercing) shell proved to be

ineffective, breaking up on impact, or failing to explode once penetrating

the German armour. The shells tested at 90-degree angle, was defective in

design when hitting at lesser angles. This problem had been suspected for,

but the Admiralty had neglected to conduct proper testing.

f. Shell Handling Room. This was not a fundamental weakness

in the design of the British ships over the German ships, rather a difference

in experience. At Dogger Bank, SMS SEYDLITZ was almost destroyed when

a plunging shell penetrated a turret and the resulting cordite flash killed

every one in two turrets. The Germans through this tragedy learnt and

immediately, flash tight shell handling room was introduced. The British

unaware of this kept the existing design. In Jutland, a number of British

ships including HMS LION were damaged by hit on Q-turret, which sent a

flash down the hoist.

APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR

40. Principle of war followed by the British and the German are mentioned

below:

a. Maintenance of Aim. Both the British and the Germans had

specific and a solid set of aim to achieve national objectives. Due to the

overwhelming concentration of British forces the Germans could not

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maintain their aim till the end of the battle. British could maintain the aim

throughout the battle.

b. Offensive Action. The Germans courageously displayed the

offensive action all through but the British resolutely displayed the same

but sometimes they were reluctant.

c. Concentration of Force. Throughout the battle the High Sea

Fleet could concentrate their force but the Grand Fleet could not due to

their lack in communication and intelligence.

d. Economy of Effort. Although British could achieve strategic

victory, they had to mobilise all of their efforts and force. On the other

hand the German was able to cause more damage to the British by using

inferior force.

e. Flexibility. German had greater organisational flexibility as they

were practising more decentralised command. British were bounded by the

Jellicoe adopted rigid ‘Grant fleet orders’, which in many occasion

prevented subordinate commanders to act independently.

f. Security. The Germans could not ensure the security of their

cipher and signal books. As a result the British often had advance

knowledge of enemy movement. On the other hand the British could

ensure the security of their assets.

g. Surprise. British achieved the initial surprise but could not

materialise it. British had the provisions to get early information through

intelligence and the Germans deployed submarines for early information.

But none of the provisions could be exploited to achieve tactical gain.

h. Maintenance of Morale. Moral of both the nations to fight the

battle were very high. The Germans moral was especially very high

because they were defending their existence and their leadership was of

very high order. The morale of British force was high as they were having

superior force.

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j. Co-operation. The units of the Grand Fleet during the war

lacked in co-operation. On the other hand the Germans had good co-

operation between two forces.

k. Administration. The British lacked in administration flexibility

in operation. The Germans had efficient and flexible administration among

the High Sea Fleet.

LESSONS LEARNT

41. Naval warfare has changed over the period of years since the battle of

Jutland. Today, technology is at the forefront of any battle. Modern sensors and

precision weapons have changed the whole perspective of the naval warfare. The

pertinent aspects of Jutland, which deserve attention today, are discussed below:

a. Lessons of previous war are essentially to be implied in subsequent

war. Germans successfully implemented the lessons of Dogger Bank but

the British paid in Jutland for not doing so.

b. Implication of the technology available is essential for success in

naval war. German successfully used the advance cordite and shell design

technology of the time and achieved success.

c. Numerical achievement does not always reflect the out come of the

battle. German sunk more British ships but the out come of battle was

different.

d. Numerical supremacy may not be the determinate for success.

British had numerical superiority but inferior application of tactics failed to

bring success for them.

e. Sound war plan may get ruined due to lack of information security.

Scheer could not gain success out of his sound war plan, as British could

decipher all German messages.

f. Better communication is essential for effective command, control

and co-ordination. Ineffective communication almost resulted British

command failure, Jellicoe in one occasion had to shout to his fleet without

response, ’Where is the enemy’s battle fleet?”

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g. Lack of training may cause severe tactical disadvantages. British

avoided night engagement due to their lack inefficiency in night fighting,

which ultimately caused German retreat by night.

h. Freedom of action for subordinate commanders is essential in naval

warfare. Jellicoe adopted rigid ‘Grant fleet orders’ which prevented

subordinate command to act spontaneously. As G.Till mentioned “......... if

centralised control like Jutland would force in future, ships would be sunk

before the senior offices had got his intention made clear.”

j. Navy can be used effectively in continental war. Effective blockade

of British had caused severe food shortage in Germany and subsequent

defeat of Germans in WWI.

CONCLUSION

42. To conclude gentleman, British and German fought the Battle of

Jutland from their own respective standpoint. Germans, the land power had

involved them in to the battle to reduce the numerical superiority of the

British, the Sea Power. On the contrary, British engaged themselves into

the war to gain total ‘command of the sea’. German though had the unique

plan, but failed to attain desired surprise due to their poor intelligence

security. British, on the other hand, failed to capitalise the tactical

superiority gained from surprise. Germans showed their tactical mastery

and could manage to evade from inevitable defect.

43. The British fleet, though had out manoeuvred the Germans

strategically, its material weaknesses were evident. The German

shipbuilding, gunnery and mechanical devices had displayed much

superiority and passed the severest test with flying colours. Their

commander Admiral Scheer also showed profuse vigour and courage. On

the other hand, the commander British fleet Admiral Jellicoe, a strong

personality could not display his sound strategical knowledge in the battle

as expected.

44. Both the fleets tried to use the principle of war effectively. Due to

the British overwhelming concentration of forces the Germans could not

maintain their aim till the end.

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45. The battle of Jutland gave us a number of lessons for future and till

today adequately draws our attention. The famous historian Captain Liddell

Hart thus appropriately said, “No battle in all history has spilled so much

ink as Jutland did”.

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