NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGYOFTHEUNITED STATES

THE WHITE HOUSEJANUARY 1987

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"Freedom, peace and prosperity ...that's what America is allabout. .. for ourselves, our friends,and those people across the globestruggling for democracy~'

Contents

I. An American Perspective ••. 1

II. Fundamentals of U.S. NationalSecurity Strategy ... 3

u.s. SECURITY IN A COMPLEX AND CHANGINGWORLD ... 3

U.S. INTERESTS ... 4

MAJOR OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF u.s.INTERESTS . .. 4

PRINCIPAL THREATS TO u.s. INTERESTS ... 6

III. U.S. Foreign Policy ... 9

CONTINUITY OF BASIC GOALS .• . 9

INSTRUMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY 9

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 11

POLITICAL AND INFORMATIONAL ELEMENTS OFNATIONAL POWER 13

REGIONAL POLICIES 13

Western Hemisphere .•. 13

Western Europe ... 14

East Asia and Pacific ... 15

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ... 16

Middle East and South Asia ... 17

Africa ... 18

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UUDLEY KNOX LIBRARYNAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLMONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943.5002

IV. U.S. Defense Policy ... 19

INTRODUCTION .. . 19

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF U.S. STRENGTHS ANDSOVIET WEAKNESSES . .. 20

MAINTENANCE OF A STRATEGIC DETERRENT. .. 21

ARMS CONTROL . .. 23

MAINTENANCE OF A CONVENTIONALDETERRENT . .. 26

SPACE SUPPORT OF NATIONAL SECURITY . .. 31

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OF NATIONALSECURITY... 31

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT . .. 32

V. Executing the Strategy ... 35

FOREIGN POLICY CAPABILITIES . .. 35

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES . .. 36

INTEGRATING NATIONAL SE(URITYCAPABILITIES . . . 40

VI. Looking Forward to the1990's ... 41

I. An American Perspective

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In the early days of this Administration we laid thefoundation for a more constructive and positiveAmerican role in world affairs by clarifying theessential elements of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Over the intervening years, we have looked objectivelyat our policies and performance on the world scene toensure they reflect the dynamics of a complex andever-changing world. Where course adjustments havebeen required, I have directed changes. But we havenot veered and will not veer from the broad aims thatguide America's leadership role in today's world: .

• Commitment to the goals of world freedom, peaceand prosperity;

• Strong and close relationships with our Alliancepartners around the world;

• Active assistance to those who are struggling fortheir own self-determination, freedom, and areasonable standard of living and development;

• Willingness to be realistic about the Soviet Union,to define publicly the crucial moral distinctionsbetween totalitarianism and democracy; and

• Seeking meaningful ways of working with theSoviet leaders to prevent war and make the world amore peaceful place.

The foundation of a sound National Security Strategy,laid in the early days of this Administration, has heldfirm and served us well. Our economic, political andmilitary power is resurgent. The Western democraciesare revitalized, and across the world nations are turningto democratic ideas and the principles of the freemarket. In all of this, the United States continues toencourage those who seek the benefits of ourdemocratic way of life.

While the United States has been the leader of the freeworld since the end of the Second World War, we have

not acted alone. During that war and in the succeedingfour decades, our strategy has been based onpartnership with those nations that share our commongoals.

As the world has changed over the years, thedifferences between nations striving to developdemocratic institutions and those following thetotalitarian banner have come into sharp focus. Asfuture changes take place in human rights, advancedtechnology, quality of life, and the global economy, ourexample will continue to exert tremendous influenceon mankind. The United States is on the right side ofthis historic struggle and we have tried to build alasting framework for promoting this positive change.

This National Security Strategy Report builds on theefforts of the Administration, Congress, and theAmerican people over the past six years. But anystrategy document is only a guide. To be effective, itmust be firmly rooted in broad national interests andobjectives, supported by an adequate commitment ofresources, and integrate all relevant facets of nationalpower to achieve our national objectives. It mustprovide a framework within which more specific anddetailed objectives can be identified by those executivebranch agencies charged with stewardship over variouselements of the nation's power. And it must guide thecreation of specific plans for attainment of those moredetailed objectives.

For this reason, the annual presentations to theCongress by the Secretary of State and Secretary ofDefense playa key role in supporting the objectivesoutlined in this report. In their respective areas ofForeign and Defense Policy, they develop detailedplans of action to sustain our National Strategy,advance U.S. interests and most importantly, reduce therisk to our nation and our allies.

What follows is this Administration's effort to articulatethe National Security Strategy of the United States-ablueprint for future freedom, peace, and prosperity.

II. Fundamentals of u.s. NationalSecurity Strategy

u.s. SECURITY IN ACOMPLEX ANDCHANGING WORLD

In the years following World War II, the United Statesfaced, for the first time, an inescapable responsibilityfor world affairs. No longer protected by nearly perfectfortresses of oceans, allied with countries devastated bywar, and presented with irrefutable evidence of Sovietexpansionist aspirations, the United States shoulderedthe dual burden of facilitating the restoration of a worldeconomic order and arresting the spread of the SovietUnion's peculiar brand of totalitarianism andcommunism.

The United States responded to the threats posed byMoscow with a policy of containment. Containment, asa strategy for world peace, entailed three distinctelements.

The first element, U.S. defense policy, involved forwarddeployment of military forces as necessary to deter andcontain Soviet military expansion. In practice, thismeant keeping, for the first time in our history, largemilitary formations on the soil of allies in WesternEurope and East Asia. As Soviet nuclear weaponsdelivery systems grew, it also required a large strategicforce, to augment the deterrence provided by theconventional forces of the United States and its allies.Thus our military security system rested primarily ontwo strategic zones, Europe and East Asia, backed byour nuclear deterrent forces.

The second element, u.s. international economicpolicy, involved economic recovery programs for

Western Europe·and Japan. It also required U.S.leadership in establishing and managing theinternational monetary system, and encouragingregional and global free-trade agreements.

The third element, U.s. policy toward the Third World,included both economic and security assistance. It alsohad a profound political component: decolonization,self-determination, and support for the evolution towarddemocracy. The Soviet Union opposed us in the ThirdWorld with a policy of "wars of national liberation;'through which they sought to exploit the instability ofemerging nations to establish Marxist-Leninist regimesbased on the Soviet model.

The three postwar decades witnessed importantsuccesses for our National Strategy. World war wasavoided. Europe and Japan regained their prosperity,with the help of massive U.s. assistance, and most ofthe Third World was decolonized. Containment,however, was an expensive policy. But because theUnited States had the lion's share of the developedworld's economic power, we could carry the burden.

The postwar era came to an end during the 1970s. Thecauses of its demise were threefold. First, the success ofU.s. economic policies in Europe and East Asiadramatically changed the distribution of wealth andpower within our alliance systems. The United Statesno longer had an overwhelming economic position vis­a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland. Andour success in deterring Soviet military aggression inthese two strategic zones created growing public beliefthat direct Soviet aggression in these two regions hadbecome less likely.

Second, the Soviet military buildup and the projectionof Soviet power into C~ba, Nicaragua, the Middle East,

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Southeast and Southwest Asia, and Africa requiredchanges in strategy for implementing our containmentpolicy. Particularly significant was the Soviet Union'sattainment of strategic nuclear parity with the UnitedStates.

Third, the political awakening in the Third Worldcreated civil wars and regional conflicts that threatenedto draw the United States and the Soviet Union intodirect military confrontations. And economicdevelopments, particularly in the energy area,contributed to political instability and causeddestabilizing effects in the international monetarysystem.

In such a significantly different world, the foundationsof strategic planning had to be reconsidered. U.S.military superiority in strategic forces no longer existsand the continued growth of Soviet military capabilitiesapplicable to Europe, the Persian Gulf, and otherimportant areas, pose a continuing threat to regionalsecurity.

Today it is more important than ever before that ourNational Security Strategy be based on a solidunderstanding of U.S. interests and objectives and arealistic approach to dealing with the Soviet Union andother threats to U.s. security.

u.s. INTERESTSU.S. National Security Strategy reflects our nationalinterests and presents a broad plan for achieving thenational objectives that support those interests. The keynational interests which our strategy seeks to assureand protect include:

1. The survival of the United States as a free andindependent nation, with its fundamental values andinstitutions intact.

2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy.

3. The growth of freedom, democratic institutions, andfree market economies throughout the world, linkedby a fair and open international trading system.

4. A stable and secure world, free of major threats toU.s. interests.

5. The health and vigor of U.S. alliance relationships.

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MAJOR OBJECTIVESIN SUPPORT OFU.s. INTERESTSU.s. national security objectives are statements ofbroad goals which support and advance nationalinterests. As such, they are not intended to be appliedmechanically or automatically, but constitute a generalguide for policy development in specific situationswhich call for the coordinated use of national power.The principal objectives which support our nationalinterests are:

1. To maintain the security of our nation and our allies.The United States, in cooperation with its allies, mustseek to deter any aggression that could threaten thatsecurity, and, should deterrence fail, must be preparedto repel or defeat any military attack and end theconflict on terms favorable to the United States, itsinterests, and its allies.

Specifically:o To deter hostile attack of the United States, its

citizens, military forces, or allies and to defeat attackif deterrence fails.

o To maintain the strength and vitality of u.s. alliancerelationships.

o To deal effectively with threats to the security of theUnited States and its citizens short of armed conflict,including the threat of international terrorism.

o To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.o To reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear

weapons by strengthening our conventional forces,pursuing equitable and verifiable arms controlagreements, and developing technologies forstrategic defense.

o To assure unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans andspace.

o To prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmassby the USSR (or any other hostile power, orcoalition of powers).

o To force the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of itsdomestic economic shortcomings in order todiscourage excessive Soviet military expendituresand global adventurism.

o To foster closer relations with the People's Republicof China.

2. To respond to the challenges of the global economy.Economic interdependence has brought tremendousbenefits to the United States, but also presents newpolicy problems which must be resolved. Since ourresource dependence has grown, the potentialvulnerability of our supply lines is an issue of concern.Although continuing U.s. economic growth is helpinglift the world out of recession, economic slowdowncontinues in many countries. We must devoteattention to critical global problems, which ifunresolved or unattended, may affect U.S. interests inthe future. Many of these problems such as ThirdWorld debt, the international narcotics trade, andgrowing protectionism are currently having an impacton U.S. interests.

Specifically:

o To promote a strong, prosperous and competitiveU.s. economy, in the context of a stable and growingworld economy.

o To ensure U.S. access to foreign markets, and toensure the United States and its allies and friendsaccess to foreign energy and mineral resources.

o To promote a well-functioning internationaleconomic system with minimal distortions to tradeand investment, stable currencies, and broadlyagreed and respected rules for managing andresolving differences.

3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy,freedom, and human rights throughout the world. Aforeign policy that ignored the fate of millions aroundthe world who seek freedom would be a betrayal ofour national heritage. Our own freedom, and that ofour allies, could never be secure in a world wherefreedom was threatened everywhere else.

Specifically:

o To promote the growth of national independenceand free institutions throughout the world.

o To encourage and support aid, trade, andinvestment programs that promote economicdevelopment and the growth of free a·nd humanesocial and political orders in the Third World.

o To encourage liberalizing tendencies within theSoviet Union and its client states.

4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S.interests in troubled regions of the world. Regionalconflicts which involve allies or friends of the UnitedStates may threaten U.S. interests, and freguently carrythe risk of escalation to a wider conflict. Conflicts, orattempts to subvert friendly governments, which areinstigated or supported by the Soviets and their clientstates, represent a particularly serious threat to U.S.interests.

Specifically:

o To maintain stable global and regional militarybalances vis-a-vis the USSR and states aligned with it.

o To aid threatened states in resisting Soviet or Soviet­sponsored subversion or aggression.

o To eliminate, where possible, the root causes ofregional instabilities which create the risk ofmajor war.

o To neutralize the efforts of the Soviet Union toincrease its influence in the world and weaken thelinks between the USSR and its client states in theThird World.

o To aid in combatting threats to the stability offriendly governments and institutions frominsurgencies, state-sponsored terrorism and theinternational trafficking of illicit drugs.

5. To build effective and favorable relationships with allnations with whom there is a basis of shared concern.In the world today, there are over 150 nations. Not oneof them is the equal of the United States in total poweror wealth, but each is sovereign, and most, if not all,touch U.s. interests directly or indirectly.

Specifically:

o To support the formation of associations of statesfriendly to U.S. interests using the full range ofdiplomatic, political, economic, and informationalefforts.

o To make major international institutions moreeffective in promoting peace, world order andpolitical, economic and social progress.

o To explore the possibility of improved relations withthose nations hostile to us in order to reduce thechance of future conflict.

• To strengthen U.S. influence throughout the world.

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Our National Security Strategy must be resolute insupporting U.S. interests and objectives. It must alsotake into account the many threats and instabilities oftoday's complex and changing world.

PRINCIPAL THREATS TOU.s. INTERESTS

The most significant threat to U.S. security and nationalinterests is the global challenge posed by the SovietUnion. While only a handful of people in the Politburocan claim with any confidence to know the Kremlin'sprecise near-term, tactical plans, the long-term strategicdirection of Soviet foreign policy is clearer. Motivatedby the demands of a political system held together anddominated by Marxist-Leninist ideology and thepolitical party which represents it, Moscow seeks toalter the existing international system and establishSoviet global hegemony. These long-range Sovietobjectives constitute the overall conceptual frameworkof Soviet foreign and defense policy.

Fundamental differences in economic, social, andpolitical beliefs and objectives lead to an essentiallyadversarial relationship between the United States andthe Soviet Union. The two sides nevertheless share thecommon goal of avoiding direct confrontation andreducing the threat of nuclear war. The real challengefor American statecraft is how best to realize thiscommonality of interests, so as to preserve peace,without jeopardizing our national security orabandoning our commitment 1:0 the cause of freedomand justice.

To execute its'expansionist policies, the USSR hasperpetuated a domestic political system of centralizedtotalitarian control and mobili:zed and organized thissystem to support its international objectives.Internationally, the Soviets have continued to assistgroups waging so-called wars of "national liberation:,sponsor with arms and militarv training internationalterrorist groups, promote and ,~xploit regionalinstabilities and conduct an aggressive and illegal warin Afghanistan. In numerous other places around theglobe, Soviet advisors and combat troops have also

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engaged in conduct in violation of internationalagreements.

The Soviets have undertaken an unprecedented militarybuildup that poses a continuing threat to the UnitedStates and our allies. The Soviet leadership clearlyattaches the greatest importance to its military strength,which has been the most significant source of theUSSR's influence on the international scene. Fordecades the Soviet Union has allocated adisproportionate percentage of national income to thebuildup of its military forces. It now has a uniformedmilitary of more than five million (excluding more thanone million border guards and other security forces). Itis estimated that military expenditures currently absorb15-17 percent of the total Soviet GNP.

Soviet military power permits Moscow to provide astrong defense of the homeland while facilitating directand indirect participation in regional conflicts beyondSoviet borders. Furthermore, Soviet military resourcesincreasingly are used to influence and broker thepolicies of other countries and to promote instability.

The evidence of the relationship between the SovietUnion and the growth of worldwide terrorism is nowconclusive. Even though the Soviet Union does nothave direct control over most of the terrorist groups, itsupplies massive amounts of arms, money, andadvisory assistance to revolutionary forces engaged interrorist activities. The Soviets attempt to disguise suchsupport by using middle men-radical governmentssuch as Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Syria, andLibya, which deal directly with radical terrorists andinsurgents. Whether Moscow is providing supportdirectly or indirectly, the ultimate targets of radicalterrorism are the United States, Western Europe, Japan,and other moderate, proWestern governments.

The Soviet Union in recent years has become muchmore sophisticated in wielding the instruments ofnational power. Despite significant weaknesses in theSoviet economy, the Politburo actively employseconomic instruments in its global strategy. It usestrade with the West to obtain economic leverage,technology, and foreign exchange. The acquisition ofmilitary-related advanced technology through legal and

illegal means, is especially important to the Soviets, toshorten weapon development times, reduce costs, andto compensate for the weakness of the Soviet economy.Acquisition of production technology is equallyimportant to the Soviets, to improve the efficiency oftheir defense industry. Access to Western manufacturingequipment, processes, and know-how has enabledSoviet defense plants to introduce some advancedweapons into production up to five years earlier thanwould have been otherwise possible. The Soviets alsoattempt to obtain long-term economic agreementswhich build relationships of dependency on the USSR(e.g., those relating to the supply of energy resources toWestern Europe).

In addition, the Soviets have established a massivepolitical influence apparatus. This apparatus includesthe world's largest propaganda machine, incorporatingovert and clandestine activities in all types of media;funding and 'support of foreign communist parties andfront organizations; political and ideologicalindoctrination of foreign students, government officials,terrorists, and military personnel; and perceptionsmanagement of foreign visitors to the USSR. It includesseparate efforts to conduct "active measures;' includingdisinformation, forgeries, the use of political agents ofinfluence, and other deceptive operations.

While the Soviets cannot be branded as instigators ofall revolutionary movements, their strategy clearly is toexploit domestic vulnerabilities in foreign countries topromote the emergence of regimes under Sovietinfluence or control. All this is accomplished under therubric of "peaceful coexistence" with the United Statesand the West, defined as a continuing contest in whichall forms of struggle are permissible short of all-out war.

While we remain properly concerned with the Sovietthreat, we must not neglect other destabilizinginternational threats and problems which can seriouslydamage U.s. interests if not properly addressed. Theseinclude non-communist nations with oppressivegovernments and ideologies opposed to ours;international economic concerns of massive worlddebt, trade imbalances, and shifts in comparativeadvantage in our interdependent global economicsystem; the global population explosion and relatedfood, water, and poverty problems; the proliferation ofnuclear weapons; drug trafficking; and human rightsviolations, to name only a few.

An additional, threat, which is particularly insidious innature and growing in scope, is internationalterrorism-a worldwide phenomenon that is becomingincreasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state­supported. Terrorism is likely to be a prominent featureof the international landscape for the remainder of thiscentury. It directly attacks our democratic values,undermines our diplomatic efforts for peacefulsolutions to conflicts, and erodes the foundations ofcivilized societies. Effectively countering terrorism is amajor national security objective of the United States.

A solid understanding of our national interests andobjectives, against the backdrop of major threats tothose interests, is essential to devising sound strategies.The next two chapters will discuss the principalelements of our foreign and defense policies, and theways in which they contribute to the achievement ofnational security objectives. The effective integration ofour foreign and defense policies provides thefoundation for our National Security Strategy.

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III. U.S. Foreign Policy

CONTINUITY OFBASIC GOALS

Our foreign policy reflects the basic thrust of ourNational Security Strategy-the promotion of ourdemocratic way of life. History has shown usrepeatedly that only in democracies is there inherentrespect for individual liberties and rights. In thepostwar world, democracies have also exhibitedextraordinary economic vitality. With their moreflexible economies, democracies have continued todemonstrate the efficiency and dynamism necessary tomaintain strength in a complex and difficultinternational economic environment.

If we are to achieve the kind of world we all hope tosee, democracy must continue to prosper and expand.Today, in a number of countries in varying stages ofeconomic development, democracy is growingstronger. The United States must be a beacon fordemocracy. Unfortunately, many in the world areprevented from seeing our beacon. For many more, ithas been distorted; and still others, who are able to seeit and are inspired by it, need help in the form ofpractical assistance.

We have provided assistance before-in postwarWestern Europe and Asia-and we must again. Whatwe helped achieve in those areas constitutes one of themost remarkable, positive chapters of recent history.Our support for democracy should not be hidden; itmust be active and visible. Active support ofdemocratic forces in the past two decades hasdemonstrated the value of this legitimate and importantactivity. The substantial support provided .by West

European democratic parties significantly aidedthe successful drives of democratic movements inSpain and Portugal.

We are interested in assisting constructive changewhich can lead to greater political stability, socialjustice, and economic progress. Change must comefrom within, following a path dictated by national andlocal traditions. 'In some instances, assistance andguidance is better provided by other democracies ormultilaterally. Patience, respect for different culturesand recognition of our own limitations must guide oureffort.

INSTRUMENTS OFFOREIGN POLICY

The United States has an exceptionally diverse array oftools for protecting its international interests and forsupporting the drive toward democracy across theglobe. It is possible that no other nation has ever beencomparably endowed. These instruments are normallymost effective when used in concert with others. All ofthem must be adapted to changing situations. Theresurgence of our national strength in this decade hasbeen broadly based. It will endure into the next decadeonly if we protect this base and ensure that the toolsavailable to us are properly sustained and effectivelyused. The separate, but interrelated tools on which thesuccess of our foreign policy depends are:

Moral and political example. American spirit andprosperity represents a critical challenge to the

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ideology and the practical record of our adversaries:free, pluralist societies work. This power of examplerepresents a potent advantage of American society, butwe should not leave its expression to chance. It is inour interest to spread this message in an organizedw~.

Military strength and economic vitality. A strong U.S.military capability is essential to maintaining the stable,secure environment in which diplomacy can beeffective and our adversaries are deterred. America'seconomic power sustains this strength and fortifies ourrelations with the other countries that share our interestin a free and open international order.

Alliance relationships. The pursuit of American goalsdepends on cooperation with like-minded internationalpartners. This relationship enhances our strength andmitigates the understandable reluctance of theAmerican people to shou Ider secu rity burdens alone.The predictable difficulties that arise from time to timein all alliance relationships must be measured againstthe enormous value that these ties bring us and ourfriends.

Security assistance. By helping friends, allies, andthose targeted by our adversaries acquire the means todefend themselves, we limit the potential of our owninvolvement in dangerous conflicts. Security assistanceabroad is productive investment in our own security. Itaids deterrence, promotes regional stability, helps toensure access to vital overseas military facilities, andlessens our own military requirements. Resolute use ofthis valuable foreign policy tool directly promotes oursecurity interests.

Economic assistance. In the decades since World War II,America has contributed nearly $200 billion to theeconomic development of other countries. Thesefinancial resources have played a vital role in ensuringcritical U.S. objectives are met. A well structuredeconomic assistance program provides essentialsupport for our world leadership position.

Trade policy. The impact of economic assistance ismaximized when it is matched by a sound trade policythat facilitates the best use of our assistance. Moreover,a trade policy that aggravates the economic difficu Itiesof others may only increase the need for future

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American assistance. Adherence to the principles of anopen and fair world trading order ensures thatcountries acquire the economic strength to stand ontheir own feet, and contributes to our own well-beingthrough mutually beneficial trade. Securityconsiderations Will sometimes require restrained tradeand allied cooperation to prevent enhancing themilitary capabilities of our adversaries.

Science and Technology Cooperation. For mostcountries, access to advanced scientific andtechnological resources is critical to prosperity andlong-term economic growth. U.S. world leadership andvast resources in science and technology constituteimportant strategic assets to strengthen existing tieswith friends and allies, and promote positiverelationships with emerging nations.

Private investment in developing economies. The freeflow of international investment is as central to globaleconomic growth as an open trading order. U.S. privateinvestment in less developed countries contributessignificantly to their economic growth and promotessocial stability. At a time when developing countriesare striving to meet their debt-servicing obligations andthe resources of our national budget are underpressure, the contribution of private-sector investmentassumes increased importance.

Diplomatic mediation. In regions where conflictthreatens our interests and those of our friends,political efforts are essential to ending Violence,promoting freedom and national self-determination,and laying the foundations for future stability. Theinitiatives of American diplomacy take their strengthfrom effective and integrated use of the other toolsalready discussed, and from the ability of U.s.representatives to act credibly as mediators of disputes.Making clear the firmness of our commitments tofriends and allies will, in fact, increase the incentives oftheir adversaries to negotiate seriously.

International Organizations. Multilateral diplomacyand participation in international organizations providean opportunity to address common global problemsand share the task of solving them. Skillful U.s.diplomacy within these organizations has served toenhance our overall goals on issues such as

peacekeeping, promotion of human rights, andencouraging the development of free economic andpolitical systems.

Support for Freedom Fighters. The tools of foreignpolicy must encompass the special needs of those whoresist the Soviet-style regimes implanted in Third Worldcountries in the 1970's and 1980's. America has a longhistory of private and government support to groupsseeking national independence and freedom. This is avital and important effort, as aggressive Marxist-leninistregimes clearly threaten international peace andstability. We seek to advance the cause of freedom anddemocracy, and to demonstrate to the Soviets that theiractions aimed at spreading Marxist-leninisttotalitarianism will bring them no enduring gain.

INTERNATIONALECONOMIC POLICY

The United States supports market-oriented policiesthat foster economic growth, both domestically andinternationally. The economic growth of the UnitedStates is the cornerstone that ensures our strength andpermits human potential to flourish. Our policies ofeconomic growth have provided the underlying base ofsupport for the most important element in our NationalSecurity Strategy in the past six years-the revitalizationof U.S. military power. The dynamic growth of the u.s.economy is the envy of much of the world. We arenow working in this country to rebuild Americanproductivity, sustain our scientific and technologicalleadership, make the most of our human potential, andmove into the 21st century with an even more efficient,capable and competitive American economy. Ournation will achieve these goals with hard work,determination, and a commitment to the revitalizationof American industry.

The United States places reliance on private enterpriseand initiative. This philosophy leads to higher livingstandards and concern for the economic advancementof the individual. Our National Security Strategy in theinternational economic area seeks to support andpromote market-oriented economic policies which willmaximize economic opportunity and individualwelfare.

It is important to understand why we stress privateenterprise as the basis of our international economicpolicy. This is one of the prime areas in which theUnited States-and the free world generally-differ inall respects from the communist world. The Sovieteconomic model is characterized by the ineffectivenessof the centralized command economy, the failure ofcollective enterprises, and the inability to provideadequate standards of living for the mass of Sovietcitizens. The Soviet model of economic organizationdoes not work and will not work.

Under the leadership of General Secretary Gorbachev,the Soviet Union has announced that it is attemptingfundamental reforms in the management of economicpolicy. Recently, Gorbachev invited the Western privatesector, and U.S. business leaders in particular, todevelop a long-term stake in the future of the Sovieteconomy. In light of this Soviet initiative, we need toask ourselves what kind of Soviet Union we wish to seein the next twenty or thirty years. Clearly, we can affectthe outcome only at the margin. But we should notignore new opportunities for increasing economicinteraction between our two societies. Greatereconomic freedom for the Soviet people is in theinterest of the West as long as it does not foster greaterSoviet investment in military capability.

But we must approach such interaction with a sense ofrealism. There are some areas where it would clearlynot serve constructive purposes. Soviet membership inthe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAD), forexample, would not be in the best interests of the Westat present. In addition to the danger of GADpoliticization, the USSR's state-direeted trading systemis fundamentally incompatible with the free-marketorientation of the GAD international trading system.Suggestions by Soviet officials about possible USSRmembership in the World Bank or InternationalMonetary Fund should be treated with caution forsimilar reasons. \/lie would oppose such membershipunder present circumstances.

The USSR's effort to broaden its foreign economicrelations forms an integral part of Soviet nationalsecurity strategy. In addition to aiding the Sovieteconomy, it is designed to exploit dependence oftrading partners and enhance Soviet power and

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influence generally. Trade with the West can also

provide access to advanced technology which

facilitates the Soviet military buildup. Non-communistgovernments need to display greater discipline in

weaving security considerations into the fabric of East­

West commercial relations.

Specifically:

• As recognized in the Helsinki Accords, government­to-government cooperation in the economic sphereshould be dependent on progress in other areas of

East-West relations, including Eastern observance of

human rights.

• COCOM controls on strategic technologies shouldbe maintained, streamlined and enforced to restrain

the ability of the Soviet Union and its allies to match

or overtake Western defense capabilities.

• The International Energy Agency (lEA) shouldcontinue its efforts to reduce dependence among

member countries on insecure energy supplies.

Early in our Administration, we laid the internationaleconomic groundwork for greater cooperation with our

allies. We have attempted to foster the view that the

future belongs to those who allow free enterprise toguide economic decisions and not to those regimes

which allow bureaucratic functionaries to set the

course of economic development. Throughout these six

years, we have witnessed these principles move fromconcept into reality. In France, economic liberalization

is steadily progressing. In Japan, slowly but surely, tradeand capital markets are being opened. In Germany and

the United Kingdom, new economic courses are being

set to sustain growth with low inflation.

We believe that market-oriented policies are key to

greater growth in America and throughout the world

over the long-term. We have worked diligently to resist

protectionist tendencies both at home and abroad,since protectionism will harm all free nations. _

Immediate as well as long term costs would more than

offset any short-term benefits which might be gained.

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We have encouraged market-based energy policies and

more open energy trade within the International Energy

Agency. We have been the prime movers in laying the

groundwork for a new round of negotiations in the

GAIT that will open markets for our exports of goods

and services and stimulate greater growth, efficiency

and worldwide job opportunities. We have forged

stronger ties with our Asian partners by emphasizing

the future role of U.s.-Pacific economic relations.

The industrial nations of the West have become

increasingly interdependent. None of these countries

acting alone can effectively resolve long-term economic

problems. The United States and its allies must work

together if we, and the rest of the world, are to prosper

and grow.

Enhancing world economic growth, opening markets,

and ameliorating the developing country debt situation

are long-term goals that can be met only through

sound economic policies, prudent lending, and direct

investment and aid strategies that will elicit the broad

economic development and growing markets needed to

sustain long-term prosperity. Significant contributions of

capital and know-how through aid, investment,

technology transfer and training are as much an

ingredient of regional peace and collective security as

are deterrent forces and defense alliances. This

redefinition of the traditional concept of

"burdensharing" is in keeping with the capabilities of

the United States and our allies and the evolving

responsibilities of shared leadership.

In short, our international economic policy is built

around the belief that economic freedom is not the

sole possession of a chosen few, but the universal right

of all people. We will use our economic power and

political will to preserve and nurture our vision of the

world's economic future, which belongs to free people,

free governments and free economic enterprises.

POLITICAL ANDINFORMATIONAL ELEMENTSOF NATIONAL POWER

We are faced with a profound challenge to our national

security in the political field. This challenge is to fight

the war of ideas and to help support the political

infrastructure of world democracies. To accomplish this

we must be as committed to the maintenance of our

political defense as we are to our military defense.

Public opinion polls consistently find that two-thirds of

the American electorate normally take no interest in

foreign policy. Moreover, only a bare majority today

believes that this country needs to play an active part

in world affairs-and that majority is eroding. There is

no natural domestic constituency for foreign policy­

we must build one.

The instruments to implement such an approach

include a number of traditional foreign policy agencies

such as the Departments of State and Defense, Agency

for International Development (AID), and u.s.Information Agency (USIA), plus several less traditional

participants including the Departments of Commerce

and Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).

Another actor in the field of political, informational

and communications activity is the private sector.

During the past six years, th'e private sector has been

energized as a key element in the projection of U.S.

foreign policy goals. leading private citizens and

groups are taking steps to identify and organize the

many local forces throughout the United States that

have a direct stake in the nation's relations with the rest

of the world. The private voluntary organizations in

world affairs are doing an indispensible job of public

education. They have our strongest encouragement and

support.

While we focus on the needs of an effective political

and informational policy, we must keep in mind that

the Soviet Union has a most aggressive public

deception and propaganda program, using a widerange of techniques aimed not only at the Third World,but also at our alliance partners. The current Sovietregime has increased the range and intensity of Sovietpublic diplomacy and propaganda efforts. We mustactively counter Soviet propaganda and activemeasures using the full range of U.S. informationalprograms,

Our political and informational strategy must alsoreach to the peoples of denied areas, particularly theUSSR and Eastern Europe-to encourage hope forchange and to educate publics on the benefits of freeinstitutions. This is achieved through the electronicmedia, written materials, and the increased contact andexchange of ideas that come from such contact. Theprocess of gradual change will take place inside, butthe stimulant and the vision of "how things could be"must come from outside in a closed society. This is thevision of a nation which believes that a world ofdemocracies is a safer world, and one where therespect for the dignity of all men has a better chance tobe realized.

REGIONAL POLICIES

Western Hemisphere. The defense of North America isthe nation's most fundamental security concern. Sincethe Second World War this has entailed a hemisphericsecurity system, composed of a strong u.s. nucleardeterrent, greater cooperation with Canada, and thepromotion of collective security arrangements withlatin America. New threats and new opportunities fordemocracy in the Western Hemisphere require that thistraditional approach be revitalized by building on theinterests we share with our democratic Caribbean,North, Central and South American neighbors.

Aggressive Marxist regimes in Cuba and Nicaraguahave made the Western Hemisphere, once consideredindisputably secure for the United States, an area ofstrategic opportunity for the Soviet Union. The fragilityof social and political arrangements in latin Americaand the presence of these two Soviet client states, withtheir support for guerrilla movements in other latinnations and their ties to international terrorism,

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promise continued instability and conflict in theregion. This situation is compounded by continuingeconomic and debt-servicing problems, the ongoingproblem of the drug trade and the growing politicalstrength of the drug traffickers who-often in collusionwith local guerrilla groups-have begun to pose seriouschallenges for the reborn Latin democracies.

U.S. national security policy for the WesternHemisphere seeks to address these problems within thebroader framework of the promotion of democracy,fostering economic development, strengtheningdialogue and diplomacy within and among areacountries, and contributing to defensive capabilitiesthat allow progress without debilitating externalinterference. Many of the current challenges for theUnited States fall outside of the formal collectivesecurity arrangements created in previous decades. Ournational security requires an emphasis on political andeconomic support for the hemisphere's democraciesand diplomatic initiatives to strengthen alliances.

Western Europe. The security of Western Europeconstitutes a vital interest of the United States. Sharedvalues, the Soviet threat, and U.S.-European economicinterdependence underscore the importance ofcollective defense epitomized by NATO.

The two greatest dangers to Western Europe's securitytoday are the proximity of massive Soviet conventionaland nuclear forces, and the vulnerability of WesternEurope's oil supply, some 60 percent of which movesby sea from the Persian Gulf.

The cohesion of the NATO Alliance remains strong inthe face of these challenges, and is reinforced by anintensive process of consultation on the full range ofsecurity issues. Over the past twelve months, there havebeen almost thirty high-level consultations at NATO.This intense process, to which we remain fullycommitted, has contributed to the fundamentAlliance consensus on its approach to East-Westrelations on issues ranging from arms control to humanrights. The common Alliance approach, set forth inrecent NATO Ministerial communiques,combines a commitment to preserving the strength

14

necessary to defend our vital interests with a readinessto work toward improved relations through a realisticdialogue with the Soviet Union.

The Alliance has been measurably strengthened inrecent years. The United States has devoted specialattention to rebuilding its Alliance relationships, andour efforts to reinvigorate the American economy haveprovided a major impetus for growth in WesternEurope. Other milestones include the Spanish entryinto NATO in 1982 and last year's Spanish referendumin support of continued membership. Through its 1983and subsequent Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF)deployments, the Alliance demonstrated its resolve toprotect its basic interests in the face of Sovietintimidation. In 1984, the Allies launched a program toimprove conventional defense capabilities, and morerecently have focused increased attention onarmaments cooperation. In 1985-86, Allied firmnessand solidarity helped to bring the Soviets back to thenegotiating table in Geneva and to promote progress inthe talks themselves.

Despite the basic vigor and strength of the AtlanticAlliance, NATO relationships have come under strainfrom several quarters. The challenges include, forexample, protectionism and trade deficits, differentmethods of dealing with terrorism;burdensharing, andat times, differing assessments of the Soviet threat.Moreover, the foreign policy priorities of Western.European governments with respect to developments inAsia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America do notalways coincide with U.S. priorities, in part because theUnited States must adopt a global outlook.

Doubts have sometimes been expressed, especially inthe late 1970's, over the continued validity of the U.S.commitment to Europe's defense. The successfulimplementation of NATO's 1979 INF dual-track decisionthwarted the most recent Soviet attempt to decouplethe u.s. security guarantee from the defense of Europe,and has served as a major incentive for the Soviets toengage in serious negotiations for real reductions inintermediate-range nuclear forces. Whatever theoutcome of the INF negotiations, flexible response willrequire the continuing pre.sence of U.S. nuclearweapons in Europe. Nonetheless, NATO has

consistently worked to keep its nuclear arsenal at theminimum level necessary for deterrence and isproceeding with the reductions in its stockpilemandated by the 1983 Montebello decision.

The challenge before us is to maintain the momentumwe have achieved and continue to manage theinevitable strains in our Alliance relationships. With acommon commitment to the values and interestswhich constitute the bedrock of the Alliance,imagination, and political courage, the United Statesand its Allies will succeed in building an even strongerbulwark against Soviet aggression and intimidation.

East Asia and Pacific. The United States is a Pacificpower and a proud member of the area of the globethat has led the world's economies in growth. Sovietmilitary power in Asia and the Pacific has growndramatically, but the U.S. response goes far beyondtechnical issues of relative military power. The goal isto strengthen our natural political and economicassociations, while proceeding steadily with necessarymodernization of our military forces deployed in thearea.

Cooperation with Japan is basic to u.s. relationships inthe region. The U.s.-Japan Mutual Security Treatyformalizes our defense ties, proViding a securityfoundation for the broad spectrum of economic, socialand political associations which join us.

In the security area, Japan's recent redefinition of itsself-defense goals-especially as they relate to sea laneprotection - is of particular importance. Japanese forcesare developing capabilities that can make a significantcontribution to deterrence. At the same time, Japan'sdefense spending remains small as a share of its hugeeconomy, and more rapid progress is needed towardJapan's defense goals. But the constant and substantialgrowth of that spending over the last fifteen years, andparticularly over the last five years, is significant. Japan'srecent decision to spend more than one percent of itsGNP on defense is especially noteworthy.

Japan is now the world's second greatest economicpower. This development is reflected in increasedJapanese expenditures on foreign assistance, which itcontinues to target on key strategic countries. At the

same time, Japanese economic relations have becomea source of political tension. The Japanese tradesurplus is the biggest in history. This surplus cannot besustained and must be brought into better balance. Weare working together on many fronts to do this.

Our alliance with the Republic of Korea remains ofexceptional importance. North Korea still has armedforces that far exceed those of the South in quantity, arenewly strengthened by additional Soviet weapons, andare in the hands of a government whose aggressivedemeanor and tendency to act unexpectedly is wellknown. Our own military presence in the Republic ofKorea is of importance, both for regional stability andfor local security, which is essential to that country'sremarkable economic development. It now faces acritical period of political development as well, as itmoves toward a first-ever peaceful change ofgovernment when President Chun's term will becompleted in 1988. In this process, the United Stateshopes to use its influence to encourage Koreans in thisdemocratic change. We do so, however, in careful waysthat respect Korean traditions and political realities, andare mindful of the constant security threat.

China's importance speaks for itself. Its attainment ofrapid economic growth, while simultaneously makingbasic economic, social and political changes, isanother great achievement in its remarkable history.The United States seeks a close, friendly, andcooperative relationship with the People's Republic ofChina, outside any alliance, and without any illusionsthat one is a political or strategic "card" for the other.Simply put, both of us recognize the importance ofeach to the other in the many shared areas ofagreement, even as we appreciate the diversity of ourpolitical systems.

In the Philippines, the new government faces majorand inherited political, security and economicchallenges. Through all of the tools available to us, weare det, ""1ined to help this key Pacific ally to overcomethese problems so it can once again achieve economicgrowth, counter the threat of a serious insurgency andstrengthen democratic government.

Our second treaty ally in Southeast Asia, Thailand, isthe ASEAN frontline state bordering Cambodia, now

15

occupied by the Vietnamese and the site of an activeCambodian resistance coalition struggling to gain self­determination for the Khmer people. In support ofThailand, which also shoulders the major refugeeburden in Southeast Asia, we will continue our closesecurity cooperation to deter any potential aggressionand maintain our support of eligible refugees. We willalso continue our cooperative effort with Thailand tosuppress narcotic trafficking.

The United States views the continued occupation ofCambodia by Vietnamese forces as unacceptable as itundermines regional efforts towards development,peace and stability. We also oppose the return of theKhmer Rouge to power in Cambodia. We will continueour strong support of ASEAN's quest for a peacefulpolitical solution and for the non-Communist elementsof the resistance coalition. Under our initiative onregional problems at the United Nations, we areprepared to playa constructive role in the context of aCambodian settlement.

Despite acute and serious differences with Vietnam,through bilateral discussions we have made moreprogress in accounting for our missing servicemen inthe past two years than at any time since the end of thewar. Similarly, our bilateral discussions on thehumanitarian question of refugees, reeducation ofinternees and Amerasians will continue with theobjective of a humane solution to these complexquestions. We will not, however, resume normalizationof relations with Vietnam until Hanoi agrees to aCambodian settlement involving withdrawal of itsoccupation forces.

We have seen a modest but welcome improvement inrelations between Laos and the United States. Ourprimary measure of their sincerity to improve relationsis further, accelerated, cooperative efforts to account forour servicemen still missing.

In the South Pacific, our longstanding alliance withAustralia under the ANZUS Treaty remains the keystoneof our foreign policy in the area. The United States hasbeen especially aware of the needs of the South Pacificindependent states. We recently reached agreement onthe key elements of an historic fisheries treaty. We arepleased with this agreement which creates a solid

16

foundation for future friendship and cooperation. Webelieve that the package of U.S. assistance that is linkedto the treaty will encourage development of the islandeconomies. We also were recently able to celebrate thecreation of a new U.S. Commonwealth-The NorthernMarianas-and two new freely associated states, theFederated States of Micronesia and the Republic of theMarshalls. We welcome these new participants to thePacific Ocean community.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As mentionedearlier, the most significant threat to u.s. security andnational interests is the global challenge posed by theSoviet Union. There is no doubt that Moscow aspiresto alter the existing international system and establishSoviet global hegemony. These Soviet long-rangeobjectives are underwritten by Soviet concepts offoreign and defense policy. Our policy for dealing withthe Soviets rests on three guiding principles:

• Realism, which means that we must recognize thenature of the Soviet system and deal frankly andforthrightly with problems in our relationship.

• Strength, which is more than military power, butincludes political determination, the strength ofalliances, and economic health as well. The SovietUnion respects strength and takes advantage ofweakness.

• Dialogue, which means that we are prepared todiscuss all the issues that divide us, and are readyto work for practical and fair solutions on a basiscompatible with our own fundamental interests.

Consistent with this approach, we are engaged indialogues with the Soviets on four basic elements ofour relationship: human rights; the reduction ofregional conflicts; areas of mutually beneficialcooperation; and arms control. In all areas, progress isslow.

At the same time, through coordinated employment ofmany elements of our national power, we seek to deterfurther Soviet direct and indirect aggression, and

.achieve a lessened Soviet reliance on the use or threatof force. We will continue to counter Sovietexpansionism worldWide.. No additional country hasfallen to Soviet aggression since 1981, and the Soviets

have been more cautious in undertaking new militaryadventures in recent years, though they and theirproxies remain active in such areas as Afghanistan,Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua.

In short, we have put in place a policy designed forlong-term management of U.SrSoviet relations in orderto pursue our interests without the rapid fluctuations orunrealistic illusions which characterized some periodsin the past. The fundamental fact is that the u.s.-Sovietrelationship is essentially adversarial, and will remainso for the foreseeable future. But both sides agree thatwe have a responsibility to ensure that this relationshipremains peaceful. We are ready for the long effort andsteady course required to pursue our national interestsin this fashion.

The United States has important political andeconomic interests in Eastern Europe. We have neverrecognized .the division of Europe as either lawful orpermanent. There was no agreement at Yalta to divideEurope into "spheres of influence:' Rather, the SovietUnion pledged itself to grant full independence toPoland and to other states in Eastern Europe and tohold free elections. Soviet failure to honor thesecommitments is one of the primary causes of East-Westtensions today. Our policy toward Eastern Europe seeksto promote a positive role for Eastern European statesin preserving European stability and exercising amoderating influence on the Soviet Union.

We believe the United States should deal with the EastEuropean countries on an individual basis and vary ourpolicies depending upon our assessment of theconditions in each nation. In keeping with thisprinciple, we differentiate our policies toward EasternEurope to achieve a variety of objectives. These includethe encouragement of domestic liberalization andmore autonomous foreign policies; promotion ofsecurity through enhanced economic and politicalcooperation; and the fostering of genuine and long­lasting improvement in human rights. Concurrently, weseek to promote increased dialogue through culturaland scientific exchanges, international forums, high­level visits, bilateral councils and people-ta-peoplecontacts.

The Middle East and South Asia. Our principalinterests in the Middle East include maintainingregional stability, containing and reducing Sovietinfluence, preserving the security of Israel and ourother friends in the area, retaining access to oil onreasonable terms for ourselves and our allies, andcurbing state-sponsored terrorism. Those interests arethreatened by the continuation of the Iran-Iraq conflict,the existence of deep-seated Arab-Israeli tensions, thegrowth of anti-Western political movements in theregion, and the use of terrorism as an instrument ofstate policy, particularly by Libya, Syria, and Iran. Ourstrategy in the region aims to safeguard our interestsfrom those threats; to hasten negotiated settlements ofthe Palestinian problem and the Iran-Iraq war; tobolster the security and economic well-being of Israeland moderate Arab regimes; to help our friends in theGulf protect themselves and international shippinglanes; and to isolate and deter state sponsors ofterrorism.

The U.s. Initiative of September 1982 remains thecornerstone of our approach to the Arab-Israeli peaceprocess. Our immediate goal is direct negotiationsbetween Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,as part of a general effort to broaden the Egyptian­Israeli peace and bring about a just and lastingresolution of the Palestinian problem. We remain firmlycommitted to a prompt and honorable negotiatedsettlement of the Iran-Iraq war. Current Iranian behaviorposes a serious threat to our interests and those of ourfriends in the region. Until Iran ceases its efforts toprolong the senseless war with Iraq, we will workactively to block the flow of arms and military materialto Iran.

Despite severe budgetary constraints, economic andsecurity assistance, together with a prudent butresponsive policy of arms sales within the region,remains an essential part of our efforts to strengthenIsrael and moderate Arab regimes. We cannot afford toneglect the real needs of our friends. At the same time,we will continue to try to isolate and build interna­tional pressure against state sponsors of terrorism. Ourrecent actions against Libya were designed todemonstrate the political, military and economic

17

costsof supporting terrorism. While we have noillusions about eradicating this menace easily orquickly, we remain determined to combat it vigorously

. in close cooperation with our friends and allies.

U.S. objectives. in South Asia include reduction ofregional tensions; development of cooperativerelationships between South Asian countries;prevention of nuclear proliferation; and restoration ofthe freedom of the Afghan people.

U.S. policy also seeks a general improvement inbilateral relations with all countries of thesubcontinent. Important elements have been improvedIndia-U.S. relations and u.s. encouragement of betterrelations between India and Pakistan. A new six-yearassistance plan of $4 billion for Pakistan has beenproposed by this Administration and is vital to thatcountry's ability to withstand strong pressuresgenerated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.Pakistan is hosting nearly three million Afghan refugeeson its soil. The United States remains the largest donorof humanitarian assistance to the refugees.

For the first time, the United States has establishedsubstantially improved relations with both India andPakistan. This enables us to help support the regionaldesire for peace, despite periodic crises in Indo­Pakistani relations.

Africa. African issues demand increasing attention

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because of the continent's extensive natural resources;its growing role in international forums; the threatposed to regional security by the escalating racialconflict in South Africa; and Soviet, Libyan, EastEuropean and Cuban adventurism throughout theregion. The challenges to democracy are especiallystrong in Africa, and we remain concerned about thewidespread denial of basic human rights, whether byMarxist-Leninst clients of the Soviet Union or throughapartheid in South Africa. The sources of conflictwithin Africa are many: extreme poverty, greatdisparities of wealth, ethnic frictions, unsettled borders,and religion.

U.s. policy must strive to encourage economicdevelopment and political stability in Africa. Africanleaders have started to recognize that statist solutionsare not the answer and are beginning to reform theireconomies. We must work with other donor countriesand the multilateral institutions to reinforce this trendtoward economic policy reform and private sectordevelopment.

Economic growth will contribute to, but also requires,political stability. We must continue to encourage thepeaceful resolution of conflicts without foreignintervention. Deteriorating economic conditions andpolitical instability have encouraged intervention by theSoviets, their surrogates, the Cubans, and mavericktroublemakers like Libya.

IV. U.S. Defense Policy

INTRODUCTION

The Defense Policy of the United States requiresmilitary forces that are organized, manned, trained, andequipped to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggressionacross the entire spectrum of potential conflict. OurNational Security Strategy, global objectives, and thenature of the threat require that we be prepared todefend our interests as far from North America aspossible. Accordingly, our strategy relies heavily onforward deployment of combat-ready forces, rei nforcedby strong alliance relationships. In 'support of thoserelationships, we will continue to maintain inpeacetime major forward deployments of land, naval,and air forces in Europe, the Atlantic and the Pacific;and other deployments in the Western Hemisphere andIndian Ocean. The overall size and composition of ourarmed forces are strongly influenced by theserequirements,

The challenge we face is dynamic and complex. Thereremains a significant imbalance of forces favoring theSoviet Union in several important contingencies. Inaddition, Third World states are increasingly armedwith modern and sophisticated military equipment.

Comprehensive and imaginative integration of U.S. andallied military capabilities is required to reduce risks toour national security. Since our political and socialheritage militates against raising and supporting largeforces in peacetime, we are impelled to seek securityin America's national genius for technologicalinnovation; the breadth and diversity of our nationaleconomy; and alliance cooperation. The United Statesmust pursue strategies for competition with the Sovietswhich emphasize our comparative advantages in theseareas.

The full range of u.s. military capabilities must besuitably balanced among combat and supportelements, and contain an appropriate mix of activeduty and reserve components. The United States musthave specialized forces-ranging from those requiredfor nuclear deterrence to forces configured to deal withterrorism; and must also have general purpose forcescapable of sustaining high intensity conflict, whilemaintaining an effective capability for lessercontingencies and special operations. At the same time,we must balance defense priorities among thecompeting needs of readiness, sustainability,modernization, and force expansion.

U.S. military forces also must be supported by plans,doctrines, and command relationships which providefor effective integration and employment of all facets ofour military power. While the possible use of nuclearweapons must remain an element in our overallmilitary strategy, nuclear forces should never be viewedas simply a lower-cost alternative to conventionalforces. U.S. forces must be capable of rapid deploymentto deter wider crises or conflicts. They must alsopossess the capability, should deterrence fail, to expandthe scope and intensity of combat operations, asnecessary, to terminate the conflict on terms favorableto the United States and its allies.

The United States must maintain effective and robustReserve and National Guard forces, trained andequipped at levels commensurate with their wartimemissions, as well as Coast Guard and other capabilitieswhich support the national security establishment. TheUnited States must also continue to enhance itscapabilities to surge or mobilize manpower and keyindustrial resources, planning for the most effective useof available strategic warning in the event of crisis orwar.

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TAKING ADVANTAGE OF U.s.STRENGTHS AND SOVIETWEAKNESSES

One of the central tenets of our defense policy is thatthe United States will not seek to match the SovietUnion weapon for weapon. Rather, we will work toovercome Soviet numerical superiority by takingmaximum advantage of the inherent strengths ofalliances composed of democratic, industrialized, freeeconomy nations.

Technology. The United States and its allies continue toenjoy technological superiority over the Soviet Bloc inmost areas of military application. This technologicaladvantage derives from the fundamental nature of thetwo societies. The spirit of inquiry and the free flow ofinformation which characterize the West will inevitablypermit technology and innovation to flourish to agreater degree than it will in a closed society. TheUnited States and its allies enjoy an intrinsic advantagenot only in the creation, but in the practicalexploitation of advanced technologies. Competitive,free-enterprise societies consistently out-performcentrally planned economies in fostering innovation,growth, and the application of new technology to awide variety of fields.

Technology affects our national security in two ways.First, the ability to exploit and adapt technologycontributes to the overall economic health of theUnited States and its allies, which is a key element ofnational power. Second, the exploitation of atechnological advantage directly enhances defense.Precision guided munitions, for example, help offsetthe large Soviet edge in tank forces. Stealth technologyhelps counter the massive Soviet investment in airdefense. Advances in anti-submarine warfaretechnologies and in submarine quieting help preservemaritime superiority despite the Soviet Navy'snumerical advantages. Perhaps most significantly, theU.S. edge in computer technology and software hasmilitary relevance across the entire spectrum ofwarfare.The Soviets are, of course, conscious of the Westerntechnological advantage and have undertaken a

20

massive effort to acquire and exploit Westerntechnology. Thus a vital element of our defense policyis to control technology transfer and protect classifiedinformation relating to military technologies. With thisin mind, we have undertaken a major effort to enhanceour National Counter-intelligence and SecurityCountermeasures plans and capabilities, as I outlinedin my November 1986 report to Congress.

Competitive Strategies. Competitive strategies areaimed at exploiting our technological advantages inthoughtful and systematic ways to cause the Soviets tocompete less efficiently or less effectively in areas ofmilitary application. Such strategies seek to makeportions of the tremendous Soviet military machineobsolete and force the Soviets to divert resources inways they may not prefer, and in a manner that may notnecessarily threaten our own forces. Low observable(stealth) technology, for example, can render much ofthe Soviet investment in air defense obsolete andrequires the Soviets to divert resources from offensiveforces to defensive forces. The contribution which newtechnologies can make to our competitive strategies isan explicit consideration in making defenseprocurement decisions.

Alliances. A third area of U.S. strength and Sovietweakness is alliance relationships. While the SovietUnion presides over an empire that has seen severalarmed rebellions in the past forty years, the UnitedStates is the leader of a voluntary coalition of equalnations. U.S. allies, particularly our NATO partners,contribute a major share of the West's total militarystrength. Recognizing this contribution, our defensepolity is based on the fundamental premise that wewill not seek to offset Soviet power alone, but inconjunction with our allies throughout the globe, on abasis of equitable burdensharing.

In NATO, this means continuing our strong support forAlliance efforts to improve the overall Westernconventional balance, including appropriate economicand military assistance to allies on NATO's criticalsouthern flank. It means integrating the contribution ofour NATO partners into our strategy-indeed, theUnited States has no separate military strategy for thedefense of Europe, but is a partner in the NATOalliance strategy of deterrence and defense. Outside ofEurope, the United States seeks strong ties with nations

throughout the globe, assisting Iriendly and alliedcountries in improving their military capabilities whileencouraging them to assume a greater role in their own

defense.

The Strength of the Individual. One of our greatestadvantages in competing with the Soviet Union is thecharacter of our people. Western societies, with theirstress on the importance of the individual, stand insharp contrast to the repressive nature of the Sovietstate. The initiative, enterprise, and motivation of freepeople is a source of great strength when individualsare put to the supreme test of combat. Whileintangible, these qualities are an important asset, whichthe Soviets cannot match. Defense policy recognizesthis by stressing unit integrity and leadership, while ourtraining and tactics place great value on individualinitiative, and aggressive exploitation of opportunities.

MAINTENANCE OF ASTRATEGIC DETERRENT

Deterrence is the most fundamental element of ourdefense policy and the cornerstone of our alliancerelationships. Deterrence must not only preventconventional and nuclear attack on the United States,but must extend such protection to our allies.Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posturemakes the assessment of war outcome by the Soviets,or any other adversary, so dangerous and uncertain asto remove any possible incentive for initiating conflict.Deterrence depends both on nuclear and conventionalcapabilities, and on evidence of a strong will to usemilitary force, if necessary, to defend our vital interests.

While deterrence requires capabilities across the entirespectrum of conflict, its essential foundation isprovided by our strategic nuclear forces and thedoctrine which supports them. Nuclear deterrence, likeany form of deterrence, requires us to consider notwhat would deter us, but what would deter the Soviets,whose perceptions of the world and value system aresubstantially different from our own. Since we cannever be entirely certain of Soviet perceptions, it is ofthe utmost importance that the effectiveness of our

strategic capabilities-and our will to use them, ifnecessary-never be in doubt.

In the interest of ensuring deterrence, the United Statesmaintains diversified strategic forces to hedge against adisarming first strike, complicate Soviet attack plans,and guard against technological surprise which mightthreaten one element of our strategic forces. To thisend, we maintain a variety of basing modes, launchplatforms, and attack vehicles, achieving diversitythrough a triad of SLBMs, ICBMs and bombers.Adequate and survivable command and control is anessential element of strategic force structure, and iscritical to the credibility of our strategic deterrent.

Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policymust, by any calculation, be perceived as makingnuclear warfare a totally unacceptable and unrewardingproposition for the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, our

strategy:

• Denies the Soviets the ability to achieve essentialmilitary objectives by holding at risk Sovietwarmaking capabilities. This includes the entirerange of Soviet military forces, as well as the warsupporting industry which provides the foundationfor Soviet military power, and supports its capabilityto conduct a protracted conflict.

• Places at risk those political entities the Sovietleadership values most: the mechanisms for ensuringsurvival of the Communist Party and its leadershipcadres, and for retention of the Party's control overthe Soviet and Soviet Bloc peoples.

This basic strategy of targeting those assets which areessential to Soviet warmaking capability and politicalcontrol has been U.S. policy for many years. Inimplementing this strategy, the United States does nottarget population as an objective in itself and seeks to

.minimize collateral damage through more accurate,lower yield weapons.

We cannot permit any President to be faced with asituation in which the only available responses toaggression are capitulation or massive destruction.

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Thus, in addition to holding at risk the full range ofassets important to the Soviet leadership, the UnitedStates also requires flexibility in the employment of itsstrategic forces. It is essential that we have responseoptions appropriate to the broad range of plausiblesituations. This flexible response capability bolsters thecredibility of our deterrent by making clear to theSoviets that the United States has a variety of militaryoptions with which to respond to aggression.

Finally, the United States also requires sufficientresidual capability to provide leverage for early wartermination, and to avoid coercion in a post-conflictworld. For this reason, we maintain a nuclear reserveforce as an integral part of our strategic forces. We alsomaintain Continuity of Government programs as anessential element of deterrence to assure the Sovietsthey cannot escape retaliation by a qUick,"decapitating" attack aimed at incapacitating U.S.political and military leadership.

These capabilities do not imply the United States seeksto fight a nuclear war. I have repeatedly emphasizedthat a nuclear war cannot be won and must never befought. But we seek to deter an adversary with a verydifferent strategic outlook from our own -an outlookwhich places great stress on nuclear warfightingcapability. It is essential the Soviets understand thatthey cannot gain their objectives through nuclearwarfare under any cqnceivable circumstances. Toachieve this we must ensure that they clearly perceivethat the United States has the capability to respondappropriately to any Soviet attempt to wage a nuclearwar, and that we have the means to do this in wayswhich will defeat Soviet military objectives withoutnecessarily triggering a massive nuclear exchange.

Strategic Defenses. Our policy of flexible response anddeterrence through the threat of offensive retaliationhas preserved the security of the United States and itsallies for decades. At the same time, the Soviet strategicforce buildup has threatened the foundation on whichdeterrence has long rested. Looking to the future, theU.s. Strategic Defense Initiative offers an opportunity toshift deterrence to a safer and more stable basisthrough greater reliance on strategic defenses. Suchdefenses, which threaten no one, could substantially

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enhance deterrence by injecting great uncertainties intoSoviet estimates of their ability to achieve theiressential military objectives in a first strike. "Leak proof"defenses would not be reqUired initially in order todeny the Soviets confidence that they could achievemeaningful military goals. Even less than perfectdefenses could significantly increase stability byeliminating plausible incentives for a Soviet first strike.In judging the suitability of systems for possibledeployment, we will continue to be guided by thecriteria of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost­effectiveness at the margin.

By reducing the military value of ballistic missiles, andultimately rendering them obsolete, strategic defenseswould also provide incentives for Soviet acceptance ofsignificant arms reduction agreements. In a world withfewer ballistic missiles, however, Soviet incentives tocheat would be greater. Strategic defenses caneffectively negate these incentiV!!s by eliminating themilitary utility of covertly stockpiled missiles. Thus,they offer the prospect of a safer, more stable world inwhich deep reductions in strategic offensive arms areboth negotiable and enforceable.

In short, the pursuit of strategic defenses has thepotential to bring about the most significant change inU.s. National Security Strategy since the end of WorldWar II. By allowing us to move away from reliance onthe threat of massive destruction to deter aggression,strategic defenses would change the entire U.S.-Sovietstrategic relationship in a positive way, increasing thesafety and security of the peoples of both nations andtheir allies. We will continue to try to persuade theSoviets to join with us in working out a stabletransition to this sensible and attainable goal.

U.S. Strategic Modernization Program. Continuing U.S.strategic modernization is essential to assure reliabledeterrence, enhance stability, and provide motivationfor the Soviets to negotiate broad, deep, equitable andverifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms. Whilewe are firmly committed to using arms control as onecomponent of our policy for enhancing U.S. and alliedsecurity, it would be exceptionally dangerous toanticipate success in arms control. Indeed, neglectingstrategic modernization in expectation of armsreduction agreements would have the perverse effect ofdecreasing the likelihood of such agreements by

reducing one of the principal Soviet incentives toagreement

History shows that a demonstrated will to maintain amilitary balance with the Soviets and not allow them togain a significant strategic advantage is an essentialfoundation for serious arms control negotiations. It wasU.s. action to rectify imbalances which brought theSoviets to consider the major force reductionsdiscussed at Reykjavik. Even if we are successful inachieving the agreements we seek, however, the UnitedStates will continue to require modernized, mission­effective, and survivable nuclear forces to providedeterrence, promote stability, and hedge against Sovietcheating or abrogation during the transition to new,lower force levels.

For their part, the Soviets continue to invest heavily instrategic modernization, with emphasis on accurate,fast-flying ballistic missiles which can destroy hardtargets. Their goal has been, and remains, attainment ofan effective disarming first-strike capability. They havealways sought to enhance their ICBM survivabilitythrough silo hardening. Recently they have also soughtto do so through mobility, including continueddeployment of the road-mobile S5-25, and preparationfor deployment of the rail-based 55-X-24.

At the same time, the Soviets continue to invest roughlythe same amount in their strategic defense programs asin their offensive force modernization. They areexpanding and improving the world's only deployedABM system. They continue to violate the ABM Treatywith their radar at Krasnoyarsk, enhancing their abilityto break out of the Treaty through rapid deployment ofa nation-wide ABM system. Their extensive civildefense program includes a vast and growing networkof deep underground leadership shelters aimed atensuring the survival of Communist Party control overthe Soviet nation, economy, and military forces in war.Their strategic communications are highly redundant,survivable, and hardened against nuclear effects. Theiractive and passive defenses, their unrelenting buildupof offensive forces, and their published doctrine allprovide evidence of the Soviet nuclear warfightingmentality, and underline the absolute essentiality ofmaintaining the effectiveness of the U.S. strategicdeterrent.

To this end, in 1981 we undertook the StrategicModernization Program in order to maintain theessential survivability and effectiveness of our ownforces in the face of the continuing qualitative andquantitative upgrade in the Soviet threat. Currentelements of that program, which remains our highestdefense priority, include:

• Improved strategic command, control andcommunications, to ensure timely warning of attackand an assured means of passing retaliatory orders toour strategic forces.

• ICBM modernization, centered on the PEACEKEEPER(MX) and Small ICBM, both of which will haveenhanced survivability through mobility.

• SLBM modernization, including deployment of theTRIDENT submarine and development anddeployment of the TRIDENT II missile.

• Bomber and cruise missile upgrades, includingdeployment of the 8-1B, and the exploitation of theimportant U.S. lead in low-observable technology bydevelopment of the Advanced Technology Bomberand the Advanced Cruise Missile.

• Strategic Defense programs, including SDI and theAir Defense Initiative, to redress the long-standingneglect of defensive programs generally, and tocapitalize on the potential which moderntechnology offers for radically transforming the basisfor deterrence and laying the foundation for a farmore safe and stable strategic relationship with theSoviet Union.

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control is not an end in itself but an integral partof our overall National Security Strategy. It must beviewed as only one of several tools to enhance ournational security and to promote our fundamentalnational interest in the survival of the United States asa free and independent nation. Our arms controlobjectives are fully integrated with our defense andforeign policies to enhance deterrence, reduce risk,support alliance relationships, and ensure the Sovietsdo not gain significant unilateral advantage over theUnited States.

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Based on this view of arms control as a complement toa strong national defense posture, u.s. arms controlpolicy, since the beginning of this Administration, hasbeen guided by several fundamental principles:

• The United States seeks only those agreementswhich contribute to our security and that of ourallies.

• The United States seeks agreements which reducearms, not simply codify their increase.

• Achieving agreements on broad, deep and equitablereductions in offensive nuclear arms is the highest

arms control priority of the United States.

• Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, the. United States gives priority to reducing the most

destabilizing weapons: fast-flying, non-recallableballistic missiles.

• The United States also seeks equitable arms controlmeasures in the area of nuclear testing, chemicalweapons and conventional forces.

• The United States insists on agreements that can beeffectively verified and fully complied with. Armscontrol agreements without effective verificationmeasures are worse than no agreements at all asthey create the possibility of Soviet unilateraladvantage, and can affect U.S. and allied planningwith a false sense of confidence.

These principles contrast sharply with the Soviet armscontrol approach. The Soviets have historically soughtto exploit the arms control process to gain unilateraladvantage by shifting the military balance in their favor.At the same time, they have pursued additionaladvantage by failing to comply with importantprovisions of existing arms control agreements, securein the knowledge that the United States does not cheatand can be relied on for full compliance withagreements in force.

This approach has proven at least partially successfulfor the Soviets in the past. The arms control agreementsof the 1970s largely legitimized the planned Sovietstrategic buildup, while constraining our own forcemodernization by reducing public support for essentialstrategic programs. Typical of the defects of the pastwas the SALT II Treaty of 1979, a fundamentally flawedagreement which was never ratified. Unequal and

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unverifiable in important provisions, it was inimical tothe security interests of the United States and its allies,and to the stabi Iity of the U.S.-Soviet strategic

relationship.

Imperfect as these earlier arms control agreementswere, their faults have been compounded by theSoviets' failure to abide by key provisions-a failurewhich persists today. They encrypt telemetry associatedwith ballistic missile testing in a manner whichimpedes verification. They have deployed a prohibitedsecond new type of ICBM, the S5-25, and exceeded thenumerical limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.The Soviets have also violated the SALT I InterimAgreement of 1972; and with respect to the ABM Treaty,as noted earlier, the Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clearviolation.

As a result of both U.S. concerns with the SALTstructure and the poor Soviet compliance record, Idetermined in May 1986 that, in the future, the UnitedStates would base decisions regarding its strategic forcestructure on the nature and magnitude of the threatposed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standardscontained in a flawed, unratified, and expired treatywhich has been repeatedly violated by the SovietUnion. At the same time I indicated that-assuming nosignificant change in the threat we face-the UnitedStates will not deploy more strategic nuclear deliveryvehicles, or more strategic ballistic missile warheads,than does the Soviet Union. Thus, while ensuring anadequate strategic deterrent, the United States willcontinue to exercise the utmost restraint, in order tofoster the necessary atmosphere for obtaining Sovietagreement to significant reductions.

While the United States' priority objective in armscontrol is deep reductions in strategic offensive arms,we are also engaged in a wide variety of negotiationsand discussions on other subjects. The U.s. approachto all of these areas is consistent. We seek only thoseagreements which are equitable, verifiable, and willenhance our security and that of our allies.

Specifically:

• In the area of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces(INF), we seek the complete elimination of an entire

class of weapons: land-based longer-range INF(LRINF) missiles. As an interim goal, we seek aglobal agreement limiting the U.s. and USSR to 100LRINF missile warheads each, to be deployed inSoviet Asia and the United States, with none of eitherside in Europe.

• Consistent with our belief that strategic defenses mayoffer a safer, more stable basis for deterrence, weseek Soviet agreement for an orderly transition to amore defense-reliant world.

• We have proposed an effectively verifiable globalban on chemical weapons.

• We seek alliance-ta-alliance negotiations to establisha more stable balance in conventional forces fromthe Atlantic to the Urals, at lower levels. Suchreductions must be effectively verifiable and mustrecognize the geographic asymmetries between thetwo sides.

• In the area of nuclear testing, we seek essentialverification improvements to permit ratification ofexisting treaties: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, andthe Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once ourverification concerns have been satisfied and theratification process is complete, we would beprepared immediately to engage in negotiations withthe Soviets on ways to implement a step-by-stepprogram to limit and ultimately end nuclear testing,in association with a program to reduce andultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.

• Finally, we seek to improve stability throughimproved measures which could preventmisunderstanding during periods of crisis. We havemade progress on such measures at the recentlyconcluded Stockholm conference.

In all of these areas we consider effective verification tobe equally as important as specific negotiated limits;they should be negotiated concurrently. We cannotaccept obligations that limit our military programsun less we can effectively verify Soviet compliance withthose same obligations. This is particularly important inlight of the continuing pattern of Soviet violationsdocumented in the several reports which I havesubmitted to the Congress on Soviet non-compliance.

Substantial progress toward the achievement of U.s.arms control goals was made at the October 1986meeting in Iceland between General SecretaryGorbachev and myself. At that meeting we agreed onthe outlines of a 50 percent reduction in strategicoffensive forces and a dramatic global reduction in INFmissiles. In the near-term, our primary focus will be towork toward agreement in these areas. Consistent withour priority on radically reducing the mostdestabilizing strategic systems-and in response to theSoviet desire for a ten-year commitment not towithdraw from the ABM Treaty-we proposed to acceptsuch a commitment through 1996, during which timeresearch, development and testing, which is permittedby the ABM Treaty, wou Id continue. At the same time,the proposed agreement provided for:

• A fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forcesof the United States and Soviet Union during the firstfive years of the ten year period.

• Elimination of all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballisticmissiles of whatever range or armament during thesecond five years.

• Agreement that either side could deploy advancedstrategic defenses after the ten-year period, unlessboth agreed not to do so.

It is too soon to foresee the future course of armscontrol following Reykjavik. Much depends on theattitude of the Soviet Union. The United States hastabled proposals in the Geneva negotiations reflectingthe areas agreed on in Iceland; the Soviet Union hastabled proposals that only partially reflect theachievements of Reykjavik. If the Soviets maintain theircurrent attempt to hold all progress hostage to U.s.agreement to kill the Strategic Defense Initiative,prospects for progress are dim. On the other hand, ifthey are willing to implement the agreements reachedin Reykjavik, we can move now to achieve greaterstability and a safer world. In moving to that world, Iwill maintain my commitment to broad, deep,equitable, and verifiable reductions, focused especiallyon ballistic missiles, and my equally strongcommitment to the Strategic Defense Initiative as abasis for moving to a safer, more stable form ofdeterrence.

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Finally, I should emphasize that the measure of successin arms control is not the number of meetings held oragreements signed. Rather it is whether thoseagreements which are signed contribute to U.s. andallied security and advance the cause of peace andstability. Because of tnis, while the United States willremain both creative and patient, it will continue toreject calls for agreements which do not enhance u.s.and allied security and contribute to global stability

MAINTENANCE OF ACONVENTIONAL DETERRENT

Forward Deployed Conventional Defense Capability.Strategic nuclear capabilities are essential fordeterrence, but they alone are obviously not enough.The United States and its allies require robustconventional forces as an integral part of our overalldeterrent. The U.s. National Security Strategy is builton the concepts of forward defense and alliancesolidarity. Consistent with this strategy, we maintainlarge, forward deployed forces at sea and on theterritory of our NATO and Asian allies in time of peace.The overall size and capabilities of u.s. armed servicesare heavily influenced by the need to maintain suchpresence, which is essential to deter aggression.

The most demanding threat with which those forcesmust be prepared to deal is, of course, the Sovietthreat. Soviet forces may always outnumber our own­even when allied forces are thrown into the balance.For this reason, we must give the most careful attentionto maintaining our forces' qualitative superiority at thelevel necessary to accomplish their deterrent andwarfighting missions.

An additional premise of American defense policy isthat the United States does not seek to deal with thethreat from the Soviet Union unaided. A system ofvigorous alliances is the only effective way to deter theSoviets. The most important of these alliances is NATO,which for over a generation has preserved peace andsecurity in Europe. While no single NATO partner canmatch the massive Soviet conventional forces, togetherwe are capable of fielding a powerful deterrent.

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U.S. Contribution to NATO. The United Statescontributes to this NATO deterrent in several ways.Most visible is the peacetime stationing of over300,000 military personnel in the European theater.Although our allies contribute the majority of theconventional forces in Europe, and would continue todo so in crisis and mobilization, the presence of U.S.forces makes it clear that it is not possible to attack aNATO ally without simultaneously engaging the fullmilitary might of the United States.

In addition to the direct provision of forces, the UnitedStates provides security assistance to those NATO allieswhose economies do not permit them to make as greata contribution to the common defense as they and wewould wish. Such assistance serves as an importantand cost-effective force multiplier, increasing both thepolitical solidarity and the military effectiveness ofNATO, Finally, the United States provides the maincontribution to the nuclear umbrella over NATO whichhas been one of the pillars of NATO's strategy fordecades.

The Strategy of Flexible Response. NATO's deterrentstrategy requires a capability for flexible response,appropriate to the nature of Soviet provocation. Inaddition to robust U.S. and allied conventional forces,backed by the strategic nuclear capability of the UnitedStates, this strategy must be supported by effective andsubstantial non-strategic nuclear forces as well. TheUnited States contributes to all legs of the "NATOTriad": conventional forces, non-strategic nuclear forces,and strategic forces. NATO's 1979 decision tomodernize its nuclear forces through deployment ofGround Launched Cruise Missiles and Pershing IIballistic missiles helped to redress the imbalancecreated by the Soviet deployment of 55-20 missilestargeted against NATO territory. It also signalled NATOresolve to maintain the effectiveness and integrity of itsdeterrent capabilities, and helped lay the foundation foreffective arms control negotiations aimed at reducingthe ballistic missile threat to NATO.

In clear contrast to the Soviet Union, it is NATO'spolicy to maintain non-strategic nuclear forces at thelowest level capable of deterring the Warsaw Pactthreat. In pursuance of this policy, the Alliance decidedin October 1983 to reduce the number of warheads inEurope by 1,400, in addition to the 1,000 warheadreduction completed in 1980. These reductions, taken

independently of any arms control agreement, willreduce NATO's nuclear stockpile in Europe to thelowest level in over 20 years. This makes it essentialthat the remaining stockpile be survivable, responsive,and effective.

Deterrence of Chemical Warfare. While neither NATOnor the United States seeks to match the Sovietsweapon for weapon, deterrence would be weakened ifthe Soviets were allowed to field a capability whichwas completely unmatched by a countervailing NATOcapability. This premise, which underlies NATO'sdecision to modernize its theater nuclear forces, isequally relevant to our own determination tomodernize U.S. chemical weapons capability throughdevelopment of modern, safe, binary munitions. Thismodernization will provide us the capability to deterSoviet first use of chemical weapons. In the absence ofsuch capability, we will remain dependent on an agingstockpile of unitary chemical weapons ill-suited tomodern delivery systems, and alliance nuclearcapabilities, to deter such Soviet use-an obviouslyundesirable and risk-prone situation.

The Scope and Intensity of Conflict. Our strategyrecognizes that the Soviet Union, together with alliedforces, is capable of simultaneous aggression in morethan one region of the world. Should aggression occurin several regions simultaneously, U.s. militaryresponses would be governed by existing commitments,general strategic priorities, the specific circumstances athand, and the availability of forces. This capability torespond would be enhanced by the flexibility we havebuilt into our forces, including our capabilities forglobal strategic mobility and power projection. Thiscapability to respond effectively in distant theatersreduces the risk that we will ever have to meet suchattacks.

If we must respond to such an attack, our overallobjective would be to terminate the war as soon aspossible, at the lowest level of violence consistent withthe restoration 'of peace on terms favorable to theUnited States and its allies. Should our initial attemptsto defeat aggression fail, however, U.S. strategy providesfor the flexible and sufficient application of force for aslong as combat continues to ensure that no area ofvital interest is lost. Should escalation occur, despiteour best efforts to contain the intensity of the conflict,we would attempt to employ our forces in a mannerwhich would discourage further escalation whileachieving our national objectives.

Thus, our strategy recognizes that a variety of factorswould affect the nature, locations, and intensity of ourmilitary actions in a conflict with the Soviet union. Ourstrategy is not to try to fight "every where at once:' Wewould do what is strategically sensible andoperationally achievable under the circumstances. Butwe do need the capability for credible responses tomajor threats worldwide, so we can ensure that ourweakness does not tempt our adversaries.

Other U.S. Commitments. NATO is not our onlyalliance. The United States has bilateral or multilateralsecurity commitments with some 43 nations

throughout the globe.

In support of those commitments, and to deter Sovietand Soviet client state adventurism, the United Statesmaintains forward deployed forces in many regions ofstrategic importance. In addition to our fleet in theMediterranean, the United States maintains a largenaval presence in the Western Pacific. A smallerpresence in the Indian Ocean serves to support ourinterests in Southwest Asia. U.S. Air Forces deployedthroughout the Pacific assist in meeting our securitycommitments to such nations as Japan and thePhilippines. Substantial ground and air forces aredeployed in Korea to complement forces of theRepublic of Korea in deterring aggression from theNorth.

Our global forward deployed forces serve severalfunctions. They are essential to the creation of regionalpower balances which deter Soviet aggression andpromote overall regional stability; they support thepolitical independence of nations on the Sovietperiphery and hence are key to the fundamental u.s.strategic objective of avoiding Soviet domination of theEurasian land mass; and finally, they provide animmediately available capability to deal with lessermilitary contingencies.

Although the Soviet Union represents the greatestthreat to the United States and its allies, as mentionedearlier, it is not the only threat. Forward deployedforces can also discourage local aggression, contributeto regional stability, and serve as visible symbols ofUnited States' will and capability to protect its interests.For military contingencies not involving the SovietUnion, however, the United States looks primarily tothe nations involved to provide for their own defense.

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Direct involvement of U.S. military forces is a lastresort, to be undertaken only when clear politicalobjectives have been established, our political will isclear, and appropriate military capabilities are available.If U.s. combat forces are committed, the United Stateswould seek to limit the scope and level of the conflict,avoid the involvement of the Soviet Union, and achieveU.S. objectives as quickly as possible.

In the past six years we have made substantial progressin improving the capability of our forward deployedforces to protect U.S. interests, execute our NationalStrategy, and support alliance commitments. We remainfirmly committed to continued improvement in ourdeployed capabilities in support of our forward-defense,alliance-based strategy. The following paragraphs willdiscuss selected capabilities which provide essentialfoundations for that strategy.

Maintenance of Global Support and MobilityCapabilities. The ability to reinforce and resupplyforward deployed forces is essential to the execution ofthe U.S. strategy of forward defense and alliancesolidarity. Rapid reinforcement of NATO during times oftension, for example, is critical to effective deterrence.

The Soviets have a natural geographic advantage withrespect to countries on the Eurasian rim, and growingcapability to launch simultaneous offensives in Europe,Southwest Asia and the Far East. Capitalizing oninterior lines of communication, they can redeploy andresupply forces over a broad geographic range. RecentSoviet efforts have significantly improved militaryaccess, by rail and road, to strategically important areasalong the USSR's southern frontiers.

Our global support and mobility capabilities, includingairlift, sealift, and prepositioning are therefore essentialto allow us to meet military challenges around theperiphery of the Eurasian continent, which remains theprimary locus of Soviet expansionist interests.Prepositioning ashore or at sea can sharply reduce ourresponse times. Airlift, the quickest and most flexible ofour mobility assets, would deliver initial reinforcementsin most contingencies; but sealift will inevitably carrythe bulk of our reinforcement and resupply material, asit has in past crises. To reduce response times, theUnited States combines prepositioning with airlift andsealift in an integrated fashion. Mobility capabilities areespecially critical to our strategies for dealing with

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contingencies in Southwest Asia, where we have nomilitary bases or permanently stationed military forces.

Consistent with our alliance approach to security, U.s.allies make critical contributions to the effectiveness ofour mobility capabilities. Not only do our alliescontribute airfield and port facilities, they also augmentour airlift and provide the bulk of our sealift capability.Finally, allied cooperation is an obvious prerequisite forprepositioning.

When this decade began, we faced severe difficulties inmoving large forces quickly enough to deter Sovietaggression, deploying forces to two or more theaterssimultaneously, or moving material effectively into less­developed regions. Since 1981, with the support ofCongress, we have made great progress in redressingthese deficiencies, adding substantially to our airliftand sealift capability and prepositioning additionallarge quantities of material abroad. Not all of ourobjectives have been accomplished, however. Inparticular, the continuing decline of the U.S. merchantmarine and U.S.-flag commercial shipping assets is amatter of concern. This problem is compounded by thedecline of the U.S.-flag fleet which results in areduction of the seagoing workforce to man all ourU.S.-flag vessels-as well as ships of the Ready ReserveForce, the National Defense Reserve Fleet and anyeffective U.S. controlled ships which might needrecrewing. The lack of merchant mariners in the nearterm could impede our ability adequately to projectand sustain forces by strategic sealift.

Maintenance of an Adequate Logistics Base. Tomaintain a strong conventional deterrent it is vital thatwe provide adequate logistic support for u.s. forces. Arobust logistics infrastructure strengthens deterrence bydemonstrating our preparations for hostilities at anylevel of intensity, and for the length of time necessaryto defend U.S. interests. Adequate, sustained supporthelps raise the nuclear threshold, strengthensdeterrence, and improves prospects for early success inconflict. Adversaries must not conclude that U.S. andallied capabilities would erode if confronted with acomplex or prolonged military campaign.

We have made substantial progress over the past sixyears in improving our military logistics base, and in

the process provided stronger support for ourdeterrence strategy. With the support of Congress, wewill seek continued improvement in this unglamorous,but essential component of military power.Concurrently, we will continue to emphasize to ourallies the impOrtance of improving the logistics base oftheir own forces to ensure that their endurance incombat will be parallel to that of our forces.

Maintenance of Adequate Active Forces. Support ofour conventional deterrent requires that we maintainbalanced and effective active forces sufficient in qualityand quantity to make our National Military Strategycredible. In the context of our alliance relationships,deterring and, if necessary, defeating the Soviet threatrequires a carefully structured mix of u.s. and alliedland and sea-based forces capable of executing theagreed strategy until reinforced from the respectivecountries' mobilization bases. In the case of NATO, theproximity of major Warsaw Pact ground, air and navalforces to Alliance territory, the speed with whichmodern conflict can unfold, the Pads significantnumerical advantages, and the Soviets' strong doctrinalemphasis on surprise, all argue for substantial,qualitatively advanced, and flexible u.S. and alliedconventional forces.

The land-based forces of the United States and its allieswould have primary responsibility for blunting a Sovietattack and defending allied territory, whilesimultaneously disrupting and destroying the follow-onforces which Soviet strategy relies on to exploit anyinitial successes. U.S. and allied ground forces,supported by tactical air power, require the capabilityto halt a Pact attack and restore the integrity of Allianceterritory if NATO political and military objectives are tobe achieved. Absent such capability, Alliance strategybecomes heavily dependent on the threat of resortingto nuclear weapons to achieve essential deterrence andwarfighting objectives.

For decades it has been a fundamental U.s. objective toreduce· the risk of nuclear warfare by maintainfng thenuclear threshold at a high level. Achievement of thisgoal requires that, wherever we confront Soviet forces,the forces of the United States and its allies have thecapability to achieve their missions with conventional

arms. In the case of our land-based forces committed toEurope, this requires constant upgrading andmodernization to retain a qualitative edge in the face ofthe Pac(s superior numbers.

While NATO requirements properly occupy much ofour ground forces' concern, the global nature ofpotential threats to U.S. interests requires maintenanceof flexible and diverse ground forces capable of rapiddeployment to, and effective operations in, areas ofstrategic importance. This has led the Army to establishfive rapidly deployable light divisions, while continuingefforts have gone into the enhancement of MarineCorps capabilities. These ground forces, withappropriate tactical air support, prOVide essentialelements of our capability to deal with worldwidecontingency requirements.

Tactical airpower supports the achievement of groundforce goals by maintaining battlefield air superiority,providing responsive and effective firepower for Armymaneuver units, and conducting deep interdiction ofenemy forces, command and control capabilities, and

. sources of logistic support. In addition, it plays acritical role in assuring the essential reinforcement andresupply of U.S. forward deployed forces by protectingport facilities, aerial ports of debarkation, and lines ofcommunication from attack and disruption. Thecapability of air forces to deploy rapidly in crises addsto our ability to deter threats to our interests in distantareas, and to bring effective military power to bearshould deterrence fail.

Maritime forces playa unique role in supporting ourmilitary strategy. Given the realities of our geostrategicposition, fronting on two oceans, maritime superiorityis vital to support our alliance relationships and ourforward deployed forces. While maritime superioritydepends predominantly on the capabilities of our navalforces, land-based air forces also contribute to itsmaintenance in important ways, including earlywarning of enemy air threats, long-range aerial tankersupport for sea-based tactical aircraft, and the laying ofanti-submarine mines.

Maritime superiority enables us to capitalize on Sovietgeographic vulnerabilities and to pose a global threat

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to the Soviers interests. It plays a key role in plans forthe defense of NATO allies on the European flanks. Italso permits the United States to tie down Soviet navalforces in defensive posture protecting Soviet ballisticmissile submarines and the seaward approaches to theSoviet homeland, and thereby to minimize the wartimethreat to the reinforcement and resupply of Europe bysea.

The mobile nature of maritime forces allows themdirectly to influence land campaigns through theapplication of sea-based tactical air power; and by theuse of amphibious forces to seize strategicallyimportant territory, reinforce allies accessible from thesea, or threaten the seaward flanks of enemy groundforces.

This capability to project power far from our shores isof particular importance, given the central position ofthe Soviet Union in the Eurasian land mass, the factthat many of the United States' most important alliesare located on the Eurasian periphery and offshoreislands, and the volatility of many Third World areas inwhich there is no U.s. military presence. Our navalpower projection capabilities would play an essentialrole in any Southwest Asia contingency.

Essential to our wartime strategy, maritime superiorityplays equally vital roles in peacetime. Mobile maritimeforces, easily deployed in time of crisis, are a traditionalsymbol of our nation's will and capability to defend itsvital interests. They have proven to be an indispensabletool of crisis management for every U.S. president sincethe end of World War II. Finally, by permitting therapid application of U.S. power, maritime superioritycontributes to regional stability, whether in the IndianOcean, Central America, the Middle East, or otherareas of strategic concern.

The trends in the maritime area are generally favorable.We are steadily building back toward our goal of a 600ship, 15 carrier battle group Navy. With continuedstrong Congressional support, the programs of thisAdministration should ensure our essential maritimesuperiority for the remainder of this century.

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Maintenance of Effective Reserve Forces and NationalMobilization Base. The effective mobilization ofmanpower and industrial resources in the event ofconflict would provide essential support for our militarycapabilities. With approximately 6 percent of GNPdevoted to defense, our peacetime economy focuses onthe needs of the civilian marketplace, not on thenation's defense requirements. We rely on the inherentsize and strength of the U.S. economy as our ultimateline of defense, tapping into civilian production to agreater or lesser extent only as the situation mayrequire.

As a result, we require an ability to surge our industrialbase to produce the additional wartime materielneeded during conflict. The health of the industrialbase, therefore, has clear military and strategicsignificance. Accordingly, the u.s. Governmentcontinues to promote initiatives which supportimprovements in industrial productiVity andmodernization.

Additionally, through its procurement procedures, thegovernment seeks to provide incentives for increasedproductiVity, improved manufacturing technologies, andto increase U.s. competitiveness in the internationalmarketplace.

To complement our industrial mobilization programs,the United States has maintained for over thirty years astockpile program to ensure a supply of critical rawmaterials to support defense and essential civilianneeds during an emergency. It is important that wecontinue to modernize our stockpile program to keeppace with current requirements, changes in industrialcapacity and new manufacturing and technologicaldevelopments. Since fundamental disagreements onstockpile policies exist with the Congress, we mustrenew efforts to resolve our differences and developrealistic goals and policies which will produce amodernized stockpile for the future.

On the manpower side, the Total Force policyestablished in the early 1970s places increasedresponsibilities on the reserve component of U.S.forces. Today, fully 50 percent of the combat units forland warfare are in reserve components. Reserve units

perform important missions and support functions on adaily basis. Their priority for manning, training, andequipment 'modernization is not based on theirpeacetime status as forces "in reserve;' but on the basisof their direct integration into the nation's operationalplans and missions. In many cases, the sequence ofdeployment in the event of conflict would place reservecomponent units side-by-side, and sometimes ahead ofactive duty forces.

To maximize the cost effectiveness of the Total Forcepolicy, we must continue to balance the combat andsupport elements of our active and reserve forcestructure, their costs, and attendant levels of risk. Whilethere are specific mission areas in which the role ofreserve components can be expanded, we mustexercise care to avoid making demands on ourpersonnel that would fundamentally alter the nature ofservice in the reserves. Our peacetime operationaltempo, forward deployments, and our general strategyof deterrence all require a substantial, balanced, andready active duty military establishment.

SPACE SUPPORT OFNATIONAL SECURITY

The United States uses space systems to conduct avariety of activities that are essential to our nationalsecurity, including command, control, andcommunications, navigation, environmentalmonitoring, warning, surveillance, and treatymonitoring. Support of these important activitiesrequires assured U.S. access to space, supported by anefficient and predictable launch capability. Therefore,late last year I directed that U.S. national space launchcapability be based on a balanced mix of launchersconsisting of the Space Transportation System andExpendable Launch Vehicles (ElVs). The elements ofthis mix support the mission needs of the nationalsecurity, 'civil government, and commercial sectors ofu.s. space activities.

To support this approach, the Department of Defensehas undertaken an effort to achieve the design and '

procurement of a medium-sized ElV. This willcomplement the Shuttle, and existing small and largeElVs. In addition, selected government satellites will bedesigned for dual compatibility with either the Shuttleor ElVs.

In view of the increasing reliance of U.S. and alliedforces on space-based support, we must be prepared toprotect our space assets against hostile interference.Accordingly, other facets of the national security spaceprogram include development of concepts andtechniques that allow systems to survive in crisis, andthe development of an anti-satellite capability to deterthreats to U.S. space systems, and to deny an adversarythe use of his space-based resources in war, correctinga serious asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet spacecapabilities. The Soviets introduced their anti-satellite(ASAT) system over a decade ago. Today it is the world'sonly operational ASAT system. The Congressionallyimposed ban on testing of our developmental ASATsystem against targets in space leaves the Soviets with amonopoly in ASAT capability and should be removed.

Overall, Soviet space programs are strong and growing.Their well-publicized manned space programs, theirambitious space scientific exploration programs, andtheir impending heavy-lift space launch capabilitieswill pose strong challenges to U.S. space leadership inthe near-term. In addition, these capabilities providethe base for rapid development and deployment ofmilitary space assets, in crises or war.

An emerging technology that has important security, aswell as civil and commercial applications, is theNational Aerospace Plane. The design of this planeincorporates advanced air and space flight technologiesto yield an aircraft that can function in both theatmosphere of earth and the vacuum of space. The firstflight of an experimental aerospace craft, whichcapitalizes on important U.s. technological advantages,could take place by the mid-1990s. .

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT OFNATIONAL SECURITY

Development and execution of a sound NationalSecurity Strategy requires effective intelligence

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capabilities to provide thorough and accurateappreciations of actual or potential threats to ournational security. Early warning of developments whichcould place at risk key U.S. interests is vital if we are toemploy the relevant elements of national power in atimely way, and deal with threats before they becomeunmanageable, or entail the risk of major conflict.

Our deterrence strategy relies heavily on reliableintelligence concerning potential adversaries' strategies,forces, doctrine, strengths, weaknesses, and probablecourses of action. Intelligence also provides essentialinsights into how we are viewed by those adversaries.An appreciation of their perceptions of our capabilities,political will, national interests, and likely reaction tohostile provocation, provides an important measure ofthe effectiveness of our deterrence. Intelligence alsoimproves our ability to detect violations of arms controlagreements and potential technological breakthroughswhich could adversely affect the strength of ourstrategic or conventional deterrents. Intelligence allowsus to plan our strategies and forces to take advantage ofour adversaries' weaknesses, correctour own, andcapitalize more effectively on areas of relativeadvantage.

The ability to conduct covert operations is an essentialadjunct of our intelligence capability, and allows us todeal effectively with developing threats to our securitybefore they require the employment of u.s. militarypower or other actions entailing higher costs or risks.

The capability to deal with the hostile intelligencethreat to the United States provides equally importantsupport for our National Security Strategy. Theextremely large and active intelligence services of theSoviet Union, its clients and surrogates, conduct highlysophisticated collection and analysis operationstargeted against us, our allies, and friends. The Sovietsrely heavily on espionage, and the illegal acquisition ofWestern military technology, to achieve broad strategicaims and aid materially in shifting the global"correlation of forces" to Soviet advantage. Theapprehension over the past few years orspiesconducting very damaging espionage operationsagainst the United States has dramaticaly underlined

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the severity of the threat. As part of our intelligencestrategy we have taken a number of steps in recentyears to strengthen our security and counter­intelligence capabilities. These efforts will continue asa matter of high national priority.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Conflict in the Third World can pose serious threats toU.S. security interests. Low Intensity Conflicts, whichtake place at levels below conventional war but abovethe routine, peaceful competition among states, can beparticularly troublesome. They often involve aprotracted struggle of competing principles andideologies. low Intensity Conflicts may be waged by acombination of means, including the use of political,economic, informational, and military instruments.They are often localized, but can have significantregional and global security implications.

Major causes of low Intensity Conflict are instabilityand lack of political and economic development in theThird W:>rld (though Low Intensity Conflict can occurin areas outside the Third World as well). Theseconditions provide fertile ground for unrest and forgroups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for theirown purposes. The resulting conflicts are of concern tothe United States when they assault U.S. nationalinterests and the security, values, or politicalfoundations of the United States, our friends, and allies.Low Intensity Conflict can gradually isolate the UnitedStates, its allies, and major trading partners from theThird W:>rld and from each other. This isolation can bemanifest in economic, political, and military terms.

Specifically, Low Intensity Conflict can lead to:

• Interruption of Western access to vital resources.

• Gradual loss of U.S. military basing and accessrights.

• Expanded threats to key sea lines of communication.

• Gradual shifting of allies and trading partnersaway from the United States into positions ofaccommodation with hostile interests.

• Expanded opportunities for Soviet political andmilitary gains.

An effective U.s. response to this form of warfarerequires the national will to sustain long-termcommitments. The United States has addressed themanifestations of Low Intensity Conflict through atough counter-terrorism policy; support for democraticresistance movements; and political, economic, andmilitary assistance to developing nations to help themprevent or combat low intensity challenges.

U.S. policy for dealing with Low Intensity Conflictsituations may be summarized as follows: When it is inu.s. interest to do 50, the United States:

• Will take measures to strengthen friendly nationsfacing internal or external threats to theirindependence and stability by systematicallyemploying, in coordination with friends and allies,the full range of political, economic, informational,and military instruments of power. Where possible,action will be taken before instability leads toviolence.

• Will work to ameliorate the underlying causes ofinstability and conflict in the Third World bypursuing foreign assistance, trade, and investmentprograms that promote economic development andthe growth of democratic social and political orders.

• May support selected resistance movements acting inopposition to regimes working against U.s. interests.Such support will be coordinated with friends andallies and may contain political, informational,economic, and military elements.

• Will take steps to discourage Soviet and other state­sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs tothose who use proxies or terrorist and subversiveforces to exploit instability in the Third World.

The low Intensity Conflict strategies that support thesepolicies must coordinate the use of a variety of policyinstruments among U.s. Government agencies andinternationally. Responses may draw on economic,political, and informational tools, as well as militaryassistance.

Economic Policy and low Intensity Conflict. U.S.policy for low Intensity Conflict recognizes that longterm political and economic development will reducethe underlying causes of instability of the Third World,help undermine the attractiveness of totalitarianregimes, and eventually lead to conditions favorable to

U.s. and Western interests. Therefore, we willencourage expansion of free trade, the development ofprivate enterprise, and the expansion andindependence of local economies. U.S. developmentassistance and economic aid programs facilitate thesepolicies. In addition, we will encourage privateinvestment in the Third World when that investmentsupports balanced economic growth.

Informational Policy and Low Intensity Conflict. LowIntensity Conflict.is a political struggle in which ideasmay be as important as arms. We hold significantadvantages over our adversaries in this area. In contrastto our adversaries, we have an open political systemthat thrives on communication and truth. We mustensure, however, that accurate information concerningAmerican ideals and objectives is available throughoutthe Third World; and that the resources needed toaccomplish this are available.

Political Instruments and low Intensity Conflict. Werecognize that other nations may not necessarilydevelop along democratic lines identical to ours.Nevertheless, we seek to encourage the development ofpolitical systems that protect the rights of the individualand provide for representative government, freeinstitutions, and an environment in which humandignity can flourish. We do this partially by example,and by defending our own ideals when they arechallenged. We can also promote development ofhumane social orders by helping eliminate securitythreats and the underlying economic causes of unrestand instability.

Military Instruments in low Intensity Conflict. Thefundamental tenet of u.s. strategy for dealing with lowIntensity Conflict directed against our friends and alliesis that military institutions in threatened states mustbecome able to provide security for their citizens andgovernments. U.S. low Intensity Conflict policy,therefore, recognizes that indirect-rather than direct­applications of U.S. military power are the mostappropriate and cost effective ways to achieve nationalgoals. The principal military instrument in LowIntensity Conflict, therefore, is security assistance.

The primary role for U.S. armed forces in Low IntensityConflict is to support and facilitate the securityassistance program. The"military services must alsostand ready to provide more direct forms of militaryassistance when called upon. Usually, this assistance

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will consist of technical training and logistical support.The services and the Unified Commands must also beprepared for the effective execution of contingency andpeacekeeping operations when such operations arerequired to protect national interests. U.S. combatforces will be introduced into low Intensity Conflictsituations only as a last resort and when vital nationalinterests cannot otherwise be adequately protected.

Narcotics Trafficking and Low Intensity Conflict.Narcotics trafficking can breed violence, fuel instabilityand threaten governing institutions wherever it is found.The vast revenues produced by illegal narcotics sales,and concomitant use of international financial networksto launder the proceeds of these transactions, canpromote the type of instability that becomes a breedingground for low Intensity Conflict. For these reasons,our policies for dealing with drug trafficking provideimportant support for our efforts to deal with low

Intensity Conflict.

Terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict. Under somecircumstances, terrorism can be an important aspect oflow Intensity Conflict. This Administration has taken

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significant steps to define and implement policies tocounter international terrorism. These policies focus ondeterring, pre-empting and effectively reacting tointernational terrorist incidents. low Intensity Conflictpolicy goes beyond this, however, and deals with thebroader problem of supporting groups andgovernments against which terrorism is being used as asubversive weapon.

We must realize that low Intensity Conflicts arefrequently protracted struggles. In addition, most of theinstruments of power that we can bring to bear onthem work indirectly and over a long period of time.Therefore, we must be patient in such struggles. It isimportant that we prevail, but especially important thatwe recognize that we often cannot do so easily orquickly. On the other hand, we do hold importantadvantages. We represent a model of political andeconomic development that promises freedom frompolitical domination and economic privation. If we canprotect our own security, and maintain an environmentof reasonable stability and open trade andcommunication throughout the Third World, political,economic, and social forces will eventually work to ouradvantage.

v. Executing the Strategy

This portion of the report discusses U.S. capabilities toexecute the National Security Strategy discussed inpreceding chapters with particular emphasis on thoseareas where resource shortfalls impede effectiveachievement of important national strategy objectives.

FOREIGN POLICYCAPABILITIES

The United States depends on foreign assistance andother foreign operations programs to protect nationalsecurity, promote its interests, and communicate itsvalues and principles throughout the world. Ourforeign operations programs include economic andmilitary assistance, food aid, development assistance,international education and communication programs,the overseas operations of the State Department, andmany other important functions.

These programs convert our foreign policy into positive,visible actions which provide assistance to people whoface severe economic privation, and promote theeconomic and political development so important tosupport free and democratic societies. The programsalso help governments seeking to defend themselvesfrom internal and external threats. By helping ourfriends enhance their security, we can help create thenecessary preconditions for economic and politicaldevelopment.

Equally important, our programs tell people aboutAmerican ideals and values. By building greaterunderstanding of what the United States stands for, we

can influence growth in positive directions. The overallgoal of our efforts is to create a more stable world inwhich humane social and political orders can flourishand which can support balanced economic growth. Inshort, our foreign operations programs are intended tosupport the types of positive change that will protectour national interests over the long term. A stableworld whose nations can meet the economic needs oftheir citizens and respect individual rights is a worldthat is safer for the United States and its friends.

We spend only about two percent of our annual federalbudget on the various foreign assistance programs. Thisis indisputably money well spent. The good we do, theproblems we help solve, and the threats we counterthrough our assistance programs far outweigh the costs.They represent a highly leveraged investment.Nevertheless, our foreign assistance programs do notreceive the support they deserve from the Congress. Inthe last few years, Administration foreign operationsbudget requests have been severely cut by theCongress. Although all programs must bear the burdenof reducing the budget deficit, the cuts in foreignassistance have often been grossly disproportionatewhen compared with other programs.

This is penny wise and pound foolish. We cannotdismiss foreign assistance as a "give-away" program thatwastes money which could better be spent onAmericans. In the first place, such a characterization isfactually wrong. Much of the money we spend inforeign assistance programs goes to purchase goodsand services produced here in the United States. Ourfood aid programs are one of the best examples, butother programs, such as foreign military sales, alsodirectly increase U.S. exports.

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Furthermore, our assistance programs work to solveproblems, relieve hardships, and ameliorate conflictsthat, if neglected, could degenerate into crisesadversely affecting U.S. interests. Unless we can be anactive participant in encouraging the type of worldorder we desire, we may find ourselves compelled todefend our interests with more direct, costly, andpainful means.

We face a foreign assistance funding crisis under theFY1987 budget voted by Congress. In that budget, wesought $16.2 billion for Foreign Economic and MilitaryAssistance. That assistance was carefully calculated tosupport a broad'variety of important U.S. nationalsecurity objectives.

Specifically:

• Thirty-four percent of that budget was to go to Israeland Egypt, reinforcing our vital search for lastingpeace in that region.

• Twenty-six percent was intended for military accessstates and countries hosting U.S. military forces suchas the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Greeceand Turkey.

• Eleven percent would have gone to Central Americaand the Caribbean.

• Seventeen percent was for countries which share ourdemocratic values and need our help to advancethem, such as Thailand and Colombia; where newdemocracies have emerged, such as Bolivia andUruguay; and where fundamental economic reformsare taking place, such as Ecuador and Senegal.

• All other country programs accounted for on Iy threepercent of the total foreign aid request. Some arepoverty-stricken African states to which we aredirecting our humanitarian and technical assistanceprograms. Others, such as Burma, are active partnerswith us in the war against international narcoticstrafficking.

• The remaining nine percent of our assistance was togo to international organizations, multilateraldevelopment banks, the Peace Corps, refugeeassistance, narcotics control efforts, and AID non­country programs.

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Congress cut our request to $13.6 billion. The effect ofthis cut is devastating. After we meet our commitmentto the Middle East peace process, we have grosslyinadequate funds left to meet other requirements. As aresult, we are unable to fulfill our commitments tocountries that provide us with strategically importantbasing and access rights. Indeed, some programs willhave to be cut over SO percent this year. We face thedanger of falling behind in programs that are designedto help key regions beset with severe economic andsecurity problems. We also can do little to help ThirdWorld debtors get back on thei r feet.

The cuts signal a policy of retreat. Clearly, in the nextfew months the Congress and the Executive Branchmust work together to find solutions to these fundingproblems so that we can resume our positive role.These programs are a key part of our first line ofdefense in protecting American freedoms, and mustenjoy full bipartisan support to be effective. I solicitsuch support for the FY 1987 supplementalappropriations request which has been submitted toCongress.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIESDefense resources. The successful execution of anyNational Security Strategy depends on the availabilityof adequate resources. Strategies which depend onunrealistic or unachievable assumptions about resourceavailability are doomed to failure. At the same time,recent history has taught us that the time between theonset of a crisis and the need for a national securityresponse has dWindled over the years. The days whennations could respond to crises by raising, training, andequipping new forces are gone. This fact of life,coupled with the sober knowledge that crisis situationscan burst upon the world with startling suddenness,means that we must be able to deter aggression andinfringement of our vital interes~s at any moment, andat places far removed from the United States.

In practical terms, this means that the Administrationmust not adopt strategies that our country cannot afford,

and that our military leaders cannot and must not basetheir plans on resources that are beyond the nation'scapability to provide. It also means that Congress,operating from a shared view of U.S. national interests,and the objectives which support them, must providethe Executive with the resources necessary toimplement a realistic, prudent and effective strategy.

Providing for the common defense is the mostimportant responsibility of the federal government­shared equally by the Executive and Legislativebranches. Partnership is the key to its successfulexecution. In that spirit, in the early 1980's-for thethird time since World War II-Congress and theExecutive joined together in a concerted effort torebuild and strengthen our military capabilities.However, unlike past build-ups, which werecharacterized by high rates of consumption to supportcombat operations in Asian conflicts, we focused thistime on investment. There were important manpowerand readiness problems to be overcome as well, but itwas clear that only an increase in investment wouldproduce the necessary positive, sustained impact onthe military balance.

This action was essential to redress the seriousimbalances between u.s. and Soviet capabilities whichhad emerged during the 1970's-a period ofunprecedented military investment by the Soviets,aimed at shifting the global "correlation of forces"decisively in their favor. Had we not arrested thisdangerous trend, the damage to our most fundamentalnational interests would have been profound.Fortunately, the Congress and the American peoplerecognized the essentiality of rebuilding the country'sdefenses. As a result, we have achieved great progress.Our level of investment roughly matches that of theSoviets'. However, the legacy of a decade in whichSoviet investment far exceeded our own remains, andmust be corrected.

Judgments about the adequacy of our defense programultimately come down to questions of risk. Put in itsstarkest form, the issue is: how much risk to thesurvival of this country and its free institutions are wewilling to accept? Military forces which areunsuccessful in deterring major war fail the first test of

adequacy. We and our allies must have crediblemilitary responses, the prospects of which convince ouradversaries that aggression would entail unacceptablyhigh costs for them. How much military power isrequired to deter is inevitably a subjective question,involving our sense of how others view our militarycapabilities and our political will to use them, ifnecessary. In this respect, our forces must not only beadequate, but must be unmistakably perceived asadequate to defend our interests, execute our strategy,and preserve our alliance relationships.

Without question, the defense program required tosupport our strategy is affordable. In fact, in the pastseven years, Americans have devoted an average of onIy6.1 percent of GNP to defense-well under rates in the19S0s and 1960s, which ranged from 7 percent to 9.2percent. Likewise, at about 27 percent of federaloutlays, defense spending falls well below thepeacetime average of 38 percent during the postwarera. In both instances, the increases of the early 1980sseem large only because the spending of the late 1970swas so severely depressed.

In the FY88-89 Defense Budget, I have not asked theCongress to approve defense increases similar to thoseof the early 1980s. At the same time, the Congress mustact positively to protect the gains that we together haveachieved. We must not continue on the path of realdecline in defense investment established during thepast two years. The time has come for us to jointogether in supporting moderate, sustainable increasesin our defense budget, consistent with the economicgrowth we expect for the nation as a whole, and withthe long-term challenge which the Soviet Unionpresents to the free world. Together, as a nation, wemust break the pattern of costly and inefficient ups anddowns in defense spending, and support the path ofsustained, reasonable growth, at a rate which willallow the continuing modernization of our strategic~nd conventional forces, while maintaining adequatelevels of military readiness, sustainability, and force

structure.

Military Forces. Earlier in this report I set forth ourstrategy for the maintenance of deterrence againststrategic nuclear or conventional attack on the UnitedStates or its all ies.

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The execution of our strategy to maintain a crediblenuclear deterrent through the modernization of ourstrategic forces has been successfuI to date. Majorelements of the Strategic Modernization Program havebeen approved by the Congress and ouf strategic forcesare becoming more sUlvivable and effective each day.We are improving the capability and credibility of ourdiversified strategic force mix and will continue to doso well into the next century.

As we look forward to the future, we are examiningoptions that wi II allow us to capitalize on the progressmade in the Strategic Defense Initiative to renderballistic missiles obsolete and place deterrence on amore stable long-term foundation. Strong support forthis program, which exploits our strengths in advancedtechnology, advances both our deterrence and ourarms control goals. Full funding of the FYBB-B9 budgetrequest for SOl is essential to sustain the importantprogress made to date and allow the program toproceed at an efficient pace.

The survivability of our land-based ICBM forces willincrease dramatically in the years ahead. as we movefrom older, fixed basing modes to new mobile basingmodes that contribute to stability through increasedsurvivability. The new concepts for mobile basing ofthe Peacekeeper and the Small ICBM will revitalize theICBM leg of the strategic triad, significantly improvedeterrence, and allow implementation of the ScowcroftCommission recommendations in a manner consistentwith earlier Congressional gUidance.

As we continue to improve our strategic deterrentforces, we must be mindful of the fact that ourconventional forces are the first line of deterrence, andan essential means of supporting U.S. interests in crisesshort of general war. With the emergence of roughnuclear parity between the United States and the SovietUnion, conventional forces have become even moreimportant to maintaining a secure deterrent. Ourcurrent conventional force modernization programcontributes to a strong forward defense posture.

Key elements include:

• The Army's modernization program, which is basedon the new Air Land Battle doctrine, and provides a

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combined-arms capability that will enable ourdivisions to maintain a qualitative edge over themuch larger Soviet forces.

• Ongoing modernization programs for our tactical airforces supplement these ground force programs. Theability of our tactical air forces to maintain local airsuperiority and support ground forces requirescontinuing improvement.

• The program to revitalize our special operationsforces is being fully implemented as one of ourhighest priorities. This program will ensure that wehave highly trained forces immediately available torespond to a broad range of crises and Low IntensityConflict situations, when our interests so require.

• Improvements in c'l are of continuing high priorityin order to strengthen the ability to employ ourconventional forces to their full capability.

• New short and long range mobility forces areimproving our capability to transport and supportour forward units, and to deploy forces incontingencies. The ability to build up military powerrapidly in strategically important areas on theEurasian periphery is essential for deterrence, and forneutralizing the geographical advantages of theSoviet Union.

• The warfighting capability of our naval forces isimproving markedly with the increase in the quantityand quality of ships and aircraft. This long-termprogram to assure our ability to use the world'soceans in peace and war requires continuingsupport.

The full impact of these major modernization programs

will be felt over the decade ahead. Accomplishment ofour objectives will greatly increase our conventionaldeterrent capability. The net improvement in ourdefense posture will not be marginal; it will befundamental. Full support of these programs isessential to avoid deterioration of the U.S.-Sovietconventional force balance, and assure that we haveconventional forces capable of conducting forwarddefense of our interests without recourse to nuclearweapons.

As we pursue the qualitative upgrading of our forces,we must continue to refine our plans and concepts foremploying them. Our military strategy is complex. Toaccomplish their tasks the Services have developedappropriate doctrines, organizations and tactics.Ensuring that these are melded into a coherentNational Military Strategy presents a challenge in thecontinuously changing international environment. Thisproblem is magnified by the diversity of potentialcontingencies within the spectrum of conventionalconflict. At the theater level, regional strategies havebeen developed by the Unified Commanders. Thesestrategies, together with other considerations global incharacter, or which cross CINCS' lines of authority, areintegrated into the National Military Strategy. Thatstrategy provides an effective basis for the employmentof our military capabilities worldwide, in acoordinated, mutually supporting fashion. That strategyundergoes periodic reviews to revalidate and update itsessential elements. The results will not only improveour capability for employment of military forces, butprovide stronger conceptual support for development ofour conventional force R&D and procurementprograms. In doing so, we are always mindful of therelationship between nuclear and conventionaldeterrence. Our long-term objective of reducing ourreliance on nuclear weapons, if successful, demandsspecial attention to maintaining both the effectivenessof our conventional deterrent and strong ·alliance

relationships.

Improving Efficiency. An important part of the activityaimed at supporting our National Security Strategyincludes a series of ongoing efforts to improve themanagement and operational effectiveness of ourdefense establishment. Improving the efficiency of theDepartment of Defense has been the subject of muchattention and a number of notable achievements overthe past six years. Most recently these efforts haveincluded the report of the Blue Ribbon Commission onDefense Management, chaired by David Packard; andCongressional action on defense reorganization. As aresult of this activity, important changes'have beenaccomplished in the way the Department of Defensedoes business. The overriding objectives of thesecombined efforts are to improve the quality of ourstrategic planning; promote alight linkage between

strategy, military requirements, and our acquisitionprograms; and ensure that we realize maximummilitary benefit for every defense dollar.

Important organizational changes have occurred; othersare impending. New Unified Commands forTransportation and Special Operations Forces willbecome operational this year, and we will shortlyestablish the newly authorized position of AssistantSecretary of Defense for Special Operations and LowIntensity Conflict, concurrently activating theCongressionally-mandated Board for Low IntensityConflict within the National Security Councilorganization. The authority of the Chairman, JointChiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commanders, has beenstrengthened; and the new position of Vice Chairman,Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been established.

In 1986, the Congress approved my proposal to createan Under Secretary of Defense for AcqUisition. Thisappointment has led to a reorganization ofprocurement functions within the Department ofDefense. These changes are intended to achieve amajor reduction in the time required to field newtechnology and equipment, to involve the professionaljudgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more directly inthe identification and validation of militaryrequirements, and to improve the efficiency of theacqUisition process generally. To promote technologicalinnovation, the role of the Defense Advanced ResearchProjects Agency in prototyping and other advanceddevelopment work on joint programs has beenexpanded.

To aid our understanding of future requirements, lastfall we established.<l bipartisan Commission onIntegrated Long;rerm Strategy. This group ofdistinguished Americans is working to provide theSecretary of Defense and my Assistant for NationalSecurity Affairs insights into the role and strategicimplications of new defense technologies over the nexttwenty years. The Commission will also look at ways toaccelerate the introduction of the most promising newtechnologies into our military forces. Possible newthreats resulting from ongoing Soviet research programswill also be examined.

Changes underway in the defense planning process willstrengthen the relationship between the fiscal plans fordefense and the overall budgetary plans for the federal

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government. With the encouragement of Congress, weare for the first time submitting a two-year defensebudgei. In both instances, the objective is greaterstability for the defense program. While we willcontinue to strive for greater cost control and savings, atthe program level, the Blue Ribbon Commission onDefense Management concluded that in the future, .'significant efficiencies in the defense budget were morelikely to be achieved through greater program stabilitythan through specific management actions.

Greater stability can be effectively accomplished onlythrough close cooperation between the ExecutiveBranch and the Congress. Our joint interest inimproving defense management has produced a seriesof interconnected organizational and procurementreforms that are now underway. We must now let theDepartment of Defense implement these reforms andassess their effectiveness without undue interference. Itis likely that some adjustments will be required. Aftersuitable experience with the new structure andprocedures, we will make appropriaterecommendations to the Congress.

INTEGRATING NATIONALSECURITY CAPABILITIES

As I indicated earlier, the effective achievement of ourNational Security Strategy's objectives requires thecarefully integrated employment of all facets of nationalpower. To the maximum extent possible, we attempt toachieve our objectives through employment of the non­coercive elements of national power. This approach isaided when we are able to identify problems early,diagnose them thoroughly, and apply the pooledinsights and wisdom of my senior advisors to theirsolution. The principal vehicle through which thisessential integrating function is

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accomplished is the National Security Council (NSC),and the various interagency groups which functionunder its supervision.

The NSC helps us apply our broad objectives tospecific situations and translate those objectives intodetailed policies and strategies. The overreaching taskof the NSC is to help ensure that my decisions aremade in a timely manner, and with benefit of theclearest possible articulation of alternative courses ofaction, their relative strengths and weaknesses, andlikely consequences.

The results of this process are formally recorded asNational Security Decision Directives (NSDDs). TheNSDDs, in the aggregate, provide a broad body ofguidance for the preparation of foreign and defensepolicy, military planning, and the development of sub­strategies to support the National Security Strategy'sobjectives. Over the past six years we have developedover two hundred and fifty NSDDs. Not all remain inforce, and not all deal with topics of global import; butthe process is effective in promoting the integratedemployment of the broad and diverse range of toolsavailable for achieving our national security objectives.

The continued development and successfulimplementation of u.s. National Security Strategy is amajor responsibility of the Executive Branch. But theAdministration cannot accomplish this alone.Developing and supporting a National Security Strategyfor the United States that prOVides a sound vision forthe future and a realistic guide to action must be acooperative endeavor of the Congress and theAdministration.

I look forward to working with the Congress in abipartisan manner to achieve increased understandingof, and broad support for, our National SecurityStrategy and its objectives. There can be no endeavormore important for the long-term well-being of theAmerican people; and I solicit the Congress' closestcollaboration in achieving it.

VI. Looking Forward to the 1990's

Six years ago, when the American people elected meas their President, I was determined to achieve fournear-term, urgently needed objectives in the NationalSecurity Strategy area:

• First, to restore our nation's military strength after adecade of neglect which allowed the Soviet Unionto overtake us in many critical categories of militarypower;

• Second, to restore our nation's economic strengthand reinvigorate the world economic system, in thewake of the energy crisis and global recession;

• Third, to restore the nation's international prestige asa world leader, after some years of our image beingtarnished and our adversaries believing that theUnited States was retreating from its internationalobligations; and

• Fourth, to restore personal motivation to allAmericans and carry our message to the world thatindividuals and not governments should controltheir economic, spiritual and political destinies.

After six years, I can report this restoration process iswell underway. The ship of state is heading in a new,long-term direction which should be pursued over theremaining years of this century. I believe that our mostimportant thrust in the National Security Strategy areahas been to restore the image of the United States asthe light of freedom throughout the world.

We have seen our message taken to heart by peoplesand governments throughout the world in these last sixyears. We have seen nations change their economicthinking to place more emphasis on the worth andwork of the individual as opposed to satisfying theinterests of the state. We have seen thousands of

freedom loving people take up arms against thoseregimes which seek to impose their will onpopulations who want peace and economic stability.We have seen mounting opposition to those forces inthe world that aggressively employ military power andcoercion to achieve their goals.

This is what has given me the personal strength toforge ahead in times of trouble and criticism, in timesof great risk and potential loss. I have seen that time ison our side against those forces in this world that arecommitted to the elimination of freedom, justice, anddemocratic ways of life. Time is running out for thoseregimes because people everywhere realize that theway of life imposed by those forces is counter to basichuman values. People across the world see that weoffer a vision of the future. Our adversaries offer thedarkened ways of an unsatisfied past throughdomination by military power, stifling statism, andpolitical oppression.

I have used every opportunity these past six years todrive this theme home, both here and abroad. This isalso the dominant theme of our National SecurityStrategy-the very pulse of our nation which must becarried into the future to ensure that we remain strongand innovative, vibrant and free.

We must never forget that freedom is never really free;it is the most costly thing in the world. And freedom isnever paid for in a lump sum; installments come due inevery generation. All any of us can do is offer thegenerations that follow a chance for freedom.

I ask that we stand together in my final two years asyour President to ensure that we continue setting inplace a strategy which will carry us securely into the21st Century.

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