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8.0 Natural Resources This chapter considers significant natural resource issues for Te Rarawa. The chapter is divided

into three main parts with case studies directed at specific natural resource issues. The case

studies in section 8.1 concern land and waterways, in section 8.2 they discuss flora and fauna

issues and in section 8.3 they relate to generic natural resource issues such as Crown policies

and legislation relating to the natural environment. There is considerable overlap in the issues

discussed in the case studies.

8.1 Land and Waterways: Case Studies 8.1.1 Te Oneroa a Tohe

Te Oneroa a Tohe is a sandy northwest coastline running from Ahipara to Scott Point. The

foreshore is a natural habitat for a diverse range of fish, shellfish, and other sea creatures. There

are extensive dune fields at various places along the beach, which are now largely planted in

exotic sand binders, pasture and pine forest. The dune lakes and swamps behind Te Oneroa a

Tohe are habitats for a variety of bird species.

Historically the northern tribes regarded Te Oneroa a Tohe as an important source of political,

social, economic, and spiritual authority. Many battles between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa

took place along the beach, which was a place of continuous occupation and a critical source for

food, trade, and migration. Since the 1820s at least, Te Rarawa has exercised exclusive and

dominant use of the southern end of Te Oneroa a Tohe, which includes the foreshore.1 Within

this area, Te Rarawa enhanced, maintained and gave practical effect to their customary

practices. Tribal members learned important rules and practices to maintain the diverse

ecosystems the area supported, as well as learning tikanga that supported the social relationships

connected to Te Oneroa a Tohe and its resources.

In 1955, Walter Hone Te Pania lodged an application with the Maori Land Court seeking an

investigation of title to Te Oneroa a Tohe with a view to vesting its ownership in nominated

trustees.2 The Court heard the application in 1957. Throughout the hearing, leading kaikorero

of Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri gave evidence of their customary associations with the beach.

At one time Te Aupouri was dominant in the Ahipara district, controlling fishing grounds and

the collection of shellfish. However, tribal authority along the beach has been historically

contested between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa and numerous battle sites dot the foreshore. One

1 Richard Boast, ‘In Re Ninety Mile Beach Revisited: The Native Land Court and the Foreshore in New Zealand Legal History’, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, Vol 23, 1993, p 148. 2 Boast, 1993, pp 163-164.

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of the key battles occurred at Honuhonu, as a result of which, Te Rarawa secured its authority

over the southern end of Ninety Mile Beach, including marae and other reserves, fishing

grounds, cultivations, and cemeteries.3 In evidence given before the Maori Land Court, Rarawa

Kerehoma recounted the following associated rahui:

When [the chief] Poroa died [at Honuhonu] all things pertaining to the ocean… were set apart…deemed sacred for a period of 1 year. No one was allowed to get any seafood from the sea. When the year was up the restriction was lifted. This is a custom of the Maori people.4

In cross-examination, Kerehoma reiterated that Poroa lived at Ahipara, and had made his mark

before the Treaty of Waitangi. Kerehoma also spoke of the importance of the beach to others

living inland who relied on the food from the sea, including tuna and various birds, as well as

the cultivations along the coast.

James Bowman was called to testify about his observations at Ninety Mile Beach. A Pakeha, he

was 83 years old at the time of the Maori Land Court hearing in 1957. He lived at Herekino but

had been born in Ahipara. He remarked that when he was a young boy, a chief named Mumu

was in charge, controlling nearly the whole of the beach and the land too. There were raupo

huts right around the coast along Reef Point, and gardens of potatoes, kumara, watermelon, and

taro. Bowman saw thousands of skeletons along the coastline. He explained that when Mumu

died a rahui was placed on the beach:

…when the old chief Mumu died they buried him and put up a rahui. They put up a pole a good thick post, and they carved some sort of tattoo on it…The people knew the post was up to close the coast for shell fish and mussels. One post was 2-3 miles North of Ahipara and the other was the other side of Reef Point at Otia.5

Bowman was unequivocal that Te Rarawa controlled the beach south of Hukatere and had done

since long before he was born.6

In his evidence, Matiu Witana spoke of an event in which his grandfather, Hamihana Paka

threw a European into the sea for lighting a fire on rocks that contained a bed of mussels.

According to Witana, the lighting of fires was governed by Maori custom and this European had

lit his fire below the high water mark.7

3 Northern Minute Book 85, typescript copy, pp 10-11. 4 ibid. 5 ibid, p 16. 6 ibid, p 17. 7 ibid, p 17.

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Waata Hone Te Pania commented that Te Aupouri at one time had exclusive control of the

beach and that Te Rarawa distributed that exclusive occupation. The last battle was in 1822,

when Te Rarawa went to fight Te Aupouri by way of the beach. As a result, Te Pania thought

the boundary between Te Aupouri was fixed at Ngapae by the battle in 1820 and not altered by

the later battle at Hukatere. After 1820, Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa controlled the beach, with

each chief on their side controlling their own area.8

More recently, tangata whenua presented oral evidence about Te Oneroa a Tohe during the

Waitangi Tribunal’s hearing of the Muriwhenua claims. Various Maori submitted that for much

of the twentieth century Te Oneroa a Tohe was an important source of fish and shellfish, and

other foods and resources. These submissions enhance the evidence given in the Maori Land

Court hearing of 1957, demonstrating the contested nature of tribal authority and relationships

between neighbouring iwi, with Te Rarawa tribal authority prevailing at the southern end of the

beach. The abundance of shellfish and fish caught in various places along the foreshore

including estuaries that flowed into the sea is clear in the oral evidence. In more recent times,

commercial fishing, over-harvesting and vehicles on the beach have come to be seen as the main

causes for the depletion of shellfish and fish in the area.

Haimona Snowden who was born in 1914, stated in his evidence before the Tribunal that he

gathered shellfish and fish including ngakoikoi around the rocks and dived for crayfish at Otia.

There were rules to be followed, including never scaling fish or gutting fish on the beach and

only lighting fires above the high water mark. Snowden had personally placed a rahui on the

beach when a local man had collapsed and died there. The rahui was advertised in the local

newspaper, the Northland Age. He explained that a rahui would normally be three months or

longer, but he had cut it down ‘given the ways of today’. The evidence of Hohepa Kanara

supports views of rahui commonly held by Te Rarawa people that when a person drowned at sea

or when the seabed was exhausted a rahui would be placed on the area to replenish the supply.

No one was allowed to trespass.9 According to Snowden, no one person had specific rights, but

that the amount of seafood they took was limited in practical ways. Snowden participated in the

tribal committee, which was concerned about the depletion of seafood. The committee had

discussed making a reserve from Waimimiha to Herekino, although nothing resulted. He stated

that members of the tribal committee acted as honorary fishery officers, putting notices up at

their own expense, but they had no legal backing to support their actions.10

8 ibid, p 2. 9 Boast, 1993, p 147. 10 Haimona Snowden, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 4 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C9, pp 4-9.

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Other anecdotal evidence demonstrates how Maori used their knowledge of particular seasons

as a means of maintaining shellfish populations in the area. McCully Matiu stated that toheroa

would never be taken when they were small and that:

When the kutai go off, the paua are fat, when paua goes off, kina are fat. When kowhai blooms, kina is fat. When tawhara and patangatanga, fruits of kiekie are ready, the kutai is ready.

Another important aspect was that shells and remnants of fish were never to go back into the

sea.11 Matiu commented that Walter Masters had tried to prevent Maori from accessing their

traditional spots by blocking the land, which he had leased from the Crown, with iron gates.

Matiu thought that commercial fishing ventures had hindered the area contributing to the

depletion of local resources. One example was cray-fishing at Reef Point with people gathering

about twenty sacks a day. In his opinion, they should have gone out to sea instead of exhausting

the crayfish at the rocks, and because of this commercial venture koura are scarce in the area.12

In his submission, Eddie Walker was concerned that commercial fishing had depleted the

schools of fish that were previously in abundance. The trawlers would take huge amounts of

fish without regard for other species that relied on fish for survival, including other sea creatures

and birds, and that if the foreshore was overpopulated with crabs, other shellfish could not

survive. Walker went on to say that the trawlers would dump their rubbish littering the beach

with dead fish and that toheroa were affected because of the vehicles travelling along the

beach.13

Some oral submissions mentioned kaitiaki of the area, including the white shark and the

stingray, Paraweta.14 The submissions further mentioned the diversity of fish and shellfish

along the foreshore and coastline, including ngakoikoi, crayfish, toheroa, kingfish, mullet, kutai,

kina, paua, tuatua, ngohi, snapper, kahawai, flounder, parore, shark. In addition, there are living

memories of gathering seafood in knee-deep water, and netting being restricted to that depth to

ensure fish populations would not be over fished.

Despite European settlement and agricultural development Te Rarawa continued to utilise and

manage Te Oneroa a Tohe, an important mahinga kai, along customary lines. Evidence given in

1957 at the Maori Land Court hearing supported Te Rarawa having exclusive tribal authority

and that they exercised this authority according to their customary practices. The oral

submissions given in the 1990s further enhanced Te Rarawa authority and rights of access and

11 McCully Matiu, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C11, p 7. 12 Matiu, p 11. 13 Eddie Walker, Submission on Te Oneroa a Tohe, 5 March 1991, Wai 45, Doc # C12, pp 2-4. 14 Snowden, p 6 and Matiu, p 9.

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use of natural resources over Te Oneroa a Tohe through continual harvesting techniques and

management practices. In the Muriwhenua Fishing Report, the Tribunal stated that for at least

twenty years after the Treaty of Waitangi was signed Maori fished coastal areas in their

customary manner without regulation, restraint, or impediment except for rahui that they placed

on themselves.15

8.1.1.1 Ownership of Te Oneroa a Tohe

Until the 1870s, the Crown operated on the assumption that Maori titles to the foreshore had to

be expressly extinguished along with titles to the adjoining land.16 Thus, the Crown assumed

ownership and control of such areas under its prerogative right. The Director-General of the

Lands and Survey Department, in a memorandum concerning the Awapuni Lagoon at Gisborne

stated that, ‘[t]he property in the soil of the shore of the sea, of estuaries and arms of the sea and

of navigable rivers between high and low water mark is prima facie vested of common right in

the Crown.’17 The Crown view was that the foreshore was separate from other land. To

reinforce its position the Crown used legislation to secure, maintain, and administer coastal

areas. From 1878, the courts were precluded from vesting the foreshore in any person without

the special sanction of the General Assembly.18 However, lego-historian Richard Boast

maintains that legislation could stop the Court from hearing such claims because the Native

Acts were an exception to the Harbours Act of 1878.19

The Harbours Act 1910 enabled foreshore reclamation to be undertaken, based on Crown policy

that the foreshore belonged to the Crown. Pastoral development intruded on coastal areas

through sand reclamation, without regard for Maori rights and the natural resources the habitat

supported. McCully Matiu in his oral submission spoke about relief workers planting marram

grass near Lake Waimimiha, and it is possible that this related to reclamation works.20

The ownership and management of the foreshore remained a contentious issue despite the

enactment of legislation to secure Crown ownership There are numerous legal cases where

Maori have claimed ownership of the foreshore, but where the Court has ruled that customary

title did not exist. An example within Te Rarawa rohe was the Ngakororo case in the Maori

Appellate Court, where the judge accepted the Crown had title on the basis that the claimants

15 Waitangi Tribunal, Muriwhenua Fishing Report, Wellington, 1988, p 220. 16 Richard P Boast, ‘The Foreshore’, Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series (National Theme Q), Wellington 1996, p 31. 17 Geoff Park, ‘Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983’, unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 97. 18 Boast, 1993, pp 152-1523. 19 ibid. 20 Matiu, p 2.

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had failed to reach the standard of proof to show a proprietary rights over the foreshore.21 In this

case, the Crown Law Office advised that the Crown’s case was weak and recommended the

removal of such cases from the jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court.22 It is not surprising that

by the time of the investigation of title into Te Oneroa a Tohe, the Crown was taking positive

steps to secure its title to the foreshore.

During the 1957 court investigation counsel for Waata Te Pania, contended that Maori held the

land according to their customs and usages, that the land was customary land prior to the

signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and remained so subsequently. Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri

effectively occupied the foreshore to the exclusion of other tribes and Pakeha.23 The claimants

submitted evidence proving ownership, including the closing of parts of the beach for long

periods in recognition of the death of a chief and to fatten shellfish and the exclusion of Pakeha

and other tribes from the control and management of the beach. The foreshore had a vast supply

of food including fish and birds, and was a place of recreation for wrestling, boxing matches,

athletics, and horseracing. Both tribes carried out religious ceremonies associated with rahui.

The claimants argued that despite Pakeha influence, Maori continued to occupy the foreshore

and many dug for kauri gum both on the foreshore and on the coastline. On the evidence, Te

Rarawa and Te Aupouri had actual possession and control of the entire beach and occupied the

beach by virtue of necessity in respect of food, fish on the beach and birds in the bush. The

Crown could also not show that they purchased or acquired the land.24

In response, counsel for the Crown, persisted with the argument that Maori could not retain

ownership of the foreshore. In the Crown’s opinion, all Maori practised rahui whether they

owned the land or not: ‘[t]he rahui of fish and shellfish is something that all people do and is

common to all of New Zealand.’ The Crown’s view was that the battleground issue was not

about the reservation of the beach for settling armed combat but that ‘[a]n enemy fought his

enemy wherever he met him and could chase him.’ The Crown also contended that cemeteries

near the foreshore were incidental to people living there and having to bury their dead.25 The

Crown maintained that prior to the Treaty of Waitangi, Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri did not own

the land under custom and that on the cession of New Zealand everything passed to the Crown.

Subsequently, under the common law the foreshore was the property of the Crown, held for the

benefit of Maori and Pakeha alike. Furthermore, under the Native Land Act 1867 a

proclamation was issued on 29 May 1872 that suspended the Native Land Act 1865 in respect of

all foreshores in the Auckland Province. This proclamation had not been revoked prior to the

21 Boast, 1996, p 57. 22 Boast, 1993, pp 161-162. 23 Northern Minute Book 85, typescript copy, p 1. 24 ibid, p 8.

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1957 investigation. The Crown argued that there must be proof of exclusive and continuous

occupation of land from before the Treaty up until the date of investigation, before the Court

could conclude the land be Maori customary land. Crown counsel submitted this was not the

case and that for well over half a century the land had been in general use by the public.26

Judge Morrison stated that the legal questions raised by the Crown were for the Supreme Court

to determine and his jurisdiction only required him to determine whether the foreshore was

Maori customary land. He held that Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa had traditional ownership of Te

Oneroa a Tohe with each tribe occupying a particular portion of the beach; Te Aupouri at the

northern end and Te Rarawa at the southern. He concluded that each tribe had kainga and burial

grounds scattered inland from the beach and they occupied this territory to the exclusion of

other tribes. The area was regarded as a major source of food and shellfish and there was ample

evidence relating to customary conservation practices of rahui and use of the beach by members

of the two tribes.27

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Solicitor-General argued that the Crown acquired

ownership under the common law or alternatively had ownership under legislation, such as the

Harbours Act 1950 and the Crown Grants Act 1866.28 Judge Turner stated that once British rule

was established the whole country became property of the Crown from whom all titles were

derived. He also maintained that the Treaty of Waitangi, while it reserved certain property to

Maori, did not give Maori a legal cause of action. Judge Turner accepted the Crown’s argument

and read section 150 of the Harbours Act 1950 as preventing the Maori Land Court from

exercising its jurisdiction. Boast has commented that this view led to the widespread belief that

legislation extinguished Maori title to foreshore areas.29

Again on appeal, the Court of Appeal did not think that the common law was sufficient to

destroy pre-Treaty rights. Instead they placed emphasis on the coastal blocks, Muriwhenua

South and Ahipara, which the Crown had acquired in the nineteenth century and proceeded on

the basis that because coastal blocks had been sold then the Native Land Court must have

investigated all land adjoining the beach and issued titles. However, the Crown acquired both

the Muriwhenua South and Ahipara blocks before the Court was established. Boast has

examined the deeds of the Muriwhenua Southern and Ahipara purchases to see if the Crown had

purchased the foreshore the land adjoined. In the Muriwhenua South purchase there was general

description of 25 miles of beach frontage but no explicit mention of the foreshore. The Ahipara

25ibid, p 24. 26ibid, p 1. 27 Boast, 1993, p 164. 28 ibid, p 166.

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purchase did not include the coast and merely set out the western boundary down the coast. It

seems that there was no attempt to include the foreshore in the deeds, based on the assumption

that it belonged to the Crown by prerogative right.30 Instead, the Crown came into possession of

most of the frontage of the southern and central sections of Ninety Mile Beach before the advent

of the Native Land Court based on the common law assumption that the foreshore was vested in

the Crown upon the cession of sovereignty.31

Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded, incorrectly, that the Native Land Court had dealt with the

foreshore and that after investigation Maori customary rights were wholly extinguished. As a

result, the Court held that the Crown had legitimate ownership of the foreshore of Te Oneroa a

Tohe. The decision of the Maori Land Court, which had sole jurisdiction to determine

customary title, was overturned based on legislation and the Native Land Court was assumed to

have already extinguished Maori title.

Even if Maori are to accept this conclusion there are several issues left unresolved. Firstly, for

much of the nineteenth century the Crown operated on the common law assumption that it

owned the foreshore, yet both Te Rarawa and Te Aupouri comprehensively demonstrated at the

Maori Land Court hearing, that they owned the area exclusively. Secondly, legislation such as

the Harbours Act 1950, was applied to reinforce the notion that the foreshore was vested in the

Crown. However, it could be implied that Maori did have ownership of Te Oneroa a Tohe up

until that legislation was enacted. Boast maintains that this legislation could not be the basis of

Crown ownership as it does not explicitly mention the foreshore and it was not until 1991 that

there was legislation specifically referring to foreshore areas as being vested in the Crown. The

most disheartening aspect is the position taken by the Court of Appeal that the Native Land

Court had investigated and extinguished Maori rights based on coastal block purchases

adjoining Te Oneroa a Tohe. The deeds of these purchases never explicitly mentioned the

foreshore and the Maori Land Court did not investigate title to Te Oneroa a Tohe until 1957.

8.1.1.2 Resource Management Issues

The variety of iwi concerns over management of Te Oneroa a Tohe and its resources were

exhibited during the investigation of title in 1957. Claimants raised concerns about the

management of the beach and the disappearance of toheroa. Toheroa is a species restricted to

mainland New Zealand, living in exposed open coast beaches. Although toheroa produce

29 ibid, p 167. 30 ibid, p 149. 31 ibid, p 150.

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millions of eggs, a large portion is lost, consumed by other sea animals.32 Evidence from local

Maori who grew up in the area mentioned the abundance of shellfish and fish.

In May 1920 a proposed lease of Te Oneroa a Tohe was advertised in the New Zealand Gazette

for the extraction of toheroa for a cannery. Local Maori objected in a petition signed by 273

people and sent to the Member for Te Tai Tokerau, Tau Henare. The main concern was that the

local people would be excluded from gathering toheroa for personal use although they were

assured that personal taking for family consumption would be maintained.33 The Crown granted

a lease for commercial extraction and a cannery opened in Waipapakauri in 1930. In 1934 nine

people were employed with a daily in-season output of one ton and twenty local Maori were

engaged in digging and shelling toheroa on the beach.34

In 1940, Tapihana Paikea requested a concession for Maori residing along the foreshore to take

toheroa for food. He was aware of the need for control but thought that government restrictions

should be waived to those who lived on the coast. In 1942 Tapihana repeated his request to

Parliament but extended the provision to all Maori on the North West Coast. No government

action resulted.35

During the 1940s and 1950s there were more concerns over the depletion of toheroa. The

Waipapakauri cannery stopped canning in about 1943 and by 1947 had instead become reliant

on canning seasonal fish and vegetables.36 In October 1947, the Member for Te Tai Tokerau, T

P Paikea, asked Parliament to consider compensation for the destruction of toheroa beds. The

Minster of Marine, however, suggested that the cannery was not the cause. But that the cause

could be the result of ‘pollution of [the] beach by oil during the war, poaching by troops

stationed in the vicinity of the beach, heavy and fast transport using the beach during the war

and the heavy mortality of toheroa prior to the war.’ The Crown did not comment on the

prospect of compensation.37 In 1950 the cannery ceased production because of the commercial

exploitation of the beds and wartime activities.38 However, it is also possible that the depletion

was caused by human activity such as poaching and recreational activities on the beach placing

increasing pressure on the environment.

Peter Redfearn, in a report on toheroa, compiled a table of toheroa population changes from

1919 to 1986. He concluded that scientific evidence could explain the current depletion of the

32 Stokes, p 377. 33 ibid, pp 380-1. 34 ibid, p 381. 35 Park, pp 105-6. 36 Stokes, p 381. 37 ibid.

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species, that a fluctuating population is not unusual for the species; and that there may have

been poor spat, or excessive predation of juveniles. Alternatively, changes in beach profiles,

caused by swells and storms, could produce heaving surf which can destroy beds.39 Redfearn

stated that another reason for mortality arises from the tide not covering toheroa on the beach

for several days, one of the general characteristics of North Island west coast beaches. The

heating of the sand causes stress to the toheroa and they die from heat exhaustion. Another

reason for depletion of the toheroa resource put forward by Maori was that the planting of pine

at Aupouri State Forest may have affected toheroa populations, however Redfearn did not think

this would have caused depletion. However, he did voice concern that modern forestry

practices might harm toheroa by the run off of toxic materials such as insecticides or herbicides,

causing unfavourable conditions in the seawater. Redfearn also thought that the cannery

harvests did not have a long-term effect on the resource.40

In the late 1920’s there were complaints about motor vehicles that used the beach as a roadway.

There was no all-weather road up the Aupouri peninsula and until 1950 the beach was used as a

road and stock route. Tour buses travelled up the East Cape Road to Cape Reinga and then

would drive down the beach to Ahipara. 41 In the summer there may be up to 36 buses per day,

travelling along the dunes at Ahipara through Shipwreck Bay and up towards Cape Reinga.42

Redfearn in his report, commented that in general traffic over adult toheroa beds does not

appear to stress animals unless the traffic is heavy, for example, during an open season or beach

fishing competition. It seems heavy traffic may cause the toheroa to float towards the surface,

causing undue stress. Terrain vehicles can pose further potential hazards, exposing juvenile

toheroa to gull predation, heat stress or being crushed in the sand.43 A coastal survey conducted

in 1990 concluded that stock and recreational vehicles have caused damage to dune field

vegetation and these vehicles were ‘possibly adversely affecting the toheroa population.’ 44

Te Oneroa a Tohe is presently used for traditional and shore-based recreational fishing and

shellfish gathering. Forty two percent of its seafood is gathered by Maori. The area is still an

important source for tuatua, pipi, fish, paua, mussels and kina. To a lesser degree, the coastline

has crayfish, crabs, toheroa, scallops, oysters, huwai, pupu, karahu, and cockles.45 There is

formal protection of ten sites along Te Oneroa a Tohe, administered by the Department of

38 ibid. 39 ibid. 40 ibid, p 382. 41 Boast, 1993, pp 163-164. 42 James Henare Maori Research Centre, ‘Sustainable Development in Taitokerau: Case Study 2: Te Hiku o te Ika’, Auckland, 1996, pp 26-7. 43 Stokes, p 383. 44 Department of Conservation, Coastal Resource Inventory First Order Survey: Northland Conservancy, Wellington, 1990, p 43. 45 James Henare Maori Research Centre, p 27.

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Conservation. Te Oneroa a Tohe has national importance, due to the remnants of coastal

vegetation, threatened plants and rare or threatened birds utilising the coastal wetlands and

lakes, and several archaeological sites of importance.46

The coastal resources of Te Oneroa a Tohe were an integral part of Te Rarawa’s heritage

economically, socio-culturally, politically and spirituality. The legal process, Crown policy, and

legislation operated to effectively deny the mana of Te Rarawa over the foreshore. However, Te

Rarawa have always been concerned for the long-term maintenance of Ninety Mile Beach, its

natural resources and social, cultural and historical significance. The increasing human

population, agricultural development, over-harvesting (commercial and non-commercial), and

vehicles have contributed to the depletion of natural resources and the loss of knowledge and

tikanga for Te Rarawa. Te Rarawa had a system of beliefs and practices, which served to

conserve and manage those natural resources, but they have been denied the opportunity to

maintain and exercise their customary practices.

8.1.2 Tangonge: The Lake Bed Tangonge encompassed a lake, wetlands and various elevated sections. In 1835, local Maori

transferred Tangonge to the Reverend Joseph Matthews as part of a larger pre-treaty transaction.

Before the Old Land Claims Commission examined Tangonge in 1843, local Maori maintained

that Matthews return the land to them. However, when Matthews requested that Tangonge be

excised from his claim, the Commission instead treated it as ‘waste land’ or surplus and claimed

the land for the Crown. The pre-treaty transaction relating to Tangonge and attempts to have

ownership of Tangonge returned are considered in detail in Chapter Three of this report.

However, a brief summary of the transaction is also set out below and the ownership of the lake

bed is also considered.

Tangonge formed part of the Otararau block, which Matthews, under whom the Kaitaia Mission

was first established, purchased in a pre-treaty transaction from Nopera Panakareao and four

others in 1835. Matthews made a series of payments for the land between 1835 and 1840.47

Even though it appears that Europeans preferred the raised parts of the surrounding area for

farming, local Maori tended to gather at the edges of the Tangonge wetland, from which they

obtained ‘pipiwai, eels, fresh water mullet, ducks, swans, raupo, flax and other fish and birds.’48

Local Maori did not dispute that Tangonge had originally formed part of the land transferred to

Matthews. However, in what appears to be recognition of the importance of the site, they

46 ibid, p 26. 47 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 161. 48 ibid, p 258.

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maintained that Matthews promised to return the land to them before Commissioner Godfrey

inquired into the transaction 1843.49

When Otararau came before the Old Land Claims Commission, Godfrey examined it with the

nearby Waiokai block. Matthews’ deed claimed an area of 2000 acres for both blocks. Godfrey

recommended 1400 acres and 306.5 acres respectively for the Waiokai and Otararau blocks and

a grant to that effect was issued in 1844. Fourteen years later, in 1858, the Bell Commission

subsequently called in the grant. The land was surveyed and the two blocks as outlined in the

deed were found to have contained 3134.5 acres in total. Waiokai amounted to 1279 acres and

Otararau 1855.5 acres. At Matthews’ request and in what appears to be the fulfilment of his

promise to return the land to local Maori, Bell excised 685 acres from the southern end of the

Otararau block.50 Though Matthews wrote to Bell noting Tangonge had been cut off as he had

asked, he did not say why. Bell merely assumed that this section was the balance of the land or

the ‘surplus.’51

In the Muriwhenua Land Report, the Tribunal found that Bell should not have assumed the land

was surplus.52 Matthews had been close to Panakareao and had known of the condition that

Maori would not affirm any land transactions if the Crown did not return the surplus.53 If

Matthews cut off a piece of land there was no reason to believe that it should revert to the

Crown, rather than local Maori. Moreover, while the Crown had alienated Tangonge on paper,

the most visible aspect of a land sale, the delivery of vacant possession, did not occur. Maori did

not notify the Crown of their claim to the land in either of the Old Land Claim Commissions

simply because they believed it was still theirs. It was not for some 40 years, until the 1890s,

that the Crown gave local Maori cause to believe otherwise.

8.1.2.1 Ownership of the Lake Bed

Part of Tangonge was brought before the Native Land Court in 1933 in response to an

application by Herepete Rapihana and others requesting ‘a full enquiry and investigation of all

the circumstances in connection with our land “Tangonge” by the Native Land Court.’54 By the

time of the petition, Lake Tangonge no longer existed as the claimants had known it. A major

Government controlled drainage scheme had exposed the bed. The Pukepoto outlet had been

constructed to drain the lake into the Awanui River and the lake had become only an emergency

49 Nepia, p 11. 50 ibid. 51 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 260. 52 ibid. 53 ibid, pp 260-1.

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ponding area.55 Local Maori claimed the work of the Kaitaia Drainage Board had deprived them

of their ‘ancestral foods such as Pipiwai, Eels, Fresh water mullet…Kanae Raukura, Ducks,

Swans and other fishes and birds.’56 Though the claimants maintained that no part of Tangonge

had ever been alienated, the claim before the court was limited at that time to the bed of the

lake, which was approximately 693 acres.57

The Crown did not contest the ownership of the lakebed at the hearing in 1933. Indeed, in a

letter to the Native Minister later that year, Herepete Rapihana recounted that at the sitting of

the Court ‘none of the officers of the Crown were present.’58 Evidence was put forward that the

lake had never been sold and the lake’s importance as a major source of sustenance and other

resources was voiced. Judge F.O.V. Acheson subsequently gave his judgement in favour of the

Maori owners. The minute book records that orders were made that the bed be declared native

customary land and that written judgement would be given as soon as possible. It appears to

have never been given.

Further hearings had to take place to determine relative shares in the Tangonge Lake. Acheson

divided the 693 acres into 693 shares. 75 shares were vested in ‘the Aupouri tribe’; 75 shares

were vested in ‘the Rarawa tribe’, with 15 temporary trustees being named in the order; 25

shares were vested in Herepete Rapihana; 222 shares in the Puhipi list (individualised, ranging

from 17 to 5 shares per person); 221 shares in a list provided by Rapihana; and 75 shares in a

list provided by Hohepa Kanara. Acheson evidenced a good grasp of the complex relationship

between Te Aupouri and Te Rarawa at Ahipara and his allocations showed he was trying to be

fair to everyone. However, because of this judgement, the ownership of the bed of the lake

became almost impossibly complicated. In practice, the Pukepoto Tribal committee seems to

have taken responsibility for management of the area, and they leased parts of it for grazing.59

The drainage scheme seems to have left the bed in the worst possible state since it was neither a

lake nor dry land at least not consistently through the year. A once vital and productive food and

plant gathering resource was transformed into a boggy plain, which was usually under

floodwater during winter and not useful for much else other than rough grazing during the rest

of the year. The drainage scheme was altered in the late 1950s to minimise the risk of flooding

54 Petition, Herepete Rapihana and Others, 8 September 1932, Petition No. 183/32, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 55 R.P Boast, ‘The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases’, Waitangi Tribunal Report, p 36. 56 Petition, Herepete Rapihana and Others, 8 September 1932, Petition No. 183/32, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 57 Boast, ‘The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases’, p 36. 58 Letter, Herepete Rapihana, to the Hon. Sir Apirana Ngata, 20 October 1933, Tangone Block 1913-1946, MA 1, 38/18/5, Vol 1 Part 1, National Archives Wellington. 59 Boast, ‘The Muriwhenua South and Ahipara Purchases’, p 37.

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in Kaitaia over winter. This had the effect of overflowing the bed earlier than before. The

owners were not consulted about this, continuing what seemed to have been normal practice.60

8.1.3 Kahakaharoa

Kahakaharoa is a large block consisting almost entirely of sand abutting Te Tai Tamahine on

the northern side of the mouth of the Hokianga Harbour. It comprised approximately 4000

acres and as well as being home to a number of wahi tapu, including Te Puna ki Hokianga, it

served as a gateway to the moana and its resources. The Crown’s interest in the block stemmed

from its emphasis on opening up land for agricultural and pastoral development. Sand

reclamation thus became the rationale for the Crown purchase of Kahakaharoa. To some extent,

Te Rarawa thought a sand reclamation project would have some benefits, although it was

unlikely they would ever compromise the importance of Kahakaharoa as a site of significance.

The attitudes of local hapu were reflected in their consistent push to reserve significant sites

within the block, and maintain their customary rights to the incumbent natural resources,

whether on land or at sea.

By the early twentieth century, the Crown was of the view that coastal sands had no (economic)

worth in their natural state. Underlying this perception was the perceived need to further land

development objectives, which had dominated Crown land policy for much of the nineteenth

century.61 After the turn of the century, therefore, sand dunes, dune lakes and sand flats became

subject to the Sand Drift Act 1908 and various Harbours Acts, largely due to the Crown’s

perception that coastal sands had no (economic) worth in their natural state. The Crown wanted

areas of ‘highly evolvable character’, like Kahakaharoa, to be either ‘reclaimed for production’

or ‘stabilised to prevent it threatening adjacent pasture country.’62

In 1911, the government published a report by Leonard Cockayne, an ecologist, about the

nation’s sand dunes. This report, and a further report from Cockayne in 1914, became the

cornerstone for official attitudes and policies regarding sand dune reclamation. During the years

following the production of his reports, Cockyane became one of the commissioners on the

Royal Commission on Forestry. His reports considered sand dune areas to be ‘inherently

unstable, potentially productive and in need of reclamation.’63 The 1914 report stated there

were 290,000 acres of sand dune country in the North Island and Cockayne recommended that

60ibid, pp 37-8. 61 Geoff Park, ‘Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983’, unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 100. 62 ibid, p 132. 63 ibid, p 133.

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the State become involved in the reclamation of Crown-owned land.64 He noted that Màori

owned many areas in need of reclamation thus:

Of the total area of sand dunes in New Zealand a large proportion is owned by Natives, and at present I do not recommend that the State in any way touch this. The chief localities where there are large native areas of sand dunes are the northern portion of Mangonui County, Hokianga Heads, near Helensville, Kawhia, and Levin.65

Cockayne warned the government not to consider the Hokianga Heads for a sand reclamation

project, given the number of owners of the block and the process required to obtain consent

from them to commit to a reclamation scheme. However, the Crown began to assess a proposal

of acquisition to enable reclamation, as settlers in the area were concerned that sand was drifting

onto their farms.66 After an inspection of the area, W.J. Wheeler, Chief Surveyor, proposed that

Kahakaharoa be made into a scenic reserve due to the wahi tapu in the area and its historical

significance as a landing place for Kupe. Moreover, Wheeler thought there would be problems

in getting the owners to sell their interests and the only other way in which the Crown could

obtain title would be as a compulsory acquisition under the Public Works Act.67 As a result, the

Crown did not pursue the acquisition of Kahakaharoa.68

In 1945, Kahakaharoa came to the attention of Judge Prichard of the Native Land Court. In a

report to the Native Department, Prichard described Kahakaharoa as ‘useless and dangerous,

with drifting sand encroaching on useful lands.’ He was interested in convening a meeting of

owners to discuss the problem. Under the Native Purposes Act 1943 section 8, and with the

consent of the owners, such lands could be vested in the Taitokerau District Maori Land Board

as trustee for the owners and agent for any negotiations. But Prichard thought the Crown could

obtain the freehold title, and that it should endeavour to do so on the basis that:

interests of the native owners are almost valueless and unless they are extinguished, hundreds of pounds will over the years be spent by the Department in putting through successions … and the owners would never become entitled to any money from the block.69

64 ibid, p 133. (Cockayne’s first report was published in 1911: Report on the dunes – areas in NZ, their geology, botany and reclamation, AJHR 1911 C-13, pp 1-76. The 1914 report, Sand Dunes in New Zealand – Area and Description, is available at F1, 27/0 vol 3, National Archives, Wellington). 65 ibid, p 133. 66 ibid, p134, (Under-Secretary Lands and Survey to Commissioner of Crown Lands, Auckland, 29 July 1914 re: Sand Areas on Native Land: Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland). 67 ibid, pp134-135, (W J Wheeler to the Chief Surveyor, Auckland, 16 September 1914, Sand Areas on Native Land: Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland) 68 ibid, pp134 -135, (Commissioner of Crown Lands to Under-Secretary for lands and Survey Department, 14 Nov 1914 Proposal for scenic reserve, Hokianga Heads, BAAZ 1108/234e, National Archives, Auckland). 69 Memorandum, Registrar to Under-Secretary, 7 December 1945, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington.

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Prichard then considered the question of whether the land should be gifted or sold. He

concluded that while the owners could be persuaded to gift the land, they would over the years

regret their decision. The Registrar of the Maori Land Court noted that ‘the natives…will

always be expecting and hoping for a dividend’ and concluded that the Crown could pay 2/6d

per acre, a nominal figure, for Kahakaharoa.70

At Prichard’s request, the Native Department considered acquiring the freehold title to

Kahakaharoa for the Crown, in the interests of Maori land affected by the ‘sand menace’. In

1946, the Native Minister investigated the North Head area. It seems there was real interest to

provide for some measure of reclamation of Kahakaharoa, with tree planting viewed as one of

the most beneficial forms of reclamation.71 The Crown’s acquisition of the freehold would

prevent the owners from expecting the return of the land ‘with a greatly increased value

resulting from the State’s reclamation work.’72 In October 1946, R Packwood, District Engineer,

conducted a survey of Kahakaharoa. He concluded that the sand dune country covered

approximately 6,000 acres, which was generally unsuitable for cultivation or settlement. His

opinion was that the sand drifts had no economic importance and the land covered had no

commercial value unless reclaimed.73 It seems other government departments concurred on the

basis that the drifting sand was engulfing stabilized land, but the Commissioner of Crown Lands

did not think that the Crown should shoulder responsibility for the area until it was proven that

it could be successfully reclaimed. Given the success at Poutu Peninsula, he recommended that

the Crown should purchase the lands, as ‘it would be a valuable asset from a farming point of

view.’74

The government had been fully informed that commencing a sand reclamation project while

Màori retained ownership could have disastrous effects. Various government departments

recommended that it would be more beneficial if the Government obtain the freehold title.

However, the Native Land Act 1931 precluded the government from purchasing Màori land at

less than the government valuation. On 13 September 1946, a special government valuation

valued Kahakaharoa, containing 4480 acres, at £225. This was an amount the Crown was

willing to pay, offering to purchase Kahakaharoa in April 1947 for the stipulated £255.75 While

70 ibid 71 Memorandum, Under Secretary to Native Minster, 18 September 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 72 Memorandum, Under Secretary to Under-Secretary, Department of Lands and Survey, 24 July 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington. 73 Letter, District Engineer to Engineer in Chief, Public Works Department, 22 October 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 74 Memorandum, Commissioner of Crown lands to Under-Secretary for Lands, 23 December 1946, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 75 Proposed Purchase of Native Land for Sand Dune reclamation, 6 March 1947; and Offer by the Crown to purchase Native Land submitted to the Tokerau District Maori Land Board, 8 April 1947, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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the Crown was eager to complete the sale of Kahakaharoa, the Native Land Act 1931 prescribed

the manner in which the alienation should proceed. The owners needed to convene a meeting in

accordance with Part XVIII of the Act, and then pass a favourable resolution with the support of

a majority of the shareholders present at the meeting.76 Under the Act, an offer from the Crown

to purchase had to precede any resolution to sell.77 The Crown was also precluded from

purchasing land at less than the assessed value and had to ensure no owner was rendered

landless as a result of the transaction.78

The specific details of the trasnaction are sketchy, but it seems that Kahakaharoa was vested in

the Te Tai Tokerau Board under Part XIV of 1931 Act, perhaps as early as December 1945.79

In 1947 a meeting of the assembled owners was convened at Waihou. Judge Prichard and the

Deputy Registrar of the Maori Land Court attended, and the meeting was facilitated by William

Cooper. The minutes record 49 owners as present (three by proxy), 15 of whom had their

shares noted. It is unclear what percentage of the owners was represented by these 49, although

it is known that the Court listed 419 owners in 1959. Further research into the records of the

Maori Land Court should reveal the nature of ownership over time, including the percentage of

owners and shares. The resolution of the 1947 meeting was to sell Kahakaharoa to the Crown,

however Himiona Kamira proposed that the land in question be gifted to the Crown. The

owners resolved to gift Kahakaharoa to the Crown without consideration, although Ngakuru

Pene Hare dissented.

Although the owners resolved to gift their interests in Kahakaharoa there was an unequivocal

desire to protect particular sites, including waahi tapu, and maintain existing rights to access and

use the natural resources within and around the area. At the first meeting in 1947 the owners

wanted several waahi tapu excluded as well as an area around Te Puna ki Hokianga of about 50

to 100 acres. They also wanted access rights, at the Crown’s discretion, to the sea and the right

to use the foreshore for fishing and ‘picknicking’ to a depth of three chains as well as a right of

way for the people living at Rangi Point or Orongatea. In addition, local Te Rarawa asserted

that any lime deposits found, and deemed economically workable, should be operated for the

benefit of the local Maori farming community.80 In addition, it was understood that the Crown

would help to reclaim areas reserved for the owners, and not just reclaim the land it was about

to purchase.

76 Native Land Act 1931 s 418. 77 Native Land Act 1931 s 434. 78 Native Land Act 1931 ss 452-3. 79 See Memorandum, Registrar to Under-Secretary, 7 December 1945, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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The Court convened to confirm the resolution in April 1948. Representing the Crown, Mr Bell

informed the owners that while the Crown was happy with the gesture of gifting the land, it was

precluded by law. Section 452 of the Native Land Act 1931 prevented the Crown from

acquiring Maori land except at a price at least equivalent to its government valuation. Whina Te

Wake, representative for the owners in general and in particular for the people present at the

meeting, stated that owners wanted to gift the land even if this required the passing of special

legislation. The Court adjourned and referred the proposal of special legislation to the

Department of Maori Affairs.81 However, the Crown would not oblige. It was deemed more

expedient to purchase the land to obviate any grievance that might be laid against the Crown in

the future and that consideration given could be applied for the benefit of the community. The

Crown insisted that the alienation of Kahakaharoa be a conventional sale.82

In September 1948, a further meeting was convened to consider the sale of Kahakaharoa. Only

18 owners were present with their shares respectively listed. After considerable discussion, the

owners now resolved that if they were to sell the price should be set at 2/6d an acre (with the

Crown to bear all survey costs). 83 This was based on an adjoining block a quarter of the size of

Kahakaharoa, yet of the same quality, which had been valued at 5/- an acre. The owners felt

there was too much disparity between the government valuations for Kahakaharoa and other

blocks in the area, and the 2/6d amount seemed a fair compromise. At this rate, the sale would

yield around £700, which would be applied to marae and community improvements.

At the 1948 meeting, when the owners heard gifting of the land was legally untenable they

resolved to sell to the Crown. However, they insisted on adhering to the conditions they had set

at the 1947 meeting: to protect specific sites, access to and use of the beach and its resources,

and future economic benefit that might derive from workable lime deposits.84 As long as the

Crown met these conditions then the owners could accept the alienation of Kahakaharoa. These

conditions highlight not only the importance of Kahakaharoa to Te Rarawa, but also the

people’s desire to protect their ongoing interests.

On 29 July 1949, the Court confirmed the resolution of assembled owners under the terms of

2/6d per acre and the reservation of two blocks of land. The Court further confirmed that

80 Minutes of a meeting of assembled owners – Kahakaharoa resolution, Waihou, Panguru, 27 September 1947, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 81 Extract from Tokerau District Maori Land Board Minute Book, Vol 18 Folio 92-93, 26 April 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 82 Memorandum, Under-Secretary to Registrar Auckland, 11 June 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 83 Minutes pf a meeting of assembled owners - resolution, Waihou, Panguru, 16 September 1948, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol.2, National Archives, Wellington. 84 Memorandum, Registrar, Auckland to Under-Secretary, 20 April 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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maintaining access rights and maintaining interests in the lime deposits be given effect as far as

practicable. 85 The actual confirmed resolution passed by the assembled owners did not,

however, mention the issue of access rights and lime deposits; it merely noted the reservation of

two particular blocks from the sale.86 Crown officials at the Department of Lands and Survey

felt that the purchase of the land was still cheaper than administering the land while in Maori

title. However, the Crown was hesitant over the conditions of sale. One major concern was Te

Puna ki Hokianga, which it thought could be cut down to an area of 30 to 40 acres, despite the

owners resolving that it be an area of 50 to 100 acres. Officials were also concerned with access

rights for residents of Orongatea Block and Rangi Point in that it would heighten wind erosion

and create a fire hazard. They were further troubled by the three-chain foreshore right and

wanted it to ‘exist only from the low water mark and not above the high water mark.’87

The Deputy Registrar responded to these concerns by explaining each condition of the

resolution. He informed the Under-Secretary of Maori Affairs that the figures of 50 to 100

acres for Te Puna ki Hokianga were approximate to avoid the expense of survey work, and that

the boundary lines were of small importance. He noted that very few residents at Rangi Point

had no road access, and that the reservation of access rights would retain their access to outer

settlements. The Registrar was clear in stating that such issues would not cause major problems

for the Crown. He seemed more concerned with completing the transaction as the issue of

reclamation would take considerable time and these incidental issues could be dealt with once

the transaction was completed.88

In 1950, the Director General of Lands informed the Commissioner of Works that hundreds of

Maori owned valueless interests in the area, and that the Maori Land Court recommended the

Crown acquire the land for reclamation. He continued that there would be no expense in buying

the land but there must be a definite reclamation proposal or else the block would become a

liability for the Crown.89 The Director General was simply reiterating comments and concerns

shared with other government departments, yet it seemed that the Crown had not properly dealt

with the issue of Kahakaharoa. Relevant government departments pushed memos around for a

while answering internal questions concerning the boundaries and access rights to the beach. In

1951, the owners, represented by Whina Cooper, contacted the Minister of Native Affairs

85 Extract from Tokerau District Maori Land Board Minute Book, vol 18 Folio 176/178, 29 July 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 86 Confirmation of Resolution passed by Assembled Owners, 29 July 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 87 Memorandum, Director-General, Department of Lands and Survey to Under Secretary, 30 August 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 88 Memorandum, Registrar, Auckland to Under-Secretary, 16 September 1949, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 89 Park, p136, (Director General Department of Lands and Survey to the Commissioner of Works, 5 May 1950, re Sand dune reclamation: Northside Hokianga Harbour, F1/27/1, National Archives, Wellington).

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regarding the sale of land. He stated that he had no knowledge of the matter as sand

reclamation had been taken over by the Forestry Department.90 The Minster of Native Affairs

replied to Whina Cooper in June of 1951 stating that sand reclamation was very much a nation-

wide issue but that purchasing the block had been deferred until the government had decided on

the best way to deal with the problem.91 Further internal memos indicated that the government

was still mulling over what policy it should adopt regarding sand dune reclamation.92

Despite Judge Prichard, in 1951, further requesting information as to whether the Crown would

proceed with the sale of Kahakaharoa, there was still no authorisation from the government to

purchase the block. By May 1953 the government recommended that Kahakaharoa be

purchased but only at the nominal figure of 1/- per acre.93 By this time, the Lands and Survey

Department had taken over sand reclamation. Crown agents were awaiting approval from this

department, and there was some concern that the Crown could not go back on its earlier offer.94

In 1953, the Director General of Lands was again alerted that its figure of 1/- was below

government valuation and that it could not legally purchase at the price, just as it was prevented

from accepting the land as a gift.95 In July 1953, based on a government valuation conducted in

1952, the government indicated it was prepared to pay £255 because it did not materially differ

from the figure of 1/- per acre.96

Nine people are recorded as attending a meeting convened at Panguru on 14 December 1953.

The minutes also mention that numerous other owners ‘on succession’ were present. The

meeting recorded that the owners were disappointed at the delay over this matter and the failure

to pay the original figure of 2/6 per acre. However, the owners resolved to sell Kahakaharoa at

the price of 1/- per acre subject to the same conditions in the resolution of 1948, which included

the exclusion of two portions of land.97

In September 1954 at a Court hearing the Crown submitted that while it was willing to purchase

the land, the exact area needed to be surveyed. Court was adjourned, though the resolution was

provisionally confirmed. The Maori Land Court confirmed the owner’s resolution to sell and, on

90 Notes of Interview, 12 April 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 91 Letter, Minster of Màori Affairs to Mrs W Cooper, 18 Jun 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 92 Memorandum, Duty Registrar to Under-Secretary, 16 May 1951, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 93 ibid 94 Kahakaharoa and Wairoa A: Sand Dunes, 26 May 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 95 Memorandum, Secretary to Director General of Lands, 4 June 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 96 Memorandum, Director General to Secretary for Maori Affairs, 15 July 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1 part 1, National Archives, Wellington. 97 Minutes of meeting of assembled owners, at Panguru, 14 December 1953, MA W2459 5/14/1, vol 1, National Archives, Wellington.

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9 April 1959, ordered a partition of the Kahakaharoa block into Kahakaharoa A, B, and C.

Further, Kahakaharoa B and C were vested in nominated trustees. Kahakaharoa at this stage

had 419 owners in unequal shares. The Court reported that all other owners who had attended

earlier meetings were deceased and that these orders were provisional only until a further

meeting of owners was convened.98 In 1960 the Màori Land Court confirmed the trustees for

Kahakaharoa B and C blocks with the power to arrange leases, to negotiate for sale of sand and

minerals and to administer funds arsing from those activities.99 Kahakaharoa C contained the

historical spring Te Puna ki Hokianga. Each block was to have sea access and block B would

have road access to a public road.100 The Crown acquired Kahakaharoa, described in the

purchase deed as containing 3620 acres. The deed states that the owners met, the Court

confirmed their resolution and on 7 July 1959, the Board of Maori Affairs adopted the

resolution and the Maori Trustee executed the transfer as agent of the owners and received the

sum of £181.101

While further research is required to discover the history of Kahakaharoa since 1960, it is clear

from maps compiled as a part of the Te Rarawa treaty settlement negotiations process that the

stretch of beach adjoining Kahakaharoa, in the Crown’s view, is in the ownership of the

Department of Conservation, a clear contradiction of what the owners had intended.102

8.1.4 Whangape Harbour

The Whangape harbour is one of the smallest harbours and estuaries opening up to the Tasman

Sea on the west coast of the northern North Island. It is a 4 kilometre long narrow gorge, which

opens into a broad Y shaped with two rivers – Awaroa and Rotokakahi.103 The floor of the

harbour is irregular due to sandy bedforms and rock outcrops up to two metres in height. There

is an active transport of sediment from catchments to the lower estuary in Rotokakahi River.104

The river banks act as a store of sediment but changes in natural control initiate new sediment

patterns. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that rapid bank erosion on Rotokakahi was

initiated by the removal of willows in mid 1980s but records relating to this issue were lost in a

98 Hokianga Minute Book, Vol 29 Folio 187-198 & 199/202, Partition Order, 9 April 1959, MA W2459 5/14/1 pt1, National Archives, Wellington. 99 Memorandum, Secretary to Minster of Maori Affairs, 27 July 1962, MA W2459 5/14/1 vol 2, National Archives, Wellington. 100 Partition Order, Kahakaharoa & Wairoa A, 1954-73, MA W2459, 5/14/1 volume 2, Box 50, National Archives, Wellington. 101 ‘Kahakaharoa A Block (AK 5453)’ paper and attachments summarizing the transfer of Kahakaharoa A Block to the Crown, tabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements at a negotiations meeting with Te Rarawa, Auckland, 5 June 2003. 102 See, for example, Map of Crown Owned Land, (Sinclair Knight MERZ, sourced from Land Information New Zealand data) tabled by the Office of Treaty Settlements at a negotiations meeting with Te Rarawa, Auckland, 21 August 2003. 103 S1 WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE? 104 S31

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fire at Far North District Council offices.105 The gravel in the Rotokakahi and Awaroa rivers is

highly moveable, with the gravel bar accreting rapidly despite regular gravel extraction.106 One

of the main concerns for Maori in this area has been the depletion of shellfish resources and the

decline of stocks of fish in the North Hokianga region. Pipi and cockles range in size but on

average are very small. The harbour supports a very high mud content, this top layer of mud

kills pipi, though cockles adapt and can increase in size.107 In the late 19th and early 20th century

there was a Kauri timber milling industry operating in the area. The catchment of the harbour

covers 300 square kilometres and by the 1920s the area had largely been stripped of its kauri

timber. A mill operated on the west side of the harbour inside the entrance and at mouth of

Awaroa River, but this activity ceased in the 1920s. The last of the logging operations were in

1960’s at the catchment in Warawara Ranges where timber was taken from the Hokianga

Harbour.108 Pollution has been one of the major concerns of Te Rarawa Maori in this area,

especially as it relates to the failure of the Crown to protect fisheries and other resources in the

Whangape harbour and environs. The history of pollution from milling is discussed in this

section.

In 1907 G.W. Budd, a coastwaiter at Herekino, noted that sawdust from Mitchelson & Co Mill

at Whangape was streaming through gaps in a retaining wall into Whangape Harbour.109 Local

Màori sent a letter of concern to the Minster of Marine on 12 October 1908 stating that the

Whangape River was being silted up by the dumping of sand used as ballast from the ships of

Mitchelson & Co and from kauri sawdust flowing into the harbour from the mill. Debris was

being deposited on the upper side of the wharf and part of a paddock had been left open for

sawdust to run through to the river where it floated on water before sinking.110 The Secretary of

Marine, George Allpot acted on the complaints requiring local officers to report on the situation.

However, even after this action the company still let sawdust seep through into the harbour.

This was evidenced in correspondence from the acting Collector of Customs to the Secretary of

the Marine Department.111

In 1909 Budd reported that sawdust was still being allowed to run into the harbour unchecked.

Mitchelson denied these claims and stated his intention to repair breastwork on the retaining

wall as soon as a pile-driver was available (the pile driver was at that time employed at

Herekino). Mirchelson stated the problem was teredo, a shipworm which bored though wood.112

105 S 15 106 S15 107 S91 108 S2 109 Daamen, p 80 110 ibid, p 81 111 ibid, p 84 112 ibid, p 85.

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The work was still not done by 10 August 1909. Mr A. Ngawaka wrote to say he feared

channel would become blocked owing to ballast being washed into it near the low water mark.

The manager of the company, J.H.M. Carroll, explained on 16 September 1909 that floods and

bad weather had damaged repairs, that the mill was not working at that point and that ballast

was not being deposited into the harbour but only under the wharf in order to secure it.

By December 1910 the company went into liquidation. Despite the liquidator’s instructions that

no material be deposited into the harbour, the manager was unresponsive.113 In January 1911

Budd reported to the Minster of Marine that the retaining wall was in a worse condition than

first reported, with no repairs being done, and ballast was still being emptied behind the wall

which washed out into the harbour. Budd also wrote that Constable Hampton of Herekino had

visited with Budd and seen the damaged wall.114

In September 1913 W.E. Hunt succeeded Budd as the coastwaiter at Herekino. He contacted the

Secretary of the mill about debris being dumped in the harbour and sent a letter to the

Superintendent of Mercantile Marine stating that no serious attempt was being made to stop

sawdust dumping in the harbour and along the foreshore. He commented that the dumping was

not interfering with navigation but that local Màori were concerned that the sawdust was

affecting the fisheries resource. As a result, proceedings were begun against the Whangape

Timber Company on 19 January 1914. The company was convicted and fined but did not stop

further sawdust dumping.

Ngawaka made a further complaint relating to gravel abstraction in June 1919. Budd, who was

now the coastwaiter at Whangape, noted this and a further complaint about the dangerous slips

that could be caused by continued removal of gravel and that it be discontinued pending an

official examination of the foreshore. John Brindle, harbourmaster at Hokianga investigated the

complaint and agreed that the taking of gravel from that part of the river should cease

immediately.115 John Wood, resident engineer of the public works department at the district

office in Whangarei agreed that their contractor J Harrison should cease working on extracting

gravel from the river. However, the district engineer suggested that there would be no harm

done in removing shingle from Rotokakahi River, Pakinga Point or the area on the southern side

of harbour extending from site of ferry to the bar.116

113 ibid, p 86. 114 ibid, p 87. 115 ibid. 116 ibid, p 88.

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It is unclear what happened after this. However, the records show the continuous concern of

Maori about the ill-effects of sawdust, sand dumping and gravel extraction. The Crown may

have been responsive in terms of initiating investigations into potential damage but it did not act

with enough force and speed to control continued damage.

8.1.5 Reclamation of Mudflats in the Hokianga Area

Mudflats on the Hokianga area were an important source of sustenance for local Màori. They

yielded large amounts of shellfish with extensive sources of pipi and karehu. The issue of

mudflat reclamation brought into question river access for Maori to exercise their fishing

rights.117 Shellfish was considerably reduced by mudflat reclamation and large tracts of

traditional food-gathering sites were destroyed. Such sites did not only exist as sources of food

but as integral parts of the local Màori cultural landscape. The reclamation of such sites

reflected a Pakeha understanding sanctioned by the government: that the land was more

valuable and productive as pasture. The Maori view of such sites and their significance in the

Màori world-view was disregarded.

As with many other Government actions, there was never any specific contract that the Crown

could take or reclaim such areas. Màori wanted unrestricted access maintained. However, the

government considered the shell fish argument to be very weak and that Maori still had

sufficient sites to gather what they needed. Section 39 Harbours Amendment Act 1910 gave the

Governor-General in council, the power to grant rights to lease lands between the high and low

water marks where the depth of water was not sufficient for the purposes of navigation, for

reclamation for up to 21 years. The 1908 Harbours Act stated that such work could not be

authorised without the sanction of a special Act of Parliament.118 Pakeha farmers in Hokianga

applied for licenses to expand farming and cultivations onto mudflat areas. In 1930 the

Secretary of the Marine Department, G.C. Godfrey, released mudflat regulations under section

146 Harbours Act 1923. Licensees were notified that they could surrender their leases and apply

to Commissioner of Crown Lands for a lease under the new regulations. To obtain the benefit

of the regulations a new proclamation had to be issued setting land aside for reclamation.119

There were two areas under reclamation in Hokianga in the early 20th century, the Vujcich

reclamation at Tapuwae and Robert Holland’s reclamation at Whakarapa. In general, Maori

were opposed to the reclamations on the basis that the mudflats were a source of food and

traditional use. On 31 January 1922 a petition by Te Tai Papahia and others was sent to Native

Minister relating to banks of Hokianga River that were under water at high tide and left dry at

117 Reclamation Mudflats, North Auckland, 1935-40, MA 1, 19/1/217, National Archives Wellington. 118 Daamen, p 96

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low tide. They objected to mud banks being vested in the Marine Board as the lands in questions

were not sold by Màori to the government and the areas still belonged to Màori. They received

no reply except to say they were informed that ‘where the salt water of the ordinary tide flows

over land, that land belongs to the King’ and that the Marine Department managed these areas

and the government could lease but not sell these areas.120

8.1.5.1 The Vujcich Reclamation

In 1917 Mijo Vujcich and Vukovich sought a licence from the Marine Department to lease a

portion of mudflat on the southern bank of the Tapuwae River. The land comprised 100 acres, a

strip extending from near the mouth of the river to a distance of 1/3 of mile upstream. This area

fronted their property and a Màori owned block known as Puketoro No 1 or Rerenga.121 Vujcich

reapplied for a licence in July 1919, intending to buy his partner’s interest in adjoining land. A

licence to occupy and reclaim for 50 years was issued by order-in-council on 17 Nov 1919.

However, Vujcich considered the expense of 50 acres too expensive. As a result this licence

was revoked and a new one was issued on 26 Jan 1920 for 165 acres.122 In 1923 Vujcich

assigned occupation to his wife, Kathleen Vujcich. She had intended to improve the land but

this did not occur. A half interest in the licence was then transferred to his brother, Ivan

Vujcich. Vujcich did not always made full payments of rent to the Marine Department. In 1934

Ivan wrote to change payments on the basis they occupied only 146 acres not the full 165 acres

and accordingly the rental was reduced. On 2 March 1937 they requested that the tenure of the

land be placed under s146 Harbours Act 1923.123

In November 1923 Hohepa Himi Hare wrote to Tau Henare asking that the mudflats from the

mouth of the Tapuwae River to its source and along its tributaries not be included in Marine

Department leases as his people obtained food from these areas. His concern was directed

solely at the mudflats fronting their interests in land.124 Rosemary Daamen commented in her

report into Te Rarawa ki Hokianga that ‘Maori throughout Hokianga…were concerned about

the reclamations in their areas and the very apparent loss of their rights to use these areas for

their own purposes.’125

8.1.5.2 The Holland Reclamation

119 ibid. 120 ibid, pp 98-99. 121 ibid, p 99. 122 ibid. 123 ibid, p 100. 124 ibid. 125 ibid.

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The Whakarapa River is an arm of the northern Hokianga, located in an area of mudflats in the

intertidal zone known as Ngakororo.126 In October 1919 a request to lease the Ngakororo

mudflats at Whakarapa was made by Robert Holland.127 In November 1920 plans were prepared

and forwarded to the Marine Department. In January 1921 John Mitchell, the pilot and

signalman at Hokianga, sent the plans back to the Marine Department.128 The plan showed 63

acres to be included in the lease. The District engineer reported that Holland did not own any

land around the foreshore but land that was some distance inland. Also that local Maori objected

to the proposal, but that this there was no reason, in his view, to object. Holland received

permission and an order-in-council was signed in January 1922.129

In 1922, much to the dismay of local Maori, Holland was given permission by the Marine

Department to extend his farm by draining and banking an area of foreshore. Permission was

granted pursuant to section 39 of the Harbours Amendment Act 1910. The license allowed

Holland to occupy the area of foreshore for 21 years and to execute works for reclamation

purposes.130 In effect, Holland was given permission to artificially create an area above the

high-water mark directly abutting on areas of Maori freehold land. The owners of these blocks

were incensed. Holland’s project, if successful, would destroy their areas of foreshore and cut

them off from access to the sea.131 In September 1924 Holland wrote to Marine Dept requesting

that he be able to lease a small extra piece of land at Whakarapa between his section and the

main road. Around this time William Topia wrote to the Native Minister asking what rights

local Maori owners had. He wrote again not objecting to Pakeha gathering shellfish for their

own use or sale but objecting to Pakeha farming on the mud flats.132

In 1924 a deputation of northern Maori called on the Minister of Marine, G.J. Anderson to

explain their concerns about the Hokianga foreshore. The two major concerns were that Pakeha

were legally taking and selling toheroa and the issue of the leased areas of mudflats around

Hokianga.133 Terima Teiki stated that the mangroves flats adjoining lands and homes at Waihou

and Whakarapa inlets and at Motuti and Wairae, were leased by the Marine Department to

Pakeha who owned farms inland. He wanted to work the mudflats adjoining their lands

themselves.134 Despite being told by the government that Maori would be given an opportunity

to object to the leases the problem at Whakarapa did not go away. For example, the Auckland

126 Boast, 1996, p 57. 127 Daamen notes that this is at odds with King's assertion that Holland took a lease from the Marine Department in 1914. 128 Daamen, p 101. 129 ibid, p 102. 130 Boast, 1996, p 57. 131 ibid. 132 Daamen, p 103. 133 Boast, 1996, p 57. 134 Daamen, p 103.

168

Star on 2 March 1925 reported that two Màori being charged with trespass and damage to

property on land leased by Holland. Two Maori had dug out and demolished part of retaining

wall erected as part of the reclamation. The newspaper reported that on 15 September a large

number of Maori had assembled on the property armed with shovels to demolish the wall.

However, the Judge reserved his decision.135

On 11 June 1925 Ira Anihana applied to the Native Land Court for an investigation of title to

Ngakororo. The Native Land Court investigation of title began at Rawene on 18 August 1925.

However, the Crown representative was not present so the case could not proceed. A record of

objections to the licence included those made on the basis of ancestral rights, occupation,

access, fishing purposes and frontage to sections. The Court recognised there may be special

rights but adjourned the hearing until November of that year. By December 1925 there had still

been no decision.136 On 13 May 1926 in the Native Land Court at Opononi, Judge Acheson held

that at since the Crown representative did not claim the mudflats as Crown land it was

customary land.137 Judge Acheson wanted a survey of the area completed but the Lands and

Survey Department could not complete the report for some time as they were gauging the tide

over 15 months. Meanwhile, Holland asked the Marine Department to protect his tenancy. He

wanted a lower rental from September to December 1927 given he could not do anything with

the area. In 1930 Holland refused to pay rent for the 63 acres unless he could get a lease for a

further four acres.

The survey was finally completed on 1 September 1931.138 There was a further court hearing on

the investigation of title on 21 October 1931 at Rawene but the court adjourned until 28 January

1932.139 In February 1932 the Native Land Court heard further evidence at Pangaru. In April

1935 Secretary of Marine informed the Secretary-General that final consideration of the case

was deferred for various reasons which included the possibility of the Public Works Dept taking

over and reclaiming the area for Native Settlement.140 In 1941 judgement was given that

Ngakororo was papatupu land. Ngakororo became a tribal reserve as a Native Reservation under

section 5 of the Native Purposes Act 1937 and rentals from it were paid to Maori. However, on

appeal the Native Appellant Court accepted that the Crown had title and stated that the

Claimants had failed to meet standard of proof to show any proprietary rights over the

foreshore.141

135 ibid, p 104. 136 ibid, p 106. 137 ibid. 138 ibid, p 107. 139 Daamen, p 108. 140 ibid, p 109. 141 Boast, 1996, p 57.

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8.1.6 Owhata

The following account relating to Owhata block is taken directly from Professor Evelyn

Stokes report on the Muriwhenua Claims Post 1865.142

On the Owhata block there was a papakainga on a sandy spit jutting out into Herekino

Harbour. It was not part of the sale to the Crown of Rarotonga A1 in 1897. When the title to

Owhata was investigated in April 1889 the area on the plan before the Court was 43 acres. In

1897 the block was partitioned into Owhata A and B. The papakainga, with a marae and

urupa, was known as the place where kaimoana was abundant. The people also cultivated

kumara and had vegetable gardens there. There was probably little to disturb the pace of life in

this remote community until 1937 when a road was surveyed and constructed around the

shores of Puhata Creek to Owhata, and now called Owhata Road. The large family of

Maraea Heke were living at Owhata, and she believed that some of their land was being taken

for the road. Jim Heke, in his oral evidence before the Tribunal, said his grandmother, Maraea

Heke, 'strongly disagreed' with any taking of Owhata block. When the workmen arrived to

start constructing the road, she put a fence across it to obstruct them.

During 1937 Maraea Heke had written letters to the Native Minister complaining about the

road, before she fenced the area where she thought it crossed Owhata land. Officers of the

Department of Maori Affairs were asked to investigate but the plan they found showed a road

laid out in 1895 entirely on Rarotonga block, not Owhata. Maraea did not accept this. The

unsympathetic Department of Maori Affairs officer advised the County Council it was a

matter for police action. The neighbouring farmer Vickers who was also Mangonui County

Chairman, was also putting pressure on to resolve the matter. Maraea was arrested and sent to

Mount Eden gaol. By this time Judge Acheson, who had not been directly involved, sent an

urgent message to the Under Secretary. On the grounds that Maraea had not been present in

court when her case was heard in Kaitaia, there was a rehearing in Whangarei, and she was put

on probation and sent home.

In response to Judge Acheson's conclusion that there was some merit in Maraea's claim.

Chief Judge Jones decided to do his own investigation. He wrote to the Under Secretary, Native

Department, on 18 May 1938:

I have gone through the records and plans so far as they were available and have come to the conclusion that the Native owners of this [Owhata] Block have reasonable grounds of complaint both with regard to the taking and laying off of a road over their land and a claiming of a portion of the block as Crown land (National Archives ABWN 6095 ACC W5021 7/871, box 256).

142 Stokes, pp 147-155.

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Chief Judge Jones recommended the matter be sorted out on the ground with local people with

a surveyor present.

Meanwhile, Vickers could not wait for a full investigation and unwisely led a picnic party of

about 36 family and friends to the beach on the disputed land. The party was met by a hail of

stones from Maraea and her family and there were some injuries. Maraea was arrested again

and sentenced to five months in Mount Eden. Her husband was working away on an

unemployment relief scheme. Her numerous children (at least 8 of her 23 children were still

living at Owhata) were left in the care of a 13-year-old daughter. In spite of pleas by local

staff and Judge Acheson to arrange for relocation of the family, nothing was done by Native

Department officials. Acheson considered that the eroding Owhata block was too small to

support a family farm.

Further investigation revealed survey problems acknowledged by the Chief Surveyor, and in

January 1941 the boundary issue was put before the Native Land Court. Mr P B. Wright

gave evidence, based on an investigation by the Department of Lands and Survey of all the

earlier survey plans, in an attempt to establish whether the road did encroach on Owhata block.

He explained that the original “Plan 3402 Red", surveyed by a Mr Simpson in 1875, had been

before the Court in 1879, when Rarotonga block title was investigated, in 1889, when it was

partitioned, and when Owhata block title was investigated on 9 April 1889:

Plan 3402 shows a road coloured burnt sienna running over the Rarotonga Block only and not through or adjoining the Owhata Block. I wish to point out that this road was not part of the survey but was merely superimposed upon Plan 3402 and not (in all probability) immediately defined. This practice is not permitted nowadays but was allowed in the old days.

He then referred to a plan dated 1893, 'No. 7085/3 Blue':

This was the first survey of the road which may intersect the Owhata block on the Rarotonga block. There is a dotted line which may appear to indicate the boundary of the Owhata block. It would appear from this plan that for the most part the boundary of Owhata is just to the north of the road, but that at the S. E. corner of the Owhata block the road intersects the Owhata block. None of the pegs of the Owhata block are shown on plan 7085.

However, in the Native Land Court orders, dated 19 March 1897, for the partition of Owhata

A and B. the plans 'show the road wholly on the Rarotonga Block'.

Wright then referred to “Plan 4477 Red", prepared by the Survey Department in 1898 on which

the road, instead of being shown inside the boundary of Rarotonga block, as on the earlier

plans, "is now shown as running along the southern boundary of the Owhata Block.” This

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apparent adjustment of the Owhata boundary had involved taking off about 1 acre from the

south-western corner of Owhata block as well as a small part of Rarotonga. 'On the other

hand a small portion of the Owhata block at the S. E. corner seems still to be included in the

area taken for road.' Wright also drew the 'Court's attention to the fact that none of the old

pegs showing southern boundary of Owhata were picked up' on Plan 4477. Wright commented

that it was 'quite clear that the road boundary of Owhata as shown on Plan 4477 Red cannot

possibly be the same line' that was shown on the earlier plans. He also stated that he had

searched the files for an explanation of the I acre taken from the south western corner,

which was a 'clear deviation from the original boundary of Owhata". It was the surveyor's

duty to find the old pegs from former surveys, but perhaps he had been unable to find them:

It has been suggested that he cut off the lac. lr. 08p in order to bring the area of Owhata to the original 43 acres. In my opinion a Surveyor of Mr Warner's type would not have cut off this area without some very good reason. A second suggestion is that Mr Warner, finding no old pegs to define the boundary between Rarotonga and Owhata, decided to bring Owhata up to the road by adding to it part of the Rarotonga Block between the road and the Owhata Block. To allow for this extra area for the Owhata Block he must have added lac. lr. 08p (from S. W. corner of Owhata) to the Rarotonga Block, which at that time was Crown Land. The area 43 acres as fixed on investigation [of title] remained the same but the boundaries were different.

Wright also added that the proclamation taking the road did not refer at all to any land taken

from Owhata Block. Figure 20 shows the boundary of Owhata Block and road line based on

the 1898 Plan 4477 Red.

In summing up the situation. Wright noted that Plan 3402, surveyed in 1875 by Mr Simpson,

was 'found to a very unreliable survey' as the surveyor did not 'close' his survey lines. It was

this survey that had caused the problems for the Crown in Samuel Yates' claims for

reimbursement of survey costs noted earlier in respect of Rawhitiroa block. None of Simpson's

original survey pegs had been found by surveyors who followed him. Complicating this

situation, Wright suggested, 'The seaward boundaries of the three blocks may have altered

between 1875 (Plan 3402) and 1893 (Plan 7085/3'. He concluded it was impossible now to

establish the original 1875 boundary of Owhata:

The Lands Dept. makes the following suggestion that the Natives accept the southern boundary of the Owhata block the road as first surveyed by A. B. Wright in 1893 Plan 7085/3 blue, commencing at the western side where the road meets the seashore ... and thence by the road to the point where the shore is reached on the S. E. boundary of Owhata.

By accepting the road as the Southern boundary the Natives will gain more than they will lose. A road is a natural boundary. The suggestion I have made seems to be the common sense one. I leave the matter in the hands of the Court (Northern MB 72/94).

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Anaru Ngawaka, speaking in Court on behalf of Maraea Te Awa Heke, thanked Wright for

his explanation, and noted the apparent discrepancies in area. 'Maraea appears to have made a

mistake, just as the surveyor did/ Anaru agreed that the road boundary was the best solution.

'Maraea says that the Natives were not consulted" about the survey of the road:

If the position had been properly known some years ago. Maraea te Awa would not have suffered imprisonment. The position re her imprisonment should be looked into. She is poor and in ill health. She has a big family. She has insufficient means for a living. She does not look for trouble. What she wanted to do was to show her right. I ask the Court to look into this question of Maraea's imprisonment.

I ask that an extra ten acres be awarded to Maraea out of the Rarotonga Block' (Northern MB 72/95).

Maraea was also present and told the Court:

I support what Anaru has said to the Court. I claim an extra ten acres.

With regard to the road I am still "pouri" [distressed] about that. The County Council or the Crown did not deal fairly with me about the road.

If the Crown were to award me an extra ten acres perhaps the troubles over the road might be forgotten (Northern MB 72/96).

The hearing concluded with the Judge's comments:

Court will report fully on the facts to the Chief Judge but it feels it to be its duty to say plainly that if the facts of the case had been properly investigated by the Native Department in the first place and by the Magistrate in the second place. Maraea Te Awa would never have been subjected to the indignity and injustice of imprisonment. The Court feels it necessary also to say that it strongly objects to the Magistrate's Court or even the Supreme Court assuming jurisdiction to decide matters involving title to Native land. Only the Native Land Court has the jurisdiction and the knowledge and experience required in deciding questions affecting Native land, and in this case of Owhata the Native Land Court's assistance and judicial enquiry were not sought until after all the harm had been done. The Court will certainly recommend substantial financial and other compensation for Maraea Te Awa, and a rectification of the boundaries and area of the Owhata Block (Northern MB 72/96-97).

Judge Acheson did write a report some time later that was received by the Chief Judge in

January 1944. After outlining what he called the "salient points" of the survey evidence, and

noting that the place where the Vickers party was attacked was the small piece of Owhata that

had been added to Rarotonga by the surveyor Warner, Judge Acheson attacked Native

Department officials for their ineptitude in dealing with the matter. He explained that

Maraea had come to see him to explain her objection after her first arrest, but the issue had

not been referred to the Native Land Court until after the second incident:

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I had immediately realised the need for searching at the roots of the titles and for verifying the old surveys. I at once warned Mr Vickers against assuming that Maraea was in the wrong, and 1 told them both that the Court would search the old records on return to Auckland. Before the search could be made, Mr and Mrs Vickers trespassed again, and were attacked by Maraea and her husband. Not knowing the true facts, the Magistrate gaoled Maraea. She was a sick woman when she went to gaol. Her bitterness at what she knew was unjust imprisonment undoubtedly affected her health. She did not live very long after her release, but before she died [in 1941] she expressed her determination to press for redress, for compensation for wrongful imprisonment (National Archives MAI 22/1/135 pt 2 Owhata A, box 486).

Judge Acheson recommended substantial compensation should have been paid to Maraea. and

should now be paid to her children, in 'the form of a house in which Maraea's children might

live clear of debt or rent'. He also suggested that other farm land should be found for the

family with their new house, closer to a school. The Owhata block was eroded, 'too small for

farming purposes', and 'should be converted under Consolidation into a Seaside Reserve for the

Maoris of the district' (ibid). In addition he recommended monetary compensation of £500 as

well as the 10 acres suggested in the 1941 Native Land Court hearing.

The Chief Judge of the Native Land Court was now G. P Shepherd, who was not impressed

with Judge Acheson's report, with its criticism of Native Department officers. As far as the

Owhata block boundary was concerned. Shepherd considered that the suggestion by the Lands

Department officials to make it at the gazetted road line should be accepted:

As for the recommendation made by the Court about compensation, I can only say that I see no justification for the provision of compensation. The office file shows that everything possible was done by the Department to assist Maraea. Her second incarceration was the result of her failure to make good her promises of good conduct for the future (ibid).

This is in stark contrast to his predecessor. Chief Judge Jones, who considered the Owhata

owners had grounds for complaint, and the evidence produced by the Lands Department

supported this conclusion.

Neither the 10 acres of land, nor another house and farm, nor any other compensation was

granted to Maraea Te Awa Heke, or her family. It is obvious, however, that firstly, if the

early survey plans had been accurate, the boundary between Owhata and Rarotonga blocks

would have been properly defined. Secondly, even if there was stilt doubt, proper consultation

about survey of the road would have allayed local fears.

In 1973 Paenga Wikitera, one of the owners, applied to the Maori Land Court to partition out

his interest in Owhata. This required a survey and the surveyor. B. von Stunner, encountered

two related problems. First, he could not find any of the early survey pegs on the Rarotonga

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block boundary. Secondly, there had been substantial erosion on the western boundary of

Owhata and some accretion on the eastern boundary. The Court cancelled the original

partition orders of Owhata A and B so that the proposed subdivision could be considered in

relation to the whole block. The surveyor was directed to make the road line the inland

boundary.

In 1976 the Court made orders for new partitions:

Owhata A: 4a. lr. OOp Paenga Wikitera solely

Owhata B: Esplanade reserve with area and boundary adjustment to be defined on survey to vest in the Mangonui County Council.

Owhata C: Balance area to be in the names of balance owners for 37.500 shares.

The old partition lines had served no useful purpose as the land which was flat had been

treated as one block. In adjusting the shares by amalgamating the former partitions, the total

shareholding was 43 shares, based on the original acreage. Paenga Wikitera's shareholding

represented the equivalent of 4a. lr. 20p: 'Having regard to the fact that Paenga's area had

road frontage and the use of an esplanade reserve in excess of I acre it is felt that 4a lr OOp

should more than satisfy his entitlement" (Kaitaia MB 9/341-343). Unfortunately for the rest

of the owners, Paenga Wikitera's subdivision had the effect of requiring the vesting of a one

chain esplanade reserve around the seaward boundary of the block. In 1976 there were some

95 owners in Owhata C block, and by 1990 there were over 150.

An esplanade reserve of one chain, the 'Queen's Chain', now a 20-metre strip around the

seashore and banks of rivers and lakes, is a requirement set out in s.289(l) Local Government

Amendment Act 1978, when any land with a boundary to mean high water mark is

subdivided. In s.23 Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 a new S.432A was added to the Maori

Affairs Act 1953 requiring that partitions of Maori land comply with Part II of the Counties

Amendment Act 1961 as to subdivisions. These provisions are now embodied in the Local

Government Act. This is an issue which is also of concern in Karikari 2 block and is discussed

later in the Wai 117 claim. For the people at Owhata who have already lost land from erosion

from the sea, the loss of the title to the esplanade reserve was a further blow.

Although the owners of Owhata C still have the use of their coastal strip it is not an exclusive

use, as it is public reserve. Erosion has continued on the western side of the block, eating up

much of the esplanade reserve. The available land was estimated by Jim Heke in oral evidence

before the Tribunal on 5 December 1990 as between 20 and 22 acres because of the erosion.

Jim Heke claimed that the rate of erosion had increased dramatically in the past few years, that

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between April 1989 and December 1990 the coastline had retreated another two feet.

Accretion on the other side of the spit has been limited and does not compensate for the losses

by erosion.

When the Tribunal visited Owhata in December 1990 there were about five families living

there, although Jim Heke said the numbers fluctuate, and formerly the population was

much higher. They were living in caravans, tents and makeshift corrugated iron shacks. There

is also a marae and urupa. The other small reserve, Omaku, has no road access. The Owhata

owners feel their papakainga is under threat, that the Crown and/or the local authority should do

something constructive to curb the losses by erosion. In their view there does not seem to be

much logic in having a public esplanade reserve around their papakainga, and the loss of this

land from their tiny reserve is deeply felt.

8.2 Flora and Fauna 8.2.1 Kereru

Màori have a relationship with the kereru based on its role as a food source and as a cultural

treasure. The kukupa was used for food and its feathers for cloaks.143 The Wild Birds Protection

Act 1864 was the first legislation concerning the kukupa but this Act and other legislation

probably had little practical effect on Maori and their hunting continued for most of the

nineteenth century.144 However, the legislation did establish a framework which eroded Màori

rights and access to kukupa in the twentieth century.

The Wild Birds Protection Act in 1864 prescribed a hunting season for kukupa to be shot from

April to July, within specific areas as proclaimed by the governor. The 1865 Act moved the

kukupa season one month later into the year and prohibited snares and traps. This had a

devastating effect for Maori given the customary practice of using snares to catch kukupa. In

1866 the kukupa was classified as ‘game’ and a license to shoot kukupa became necessary. In

1867 kukupa was reclassified as ‘native game’ as opposed to game, and a distinction was made

between the two categories, principally based on property rights. A license was no longer

143 James W Feldman, Treaty Rights and Pigeon Poaching: Alienation of Màori Access to Kereru, 1864 – 1960, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 2001. 144 TP p 2. WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE?

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required after all. The 1867 Act set an important precedent by establishing government-granted

property rights to wildlife.145

The Animals Protection Act 1867 provided the first clue of how early game laws affected

Màori. Harry Atkinson, a member of the House of Representatives, objected strongly to the

1867 Bill and questioned the impact of game laws on Maori. Atkinson also noted that in some

areas Maori lived on wild ducks and that bird life was an important part of the Maori economy.

At the very least he wanted the Bill translated into Màori to avoid ignorance leading to violation

of the law.146 Maori objections or responses to the legislation were not recorded or were non-

existent.

In 1868 there were further ramifications for kukupa with the Protection of Animals Amendment

Act 1868 removing kereru from the schedule of native game. Thus, no license was needed to

kill kukupa. However kukupa remained on the schedule until 1872 when it returned to its status

as ‘native game’. The 1872 Act reinforced the ban on snaring game but the clause did not apply

to native birds.147 In 1879 Paora Tuhaere’s Maori Parliament at Orakei held a discussion on the

status of kukupa. Maori supported new restrictions on hunting but thought such laws should not

apply to them. It seems this argument would continually surface for the next fifty years. Maori

agreed the season idea was a good one, recognising that the pigeons potentially faced extinction

and that kukupa needed time to breed.148

In 1889 Animals Protection Act Amendment Act was amended to tighten up previous loopholes

of early Acts. There was the clamping down on market hunting as some people were making a

living by killing thousands of birds. The Act banned specific types of weapons, game could only

be sold at certain times of the year and birds could only be shot for sport and not for profit.149 In

the 1880’s Maori Members of Parliament spoke about the management of the bird. Many

thought that the game laws should not apply to Maori and that Maori could take care of their

own birds. They supported this by demonstrating that Maori had a seasonal structure for hunting

and were more active than Pakeha in ensuring the sustainability of the bird populations. They

commented on rahui, the ramifications for the breaking of rahui and commented that the hunting

season depended primarily on the condition of the birds. Màori preferred to hunt when the birds

145 TP p 9-10. 146 TP p 12 NZPD, 1867, vol 1, pp 1230 – 1231. 147 TP p 13-14. 148 TP p 15 AJHR 1879, session II, G8 pp26,28. Mentioned in Claudia Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, Wellington, 1987, p 192. 149 TP p 19.

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had grown fat on miro berries usually in July, August or September but Pakeha had failed to

consider this traditional timing.150

Hone Heke commented in 1899 that the trend towards conservation conflicted with the way

Maori used native birds but he was also concerned with the taking away of Maori rights. Heke

stated that Maori had a system whereby they acted as a management control in the taking of the

bird and he proposed that Pakeha align their dates with the Maori season for the taking of

birds.151 Hone Heke spoke for the Màori position on this issue again in 1900, 1903, 1907, 1908

and 1910. His argument repeatedly explained the Maori system of rahui and he demanded more

flexible hunting seasons.152

In 1900 an amendment (the Animals Protection Act Amendment Act 1900) opened up the

hunting season for native and imported game on the first day of May and closed it on the last

day of July. There was provision for the governor to alter the season but not at the request of iwi

and hapu. In 1901 season signs were posted in English and Maori and there were also posters in

the Gazette that ‘any Màori or half-caste Màori could kill pigeons in certain, prescribed

areas.’153

In July 1905 Taiaha Paurini and 137 others petitioned Parliament:

Your petitioners hereby pray that we be left to manage our Maori birds upon our own lands; we to fix the times at which they may properly be killed. For the reason that the law administering birds is wrong; when the birds are fat they are protected, and when they have become thin their killing is now open. From former times down the Maoris have been a people expert in administering their bird-forests, and all other food workings; for that reason an abundant supply prevailed; and now since the European Law has come in to protect them our birds are disappearing. Another prayer of your petitioners is that we may have the power to prevent Europeans from wrongfully coming to kill our birds, We are not permitted to go to their lands [sic} to kill birds.154

The Animals Protection Act 1907 contained a clause prohibiting use of snares. Hone Heke

opposed this on the basis that the snaring of birds by Maori was for food not for sport and Maori

preferred snares because guns scared the birds away. He stated that the government should not

prevent Maori from using their old methods of catching food.155

150 TP p 20-21 Tame Parata representing Southern Maori District, explained this to his colleagues in 1888 at Parliament that Maori could take care of their own birds – NZPD, 1888 vol 61 p 373. 151 TP p 32 NZPD 1899 vol 10 p 407 152 TP p 37 NZPD 1903 vol 26, p 72; NZPD, 1907 vol 142 p 788; NZPD 1908 v144 p 288; NZPD 1910 vol 151 p 207. 153 TP p 35. 154 TP p 37 22 July 1905, IA 1 1905/2536, NA, DB p 21. 155 TP p 38 NZPD, 1907 vol 142 p 786.

178

Maori used preserved birds as a vital food source. The Act prohibited hunters from preserving

their prey and selling them later. Sir Peter Buck (Te Rangihiroa) argued that the latest

amendment would cause great hardship as Maori killed game entirely for food purposes.

Custom among Maori was that birds were cooked and preserved in their fat and kept as food

source for leaner time of the year. The Minister of Internal Affairs, David Buddo, introduced an

amendment to the legislation in 1910 (the Animals Protection Act 1910) that protected Màori

right to keep preserved food.156

Treaty issues played little role in Crown management of the kereru. The government used

legislation to limit access to pigeons. Given the restriction on their access to a traditional food

supply, still Maori expressed their belief in a Treaty-guaranteed right to take the kereru and

other native game.157 Various correspondents reiterated arguments made by Maori for over 30

years: Maori retained the right to kill kereru on their land, whereas Pakeha had cut down their

bush and lost that right, and that the Treaty of Waitangi guaranteed access rights to kukupa and

other native game.158 For most of 1910s Maori continued to hunt the bird and when confronted

by rangers they claimed a Treaty right to do so. The Crown Solicitor, E. Redward, was

determined to prove that Maori enjoyed no special access rights to the kereru. He maintained

that ‘[t]here is no exception with respect to Màori or half-castes and anything contained in the

Treaty of Waitangi cannot affect this position. Whatever force or effect that the Treaty may

have nothing therein can override the direct provisions of a statute.’ He cited court cases with

closely related issues over access to fisheries. Redward argued fisheries were in a better position

because there was specific reference in Article Two of the Treaty to fisheries but no such

reference was made to birds or native game.159

In 1922 a new version of Animals Protection Act stripped Màori of their last claims for access

to kukupa. It listed the kukupa as protected and to hunt kukupa special permission was needed

from the governor. From 1922 the focus was on preventing poaching of kukupa.160 Maori

during the 20th century continued to hunt the bird and claimed it as a right guaranteed by the

Treaty of Waitangi.161 In the Far North in the late 1950s, there were no full-time rangers and

large numbers of pigeons were hunted. In 1960’s miro fattened pigeons were still being hunted

and it appeared that little had changed in 100 years.162

156 TP pp 38-39 Te Rangihiroa NZPD 1910 vol 151 pp 257-58. 157 TP p 48. 158 TP p 53. 159 TP pp 56-57; E Redward, “Native Pigeons and the Treaty of Waitangi”, 27 September 1917, IA 1 25/12/pt. 1, NA, DB. 160 TP p 58. 161 TP p 61. 162 TP p 86.

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From 1922 management of native birds was delegated to acclimatisation societies. The

Department of Internal Affairs gave these societies a range of powers including the right to

charge for licenses to shoot native game. These societies continued management of native game

for the next thirty years. However enforcement of conservation measures continued to be

difficult. The kukupa was the most difficult to manage. The societies often concentrated their

efforts on game, ignoring their responsibility to protect native birds. With pressure from the

newly formed Native Bird Protection Society in 1923, the Department of Internal Affairs

restructured their efforts, relying on local agencies such as the Police to capture and prosecute

offenders. But the real problem lay with the fact that wildlife as a category was not controlled

by one department. It was not until 1946 that a Wildlife Branch was created as part of the

Department of Internal Affairs. This branch undertook a review of government policy on bird

conservation. In the 1950s the branch took a much more active role in educating people on the

importance of native species and much of their work was geared at decreasing pigeon poaching.

The branch co-operated with Department of Màori Affairs to stop Maori pigeon poaching; it

circulated pamphlets and published an article on the issue in Te Ao Hou: The New World.

The new argument in the twentieth century for government departments and conservationists

was that Màori no longer depend on the kukupa as food source. There was also a further

concern that the habitat could no longer support the kereru. Predators had increased and the

kukupa took a long time to breed giving predators an opportunity to destroy nests. Maori

responded by stating the historic importance of bird as food source and a cultural treasure.163

However, in the last two decades Maori people have still been apprehended for taking kereru.

Since April 1990 18 people have been charged with taking kereru with total of 33 birds seized.

Twelve of these offenders were caught in the Mangamuka scenic reserve area.164

In April 1991 Ian Gregory (brother of Northern Maori MP, Bruce Gregory) was observed

leaving home with a rifle and entering the Herekino conservation area. After shots were heard

Gregory was approached by wildlife rangers who found four freshly plucked kukupa. Gregory

was charged with a firearms offence and under section 63 of the Wildlife Act for hunting and

unlawfully possessing a protected species. He was convicted and sentenced to 150 hours of

community work. In July 1991 two Maori from the Mangamuka area pleaded guilty to charges

in the Kaitaia Distirct Court of killing seven kukupa. The lawyer for these two men argued that

they had been asked to do so by the older members of their community. The Judge convicted

them but discharged them without penalty. In November 1992 a Kaitaia panel beater, Raymond

Subtrizki pleaded guilty to charges of killing and possessing a native pigeon. He argued that he

163 TP pp 91-92. 164 F&B 21 WHAT IS THIS REFERENCE?

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had taken the bird on the wishes of his dying father, a kaumatua of the area. The Department of

Conservation prosecuted the case themselves and the Judge discharged Subritzki without

penalty.165

8.2.2 Toheroa at Mitimiti

On 29 September 1924 a deputation consisting of Tau Henare, W Rikihana, Terima Teiki and

Tamaho met with the Minister of Marine, G.J. Anderson, concerning the toheroa beds and

mudflats in the Hokianga area. The deputation wanted the toheroa beds between Whangape and

entrance of Hokianga harbour to be protected. They claimed Europeans took and sold toheroa

and suggested that tangata whenua form a committee to prevent further taking of toheroa and to

look after the beds. They did not claim exclusive rights. The Minster of Marine offered to

prosecute Pakeha illegally taking toheroa for sale.166

On 5 Deemberc 1924 LF Ayson, Chief Inspector of Fisheries, accompanied by Tau Henare and

Inspector Flynn met to discuss Toheroa beds and fisheries at Pangaru. Ayson inspected the

beach and concluded that the beds much smaller than the average size. His report added to what

the deputation had said and supported the idea that a committee be formed. He also advocated

the compulsory taking of toheroa by hand and that there be a closed time during spawning

season (from December to February). Ayson told the department that it should do what was

necessary to conserve this food for Maori. He was not opposed to the selling of Toheroa but was

opposed to establishing a factory to can toheroa.167 The next day Ayson meet with Maori at

Mitimiti, recommending in addition that selling licences be allocated by the department on the

advice of the local committee. A committee was established consisting of Himiona Kamira,

Ngakuru Pene Haare, Henare Matini, Moa Tahana, Mane Hotere, Winata Hone and Eruera

Rikihana.168

An Order of Council was drafted under section 5 of the Fisheries Act 1908 with regulations

concerning toheroa. There was a closed season from December to February. Taking toheroa

was lawful for local consumption but not for sale or barter except with the consent of the

Minister. The taking of Toheroa was under the control of the committee appointed by Minster.

No spade or blade implement was to be used to extract toheroa. In addition, if any of these

regulations were breached there would be a fine of £20.169

165 F&B 19. 166 Daamen, p 89. 167 ibid. 168 ibid, p 90. 169 ibid.

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The draft was circulated for comment. The gazetting of the regulations was considered in 1925

but deferred until later. Eventually the draft dropped out of circulation. There was no formal

acknowledgement of committee which had been operating since 1924, and in 1930 people found

out that the committee had no standing and so no longer paid any attention to the committee.

Barney Hotere wrote to the Minster in June 1930 requesting confirmation that the rules were

lawful. In 1933 Henare Matini wrote to Minster, Apirana Ngata suggesting the reappointment

of members. This correspondence suggested the tangata whenua believed the beds to be a

native reserve.170

In 1943 Wiremu Tahana and Himiona Kamira wrote to the Marine Dept to request a licence to

sell toheroa. The department obtained reports on the beds at Mitimiti. E G Hendall, reported

that presently the stocks were insufficient. The report also noted there had been two drownings

in the area and fishing of all description and the taking of shellfish was prohibited.171 Hefford

suggested that the selling of toheroa not be allowed and regulations concerning the numbers to

be taken (80 per Màori and 30 per European) be strictly enforced. He suggested there be

official supervision of the beach by either a Police Constable at Kohukohu or Wiremu Tahana.

He noted tribal regulation and the closed season were indicators of the need to conserve.

The Committee wrote again advising of new appointments in March 1944, they insisted on

official recognition of committee as well as the enactment of new by-laws including a closed

season from January to March, and that blades and implements used to dig up the toheroa not

exceed four inches wide. They also sought a restriction on the amount a person could gather to

no more than 200 toheroa per home. The Committee also wanted to prevent selling of toheroa.

Hefford suggested that the by-laws be incorporated into marine regulations and that a chairman

of the committee be appointed an inspector of sea-fishing.

In the next four years there were no serious problem and the toheroa on Mitimiti beach were in

‘splendid condition’. In July 1948 a permit was sought for hui to celebrate Father Wanders

jubilee as priest. This was granted by Marine Dept. In November 1948 Hipiriona Hotere

(Barney) sent word to Crown officials that the taking of toheroa was getting out of hand and he

recommended the closing of the beach. There were also concerns as to the efficacy of Hotere as

fisheries officer. A.H. Taylor, local inspector of fisheries, suspected he was accepting bribes to

let people exploit the beach, but this accusation was not accepted by the Marine Department.172

The Marine Department officials were reluctant to close the beach because of the lengthy legal

process involved. However, by March 1950 toheroa on Mitimiti beach were all undersized and

170 ibid, p 91. 171 ibid, pp 92-93.

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the taking of toheroa was declared to be illegal. In 1952 the committee in conjunction with

fisheries officers requested that the beach be closed for 12 months.173

The efforts of the local community clearly highlight a plight to conserve resources over 28

years. The Crown recognised the need to implement conservation practices and management,

but it did not give up control and abdicated responsibility which prevented a management

structure operating efficiently.

8.2.3 Warawara State Forest

The Warawara State Forest is a rainforest on the west coast of Northland between the Hokianga

and Whangape harbours, with an area of 6931 hectares. The forest features four of the largest

kauri in New Zealand, Moetangi 1, 2, 3 and Ward kauri. The mountain Moumoukai is its tallest

peak at 730 metres and the mountain range is volcanic. The forest is supported by three

watersheds of the sea and streams connecting to the Rotokakahi River. The forest supports a

wildlife habitat including kaka, kiwi, pied tit, red parakeet and bats. The kokako was last

sighted in Warawara in 1965. Warawara is also known for its plant diversity including manuka,

taraire, towai, puriri and rimu, kauri, miro groves, nikau, rewarewa, mahoe, kohekohe, kiekie,

supplejack, comprosma and ferns.174 Within Warawara are significant pa sites and urupa in the

mountains, sacred to the local people.175

In 1885, the State Forest Act was enacted to allow the Crown to have ownership and forested

lands were administered by the Lands and Survey Department. The Crown acted on a policy

that the forestry industry was in crisis, giving them a legitimate reason to gain control of an

important economic and financial source for New Zealand’s economy.176 In 1886 Warawara

was gazetted as a State Forest comprising of land purchased in 1875 and 1879 including land

from Te Kauae o Ruru Wahine 1, 2 and 3, Otangaroa 1 and Te Takanga 1 and 2 blocks. The

total area was 12,360 acres.177

In January 1911 Edwin Mitchelson of the mill of Mitchelson & Co, merchants, brokers and

exporters, at Whangape sought timber cutting rights in Warawara. His request was rejected

following a report of the caretaker who felt the forest should not be logged due to the risk of fire

and the low price to be obtained from timber. Another request was made from J W Easson of

172 ibid, p 94. 173 ibid, p 95. 174 Watkins, p 119. 175 ibid, p 4. 176 ibid, p 119. 177 ibid, p 119.

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Easson Ltd, timber merchants, who were similarly declined.178 In 1913 the Royal Commission

on Forestry was of the opinion that because of the position of the forest and the rugged nature of

the country it was too difficult and expensive to remove the timber. The Commission instead

wanted the forest for the purpose of a national kauri park.179

There was a Maori desire to dig gum in the forest at this time because of the lack of land and

other resources remaining in Maori ownership on which the Te Rarawa people could make a

living. On 2 June 1913 Robert Ngakuru wrote to the government asking for the forest to be

opened for gum digging for the Màori people of Mitimiti as it had been a struggle making a

living since the closing of the forest. He stated that Màori were happy to pay a licence but the

Commissioner of Crown Lands was adamant that State Forests would not be opened up for gum

digging.180 Three days later Pakihi Peita wrote on behalf of the women at Whakarapa and

Waihou asking that their children be allowed to gum dig for one month so that they could afford

to go to school.181 In August 1914 two Màori, Kararoa Pairama and Peri Poko, were found

camped in the forest with five and half sacks of bled gum. They were convicted at Rawene on

30 May 1915 and fined £10 (including £1 16 shillings in costs) and the gum was confiscated.182

In the early 1920’s kauri gum was collected from Warawara under a licence issued by Forest

Service.183 In February 1920 the Commissioner of Crown Lands had noted that gum of about

ten tons remained on trees. He thought that unless it was collected it would remain an incentive

for Maori and others to trespass. In August 1922 Joseph Leef and 13 other returned Maori

servicemen were out of work. They requested permission to dig gum to earn an income. A

reported from Conservator of Forests stated that ‘on no account should this be allowed.’184

The Forest Service was formed and took control of the area in 1922.185 In the same year the

settlers’ association at Whakarapa, pressured for land within Warawara forest be opened up for

settlement. The Forest Service agreed to release approximately 1300 acres at the northern end of

the forest but this did not occur until December 1929. Reweti Kingi of Otiria applied in July

1923 to extract gum but was informed that the right had already been given to a Pakeha named

A.P Browne.186 In 1929 the Native Department purchased 3,000 acres comprising sections

Waihou Lower A37, A39, A40, A41, A42, A43 and Whakarapa 61A from a Mr Duthie. This

land was intended for a land scheme to consolidate, extend and improve Maori land in the

178 Daamen, p 60. 179 ibid, p 150. 180 Daamen, p 61. 181 ibid. 182 ibid. 183 ibid, p 120. 184 ibid, p 62. 185 Watkins, p 119.

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district but only two small portions were needed. The Native Department offered the remaining

land to the Forest Service as it was forested and although the Forest Service was interested they

had insufficient funds to purchase the land. It seems that no further action was taken.187 In 1930

1,400 acres of Warawara was withdrawn and made part of the land scheme initiated by the

Native Department. However in 1939 1,190 of the 1,400 acres was declared unsuitable for

farming and again proclaimed State Forest.188

In 1937 forest foreman D.M. Blithe noted in his monthly report considerable shooting of native

pigeons. In one incident a Maori person was stopped, but when asked to hand over rifle he

pointed the rifle at the ranger. This person was later identified as Nuki Te Hira.189 Four years

later the caretaker of the forest reported that eight Maori, one with a rifle, had trespassed on the

land. Those involved were taken to court at Rawene on 7 August 1941 but the hearing was

adjourned pending proof that it was a State forest. Three of the alleged trespassers were

convicted and fined, one was admonished and discharged and another was dismissed. At the

second hearing the other three accused were convicted and fined.190

In 1947 143 acres, 3 roods and 8 perches of Crown land (formerly part of Ototope A) was

proclaimed State Forest to improve the forest boundary.191 Ten years later, 4,223 acres,

comprising of Waihou Lower A37, A38, A39, A40, A41, A42, A43 and Waireia became part of

the Warawara State Forest.192 In 1961 299 acres of Maori Land, Rotokakahi A3C2E2C, became

part of Warawara State Forest and in 1964 Paihia 1A1 was gazetted as part of Warawara State

Forest.193

The milling of timber was considered over time but the implementation of a milling station was

too expensive. The forest was also saved by logging in the early days due to the remote, wet,

windswept and steep terrain and also its isolation from roads and waterways.194 However, dry

timber could be taken. In 1922 a sawmill licence was given and 136,000 board feet was

extracted, 90 % of which was kauri. No saw milling licenses were issued after 1922 but sales of

dry kauri were made between 1933 and 1937. Between 1937 and 1967 no licenses or permits

were issued to remove timber from the forest. There were numerous requests for permits to

186 Daamen, p 63. 187 Watkins, p 119. 188 ibid. 189 Daamen, p 163. 190 ibid, p 64. 191 Watkins, p 119. 192 ibid. 193 ibid. 194 Watkins, p 150.

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collect kauri gum but these were refused on account of the risk of fire and damage to living

trees.195

Local Maori communities requested timber for numerous purposes but these requests were often

denied. Local Maori petitioned that the timber contained in Warawara was not a part of the sale

of the land but no recommendation was made by the Native Land Court.196 A letter was sent by

Taitokerau Màori Land Board to make available 15,000 board feet of dry kauri to repair a

meeting house at Mitimiti. In return the Board and native owners of Taikarawa A and B,

Moetangi and Ototope B blocks reciprocated by granting access routes through the blocks to

kauri areas thereby providing legal access to the forest. Mitimiti elders agreed to this as it

meant they had legal access themselves.197 In 1937 the people of Pawarenga wanted to extract

timber for housing from northern end of Warawara State Forest adjoining their property for

housing purposes. 198 They also requested a saw mill at Pawarenga to cut the timber, with the

cost to be borne by themselves. The Forest Service agreed to the taking of timber as long as the

activity was supervised by the Native Department. However, the Forest Service thought the

quantity did not warrant the expense of a mill and preferred Màori to contract the mill work. In

1937 the local community of Mitimiti requested 50,000 board feet for the purpose of building a

school and Whina Cooper requested timber for a Maori housing project.199 The Conservator of

Forests decided that milling timber at Warawara Forest would not be considered until a working

plan has been approved and this could not be completed until legal access was provided and

boundaries were defined.200

In 1963 a report was commissioned regarding millable timber in Warawara. This report was

brought on by pressure to open the forest up for logging purposes. The report reflected a

positive outlook for Warawara but the figures suggesting that Warawara could sustain logging

were not accurate, possibly reflecting only part of the forest. Logging operations continued but

were restricted to 1,300,000 board feet, 60% of which could be kauri with a minimum

diameter.201 The total quantity of timber extracted during logging was 8,500,000 board feet with

kauri comprising just over half of the total amount. The remainder timber quantity was made up

of tawa, rimu, miro, taraire, matai, kawaka and kahikatea.202 Whitecliffs Sawmilling Company

195 Watkins, p 121. 196 ibid. 197 Daamen, p 66. 198 Watkins, p 121. 199 Watkins, p 121. 200 Daamen, p 66. 201 Watkins, pp 121-122. 202 ibid, p 123.

186

had contractual rights to the timber of Warawara until 1977 though logging ceased on 23 March

1974.203

In 1972 Warawara State Forest became a sanctuary but it was not until 1979 that the Warawara

Forest Sanctuary was gazetted. Part of the Warawara State Forest became Te Hura Ecological

Area in 1980, which was gazetted in 1982. The Warawara Forest Sanctuary contains about 869

hectares and Te Hura Ecological Area supports about 999 hectares. Both these areas are

protected under sections 21 and 22 of the Conservation Act 1989.204 In 1979 Warawara Forest

was opened up for recreational purposes, though it was gazetted a year later. Two mineral

prospecting warrants were granted, in 1971 to Waihi Exploration and Mining Company,

covering portions of Ecological Area and a second licence was issued in 1980.205 On 31 March

1987 Warawara Forest was transferred to the Department of Conservation to be held under

section 61 of the Conservation Act 1987. Warawara was deemed part of Northland

Conservation Park with the Sanctuary and Ecological areas intact.

8.3 Generic Issues 8.3.1 Crown Policies in relation to Scenic Reserves

Since 1840 the Crown has been committed to transforming large tracts of land for pastoral and

agricultural development, but in the late nineteenth century it became interested in preserving

areas showing the original habitation of New Zealand. Three Crown polices evolved in the late

19th century and 20th century. Through these policies preservation legislation was enacted,

seeking to reserve areas of land for scenic purposes as well as the preservation of native flora

and fauna. Crown policy and legislation failed to acknowledge Maori rights to use and access

land reserved for scenic purposes, as well as the natural flora and fauna these areas contained.

Maori were not advised, informed or consulted despite such areas providing sustenance

culturally, economically, and spiritually to iwi and hapu members.

Initially scenic reserves were set aside on aesthetic grounds and because of proximity to tourist

routes under the Land Act 1892. The Act, while providing for scenic reserves, did not set out a

selection process nor did it offer a management structure for the maintenance of scenic reserves.

Instead, the Act stated that the Governor had a prerogative right to declare lands reserved in the

national interest.206 Reserves were selected based solely on the Crown’s policy of ‘beautiful

203 WK 152. 204 Watkins, p 123. 205 ibid. 206 Geoff Park, ‘Effective Exclusion; An Exploratory Overview of Crown Actions and Maori Responses Concerning the Indigenous Flora and fauna, 1912-1983’, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 252

187

scenes’ and based on proposals to develop tourist and health resorts. These early reserves were

under the control of the Department of Tourism. 207

In 1901, the Department of Lands and Survey took control of scenic reserves. The Department

held two conflicting roles, however, and was required to recommend to the Crown the setting

aside of reserves while also opening land up for pastoral and agricultural development.

Coinciding with Department of Lands and Survey taking over the management of scenic

reserves, the Scenery Preservation Act 1903 was enacted, modifying the earlier Crown policy of

‘beautiful scenes’. The Act, unlike its predecessor, set up an evaluation, selection and regulated

management framework for scenic reserves. It set up a five-person commission, who were to

recommend to the Crown land to be set aside for scenic, thermal, or historic reserves. The

primary object of the Act was to safeguard beauty spots and scenic wonders for tourism.208 The

Government set aside £100,000 to be spent over four years for the acquisition and maintenance

of these reserves. However, the reservation of land was still limited to a Pakeha perception of

what was beautiful and the commission did not allow for Maori input.

For much of the early twentieth century the Crown was concerned with the acquisition of land

for reserves as opposed to the maintenance of existing scenic reserves. In 1906, an amendment

to the Scenery Preservation Act prevented Maori land from being reserves. However, under the

Maori Land Claims Adjustment and Law Amendment Act 1907 Maori reserve land could be

taken for scenic purposes.209 Once land became a reserve that land was inalienable, however

upon reservation it became Crown land and if the reservation was revoked the Crown could

dispose of the land under the Land Act 1892.210 The 1906 Act replaced the Commission with a

board of three senior public servants. Again, there was no Maori representative nor did the Act

allow public consultation.

As early as 1907 Maori were concerned that scenery preservation was causing further land

dispossession. The Department of Lands and Survey failed to appreciate the idea of public

consultation and input. For Maori the only legitimate process to air their grievances was

through submissions to the government or alternatively voicing their concerns to members of

parliament. Hone Heke Rankin, a Maori Member of Parliament iterated in 1907 that the areas

207 ibid, pp 346-347. 208 Cathy Marr, Robin Hodge and Ben White, ‘Crown Law, Policies and Practices in relation to Flora and Fauna, 1840-1912’, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington, 2001, p 417. 209 Anna Hewitt and Diana Morrow, “Te Atiawa and the Customary Use of Natural Resources in Te Tau Ihu, 1840-2000”, a report commissioned by Te Atiawa Manawhenua ki Te Tau Ihu Trust, Wellington, August 2000, p 77 210 Park, pp 256-257.

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now in reserves continued to provide some means of subsistence for iwi and hapu.211 Despite

this, the Crown continued to acquire lands for more scenic reserves.

By 1912 there were 262 reserves. In 1912, alone 92 new reserves were created containing

94,000 acres of Crown land.212 Scenery preservation legislation required that land taken for

scenic reserves be gazetted but this was not consistently done. In 1913, twenty-two of the new

fifty-nine reserves were Màori land and by 1917, there were 63 new reserves from Maori

land.213 But where Màori land was involved Crown officials took the position that once the

acquisition of an area had been recommended and Maori were informed then the land came

under Crown control. When and if gazetted, these reserves were not identified as being Màori

land.214 However, the problem was that often Crown officials negotiated the reservation of

lands with Maori who had no legitimate authority to agree to such a proposal. The Crown failed

to appreciate the nature of decision making within a collective community of whanau, hapu and

iwi.

By the 1920’s Crown policy changed and ‘protecting nature’ became the core doctrine for

scenic reserves. Crown officials were concerned about the maintenance and management of

reserves based on a report given to Parliament in 1920.215 Instead of the ‘beautiful scene’

ideology Crown officials seemed committed to the preservation of indigenous flora and fauna,

possibly as a result of concerns over the large clearing schemes set up to facilitate pastoral

development. Inherent in this new ‘protecting nature’ philosophy was the exclusion of human

habitation, including access and use of natural resources within scenic reserves. But the Crown

still carried an ongoing policy that scenic reserves would only be selected if they had no

potential for agricultural development. 216

Early Crown policy and legislation separated Maori from an integral resource base yet Maori

retained an interest and continued to use forest materials. In 1925 there was a report that certain

saplings had been culled and a track cut through Mangamuka Scenic Reserve. The Crown was

concerned about the damage to the scenic reserve. They proceeded with a prosecution but the

case was dismissed after inadequate proof. The Crown maintained that the Maori people

involved were guilty of trespass, the only preservation of Maori rights stemmed from legislation

and this was limited to a right to take birds and bury their deceased in existing urupa with scenic

reservea.

211 ibid, p 292 NZPD 1907 vol 142 pp 1178-1179 212 ibid, p 258. 213 ibid, p 263. 214 ibid, p 260. 215 Report is in AJHR 1920 C-6 Report on Scenic Reserves. 216ibid, p 254.

189

The Crown often delegated management of reserves to trust domain boards who were thought to

be better equipped to manage reserves and who would allow local input. Yet Màori remained

on the outside. In the Auckland region, a list of honorary inspectors in 1947 showed 280 names,

with only one name identifiable as Màori. Despite having customary rights and conservation

practices Maori were excluded in the consultation and management processes of scenic

reserves. The Reserves and Domain Act 1953 consolidated the early Scenery Preservation

legislation and the Crown shifted their focus from acquisition of land to the maintenance of

exiting reserves. This Act provided a measure of protection that Maori land could not be taken

without consultation of the Minster of Màori Affairs.217 Effectively this implied that the

Minster would inform Maori owners, call a meeting then make a decision based on what the

owners had agreed. However, most of the time this did not occur and the Minster merely

“rubberstamped” such takings and the Màori owners were often not informed or consulted.

The Reserves Act 1977 transformed Crown policy from preservation of indigenous flora and

fauna to preserving representative samples of natural ecosystems and landscapes, coupled with a

effort to classify reserves so that management structures could be more efficient. At first

glance, the change in policy does not seem revolutionarily. But with the emphasis on creating

representative samples of a diverse range of ecosystems the Crown had a new incentive to

acquire more land for reserves. The Act created reserves for recreation, historic, scenic, nature,

scientific, national and government purposes with administration carried out by the Department

of Lands and Survey. Under section 12 the Minister of Conservation could acquire land for a

reserve or improvement, protection or extension of or access to an existing reserve. There is no

public notification or gazetting where the Minister of Conservation purchased land in name of

the Crown. If Màori land was needed then the Department needed to obtain the consent of the

Minister of Màori Affairs. There is no information of what the Minister of Maori Affairs did

when confronted with this issue. Where local authorities wanted to reserve land then they had

publish a notice one month prior. This assumes that Maori could object and that there was a

process for submissions. 218

The use and management of flora and fauna varied according to the reserves classification. If

the scenic reserves were previously Maori land, the Minister ‘may’ grant permission for Maori

to take or kill birds provided it does not contravene the Wildlife Act 1953. Crown owned

reserves may be vested in the local authority for administration and management purposes.

There is a potential for Màori or Maori dominated trust to become the administrating body. The

217 ibid, pp 278-280.

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Minister is generally required to publicly notify this intention and consider public objections

and submissions.219

In 1978, the Department of Lands and Survey published a general reserves policy, which

remains operative. It focuses on the implementation of management plans for reserves. This

enables local authorities to learn how to draft a plan and outlines the necessity of public

consultation, public consultation, and public hearings. The policy aims to promote public

participation in reserve policy. However, the policy contains no explicit reference to Màori

interests or values. Originally, the Act provided that management plans be prepared within five

years or within 5 years of the administration body who subsequently took or takes control of

reserves after 1977. In 1983, the Minster of Lands and Survey granted an extension for

recreation reserves which continues to apply; local authorities are free to choose when they will

prepare the management plans.

With the enactment of the Conservation Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977 remained in place but

control, authority and management of these reserves was taken over by the Department of

Conservation (DoC). DoC could delegate the administration of reserves to various bodies

including local authorities, voluntary organisations, reserve boards, trust boards, trustees, Maori

Trust Boards or a Minster. There are 4000 reserves in New Zealand. The Minster of

Conservation has the power to grant the right to take species of flora and fauna and can permit

Màori to take or kill birds in a scenic reserve provided the land was Màori land before becoming

a reserve.220

Despite a general reserves policy having been developed it was not until 1997 that local

government and DoC sought to update the Reserves Act 1977. In 1998 a report was produced

by a working party but there was no formal Màori representation on the working party. The

update saw the inclusion of Treaty of Waitangi obligations and discussion of the implications of

claim settlements and provision for consultation with tangata whenua.221 Only a small number

of reserves have been vested in iwi authorities or such authorities have been granted powers to

manage reserves under the Reserves Act 1977 as part of a treaty settlement. Examples of where

this has happened are in the Ngai Tahu and Ngati Turangitukua settlements.222 Yet the majority

of reserves remain within the conservation estate and use of reserves or access to natural

materials still requires a permit from DoC.

218 Peter Thrush, ‘Indigenous Flora and Fauna of New Zealand’, a report commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, August 1995, p 21. 219 Robert McLean and Trecia Smith, ‘The Crown and Flora and Fauna: Legislation, Policies and Practices, 1983-1998’, Waitangi Tribunal unpublished report, Wellington 2001, p 292. 220 Thrush, pp 7-8. 221 Marr, p 443.

191

8.3.1.1 Tapuwae Scenic Reserve

The Tapuwae reserve is a part of Tapuwae No 3 block alienated by the Crown on 11 March

1897. On 25 May 1905, the Land Board recommended that the section be made a reserve for

the preservation of scenery under section 235 of Land Act 1892 and Tapuwae scenic reserve, of

202 hectares, came into existence in 1905 under the Scenery Preservation Act 1903.223 There

were attempts by Maori and Pakeha to have the reservation removed and land made available

for purchase or for timber. During 1932, timber was taken illegally and sold to the King Timber

Company at Kohukohu. Tihi Harris admitted to the theft and was fined. King Timber

Company knew it to be stolen but no action was taken against them.224

Section 16 of the Reserves Act 1977 provided that all reserves were to be classified. The

Committee recommended that Tapuwae remain scenic. Section 1A of Tapuwae block was not

officially a scenic reserve. As early as November 1905, it was noted that the adjoining section

1A block XIII Mangamuka Survey District of 10 was acres not gazetted as a scenic reserve but

referred to as a scenic reserve in correspondence. In 1980, this scenic reserve was gazetted and

classified for scenic purposes.

There was only one official record of tangata whenua involvement in monitoring or

administering with a report by John Beachman, the District Conservator. The Department of

Conservation visited the reserve on 18 August 1989 with L Forester and A Walker. Beachman

stated that Ben Te Wake of Motukaraka came with them.

Presently this reserve is administered by DoC.225 LM McCaskill in 1981 published a book on

the scenic reserves of Northland. McCaskill listed the Tapuwae reserve as containing 202

hectares, and was gazetted by the Crown in 1905 as a scenic reserve. McCaskill states the

reserve is on the right bank of the Tapuwae River, but is isolated with no formal road access.

The reserve can be viewed from the harbour.226 The reserve is situated in the hill slopes between

Te Kotuku Creek and Okapura creek overlooking Hokianga Harbour, North West of Rawene.

The area supports kahikatea, puriri, taraire, totara, scattered medium sized kauri and clumps of

pole kauri, and secondary kanuka.227

8.3.1.2 Motukaraka Scenic Reserve

222 ibid, p 445. 223 Daamen, p 72. 224 ibid. 225 ibid. 226 LW McCaskill, Scenic Reserves of North Auckland. Book One: North of Whangarei and Dargaville, Wellington, Department of Lands and Survey, 1981, p 29.

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Manuoha/Motukaraka scenic reserve is part of Motukaraka West B block. In November 1940

the Commissioner of Crown Lands, L J Poff, stated a decision to declare sections of

Motukaraka a scenic reserve and the matter was to be considered by the scenery preservation

board. Motukaraka Scenic Reserve came into existence in 1941. There were still issues over

sections 67 and 68 block IX Mangamuka Survey District – Motukaraka scenic reserve and

sections 65 and 66, block IX Mangamuka Survey District – Tapuwae state forest and section

13A block V Mangamuka Survey District, which was unoccupied Crown land acquired in 1880.

There were attempts to put these three areas together under one administration. In 1969 there

was a joint report from the district ranger of the forest service and senior field officers of the

Lands and Survey department recommending amalgamation as either all scenic reserves or all

state forests. In 1977 there was a further joint report which stated that the area was unworthy of

scenic status and should be offered to the adjoining farmer.

The naming of Motukaraka was questioned in 1977, relating to the classification of reserves

under Reserves Act 1977. Although gazetted and referred to as Motukaraka, the reserve had

never been named as such. There had been no involvement of tangata whenua in the naming

process. A senior field officer was asked to comment on the suitability of a name, however, and

he responded that the name Motukaraka was in common usage.228

McCaskill reports that the Motukaraka scenic reserve contains 121 hectares and was gazetted in

1941. The reserve is 6km west of Kohukohu and adjoins the Tapuwae State Forest 160.229 The

Register of Protected Areas lists the Motukaraka scenic reserve as an area of 96 hectares,. It is

above the Manuoha Stream, 5.4 kilometres west of Kohukohu. The area features kauri forest,

rimu, miro, kahikatea, puriri, and taraire.230

8.3.1.3 Rotokakahi River Scenic Reserve

The Rotokakahi River scenic reserve comprises of sections 47, 48, and 93 Block III Whangape

Survey District, within a block formerly known as Rotokakahi A2 block. The earliest record

was dated October 1952 from the Commissioner of Crown Lands to G E Mulligan of the Lands

and Survey Department stating that ‘[s]teps were taken in 1947 to have following areas reserved

for Scenic purposes’ but this was overlooked in Head Office. 231

The Hokianga County Council thought the area should be controlled by the Forest Service and

submitted this proposal to the Conservator of Forests. E A Corby, district ranger at Kaikohe,

227 Department of Lands and Survey, The Register of Protected Areas in New Zealand, Wellington, 1984, p 12. 228 Daamen, p 74. 229 McCaskill, p 30. 230 Department of Lands and Survey, p 12.

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was called upon to report. He recommended that the section be proclaimed a state forest.

Following the report, the Conservator of Forests agreed to the setting apart of the area as a

permanent state forest for scenic and protection purposes. But in late 1953 the Director-General

of Lands thought the land should be set aside as a permanent state forest and the Commissioner

of Crown Lands advocated the area for a scenic reserve.232

The Register of Protected Areas listed the Rotokakahi River Scenic Reserve as being gazetted

by the Crown in 1955, containing 46 hectares. The reserve is a flat terrace in the bend of the

river and includes steep slopes above the river. It is located 8 kilometres south-west of

Broadwood, with some logging on the lower slopes (possibly part of the mill at Whangape and

used as a source of wood for other mills in the area). The area supports various native flora

including kahikatea, puriri, taraire, tawa, karaka, towai, kauri on higher slopes. Rimu, miro,

kahikatea, puriri taraire appear on the lower slopes and secondary manuka on ridge tops.233

8.3.1.4 Other reserves

Kaitaia Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1924 containing 7.2 hectares. The reserve is situated on

the slopes above Ngahuirangi stream at Kaitaia on the northern side of Ahipara Hills with Old

Takahue Road as the northern boundary234. The reserve features puriri and taraire in the gully at

the head of the stream, with secondary kanuka trees. 235 In 1984 this reserve was administered

by the Department of Lands and Survey.

The Mangamuka Gorge Scenic Reserve is the largest reserve in the Northland Conservancy

featuring 2,832 hectares. Land was gazetted throughout the 20th century between 1927 and

1981. The reserve includes the Maungataniwha range, and the headwaters of the Mangamuka

River 25 kilometres south of Kaitaia, as well as Soda spring. State Highway One is situated in

between the reserve. The reserve features a variety of flora including rimu, rata, taraire, tawa,

hinau, rewarewa, puriri, kahikatea, miro, kohekohe and pukatea, and kauri. The North Island

kiwi, NZ pigeon, tui and the Kauri snail are the native fauna present in the reserve.236

The Otaneroa Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1941 containing 2.6 hectares. The reserve is

located on a steep hillside above a tributary of Awaroa River, near Waiotehue, 18 kilometres

231 Daamen, p 76. 232 ibid, p 77. 233 Department of Lands and Survey, p 10. 234 McCaskill, p 33. 235 Department of Lands and Survey, p 6. 236 ibid.

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from Kaitaia. Above the tributary of Awaroa River, the reserve is isolated.237 The reserve

features taraire, rewarewa, and towai remnant, with secondary bracken fernland.238

The Waitawa Scenic Reserve is administered by the Hokianga County Council. It was gazetted

in 1935. The reserve is above the Waitawa stream, at the southern end of Maungataniwha range,

16 kilometres south east of Kaitaia. It was formerly Kohukohu Rd scenic reserve and is the

southern margin of the Raetea forest239. The area features a forest containing rimu, rata,

kahikatea, totara, miro over taraire, tawa, kohekohe, hinau, rewarewa, pukatea, and puriri.240

The Pukemiro Scenic Reserve came into existence in 1921 with a further section added in 1935.

In 1984, the reserve contained 191 hectares, and was administered by the Department of Lands

and Survey. The reserve is situated in steep broken hill country rising to twin peaks, 33

kilometres south of Kaitaia coming down to the headwaters of the tributaries of the Waitawa

Stream. The reserve is along the south-western margin of Raetea State Forest, 9 kilometres

north of Broadwood and can be reached by a walk of 3 kilometres from Pukemiro Road. Farm

land surrounds it on three sides.241 The reserve features rimu, rata, towai, kohekohe, taraire

forest, occasional miro, hinau, rewarewa, pukatea and puriri.242

The Broadwood Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1919 and contains 7.2 hectares. The reserve is

a flat terrace alongside Manganuiowae Stream in the Broadwood township and is accessible

from Takahue Saddle Road to the north and the Mangonuiowae Stream to the south.243 The area

contains kahikatea, taraire, towai, and houhere, titoki with kohekohe, hinau, karaka and mapou.

Totara, matai. There is pastureland with scattered willow, wattle, and toetoe. Pigeon,

kingfisher and fantail use the area as a feeding habitat.244

In 1939, the Paponga Scenic Reserve was gazetted containing 2.7 hectares. The reserve is a

heavy rolling land south of Broadwood, made up of mudstone. Secondary tree land manuka,

regenerating totara, rewarewa, rimu, kahikatea, miro taraire are the native flora appearing in the

area. The area also supports broadleaved shrubs including rangiora, heketara, wineberry, and

tree fern. The pigeon, tui and fantail use the area as a source of food.245

237 McCaskill, p 33. 238 Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 239 McCaskill, p 33. 240 Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 241 McCaskill, p 33. 242 Department of Lands and Survey, p 7. 243 McCaskill p 33. 244 Department of Lands and Survey, p 10. 245 ibid.

195

The Runaruna Scenic Reserve was gazetted in 1939 and 1978. It contains 5.8 hectares in total.

The reserve is a steep hillside, south of Broadwood. The area supports secondary manuka,

regenerating towai, taraire, rewarewa, totara, miro, rimu, kahikatea. The pigeon, tui, fantail and

robin are common to the area.246

The Mangataipa Scenic Reserve contains 76 hectares and was first gazetted in 1904. Further

sections of land were included in the reserve in 1912, 1919 and 1968. The reserve is situated at

the slopes above the tidal estuary of the Mangamuka River. The area supports towai, puriri and

kohekohe forest. It is of significant scientific value because pohutakawa are not present within

the forest. Other native trees include rimu, rata, totara, kahikatea, taraire, towai forest.247

Generally, these reserves were administered by the Lands and Surveys Department with a few

exceptions. Presently these areas would be under the administration and management of the

Department of Conservation. Effectively Crown actions in respect of reserves were a denial of

kaitiakitanga and rangatiratanga. Most of the reserves now in existence are less than five

hectares, tiny fragmented areas, which do not necessarily protect, enhance or maintain the flora

and fauna they are supposed to. Most of these areas remain isolated surrounded by areas of

cleared country.

8.3.2 Legislation

Almost all native plants and animals are protected under legislation. By virtue of the Wildlife

Act, fauna that are part of the Wai 262 claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, are ‘deemed vested in

the Crown.’ The responsible Minister has the power to issue permits, permitting the degrees of

harvest for protected plants and animals.248 The Act allows reserves to be created as a refuge

and sanctuary for particular animals. The Governor-General by proclamation can declare a

‘wildlife sanctuary’. Where Crown land is involved, the reservation of such areas requires a

joint recommendation by the Minster of Internal Affairs and the Minister in control of the land.

If the proclamation affects water, then a joint recommendation is required by the Minster of

Internal Affairs and the Minister of Transport. Under the Act the Governor-General has the

power to impose conditions including prohibiting or restricting the entry of a person or classes

of people.249 These reserves prohibit or restrict hunting, killing and taking of animals, eggs or

spawn as well as vegetation in the sanctuary. Proclaimed ‘wildlife refuges’ or ‘wildlife

management reserves’ are also subject to restrictions. Wildlife areas are managed by the

246 ibid. 247 ibid, p 11. 248 Thrush, p vii. 249 Section 9(2).

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Department of Conservation in accordance with its general policy and conservation

management strategies.250

The Wildlife Act effectively restricted Maori rights to take, hunt and keep native fauna. Maori

were concerned about the restrictions concerning the use of feathers and bones and other dead

specimens, which under the Act belonged to the Crown. In the late 1970s dead kiwi were

plentiful. These birds would be handed to the Wildlife Service and were then given to approved

weavers. Most of the dead specimens were killed by possum traps, pig hunting or had been hit

by cars. The general policy of the Wildlife Service at that time was that any killed native fauna

was to be forwarded to the Wildlife Service. Individuals and organisations that wanted the

animal material would make requests to the Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts. The

Council would then make a recommendation to the Wildlife Service as to allocation, which the

Wildlife Service usually accepted.

However from 1983 the supply of kiwi feathers was reduced resulting in fewer to distribute to

weavers. The Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts established allocation guidelines

outlining that:

a) priority would be given to the repair of cloaks ahead of the making new ones;

b) the experience of the weaver would be taken into account; and

c) the teaching content involved in a programme would be a consideration.

However Maori reacted negatively to this scheme. In 1984 Oneroa Steward from Kerikeri High

School was concerned that in the North dead kiwi were quite common from being run over,

taken by dogs or falling into cattle stops. She argued that as tipuna had been making korowai

for a long time that Màori should not need to ask permission to make or repair such taonga.

In 1986 the Wildlife Service developed its own policy on the allocation of kiwi feathers, that:

a) feathers may only be received from the Wildlife Service;

b) specimens suitable for mounting or study must be used for that purpose;

c) any articles made from feathers (such as korowai) located on marae are the property of

the Crown;

d) a register must be kept by marae listing such Crown property;

e) priority is to be given to the repairing of cloaks rather than new items;

f) craftswomen receiving the feathers are to be sufficiently experienced;

g) in creating or repairing traditional materials and methods are to be used (including

muka or treated flax backing); and

250 Thrush, p 3.

197

h) that there should be some teaching content in the project.

Thus, the Wildlife Service still believed that it had the right to enforce such a policy on the basis

that native fauna belonged to the Crown dead or alive.251

However, in fact the provisions of the Wildlife Act are deemed not to be retrospective. In

Department of Internal Affairs v Gary Nicholls the Court commented that the common law

position was that ownership rights did not exist until the fauna was captured and possessed. The

issue was whether the provision of the Act only applied to fauna acquired after the Act. The

Court concluded that the Act needed to be clarified and was of the opinion that it was not

intended to be retrospective. Because of this the Wildlife Service sought legal advice on its

obligations to Maori. They were advised of the possibility that the Treaty of Waitangi Act could

allow a Maori person to lodge a claim to having customary or traditional rights to take certain

wildlife and keep feathers for the purpose of cloak weaving. The legal opinion recommended

clarification of the Act but in the end the Wildlife Service was disbanded and the Department of

Conservation was established.252

The Act was incorporated into the Conservation Act and the Conservation Act requires that

conservation strategies involve consultation with iwi. Until amended in 1990 there was little

statutory basis for consultation or community discussion.253 To take any wildlife, dead or alive,

the permission of the Secretary of Internal Affairs is required and conditions may accompany

any permit including the means of taking and the area of harvest. All wildlife is now absolutely

protected and ‘deemed vested in the Crown’ other than those specified in the fifth schedule.254

Other legislation affecting Maori rights to natural resources includes the Marine Reserves Act

1971, which relates to marine life species inhabiting the sea or foreshore. Under the Act the

public shall have freedom of access and entry to reserves and the opportunity to study, observe

and record marine life in its natural habitat.255 The Native Plants Protection Act 1934 offered a

degree of protection of plants on Crown land. Permission was required for the extraction of

some plants, though some were excluded and listed in a schedule. The Governor-General had

the power to declare any plant protected. As a result it was an offence to take plants in a public

reserve and an offence to take plants from private land without the permission of the owner.

However, one could take a reasonable amount for medicinal, scientific and nature study

purposes.256 In 1973 the Act was tested in Davy v Borough of Birkenhead concerning the

251McClean and Smith, pp 303-304. 252 ibid, pp 305-306. 253 Thrush, p 4. 254 McClean and Smith, p 287. 255 Thrush, p 6. 256 ibid, p 14.

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cutting of pohutakawa trees. The Supreme Court stated that this Act applied to plants not trees.

In 1987 the Department of Conservation took responsibility for the enforcement of this Act.

The Conservation Act 1987 established the Department of Conservation. The Minster of

Conservation can declare that the Crown under conservation purposes will hold land or

foreshore. Marginal strips (land 20 metres wide) which run alongside seashores, lakes and

rivers, are reserved from sale or disposition by the Crown and allow public access.257 The

Conservation Act is a mixture of consultation and arbitrary announcement but no consultation is

required before Governor-General issues a proclamation under section 9(2) of the Wildlife

Act.258 The Conservation Act amalgamated all natural resource legislation giving the

Department of Conservation a management role over all protected areas. In administration of

existing legislation, DoC had to advocate for the preservation of natural and historic areas for

the future generations of New Zealand.

The Crown recognises cultural, spiritual, historic and traditional associations of various iwi with

certain species and the natural environment through treaty settlements.259 In the Ngai Tahu

Settlements Act 1998 there are provisions relating to the ownership and management of

particular species. The Crown acknowledges the ‘cultural, spiritual, historic, and traditional

association of Ngai Tahu with certain taonga species’. The Minster of Conservation under the

Act must consult with Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu regarding relevant policies or reviews of taonga

species. Ngai Tahu members can lawfully have in their possession wildlife specimens, including

species under the Wildlife Act. Such activity cannot be for commercial purposes or non-

commercial transfer. As a result the Act legally presents a proprietary interest in flora and fauna

to Ngai Tahu. Ngai Tahu also maintains interests in flora and fauna through protocols. These

protocols require DoC to exercise its functions, powers and duties with consideration of Ngai

Tahu interests. Such protocols include conservation management strategies and management

plans.

As part of the Ngai Tahu Settlement, protocols have been prepared on six issues: cultural

materials; freshwater fisheries; culling of species of interest to Ngai Tahu; historic resources;

involvement in RMA processes; and visitor and public information. The cultural materials

protocol refers to plants, plant material and materials derived from animals, marine mammals,

or birds for which DoC is responsible. This protocol requires the Department to consider

requests for materials as they become available and consult with Te Runanga where there are

competing requests from non-Ngai Tahu persons for cultural materials. The Department also

257 ibid, p 10. 258 ibid, pp 22-23.

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has other duties to help define levels of customary use of cultural materials, identify local

sources of plants and advise Te Runanga in respect of the establishment of Te Runanga

cultivation sites.

Despite the provisions for the recognition of Ngai Tahu’s relationship with the natural

environment in the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act, Maori interests in the conservation estate

remain undefined and unclear. While some concessions are made for Màori, the Crown remains

very much in control of conservation policy, laws, and practice. There are limited provisions in

legislation for Maori to take flora and fauna from conservation areas under permits for

traditional purposes. However, conservation and sustainable management objectives now

dominate government policy. The Crown still asserts the right to manage the conservation

estate and local authorities are often given delegated authority to regulate such areas. Maori

remain powerless to manage lands unless the Crown grants them a right to do so. Màori are

prevented from undertaking sustainable and customary harvests of particular fauna including

kukupa and kuaka and from exercising their historical and customary relationships with the

environment. Moreover, Maori are largely prevented from obtaining the economic benefit the

conservation estate offers through the development of eco-tourism type initiatives.

8.3.3 The State of the Environment

An interim report from the New Zealand Conservation Authority in1997 exposed the reality of

New Zealand’s natural landscape and the severely depleted state of natural resources. The New

Zealand Conservation Authority concluded that:

• New Zealand has 11% of the world’s endangered species;

• Three-quarters of New Zealand’s present heritage of land and freshwater birds are

threatened – a greater percentage of threatened native birds than almost any other country in the

world;

• Nearly one-third of New Zealand’s original diversity of land and freshwater bird species

are now extinct;

• Virtually all New Zealand’s native bird species are declining in numbers, with a handful

of exceptions;

• 90% of New Zealand’s wetlands have been drained, filled or destroyed;

• The natural habitat that remains for native birds and animals is severely fragmented

because settlement, agriculture, and production land-uses take up over 90% of lowland areas.

Many species can no longer survive in the scattered patches surrounded by farmland, pine

plantations and built up areas;

• 70 million possums infest about 92% of New Zealand’s land area;

259 McClean and Smith, p 423.

200

• Nearly 3 million hectares of New Zealand’s native forests are vulnerable to possums –

over 60% of the North Island’s native forests are at serious risk;

• Other introduced species cause serious environmental damage and include: deer, thar

and wapiti, rats, stoats and ferrets; feral goats, cattle and sheep, rabbits and hares; wasps and

trout; and

• 10% of New Zealand’s land area is classed as severely eroded.260

Explanations are given for the current state of New Zealand’s environment, ranging from pre-

European experience to European settlement and impact. Migration of Màori would have had a

major impact on pre-human ecosystems although some areas of original forest would have been

destroyed by fire accidentally. Indeed, the clearing and modification of land for settlement

would have added to a cumulative process of exploitation and depletion of natural food

resources. Early harvesting techniques would also have contributed to the depletion of

resources. Geoff Park comments that;

the country the first Europeans saw wasn’t a pristine wilderness, but neither was it a run-down desert, burnt from one end to the other…The early Maori were capable of burning forests and certainly did …but the natural forest cover of plains country …was kept intact because these rainforests were often a better source of food than cultivated land or second-growth vegetation.261

In contrast, European arrivals saw the new colony as a place of new beginnings. Opportunities

for agriculture development and promising economic prosperity were the focus of the new

arrivals. Both Maori and European were eager to participate in the benefits of trading and other

commercial activities. However, agriculture has had a devastating effect on the environment as

New Zealand has been transformed into a producer of meat, wool, and butter for Britain and

other international markets.262 Agricultural development brought with it an invasion of new

plants and animal species and the clearing of lands destroyed much of New Zealand’s

indigenous flora and fauna. The ethos of the settler government in New Zealand was on

development. Indeed, a Royal Commission in 1913 thought that forestland which was suitable

for farmland should not remain forest if it could be occupied and resided upon.263

While Maori hunted birds and other resources for food, they also utilised a range of natural

resources as building materials and cultural or medicinal purposes including;

• large trees for waka and buildings;

260 New Zealand Conservation Authority (NZCA), Maori Customary Use of Native Birds, Plants and Other Traditional Materials: Interim Report and Discussion Paper, Wellington, 1997, pp 71-72. 261 Geoff Park, Nga Ururoa: The Groves of Life – Ecology and History in a New Zealand Landscape, Wellington, 1995, pp 45-47 and 318. 262 NZCA, pp 76-77.

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• rongoa plants;

• wild plants for food sources including bracken fern, karaka, hinau, nikau, mamaku, ti,

tawa, kahikatea, raupo, puha, kiekie, kelp and seaweeds;

• flax, ti, pingao and kiekie, feather, sealskins and dog skins for weaving and clothing;

• dyes from muds and soils, tree bark, berries or the pink feet of kereru;

• oils from whales, shark liver or plant seeds such as titoki;

• green leaves and twigs for ceremonial purposes;

• implements from bird bones, whale bone, shells and woods; and

• decoration with special coloured feathers or plumes of birds, and teeth of sharks and

whales.264

Te Rarawa has informed the Crown that it can manage and control particular natural resources.

For example, at a hui in November 1994 Te Runanga o Te Rarawa passed a resolution ‘[t]hat Te

Rarawa be given authority, after working out a process of control with the Department of

Conservation, for cultural take of kukupa.’ All applications would be scrutinised by Te Rarawa

and any take would need to be for a specific purpose for kaumatua and kuia.265

Under the Wildlife Act 1953 all crafted artefacts or taonga using indigenous materials, and all

the feathers and other materials allocated by the Department of Conservation to Maori

craftspeople, remain the property of the Crown. Though while this is the case there are no

known cases where the Crown has taken back such artefacts, though there is a possibility for

this to happen.266 The lack of real ownership for Maori is a concern and may be regarded as an

insult to mana and the denial of the rangatiratanga and kawanatanga guarantees in the Treaty of

Waitangi.267

8.4 Conclusion

Professor Stokes has commented that in recent decades, and particularly since the mid 1960s

when the Crown began acquiring substantial tracts of coastal lands to create scenic and

recreational reserves, there has been increasing tension between the Crown and Maori over

management of these lands.268 Most of these lands in the late 1980s were transferred to the

conservation estate, to be administered by the Department of Conservation. Although this

department has taken active steps in recent years to consult more widely with Maori, there is

263 Park, p 241. 264 NZCA, p 92. 265 ibid, p 34 266 ibid, p 143. 267 ibid. 268 Stokes, p 397.

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still frustration for many Maori who feel they have lost control of some very special places of

significance to them.

This chapter has examined several diverse natural resource issues for Te Rarawa but is by no

means exhaustive in its coverage. Case studies relating to land and waterways, flora and fauna

and generic issues such as Crown policy and legislation have discussed Te Rarawa claims to

management and control of such resources. A consistent picture has emerged of a gradual loss

of control over natural resources over time and the failure of the Crown to recognise, protect

and provide for Te Rarawa’s relationship with the natural environment.

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9.0 Social and Economic Deprivation

Te Rarawa has experienced negative demographic, social, economic and political changes to

their world since contact with Pakeha and the Crown began. This chapter discusses the social

and economic conditions of Te Rarawa Maori over time and attempts to establish a context

within which Crown-Te Rarawa relations may be placed. The first part of the chapter considers

the social and economic impact of land loss, disease, and changes in the Maori economy in the

nineteenth century. The second part of the chapter concentrates on health and education in the

Hokianga area from 1900, based on a research report by Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai.269

9.1 Social and Economic Conditions in the 19th Century

Land alienation began prior to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and continued in to the

twentieth century. The flow on effect of land loss in the Muriwhenua region was a cycle of

economic dependence, poverty, gum digging, debt and ill-health which disrupted and

demoralised communities and hindered their attempts at positive social and economic

development.270

Pre-treaty land transactions were executed between private purchasers and Maori before 1840.

Such transactions in the Te Rarawa area were mainly with missionaries and other people

associated with the Church Missionary Society in the area around Kaitaia. After the signing of

the Treaty a number of inquiries were constituted by the Crown to consider the validity of pre-

treaty transactions. The impact of these purported purchases remained with Te Rarawa

throughout the nineteenth century as the Maori owners maintained the position that such

transactions had not amounted to sales of land.

From the 1840s the Crown embarked on a determined and comprehensive land-purchase

programme which was sustained through to 1865. The aim of the programme was to extinguish

customary land title and secure Crown ownership for the purpose of opening up Maori lands for

European settlement. The Tribunal has commented that the Muriwhenua region was most

affected by the Crown Purchasing programme in the period from 1856 to 1865; a period in

which the Crown sought, in particular, to secure title to the Victoria Valley and all its adjacent

lands. Viewed as highly desirable by the Crown, these land-holdings constituted an

269 Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai, ‘Education and Health Issues in Hokianga: Research Report for Te Rarawa’, unpublished report prepared for Te Uira Associates, 2003. 270 Geiringer, p 7.

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uninterrupted band of land extending north from Mangonui and Whangaroa to Kaitaia and

Ahipara, and westward to the North Hokianga. The land-purchase programme in this region

involved complex negotiations between Maori and Crown agents who held divergent

understandings about the purposes and benefits of land sales. Between 1865 and 1900, the

Crown alienated at least 130,000 acres of prime Te Rarawa lands and forests.271 Although part

of the ongoing and nation wide land purchasing regime dating back to 1840, a key characteristic

of land alienation throughout this period was the employment of the Native Land Court and the

Crown Purchasing Board to administer and facilitate the alienation of Te Rarawa lands.

An understanding of the Crown’s alienation of Te Rarawa land requires an historical outline of

both Crown policies and the socio-economic and political contexts in which Te Rarawa Maori

understood and responded to the Crown. As Claudia Geiringer has noted in the Muriwhenua

context, ‘Crown land alienations did not occur within a vacuum….A cycle of poverty, disease

and debt provided the backdrop to all Crown/Muriwhenua interactions over Muriwhenua land

during the late nineteenth century [and] it is within this context that any explanation of Crown

land purchase activities in Muriwhenua must be placed.’272

According to Linda Bryder and Derek Dow, Maori health has been a “relatively neglected field

in New Zealand history”.273 The provision of health services to Maori in the nineteenth and

early part of the twentieth centuries was premised on the “fatal impact” or “dying race” theory,

illustrated through the sharp decline in the Maori population. This decline was due to post-

contact dislocation of the Maori environment, whereby changes to traditional Maori structures

and ways of existing were significantly eroded. The impact of these changes had, therefore,

serious effects on standards of health. James Belich disputes the general notion of fatal impact,

arguing that the population decline for Maori post-contact was nowhere near as devastating as

European experiences post-plague and famine. Rather, Belich views the fatal impact theory as a

“myth” that was “strong enough not only to overshoot the evidence on Maori depopulation and

to have an enduring effect on historians’ interpretations, but also to help project the British

Empire into New Zealand in 1840”.274 Regardless of the arguments for and against the fatal

impact theory or myth, there is clear evidence that Maori health suffered post-contact.

271 This figure accounts for approximately one third of total Te Rarawa lands. It is a conservative figure calculated according to transactions identified as part of the research undertaken for this report. This figure excludes private purchases and any Te Rarawa lands unidentified at the time of writing. 272 Geiringer, p 44. 273 Cited in Tiakiwai, p 59. 274 ibid.

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Geiringer notes that crippling health problems and continued population decline disrupted and

demoralised the economy of Muriwhenua Maori in the nineteenth century.275 Contemporary

accounts emphasise the existence of diseases including scarlet fever, typhoid, measles,

rheumatic fever, influenza, and pheumonia, and mortality rates were high. In addition,

malnutrition, skin diseases and chronic invalidism meant that ‘many Maori communities simply

staggered…from one major health crisis to another.’276

There were epidemics of fatal diseases. For example, a severe outbreak of typhoid at Ahipara in

1874 killed 34 people in three weeks and many people, including the prominent rangatira,

Timoti Puhipi, were seriously ill.277 This epidemic spread to other settlements and was followed

by measles. The acting Resident Magistrate, George Kelly, blamed the epidemic for the huge

population reduction of 23% between 1874 and 1878.278 In 1875 another epidemic at Ahipara

claimed the life of the school master and 28 others and closed the school for a time. At Kaitaia

the same epidemic caused a decrease in school attendance from 31 children to 17.279

The most obvious indicator of the impact of European disease in the Muriwhenua region is

population decline. Prior to European contact the Muriwhenua claim area supported a

considerable population. However, a dramatic population decline took place over the nineteenth

century. Rigby and Koning estimate that by 1845 the population of Muriwhenua had been

reduced to 4000 and that between 1845 and 1858 the population had again been halved.280 The

Redident Magistrate at Mangonui recalled in 1868 that:

…twenty years ago on paying my first visit to Ahipara, I was struck by their numbers, their large villages and pas, occupied by a numerous population…Now I regret to say, the country is almost a waste, the population dwindled to a few hundreds.281

The Maori population of the Mangonui area continued to decline reaching a low of 1,615 people

in 1878. Because of the early history of Maori/Pakeha contact in Muriwhenua the Maori

population declined early but also began to recover earlier than in other tribal areas. By 1880 the

Maori population of Muriwhenua was increasing.282 Geiringer concludes that high levels of

disease and mortality caused considerable disruption, dislocation and demoralisation to Maori

communities and caused greater dependence upon the Pakeha case economy. She notes that the

‘near constant state of disruption and devastation caused by endemic disease provides the

275 ibid, p 16. 276 ibid. 277 ibid. 278 ibid, p 17. 279 ibid. 280 ibid. 281 ibid.

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backdrop against which one must analyse all Crown/Maori interaction in Muriwhenua during

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’283

A correlation has also been drawn between land alienation and population decline by academics

such as Ian Pool.284 Pool writes that:

the Maori subsistence food-economy had depended on a combination of extensive and relative intensive land utilisation. After land alienation had occurred, they were restricted essentially to smaller tracts of land, and thus found it necessary to develop new strategies to obtain food and other basic needs. They had to turn either to more intensive techniques of land use, or to replace subsistence production with cash purchases of food.285

Sources show that the latter strategy identified by Pool was utilised by many Te Rarawa hapu,

which from the 1840s had become increasingly dependent on waged employment or some form

of exploitative resource industry.286 Drawing on natural resources in their districts some Te

Rarawa Maori, particularly those situated in the Herekino region and along the Hokianga and

Whangape harbours, were able to derive a cash income from the kauri gum and timber

industries. Other Te Rarawa hapu either migrated for extended periods to areas of industry or

relied upon European settlement in their areas to bolster their subsistence economies such as

gum digging.287

Maori in the Muriwhenua area had been digging gum for commercial export since the 1840s. By

the close of the 1850s a flourishing export trade for gum had been established and both prices

and demand rose dramatically. Gum digging provided the only industry for Maori in the late

1860s and the industry dominated the Maori economy in this region for the next sixty years.288

The former trade in horticultural produce had slumped at this time and it was gum not land that

brought the major influx of Pakeha into the region. In the absence of any other sustainable

economic activity gum digging provided a crucial source of income.

However, gum digging had considerable social costs. In order to procure gum Maori lived a

nomadic existence, locating themselves wherever it was most abundant. In times of high prices

everyone from the very young to the very old was engaged in gum digging. Geiringer notes that

282 ibid. 283 ibid, p 20. 284 Ian Pool, Te Iwi Maori: A New Zealand Population Past, Present and Projected, Auckland, 1991. Pool sought in his research to test this point originally made by Keith Sorrenson. Pointing to the drop of child to woman ratios in Te Rarawa from 1874 through to 1891, before recovering in 1901, Pool argues that increased Maori exposure to European diseases reinforced a cycle of malnutrition –infection ‘caused principally by the processes and end-results of land alienation’. 285 ibid, p 63 286 ibid. 287 Stokes, p 80

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contemporary sources linked the conditions in the gum camps with high levels of disease and

mortality.289 Kauri gum also introduced a Maori dependence on the cash economy and its

fluctuations. Thus, while prices were good a living could be made but when prices dipped Maori

were thrown back on to other meagre resources. The lifestyle also meant that Maori were not

cultivating the little land that did remain in their ownership and the monopolistic practices of

many store keepers and gum traders considerably worsened the problem of debt.290 Gum

digging locked Maori into a cycle of poverty and dependence from which they were not relieved

until the 1960s.291

While the timber and gum industries provided some hapu with economic advantages, both

industries were contained within isolated pockets throughout the Te Rarawa region and were

subject to a fluctuating and often unscrupulous market place. Indeed, the benefits from the

timber trade were negated with the use of extended credit by local storekeepers which forced

Maori to work year round, disrupting seasonal planting and harvesting, and creating a cycle of

indebtedness and poverty.292 Additionally, working in the gum fields for extended periods

further impacted on the poor health of Te Rarawa Maori. The overall benefits of such industries,

therefore, were nominal and incapable of enabling hapu to survive comfortably, let alone

progress in the face of continuing land alienation.

The cultural framework in which Te Rarawa Maori understood and sought solutions to their

socio-economic situation remained distinctly Maori at this time. Forming the basis of their

worldview was a relationship to the land based on customary systems of socio-political

organisation. While it is likely that Te Rarawa Maori would have been developing an

understanding of Western concepts of land ownership throughout this period, the principles

underpinning hapu land rights were still firmly based upon the principles of take raupatu

(conquest), whakapapa (land rights transmitted and validated according to ancestral genealogy),

and ahi kaa (continuous occupation). In simple terms, Te Rarawa rights of land possession were

transferred down in a line from a common ancestor who had claimed and retained land rights

according to the sustained occupation of that land. Those who could whakapapa directly to that

common ancestor resided upon the land as members of the hapu, sharing rights and obligations

under the direction of rangatira.

288 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 355. 289 Geiringer, p 22. 290 ibid, p 24. 291 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 363. 292 Judith Binney, Judith Bassett, Eric Olssen, The People and the Land Te Tangata me te Whenua An Illustrated History of New Zealand 1820-1920, Wellington, 1990, p 22.

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Hence, in response to poverty, illness, and land loss, Te Rarawa rangatira and their hapu sought

out solutions to their problems; they did not sink into a state of hopelessness. As Vincent

O’Malley and Stephen Robertson noted in their report on Muriwhenua, poor socio-economic

conditions failed to demoralise Maori communities: ‘although victims of the colonisation

process, Muriwhenua Maori were never passive victims.’293 Likewise, Te Rarawa continued to

act upon their decisions in order to improve the socio-economic welfare of their hapu.

However, at the turn of the nineteenth century it was clear that Crown land legislation and

purcahsing had had a devastating affect on Te Rarawa hapu. The extent to which Te Rarawa

leadership could continue to exert their authority within the hapu had been severely undermined,

while control beyond the hapu to policy matters relating to land tenure reform and alienation

was completely severed. Furthermore, the sale of hapu land to the Crown, based upon the

expected economic benefits of European settlement, failed to exact any long-term benefits.

Quite in reverse, the huge economic costs associated with land sale transactions imposed even

more poverty and debts upon hapu, in turn perpetuating a cycle of further alienation of land to

the Crown. From 1865 to 1900 the corrosion of hapu authority and economies occurred

simultaneously under the Crown’s unilateral imposition of Native Land Court systems in 1865,

the practices of the Crown Lands Purchasing Board from 1870, and from 1892 the land policies

of the Liberal Government.

9.2 Education and Health in Hokianga294

This section is divided into two parts providing an examination of education and health issues

for Maori within the Hokianga region. Section 9.2.1 examines the establishment of Mission and

Native Schools to provide a context for how Hokianga Maori became exposed to education.

Case studies of Motukaraka Native School and Te Karae Native School are included. Section

9.2.2 focuses on the health of Maori, particularly Hokianga Maori, with a particular focus on the

provision of health services to Maori in the Hokianga during the period 1939 to 1954.

The findings indicate serious concerns as to the level and quality of education and health care

provided for Maori in the Hokianga region. These concerns in part mirror government policies

of assimilation, while at other stages are reflective of the racial prejudices of the time. The

findings drawn from this study provide an indicative picture of the experiences of Te Rarawa

Maori in the Hokianga. These findings suggest that:

293 O’Malley and Robertson, p 5. 294 This section is taken from: Sarah-Jane Tiakiwai, ‘Education and Health Issues in Hokianga: Research Report for Te Rarawa’, unpublished report prepared for Te Uira Associates, 2003.

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1. There was a clear lack of any basic provision of education, particularly for Motukaraka

Native School students between 1903 and 1908.

2. There was no action on concerns raised by government officials as to the quality of

teaching at Motukaraka Native School.

3. The government sought to provide compensation for the teacher who was found to be

severely lacking in any teaching ability, and had been in such a state for a number of years. No

such compensation was offered to the Maori community.

4. There is no evidence to indicate whether the land transferred by the Tokerau Maori

Land Board to the Crown for the purposes of a Native School at Te Karae was returned.

5. Te Karae Maori were inhibited in accessing a Native School education because of

protracted indecision by government officials. During the same period, and in lesser amount of

time, a Board school was established in a neighbouring block of land.

6. Hokianga Maori were restricted in their ability to access health services due to isolation

and lack of appropriate roading and transport conditions.

7. Hokianga County Council and health officials were in disagreement about who was

responsible for resolving these conditions, which meant Hokianga Maori continued to miss out

on access to these services.

8. There was both blatant and underlying examples of racism, whereby Maori were unable

to access health services available to the general population.

9.2.1 The Educational Experiences of Te Rarawa Maori

The history of education for Maori in New Zealand has been described as contradictory.295 The

system has been contradictory in that educational developments, such as the Native Schools,

were established and seen by some as “instruments of colonisation set up to aid cultural

assimilation and economic exploitation”, while being seen by others as “sites of opportunity for

the educational aspirations of Maori.”296 The two Native Schools examined in this section

illustrate the obstacles faced by Maori in trying to support the education of their children. One

case notes the extreme difficulties in actually getting a school established, while the other

illustrates the inability of government officials to adequately address issues of teaching quality

and achievement, and the problems that emerged as a result. This second case, in particular,

provides rich detail highlighting the battles faced by Maori communities regarding the education

of their children.

295 Judith Simon, (ed), Ngä Kura Mäori. The Native Schools System, 1867–1969. Auckland, 1998. 296 ibid, p 2.

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9.2.2 The Mission Schools and the introduction of education to Maori

The education system for Maori, while not formally established as a state system until 1867 was

governed by legislation introduced in 1847. Prior to that, missionaries introduced education to

Maori. The first Mission School was established at Rangihoua, in the Bay of Islands by Thomas

Kendall. While not successful (it closed after two years), Maori had whetted their appetite for

learning. Maori interest increased but the government was “content to leave the education of the

Maoris to the missionaries”.297 Simon highlights the ease with which Maori mastered the art of

reading and that this resulted in the creation of village schools where Maori taught each other.

Maori embraced literacy as a way of accepting that these were relevant tools, which would

enable them to communicate and interact on an equal level with their Pakeha counterparts.

The rapid advancement of literacy caused a number of changes to key structures of traditional

Maori society. One change was the influence exerted by the missionaries, reinforced through the

teaching of the scriptures and subsequent undermining or marginalisation of Maori knowledge

and customs through a process of “evangelical imperialism”.298 Another change also related to

traditional Maori knowledge and customs, which focused on the ease with which Maori were

increasingly able to access what was traditionally considered a highly tapu system. While

Stokes argues that Maori would not have disclosed their knowledge to Pakeha, she does

acknowledge that some early missionaries reflected on the negative impact their teachings had

on Maori:

Later in his life, William Colenso, the missionary printer, commented on the role of missionaries in undermining the social structures and belief systems of the Maori world. Colenso had been dismissed by the CMS (Church Missionary Society) for allegedly getting a Maori woman in his household pregnant, so he had that as a bias. However, he was one of the few to reflect more deeply on the implications of culture contact.299

The results of these changes thrust Maori into the wider debate of how they would participate

not only in the New Zealand education system but also how they could be better incorporated or

assimilated into New Zealand society.

In 1847 the Education Ordinance Act was passed. The Ordinance provided government

subsidies for missions, conditional on their provision of focusing on boarding rather than day

schools. The Ordinance stated that instruction should be provided in English as well as in the

297 Tiakiwai, p 9. 298 Evelyn Stokes, A Review of the Evidence in the Muriwhenua Lands Claims, Waitangi Tribunal Review Series, Wellington, 1997, p 135. 299 ibid, p 148.

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vernacular.300 However, another view is that the aim of the Ordinance was to isolate Maori

children from influences of traditional villages, assimilating them into the habits of European

culture.301

9.2.3 The demise of the Mission Schools and rise of the Native Schools

The missionary domination of Maori education ended following the land wars of the 1860s. The

land wars severely impeded attendance at the mission schools. Simon disputes this focus as

being the sole reason for the decline in Maori attendance at the mission schools. Instead, she

posits that while the “intentions of Maori” on the “surface” appeared to be similar to Europeans,

the key point of differentiation lay in the fact that Maori viewed schooling as a way to “extend

their existing body of knowledge” while the state, “through its assimilation policy, intended to

replace Maori culture with that of the European”302

Simon gives another reason for growing Maori dissatisfaction with the mission schools. During

the 1850s, the government required mission schools to provide industrial training, which

effectively meant manual labour. Maori parents’ concerns lay in the fact that the children spent

more time on manual labour than on learning to read and write. However, Simon notes that the

school inspector, Henry Taylor, felt that Maori had misinterpreted the role of education and the

need to balance academic work with manual training. The result was that “intellectual

development was given a low priority by both state and missionaries in the Native Schooling

policy of this time”, highlighting the fact that “while Maori were seeking through schooling to

enhance their life chances, the state was setting out to control and limit those life chances”.303

The introduction of the Native Schools Act 1867 saw the focus change away from mission

education to secular education, allowing the government to establish greater control over the

provision of education to Maori in New Zealand.

9.2.4 The Native Schools

The Native Schools Act 1867 provided for the establishment of village schools. Instruction was

required to be in the English language only, financial contribution by Maori to school buildings

and staff salaries was required and there was supervision of village schools receiving

government aid.304 Essentially, the schools were to maintain their role as “civilising agencies

and centres for spreading European ideas and habits”.305 Herein lies the contradiction. How

300 Tiakiwai, p 10. 301 ibid. 302 Simon, p 9. 303 ibid, p 11. 304 W Bird, “The Education of the Maori”, in I Davey, (ed.), Fifty Years of National Education in New Zealand, Auckland, 1928, p 62. 305 Tiakiwai, p 12.

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could the Native Schools be sites of educational opportunity for Maori when their main purpose

was to facilitate the cultural assimilation of Maori children?

The establishment phase of the Native Schools was supported largely due to the political climate

that had witnessed severe disruption to the schooling system as a result of the land wars. The

economics of war and desire for greater social control shaped the parliamentary debates that

subsequently led to the establishment of the Native Schools. It was proposed that an investment

in Maori education would reduce expenditure on Maori incarceration. As Duffy (2002) notes,

“education was preferred to warfare as a method for tackling Maori resistance to colonisation

and settlement.”306

Support for the establishment of native schools differed among tribes, particularly after the wars

of the 1860s. A large proportion of the support for the schools came from North Auckland,

where the tribes had either fought on the Pakeha side during the Wars or remained neutral. The

success of the Native Schools, was largely dependent on Maori communities. Maori acted as

advocates within their communities to get the Native School established, mostly through the

gifting of land for buildings. Furthermore, Maori had to provide evidence of numbers to warrant

the erection of a school within their community. Archival evidence includes the names and ages

of Maori (and non-Maori) children attached to support petitions and applications for a Native

School. For example:

Dear Sir Sending list of children to attend Karae School when open. None of these are at school at present but mine and two of Hohaias, the rest having no school yet and never. Mete Smith.307

While Maori communities were the main initiators of the establishment of Native Schools,

Pakeha also realised the value such schools had for their own children and were at times willing

to support petitions begun by Maori communities. For example, a settler, Seay, wrote:

I beg to draw attention to the fact that there are 17 children of school age residing in the Te Karae Block, who are at present receiving no education at all. They are all residing along a two mile stretch of the Te Karae Broadwood road. The road is now near completion. There are 15 native and half caste children and two white children, my own. There are also a

306 S Duffy, “Hokianga Native Schools, 1871-1900. Assimilation Reconsidered”, MA thesis, Massey University, 2002, p 1. 307 Mete Smith to Millar, Postmaster, Rawene. 11 August 1911. Contained within this letter was a list detailing the ages and gender of 35 Maori children who ranged in age from 4 to 15 years. The Te Karae Native School file contains numerous lists of names, ages and gender of children as the Maori community sought support from government officials to open a Native School in its district: National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/595c.

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number of young children coming on to school age…It is a great pity that so many children should be growing up in ignorance. 308

The dream of establishing a Native School was quickly replaced by the reality of maintaining

them. Teachers were poorly paid and often uncertificated, and attracting teachers to and

reatining them in isolated areas such as the Hokianga proved particularly difficult.

9.2.5 Native Schools in the Hokianga

The role of Hokianga Maori, in the foundation of New Zealand as a colony was pivotal. Indeed,

Lee noted that while the eastern side of the northland region was fairly well dominated by

Pakeha traders, the scenario was quite the opposite in the Hokianga. Lee notes that Hokianga

Maori had very strong and healthy trading businesses, both internally and internationally.309

Similarly, the social and political system amongst Hokianga Maori was much more

sophisticated and organised. Thus, when Pakeha traders sought to establish themselves in the

Hokianga, the success of their endeavours depended largely on their relationships with

Hokianga Maori. Further to this, when the missionaries arrived in the Hokianga, the fervour

with which Maori responded to the teachings of the Bible opened a whole new range of

opportunities from which to advance and progress their trading activities, as well as their

relationships with Pakeha. Hokianga Maori clearly understood the advantages associated with

accessing literacy, and learning English. Thus, the ability to access education through the

establishment of the Native Schools was welcomed. The extent of this view is demonstrated in

the following extract:

we have been taught three things – reading, writing and arithmetic. What we want is that education should be progressive, and that schools should be established for children of two years up to twenty-one…We want more than these three things to enable our descendants to cope with the Europeans.310

Daamen highlighted the enthusiasm with which Maori communities in the Hokianga appeared

to have embraced education and the opportunity to establish Native Schools in their rohe,

despite the many hardships faced in getting their children to these schools. The experiences of

the Hokianga Native Schools also highlighted the political nature of the education system and of

Maori-Pakeha relations during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Duffy states

that the Hokianga Native Schools “were placed right at the heart of Maori communities, and

often became the focal point for community in themselves”.311 Simon concurs, noting that the

Native Schools “contributed to the building of a different sense of community from that of the

308 Seay to Fowlds, 13 December 1910. BAAA 1001/595c, National Archives, Auckland. 309 Tiakiwai, p 15. 310 Simon, p 12. 311 Duffy, p 10.

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close whanau-based kainga which had been such a significant part of Maori social

organization.”312

The Hokianga experience was no different. The experiences of the schools’ communities

examined in this section highlight the importance Maori leadership had and its impact on the

ongoing education of Maori children.

9.2.6 Motukaraka Native School

Motukaraka Native School was operational from 1881 to 1908. This case study focuses on the

period from 1903 to its eventual closure in 1908. Events after the closure of the school, up until

1925, are also included as they illustrate a range of issues faced by Maori communities, socially,

culturally and politically, upon the demise of the Native schooling system in their community.

During this period, the head teacher of Motukaraka Native School was Thomas Danaher, while

his daughter, Winifred, held the assistant’s position. This was in keeping with the policy that

“no male assistant be employed on the staff of any Native school” and also reinforced the role

of the female assistant, whose duties were to teach sewing and demonstrate civilised conduct.313

Danaher had been in the Native School service since 1880 and at Motukaraka since 1887.

The school had a Maori committee, in accordance with the legislation under which Native

Schools were established. Members of this committee, during the period examined, were drawn

largely from the Hare family, of the Ngati Here hapu, who were a well-established family at

Motukaraka. Frank Hare, Ngahuia Hare and Himi Te Uruti gifted the school site in 1880. The

Maori community was a strong Roman Catholic population and there was a church not far from

the school site. In 1899, attendance at the school had increased, due to job opportunities in the

timber industry that had arisen in the district. While pleased with this outcome, government

officials expressed concern that once the timber supply was exhausted, the school would see a

reduction in attendance figures. However, immediately prior to the period being examined in

this case study, the school had experienced problems of low attendance and had fallen into a

state of disrepair. Despite this, there was hope that the school might be able to overcome these

difficulties and move forward:

It has been eight years since any repairs have been done, owing no doubt to the feeble unsettled state of the school – which was brought about mainly by sickness and people leaving the place. Now however it is growing decidedly healthy again. It is about 25 years since the Ngatihere people made their gardens here in Motukaraka before. The site of the

312 Simon, p 22. 313 ibid, p 14.

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church is only a few chains from the school-house. No doubt that the number of scholars from here will increase before the end of the year.314

However, the following years were punctuated by illness, lack of resources including suitable

teachers, isolation and administrative constraints. Thus, the optimism was short-lived.

Simon notes, “the majority of the Native Schools were in rural settlements far removed from

shops, electricity and other amenities”.315 Access to the schools themselves was often difficult

due in part to the isolation and also lack of suitable roading. Duffy identifies isolation as being a

key factor for the Hokianga schools. Motukaraka was no exception in terms of its physical and

cultural isolation although Kohukohu and Rawene were accessible across the other side of the

harbour. A letter to the Secretary for Education, Edward Gibbes, Danaher informs him of the re-

opening of Motukaraka Native School after suffering a bout of illness. Danaher noted that the

length of time in which the school was closed (ten days), was a result of a lack of access to

medical facilities and a doctor, due to the remoteness of Motukaraka and transport difficulties.

The physical isolation of schools such as Motukaraka, combined with a lack of ready access to

relieving staff, meant that Native Schools were often required to close when the teaching staff

became sick.

The impact of epidemics in Maori communities in locations like Motukaraka was significant.

Within the five-year period being examined in this section, Motukaraka Native School was

closed on numerous occasions due to general illness (1902-1903, March 1907) outbreaks of

influenza (Nov 1905, July 1907, March 1908) and chicken pox (July 1907). The severity of

these outbreaks were recorded in official reports:

Here, too, disease had played havoc with the school. Enteric fever was raging for some months and many deaths occurred. This led to the closing of the school for a considerable period.316

Danaher described the Hokianga experience at that time as ‘a very sickly season, what with

fever, chicken pocks and influenza.’317

Native Schools and their teachers were expected to educate Maori children about the ‘civilised’

ways of the Pakeha. This included health education. However, when the epidemics swept

through the Native Schools, the health of not only the Maori children who attended the Native

314 Inspector’s Report, W. Bird, 15 April 1905. Motukaraka Native School file, National Archives Auckland, BAAA 1001/365b. 315 Simon, p 65. 316 AJHR, 1904, Vol. 2, D-G, E-2, p.6. 317 Danaher to Gibbes, 17 July 1907. National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Schools, but also the wider Maori community were severely affected due to the lack of inherited

immunity to these introduced diseases. As Simon states:

the work of the Native Schools was often seriously impeded by sickness and disease amongst the pupils. Influenza epidemics, chickenpox, tuberculosis and measles swept through Maori villages and at times closed many schools.318

During these outbreaks, teachers within the Native Schools were often required to dispense

medicine despite being given “no specialist training in the field”. Simon records that many

teachers applied themselves “with great earnestness to this task; when epidemics raged they

took responsibility for nursing the sick”.319

Health issues were not the only reason that affected Maori childrens’ attendance at school.

Officials noted that:

The attendance at these schools, with some few exceptions, is not so satisfactory as it should be; indeed in four cases it is altogether unsatisfactory. Proximity to gumfields, to timber-mills, and to flax-mills has a bad effect.320

Motukaraka children, between 1903 and 1907, had relatively little distance to travel to school,

except in times of inclement weather, when the roads became impassable due to the poor

roading conditions in the area. Yet William Bird, Chief Inspector of the Native Schools

described attendance at the school in 1906 as being “very lax”:

The tone is more or less unsatisfactory as regards the appreciation by the elders of the school. The children do not appear to be keenly interested. The want of rigour here and the half hearted manner of the children are very discouraging. The attendance is bad also and this must militate against the success.321

Frustrating to government officials and Native School teachers was the perceived influence

Maori leaders had on the attendance figures at Native Schools. According to Duffy, the real lack

of departmental control due to the isolation of many of the Native Schools meant that Maori

communities were able to “manipulate a school’s attendance in order to achieve a particular

end…The practice seems to have been quite widespread”.322 There is little evidence in the

Motukaraka file to suggest that Maori community members and Maori leaders were

manipulative in their approach to school attendance. Certainly, they knew the value of their

318 Simon, p 120. 319 ibid. 320 AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p.4. Report on the Native Schools in the Hokianga District. There were 12 schools within this district and the Motukaraka Native School file indicates poor attendance during the examination for 1905. 321 AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p 15. Annual Report by William Bird. 322 Duffy, p 38.

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children’s attendance in establishing the school, as evidenced in the provision of lists of

children’s names to government officials. But attendance at Native Schools was not

compulsory, and the impact of the flourishing timber and gum industries and distance perhaps

contributed to the issue of poor attendance.

Despite concerns expressed by William Bird, Inspector of Native Schools, the Motukaraka

Native School file indicates a period of relative stability in terms of attendance figures between

1905 and 1908, although this does not take into account fluctuations in enrolments during the

year.

Figure 1: Motukaraka Native School Attendance Figures 1905 to 1908

Maori Boys Maori Girls Total

1905 13 9 22

1906 11 11 22

1907 9 13 22

1908 9 12 21

Source: Motukaraka Native School file, National Archives, Auckland, BAAA 1001/595c.

However, Bird’s concluding comments in his 1905 annual report to the government about

attendance at Native Schools perhaps have more relevance to the state of attendance at

Motukaraka than the figures given in the table above:

There can be no doubt, however, that the greatest factors in producing good attendance at a Native school are the inherent attraction that the school itself has for the children and the confidence the parents have in the master. That is to say the attendance in many cases depends largely upon the teacher himself, and falling off in the attendance should be to him the occasion for a little introspection.323

The correspondence from Danaher to officials at the Education Department on attendance

indicates that there was some need for justification of low attendance (and subsequent reports of

improved attendance) at Motukaraka that belied the introspective approach suggested by Bird.

Furthermore, it suggests that Danaher was seeking ways of disassociating himself from the real

issues that were impacting on the education of Motukaraka Native School children.

By 1900, thirteen years after Danaher began at Motukaraka, his relationship with the local

Maori community was characterised by his dislike of the Chairman of the Native School

Committee, Frank Hare. Danaher wrote to Edward Gibbes, Secretary for Education, regarding

323 AJHR, 1905, Vol. 3, D-G, E-2, p.15.

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the improvement in school attendance (which had risen to 23) and that the improvement was

due to a “change in chairman and Committee. The new committee I am happy to say take an

interest in the school and show it by assisting us while at work from time to time.”

There was a much more sinister undertone however to the strained relationship between

Danaher and Frank Hare, which did not emerge until the mysterious disappearance of Danaher

in late 1908. Porteous, Inspector of Native Schools, reported the following to Gibbes in his 1909

Inspection Report:

The current rumour is that Danaher had been misconducting himself with the Maori girls of the place, some of these school girls. It is said he was in the habit of giving them whiskey and tobacco. A girl belonging to a Maori named Nui Hari – gave birth to a child. This girl was about 14 years of age and attended school. A hui was held by the Maoris to consider the question of the paternity of this child...It is said that the girl eventually stated that Danaher was the father…I made an effort to see Nui Hari but failed. Motukaraka is a Roman Catholic community and it is quite probable that the priest had forbidden the Maoris to say anything of the matter now.324

Nui Hari was Frank Hare, the Chairman. The girl had stated that a local boy was the father, but

upon the birth of the child, which was of fair complexion, the girl admitted that Danaher was the

father. Further to this, it was widely speculated that Danaher was given money to ‘disappear’

by Frank Hare. There were a number of reported sightings of Danaher in Sydney, Australia, and

Auckland, but he was not to surface in Motukaraka again. It is unclear why Danaher and Hare’s

relationship was so strained. Whether Hare knew what Danaher was doing with the Maori girls

is unsubstantiated. What the file does show however, is a lack of regard held by Danaher for

members of the Maori community, even after Hare had been replaced by Rawiri Rewi as

Chairman in 1907. Furthermore, reports completed by Chief Inspector Porteous in 1907 and

1908 express the frustration at any real lack of academic progress being achieved by the

students who attended Motukaraka Native School.

In annual reports provided to government on the progress of Native Schools, blame for the lack

of academic achievement was often placed at the feet of Maori communities. Indeed,

explanations given included poor attendance by children, difficulties within Maori communities

and “the occurrence of tangis and Native feasts”. The reports from the period 1905 to 1908

highlight a number of serious issues relating to the quality of teaching given to the local Maori

children who attended Motukaraka Native School. While the 1905 inspection report by William

Bird, Chief Inspector for Native Schools, identified a lack of support from the local Maori

324 Inspector’s Report, Porteous, 14 April 1909, BAAA 1001/365b, National Archives, Auckland.

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community, Bird also highlighted confidential notes that raised concern about the role the head

teacher’s daughter played as a teaching assistant:

I cannot say that the new assistant, the youngest daughter of the head teacher, showed the slightest capability as a teacher. No method in her work was evident and her controlling power may be set down as nil. The methods generally are behind the times and the children have but a poor chance of acquiring much education. Mr. Danaher informed me that this was his 25th examination. I think that a change would be certainly beneficial to the Maoris here.325

In 1906, Bird again noted the lack of academic progress being achieved by the children of

Motukaraka Native School. While not attributing the children’s “half hearted manner” to school

to the “very poor” results, Bird nevertheless expressed concern at the viability of the school to

remain open under the tutelage of the Danaher family. Following the submission of Bird’s

report to government officials, Danaher received a letter from the Secretary for Education in

relation to his daughter’s continuing role as Assistant:

From remarks contained in the last two reports made on your school….it appears to the Department that the present Assistant is hardly qualified to undertake successfully the work required of her, and I find now that her appointment has never been confirmed. I shall be glad, therefore, if you will recommend someone who is more capable of doing the work.326

Danaher’s response was in defence of his daughter and he noted that he had been giving his

daughter lessons. Danaher’s response in the difficulty of finding anyone to replace his daughter

as Assistant, ensured a reluctant acceptance to her continued appointment. Bird acknowledged

the real difficulty in finding anyone to replace Miss Danaher, but continued to express his

concern at her continued appointment.

Less than a month later the school nearly burned down and there was a lack of community

support to replace any of the damaged equipment. The Department of Education subsequently

refused to give any additional funding to assist in the rebuilding of the school. The reason for

this lack of support is unclear, but it suggests that relations between Danaher and the Maori

community had reached a low point. This would also seem to be the first clear indication that

government officials were not looking at the school in any long-term capacity. The inspection

report the following year was equally grim, with Porteous reporting on the sad state of the

school buildings and the continued lack of academic progress:

325 Inspector’s Report, W. Bird, 15 April 1905, BAAA 1001/365b. 326 Secretary for Education, Gibbes to Danaher, 30 April 1906, BAAA 1001/365b.

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The efficiency of this school is not high… The whole place [is]…going to rack and ruin, and [it] appears to have outlived its usefulness – despite some minor repairs being carried out the year before.327

Bird concurred, noting on the file that:

The school has never been successful in the hands of the present teacher who is one of the old regime having been in the service since Jan[uary] 1880. I am not prepared to recommend his transfer to another school as I consider he is not qualified for the work.328

Although the reports and comments from government officials were not encouraging, Danaher

continued to teach at Motukaraka Native School. He wrote to the Department of Education on a

number of occasions, mainly to inform them of the improved attendance, which he reasoned

was due to a “change in chairman and Committee”. Whilst government officials expressed

concern in both the inspection report and the Motukaraka Native School file, no further action

was taken until after the 1908 inspection report was completed. The report, completed by Bird,

was damning. Bird commented on a number of issues, noting the children’s apathy, irregular

attendance, lack of discipline and cleanliness. Bird also noted the continued disrepair into which

the school had fallen, commenting on the fact that repairs had not been done for quite some time

and noting, “much of the trouble arises from the neglect of the teacher to attend to small

matters”. However, Bird saved his most vociferous criticism for the lack of teaching ability and

subsequent lack of academic achievement attained by the children.

Attached to the examination results, Bird added a number of confidential notes, writing:

It is necessary in connection with this report to state that there have been many children who have attended this school more or less irregularly for long periods from eight years upwards and who have not yet passed even a very low standard. Some of these 8 or 9 have left recently as being over school age. They have reached the age of fourteen or fifteen having passed only S[tandard]1 or S[tandard] 2...Surely the Dep[artmen]t has no need to wonder why the children attend badly or why they show such apathy in school. I have never found in any school such miserable results as these. There can be little doubt that they are due to incompetence on the part of the teacher.

Figure 2: Examination Results Motukaraka Native School, 1903 to 1908.

Year Passed Failed Absent New 1903 2 7 0 2 1904 2 7 0 2 1905 4 11 1 2 1906 6 11 2 2 1907 5 12 2 0

327 Inspector’s Report, Porteous, 25 March 1907, BAAA 1001/365b. 328 Note from Bird on Motukaraka Native School file, 15 April 1907, BAAA 1001/365b.

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1908 0 20 0 0 Source: Motukaraka Native School file, 13 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b, National Archives, Auckland,

In a letter from the Secretary for Education, Gibbes, to Bird in May 1908, it was

concluded that the:

school should no longer be allowed to exist in its present condition. The reports have been unsatisfactory for years. Inspectors have indicated that Danaher should have been transferred years ago and that the buildings once again be put in order. Time is now, can no longer delay. The settlement must be given another chance under a new teacher, in buildings put into proper order, or the school must be closed, and the place, for a time…abandoned.329

However, in arriving at this conclusion, Gibbes was also conscious of Danaher’s age and length

of service and felt that the termination of his appointment should be compensated. There was

little consideration of compensating the Motukaraka Maori community for their prolonged

suffering under the incompetence of both Master and Assistant.

In response to Gibbes’ letter, Bird reiterated the dismal findings of his inspection report and

replied:

Motukaraka Native School is probably the worst from every point of view in the service… Mr. Danaher is simply marking time pending his retirement under superannuation. Meanwhile the education of the Maori children at Motukaraka School is being either neglected or carried on in a very lifeless fashion. The Department has certainly given Mr. Danaher every consideration, for his incompetence has been evident for some time past, as can be seen from the reports. I consider that the Department is not justified in allowing the present state of things to continue. At the same time to terminate his engagement after 28 years’ service when the benefits of the Superannuation Act are almost within his reach, seems harsh treatment. Action should have been taken earlier, e.g., in 1903, and I cannot see my way to recommend his dismissal now.330

In essence, despite the acknowledgement that the Maori children and indeed the wider Maori

community involved with Motukaraka Native School had suffered under Danaher’s instruction,

Bird agreed with Gibbes and looked sympathetically upon a man who was “marking time until

he retired”. This was perhaps to mitigate for their own inability to dismiss him some time

earlier, when the academic results were already indicating the children’s ability to achieve any

reasonable standard of education. After agreement by the Minister of Education a compensation

package was negotiated with Danaher. It would appear that the Maori community was not

aware of the reason behind Danaher’s early retirement, nor did they seem unduly concerned at

his departure. One might speculate that the community were aware of his activities with some of

329 Gibbes, Secretary for Education, to Bird, 11 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b. 330 Bird to Gibbes, Secretary for Education, 13 May 1908, BAAA 1001/365b.

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their young girls, and were quite glad to see him leave the school. One month later, Danaher had

disappeared.

Upon Danaher’s retirement, the school was closed, as there was no one who was able to replace

him. Aside from the initial request from the Maori community about ensuring the replacement

teacher would also be Catholic, little was done to advance the reopening of the school. This was

largely due to the preoccupation of the community at this time in Danaher’s disappearance.

Many people spent days searching the district for him, and focus was taken away from the

school and from the education of their children.

At the end of 1908, Hohaia Hare sent a letter to Gibbes asking when the school might be

reopened and perhaps anticipating a not too positive response he also queried whether the

schoolhouse might be available to rent. The response was noncommittal to the reopening of the

school, and Hohaia Hare was informed that the “Department is not prepared to accept any offer

for the use of the buildings in the meantime”. In January, T. Nui Hare sent a letter to the

Secretary for Education requesting a date for the reopening of the school. Bird noted that the

Rawene Postmaster, Mr. Millar, had been asked to provide details of the Motukaraka children to

assist Inspector Porteous to “finally decide upon the action to be taken” when he visited

Motukaraka.

Millar was unable to complete his task of providing details of the Motukaraka children on

account that the “natives…left for Kaikohe to attend to Hone Heke’s tangi”. However, Millar

noted that there was a Board of Education School within a mile of Motukaraka Native School,

at which attendance at this school was low. Millar recommended that it might be “worthwhile

considering the advisability of making two half time schools”.

Millar’s suggestion was not well received by the Motukaraka community. A letter signed by Nui

Hare, the committee and the iwi to Millar noted their receipt of his request to supply a list of

names for their children to attend the “Pakeha school at Wairupe” (Wairupe being the European

school at Motukaraka). The letter also outlined the reasons why Wairupe was considered an

inappropriate alternative by the community:

1. Already have a school (Motukaraka).

2. Wairupe is too far.

3. Afraid of the bridge at Wairupe lest the children meet with misfortune and die.

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Noting that the community had been without a teacher for a long time, the letter suggested an

alternative arrangement. The community requested that the teacher of the European school, Mr.

Rudall (or Rutoro, as he was referred to by Maori), be sent to Motukaraka three days a week,

and stay at the European school three days a week. The suggestion to operate Motukaraka as a

half-time school was deemed worthy of consideration by government officials, but only in

regards to transferring Motukaraka Native School to the Board School, which would serve as a

half-time school. There was no consideration to the reopening of Motukaraka due to reasons of

cost, and the fact that the Board School needed more enrolments to justify its own usefulness.

In March 1909 Porteous found that the buildings were in such a dilapidated state that an

extensive overhaul would be required. Despite these anxieties, Porteous recommended that the

Motukaraka children could and should commute (“be ferried”) to the nearest Board School,

which was located across the harbour in Rawene:

The children of Motukaraka have in my opinion ample opportunities to attend school, and I therefore recommend that no steps be taken to reopen the Government school there. 331

Gibbes sought Millar’s opinion in selling the teacher’s residence at Motukaraka and the

feasibility of removing the other school buildings to another school site. Thus the future of

Motukaraka Native School was decided. It was three months after Nui Hare’s petition, and the

community had not yet received a reply from government officials as to the state of their school.

Prior to Gibbes’ decision, Nui Hare put forward another petition, this time to the Minister for

Maori schools. The petition again sought a teacher (a Catholic) for the school at Motukaraka,

and reiterated the community’s stance not to send their children to the “Pakeha school”. The

reason given was that the bridge crossing was too dangerous for the children. Accompanying

the petition were names of children who would attend the school at Motukaraka if it reopened.

The list of petitioners was signed by Rawiri Rewi, Chairman of Motukaraka Native School

committee.

While the official response to this latest petition was “under consideration”, government officials continued to pursue the dismantling of the school. Notes on the Motukaraka Native School file indicate that some of the children listed in the petition were considered too old, not interested in attending school, erratic and not resident at Motukaraka. Millar reported to Gibbes in July 1909, refuting many of the claims put forward by the Maori community in their petition. Millar identified 14 of the 22 school age children listed on the petition as being “bona fide”. He also noted that “the bridge referred to is a most substantial one only lately constructed by the Roads Department and is wide enough for coach traffic – the fear of the bridge is ridiculous.”

331 Porteous to Gibbes, Secretary for Education, 14 April 1909, BAAA 1001/365b.

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In essence, Millar reinforced government perceptions that reopening Motukaraka would be a

waste of time and resources. This last comment about the lack of attendance and the seemingly

ridiculous nature of the Maori community’s demands do not take into account the Department’s

own ineptness in reducing the school to this state. Bird himself acknowledged that Danaher

should have been removed in 1903. Instead he was able to carry on his abysmal job of educating

Motukaraka’s children. The Department added to this farce by compensating Danaher in his

retirement, acknowledging his length of service, as opposed to the quality of the service he

provided. Furthermore, the Department did not appear competent enough to inform the

community of the decisions being made in Wellington. This was highlighted when Mr J.H.

Rudall, the teacher of the Public School at Motukaraka who had been listed in the Maori

petition as being the half-time school teacher, himself wrote to Gibbes requesting “whether the

Education Department has advised the Motukaraka Natives the Department’s intention of not

reopening the Native School.” Gibbes’ response was to reiterate the intention not to reopen

Motukaraka Native School.

Motukaraka was not the only Hokianga Native School that experienced difficulties with

government officials. The case of Danaher at Motukaraka was unusual for a number of reasons.

Firstly, there is no information on the file to indicate the Motukaraka community’s displeasure

with Danaher’s teaching approaches. This is in contrast to a case at Waima, where the Maori

community, under Hone Mohi Tawhai, petitioned government officials for the removal of their

teacher, Mr. Hill, because they felt “too much time was being devoted to keeping the Waima

school facilities clean” and that the “children’s educational achievement was being hindered”

(Duffy, 2002, p.86). However, the Motukaraka community had known only one other teacher

prior to Danaher, and his service at Motukaraka was over such a long period that it was probable

that the community had come to expect nothing more than what Danaher had to offer.

It would appear that the community at Motukaraka were aware of what was happening, despite

not being informed directly. In September 1909 Nui Hare wrote to Millar reaffirming the

community stance not to send their children to Wairupe, and again requesting the appointment

of a half-time teacher for Motukaraka. In his letter, Hare indicated that he had heard of the

impending sale and removal of Motukaraka’s school buildings. His translated reponse was

direct:

I say unto you that I will not allow that to be done. If the Maori school here is to be permanently closed by Government, the land will revert to me, and all the buildings thereon, including schoolhouse and Master’s residence. I will not allow those to be sold by

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Government, to any other person whatever. I have sent in a demand to the Goverment to that effect.332

Hare saw the opportunity to fight for the return of the land he gifted to the Crown for the

purpose of opening a school at Motukaraka. This was to form the next phase of his battle with

government officials in relation to Motukaraka Native School.

Hare also sent a letter and a petition to the Minister of Native Affaris James Carroll. The

petition, signed by Nui Hare, Rera Hare and 33 others, outlined the lack of progress made in

regards to reopening Motukaraka Native School and reiterated their desires and reasons for not

sending their children to the Pakeha school. Carroll referred this letter to the Minister for

Education. The Minister of Native Affairs received another letter from Nui Hare, dated the same

day. This letter was more strongly worded, perhaps an indication of the level of frustration felt

by Nui Hare that they had little effect on deciding the future of Motukaraka Native School:

This is to formally notify you that if the Maori school of Motukaraka is permanently closed, that you and the Government are to return the school site to me and all of the buildings standing upon it. Because I gave that land in the first instance as a site for a Maori school absolutely. And if the Government permanently closes the school then it is right that the land and buildings thereon be returned to me. I will not approve of the Government selling the buildings to somebody else. Those houses belong to me if the school is to be permanently closed. If a Master is sent along the thing remains as originally intended, but if the school is to be permanently closed then the land and the buildings must be given up to me.333

This letter, which was also referred to the Minister of Education, clearly states Nui Hare’s

determination in seeking resolution to the issue of the school. The title clearly states that Frank

Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi Te Uruti made an unconditional gift of land to the Crown for a

Native School reserve. However, according to the Crown, the issue was clear, they held title to

the land and simply disregarded Nui Hare’s claim.

However, the notion of ownership, particularly in relation to ‘gifted’ land was less clear-cut. In

order to establish a Native School within their areas, Maori were required to ‘gift’ suitable land

on which the school could be built. The Maori perspective, as stated in Hare’s claim, was that if

the purpose for use of the gifted land had changed, so too had the circumstances of the original

gifting, thereby the land would return to Maori ownership. In Motukaraka’s case, while the land

was transferred to the Crown, the title clearly states the purpose for which the Maori owners

gifted the land:

332 Nui Hare to Millar, 20 September 1909, department translation, BAAA 1001/365b. 333 Nui Hare to Minister of Native Affairs, Hon. James Carroll, 20 September 1909, department translation, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Particulars of title of Motukaraka Native School known as Matataiki and containing 2 acres 1 rood. 1. Native Title: Memorial of ownership, Northern district (Vol. 2 – 157), 3 May, 1880, in which Frank Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi Te Uruti are stated to be the owners of the said piece of land. (Note: Memorial bears endorsement by Chief Judge of the Native Land Court 20 June 1881, which refers to the conveyance of the land to the Crown, and is to the effect that the transfer is a bona fide transaction and is complete. This is followed by an Order of the Court bearing the same date (20/6/1881) and declaring that the land shall be held in freehold by the Crown according to the limitations set forth in the deed of conveyance. 2. Title of Crown: Conveyance to Crown 24 December 1880 (Deed 1241 Auckland) and bearing signatures of Frank Harris, Ngahuia Hare, and Himi te Uruti, makes an unconditional gift of the land to the Crown as a Native School reserve. (emphasis added).334

The Waitangi Tribunal in the Muriwhenua Land Report documents Maori understanding in

relation to the gifting of land. In particular, the report states:

For everything given or taken a return of some kind was required…Thus those who give gain mana above the recipient. Those who receive must restore the balance, by responding generously over time.335

From within this construct, Nui Hare was justified in expecting the return of the original gift of

land. Unfortunately, Hare did not get the support he had hoped for from the Minister of Native

Affiar. Carroll was timid in his approaches to the Department of Education, and did little, if

anything to advance Nui Hare’s case to reopen Motukaraka Native School, or for the return of

the land gifted for the school:

There is a fairly large Native Village at Motukaraka and unless the number of children has gone off considerably, it should justify the retention of the School. Knowing however the interest the Department has always taken in promoting Maori education, I am sure that any step they have taken is for good reason. I respectfully ask that you supply me with these reasons in order that I may present the facts to Nui Hare and his people. If there is anything that the Maoris may be able to assist in rectifying it.336

Apart from a parliamentary question by Carroll to the Minister of Education in 1912 querying

the reopening of Motukaraka Native School, there is nothing in the file on this matter until

1922. This could have been for a number of reasons. Motukaraka Native School was already

closed and officials had shown no intention of reopening the school. Instead they had actively

worked to find alternative education options. There was no communication with the community

on what was happening, despite numerous attempts by Maori and even non-Maori to seek

answers from government officials as to the status of the school. Attempts by the Maori

334 Motukaraka Native School file, 14 October 1909, BAAA 1001/365b. 335 Muriwhenua Land Report, p 26.

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community to seek support from Ministers also drew little effective response. The sheer effort

of maintaining the level of interest within the community and the ability to correspond with

bureaucrats was a skill that few Motukaraka Maori possessed at that time. The death of Nui

Hare, who had largely spearheaded the efforts to date, had perhaps the most significant impact

on progressing the issue.

Ten years after Carroll’s parliamentary question, the issue of Motukaraka Native School was

reignited. During that time, the school buildings had been sold and removed and in 1916, the

land had been leased to Thomas Hancy, a local Maori. In 1922, Tipene Hare, Nui Hare’s son,

petitioned his local Maori Member of Parliament, Tau Henare about the possibility of reopening

Motukaraka Native School and freeing up the land that was given for the school site (the land

that was being leased by Hancy). Hare sought Henare’s assistance in the resolution of these

matters. Hare’s petition was forwarded to the Minister of Education, with Henare’s

accompanying comment:

This request is an old and genuine one. I should be glad to hear whether anything can be done to meet this request.337

The belligerence of the government officials experienced by Nui Hare had softened to a more

helpful approach in 1922. While there was a firm stand on government policy that required the

Motukaraka children to attend school at Wairupe, the view in relation to returning the land to

Motukaraka Maori was more supportive. Notes in the file indicate that some work was

undertaken to ascertain the status of the land, and it was surmised that the claim was due to the

lessee, Hancy, being in arrears on the land. Porteous, who was still working for the Department

of Education, recommended to the Minister that the land be returned. The Minister agreed, and

after the appropriate legislation was drawn up, a letter from Caughley, the Director of

Education, to Tipene Hare was sent advising him of the return of the land to its original owners.

The process was completed through the Native Land Court in 1924.

This case study on Motukaraka Native School highlights a number of deficiencies within the

administration of the Native School system. Requests by the community in regards to keeping

the school open, maintaining the unique character of the school (underpinned by their Catholic

beliefs) and maintaining the right to continue sending their children to Motukaraka Native

School were met with indifference by officials. The continued provision of substandard teaching

at Motukaraka is further evidence of such deficiencies within the government department. The

government’s decision to compensate Danaher so as not to prejudice his length of service,

336 Carroll to Minister of Education, 19 November 1909, BAAA 1001/365b.

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alongside the suspicious circumstances of his disappearance was problematic. The persistence

of Nui Hare in fighting for the return of the land was eventually rewarded, albeit after his death.

The Motukaraka community suffered under the provision of a substandard education over a

period of years. The Motukaraka file, unsurprisingly, makes no mention of government

officials’ inability to discharge their duties satisfactorily in the Motukaraka case. Nor is there

any mention of how the provision of substandard education might have affected both the

attendance figures and the general attitude of nonchalance described by Bird in his 1906

inspection report. The abysmal educational achievement of these children in the period 1903 to

1908 would have severely inhibited their ability to progress when they were forced by

government officials to attend the Board (or Public) School. Furthermore, the actions of

Danaher outside of the classroom, in what appeared to be widely known dalliances with local

Maori girls, might have contributed further to a sense of hopelessness felt by Motukaraka Maori

in being able to change their circumstances. Constant rebuffs to the few concerns expressed to

government officials would probably have reinforced this view. Given that just over ten years

had passed between the last petition by Nui Hare and the renewed one by his son, Tipene, the

question also arises as to whether there had been a change in government officials’ approach to

Native Schools and in particular, to addressing the concerns of their Maori communities. This,

and the climate that existed as a result of the closure of the school, might explain the initial

response by government officials to Nui Hare’s request. It would appear more likely that the

process of time assisted Tipene Hare in his successful petition to have the Motukaraka Native

School site returned, facilitated by the support of Tau Henare, the Maori Member of Parliament

for Te Tai Tokerau.

9.2.7 Te Karae Native School

This case study examines the experiences of the Maori community in trying to establish a

Native School at Te Karae in the Hokianga. The case study indicates an experience fraught with

administrative difficulties and delays. Simon notes that Te Karae was open between the years

1910 to 1915. However, Duffy’s thesis on Hokianga Native Schools lists no reference to Te

Karae. There is a file on Te Karae Native School at the National Archives, but there was no

evidence in the file to confirm that the school actually opened. It is probable that because a file

on Te Karae existed during the period identified by Simon, it might have been assumed that the

school actually opened. Thus the examination here is more of a snapshot into the efforts

expended by the Te Karae community in trying to establish a Native School in their area.

337 C.J. Parr to Henare, 1 August 1922, BAAA 1001/365b.

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Maori involvement was a mandatory requirement for the establishment of a Native School. This

requirement was built into the 1867 Native Schools Act and subsequent legislation. Whilst

Maori involvement was built into the legislation, in that Maori were expected to provide land

for the school site, contribute to the cost of the school buildings and guarantee pupil attendance;

it was the government that dictated the terms as to how this involvement was to occur. Despite

these constraints, the Te Karae community, which included Maori and Pakeha families, tried to

fulfil the requirements in the hope that they too could have a Native School for their children:

I beg to draw your attention to the fact that there are 17 children of school age residing in the Te Karae Block, who are at present receiving no education at all…There are 15 native and half caste children and two white children, my own. There are also a number of young children coming on to the school age. The Block has only been opened to settlement a short while and is now mostly taken up. I think if there was a school here a number of white men with families would settle here, who at present do not care to come on account of there being no educational advantages for their children. I would be very glad of your advice and assistance in this matter. It is a great pity that so many children should be growing up in ignorance.338

This letter, by Pakeha settler Seay, in 1910 is interesting in the fact that he was endorsing the

establishment of a Native School, as opposed to a Public School (which had been in operation

since the Education Act 1877). Maori communities had to provide land and contribute to the

building costs for Native Schools, but Pakeha children were able to attend these schools. The

role played by Pakeha within Native Schools, however, were not always supportive of ensuring

that their primary function was the education of Maori children. The 1880 Native Schools Code

permitted the attendance of Pakeha children, but only if it did not interfere with this primary

function. However, Bird revised the Code and the Regulations that were adopted in 1909

allowed European representation on Native School Committees if there were European pupils.

The effect of this change on some Native Schools was devastating as an increase in Pakeha

children at a school signalled also a potential increase in Pakeha control. Because Native

Schools were represented as inferior institutions, this often meant a move by Pakeha parents to

have the schools designated as Public Schools.

While it is difficult to assert that Seay’s intentions would have progressed to the extent of

eventually turning the Native School into a Public School, it would be fair to assume that this

may have been a possibility, given Seay’s comments about how a school would attract more

Pakeha settlers. Indeed, the Secretary for Education, Edward Gibbes’ response to Seay, sought

clarification as to whether he was requesting the establishment of a Native School or a Public

338 Mr S. Seay to Hon G. Fowlds, 13 December 1910, BAAA 1001/595c.

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School. Subsequent correspondence from Seay confirmed his efforts, alongside the Maori

community at Te Karae, to establish a Native School.

In December 1912, frustrated at the delays, Seay sent a letter to the Minister of Education, the

Honourable William Massey:

Dear Sir I am writing to bring before your attention the hard lot of the children at Te Karae. Two years ago we applied for a school…After waiting about a year the inspector at last came up and selected the site and told us that once it was surveyed we would not have long to wait. It has been surveyed eight months now but we seem to be no nearer getting the school…We have written to the Secretary for Education repeatedly and the reply we always get is a promise that the buildings will be started shortly. We settlers in the back blocks have many hardships to ensure but the worst of all is seeing our children grow up in ignorance of even their letters. I understand that in places a teacher has been promised for even 4 children. What is the reason that we, with our large numbers are put off year after year?339

In 1913, Inspector Porteous sent his report to the Secretary for Education, followed a year later

by Inspector Bird’s report. On reading the two reports, it would appear that much of the delay

was because of the difference of opinion in relation to where the school should be situated.

Porteous noted that the settlers at Te Karae took the opportunity of making a deputation during

the Minister of Native Affairs visit to Kohukohu, where they “complained that the proposed

new school at Karae was not in a central position as far as the Karae block was concerned”.

Porteous reported that Bird’s earlier inspection had identified a site at Onepoto, near the

entrance of the Karae creek. The rationale for this site was that it was more centrally located and

could tap into a much wider district. During this time, a Public School had been established at

Orowau (Tutekehua) by many of the original group of settlers who had petitioned for a school at

Te Karae. This greatly reduced the case for the Onepoto site. As a result of this development,

Porteous disputed Seay’s claims as to the number of settlers in the district, instead stating that

their interests were “as yet comparatively small.”

Bird makes a number of interesting comments on the report filed by Porteous. In particular, Bird

noted that he was informed that the settlers who made the complaint to the Minister of Native

Affairs had no children, were not residing on the Te Karae block and that they had other –

financial – interests in the block instead. The fact that the settlers made no offer of a site, as

noted by Porteous, indicates that Seay, while wanting his children educated, did not want to

have to make any contribution for this to happen. The long delays frustrated Seay so much that

Bird reported in 1914 that he had taken to teaching his children at home.

339 Seay to Massey, Minister of Education, 30 December 1912, BAAA 1001/595c.

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Despite these ongoing delays, Maori from the Te Karae community continued to pursue the

establishment of a Native School. The Tokerau Maori Land Board had already transferred land

to the Crown for the purpose of a Native School, and yet another list was procured (following

Bird’s request) to confirm (again) the numbers that might attend Te Karae:

This is an application from us asking that favourable consideration be given to our request that a school be established for our children…There are many children available as has already been stated in the lists supplied last year. There are also a good many new ones to take the place of those who are now grown up and are too old for school. Hence we feel justified in renewing our application to your Department.340

The response to Toki Pangari was not encouraging. Bird’s notes on Pangari’s letter indicated

that Gibbes also needed to seek clarification on the status of the Board School, Tutekehua. Bird

was of the opinion that given the influx to Tutekehua by Te Karae Maori children, the need for a

Native School was perhaps negated. Furthermore, he informed Gibbes that the site originally

handed over by the Tokerau Maori Land Board had since been given back to them, as it was

considered unsuitable. Gibbes’ response to Pangari closely mirrored Bird’s suggestions.

Effectively, Gibbes’ informed Pangari that, following confirmation from the Education Board as

to the status of the Board School at Tutekehua, it was the Department’s view that one school

would serve the area better, and that this school would be Tutekehua. This decision effectively

ended any future discussion on Te Karae.

A number of issues emerge in relation to the Te Karae Native School case. Similar to the

Motukaraka case study, these issues point to the role of the government officials, and

particularly the lengthy delays subjected to the Te Karae community. Correspondence written

by Seay was always replied to by government officials, whereas the file indicates only one letter

from the Department to the Maori community, and this letter was to inform them that Tutekehua

would probably usurp the need for Te Karae. One possible explanation for this might be that

both Inspectors Porteous and Bird had contact with Mete Smith (the main initiator for the

Native School and contact person within the Maori community at Te Karae). The reports filed

by both Bird and Porteous note their communication with Mete Smith. There is little in the file

to indicate they had a similar level of contact with Seay. Another explanation might be that Seay

felt more would be achieved if he wrote directly to the Minister of Education. This was

probably because both Bird and Porteous appeared to view Seay as a man looking after his own

interests.

340 Toki Pangari to Inspector of Native Schools, 24 March 1914, department translation, BAAA 1001/595c.

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Of more interest however, is the difference of opinion between Porteous and Bird as to the best

location for the proposed school. It appears from the file that this was the main cause of delay,

which eventually resulted in the school not being built at all. While there is acknowledgement of

the role the settlers played in identifying a suitable site, as Porteous noted, they were unwilling

to offer sections of their own, instead relying on Maori to supply the land. After Mete Smith’s

advice against the original site (which was below a grave yard), it appears that neither Porteous

nor Bird could agree on any alternative. Each was firmly of the opnion that their site was best –

Porteous at Pateoro and Bird at Onepoto. In the end, it would appear that due to this inability to

make a decisive statement on this issue, Maori at Te Karae missed the opportunity to send their

children to a Native School and were forced (through bureaucratic processes) to send their

children to the Board School at Tutekehua.

Another point that emerges from this snapshot is the relative ease with which the Board School

at Tutekehua was established in relation to the difficulties experienced by the Te Karae

community. This points to the control asserted over the Native Schools system by government

officials, and the fact that Maori had no control over the process particularly in relation to the

length of time it took to make what appeared to be relatively simple decisions. The question to

be asked in the Te Karae case is the extent to which decisions, or lack of decisive action by

government officials impacted on the ability of Maori communities to advance their education.

The question of deciding a site took over four years, with no satisfactory resolution to the Te

Karae community.).

While it could be asserted that the Maori children from the Te Karae district did (finally) access

education through the Board School at Tutekehua, Te Karae Maori did not become masters of

their institution, but were instead placed even further under the control of the system through

their subordination into the Board School system.

9.3 Maori Health in Hokianga

This section examines the issues associated with Maori health in the Hokianga region. Particular

focus is placed on the period immediately prior to and post World War Two, where the impacts

of post-war stress, the decline of rural communities and corresponding trend towards

urbanisation caused by a combination of rural isolation, limited opportunities and government

policy were keenly felt by Hokianga Maori.

9.3.1 Maori Health

According to Salesa “from the outset of settlement in New Zealand, the health of Maori was a

genuine and central concern” and health services had already been established for Maori by the

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late 1840s.341 However, the provision of health services for Maori during the 1840s was not “in

any way systematic”.342 This lack of co-ordination could be attributed to the fatal impact theory,

which was prevalent throughout the mid to latter parts of the nineteenth century. Many involved

in Maori health or interested in the general wellbeing of the Maori people, whilst ascribing to

the fatal impact theory, believed that this did not mean that “Maori welfare should be

neglected”. 343 However, these thoughts were more to allay their concerns about acting in a

capacity that would ensure that “history will have nothing to reproach us with”, than perhaps a

genuine interest in the outcomes of Maori health issues at that time. Belich notes that the

perception of Maori as a dying race persisted to 1930 and that one reason for the marked decline

in the Maori population, particularly in census counts, was due to Maori resistance or

“disengagement”. Disengagement, which meant “avoiding interaction with Pakeha state and

society, while continuing to interact economically and technologically” resulted in no Maori

census collections between 1857 and 1874, primarily due to an inability to track Maori

populations. As Belich states, “a feature of persistent Maori independence was that you did not

let the government count you”.344

Not all agreed with the theories of fatal impact and the notion of providing humanitarian care

for the terminal “malady of the Maori”. In 1872, the first legislative move for health was made,

with the passing of the Public Health Act. Based on the old system of provincial government,

the Act failed, because the central boards (established under the Act) were unable to raise funds

and the local boards had little power to positively effect change. The lack of basic sanitation and

water systems also hindered the core tasks of these boards. The impact of the Act on Maori was

small. Government policy prior to 1900 was primarily focused on Maori land, the sales of which

were justified as being for the greater good of New Zealand. As a result, the issue of Maori

health “remained neglected”.345

Despite the neglectful state of Maori health, McKegg asserted that Maori were “neither

apathetic nor inactive” in trying to find alternatives to their situation, to the extent that they were

“active and indeed desperate to improve their appalling health status”.346 Belich states that

Maori adopted a number of approaches to cope post-contact. One of these, engagement, sought

to accept “the Pakeha embrace” but also “to soften it or even subvert it towards Maori

341 T D Salesa, ‘The Power of the Physician’: Doctors and the ‘Dying Maori’ in Early Colonial New Zealand, Health and History, 2001, 3, pp 16 and 17. 342 Tiakiwai, p 60. 343 ibid. 344 Cited by Tiakiwai, pp 60-61. 345 Raeburn Lange, May the People Live: A History of Maori Health Development 1900–1920, Auckland, 1999, pp 66-67. 346A McKegg, “The Maori health nursing scheme. An experiment in autonomous health care”, New Zealand Journal of History, 26, (2), p 145.

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interests”, which may have explained Maori eagerness to become involved in the provision of

health services for their own people. It may also have been an assertion of their increasing

desire to be more independent of the state, fuelled by the knowledge that despite the increasing

need of health services for Maori, such views and approaches were still largely rhetoric in

nature.

The establishment of the Department of Public Health in 1900 was seen as a direct result of the

plague scare. Already under pressure for the government to take greater control over the health

system in New Zealand, the formalisation of this department created a number of tensions for

Maori. One tension of having greater government control over the health system, and

particularly for Maori, was that it drew focus away from efforts by Maori to have some

autonomy in the provision of health services. McKegg notes the desire by Maori to develop

such systems through the Maori Councils, through the establishment of Native Sanitary

Inspectors and a proposed independent hospital system.347 The establishment of the Maori

Women’s’ Welfare League in 1951 also sought to develop more effective systems for the

provision of health services to Maori. Such developments, however, failed to achieve the

“anticipated results due to the lack of official Pakeha support”.348

The lack of support by Pakeha officials created another tension for Maori health. The anomaly

of allowing Maori full participation – both in the planning and implementation of health

services – only occurred under schemes and policies that were Pakeha-controlled and

determined according to Pakeha agendas. Tension also existed in that the general public, and

government officials themselves viewed Maori as being indisposed to the teachings and

practices that would ensure better health; and that Maori were lazy and unwilling to change their

unsanitary ways. Indeed, it was a common view that “the entire Maori way of life became a

cause of their decline”.349 This was exacerbated by the reluctance of Maori to fully embrace

western medicinal approaches. The continuing presence of tohunga frustrated government

health officials, including Maori officials such as Maui Pomare, who in 1902, suggested that

there was greater “need for ‘properly qualified men to advise indigent Maori patients, in order to

negate the threat posed by tohunga.”350 Even the impact of Maori nurses was viewed with

scepticism and, in cases, scorn by their Pakeha counterparts.

347 ibid. 348 ibid. 349 Salesa, p 22. 350 Derek Dow, Safeguarding the public health. A history of the New Zealand Department of Health, Wellington, 1995, p 185.

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Another tension was focused around which department had responsibility for Maori health

issues. Up until that time, Maori issues were the concern of the Native Affairs department,

which had disregarded a number of suggestions for reforming the provision of health services

for Maori.351 However, the practical implementation of daily health messages had, up until that

time, been most effectively conveyed through the Native School system. Furthermore, prior to

the formal establishment of the Department of Public Health, the issue of Maori sanitation had

already been addressed through the appointment of Native Health Commissioners in response to

the plague scare. The appointment of Maui Pomare in 1901 as Native Health Officer was seen

as a follow on from the work already started by the Native Health Commissioners, and in effect,

this appointment was viewed largely as a result of the work Maori themselves had initiated and

undertaken.

While Pomare’s role formalised Maori health within the public health system, there were still

pockets of the Maori community who aspired greater Maori control over how decisions

pertaining to Maori were made. The passing of the Maori Councils Act in the same year as the

Public Health Act was a watered down version of the Kotahitanga movement’s aspirations for

Maori self-government. The revised version was the work of the Te Aute Association, which

saw the committees as being an alternative to the declining authority of chiefs, and perhaps

more importantly, as being an accepted way of controlling Maori aspirations. In the end, the role

and functions of the sanitary committees that were proposed under the public health legislation

was shifted under the Maori Councils legislation. The most significant aspect of this shift came

through the Maori Lands Administration Act 1900, which required the incorporation of these

Councils to have a Pakeha majority, once again effectively negating Maori input and control. 352

The appointment of Maui Pomare as Native Health Officer, whilst seen as positive for Maori, in

effect placed him under tremendous pressure. Pomare was expected to, and did, travel the

breadth of the country visiting Maori communities in relation to Maori health issues. The

appointment of Peter (Te Rangihiroa) Buck, whilst a welcome addition, did little to support

Pomare in his job. Seddon’s admiration and support for the work Pomare and Buck were doing,

alongside their pleas for more support, resulted in a proposal to expand the number of medical

bursaries offered Maori in order to get more Maori health officers out in the community.

According to Lange, Seddon’s proposal in 1905, which was initiated by the Te Aute Association

some fifteen years earlier, was that “candidates would be selected from the various tribal areas,

trained in Dunedin, and bonded for government service among their own people”.353 The

351 Lange, p 68. 352 Vincent O’Malley, Agents of autonomy. Maori committees in the Nineteenth century, Wellington, 1998. 353 Lange, p 149.

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reasons for why the proposal did not succeed are not clear, but when viewed alongside the

establishment of the Maori nursing scheme in 1898, there is a view that racial prejudices sought

to limit any advances in Maori health.

The Maori nursing scheme, again an initiative of the Te Aute Association, was seen as a

positive opportunity for Maori girls to train and qualify as nurses who would then return to work

in their orn communities. These positions were seen as complemeting the work already being

done by the Native Sanitary Committees and the scheme was expanded in 1905 to include a full

training scholarship, whereby Maori nurses would be ‘bonded’ to the Health Department,

attached to a hospital, in order to copmplete their full state regisration examinations. This is

where the scheme fell apart. Despite the support from the Education and Health Departments,

many hospital boards were reluctant to take Maori nurses:

Hospitals that did participate did so willingly and professed themselves well satisfied, but other boards raised all sorts of objections when approached by the Education Department. It was argued that all hospitals had a waiting list of Pakeha girls, that training would be a waste of time because the girls would not want to leave the towns and return to kainga life, or that they were bonded to the Health Department and so would be lost to the hospital when trained. There was also the age stipulation, often as high as 23 – a regulation Pomare thought ‘silly’ and ‘obtuse’. He passionately denounced what he could only construe as racial prejudice and a disastrous limitation of an essential programme…The outcome of this situation was that very few Maori nurses were trained.354

Other initiatives during this period included the establishment of a Maori Hygiene division,

following the restructuring of the Department of Health under the Public Health Act 1920. The

Influenza Epidemic Commission (1918) recommended the creation of this new division in

recognition of the limitations suffered by Maori health. However, as with other initiatives for

Maori health previously, this one was also shortlived, with the division being ‘mainstreamed’

and discontinued in 1930 because “there was no longer any recognition of the need for Maori

leadership in the development and implementation of health policy as it concerned the Maori

population”.355 The declining mortality rate and increasing prosperity experienced by Maori

were cited as reasons for discontinuing any role for Pomare and Buck’s contemporaries.

However, Durie notes the significance of the role Buck and particularly Pomare made in

advancing Maori health during this period. This was largely due to the fact that Pomare

recognised the strength of and actively encouraged, leadership in promoting health strategies

amongst Maori:

Pomare placed great store on community leaders. His work with Maori councils and later with Maori sanitary inspectors recognised community leadership as a key factor in health promotion. He was convinced that local initiative and leadership was much more

354 ibid, pp 167-168. 355 ibid, p 258.

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important than the immediate recruitment of health professionals and he was filled with admiration for the effectiveness of these local leaders.356

His efforts were mirrored by other Maori leaders of his time, notably Rua Kenana, Wiremu

Tahupotiki Ratana and Te Puea Herangi. However, the lack of any real progress for Maori

health during this period has been attributed to health officials’ lack of “tolerance for any

system of health care which attempted to incorporate Maori views or Maori delivery systems”. 357Thus, despite gains in Maori health during this period, official statistics noted that “Maori

living standards continued to lag far behind those of the Pakeha”.358

9.3.2 Hokianga

According to Native School records Maori in the Hokianga were susceptible to the epidemics

common across New Zealand early in the twentieth century. Cases of influenza and measles

were reported in Native School files numerous times. Lange also reports the Hokianga suffering

outbreaks of influenza (1918) and typhoid (1915), noting that Maori nurses were stationed in the

Hokianga during these outbreaks. The work done by Pomare and Buck, particularly in relation

to the Native Sanitary Inspectors, was extended to the Hokianga in 1908, with the appointment

of Taurau Toi. Riapo Timoti Puhipi was also appointed to serve in the Te Rarawa area of

Pukepoto. There were shortlived appointments however, because the Native Sanitary Inspectors

appointments were terminated by the Health Department in January 1912.

Lange notes, however, the impact that these positions must have made, particularly in the areas

in which these men served. Taurau Toi and Riapo Timoti Puhipi were both regarded highly both

within their Maori communities, and also amongst Pakeha. Riapo was the son of Te Rarawa

chief, Timoti Puhipi; was educated at St Stephen’s School and was a synodsman in the Anglican

church. He was also chairman of Pukepoto Native School, and was held in high regard by the

master of the school. Similarly, Taurau Toi, from Opononi, was from a well known family, was

high ranking within the Anglican church and had an active association in the business affairs of

the southern Hokianga region (Lange, 1998). During Toi’s short time as a Native Sanitary

Inspector, he covered most areas of the Hokianga district, and according to Lange, the Hokianga

“was singled out by the census enumerator in 1911 for the quality of its Maori Council health

work”.359

The establishment of the Hokianga Co-operative Medical Service in 1941 and the role of the

Public Health nurses give perhaps the best insight into the status of Maori health and the

356 Mason Durie, Whaiora. Maori Health Development, Auckland, 1998, p 266. 357 ibid, p 45. 358 Lange, p 260. 359 ibid, p 215.

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provision of health services to Maori in the Hokianga between 1939 and 1953. The role of the

Maori Women’s’ Welfare League (particularly through Mira Petricevich) also features

prominently in the files on Hokianga health. In reviewing the files on Hokianga health during

this period, a number of themes emerge, such as:

1. The relationship between public health bodies (Public Health nurses and HCMS) and

Maori communities;

2. The advocacy role undertaken by Maori organizations such as MWWL;

3. The impact of post-war related health issues on Hokianga region; and

4. The effect on Maori (isolation, roading, funding, resources etc).

Durie notes that after the demise of the Division of Maori Hygiene in 1930, the responsibility

for Maori health was transferred to medical officers of health and public health nurses. The role

of public health nurses in the Hokianga was perhaps more significant than that of the medical

health officers. This was because the public health nurses were the main and often only point of

contact for health services for the isolated communities of the Hokianga. The medical health

officer in charge of the Hokianga region, in contrast, was based in Whangarei and thus had

limited access and first hand understanding of the issues facing Maori in this region.

Public health nurses were expected to perform their duties often with limited resources, in

(often) substandard living and clinic conditions, and were required to traverse a wide, isolated

region with poor roading prone to lack of access due to incremental weather, and at times,

expected to cover the duties supposed to be performed by doctors. The public health nurses

appeared to generate much sympathy from within the communities they served, some of whom

were prepared to petition on their behalf for better working conditions. For example, in 1939,

Frank Shepherd, a local schoolmaster, sent a letter to the local Member of Parliament, C.

Boswell, requesting a decent residence for the district nurse, and for the division of the

Hokianga district into more manageable pieces. Shepherd also noted that the district nurse’s

house, which also served as the dispensary, was inaccessible (it was located on a hill and in

times of wet weather, the driveway became unusable). Furthermore, the schoolmaster indicated

that the distance between where the nurse was (in Broadwood) in relation to the doctor (who

was based in Rawene), made her job more demanding in that she often performed the role of a

doctor, to cover the communities’ lack of easy access to one.360

The medical officer of health’s response agreed with the concerns outlined in the petition about

the inaccessibility of the nurse’s house and dispensary. However, he noted that the Hokianga

360 Frank Shepherd, Schoolmaster, to C. Boswell, MP. 10 June 1939, Hokianga Hygiene File, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5.

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County Council, who were responsible for the access road leading to the nurse’s house and

dispensary, were “unwilling to spend to provide a more suitable access road.”361 He

recommended that a new cottage be built on a flat section closer to the township. The Medical

Officer of Health also felt that dividing the North Hokianga region was unnecessary and could

not readily justify the need for two district nurses, citing that the local District Nurse felt quite

able to cover the current area.

Hokianga Maori were also concerned at the lack of adequate provision of health services.

Letters written by the Mitimiti Maori branch of the Women’s Institute in 1939, and others

written by the Motuti and Waihou Maori branches of the Women’s Institute in 1940, reiterated

Shepherd’s earlier concerns. These letters sought the appointment of another district nurse to

cover the Hokianga district, and to support the current nurse who was based in Broadwood, as

well as the replacement of the nurse’s house.362 Because of the war, the response given to these

Maori groups was that there was a shortage of nurses and that there was unlikely to be an easing

of this or the appointment of new nurses during the war period.363

The public health nurses themselves also complained to government officials about the

difficulties of meeting community expectations within the restrictions of their jobs. In 1941, the

district health nurse in Broadwood, S. Bradford, noted that changes in the Social Security Act

had increased her responsibilities.364 Bradford sought advice, in light of these changes, as to

whether she was to “do the pakehas as well as the Maoris”, citing also her dissatisfaction with

the doctor who was not very responsive to her requests and who was “indignant” when asked to

treat a sick Maori child. The response received advised that she was indeed to continue treating

both Maori and Pakeha. However, the attitude of public health nurses to Maori, who constituted

a large proportion of the health population in the Hokianga, was not always positive. In a

confidential report to the medical officer of health by Nurse Inspector, C. Mackey, in 1953, she

noted that some residents were prone to abuse the service offered by the public health nurses:

361 Report received from the Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei. 6 July 1939, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. 362 Emma Howard (President) and Sarah Tate (Secretary), Motuti Maori Branch, Women’s Institute to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, 27 February 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. D. Heperi (Sec) and M. Witana (Pres), Waihou Maori branch WI. to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, 27 February 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. Ltr from L. Martin (Sec) Mitimiti Maori Branch WI to Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, 30 December 1939, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. 363 Dr Gilberd, Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, to Emma Howard (President), Motuti Maori Branch, Women’s Institute, 17 April 1940, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5. 364 S.A. Bradford, District Health Nurse, Broadwood to Medical Officer of Health, 9 October 1941, BAAF 1202 8B 9/8/5.

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Many have no sense of their personal responsibility for the welfare of their families and rely on the service to provide care for even the most trifling conditions. They expect to be provided with all the materials necessary to deal with normal home treatments.365

Given the size of the Maori population in the area, it is likely that Mackey was referring to the

Maori community.

Figure 3: Patients visited by district health nurses in the Hokianga Patients visiting

Clinics Patients visited at home

Emergency Calls

Populations

District M E T M E T M E T Sch M E 1945 Census

Mangamuka Bridge

635 482 1115 748 735 1493 165 98 263 451 1129 823 1962

Broadwood 308 594 902 939 906 1845 78 56 134 278 619 583 1022 Kohukohu 741 728 1469 510 341 851 216 96 302 213 498 528 1026 Kohukohu West

633 76 719 497 59 556 122 50 172 307 989 118 1107

Rawene 679 171 850 940 299 1239 201 92 293 665 1551 765 2316 Opononi 725 177 902 588 188 776 97 49 136 401 824 693 1517 Key: M = Maori, E = European, T = Total, Sch = School Source: Confidential report from Mackey to Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, 1953. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1, National Archives, Auckland NB: This table includes figures for an average year taken over a three-year period.

While unaware of the confidential report written by Mackey, it appears that by 1953, Maori

began expressing their own concerns about the services offered by the public health nurses.

Mira Petricevich (later Dame Mira Szaszy), who was Dominion Secretary-Treasurer of the

Maori Women’s Welfare League wrote to the Director of Nursing in Wellington to concerns at

what was happening in the Hokianga.366 The Utakura branch of the Maori Women’s Welfare

League had reported the “most unsatisfactory” services of the local district nurse. According to

the letter, the district nurses lack of cooperation with members of the local Maori community

resulted in some patients being forced to travel some considerable distance to hospital, where

one died. Petricevich also conveyed the Dominion Executive’s concern (on behalf of the

Rarawa-ki-Hokianga District Council Maori Women’s Welfare League) towards the Northland

Hospital Board’s proposal to do away with the Hokianga Health Scheme (which is discussed in

further detail below). Particular concerns expressed included the huge area covered by the

scheme and the “exorbitant” transport costs the Maori community faced in trying to access

health services in their region. Specific examples were given to highlight the points being made,

365 Confidential report from C. Mackey, Nurse Inspector, to Medical Officer of Health, 10 August 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 366 Mira Petricevich (Dominion Sec-Treasurer, MWWL) to Director of Nursing, 24 November 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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including one example where it was noted that the local Cream Lorry was often the only form of

transport for the sick from Mitimiti, Lower Waihou and Panguru to get to the hospital. This

mode of transport was “considered unsuitable for the sick.” It was also identified that

Pawarenga residents were required to send their sick to Hokianga, but the bus service only went

to Kaitaia, which meant that “special transport must be found to take patients to Hokianga

Hospital.”

The reply on behalf of the Director-General Health provided no concrete solutions to the issues

raised by Petricevich. While regret was expressed about changes in staffing and a promise to

“investigate the position” was given.367 Acknowledgement was also given to the criticism of

health services in the northern part of the health district, and particularly to the Northland Health

Board’s proposal to do away with the Hokianga Health Services scheme. It was noted that

consideration of improvements of services was being undertaken and it was suggested that a

meeting be sought between the Maori Women’s Welfare League Rarawa-ki-Hokianga District

Council and the medical officer of health to further discuss the issues raised in the letter.

The role of the Maori Women’s Welfare League (which was established in 1951) in raising the

consciousness of Maori health issues in the Hokianga should not be underestimated. Indeed,

Durie highlights the impact that this organisation played in advancing the causes for Maori

development, noting that in its early years, it was a particularly strong advocate for the

establishment of “accessible and culturally relevant health clinics”.368 The League’s strength and

commitment, particularly in bridging Maori communities and government agencies, meant that

they were taken seriously by government, as evidenced by the response, however noncommittal

its tone, to their concerns about what was happening in the Hokianga district. Despite this, Durie

rues the lost opportunity to Maori in that the League were never seen in any capacity beyond

their advocacy role and perhaps their ability to provide health care services based on a

combination of both Pakeha and Maori services (as the League themselves envisaged) was

never realised.

The relationship between public health nurses and Maori in the Hokianga could perhaps be

described as ambivalent. There was support from the Maori community for the services of the

public health nurses but there were also clear expectations – which were particularly expressed

by the Maori Women’s Welfare League – that such services would also recognise Maori

cultural knowledge and understandings in relation to health. Indeed, McKegg’s study on the

Maori health nursing scheme concluded:

367 Reply from D.Cook (for DGH) 16 December 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 368 Durie, p 49.

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While the district nurse supposedly had the weight of the Public Health Department behind her, this meant little in the remote rural districts of New Zealand. To gain the co-operation of the community the nurse had to achieve a balance between her hospital-based training and the health techniques of the culture within which she worked. Maori had not lost all autonomy.369

Despite this, district health nurses were not always responsive in their attitudes to Maori. The

establishment of the Plunket Society in 1907 and the subsequent exclusion of provision of

Plunket services to Maori was due more to a “territorial dispute” with the Department of Public

Health than with any overtly racist Plunket agenda. However, when a motion that the work of

the Plunket Society be extended to include Maori was put to the Society’s conference in 1945, it

was dismissed as being “wasteful for both public health and Plunket nurses” but subsequently

revised to include those Maori within city and town boundaries. Queries expressed by district

health nurses about whether they were to ‘deal’ to both Maori and Pakeha were representative

of concerns that Bryder states were centred on the belief that “the nurse would be ‘snowed

under’ by Maori, since Europeans were in the minority”.370 The figures released by the Nursing

Inspector highlight such concerns. District nurses were in the position of being refused entry to

European homes as a result of unfounded fears that nurses who had contact with Maori families

would spread disease and infection. These views persisted into the 1950s forcing in some areas,

the segregation of service provision to Maori and Pakeha communities. This resulted in district

nurses tending to Maori babies and Plunket nurses tending to European babies.

This type of segregation, and the inadequate numbers of district nurses servicing Maori

communities “allowed many who could have benefited from their services to fall through the

cracks”.371 The attitude of government officials was also not always supportive in addressing

Maori health concerns. Bryder notes that officials viewed the connections between improved

housing and sanitary conditions disparagingly, in that “a new house will be of no use without a

new mentality to go with it”.372 Similarly, the Medical Officer of Health for Whangarei, who

was responsible for the Hokianga health district, argued that:

More important than the ‘material defects of food, clothing and houses’ was the personal defect ‘of non-awareness of the insanitary and unhygienic conditions so well apparent to the average pakeha’.373

369 McKegg, p 160. 370 Linda Bryder, “Lessons” of the 1918 influenza epidemic in Auckland, New Zealand Journal of History, 16 (2), p 72. 371 ibid, p 81. 372 ibid, p 83. 373 ibid.

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Bryder concludes that the reasons for the difficulties Maori faced accessing health services were

complex and ranged from “territorial disputes to local racial prejudices and culturally insensitive

services or nurses”.374 The experiences of the Hokianga Maori community during this period

would appear to mirror those of other Maori throughout New Zealand, which resulted in Maori

being “left disadvantaged”.375

Changes to the Social Security Act prompted requests to the Medical Officer of Health for an

exception in the Maternity Benefits Scheme, seeking to make the Hokianga region a designated

Special Area. Reasons given for this exception were the considerable distance to travel to areas,

and availability of or access to medical facilities in these areas, given that Rawene, under the

stewardship of Dr Smith, was the Hokianga base for the provision of medical services. It was

noted that isolation proved problematic, and it was felt that “there are isolated communities

(mainly Maori) which may require to be classed as Special Areas”.376 The response from the

Acting Director-General Health was that “the time was not opportune for consideration of the

general question of special areas”.377

A visit by the Inspector of Hospitals, Dr Shore, in July 1939, gave rise to another effort to

advocate for greater access to and provision of health services for the Hokianga region.

Following his visit, a letter was sent back to the Director-General Health highlighting the points

raised during his visit. The points included:

1. That the district be established as a special area under the Social Security Act.

2. That the Board appoint Dr Smith as full time salaried officer.

3. That another medical man be appointed at Kohukohu as his assistant.

4. That extra District Nurses be appointed and the Hospital be made the Administration

Health Centre for the District.

5. That the Board collaborate with the other Northern Boards and establish a Central

Clinic under a Surgical specialist at Kaikohe.

6. The costs of the Clinic to be met from the Social Security Fund.378

The intention was that the North Auckland region, based at Rawene, would provide a full range

of medical services, including domiciliary, hospital, nursing and specialist. A letter by the

374 ibid, p 85. 375 ibid, p 86. 376 Letter from Medical Officer of Health, Whangarei, to Director-General Health, 5 May, 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 377 Letter from Acting Director-General Health, Wellington, to Medical Officer of Health, 14 June 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 378 Letter from Secretary to Director-General Health, 24 July 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Secretary of the Kaikohe Chamber of Commerce, along similar lines, was also sent to the

Minister of Health, Peter Fraser.379 The issue of having a dedicated service for the Hokianga

region was not a new concept. Rather, it was seen as an opportunity by a wide range of people

from throughout the Hokianga community to provide what were seen as basic needs. In 1941,

the Director-General Health advised the Hokianga Health Board of its decision, setting out the

terms under which the Board could operate its new services. The main points arising from this

decision were:

1. The provision of medical services, free medicines and continuation of free district

nursing service for all persons usually resident in the Hokianga Hospital District (which was to

be reviewed after a twelve month period);

2. Free access for all persons usually resident in the Hokianga Hospital District to a

comprehensive range of health services at the hospital;

3. The provision of domiciliary and medical care to those who would find it impossible or

inexpedient to get to hospital;

4. The appointment of a full time medical practitioner at Rawene; and

5. The appointments of additional staff, including three full-time district health nurses,

which would increase the number of district health nurses in the region to six.380

From this, the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service was established which provided for an

expansion of services offered in a region that serviced a population of some 4900 Maori and

2900 Pakeha:

Figure 4: Health provision services established under Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948 District Area Type of service Northern Broadwood 1 district health nurse Northern Kohukohu 1 doctor

2 district health nurses Northeastern Mangamuka 1 district health nurse Southern Rawene 2 doctors

1 district health nurse Southern Waimamaku 1 district health nurse Source: Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1, National Archives, Auckland. The Director of the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service also established district clinics from

which services could be dispensed. These clinics were based in Broadwood, Kohukohu,

Mitimiti, Motuti, Otaua, Pawarenga, Panguru, Taheke, Waima, Waimamaku and Whirinaki.

379 Secretary, Kaikohe Chamber of Commerce, to Peter Fraser, Minister of Health, 12 July 1939, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 380 Director-General Health to Secretary, Hokianga Hospital Board. 20 August 1941, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Less than ten years after the Service was established, J. Newman completed a report into its

activities. It is unclear from the file as to the reasons for why the report was commissioned or to

who J.Newman was. However, Newman’s findings suggest one of two things: that there may

have been a level of government dissatisfaction with Dr Smith’s management of the Service,

and that the government was looking at the feasibility of replicating this type of service

elsewhere. Newman made a number of observations both positive and critical, pertaining to the

six principles formulated by Dr Smith as the “essential features of the service”:

a) Doctors, hospital and nurses are coordinated and cooperative b) All members of staff have to attend frequent conferences at hospital c) Doctors are salaried d) Nurse is to decide if doctor is to call and visit patient e) Medical service is linked to schools for educational purposes f) Service operates from district clinics.381

Newman noted the particular success of allowing nurses, through the conference programme, to

be kept informed of the progress of their patients; and also the school programme, which

allowed the nurses to monitor children’s lunches, although he cautioned that the programme

could be prone to misuse. Thus Newman concluded:

Thanks to the service with its higher ratio of staff to population than other districts, the Hokianga gets what is probably a better medical service than other comparable areas in Northland…Some parts of the system could be reproduced elsewhere, but not the whole scheme…The clinic system is good and may be further extended in the area. So is the link between nurses and hospital, and between medical staff and schools.382

However, Newman expressed concern at the principle concerning doctors’ salaries, noting that

the Service doctors were probably earning less than those doing general medical work.

Furthermore, he queried Dr Smith’s claims about there being no shortage of doctors’

applications, wondering as to the impact this might have on quality: “the lower rate of

remuneration must adversely affect the quality of recruitment.” Newman was also not entirely

convinced that the costs associated with operating some of the services were correct, suggesting

that they were in fact higher than the figures he had been given by Dr Smith. Indeed, Newman

noted the difficulties that existed at Hokianga were largely personality based, claiming “the

Hokianga medical staff have proved entirely uncooperative with outsiders”, which had resulted

in “friction with the Medical Officer of Health” being described as “severe” in previous years.

Newman’ proposed solutions to counter these issues included a joint hospital board for

Northland and a resigned view that things might change only upon his retirement.

381 Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948. Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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The extent to which Dr Smith controlled the Service appears, from Newman’s report,

problematic in that it may have limited the effectiveness of the Service. This was noted

particularly in relationships with external agencies, such as the Department of Health, and the

overextended role of the district health nurses:

Dr Smith says that the last person to judge whether a doctor is needed or not is the patient himself. This seems to be a false premise…The use of the nurses as arbiters of the need for a doctor raises issues of…whether there are to be two standards of medical care, one a qualified one, the other an unqualified. The use of unqualified assistants is a reproduction of the bad old days of early nineteenth century medicine which led in England to the passing of the Medical Act and the condemnation of ‘covering’. For however conscientious a nurse may be, there is no getting away from the fact that her training includes nothing that could make her a diagnostician; and to recognise her as one would involve the provision of two classes of Registered Nurse, one to do the work, the other to take a different training and do the modified work of a doctor…The nurses are doing doctor’s work...Nurses are not trained to make diagnostic examinations and in going round with them it was obvious that they were not fit to undertake the work that they were expected to do.383

Newman recommended that this role be reviewed, suggesting that district health nurses should

be to “supervise and administer treatment, not prescribe it”. In essence, this was in direct

contrast to Dr Smith’s views of the role district nurses played within the Service. These

contradictory views regarding the role of district health nurses, particularly in relation to the

expectation to provide diagnostic services, culminated in a confidential report prepared by the

Nursing Inspector, C. Mackey, in 1953.

The nature of this report to the Medical Officer of Health arose from confusion about the status

and function of the Public Health Nurses, and more particularly about who had responsibility

over them. Mackey’s report outlined the intended division of nurses time when the Service was

established, noting that it was estimated that two-thirds of nurses time be spent on curative care,

and the other third on preventive care.384 Concern was expressed, however, as to Dr Smith’s

view of the nurses:

He considers that the nursing staff belong to him and are provided primarily for curative work. He also considers that all Public Health Nurses are seconded to the Service and that as Director, he should exercise full jurisdiction over their work and their movements. Our control of staff movements has been maintained despite stormy opposition…It has become increasingly difficult to retain a happy healthy staff.385

382 ibid. 383 Newman report on Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, 1948, Hokianga Health file, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 384 Confidential report from C. Mackey, Nurse Inspector, to Medical Officer of Health, 10 August 1953, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1.

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Mackey also noted that some doctors did not attend to the clinics (as they were required to do)

or follow up with nurses in regards to patient care. Nurses were often left to administer care,

contrary to the recommendations that Newman had put forward in his report, and also contrary

to the wishes of the nurses themselves:

Nurses have frequently to administer…injections of penicillin…Dr Smith…advised me he never refused to admit a case for a Nurse and it was over to her to make the decision. Some Nurses have been reluctant about making this decision. Many of their patients have not progressed in Hospital where it has been felt care has been totally inadequate at times.386

It was also found that, as a result of this practice, some patients went elsewhere for alternative

care, and nurses were then advised that they were no longer able to treat these patients if they

were in the care of ‘outside’ doctors.

The assessment of the health services offered by both the Hokianga Cooperative Medical

Service and the public health nurses also indicated the compounding problems that contributed

to the reality of operating in a region, which had difficulties with transport and roading issues.

Mackey’s report highlighted the “atrocious” roading conditions throughout the Hokianga, but

also noted that, with increased access to cars, the old approach of doctors and nurses attending

to patients in their own homes should be revisited, where the patient travelled to a clinic.

Reports by Newman and Mackey, whilst concerned primarily with the operational components

of the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, nevertheless made interesting observations that

shed some light in relation to the perception of Maori and how they should be treated in relation

to health services. Recurrent themes of poor roading, remoteness and the lack of a decent public

transport system were echoed in the reports written and endorsed by Maori agencies (such as the

Maori Women’s’ Welfare League) advocating for improvements to the provision of health

services to Maori in the Hokianga region.

Whilst Newman and Mackey appear to lay blame for these issues with Dr. Smith and the

Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service, the finger is also pointed at the difficulties associated

with providing services to Maori. Mackey alluded to the pressure placed on the district nurses

because people were too ignorant or lazy to treat themselves. She also implied that Maori

expectations of their health services made them disinclined to be self-sufficient. Yet Mira

Petricevich, on behalf of the Maori Women’s Welfare League, and representations made by the

Maori branches of the Women’s Institute, indicate that there was a willingness within the Maori

385 ibid. 386 ibid.

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community to become, perhaps not so much self-sufficient, but more aware of the types of

services Maori, and particularly Maori women, could and had the right to access.

The literature clearly identifies that Maori were subject to a number of barriers that impeded

their access to health services. These barriers ranged from racial prejudice, lack of adequate

funding, isolation and indifference. For Maori in the Hokianga, despite the provision of a free

health service, these indifferent attitudes must have contributed to the success or otherwise of

the health system in place there. In essence, the indifference at best demonstrated a lack of

clarity in communicating the expectations of the health services available to Maori. This became

clear when, in 1954, the Medical Officer of Health and the Nursing Inspector, Mackey, attended

a series of meetings organised with branches of the Maori Women’s Welfare League across the

Hokianga.

The purpose of the meetings arose from the petitions sent by the executive of the Maori

Women’s Welfare League to the Director-General Health in regards to health issues in the

Hokianga. The meetings, held at Tautehihi and Horeke, were attended not only by members of

the Maori Women’s Welfare League, but also by representatives from the Northern Hokianga

District Council and male tribal members.387 In the first meeting, concerns expressed by the

participants included clarification as to the status of the Hokianga Hospital (there was concern

that it was to be closed), the number of and access to district health nurses, doctors and health

services. The meeting also put forward a number of suggestions:

1. That an additional doctor be appointed in Special Area, might be stationed at area of

greatest need.

2. That a ‘hospital’ be established on northern side of the harbour to meet the needs of

residents in Pawarenga, Panguru, Broadwood and Kohukohu in particular – as Kaitaia was the

nearest hospital, but public transport was virtually non-existent in these areas to get to Kaitaia.

3. That a hostel be constructed at Rawene to accommodate expectant mothers in the last

weeks of pregnancy, to avoid delivery in taxis, which had happened on numerous occasions.388

In relation to this last point, the Maori Women’s Welfare League had already raised £1000

towards the cost of this proposed hostel, further refuting official views that Maori were not self-

reliant enough.

387 W. Davidson, Medical Officer of Health (Whangarei) to Director-General Health, 18 January 1954, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 388 ibid.

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Later that same month, C. Mackey, the Nursing Inspector, through the process of meeting with

members of the Maori Women’s Welfare League and other Maori members of the community,

also became more aware of how Maori viewed the issues of health and the provision of health

services in the Hokianga. In particular, Mackey noted that they had in fact a misunderstanding

(on both sides) in regards to the role and function of the public health nurses:

I noted the difficulties we had experienced over the past few years in keeping a nurse stationed at Mangamuka Bridge. I think my statement caused some surprise…I told them that the Public Health Nurse whom they recognised as the person to call in for sickness had many other important duties to perform…I suggested that the members could help if they attended to minor illnesses and injuries and reduced the number of unnecessary calls on the nurse’s time. The President of the Branch spoke. She also thought that the people could do more to help themselves. I had said earlier that the treatments of infested heads and skins was the responsibility of the family…She also expressed willingness of the group to co-operate with the nurse in every way that was possible.389

In light of these comments, it becomes clear that, if anything, Maori were taking full advantage

of the health services offered to them, as they believed they were entitled to. Furthermore, the

role of the Maori Women’s Welfare League in particular, indicates how Maori were able to

organise themselves during that period to become more self-sufficient, and to put forward their

own ideas as to how to improve the services currently being offered to them and the wider

Hokianga community. This final entry in the Hokianga file for this period indicates that a

greater understanding had been achieved through the mere process of communicating “I

consider the meeting was well worthwhile…a lot could be gained if one had the opportunity of

meeting the European population in the same way.”390

Ironically, if it wasn’t for the Maori Women’s Welfare League capability at advocating on

behalf of Maori communities, particularly in remote communities such as the Hokianga, the

question is posed whether Maori would have had any better access to the health services offered

through the Hokianga Cooperative Medical Service.

9.4 Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, Te Rarawa has experienced negative social, demographic and

economic impacts since contact with Pakeha and the Crown. It is not possible to quantify the

social impacts of many generations of deprivation and the current situation of high

unemployment, poor educational attainment and high level of dependence on various forms of

389 Mackey (Nursing Inspector) to MOH Whgrei. 22 Feb 1954, BAAF 1202 12a 25/2/1. 390 ibid.

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government assistance. However, a major component of any redress in settlement of Te

Rarawa’s claims should be concerned with social issues.

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Appendix: Legislation Detrimental to Maori This appendix summarises some legislation that has been detrimental to Maori. Many of the

earlier chapters in this report also deal with other pieces of legislation that directly affected Te

Rarawa Maori.

The Constitution Act 1852 New Zealand became a self-governing colony with the enactment of the New Zealand

Constitution Act 1852. The Act empowered the General Assembly to make laws regulating the

sale, letting, disposal and occupation of waste lands of the Crown. Waste lands were defined as

lands where native title had been extinguished and were in the possession of the Crown. In

addition, the Act preserved the Crown’s right of pre-emption under section 73 until it was

repealed in 1873, suggesting implicit recognition of the treaty’s guarantees.391

The Act seemed to give recognition for Màori to be apart of the future government of the colony

by making no distinction between the two races regarding the franchise to to vote. The

franchise qualification was; to be male, over the age of twenty one, and have in their possession

a freehold estate of an annual value of £10, or in occupation of a dwelling house of an annual

value of £10 in town, and £5 in the country.392 Although the franchise qualifications did not

specifically discriminated Maori, few Maori held property individually to qualify for the vote.

In addition, the electoral districts excluded some areas of largely Maori population.393

Essentially the Act was intended to devolve political power to local settlers without provision

for Maori representation in those law making bodies.394

In addition, section 71 made provision for the laws of the natives to be maintained in any

districts by way of Proclamation. Although requests were made by Maori (the King Country),

no such proclamations were ever made.395

The Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 The Tohunga Suppression Act gave the government powers to take action and impose penalties

against tohunga (section 2). Tohunga were those ‘person[s] who gathers Maori around him by

391 David Williams, http://www.library.auckland.ac.nz/dbtwwpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll?AC=GET_RECORD&XC=/dbtw-wpd/exec/dbtwpub.dll&BU=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.library.auckland.ac.nz%2Fdbtwwpd%2Fmll%2Fbasic.htm&TN=mll&SN=AUTO32071&SE=841&RN=2&MR=20&TR=0&TX=1000&ES=0&CS=1&XP=&RF=BriefWeb&EF=&DF=FullWeb&RL=1&EL=0&DL=1&NP=0&ID=&MF=WPEngMsg.ini&MQ=&TI=0&DT=&ST=0&IR=3449&NR=0&NB=0&SV=0&BG=0&FG=0&QS=, 29/04/2004, 8:39am. Hereafter referred to as ‘Williams’. 392 Orange, p 137. 393 ibid, p 139. 394 Willaims. 395 ibid.

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practising on their superstition or credulity of the Maori people by pretending to possess

supernatural powers in the treatment and cure of diseases, [and] the foretelling of future

events…’ The Act provided summary conviction of a fine of £25 or imprisonment of up to

twelve months in the case of second and subsequent offences. However, any prosecution of

tohunga first needed the consent of the Native Affairs Minister.396

The Act had two aims; firstly, it was an attempt to promote Maori health, counteracting tohunga

who were untrained in Western medical techniques. The second aim was to neutralise Màori

leaders, like Rua Kenana – that is to counteract the growing influence of charismatic and

powerful political and spiritual leaders. However, the primary intent of the Act was symbolic,

that was to reassert colonial legal certainty and political dominance.397 The underlying issue

was that the government or its members believed that Tohunga hindered Maori advancement

into a state of civilisation, that tohunga prevented the Europeanisation of Màori.398

Before this Act, the Criminal Code Act 1893 provided for the prosecution of tohunga; under

which at least two convictions occurred: Mapu was convicted under section 240 at Kaikohe in

1900 and Poti was convicted at Wairoa in 1901.399

The Act potentially destabilised Maori social, political and economic structures by

disempowering important figures within their whanau, hapu and iwi. There is little evidence of

widespread prosecution of tohunga; instead, Maori practitioners were pushed underground.

Often the prosecutions which did occur were the result of accusations of Màori and not

Pakeha.400

Rating legislation The predecessor of the rating regime was the Highway Boards Empowering Act 1871. This Act

provided that Native lands would be liable for rates if a Native Land Court title had been issued

for it or if ‘in the occupation of others, other than an aboriginal native’, furthermore the land

needed to be traversed by a road. The Act did not contain any power to enforce collection of

rates via the sale of the land.401

The Rating Act 1876 introduced a uniformed system for the valuation of land and levying of

rates. The Act provided that all land was rateable except ‘lands over which Native title has not

396 Mamari Stephens, “Maori Law and Hart: A Brief Analysis”, Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 32, 3, 2001, p 438. 397 ibid, pp 438-439. 398 Williams. 399 Stephens, p 451. 400 ibid, p 454.

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been extinguished and lands in respect of which a certificate of title or memorial of ownership

has been issued, if in the occupation of aboriginal natives only.’ This meant customary land

was totally exempt and that generally most Maori paid no rates. However Màori land which

had been leased to Europeans was rateable, but the lessees were liable for the rates.402 The Act

provided that rate arrears were a personal debt, if rates remained unpaid after 14 days, a local

body could initiate proceedings, if the land still remained unpaid the local body had the right to

sell the property on 12 months notice.403

Generally, the Rating Act 1882 did not significantly alter the rating regime, except to suggest

wider rating liability of Maori land. The exemptions from rating were in effect the same as the

Rating Act 1876, which appears to have only subtle changes in the wording of the relevant

section. Effectively this Act allowed the rating of Native land when not in occupation of or

owned by, a Native.404

The enactment of the Crown and Native Lands Rating Act 1882 introduced more

comprehensive liability for rates to Native Lands. This rating regime was intended to provide

local governments with their own funding base. Land belonging to aboriginal Natives that were

situated within Boroughs were rateable property. In addition, Native lands within five miles of

a highway were liable for rates. Native lands occupied by Europeans were exempt under this

Act but were rateable under the Rating Act 1882.

Rates were not charged directly to Maori, under the Crown and Native Lands Rating Act 1882

the Colonial Treasurer was deemed the owner of Native lands for the purposes of this particular

Act. The Crown paid the rates and a lien would be placed on the land. Màori members of

parliament expressed fear that this was a measure designed to take Maori land, in the event of

the rates not being paid.

Maori members of Parliament expressed concern over the liability of rates to native lands within

five miles of a highway. They voice concerned that Maori had not asked for roads to be built

and were now paying for them. They further stated that the rationale that the imposition of rates

increased land value was not true for many Maori as their land continued to be brought cheaply.

It was also suggested that this rating regime was just ‘a mean way of confiscating Maori land’.

401 Pita Rikys, Valuation for and rating of Maori Land, Waiheke Island, 2001, p 105. 402 ibid, pp 106-107. 403 Tom Bennion, Maori and Rating Law, Wellington, 1997, p 12. 404 Rikys, p 107.

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405 In practice, this particular provision affected 3.5 million acres out of 13 million acres. Over

£12,978 had been paid by the treasurer for rates on Maori land.406

The Crown and Native Lands Rating Acts Repeal Act 1888 was introduced as the government

cost cutting measure, because it could not afford to keep paying the rates to local bodies.

However, Maori land within a borough continued to be rated.407

The Rating Act 1894 consolidated all rating provisions. All the rating provisions of Native land

in the 1893 Act were preserved in the 1894 Act.408

An amendment in 1895 to the Rating Act 1894 made land held by the Public Trustee liable for

rating. Land occupied by Maori were liable for half rates. However Williams comments that

local bodies had not been able to collect rates from Maori occupied land with numerous

owners.409

The Native Land Rating Act 1904 extended the categories of Maori land that would be liable for

rates. Maori land that had previously been liable for full rates would continue. Section 2

provided that other Maori land that had yet had title ascertained would be liable for half rates.410

Customary land, land which had yet gained a certificate of title was still exempt, however if the

Native Minister thought that the delay in obtaining title was to avoid rate liability he had

discretionary powers to force the land to be brought before the Court and subject to rates.411

In addition the Native Land Rating Act 1904 introduced the concept of ‘nominated Native

occupier’. This person would be entered into the Valuation Roll, representing the other owners

and rate demands would be sent to that person, and legal proceedings to recover rate arrears

would be brought against this person alone. Alternatively the Native Minster could authorise

District Maori Land Councils to administer the lands, pay arrears and all other rates falling due.

The Native Minster could pay the rates and place a caveat over the land to secure payment, the

charge over the land could be satisfied by a portion of land passing to the Crown in the event of

subdivision.412

405 Bennion, p 19 406 ibid, p 20. 407 Williams. 408 Rikys, p 113 409 Willaims. 410 ibid. 411 Rikys, p 113. 412 ibid, p 114.

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The Rating Act 1908 again consolidated rating legislation. It was followed by the Native Rating

Act 1909 which reformed legislation regarding Maori land by consolidating 72 prior enactments

since 1871.413

The Rating Amendment Act 1910 provided that all Maori freehold land was subject to rates in

the same manner as if it were European land, unless a specific provision said otherwise. In the

case of land held by Maori Land Boards or the Public Trustee, the land was liable to rates to the

extent that the land was producing revenue. However the collection of rates remained a

problem. Local government found enforcement of rates to be difficult given that blocks were in

multiple ownership and did not have a registered title.414

From 1919 a number of Acts were introduced to combat the problems of Màori land being in

rate arrears. The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1919 gave

the Land Court sole discretion on partition orders to award additional land to any owner who

paid rates or other charges for the benefit of all owners.

An amendment to this Act in 1923 made provision for land consolidation schemes for Native

Lands. It included provisions that enable the Court to vest land in the Crown to satisfy

outstanding rates and that the Crown and local authorities could enter into agreements of

compromise for outstanding rates.415

The Native Land Rating Act 1924 attempted to again solve the problem of outstanding rates

owed on Maori land. The Act abolished the existing system of rate collecting and gave the

Native Land Court responsibility for the collection of rates. This meant that the Court could

make an order that rent from the land be used to pay rates, or a portion of that land be vested in

the Native Trustee or the Crown for lease or sale. The Act provided that if rates were not paid

charging orders could be issued. If the charge remained unpaid for more than a year the land

could be vested in the Native Trustee for the purposes of sale.416 The Act exempted customary

land, burial grounds, churches and marae on native land from rate liability.

The Rating Act 1925 was a further consolidation of rating legislation. The Native Land Rating

Act 1924 was incorporated into this statute.417

413 ibid. 414 ibid, p 115. 415 ibid, pp 116-117. 416 Williams. 417 ibid.

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The Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1927 continued to

address the problems of accumulated rates and survey charges on Maori Land. The enactment

of this Act recognised that many blocks owed rates making them uneconomic or that the

charges on the land were worth more than the land itself. The Native Land Court Judges could

now determine on a case by case basis whether the land was worth rating and the best way to

arrange payment (i.e. through leasing or sale). This Act repealed the long standing provision

that had allowed Maori Land to be taken for roads or railways without compensation.418

In addition this Act allowed Maori Land Boards to initiate consolidation schemes. These

schemes enable the Maori Land Boards to sell land to local authorities for the payment of

outstanding rates.419

The Native Land and Native Land Claims Adjustment Act 1930 consolidated earlier

amendments. The Act continued to develop consolidation and land development schemes.

Rikys comments that the rationale behind these schemes was to increase the capacity of Native

land to pay rates, although not the primary objective that Ngata had envisaged.420

The Rating Act 1967 mainly consolidation all rating legislation. The Act did however give

more power to the Maori Land Court, when issuing charging orders, to consider future use of

the land and whether to permit leases, sale and alienation.421

The Rating Act 1988 consolidated various Local Government rating provisions. It did not make

any major changes to the rating of Màori land as under the Rating Act 1967. Màori Freehold

land is liable for rates as if it was general land. The law provides special rules for the levying

and collection of rates on Maori Land. The Act provides land exempted from rating, that being

customary land, maori freehold land with a marae erected on it, land set apart for the purposes

of a marae (includes general land), and land not exceeding 2.03 hectares. Wahi tapu and

tauranga waka are not exempt unless they came within the provisions of land not exceeding 2.03

hectares or if such land is vested in the Historic Places Trust.422

Generally the concern with rating legislation is that historically land could be alienated for rate

arrears, as a result of legal proceedings brought by local authorities or at the discretion of the

Maori Land court to satisfy charging orders and Maori Land Boards.

418 Willaims. 419 Riys, pp 120-121. 420ibid, p 122. 421 Williams. 422 Rikys, pp 126-138.

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When dealing with rating legislation, themes come to the forefront, for example rating

legislation is coloured by consolidation schemes and land development schemes of Ngata.

While these schemes were primarily aimed at producing workable land and revenue, underlying

was this ideal that revenue would also be able to pay rates.

Essentially Maori were concerned because of two things;

(a) the rating system should never have applied to Màori land, and

(b) the rating system alienated or could have alienated Maori land through the

a. operation of Maori Land Boards

b. orders of the Maori Land Court

c. Legal Proceedings initiated by local authorities to recover rate arrears

d. activities of the Colonial Treasurer in paying rates, then taking possession of

Maori land for payment of rates

e. actions of Public Trustee/Maori Trustee

The Màori Affairs Acts The Maori Affairs Act consolidated Maori land legislation, with the objective of providing

better administration of Maori land by reforming multiple ownership Corbett, Minister of

Maori Affairs, argued that the sight of Maori land unused and covered in weeds was causing

unwarranted criticism of Maori as land holders, whereas the cause of idle lands lay in multiple

ownership423 The Act sought to reform ownership in two ways: the first, adjusting the number

of owners on the legal title or second, placing legal title under a legal entity, where the owners

then become beneficiaries. Essentially the government saw fragmentation of land interests as

hindering the utilisation of land, by reforming land titles Maori land would potentially become

productive, with economic and financial benefits for its owners and/or beneficiaries.

Consolidation schemes regrouped fragmented shares in a particular region. The Maori Affairs

Act 1953 remained committed to consolidation through Parts XVII and XVII. Section 149

defined the main purpose of consolidation as consolidating and redistributing the interests of

multiple Maori owners in Maori freehold lands so that suitable and convenient holdings that

might then be profitably are used to the owners’ advantage and in the public interest. The act

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also allowed pre-existing consolidations and combined partitions to remain. 424 Individual’s loss

interests in various blocks to be given a larger interest in one block. These schemes were a

drain on the administrative structure of the department of Maori Affairs. Despite the Prichard

Waetford Report suggested this practice be abandoned, though it was not until 1974 that it was

repealed.425

Land Development Schemes were established by Apirana Ngata, an attempt to develop and

settle Maori lands. They were designed for two purposes. The first, to ensure some security of

tenure for the occupier so that financing could be arranged. The second was to facilitate the

development of land. The Maori Affairs Act 1953 continued to provide for the development of

land schemes. Maori Land Boards were in charged with implementing Part XXIV Development

Schemes. Legal title to the block remained with the owners but the Boards had right to

exclusive occupation. The Boards also had the power to confer that right onto either a

nominated occupier, a lessee, or the owner(s). Developments however never directly dealt with

multiple ownership and fragmentation of land interests continued. It was solely a mechanism to

procure economic success. Hugh states that ‘development schemes put the proverbial cart

before the horse.’426

Part XVII of the 1953 Act established a conversion fund within the Maori Trustee account for

acquiring uneconomic or other interests in Maori land. Uneconomic interests were those

interests valued at less than �25. Once acquired the Màori Trustee could sell those interest, with

the general principle that the interests would be sold to Maori incorporations or Maori people,

who were usually trying to build up their interest in order to gain economic and productive

holdings. The Maori trustee would acquire such interests through a number of ways including

purchase by agreement, exercise power compulsorily on succession, or by recommendation of

the court on partition, consolidation, or by recommendation on ordering a consolidation of title.

As far as succession was concerned the court was precluded, under section 137, from vesting

any interest that constituted an uneconomic share, thus the operation of the conversion fund and

purchase by the Maori Trustee. There were general exceptions to the rule – where there was a

will, interests were useable in conjunction with other land and interests which the Maori Trustee

declined. As a matter of policy the trustee would decline interests in Màori reservations, timber

423 Williams. 424 Harris, ‘Maori Land title Improvement since 1945’, p 139. 425 Paul McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, Studies in Aboriginal Rights, No.7, University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, p 61. 426 ibid, pp 62-66.

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bearing lands, lands upon which houses stood, lands subject to heavy debt, lands in unsuitable

locations and lands for which unacceptable prices were asked.427

The Maori Land Court had exclusive jurisdiction under the Maori Affairs Act to ascertain the

beneficiaries entitled to a deceased’s interests in Maori land. Succession had been the major

cause of fragmentation, and with the Court’s new found power it could prevent the creation of

uneconomic and fragmented interests. 428 As well as preventing the operation of the conversion

process and the acquisition of shares by the Maori Trustee. Under section 136(2) the Court

could give effect to any arrangement between beneficiaries, families could by way of an

arrangement vest interests with whomever they chose, who need not be entitled to a beneficial

interest, this being effected by a Maori Land Court order. 429 Family arrangements involved the

family members of the deceased owners to come to an agreement that kept each interest in tact.

‘For example, a family of seven succeeding to their mother’s interest in five blocks might agree

to only have two successors in each block, thus keeping the value of the interests over �25.’430

There was a certain amount of objection in that by vesting ownership into one or several persons

to overcome the uneconomic provisions from operating, others would be deprived of their

turangawaewae. Yet from the courts point of view family arrangements would retain some

amount of tribal stability, based on an assumption that those who had the vested interests would

use the land for the benefit of the entire family unit. While these arrangements were to be

voluntary the court through practice advocated arrangements to be made.431

The Act gave provision under sections 151 and 152 for the Maori Trustee to actively acquire

Maori land interests. By its nature, this was a type of voluntary conversion, coined live buying,

enabling sale of ones interests to the Maori Trustee. The process was accomplished by

certificates of the Maori trustee without the necessity of a Court order.432Essentially, it was

hoped that the Maori trustee would buy land interests then proceed to sell them to other Màori.

Tribal groups no longer remained legally entitled and the Maori Trustee had powers under the

Act to dispose including g the sale of land with the consent of Maori land Boards.433 Live

buying could also take place directly between owners of the land under section 213 which

permitted vesting orders to be made when transferring interests in land.

427 Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974’, p 71. 428 McHugh, pp 56-57. 429 ibid, p 56. 430 Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974’ p71. 431 McHugh, pp 56-57. 432 Paul McHugh, The Fragmentation of Maori Land, Legal Research Foundation Inc, publication No.18, p 20. 433 McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, pp 57-58.

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Live buying became an option for avoiding family arrangements, although the Maori Trustee

warned some activities to be dissipated as there was real concern that entire families would have

no land at all. The Maori Trustee was not averse to live-buying where the owners agreed to sell

their shares, but did proceed cautiously in cases where it was used to avoid other

arrangements.434 The acquisition by the Maori Trustee meant these shares under section 213

could be sold to any Maori of any descent, a Maori Incorporation, a Màori trust or the Crown. 435

In reality, land interests could easily be alienated from the original tribal group with no chance

of reclaiming it.

To prevent the unwanted accumulation of uneconomic shares in the conversion fund, districts

were directed to proceed with live buying with an end in mind, to provide freehold tenure or

help small farmers expand their existing holdings. It was a useful tool when used in conjunction

with land development schemes.436 Whatever may have been the original intentions of the Maori

trustee to sell back to Màori, the trustee ended up owning a stock of uneconomic shares.

In addition, under Part XXVIII the Maori Land Court received further special powers including

the amalgamation of titles of adjoining titles into a single title. The Court was given the power

to confirm transfers of interests between owners and to declare Maori land held by one owner to

be European land.437 The Native Minister, Corbett, thought this would greatly assist Maori

economic development as well as push Maori into mainstream.438

Part XXII of the Act introduced Màori incorporations as a legal entity which could act for all

the owners and avoid fragmentation. Under the Act, a Maori Incorporation could only be

formed with the consent of the owners of Maori freehold land. But fragmentation continued, in

the sense that shares were devolved on death, the process of fragmentation of beneficial

interests continued. Potentially unclaimed dividends created administrative nightmares.

Incorporations resembled trusts more than private companies.439

Section 438 of the Màori Affairs Act provided for the creation of trusts, it was a device to

overcome the hurdles of multiple ownership The Court had jurisdiction to define the terms of

trust, so long as notice had been given to the owners as far as practicable. Hugh comments that

434 Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974’, pp 77-78. 435 McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, p 56. 436 Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974’, p 78. 437 ibid, p 70. 438 Harris, ‘Maori Land title Improvement since 1945’, p 139. 439 McHugh, Maori Land Laws of New Zealand, pp 66-71.

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the trust concept was and is the most promising attempt to reform Maori land tenure, but were

judicially rather than legislatively sparked440

In general, for the year 1956 15,000 uneconomic interests were acquired and 10,000 interests

were averted from being uneconomic. About 1,000 family arrangements upon succession were

worked out which meant the creation of 6,000 new interests were avoided.441 But conversion

relived tens of thousands of owners and potential owners of their uneconomic shares and

provided the state with a stock of small and fragmented interests.

The 1957 Amendment to the Maori Affairs Act strengthen provisions for arranged succession

by introducing �10 rule, which allowed court to exclude eligible successors in favour of others,

without payment provided share of each excluded person did not exceed �10. Hence, the Court

would encourage family arrangements where successors instead of taking small interests in a

number of blocks, took a larger share in one block.442

The Court would upon arranged succession, consolidate title through orders of gifts and sales

between owners to eliminate small interests. The philosophy behind this was to prevent

fragmentation and multiplicity of owners, because of the hindrance to economic progression and

prevention of the land from being fully productive.

The Maori Affairs Amendment Act 1967 merely cemented governmental policy of the need to

further improve Màori title to land. The amendment was based, largely, on the

recommendations of the Prichard Waetford Report on Laws Affecting Maori Land and Powers

of the Maori Land Court. The Report made several recommendations for the “better use” of

Maori land, most of which were in reaction to the urbanisation of Maori. 443

The Act increased the value of uneconomic shares from �25 to �50, as had been recommended

by Hunn in 1960. Prichard and Waetford had recommend this value increase to �100, given the

department had been live buying interests above the �25 value anyway. The rationale for the

increasing the value of uneconomic shares was that urbanisation was on the rise, and Màori

might prefer to have the cash value of their interests. This was not a new concept as the

department knew that proceeds of live buying financially assisted Màori who were moving to

town.444

440 ibid, pp 73-75. 441 AJHR 1957, G-9, p 5. 442 Harris, ‘Maori Land title Improvement since 1945’, p 142. 443 Willaims. 444 Harris, ‘Maori Land Development Schemes, 1945-1974’, pp 85-86.

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In response to uneconomic interests, Maori reaction was contained within 3 themes. Firstly was

the fear that the 1967 Act would make Maori more vulnerable to the loss of land, for example

the compulsory sale of land. Secondly, Màori were committed to the belief that they had ability

to make efficient use of land themselves. Lastly that finance and training be made available,

which was in the national interest of providing a stabile economy and the utilisation of lands.445

The 1967 Act introduced the four owner rule, this involve a compulsory declaration by the court

to declare any Maori land owned by four or fewer owners to be European (general) land. While

there had been a similar provision in the 1953 Act, it was rarely used. This provision had the

potential for alienating further land from Maori ownership, allowing the owners easier access to

alienation. But this provision was eventually repealed in 1974, as the government

acknowledged general Maori dissatisfaction with the procedure. In 1970, the court had made

3,410 declarations of status, only 17 percent of which had been at the owner’s instigation.446

In order to fulfil the purpose of Part II to promote the effective and profitable use and the

efficient administration of Maori Land an Improvement Officer was created to determine the

best action for use of the land, including the power to order alienation. This Part of the Act was

perhaps the most objected to at the time but it was repealed by the Maori Purposes Act 1970

under section 6.447

Sections 152 and 155 allowed the Maori trustee to sell lessees the freehold of vested and reserve

land. The Prichard Report had recommended that this should be allowed. It concluded that

Maori owners would never be able to resume such lands because the compensation payable for

improvements would always be too expensive (due to rising inflation and reasonably static

rents) and that it would better if Maori were able to capitalise their interests instead of

continuing to receive rents.448

The Act also made changes to the Incorporation system following the Prichard Report, which

had recommended changes to make them more like a business entity. As part of this, the Act

provided that the land interests of owners would be converted into shares in the corporate body.

This meant that the owners lose their direct link to their interests in the land, their

Turangawaewae. Overall, the Act reflected the attitude that Maori land holdings should be

445 I.H. Kawharu, Maori Land Tenure: studies of a changing institution, Oxford, 1977, p 92. 446 Crown Forestry Rental Trust, The Maori Land Legislation Manual, Crown Forestry Rental Trust, Wellington, (1994), pp 443-445. 447 Williams. 448 ibid.

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individual and that the individual should ultimately have the same freedom of alienation as

Pakeha. It thus does not recognise the concept of tribal land or that Maori might not want their

land to become “Europeanised” in status.449

The 1967 Act became the object of much criticism among Màori, often labelled as the ‘last land

grab’. Many protests of this modern era have been directed at this act, for it continued to

alienate Màori land from Màori ownership In response to this the act was repealed in 1974 by

the Maori Affairs Amendment Act. Effectively the 1974 Act represented the Labour

Government’s policy on Màori Affairs with the basic philosophy that the continued alienation

of Maori land ought not to be facilitated. The Act was an attempt to repair the invasion of

Maori rights by the 1967 amendment. If anything the 1974 Act aimed to insure retention of

Màori land, but in reality, the damage had already been done.

The Adoption Act 1955 The Law Commission produced a report looking at the legal framework for adoption and to

recommend whether the Adoption Act 1955 and the Adult Adoption Information Act 1985 be

modified to address contemporary social needs. This report offers insight into the history of

adoption and legal ramifications in New Zealand and the impact on Maori customary adoption

or whangai.450

Maori customary adoptions presently are no longer recognised in law apart from the statutory

provisions in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 with regards to succession. Initially customary

adoption or whangai were made without state intervention or regulation. The Adoption of

Children Act 1895 was the first Act to provide a regulatory scheme which gave all citizens the

capacity to adopt children. Maori could avail themselves of the statutory adoption produce, but

this was not obligatory.451

The Native Land Claims Adjustment Amendment Act 1901 stated that claims to adoption could

not be recognised unless the adoption was registered in the Native Land Court (section 50).

Between 1901 to 1904, customary adoption became heavily regulated, largely due to whangai

disputing land entitlements. For whangai to pursue a claim, their customary placement had to

be registered in the Native Land Court. In addition when registering a customary adoption, the

Native Land Court had to carry out an investigation as to the nature and circumstances of the

placement and further seek the opinion on the relevant Maori customary law from Maori

assessors. The Native Appellant Land Court created guidelines (based on the assessors version

449 ibid. 450 New Zealand Law Commission, Adoption, Options for reform: A discussion paper, Wellington, 1999. 451 ibid, pp 82-83.

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of Maori customary law) to help judges assess the validity of customary placements and

determine succession rights.

The Native Land Act 1909, section 161, provided that no adoption in accordance with Native

customary, even if made before the Act was passed, had any force or effect in law. An adopted

child’s rights (adoption meaning legal Western adoption) were only preserved if the adoption

had been registered before 31 March 1910.452

The Native Land Court retained jurisdiction over such adoptions. An adoption order made by

the Native Land Court carried with it the same legal consequences as other adoption orders

under the Infants Act 1908. The Maori child assumed the named of the adoptive parents and the

law deemed that the legal ties to the birth parents ceased to exist.453

Section 7 of the Native Land Amendment Act 1927 and the Native Claims Adjustment Act

1927 reinstated customary adoptions made before 31 March 1902. However, the provision only

applied ‘in the case of a Maori who dies or who has died subsequently to the commencement of

the principal Act.454

Section 202 of the Native Land Amendment Act 1931 re-instated section 161 of the Native

Land Act 1909, in that customary adoption had no force or effect in law whether made before or

after the commencement of this Act. Clearly, the provision was to have a retrospective effect as

had its 1927 predecessor. A similar version was then inserted in the Adoption Act 1955 in

section 16(2). 455

In summary New Zealand law has fluctuated in its willingness to recognise Maori customary

placements. From 1899-1902 and from 1927-1931 customary placements received legal

recognition. For times in between and since 1932 customary adoption had not been recognised

in law.

The Law Commission in its report commented that Màori considered that Adoption legislation

was an imposition on their customary law relating to lines of descent. There was risk that the

child would lose its sense of identity. In addition, secrecy and the lack of consultation involved

in the adoption process continued to undermine Màori customary practices. The report

continued to state that two claims (Wai 160 and Wai 286) before the Waitangi Tribunal argued

452 ibid, p 83. 453 ibid. 454 ibid. 455 ibid, p 84.

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that the Adoption Act constituted a breach of the Crown’s obligations to Maori in terms of

Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi.456

The Native Land Laws The Native Land Law summaries below have been taken from David Williams’ Màori Land

Legislation Database. The website has offered great insight into the objectives of Native Land

Laws since 1862. The website also offers great commentary of parliamentary debates and what

Members of Parliament thought of various pieces of legislation. In many cases David Williams’

commentary highlights the effect legislation had on Maori and their land, further exemplifying

legislation as a mechanism designed to alienate land from Maori. Each new Act has a footnote

at the end of relevant paragraph, all information of a particular Act was taken from the same

website.

The Native Lands Act 1862 preamble stated that the Act was to definine Native ownership of

land according to British law. It was the first piece of legislation to establish the Native Land

Court, though rarely used and was soon superseded by the Native Lands Act 1865. The Court

was to be established containing local chiefs in each district under the chairmanship of a Pakeha

magistrate, to ascertain Native title and issue a Certificate of Title in favour of the relevant tribe,

community or individual, prior to the sale of land.

Dillon-Bell said, in the Parliamentary Debates, that “we desire, subject to proper safeguards,

that the Natives themselves should be empowered to ascertain and define their own titles; and

we therefore propose to constitute Courts which, after a proper survey, a careful inquiry, and

confirmation of the proceedings by the Governor, shall have the power of certifying who,

according to Native custom, are the owners of any land.”

Investigation of titles however, did not prevent the Crown from acquiring land, not yet

investigated, by purchase or cession. The Governor (rather than the Governor in Council) was

given wide powers, he could confirm (or otherwise) orders of the Court, make reservations, and

proclaim where the Court could operate.

The Act set up a system which, on the face of it, was to ascertain and assimilate Maori

communal ownership into a form recognised by English law. In reality, it was a settler driven

piece of legislation initiated to combat Maori reluctance to alienate tribal land. The Treaty of

Waitangi was cited in the preamble and while it is said that the waiver of Crown pre-emption

456 ibid, pp 85-87.

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was in favour of Maori, the aim of the settlers was to facilitate the more speedy acquisition of

Maori land.

The waiver of the Crown right of pre-emption was further confirmed by a Proclamation of 6

June 1863 and heralded a system of direct purchase between Maori and private purchasers. The

reason advanced by the Government for this was that the previous Crown practice of purchasing

land at low prices and then selling it on to settlers at higher prices had meant that Maori were

now distrustful of selling land to the Government.

The Act first came into force in April 1864 in the Kaipara districts where there was Native Land

Court sittings presided over by Judge Rogan. These hearings led to large blocks of tribal land

(e.g. Paparoa Block and Pukeatua Block) being awarded to a single individual.457

The purpose of the Native Land Act 1865 was to ascertain owners and encourage the extinction

of Native proprietary customs and to convert ownership into titles derived from the Crown. The

Act laid the foundation for the work of the Native Land Court until the 1909 consolidation of

the Native land laws. Judge Fenton’s views were mirrored in the policy and workings of the

Court and the Act.

The 1865 Act reflected a stronger push towards the individualisation of title. The Act

exemplified the “10 owner rule” under section 23, in that a Certificate of Title was to be issued

to no more than 10 owners, communal Màori title was incompatible with this rule. In reality,

many Maori may have thought the 10 owners would be kaitiaki or trustees but legally they were

the absolute owners and had the power to deal with the land as they wished. Section 23 did

contain a proviso that a certificate of title could be issued to a tribe but that to do so the block of

land had to exceed 5000 acres. However, Land Court judges were reluctance to use this

provision and it was rarely used. Section 24 was an amelioration of the “10 owner rule”. It

enabled the Court to divide large areas of tribal land into allotments and award each lot to no

more than 10 people. Although this provision admitted more people onto the title to land, it

resulted in the fragmentation of tribal land and added to survey costs.

Individualisation of title was assisted by the workings of section 21. Any individual could

initiate proceedings for the investigation of title, setting the Land Court machinery in motion

and requiring all other interested claimants to appear in court to have their interests recognised.

This meant that a member of one tribe could initiate proceedings and that opposing tribes with

457 ibid.

267

an interest in the land had to go to Court to defend their rights, despite arrangements that tribes

had made with each other.

Section 75 was a weak attempt to protect Maori from the negative impact of removing the

Crown’s right of pre-emption. Any contracts entered into prior to the Native Land Court issuing

a certificate of title were void.

The Act under section 30 gave the Court jurisdiction to decide upon succession according to

[English] law. However, the Court under Fenton introduced a new and arbitrary precedent of

succession. All living children of the deceased were to succeed equally to Maori freehold land.

The process over many generations divided Maori land into unusable portions. This process of

succession worked in conjunction with section 50 which initiated the system of partition orders.

The court system of investigating title placed a further burden on Maori. Court fees, survey

costs and payment of judges created huge debts for Màori. The court hearings were in remote

areas, miles away from their tribal areas and court delays meant Màori had to rely on settler

towns for food and resources which were held on an account and to be paid once a certificate of

title had been issued, which in turn led to them selling of more land to pay for the debts.458

Despite the preamble of the Act and section 23 stating that the Court was to ascertain the

owners ‘according to Native Custom’ its real purpose was to eliminate customary tenure as far

as possible. Because of the workings of the Native Land Court Màori land was alienated by

restricting legal title to only 10 owners and secondly land was sold to pay for the debts of court

hearings, survey costs and personal debts in settler towns.

The Native Lands Act 1866 was a reaction to concern over Maori selling land that had been

reserved to them, usually to pay off debts. By placing restrictions on alienability the Court was

supposed to ensure that Maori would not be able to dispose of all their lands. According to

Richmond (1867 Debate) this Act took power concerning restrictions on alienation away from

the Court and left it to the discretion of the Governor in Council. Fenton said that this Act

should be repealed as it was unpopular with Maori. Rogan reported (A-10a) that the Act had

not been translated, and “the Native Assessors are called upon to assist in adjudicating under an

Act written in a foreign language, which is and must be prejudicial to the satisfactory business

of the Court until this is rectified.” 459

458 Williams. 459 ibid.

268

The Native Lands Act 1867 changed the “10 owner rule”, in that it required the Court to record

all owners, in addition to the 10 owners on the certificate of title. This was intended to prevent

the 10 named owners from selling the land on their own behalf without consultation and without

dividing the proceeds of sale among all the owners. However according to the Rees

Commission, ten owners could control leasing and rents without the agreement of the rest of the

owners. Ideally investigation of titles preceding this Act would require new court hearings, so

that all owners could be recorded but section 10 of the 1867 Act prevented the re-opening of

every title of land. Judge Fenton under the 1867 Act refused to implement this policy of naming

all the owners on the back of the certificate of title and he continued to issue certificate of titles

naming only 10 people. He felt that the Native Land Court should concentrate on eliminating

communal ownership460

The Native Lands Act 1869 was introduced into the Legislative Council by Chief Judge Fenton.

The Debates on the Bill give the following explanations of sections. Section 10, which gave the

Court jurisdiction over transactions before 1840, was intended for cases where the block before

the Court joins or runs into land subject to Old Land Claims. Section 12 specifies that grants of

Maori land shall be held by owners as “tenants in common”. This means that when a grantee

dies his/her interest in the land passes to his/her own successors. Section 15 meant that the

majority in value of owners must agree to alienation before the land can be partitioned for such

purposes. Section 22 gives married Maori women property rights not possessed by married

Pakeha women at the time. However, it is interesting to note that the right they are given is the

right to sell their land.461

The Native Land Act 1873 brought in four main changes because of numerous petitions and

complaints on the 1865 Act and land transactions dealt with by the Native Land Court. The first

change was to survey charges. The government under this Act would advance the money

necessary to pay for surveys, which had previously been an impediment to bringing the land to

Court. However Màori owners remained liable for the survey charges and if they could not

repay the money, the government could take the land as payment.

The second change was to District Officers. This change meant that District Officers would

investigate land ownership before the cases went to Court to avoid claimants having to be aware

of and attend Court hearings. However, this did not eventuate and it continued to be the case

that claimants initiating action in the Court had an advantage over other interests. Judges were

460 ibid. 461 ibid.

269

also giving powers to make preliminary inquires so they did not have to rely on evidence in

court, but this did not happen either.

Thirdly changes were made to reserves. Under this Act reserves were to be created to guard

against leaving Maori landless, these reserves were inalienable and created to the size of at least

50 acres per man, woman and child.

Lastly the Memorial of Ownership replaced the Certificate of Title system. The Memorial of

Ownership system was to list every owner and his or her proportionate share to overcome the

abuse of the “10 owner rule”. A whole block of land could not be sold without agreement of

every named owner, thus making it rather difficult to complete the purchase of land. It was a

way of protecting hapu interests though often it was criticised for still individualising title

instead of vesting the interests in hapu and iwi.462

The Native Land Act Amendment Act 1877 was enacted with the aim of ensuring that people

with genuine claims could ask for a rehearing. The applicant would be required to give security

for payment of the costs. Ideally the government wanted rehearing to be deterred, making title

to land more secure and purchasers would not need to worry about a rehearing that would later

show they had purchased the land from the wrong persons. Section 6 allowed the Crown to

appear before the Native Land Court so that it could obtain title to the proportion of the land it

had paid for in a block even if it had not purchased the whole block.463

A further Amendment in 1878464 made it more workable for public and private purchases of

Maori land. Sections 8, 11, 13, and 15 made it possible for purchasers to obtain title to portions

of land even if they had not managed to purchase all the interests under the Memorial of

Ownership title and in absence of an accurate survey plan. Furthermore section 4 made it

unlawful to advance a loan as a mortgage over any land held by a Maori on a Memorial of

ownership or Crown Grant. The Native Minister stated it was better for Maori to obtain money

by selling land rather than by mortgaging it. By denying Màori freedom to use their land as

security the government refused to allow Maori to control and have responsibility over their

land, as well as ensuring the alienation of land into the hands of settlers as the only means to

deal with financial difficulty.465

462 ibid. 463 ibid.. 464 Native Land Act Amendment Act (No.2) 1878 465 Williams.

270

The Native Land Act 1888 repealed the Native Land Administration Act 1886. The government

stated that Màori would not bring their land under the 1886 Act and the government did not

have the money to buy sufficient land for settlement. The Act was to work along with the

safeguards of the Native Lands Fraud Prevention Acts, to prevent Maori alienating land.

However this restriction could be removed on application of the majority of owners. Carroll

agreed that Maori should have the right to sell their land as they wished, but that the removal of

the restrictions gave trustees the power to sell tribal lands, converting their status as absolute

owners because of the power to sell land.466

The Crown’s pre-emption right had been previously re-imposed before the enactment of the

Native Land Laws Amendment Act 1895. Under the 1895 Act Maori regained the ability to sell

their land privately and only in certain cases. This applied to land that was within a town

district or borough or if the block as portioned before this Act was less than 500 acres. Section

4 gave the governor power to approve these applications and wavier pre-emption.

The 1895 Act also gave the Native Land Court power to issue a confirmation order for the

contracting of a mortgage prior to 1894. However this power was later repealed in 1897, as the

power was considered to go too far. Section 7 provided for the first time that Màori could

alienate their land without proving that they had sufficient other land for their support. Fenton,

who at that time was an ex-chief judge, commented that “[t]his Act is of as intricate a character

as the previous ones, and it is strongly advised that no operations should be made under it

except under legal advice. It contains eighty-four sections, and it is impossible to furnish an

intelligible summary of it.”467

The Native Land Act 1909 consolidated sixty nine existing Acts which had been passed during

the period 1871-1908. In addition, there were several changes to previous Native Land Laws.

Firstly, that Ascertainment of Title Native Land Court Commissioners were to be appointed to

continue routine Court work, so that Judges could continue to work through the backlog of

work. The use of Assessors were no longer compulsory and was left to the discretion of judges,

which was really a cost saving measure. Furthermore Native customary title was not

enforceable against the Crown’s assertion of clear title. Additionally the Native Land Court

when partitioning a block had to have road lines laid out first so that the land would be ready for

settlement. Carroll said that the idea was that the Court would be guided by how the land would

be used rather than considering Native custom.

466 ibid. 467 ibid.

271

The 1909 Act removed all previous restrictions on the alienation of land except those

restrictions imposed by this Act. Further Maori land was divided into different categories for

the purposes of alienation. The groups were; i) half-castes – who have more European than

Maori blood were to be classified as European and were able to alienate land as they desired; ii)

individual Maori who have sole title to a block and could convert that title into European

freehold; iii) if there were 10 or less owners, they could dispose of it as they wish, subject to

confirmation of the fairness of the terms of alienation; iv) any land purchased by a Màori from

Pakeha or the Crown would not be subject to Native Land Laws; v) for land with more than 10

owners a Runanga system would apply, with assembled owners being able to decide whether or

not to alienate. Furthermore the Governor Council could no longer compulsorily vest lands in

Maori Land Boards, except under the Noxious Weeds Act and Rating Act.

The third major change was to a miscellaneous issues including that Màori reserves (such as pa,

marae and urupa) were to be created, but would no longer be under the administration of the

Public Trustee. In addition, the Validation Court was abolished and its function taken over by

the Native Land Court. Wills by Maori had to be signed before a reliable witness to prevent

litigation. In addition, in the cases of intestacy Native freehold land would descend by custom

but other land interests and personal property would devolve according to English Law.

Customary adoption was no longer recognised and Pakeha children could not be adopted by

Maori.468

The Native Land Act 1931 consolidated Native land laws since 1909. The Native [Maori]

Purposes Act 1931 consolidated various enactments regarding Maori land which were in the

Native Land Amendment and Native Land Claims Adjustment Acts, and which were not to be

included in the Native Land Act 1931 consolidation. Apirana Ngata stated that the only new

sections were sections 27 and 118(a).469 It was not until the Màori Affairs Act 1953 that there

was a major review of Native Land Laws.

468 ibid. 469 ibid.

272

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