Nature of Balkan Society Under Ottoman Rule

8/6/2019 Nature of Balkan Society Under Ottoman Rule

1/21

The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman RuleAuthor(s): Wayne S. VucinichSource: Slavic Review, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Dec., 1962), pp. 597-616Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3000575 .Accessed: 09/05/2011 06:28

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaass . .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Slavic Review.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaasshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3000575?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaasshttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaasshttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3000575?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aaass


2/21

DiscussionSLAVIC REVIEW

THE NATURE OF BALKAN SOCIETYUNDER OTTOMAN RULE

BY WAYNE S. VUCINICH

Never a homogeneous polity, the Ottoman Empire was an enormousand intricate network of social subsystems. The complex mosaic ofOttoman society, moreover, changed significantly rom one period toanother far more than is generally believed. At any one time theempire amounted to a vast congeries of discrete cultural and societalelements, which shifted nd related much like the particles in a kaleido-scope. Not only did they differ, ne from the other, but they oftendisplayed important variations within themselves. While Arabicsocieties of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq showed wide differences, hey werealso cut across by the Sunni and Shiah societies. The main Sunni bodyfound it difficult o incorporate anyone of Shiah sympathies.1 And allArabic societies were further omplicated by being either nomadic orsedentary.

Similarly, the sedentary Turks and the Turkoman nomads of Ana-tolia exhibited major social differences, s did the pastoral people andthe agriculturists mong the Albanians, Kurds, Maronites, and Serbs.The procession of varieties seems almost endless. By virtue of theirspecial religion, the Druze constituted an exclusive society. TheGreek, Serbian, Bulgarian, Maronite, Coptic, and Armenian societies-all Christian-each had distinctive characteristics. But individual cul-tures uch as these differed rom province to province within the empire.Serbian culture, for example, manifested itself differently n Mon-tenegro, Bosnia, Serbia, and Vojvodina. Most of the societies withinthe Ottoman Empire were "closed," but none was ever completelyimmune to external influences, which, of course, varied greatly indegree and kind.

These challenging complexities are by no means the only obstacles

confronting the student of Ottoman social history. The study ofOttoman society is also made difficult y the absence of an adequatesynthesis f the seven centuries of Ottoman history. The best surveys

MR. VUCINICH is professor f history t Stanford University.1W. Montgomery Watt, Islam and the Integration of Society (London, 1961), p. 220.


3/21

598 Slavic Review

are still the multivolume works by J. von Hammer-Purgstall2 nd J. W.

Zinkeisen,3 both published in the nineteenth century. Although lessuseful, the five-volume history by N. Iorga4 is also a serious attempt toprovide a complete coverage of Ottoman history. Since the appearanceof these three works, however, no study of comparable magnitude onthe history of the Ottoman Empire has been undertaken. To be sure,H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen with their unfinished multivolumestudy, Islamic Society and the West, and Bernard Lewis with his re-cently published book, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, havesupplied authoritative assessments of important features of Ottomansociety.5 It is a pity that historians have not given this importantcivilization, which has influenced the destinies of several African, Asian,and European peoples, the attention it deserves. What explains thisneglect?

Modern Turkish scholars, preoccupied with the investigation ofpositive moments in Ottoman history, have deliberately ignored theperiod of decline and chaos. Some of them write with strong nationalistbias and a modernist aversion for Ottoman history. Although Turkeyhas produced several first-rate istorians,6 t has not trained an ade-quate number of professionals capable of covering the extensive spanof Ottoman history.

Marxist historians of the Balkan countries7 are vigorously investi-gating and reinterpreting the Ottoman period of their national his-tories. Yugoslav scholars have published many documents as well.Balkan historians, Marxist and nationalist alike, are mainly concernedwith their own people's histories. Whereas Turkish scholars tend tomake little of the histories of the subject peoples, Balkan historianstend to present their people's past in a vacuum and often disregard thedominating Ottoman influence.

Despite the vacillation in Western historiography between disdain

and sympathy for the Turks and a profuse quantity of substandardliterature, Western historiography n the Ottoman Empire has yieldedmany outstanding works. Those listed above, for example, have notbeen surpassed in any language. Together with propagandistic dia-tribes, few useful books have also been published by Soviet scholars.8But as yet neither a good social history f the Ottoman Empire nor an

2 J. von Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (10 vols.; Pest, 1827-35).3 J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa (7 vols.; Gotha,

1840-63).4 Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908-13).5

H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society nd the West, Vol. I: Islamic Societyin the Eighteenth Century, Part 1 (London, 1950), Part 2 (London, 1957). Bernard Lewis,The Emergence of Modern Turkey London, 1961).

6 0. L. Barkan, F. K8pruilui, . H. Uzuncarqili,H. Inalcik, E. Z. Karal, and others.7 B. Tsvetkova, D. Angelov, B. Djurdjev, G. Elezovic, N. Filipovic', H. gabanovic, H.

Kresev1jakovic, . Hadzibegic, and many others.8 Iu. Krachkovsky, . A. Gordlevsky, . Miller, N. A. Smirnov, nd others.


4/21

The Nature of Balkan Society under Ottoman Rule 599

up-to-date ynthesis f Ottoman history s a whole has been forthcomingfrom nyone.

I

Ottoman ociety ad its roots n local Anatolian, Muslim, nd Turkishsources,9 ut as time passed t absorbed lements f other ultures. Theindigenous Anatolian (Hittite, Greek, and other) influences uponmodern Turks are acknowledged y most historians. Byzantine nflu-ence was a result of protracted cohabitation" of the Seljuks andByzantium10 nd was somewhat intensified fter the conquest ofConstantinople. But the Byzantine nfluence n Ottoman ivilization,according o most modern Turkish and Western historians, as not asgreat s lorga (who referred o Istanbul as the Turanian Rome) andcertain ther writers ontend.11

Muslim influence epresented he most basic element of Ottomansociety. slam first eached heTurks along the borders f the caliphatein Central Asia, and, from hen on, developed nto a religious formwith a frontier uality. The influence f Central Asia on Ottomansociety, hich was largely vershadowed y slam and almost forgotten,was revived n the fourteenth entury when the Ottomans onqueredlarge numbers f Turkish nomads n Anatolia. These nomads rousedOttoman wareness f their Turkish origin and led to a momentarymanifestation fTurkish national onsciousness." he Ottoman ultansassumed he old Turkish title of "khan" and adopted the Oghuz egendas the explanation of the origin of their dynasty.12 part from thistemporary ational awareness, he Turks did not become nationallyminded until the nineteenth entury.

Feudalismwas unquestionably ne of the major pillars of Ottomansociety. Research on Ottoman feudalism has been pursued largely

from legal and theoretical tandpoint. There is a considerable is-crepancy etween feudalism s defined nd regulated by laws (kdinuin-name)and feudalism n practice. The laws were ssued t long ntervalsand did not always oincide with changed conditions. The degree towhich the classical Ottoman ystem f land tenure was implementedin a given region of the empire depended on local geography ndeconomy nd on the religion and customs of the population. Most

9Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 3-17. Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, "HowDoes Islam Stand?" in Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Unity and Variety n Muslim Civiliza-

tion Chicago, 1955), p. 11.10Bernard Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," n Grunebaum, op. cit., pp. 317-18.11SeeespeciallyKopriiliizade Mehmet Fuat, "Bizans MiiesseselerininOsmanli Miiessesele-

rine Te'siri hakkinda bazi Miilahazalar," Tilrk Hukuk ve Iktisat Tarihi Mecmuasi, I(1931), 165-313.

12 P. Wittek, "Le R6le des tribus turques dans l'empire ottoman," Melanges GeorgesSmets Brussels, 952), pp. 665-76.


5/21

600 Slavic Review

knowledge of the Ottoman system f land tenure and Ottoman societyhas been based on scattered and fragmentary egalistic data.13Ottoman feudalism, a synthesis of Arabo-Persian, Seljuk, andByzantine elements, survived, with changes and adaptations, until thenineteenth century. Late Byzantine feudalism exercised powerfulinfluence in shaping "the Ottoman system of military fiefs," ust as ithad itself been reshaped "under the impact of the Frankish feudalismof the Latin Empire of Constantinople and its dependent and successorprincipalities."14 But whatever its origins, the heart of Ottoman feu-dalism was the so-called timar-sidahi system.15 t was the keystone ofthe politico-military and socio-economic structure of the OttomanEmpire. To a very large degree, the timar-sidahi system governedsocial relations in the empire.

There has been much discussion about Ottoman feudalism as aninstrument of social "progress." The question is whether Ottomanfeudalism induced or impeded social "progress" and whether theconquered peoples would have advanced more rapidly had they re-mained under their own feudalistic regimes. While most historiansseem to think that Ottoman feudalism curbed social progress, theirviews differ n many details. There is a divergence of opinion, forexample, as to whether Ottoman feudalism was "retrogressive" fromthe beginning or only after the sixteenth century, when it becametransformed nto the so-called sift!i relations.

One group of writers contends that a high degree of prosperity ndsocial harmony prevailed during the first eriod of Ottoman history sa result of centralized rule, victorious foreign wars, moderate feudalexactions, and long intervals of peace.16 But, in the opinion of thisgroup, the military defeats and territorial losses after the sixteenthcentury undermined and caused the deterioration of Ottoman feudalinstitutions nd the "barbarization" of many parts of the empire. The

Ottoman Empire began to lag economically as well as in military andother technological matters. Hence, the central power weakened.Widespread corruption and the abuse of authority became the order ofthe day. Feudal exactions increased. Socio-religious and national rebel-

13 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., p. 235.14 Lewis,Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 43.15 The most common fief sipdhilik) was the smallest of the landed estates called timar.

The holder who rendered military ervice cavalry) in exchange for the grant was calledthe sipaha. Hence the system s known as the timar-sipaha ystem. A fief yielding revenueamounting to from ,000or 3,000to 19,999 k?(es aspres-a piece of silver] a year was called

a Timar." Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., p. 48.16 A. Horopiin, Hcmopia Buoapiu (St. Petersburg, 910), pp. 127-81. K. Jirecek, storijaSrba (4 vols.; Belgrade, 1922-23), translated by J. Radonic. Nicolae Iorga, Geschichte desosmnanischen eiches (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908-13). Vasil Zlatarsky, Geschichte der Bulgaren(2 vols.; Leipzig, 1917-18). Stojan Novakovic, Srbi i Turci XIV i XV veka (Belgrade, 1893).Momc'ilo Nincic, Istorija agrarno-pravnih dnosa srpskih tezaka pod Turcima (Belgrade,1903). Branislav Nedeljkovic, storija bagtinske vojine (Belgrade, 1930).


6/21


lions occurred in all parts of the empire. The social, ethnic, and reli-

gious cohesion of the Ottoman society oosened, and the social balancewas upset. The attempts begun in the early eighteenth century toreform he Ottoman state by halfhearted grafting f European practicesupon defunct Ottoman institutions were foredoomed to failure.

Many historians, especially Marxist writers,1T contend that the Otto-man feudal order impeded the development of subject peoples fromthe very start. Most often cited in support of this contention are theconfessional element in Ottoman feudalism, the material destructionthat accompanied the Ottoman conquest, huge losses n human resources(especially among the upper classes), and general social and economicdislocation. The Marxist writers also maintain that the "primitivecharacter" of Ottoman feudalism discouraged the growth of "productiveforces." According to their views Ottoman feudalism was more back-ward than the Balkan feudalism that it replaced.

In point of fact, however, the Balkan peasants, who constituted thebulk of the people in that area, improved their lot during the initialperiod of Turkish rule; they were less abused, paid lower feudal taxes,and as a result of the centralized Ottoman rule had somewhat greatersecurity. In the cultural field, on the other hand, the Ottoman regimeunquestionably set the Balkan people back; it destroyed their upperclasses, abolished the medieval states, and isolated the Christian com-munities from urban centers. The assertion that the stagnation and"barbarization" that occurred after the sixteenth century were theprimary causes of Balkan backwardness seems convincing.

IIWith the passing of time, some classes within Ottoman society degener-ated and disappeared, and others were born. Many of those that existedthroughout Ottoman history, moreover, were not always of the same

relative importance. Whatever the case, social differentiation revailedin both the Muslim and Christian societies of the Ottoman Empire.In Muslim society, the high-ranking members of the Ruling Institu-

tion (men of the sword) and the Muslim Institution (men of the pen),whether they were government eaders, palace officials, ommanders ofarmed forces, teachers, or judges, constituted the upper class. To besure, differences between individual categories of the upper class re-sulted from disparities in wealth and power. In theory, however, therewas no hereditary aristocracy, since the fiefholders timariots, za'zmand hass holders) held their estates on condition.

The Balkan Christians had their own well-to-do lasses. The medieval17 Branislav Djurdjev, "Prilog pitanju razvitka karaktera tursko-osmanskog eudalizma

-timnarsko-spahiskog redjenja," Godi?njak Istoriskog Drustva Bosne i Hercegovine, II(Sarajevo, 1950), 19-82. Nedim Filipovic, "Pogled na osmanski feudalizam sa narocitimobzirom na agrarne odnose," ibid., V (1952), 5-146.


7/21

602 Slavic Review

Christian feudatories who collaborated with the Turks were some-times allowed to retain their estates. Others of the erstwhile Christiannobility who survived the Turkish conquest either fled abroad or ac-cepted Islam and, under new religious garb, retained their privileges.Some of the Christian collaborators became the Christian sipahi's, pow-erful and respected but never numerous.18 By the end of the sixteenthcentury, these Christian sipah s, who, like their Muslim counterparts,had earned their fiefs hrough military and other services to the sultan,had guttered out.

Other privileged Christian groups were either created by Ottomanrulers or developed through wealth. Among these were the Greekarchonts ("elders," "primates"), a kind of official ristocracy, who ad-ministered their own affairs, ived well, and acted as agents of Turkishdignitaries, and the Phanariots, the patrician Greek families of thePhanar district of Istanbul, many of whom became prominent govern-ment functionaries, Rumanian hospodars, and higher clergy of theOrthodox Church. The Phanariots were sometimes called the "Chris-tian Turks," a term that seems to describe their "moral and politicalposition."19

In many sections of the empire the Christian tribal leaders, like the

Muslim tribal leaders, retained their positions, served as links betweentheir followers and Ottoman authorities, and enjoyed special rightsand privileges. Whether elected, hereditary, r appointed, the Serbiancommunity or village elders (knez, primuc'ar) sometimes derived bene--fits hat set them apart from the ordinary raya (or subjects proper).

Among the least known privileged Christian elements were those thatserved as military auxiliaries or guards (voynuks, nmartolosi, erbentgi,zampites, rmatoloi, tc.),20 cared for horses and provisions, or carriedon reconnoitering and police duties. They sometimes differed from.their fellow Christians in that they were paid, granted lands, or ex--

empted from feudal obligations. The Marxist historians classify omeof them as an "in-between class," because even if they were tax-privileged landowners, they tilled their and themselves. These are buta few of a number of such social groups.

The high-ranking Christian clergy (patriarchs, bishops, metropoli-tans) also constituted a privileged class. Despite established electoralprocedures, simony was widespread. Especially after the sixteenth

18 Halil Inalcik, "Timariotes chr6tiens n Albanie au XVe si&le, d'apres un registre detimars ottomans," Mitteilungen des dsterreichischen taatsarchivs, IV (1952), 118-38.Branislav Djurdjev, "Kris'ani spahije u severnoj Srbiji u XV veku," Godignjak Istoriskog

Drustva . . ., IV (1952), 165-69. Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," n Grunebaum, op. cit.,.p. 317. B. UnBeTioBa,>uMannuicxu epe4temucn, XIII (1958),184-97.19George Finlay, A History of Greece from ts Conquest by the Romnans o the PresentTime, B.C. 146 to A.D. 1864, rev. ed. by Henry F. Tozer (7 vols.; Oxford, 1877), VI, 11.

20 Branislav Djurdjev, "O vojnucima," Glasnik zemnaliskogmuzeja, II (Sarajevo, 1947),.75-137. Istorija Naroda Jugoslavije, I (Belgrade, 1960), 72-76.


8/21


century, the higher Christian clergy bought their sees, just as theTurkish pashas bought their posts, and, like the pashas, they obligedthe people to pay back "what they had expended.''21 The higher clergywere opportunistic and ready "to sacrifice he interests f their nation"to achieve material gain and to satisfy personal ambitions. Finlayobserves that there was "no more selfish and degraded class of men"than the archonts and Phanariots, from among whom the higher clergy'were selected.22 Obtaining a substantial revenue from taxes and largemonasterial properties, the higher clergy ived well. Their jurisdictionwas not confined to spiritual matters but extended, to a large degree,to political matters s well.

Both the Muslim and Christian sectors of Ottoman society weredivided into two basic parts-rural and urban. But since the Balkancity population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan ruralpopulation predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the placeof the Muslim ruler, tax collector, and security gent. Conversely, thevillage symbolized the home of the oppressed and exploited Christianpeasant, taxpayer, and food-producer. The two societal componentscame to represent a struggle between two ways of life, which deepenedand expanded as time went on. The protracted separation of village

from ity with hardly any interchange between them ed to a dichotomyof mores, habits, and customs. The city dweller and the peasant differedin many basic aspects of their lives-in their food, dress, song, speech,folklore, and world outlook. After the Ottoman Empire expired, thevillage-city onflict ontinued, even though the city ost its Turkish char-acter. This unbridged chasm is one of the major present-day roblems.

The largest social class in the Ottoman Empire was made up ofpeasants and nomads. The Christian village served as the main reservoirof human and material resources. National rebirth came from thevillage and not from the city. In Ottoman days only the village

nourished "sentiments of manly vigour and true patriotism."23 t per-petuated national oral tradition and remembrances of medieval inde-pendence and glory. By living in compact settlements, with their ownsocial organization, the peasants were able to resist the penetration ofalien cultures and to preserve their ethnic individuality. From themalone could the energy necessary for the recovery of "national inde-pendence" be derived.24 The peasants were the backbone of theinsurrectionary movements against Turkish rule. Extinction of thepeasantry would have been tantamount to extinction of the nation.

The degree of Ottoman influence on the village and the conditionsof peasant life were determined in part by the forms of social organiza-

21 William Miller, The Ottomnan mpire and Its Successors Cambridge, Eng., 1936),p. 25.22 Finlay, op. cit., V, 150.23 Ibid., p. 155.24 Ibid.


9/21

604 Slavic Review

tion of the particular community, the proximity of the Ottoman land-

lord and official, ccess to the important roads, density of Christianpopulation, and, of course, by the whims of Turkish authorities. Thepeasant was obliged to pay a poll tax (cizye), land tax (harac), and vari-ous other dues and fees, including the church tax, which went to hisbishop and patriarch. He was expected to provide free labor (kullitk)on his landlord's estate and to perform many other chores as well.

Some peasants were less oppressed than others, but, as a rule, Christianpeasants paid higher taxes than their Muslim counterparts. This isclearly indicated in Islamic fiscal laws and in "discriminatory rates ofassessment." According to Lewis, the Ottoman codes recognized theserates: "the lowest for Muslims, the highest for Harbais, and a mediumrate for Zimmais. The believer, the hostile infidel, the subject infidel-these were the three recognized categories, nd nationality, ven politicalallegiance had no bearing on them."25

Among the Muslims, local religious teachers and judges (kadi, na'ib,and hoca) had substantially ess economic means and personal prestigethan those of provincial or higher rank (kad1i, mufti', hazz'asker, eyh-iil-Isldn, etc.). A similar social difference was to be found between thelower and higher Christian clergy. The monastic Christian clergy, who,supplied the bishops and patriarchs, onstituted the clerical upper class,while the secular clerics, who served in the parishes and often sharedthe common lot, constituted the lower class. Although they lackedlearning and possessed little if any power, the secular clergy, becauseof their relation to the peasantry, exercised an influence over the fateof their nation "quite incommensurate with their social rank." Theysupplied some of the "moral strength" which enabled the Greeks,.Serbs, Bulgars, and others "to resist the Ottoman power. 26

The peasants respected the parish priest because he was one of them.The parish clergy n the town were less influential, because the small

Christian urban element had not yet developed a politically mindedand literate class to articulate their national aspirations effectively.Moreover, the hard life and "bad city" influence corrupted manyparish clergy who "displayed the vices of their own low grade of society."The life of the city priest stood in glaring contrast to that of the villagepriest who "lived and died in the same social circle" in which he grewup.27 To eke out a living the village priest tilled his own fields, whilethe city priest was frequently engaged in trade and crafts.

The city population included Muslim officials, feudal landlords,military personnel, merchants, rtisans, the 'ulema (the learned class),and the city poor-workers, porters, nd servants. Although nearly allcity dwellers were Muslim, a few cities contained Christian and Jewish

25 Lewis,Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 324.26 Finlay, op. cit., V, 150-53.27 Ibid.


10/21

The Nature of Balkan Societyunder Ottoman Rule 605

quarters mahalle). number f cities, articularly n the Greekregion,were predominantly hristian. Many cities had special quarters forGypsies, ho paid a special tax and were ubjected o restrictive aws.

In Bulgarian and Serbian cities, the indigenous lement was verynegligible, nd the non-Turkish ity population consisted mostly fGreeks, Jews, Armenians, Tsintsars, nd foreigners Ragusans, Ger-mans). The urban class of population was far more developed amongthe Greeks than among the Bulgarians nd Serbs. Jews, Armenians,and Tsintsars n the Balkans were almost exclusively ommerciallyengaged s moneylenders, erchants, r artisans. From the eighteenthcentury n, the number of Serbian and Bulgarian merchants nd arti-sans increased,28 nd well-to-do gorbaci29egan to appear among them.Christian city-dwellers ften adopted "the philanthropic selfishness ofthe archonts, egular clergy, nd Jewish colonists, with whom they ived,and with whom they truggled for preferment n the Ottoman service."30

IIIThe Muslim theocratic system was the dominant social force in theOttoman Empire. After the conquest of Constantinople (1453), theOrthodox Church was organized as a millet (community)31 under thePatriarch. His election was confirmed by the sultan, and he wasceremoniously nstalled. The Patriarch was given many rights, nclud-ing his own court and prison and almost absolute jurisdiction over thezimmis. His office anked in honor with that of the pasha with threetugs horsetails).82 ere it should be added that the so-called EcumenicalPatriarch of Constantinople was considered by the Porte as the headof the millet but that n reality the Orthodox Church was administeredby "an oligarchy of patriarchs" (those of Antioch, Alexandria, andJerusalem), each of whom had complete control over the affairs n hisown domain.33

The millets into which various groups were organized were basedon a confessional rather than an ethnic principle. There was "a Muslimmillet, ut no Turkish or Arab or Kurdish millets."34 The GregorianArmenians and several other denominations were recognized as a milletin 1461. Since the Catholicos was beyond the frontiers f the empire, anArmenian patriarch was appointed and accorded the privileges that the

28 H. H. TpeTmKOB, d., Ilomopun oAapuu (2 vols.; Moscow, 1954), I, 225-36. J. RoceM,ed., Hemopwa na BzA.apu, I (Sofia, 1954), 303-5. Caic HaTaH, HIemopummonoiuueccowopaMunmui BoAtaptuu Moscow, 1949).

29 Once a title of an officer n charge of an orta (a company or "center") of Janissaries(Yeniferi), the term eventually came to mean "well-to-do person."

30 Finlay, op. cit., V, 155.31 Officially eferred o as the Rum milleti-"the Roman community."32 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., Part 2, pp. 215-16.33 F. Steen de Jehay, De la situation legale des sujets ottomans non-musulmians Brussels,

1906),p. 81.34 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 329.


11/21

606 Slavic Review

Orthodox patriarch received. Since all the non-Orthodox Christianswere classified as Armenians, the Armenian became in a sense "themillet of heretics." Nominally, the Armenian Patriarch was in chargeof various confessions under his jurisdiction; in reality each denomina-tion had its own religious officials.35 he Jewish millet was recognizedin the fifteenth entury nd represented all four divisions (Rabbanites,Karaites, Ashkenazim, Sephardim) of Jews. The Catholic communitywas not formally recognized as a millet, because many of its memberswere treated as "foreigners." Although the devsirme (the levy of boys)was applied only to the Orthodox millet,36 he Armenian communitywas referred to as the Millet-i Sadika (the loyal community) until thenineteenth century.37

The non-Muslims were never able to mix freely n Muslim society.As subjects infidels zimmis), they were socially castigated and deprivedof rights belonging to the ruling Muslim elite. The new state was inthe hands of the Muslims, and the official anguage was Turkish. It wasIslam and not Turkish "national identity" that separated the rulersfrom the ruled. The Turks thought of themselves "almost exclusivelyas Muslims." Not until the nineteenth century did concepts of "a Turk-ish nationality" and "Ottomanism" develop under European influence.38

The word "Turk" was generally used "to denote thenomads or peasants

of Anatolia," in much the same way as felladhs used in modern Arabic.39The term "Ottoman" was used in reference to the dynasty.

The Ottoman system deliberately fostered ocial and cultural differ-entiation. Consequently, the Ottoman European possessions were neverassimilated "either to Islam or to the Turkish language," and thepeasant masses "remained Christian, alien in language and culture aswell as in religion, outside the cultural horizon of the Turks."40

IVThe Ottoman conquest abruptly halted the political and social develop-ment of the Balkan subject peoples, who found security n withdrawalto their own patriarchal institutions, which, having either disappearedor being on their way out,41 were now resuscitated and given new life.In other words, the conquered peoples were set back in their social

35 Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., Part 2, p. 232.36 Ibid., p. 223.37 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 350.38 Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," n Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 314.

39 Bernard Lewis, "History-writing nd National Revival in Turkey," M11iddle astAffairs, o. 4 (1953), pp. 218-27.40 Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," n Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 317.41 For more recent appraisals of the historical significance f Ottoman conquest of the

Byzantine Empire, see for a Marxist point of view, BU3C11sankcstcui epe.1neiti'u, VII (1953),and for a non-Marxist view 1453-1953: Le ci?7q-centieme nniversaire de la prise de Con-stan tintople Athens, 1953).


12/21


evolution. This was classically xemplified n the regeneration f tribal

society n Albania, Montenegro, ercegovina, nd the Sanjak of NoviPazar, which, under the conditions n the Ottoman Empire, was ableto survive ntil ust recently. Manyof the modern Balkan tribes wereeither born or regenerated fter he Ottoman onquest. In other partsof the empire, he Ottoman olitical nd social climate lso fostered hedevelopment f tribal ife.

What was the uridical and administrative tatus of the tribes, henature of their customary aws and social customs? How were theycoordinated ith heOttoman tate ystem? he tribes nd the phratrieswere enormously mportant s preservers f tradition nd the culturalindividuality f particular eoples. Tribal organization, ocial stratifi-cation, military ystem, eligious life, ethical codes, and intertribalrelations were all important spects f the subject societieswithin heruling Ottoman ociety.

Very ittle is known about the formation f tribes from differentethnic nd social groups and the ethnogenesis f peoples. The trans-formation f the Vlachs and the fusion f the "old" and "new" peoples-of Illyrians, Romanized groups, nd Slavs-are significant ut stillobscure developments n the history f Balkan social relations. Suchtribes s those which were partly Montenegrin nd partly Albanian, orthosewhichweredivided nto families rofessing oth Christianity ndIslam, epitomize the nature of Ottoman society. The role of theTurkish nomadic tribes n the evolution of the Ottoman Turks is ofprime ocial importance. Although hese nomadsdid not constitute aruling lement," hey id represent an ethnic eservoir" n which theruling class drew."42

Some tribes n the Ottoman Empire disappeared arly, thers n thenineteenth entury; nd still others, uch as the Arab, Albanian, andKurdish ribes, urvived ntil the present. But even where tribes had

disappeared, ribal reminiscences nd social characteristics ave sur-vived. The nomads and seminomads, hether urkoman Yuruks43 fAnatolia, Arabian bedouin, Balkan Kutso-Vlachs, r ordinary Gypsiesof different eligiousbackgrounds, urvived nd flourished nder theOttoman ystem f government. ome enjoyed variousprivileges, hileothers, uchas the Gypsies,were ubjected o special discriminatory eg-islation.But, by and large, he Ottoman ystem wasconducive o theirpreservation. ach group remained a legal entity-socially xclusiveand culturally elf-contained.

42 Bernard Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 1-17. In the thirteenth entury,according to Claude Cahen, the term "Turk" was used exclusively n reference to the"barbarous" Turkoman frontier opulation. Grunebaum, op. cit., pp. 329-30.

43 H. Vambery, Das Tiirkenvolk n seinen ethnolog-ischen nd ethnographischen Bezie-hungen (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 601-7. C. Truhelka, Macedonski Juruci (Zagreb, 1941). D.sopova, Mlakedoi?ija v XVI i XVII vek Skopje, 1955),pp. 47-62.


13/21

608 SlavicReview

Ottoman rule perpetuated the Serbian zadruga-the joint family.44

By living together, he oint family ecured economic advantages-laborpower and lower taxes. Taxation by hearth apparently encouragedpeople to band together under a single roof. The zadruga's democraticorganization of the household, rigid discipline, and high code ofmorality ubstantially ontributed to the preservation of Serbian ethnicand cultural individuality. In most Serbian areas the joint family wasthe principal form of social organization. The leader of the zadrugarepresented t and managed its affairs n consultation with the membersof the family. The joint family became the backbone of Serbian societyunder Ottoman rule.

Another ancient institution that came to life in many parts of theBalkans as a result of Ottoman conquest was the katun-a pastoralcommunity. The Serbian self-governing ommunity (knezina)45 andprobably also the Greek "free communities" (eleutherochdria andothers) were not only tolerated by the imperial authorities but inte-grated into the Ottoman administrative ystem. For a long time, it wasof advantage to both the ruling Turks and the subject peoples toperpetuate organizations of this kind, even though their existencepromoted social exclusiveness, minimum social interaction, and theperpetuation of old social forms.

The most important Christian institution that survived the medievalstates was the Orthodox Church. With the political power once vestedin temporal rulers gone, the church assumed some of "Caesar's" preroga-tives and incidentally maintained a link between each nation's pastand future. The church conserved the cultural heritage of particularpeoples, kept fresh n their minds their medieval glory and independ-ence, and preserved the ethnic individuality of the faithful.

In the Ottoman Empire, the Orthodox Church acquired "a universalstate," which it needed but was "unable to establish itself."46 The

Orthodox Christians, writes Toynbee, "had to pay for their socialincompetence by ceasing to be masters n their own house. The Muslimconquerors who established and maintained the Pax Ottomanica inthe Orthodox Christian World exacted payment, n the form of religious

44 V. Popovic, Zadruga: Istoriska rasprava Sarajevo, 1921). V. Popovic, "Zadruga, teorijei literatura," Glasnik zemnaljskogmuzeja, XXXIII-XXXIV (1921-22),73-114. Jovan Cvijic,La peninsule Balkanique (Paris, 1918), pp. 103-10. Vladislav Skaric, "Uticaj turskog ivotana dru'stveni ivot," in Knjiga o Balkanu, II (Belgrade, 1937). Vladimir Dvornikovic,Karakterologija Jugoslovena Belgrade, 1939), pp. 859-60. Most recent on zadruga are twoworks by I-mile Sicard: Problemes familiaux chez les Slaves du Sud (Paris, 1941), and LaZadruga dans la litterature erbe (1850-1912) Paris, 1943). Philip E. Mosely, "The PeasantFamily: The Zadruga," in Caroline F. Ware, ed., The Cultural Approach to Histowy NewvYork, 1940), pp. 95-108.

45 Branislav Djurdjev, "O knezovima pod turskom upravom," Istoriski casopis, Nos. 1-2(1948), pp. 132-66. Ruzica Guzina, Knezina i postanak srpske burzoaske drzave(Belgrade, 1955).

4-LArnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History Oxford, 1947),p. 130.


14/21


15/21

610 Slavic Review

ary importance, and in these fields the church stagnated. The church

was compelled, moreover, to adjust to the needs of patriarchal societyand to tolerate much that was undesirable.

VThe Ottoman Turks were unable to develop a dynamic civilizationthrough an integration of the cultures of conquered peoples. At thesame time, they failed to provide the conquered peoples with therequisite conditions for developing their own cultures.

Made up of "a variety of illiterate population," the Ottoman Empirewas regulated by "an anti-literate elite." Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecqwrites that the Turks refused to print books because the "scriptureswould no longer be scriptures f they were printed."50 The first pressand paper factory did not appear in Turkey until 1728-29,51 lthoughseveral subject peoples of the empire had them by the sixteenth century.But "the Christian channels to the West operated mainly as closedcircuits," and, as a result, "independent rates of social change occurred

the Christians modernizing faster than others."52The influence of the few Ottoman poets, literati, historians, artists,

and men of learning was largely limited to a small number of persons,and had very ittle influence on the non-Muslim communities. To saythat the Ottoman Empire was a "worthy heir" of Byzantium seemssomewhat exaggerated.53 Nor can we accept the position of the "Urqu-hart's School of Orientalists," who trace the malaise of the OttomanEmpire to the fall of Constantinople, when the Ottomans supposedlygave up their institutions to ape the Byzantines.54 Although "highlyconservative," the Ottoman artisan groups actually tried "from timeto time" to lift the empire out of its spiritual lethargy. But, as Gourhanputs it, "they turned in a horizontal spiral around their techniques,"and the civilizations "moving their feet in one spot but not going be-

yond themselves" were characterized by "proliferatingdetail."55

What happened to the culture of the subject millets as a result ofOttoman conquest? The learning virtually dried up. The art deterior-ated from xquisite medieval masterpieces to simple primitive creations.Much of the population was simply cocooned in medievalism. Once ona level with Europe in spiritual and material development, the Balkanpeoples were centuries behind by the nineteenth century.

The Ottoman conquest disrupted the historical development of the

50The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (Oxford, 1927), p. 135.51Donald E. Webster, The Turkey of Atatiirk: Social Process in the Turkishi Reforma-

tion (Philadelphia, 1939),p. 20.52 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, 1958), pp. 113-14.53Robert Brunschvig, Perspectives," n Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 58.54W. S. Blunt, "The Sultan's Heirs in Asia," Fortnightly eview, July, 1880,pp. 22-23, 25.55Brunschvig, op. cit., p. 58. Quotes Andre Leroi Gourhan, Elvolution et techniques,

Vol. II: Milieu et techniques Paris, 1945),p. 341.


16/21

The Nature of Balkan Societyunder Ottoman Rule 611

Balkan peoples, mpeded the growth f "productive orces," nd caused

the Balkan peoples to become "the most backward" n Europe.56 Onlythe Greek Phanariots, who had both the means and privileges, emon-strated reative enius n art and learning. The stage of developmentthat Greece chieved n education uring heeighteenth nd nineteenthcenturies was, to no small degree, he result of their work. The pros-perous Greek merchants nd the well-to-do xpatriates ikewisecon-tributed o the social uplifting f Greece. The Greeks' ttainment fimpressive rogress amedespiteOttoman ule rather hanbecauseof t.

Like the Turks themselves, he Balkan peoples were bypassed y theRenaissance nd Reformation. When humanism tarted ocast ts raysoverWestern urope, Ottoman darkness" escended ver the Balkans.In many nstances, heir national life centered round "small tribalcells" under the protection f the church, which "insulated the na-tionality nd culture" nd eventually ecamea nucleusof a new state.57Once again, the Balkan nations had to undergo the metamorphosisfrom ribal tatus o statehood.

The limited ommunication etween onstituent arts of the Otto-man Empire was one of the main causes of cultural stagnation. Yetthe lives of most ndividuals were not "completely ontrolled by thestate" and "many villages nd other corporate nits" were not totallycontrolled.58 ut this represented nly a politically rrelevant orm fself-government," escribed y one expert s "a Beggars'Democracy."5The communications, ntegrated nto Ottoman administration, eredesigned not to enlighten nd persuade opinion, but to prepare ndprescribe ehavior."60 he public criers, or example, were not usedfor official nnouncement o non-Muslims," ut instead their headswere ummoned to receive he news n behalf f their onstituencies."'6

VI

Despite the segregation olicy and the division of the society ntoMuslim and non-Muslim, ar more social mobility revailed n Otto-man society han s generally elieved. Frequent wars, pidemics, ndinsurrections aused arge hifts f population hatproduced ignificantdemographic hanges n the Empire. From the very beginning, herrurks dopted the policy of "sedentarization," y which nomadic ndseminomadic eoples were ettled s agriculturists r military uxiliaries

56 H. H. TpeTKROB,ed., IHomopuf oatapuu (2 vols.; Moscow, 1954), I, 163.5' Dvornikovic,Karakterologija Jugoslovena, p. 859-60.58 Karl A. Wittfogel, riental Despotism New Haven, 1957), p. 108.59 Ibid., pp. 126-296.60A. E. Yalman, The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press (1914).

Yalman, "The Press," n E. G. Mears, ed., Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic ntepreta-tion, 1908-1923 New York, 1924).

61 Leriner, p. cit., pp. 113-14.


17/21

612 SlavicReview

(as was the case with the Vlachs). This method of "settlement nd colo-

nization," called siirgiin, was not uncommon and was sometimes dictatedby penal and sometimes by political, economic, and military needs.02The people settled mostly along the frontier and were constituted

into military auxiliary units. Thousands of Serbs settled along theAustrian and Venetian frontiers r emigrated to border territories heldby Venice and Austria. On several occasions, Austrian authoritiesinvited the Serbs to settle on their side of the frontier nd to join thefrontier rmy on a permanent state of preparedness for war with theTurks. Of great significance for the national future and immediatesocial dislocation were the two "great" migrations of Serbs, led bypatriarchs Arsenius III in the 1690's and Arsenius IV in 1739 to south-ern Hungary and Austria. These migrations extended the influence ofthe church and planted Serbian colonies in the heart of Hungary andin Croatia.

The scrambling of the population in the Ottoman Empire producedethnic and cultural fusion. Protracted mixing of Serbs and Croats in thefrontier regions, on both sides of the Austro-Turkish and Turko-Venetian frontiers, eveled them and facilitated eventual Yugoslavunification. At the same time, the constant flow of the people fromthe Dinaric region to the depopulated fertile Serbian and Pannonianplains served to rejuvenate physically he surviving ndigenous element,to refresh the national tradition, and to revive the patriarchal socialorganization.63

After the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, the Greek nation"declined both in civilization and numbers."64 Moreover, "the trans-locations of the inhabitants,"65 aused significant changes in the eth-nography of Greece. In addition, the coasts of Greece were depopulatedby frequent maritime expeditions of Christian powers.66 The punitivemeasures by Ottoman authorities against the Greeks who collaborated

with Christian enemies caused losses of life and dispersion of popula-tion. The establishment of the timar-sipaha eudal system n "the richagricultural districts" of Greece also accounted for the decline ofpopulation. Under Turkish pressure, the Greek rural population"abandoned extensive districts to the Albanian race," which colonizedthe whole of Boeotia, Attica, Megaris, and several other districts. Largesections of Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly were settled by Yuruks orgranted to the Seljuk Koniarides (Iconians).67 Greeks emigrated to

62 Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 10. Lewis, "Turkey: Westernization," nGrunebaum, op. cit., p. 321. Omer Lutfi Barkan, "Les Deportations comme m6thode de

peuplement et de colonisation dans l'Empire ottoman," Revue de la Faculte' des SciencesAconomiquesde l'Universitd 'Istanbul, XI (1949-50), 7-131.63 Jovan Cvijic,Balkansko poluostrvo, , 154-55.64 Finlay, op. cit., V, 55.65 Ibid., p. 58; III, 522; IV, 266.66 Ibid., V, 104-5.67 Ibid., pp. 125-26.


18/21


Apulia, Corsica, nd to other parts f Europe.68 The Greek populationdecreased, articularly n the eventeenth entury, nd the result wasanethnic atio more favorable o Turks and Albanians. Changes n Greekand Slav population were also effected y the institution f devsirme(the evy of boys) ntroduced n the fourteenth entury. As a result fthe "levy," countless alkan Christians ntered he political nd mili-tary lites of the Emnpire"69 nd became Muslims. The practice, however,was abolished t the end of the seventeenth entury.

Beside the ethnic nd cultural Hellenization," Slavonization," nd"Albanization"which ccurred n some districts, heprocesses f "Islam-ization" nd "Turkification" lso affected ocial change. In Greece, heIslamization f ndigenous lements was slight, nd the Muslim popula-tion was primarily he result of Turkish and Albanian colonization.In Bulgariaand Yugoslavia Macedonia, Bosnia), both the slamizationof Slavsand the colonization f Turks were extensive. The withdrawalof the Serbs from their "medieval cradle" of the Kosovo-Metohijaregion and the colonization of the region by Albanians shifted heSerbian thnic entrum nd significantly nfluenced he nation's uture.A few maller groups, uch as the Donme (members f the Sabbatayansect of Jews), lso went to Islam. The settlement f Spanish Jews nTurkish cities n the fifteenth entury nd the conversion f some ofthem o Islam produced highly ompetitive lement, which ook overmany branches f trade and industry hat hitherto ad been a Greekmonopoly. The Jews becamephysicians, ankers, nd merchants, ndmany f them occupied a high social position.7o

Just what classes of the population accepted slam and under whatcircumstances as never been thoroughly nvestigated. Nor is theregood study f the social relations etween he born Muslims nd con-verted Muslims (mawali)or between the Muslims and non-Muslimscripturarians zimmi) nd foreigners ecnebi).Yet these categories fpopulation greatly nfluenced ne another. The result s that Chris-tian and a Muslim peasant n the Balkans have more n common witheach other than either of them has with an Anatolian or Arabianpeasant. The Muslim, Christian, nd Druze Arabs have more n com-mon than any of them has with a Balkan peasant. The minority ndmajority omplexes nd the frontier onditioning f the population hadmuch to do with molding egments f Ottoman ociety. The activitiesof the early kritoi nd ghazis, nd, later, klephts, ajduks, nd uskoks,and the mystique hat hrouded hem produced special mentality,special type of men, and a distinction etween Muslim and a non-Muslim, landlord nd a peasant.

68 Ibid., pp. 125.69 Lewis,"Turkey: Westernization," n Grunebaum, op. cit., p. 317.70 Finlay, op. cit., V, 149-50.


19/21

614 SlavicReview

There was a surprising degree of vertical mobility in the Ottomanempire. A Christian could become rich and a Muslim poor. A Chris-tian could become a prominent warrior, an imperial official, prosper-ous merchant or artisan. By adopting Islam, one could raise himself nthe social scale from a tolerated scripturarian to a favored Muslim.Although not so pronounced as in the time of the early caliphate, thedistinction between a born Muslim and a converted Muslim did exist(i.e., potur).

The Ottomans repopulated, renovated, and enlarged the old cities ofAnatolia and the Balkans and built new ones. For a time, separateTurkish and Christian cities existed, but gradually all cities becameTurkified. While the early period of Turkish rule was characterizedby Turkification of cities in the Balkans, the final period, especiallyafter the eighteenth century, was characterized by their de-Turkifica-tion.

Not until the eighteenth century did Slavs start drifting o cities, andnot until the nineteenth century did they develop a national middleclass of shoppers and artisans.2 Until then, the Serbs did not regardtheir co-nationals in cities as a part of their nation, and in Greece,Bulgaria, and Serbia, the overwhelming majority of peasants were

looked upon as "the real representatives" of thenation.73

The de-Turkification of Balkan cities since the eighteenth centuryis a fascinating chapter in the history of urban communities. Theemigration of Muslims to Turkey and the influx of Christian peasantsinto cities altered the ethnic and social structure of Balkan cities. Themosque with its affiliates han, hamam, schools, orphanages) and thechurch were social and educational centers n the city. The part of thecity n which the commercial and artisan shops were located was calledthe parsi cars?ija), and those who controlled the economic life of thecity were known as the parsili.74 The parsi, ow national in appearance,remained influential ven after the Turks were gone. Every city had itskahvehane, which became the local forum and place of entertainment.Here the customers discussed political and religious issues, conductedbusiness transactions, nd plotted schemes against the imperial authori-ties.75

One of the most important Ottoman institutions wvas he esnaf, the

71Evlija celebija,Putopis (2 vols.; Sarajevo, 1954). Translation by Hazim sabanovic fromTurkish original entitled "Evliya Celebi Siyahatnamesi Istanbul 1314/1896-1318/1900."

72 Traian Stoianovich, "Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant," Journal of EconomicHistory, June, 1960, pp. 234-313.

73 Finlay, op. cit., V, 122.74 Hamdija Kresevljakovic, Gradska privreda esnafi u Bosni i Hercegovini," GodiswnjakIstoriskog Drustva Bosne i Hercegovine, I (1949), 168-209. Kresevljakovic, Esnafi i obrtiu Bosni i liercegovini," Zbornik za narodni Vivot obicaje (Sarajevo, 1935). V. Skaric,Sarajevo i njegova okolina (Sarajevo, 1937).

75 V. Skaric, "Uticaj turskog zivota na drustveni zivot," in Knjiga o Balkanu, II (Bel-grade, 1937),p. 141.


20/21


21/21

616 Slavic Review

Christians was similar. They spent much of their time in the coffee-house, conducted business in the same way, adhered to the same socialcode and daily habits (greetings, table manners, etc.), and went onoutings (teferriig). Like her Muslim sister the Christian woman ab-sented herself from the city streets, wore similar though more conserva-tive dress, and covered her head with a veil similar to the ferace oryasmrak. he daily habits and chores of both women were the same, andthey uffered rom the same social interdicts nd taboos.

The social and psychological effects f Ottoman rule are apparent inboth Muslim and Christian communities: the technical and intellectualconservatism, attachment of low social value to work, suspicion ofgovernment, economic wastefulness and inefficiency. Ottoman feu-dalism stifled the creative potential of the people. Many of the long-established habits that are part of the Ottoman heritage have beendifficult o eradicate. The Muslim religious exclusiveness served tointensify similar tendencies among the Christians. If the Muslimsraised the fez and ferace to the level of a cult, the Montenegrins liftedtheir zavrata to a symbol of patriotism nd faith. To a good Muslim, anacceptance of infidel headgear implies social degradation and religiousbetrayal. The Muslims regulated the Christian dress and forbade theChristians to wear Muslim dress. By wearing discriminatory lothing,the Muslims encouraged the Christianis o style their own discriminatorydress. The Muslim clothing also had a class connotation; it was thegarb of the rulers. Consequently, the dress had deep sociopsychologicalimplications. A suppressed desire to look like Turks or to free them-selves of social suppression by wearing Turkish-styled clothes becamedeeply ingrained. The first mpulse of liberated Serbs in 1804 was todon the Turkish dress. Only after atiating their egos did they graduallyadopt part-Western nd part-local dress.

The Balkan Muslims have taken into their religion many pagan

and Christian practices and beliefs. Some continue to honor the saintsof their family before it accepted Islam. They celebrate the Chris-tian St. George and St. Ivan, and sometimes both Muslims andChristians revere the same shrine. The Muslims and Christiansexchange visits on Bayram and Christmas. Belief in miracles, super-stition, and fortunetelling re extensive among both.

The dominant Ottoman Turkish society and the numerous subsocie-ties that functioned within the encompassing system of social relationspreserved their distinctive characters and yet influenced each other.The long period of coexistence and intermingling has given the Turksand their erstwhile ubjects many common characteristics nd a similaroutlook on life. The Ottoman Empire vanished, but its influencessurvive.

Nature of Balkan Society Under Ottoman Rule

Documents

Transcript of Nature of Balkan Society Under Ottoman Rule