NAVAL AVIATION ENTERPRISE

10-YEAR COMMEMORATION

PERSPECTIVES FROM NAE LEADERS —

PAST AND PRESENT

July 2014

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FOREWORD

July 2014 marks 10 years since the establishment of the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). Today, members of our Navy and Marine Corps aviation team work together to advance readiness at an affordable cost. This collaboration and unity of focus is due, in large part, to the creation of the NAE construct and the foresight of the founding Enterprise leaders.

In 2004, our NAE predecessors came together from their various commands to establish a charter for what they called the Naval Aviation Enterprise. They recognized the risks associated with the existing Naval Aviation culture of “readiness at any cost” and managing the different aviation readiness accounts independently. They also recognized the differences between Navy and Marine Corps aviation and the requisite to meet each service’s specific requirement. Ultimately, they established a partnership with a shared goal: to “deliver the right force, with the right readiness, at the right cost, at the right time — today and in the future.”

The founders of the NAE foresaw the type of resource-constrained environment that exists today. At this 10-year milestone, we are grateful to the numerous Naval Aviation leaders who have embraced and promoted a culture of cost-wise readiness over the past decade — particularly the former NAE leaders who share their insights in the following pages. We would not be the warfighting force we are today without their prescient vision.

The NAE has created a common sight picture, which has allowed us to break down our traditional Type/Model/Series stovepipes by giving us a standardized and transparent way to view our platforms’ relative health. It allows the aggregate of the Navy and Marine Corps aviation leadership the chance to really identify and see our readiness degraders and cost drivers. As with all process efforts like this, they are only useful if they lead to "product." Our "product" is readiness — and obtaining that readiness in the most efficient and sensible way.

While we have come a long way in the past 10 years, we cannot and will not rest on our laurels. Our mission is not easy, and we face real challenges ahead. However, by applying lessons from the leaders who came before us and working together as one Enterprise team, we can be ready to meet those challenges and provide our warfighters the value they deserve. We will ensure a Naval Aviation force that is ready to answer the call and meet our nation’s tasking, today and tomorrow.

________________________ ________________________ ________________________

Vice Adm. David Buss Vice Adm. David Dunaway Lt. Gen. Jon Davis

Commander Commander Deputy Commandant for Aviation

Naval Air Forces Naval Air Systems Command U.S. Marine Corps

_____________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________

Vice Adm. David Dunaway

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TIMELINE OF NAE MILESTONES

� Late 1990s: Naval Aviation experienced growth in flying hour program costs and excessive variations in readiness. Navy leadership at the time recognized a culture of consumption and a lack of alignment between requirements and processes. As then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Vern Clark reportedly remarked, “The only thing the Navy is good at is spending money.”

� 1998: Adm. Jay Johnson, CNO, chartered the Aviation Maintenance and Supply Readiness (AMSR) Review. The review resulted in a report identifying 19 areas of concern and led to the establishment of cross-functional teams to begin investigating and addressing the issues.

� 1998: Then Rear Adm. John Nathman, Director, Air Warfare Division, oversaw the Naval Aviation Production Process Improvement (NAPPI) Program, which took a holistic view of the pilot training process to reduce delays in the pipeline and reduce the time to train.

� 2001: Vice Adm. Nathman, then Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CNAP)/ Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), led the development of the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP), with the initial mission of improving maintenance and repair processes. Through NAVRIIP, Naval Aviation leaders adopted an “enterprise” construct based on collaboration among Fleet commanders/ operators, providers and resource sponsors.

� 2001: Naval Aviation leadership began touring air stations and ships to talk with junior service members about readiness issues and barriers. These visits, known as “Boots on the Ground” or “Boots on Deck,” provided an opportunity for Sailors and Marines to share their readiness “head-hurters” and gain direct Naval Aviation leadership engagement to address issues.

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� 2003: Process improvement initiatives at depots evolved into Enterprise AIRSpeed. Vice Adm. Mike Malone, CNAP/CNAF; Vice Adm. Wally Massenburg, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR); and then Rear Adm. Jim Zortman, Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CNAL), formed the nucleus of what would soon become the NAE.

� 2004: Naval Aviation leaders established and signed the NAE charter, agreeing on a shared motto, “Deliver the right force, with the right readiness, at the right cost at the right time – today, and in the future.” Naval Aviation embraced the term “Naval Aviation Enterprise” as the enterprise concept took hold.

� 2007: The Marine Corps joined the NAE and established the Marine Aviation Executive Readiness Board (MAERB) simultaneously. Lt. Gen. George Trautman, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA), became one of the three co-leads of the Naval Aviation Enterprise, along with Vice Adm. Thomas Kilcline, CNAF, and Vice Adm. David Venlet, Commander, NAVAIR.

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� 2008: The NAE released the NAE Strategic Plan, 2008-2015, providing strategic objectives and initiatives to guide Enterprise actions and decisions. The plan included a vision, “Efficiently deliver the right force with the right readiness at the right time…today and in the future,” and a mission, “Support Combatant Commanders and the Fleet by providing combat-ready Naval Aviation forces which are fully trained, properly manned, interoperable, well maintained and combat-sustainable.”

� 2009: The NAE launched the future readiness initiatives process, an annual call for readiness and sustainment initiatives that are evaluated and, in most cases, championed by Navy leadership. From 2009 to 2014, approximately $319 million have been invested in readiness initiatives, with an estimated return on investment of 9.6-to-1, or a total of $3.4 billion.

� 2012: The NAE Strategic Plan, 2012-2017, was published with a new mission statement based

on the evolution and maturation of its mission: “Advance and sustain Naval Aviation warfighting capabilities at an affordable cost…today and in the future,” which endures today.

� 2014: NAE leadership refocuses and reshapes Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) reporting to hone in Enterprise efforts toward targeting the most impactful readiness degraders and cost drivers.

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PERSPECTIVE OF ADM. (RET.) JOHN NATHMANCNAP, 2000-2002/CNAF, 2001-2002

August 2000 was a pivotal time for me and for the development of Naval Aviation’s enterprise approach. I had been serving as Director, Air Warfare on the Chief of Naval Operations staff and I thought my next assignment was going to be to Third Fleet. Instead, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Adm. Jay Johnson, relayed on behalf of the incoming CNO Adm. Vern Clark a vision for greater alignment across the Navy and that included assigning me as Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific. I didn’t know it then, but this assignment, combined with other contributing factors, would later evolve into what we now call the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE). There were numerous broad, systemic issues facing Naval Aviation at the time — greater maintenance man-hours per flight hour, higher costs for the flying hour program overall, poor parts management, training and readiness disconnects, and insufficient production through the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRS) — that served as a call to action. We couldn’t yet envision the NAE in its present form, and we hadn’t articulated this way of doing business as an “enterprise” approach, per se, but we knew that we had to work together to address the broad issues to put readiness back on step, and that it would include the use of actionable readiness metrics.

Not only was I taking on the role of CNAP, but as part of the alignment effort, I was assigned a new role in 2001 as Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF). As CNAF, I was assigned the responsibility of the single policy owner for U.S. Navy aviation forces. I first worked with Vice Adm. Joe Mobley, Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic (CNAL), who was senior to me but — even before I became CNAF — graciously deferred to me as “Air Boss” to demonstrate east and west coast alignment. I

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then teamed with Rear Adm. Mike Malone, as the next CNAL, and we strived for continuity in policy and alignment while we both maintained our waterfront responsibilities. The assignment was unique for me in that I had the opportunity to execute what I had programmed in my previous role as Director, Air Warfare (N88).

The state of Naval Aviation readiness at the time was unacceptably low. Squadron readiness levels were not up to standard, the Fleet Replacement Squadrons were not filling Fleet seats and the maintenance and supply functions were not matching demand. The first and default approach of many in our community was to ask for more money. However, we couldn’t defend why we needed more money, and we were losing credibility with the OPNAV staff. The wake-up calls came when we put more money into the flying hour program and air wing readiness levels actually went down. We were galvanized by the realization that more money was not going to be the answer. It became evident that we needed to gain a greater understanding of our readiness production processes and the intended, as well as unintended, consequences of our actions. As a result, we launched the Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) in 2001.

Key players in the NAVRIIP team included Vice Adm. Wally Massenburg, then the Assistant Commander for Logistics, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and Rear Adm. Mike Finley, Commander, Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP). Massenburg was a huge proponent of the triad concept, and he saw himself as a “provider” to CNAF — to the point that he sent me an email telling me he was “reporting for duty.” With buy-in from Massenburg and Finley and participation of flag officers from 17 different commands, we started mapping and identifying ways to improve our maintenance and repair processes as well as readiness entitlements.

“The leaders of the various functional areas had significant working experience and camaraderie with each other before we embarked on the NAE endeavor. We all knew and trusted each other. We had one shared agenda, not separate

functional or organizational agendas. It was one for all and all for the overall good of Naval Aviation.”

- Rear Adm. (Ret.) Mike Finley, NAVICP, 1999-2002

To dig deeper into aviation readiness issues, we began conducting NAVRIIP leadership visits to master air bases. During these Boots on the Ground visits, we would meet with local leaders — the Type Wing Commander, the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) Officer, the Supply Officer and the closest/most senior FRS Commanding Officer. As we traveled to various bases, we saw many instances in which unexpected root causes were leading to major problems. During one visit to the EA-6B community at NAS Whidbey Island, we learned that the wing had an ALQ-99 backlog and that repairs were held-up because one of their two benches was not in use. As we questioned the maintainers during the site visit, we learned that the bench wasn’t being used simply because the air conditioning in that part of the building wasn’t working as the naval station didn’t have enough money to repair it — a quick fix. As another example, NAS Oceana was

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experiencing delays receiving its high-priority parts even though the parts were being flown directly to NAS Norfolk, about 20 miles up the road. What we discovered was that the folks at Norfolk were trying to reduce their trucks’ fuel costs and were only delivering parts when a truck was full, resulting in a seven- to 10-day delay in getting the high-priority parts to NAS Oceana.

With these examples in mind, it became clear to the Type Wing Commanders that they were on point for their readiness issues, and we forcefully worked to encourage them to take full ownership. My message to them was, “There is going to be accountability in the way we manage the readiness of our force, and you’d better know the second- and third-order effects of the decisions that you make.” Specifically, they needed to be accountable for the readiness of their aircraft on the flight line and for throughput of their Fleet Replacement Squadron — the seed corn of Naval Aviation. The Type Wing Commanders learned as much as we did through the Boots on the Ground visits over time, the action items went both ways, and I believe they felt invigorated knowing they were in charge of their communities.

As part of NAVRIIP, we took a closer look at our depots and how we could reduce the amount of waste in the processes there. Under Massenburg’s leadership, the depots instituted process improvement efforts like Six Sigma and Lean — which evolved into the AIRSpeed program that we have today. I remember seeing the depot at NAS North Island before and after the establishment of their process improvement efforts, and the efficiency changes were really night and day.

Around this same time, we also developed the concept of aircraft readiness “entitlements,” specifying the number of ready aircraft that a squadron needed to obtain the required readiness level for their phase of the inter-deployment training cycle (IDTC). This improved the effectiveness of maintenance and repair processes. No longer were parts into AIMD being handled via a “first-in,

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first-out” policy. With the use of entitlements, maintenance and repairs could be prioritized in a way that truly supported the targeted generation of required readiness.

Another initiative we undertook was to modify our training and readiness (T&R) matrices. Each T&R matrix was developed by Type Wing Commanders with little dedicated feedback from the air wings and with little thought to execution and consequences. We weren’t connecting the dots, and the matrices did not adequately meet the squadrons’ readiness requirements. We just didn’t have the right metrics in place. CNAF became involved in every T&R matrix and as a result of the efforts, we rebaselined our T&R matrices and set a foundation for more efficient and effective readiness production.

Looking back on my time as CNAF, I remember that the Navy’s aviation community was essentially in crisis mode. I was working to achieve transformational change, and I felt I would only have about two years to get things done. I didn’t have time to convert everyone to my way of thinking, the time for action was now, and I realized that some people were left on the sidelines. I regret this aspect of my tour as Air Boss.

With my departure in August of 2002 to become Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Requirements and Programs, I was pleased to see Vice Adm. Malone become the new CNAF since he had great involvement, understanding and ownership in the transformation. He was the right leader with the right instincts, and he could move beyond the crisis mode and — from a stable base — focus on issues that we hadn’t attacked or solved, yet. This continuity of leadership really helped Naval Aviation adopt the enterprise approach we have today.

I believe that as NAVRIIP leaders, we produced significant and productive changes in Naval Aviation. We changed the way a lot of people thought. Over the past 10 years, the focus areas have shifted depending on the readiness issues at hand. It has been the NAE construct though that has identified these issues and kept Naval Aviation out in front of them. I see great potential for the future of the NAE, and I am confident that there is a great deal more that the NAE can accomplish.

- Adm. John Nathman, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

“In the summer of 2003, Naval Aviation stakeholders, mostly Captains and Flag Officers, met at the Thomas Group (TGI) Headquarters in Fort Worth, Texas. We were examining Naval Aviation Readiness. We had been working for several years with TGI

to find the right metrics for readiness, to define the correct cross-functional relationships, and to produce aircraft ready for tasking …

… Over the next four years, Admirals Wally Massenburg, Jim Zortman and I led the effort to identify the total cost of readiness. Our belief was that we could begin to manage our costs if we first quantified them.”

- Vice Adm. (Ret.) Mike Malone, CNAF, 2002-2004

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PERSPECTIVE OF VICE ADM. (RET.) WALLY MASSENBURGCOMMANDER, NAVAIR, 2003-2007

In the 90s, our leadership valued moving to the future at all costs. As a result, resources were moved from current readiness accounts to try and buy our future. Adm. Jay Johnson, the CNO, chartered a cross-functional team, the Aviation Maintenance and Supply Readiness (AMSR) group, to analyze why Naval Aviation readiness was so poor. This team determined that there were 19 areas of deficiency that were causing unacceptable readiness risk. Although this team identified the problem areas, there was an inability to collectively address these problems and provide the resources necessary to improve them. Resources were provided marginally, and nothing changed. Naval Aviation was divided along organizational structural command and control lines, where leadership was incentivized to value their activities at the expense of all others. The business model was “Whack-a-Mole,” where we would manage crisis to crisis, platform by platform, but there was no systematic change. By 2000, we had a crisis where we couldn’t buy “new” quick enough to mitigate our inability to keep our older aircraft ready.

When Adm. Vern Clark became CNO, he knew that Naval Aviation was failing and that as a result, he risked his ability to fight the force. In addition, the demand for resources to maintain Naval Aviation readiness continued to increase at an alarming rate. He lamented that “the only thing the Navy is good at is spending money!” At the third CNO Executive Board, in December 2000, he directed Vice Adm. John Nathman, recently assigned as Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific, to assume control of all of Naval Aviation and “clean up the mess.” Although the concept was not understood, Nathman had become the single process owner for Naval Aviation, the “Air Boss.” Nathman had previous experience with the Naval Aviation Production Process Improvement (NAPPI) program, where he had looked at the inordinate length of time it took for pilots to get

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through pilot training. He had hired the Thomas Group (TGI), a process improvement company, to look at the problem differently. Nathman chose to use Thomas Group methodology to try and have a similar effect on Naval Aviation readiness. He used the AMSR as the problem statement.

As the Naval Aviation Logistician, I had introduced Nathman to a cross-functional construct. I drew the first “triangle” on a white board at NAVAIR (showing a cross-functional leadership triad), and the discussion focused on what problem we were trying to solve. Nathman wanted to take on the “Readiness Bathtub;” ergo, the first Single Fleet Driven Metric was born – “Aircraft Ready for Training.” The original leaders included Vice Adm. Nathman, CNAP; Vice Adm. Joe Mobley, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic (CNAL); Lt. Gen. Mike Hough, Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA); Rear Adm. Ken Heimgartner, Director, Fleet Readiness Division (OPNAV N43); Vice Adm. Mike McCabe, Director, Air Warfare Division (N88); Vice Adm. Joe Dyer, NAVAIR; and Rear Adm. Keith Lippert, Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). The project manager for the Thomas Group was Mike Trader.

The challenges in those early years were tied to getting various personalities to value Naval Aviation beyond their assigned responsibilities. The Naval Aviation Readiness Integrated Improvement Program (NAVRIIP) was created to develop how we were going to behave in the future. Arguments about resources, metrics and responsibilities occurred on a regular basis. Progress was minimal. There were, however, several positives. Boots on the Ground at Lemoore, Whidbey and Oceana helped us realize our center of gravity — the Type/Model/Series teams. This construct

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aligned the organization to those who were responsible for manning, training and equipping the force to provide the Combatant Commanders the readiness they needed. These teams were a mirror of the executive leadership cross-functional model. The Wing Commodores took on the responsibility for readiness.

The first team that adopted the T/M/S construct was the H-60. The first leader was now-Rear Adm. Bill Lescher, who was the Wing Commodore in Mayport, with a large supporting role from recently retired Rear Adm. Bill Shannon, who was the H-60 Program Manager. These two leaders left their “egos at the door,” embraced the concept and gave the NAVRIIP model the first successes in dealing with readiness. Boots on the Ground had matured to get senior leadership of those responsible for readiness in front of our Sailors and Marines on a regular basis. Also during this period, we started to introduce AIRSpeed (Lean, Six Sigma, and the Theory of Constraints) as the basis for continuous process improvement.

During the summer of 2001, the basics of operating with respect to the defined “greater good” started to take hold. Clark had started reallocating resources to the “housekeeping” of Naval Aviation and there were indications that readiness was slowly improving. Vice Adm. Nathman and Rear Adm. Mike Malone, CNAL at the time, were showing success in defining the Single Fleet Driven Metric with respect to the training and readiness matrices. The yeoman’s work accomplished at that time set the tone for what and how we were going to measure readiness — “The Main Thing.” However, it was evident when the attacks on the Pentagon occurred in September 2001, that we were just scratching the surface of our collective problem, as we couldn’t fully deploy a large number of our carriers (the limiting factor being support equipment). The predictions that Clark had made about the readiness of Naval Aviation were driven home.

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With renewed urgency, and a real world crisis as stimulus, NAVRIIP took off. Between the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, readiness of Naval Aviation improved remarkably as “cycles of learning” were repeated over and over again. AIRSpeed was introduced throughout Naval Aviation. In July 2003, Naval Aviation leadership met in Dallas to “celebrate” our successes. However, we discovered and acknowledged that we were using dollars for future readiness to change the situation in current readiness, and that we had swung the pendulum too far. At this juncture, we figured that “cost mattered,” which put us on the road to establishing and working as a real Enterprise the following year in 2004. The Single Fleet Metric continued to evolve – “Aircraft Ready for Tasking at Reduced Cost.”

During this period of time, Vice Adm. Malone became the “Air Boss.” Malone, now in the CEO-seat, provided discipline by holding Wing Commodores and their respective T/M/S teams responsible and accountable for the “Main Thing.” With Malone’s leadership, we started to understand our bad behaviors and provide the encouragement to change. Then Rear Adm. Jim Zortman was assigned as CNAL. For Zortman, it was the training ground to understand how to get the most out of this nascent construct. It was during this time that T/M/S teams participated in Naval Aviation-wide video teleconferences. It was the ultimate in sharing experiences and best practices among the communities. Malone had said that he worried that “we were just playing at the business of Naval Aviation.” However, as we continued to mature, it was evident that we were finally operating as an enterprise, and we agreed to call it the Naval Aviation Enterprise. When Zortman took over, we kicked the concept into high gear, aligned to the “Main Thing,” and operated the T/M/S teams as profit and loss centers, where the profit of our work was our future.

Today, Vice Adm. David Buss, CNAF; Vice Adm. David Dunaway, NAVAIR; and Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, DCA, value enterprise behaviors and have dedicated themselves to the continued success of the NAE. This construct serves Naval Aviation well. Now more than ever, Naval Aviation needs to align to their agreed “Main Thing,” “Aviation Units Ready for Tasking, at Reduced Cost – Today, Tomorrow and in the Future.”

- Vice Adm. Wally Massenburg, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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PERSPECTIVE OF VICE ADM. (RET.) TOM KILCLINECNAF, 2007-2010

Congratulations to the NAE for 10 years of exceptional contributions to Naval Aviation’s combat readiness. My association with the origins of the NAE began in 2000 when I reported as the Chief of Staff to Vice Adm. Nathman, the first CNAF. Admiral Nathman realized that Naval Aviation had to stem the 15 percent increase in the cost of readiness year-over-year that was consuming the aviation budget and constraining Naval Aviation's ability to recapitalize. His efforts and that of the team he assembled were able to raise awareness of unnecessary consumption, and they made great strides in providing more affordable readiness. Several years later, after I reported as the new N78 (Air Warfare Director on the CNO's Staff), Vice Adm. Jim Zortman (CNAF) and Vice Adm. Wally Massenburg (NAVAIR) contacted me regarding a construct called the Naval Aviation Enterprise. They were forming a team of the Naval Aviation stakeholders and asked that the Air Warfare director, as the Naval Aviation resource sponsor, join the Enterprise. Through their leadership and by forming a comprehensive and accountable team of stakeholders, the NAE flourished.

As the NAE matured under Admirals Zortman and Massenburg, a primary focus was readiness as a function of the required number of ready aircraft on the flight line. That focus was enhanced by tools and processes such as the Lean Six Sigma and Black Belt programs and the Continuous Process Improvement program, which optimized our efforts while energizing our stakeholders through Boots on the Ground events at our shore facilities and Boots on Deck events on our ships.

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Upon assignment to CNAF in 2007, I joined Vice Adm. Dave Venlet, the new NAVAIR, and formed the leadership team for an Enterprise that was already running on all cylinders in support of Navy readiness. However, we saw that cost-efficient readiness would be better served by including Marine Corps aviation. As a key part of "One Team, One Vision," Marine Corps Lt. Gen. George Trautman, then DCA, joined the NAE Executive Committee and provided Marine representation across our cross-functional teams. Over the first year, his Marines began to see an increase in readiness dollars as they became more efficient in their processes while maintaining their high- combat readiness. My remaining two years in the NAE were very satisfying as Naval Aviation had developed a great team of leaders at all levels. Our depots, aircraft carriers, Type Wings and Marine Aircraft Groups all took responsibility for their readiness, and found ways to continually improve their maintenance and sustainment processes and to increase their combat readiness. The Sailors on the deck-plate took pride in their contributions to Naval Aviation readiness via the NAE, and they were celebrated at every Boots on the Ground and Deck event. Our contractors and active/reserve support personnel were subject matter experts in aviation readiness, and ensured that NAE leadership was fully informed and able to make timely data-driven decisions focused on the key areas important to Naval Aviation. As the enterprise concept became more well-established, members of the Naval Aviation community rallied around the shared goal of affordably providing combat-ready Naval Aviation forces. The Naval Aviation Enterprise is as important today as ever. Congratulations again on your first 10 years – we all look forward to many more years of productive enterprise behavior and extraordinary Naval Aviation readiness!

- Vice Adm. Tom Kilcline, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

“When people commit together to operate as an enterprise they choose to live and practice the highest and most honorable form of service. That every person has value intrinsically is clear. When one willingly submits personal interests in service to something greater than

themselves, to America, for family, to Sailors and Marines as shipmates, the lives of everyone on the team and common good rise to a level attainable no other way.”

“The Naval Aviation Enterprise continues to be a form of exemplary service for every Sailor and Marine involved. My compliments and best wishes across the team, from the Air Boss, DCA and NAVAIR to the Marines and Sailors in ship and squadron leadership in

maintenance shops, operations and supply.”

- Vice Adm. (Ret.) David Venlet, Commander, NAVAIR (2007-2010)

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PERSPECTIVE OF LT. GEN. (RET.) GEORGE J. TRAUTMAN IIIDCA, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS (HQMC), 2007-2011

Over the course of the past 10 years, many dedicated professionals have worked together to create the Naval Aviation Enterprise as we know it today. While no single process or program is a panacea, there is no doubt that this approach has significantly improved the readiness and reliability of our aircraft through the wise expenditure of limited resources. By employing standard enterprise principles such as teamwork, transparency, intellectual curiosity, and the continual search for global understanding of complex systems and relationships, the NAE has made an important contribution to the Department of the Navy (DON). Today’s participants should be very proud of their many accomplishments. One of my favorite clichés is that reasonable men and women can disagree over the allocation of scarce resources. The value of the NAE to Marine aviation is that the Enterprise presents a venue in which professional, fact-based, and respectful dialogue can occur. When working properly, the NAE helps to ensure DON resourcing decisions are based on data driven research, informed communication, and fairness, rather than anecdotal evidence or “favored community” status. As a direct result of the NAE’s maturity and competence, the level of understanding that the Naval Aviation leadership possesses regarding the relationship between readiness and cost far exceeds the other Navy Enterprises and major Marine Corps claimants. Of course, it’s through knowledge such as this that the “resource wars” are won or lost in the Pentagon and the halls of Congress.

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Within the Marine Corps, our best Aircraft Group Commanders now fully understand that it’s their responsibility to work side-by-side with aviation logisticians to posture flying squadrons for success. To do this effectively, they must have the ability to portray a clear and compelling Type/Model/Series perspective to their senior leaders. The NAE gives these essential participants a forum that they never had before. Those who exploit the opportunity fully have seen impressive improvements in readiness and enterprise responsiveness within their communities. As these brilliant leaders join the General Officer ranks in the coming years, I have no doubt that the lessons they learned through NAE exposure will prove to be extremely valuable to our Corps.

On the 10th anniversary of the Naval Aviation Enterprise, I applaud the contributions of the caring professionals who have dedicated countless hours to improving readiness and reliability within Navy and Marine Corps aviation. With budget pressures looming and no sign of operational tempo relief in the near term, the continued laser focus of the NAE will be essential in the coming decade. Good luck and Semper Fidelis.

- Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

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PERSPECTIVE OF VICE ADM. (RET.) DAVID ARCHITZEL COMMANDER, NAVAIR, 2010-2012

Congratulations to the NAE as we pause to recognize 10 years of transformational excellence — this from someone who experienced life as a Naval Aviator with and without the presence of such an organization. During my days as a junior officer and even through my Department Head tour, the focus was on accumulating hours and there was really not much thought given to the cost of those flying hours. The NAE brought discipline and the reality that we needed to sharpen our skills and knowledge when it came to areas like readiness. We came to realize that we had to protect and maximize the dollars we had within the Flying Hour Program to generate readiness. We began the NAE journey when I was relatively senior, serving as Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers. I saw the difference cost-wise readiness made firsthand and watched it grow across all of Naval Aviation. In my final tour in the Navy, I had the honor of helping to lead the NAE as Commander, NAVAIR. Each week, a different Commodore would articulate all that his community was doing to promote cost-wise readiness. It never ceased to amaze me how far we had come from my early days as a Naval Aviator. We saw the results of our efforts firsthand when we visited a carrier, big deck amphib, Fleet Readiness Center or naval air station during Boots on the Deck/Boots on the Ground visits. It was during those visits — when a young Sailor, Airman or Marine would come forward and explain what she was contributing to the NAE or how an idea he had come up with had been implemented Fleet- wide saving man-hours of work and removing hours of down time from aircraft — that I knew how special the NAE achievement really was and will continue to be in the future of Naval Aviation. Happy anniversary NAE and … Good on ya!

- Vice Adm. David Architzel, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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PERSPECTIVE OF VICE ADM. (RET.) ALLEN G. MYERSCNAF, 2010-2012

My first exposure to the NAE was as the Director for Air Warfare, in 2007 and 2008. I was immediately impressed at the magnitude of data available and commitment to sharing the data with the NAE at large with the sole purpose of improving readiness and reducing maintenance and costs. I was also amazed at the amount of time required to prepare for, and engage in, the weekly NAE teleconferences. I could sense the “passion for Naval Aviation” in every engagement … all participants truly believed in the NAE and how it would improve Naval Aviation from the top down. My second impression was attending a Green Belt course with Navy and Marine Corps enlisted leaders. The deck-plate attendees were both motivated to gain a unique approach to improving Naval Aviation, and grateful for the opportunity to learn how to problem solve AND communicate to leadership using terminology the entire chain of command understood (Lean, Theory of Constraints). I left the course with an appreciation that this investment in training and educating our maintainers would pay huge dividends in improving Naval Aviation from the ground up.

My third impression of the NAE was as a co-lead for the NAE. Realizing the depth of momentum of the entire organization (top-down and bottom-up), my goal was to ensure the partnership by the

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other co-leads was collaborative and ensured alignment with all three organizations: CNAF, DCA and NAVAIR. We worked together, we shared data transparently to make Naval Aviation more efficient, agile and always combat-ready. We were faced with the challenge of maintaining ready naval air forces during an era of fiscal and geopolitical uncertainties. But this became a challenge that the Naval Aviation community understood and embraced. Our enterprise approach helped us operate more efficiently by breaking down barriers, spearheading cost-effective initiatives and providing leadership with the critical data needed to make superior decisions. The single, overriding measure of success for Naval Aviation’s enterprise efforts was “Naval Aviation forces efficiently delivered for tasking.” This is what the NAE did – and everyone played a key part in the success by making sure that our forces got the most capability out of every program dollar. We did this well through: our teamwork and collaboration; our trust and belief we all had the same objective and the transparency to see and understand the data, and share in each other’s successes.

- Vice Adm. Allen G. Myers, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

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PERSPECTIVE OF LT. GEN. TERRY ROBLINGDCA, HQMC, 2011 -2012 My first introductions to the NAE were during the deck-plate visits to 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing commands. Our 0-5 and 0-6 commands were just then beginning to push the "I believe" button on the tenet of the NAE that we were risking way too much for "readiness at any cost." They intuitively knew we had to get on board with the Navy and become a more efficient and cost effective organization. Our units were beginning to reap the benefits of the efficiency, and this Enterprise provided a forum for many young officers and non-commissioned officers who were seeing our poor business practices and wanted to do something about them. This, more than anything else I believe, opened the eyes of our more senior leaders that changing our culture of bad practices was an imperative worth the sustained effort at every level inside the Enterprise.

When I joined the Tri-Chair of the NAE as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation with Vice Admirals Al Myers and Dave Architzel in 2011, we were able to capitalize on the already good work of Vice Admirals “Killer” Kilcline and Dave Architzel and Lt. Gen. George Trautman. Our ability to take the NAE to the next level was due much in part to their good work and the already changing culture inside Naval Aviation. I was very proud of this effort and made lasting friendships at every level of the NAE during my time as Deputy Commandant for Aviation. Finally, I firmly believe that this 10th commemoration of the Naval Aviation Enterprise will be a lasting tribute to the Marines and Sailors at the deck-plate level who really made the difference. Happy Anniversary!

- Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, U.S. Marine Corps

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LIST OF NAE LEADERS AND CONTRIBUTING FOUNDERS

Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet/Commander, Naval Air Forces

� Vice Adm. John Nathman, 2000-2002 (CNAP), 2001-2002 (CNAF) � Vice Adm. Mike Malone, 2002-2004 � Vice Adm. Jim Zortman, 2004-2007 � Vice Adm. Tom Kilcline, 2007-2010 � Vice Adm. Allen G. Myers, 2010-2012 � Vice Adm. David Buss, 2012-present

Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

� Vice Adm. Wally Massenburg, 2003-2007 � Vice Adm. David Venlet, 2007-2010 � Vice Adm. David Architzel, 2010-2012 � Vice Adm. David Dunaway, 2012-present

Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps

� Lt. Gen. George J. Trautman III, 2007-2011 � Lt. Gen. Terry Robling, 2011-2012 � Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle, 2012-2014 � Lt. Gen. Jon Davis, 2014-present

(Photo courtesy of Lockheed Martin)

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“The Naval Aviation Enterprise has long been a path to increased readiness and efficiencies. The fiscal challenges and national security uncertainties facing our country and the military in particular have elevated the importance and

relevance of the Enterprise. This partnership of warfighters, providers and resource sponsors was created over 10 years ago in anticipation of these times.”

“… Each stakeholder member of the NAE has a responsibility to individually and organizationally contribute to the successful accomplishment of the NAE mission to ‘Advance and sustain Naval Aviation warfighting

capabilities at an affordable cost…today and in the future.’”

- Naval Aviation Enterprise Strategic Plan, 2014-2019

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this document represent personal opinions of the contributors and do not represent official views of the U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps.