NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLER … · NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v....

687NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN, INC. v. SCHEIDLERCite as 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001)

appropriate weight to the factors that areparticularly important based on the factsof each case. See Ty, Inc., 237 F.3d at901–02 (holding that the magistrate judgedid not err in placing greater weight onthe similarity of marks, the similarity ofproducts, and the area and manner of con-current use); Barbecue Marx, 235 F.3d at1046 (stating that the key factors in thelikelihood of confusion analysis in that casewere the defendant’s intent, actual confu-sion, and the degree of care exercised bycustomers).

Presented with the administrative rec-ord as well as a substantial amount of newevidence, the district court placed greaterweight on the identical appearance of theCAE marks, the similarity of the productsand services bearing the CAE mark, theidentical manner and channels of com-merce in which the parties used the CAEmark, the strength of the CAE mark reg-istered by CAE, Inc., and, to a lesserextent, the degree of care likely to beexercised by consumers. The court basedits findings on a record of undisputed factsand analyzed the importance of each factorin the context of this particular case andwith appropriate deference to the findingsof the TTAB. Clean Air failed to demon-strate a genuine issue of material fact as toany of the factors; therefore, the districtcourt correctly concluded that a likelihoodof confusion existed as a matter of law.We conclude that the district court cor-rectly balanced all seven factors. Accord-ingly, the district court correctly enteredsummary judgment in favor of CAE, Inc.and against Clean Air based on a findingthat consumers were likely to be confusedby the parties’ contemporaneous use of theCAE mark in connection with their goodsand services. See Door Sys., 83 F.3d at173 (affirming summary judgment whenthere was no genuine issue of material factas to likelihood of confusion).

Conclusion

The district court’s conclusion that con-sumers are likely to be confused by theparties’ simultaneous use of the CAE markwas correct and is conclusive as to allclaims. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-ment of the district court in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

,

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FORWOMEN, INC., on behalf of itself andits women members and all otherwomen who use or may use the ser-vices of women’s health centers thatprovide abortions, and DelawareWomen’s Health Organization, Inc.,and Summit Women’s Health Organi-zation, Inc., on behalf of themselvesand the class of all women’s healthcenters in the United States at whichabortions are performed, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

Joseph M. SCHEIDLER, Pro–Life Ac-tion League, Inc., Andrew D. Schol-berg, Timothy Murphy, and OperationRescue, Defendants–Appellants.

Nos. 99–3076, 99–3336, 99–3891,99–3892 and 01–2050.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 14, 2000.

Decided Oct. 2, 2001.

Petition for Rehearing and RehearingEn Banc Denied Oct. 29, 2001.

Women’s rights organization andabortion clinics brought class action

688 267 FEDERAL REPORTER, 3d SERIES

against individual and corporate organizersof antiabortion protest network, alleging,inter alia, that network members’ antiabor-tion protest tactics violated Racketeer In-fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO). The United States District Courtfor the Northern District of Illinois, JamesF. Holderman, J., 765 F.Supp. 937, dis-missed claims. Plaintiffs appealed. TheCourt of Appeals, 968 F.2d 612, affirmed.Certiorari was granted, and the UnitedStates Supreme Court, 510 U.S. 249, 114S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99, reversed andremanded. Following jury trial, the Dis-trict Court, David H. Coar, J., enteredjudgment on jury verdict awarding dam-ages to clinics and permanent, nationwideinjunction restricting protest activities ofdefendants and those acting in concertwith them. Defendants appealed. TheCourt of Appeals, Diane P. Wood, CircuitJudge, held that: (1) RICO’s civil remediesprovision authorizes injunctive relief at thebehest of both the Attorney General andprivate plaintiffs; (2) evidence establishedthat protesters associated with networkcommitted acts outside First Amendment’sfree speech protection that could legiti-mately be regulated; (3) defendants couldbe held liable for conduct of network mem-bers under RICO and First Amendment;(4) instructions adequately informed juryof applicable law; (5) injunction was notimpermissibly vague or overbroad; (6)women’s right organization was adequateclass representative; and (7) any error injury instruction given on elements of state-law extortion offenses alleged as predicateacts was harmless.

Affirmed.

1. Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations O55

In interpreting the remedial provi-sions of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-rupt Organizations Act (RICO), court’s in-

quiry begins with the statute’s text, and, ifthe text is unambiguous, it ends there aswell. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.


Civil remedies provision of RacketeerInfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO) both confers jurisdiction on thedistrict courts and specifies certain reme-dial powers that the courts will have incases brought before them. 18 U.S.C.A.§ 1964(a).

3. Action O3When statute expressly provides a

particular remedy or remedies, a courtmust be chary of reading others into it.


Liberal-construction mandate respect-ing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-ganizations Act (RICO) has particularforce when court is construing RICO’s civilremedy provision, because it is in this sec-tion that RICO’s remedial purposes aremost evident. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964.

5. Injunction O94 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations O82, 85Civil remedies provision of Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO) authorizes injunctive relief at thebehest of both the Attorney General andprivate plaintiffs, authorizes interim mea-sures when the Attorney General sues, andauthorizes private treble damages for pri-vate plaintiffs, but not the United States.18 U.S.C.A. § 1964.

6. Constitutional Law O90.1(1) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations O7Liability could not constitutionally be

imposed on antiabortion protesters, underRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-


zations Act (RICO), for portion of theirconduct constituting protected speech un-der First Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

7. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)Protection of politically controversial

speech is at the core of the First Amend-ment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

8. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)Antiabortion protesters’ speech label-

ing abortion as murder, urging abortionclinics to get out of the abortion business,and urging clinic patients not to seek abor-tions was fully protected by the FirstAmendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

9. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)First Amendment does not protect vi-

olent conduct, nor does it protect threatsor language used to carry out illegal con-duct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

10. Constitutional Law O90(3)Even when defendant’s conduct in-

volves expressive elements, government isfree, under First Amendment, to regulatethe non-expressive aspects of the conductif such regulation is necessary to serveimportant government interests. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 1.

11. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)The protection of rights of abortion

clinics and patients to seek and providemedical care free from violence, intimi-dation, and harassment is important gov-ernment interest justifying government’sregulations of non-expressive aspects ofconduct of antiabortion protesters underFirst Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

12. Constitutional Law O90.1(1) Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations O79Evidence that, at events sponsored by

antiabortion protest network, protesters

trespassed on abortion clinic property,blocked access to clinics with their bodies,destroyed clinic property, physically as-saulted clinic staff and patients, and sentletters to other clinics threatening similarattacks if they did not cease performingabortions established that protesters asso-ciated with network committed acts out-side First Amendment’s free speech pro-tection that could legitimately be regulatedin light of important governmental interestin protecting right to seek and providemedical care, as required to impose civilliability under Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Act (RICO) onthose responsible for organizing network.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 18 U.S.C.A.§ 1962.

13. Constitutional Law O90.1(1) Extortion and Threats O9

Letters that director for antiabortionorganization sent to abortion clinics on be-half of organization and nationwide net-work of antiabortion protesters, indicatingthat clinics would be subject to protesttactics of antiabortion protesters like thoseexperienced at other clinics if they did notcease performing abortions, were not pro-tected political speech, in light of protest-ers’ illegal conduct at other events spon-sored by network, but rather were truethreats outside First Amendment’s protec-tion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

14. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)Under free speech principles, to im-

pose liability on an individual based onthat individual’s association with an organi-zation that engaged in both protectedspeech and unprotected, illegal conduct,plaintiff must show both that the organiza-tion itself, rather than just isolated mem-bers, possessed unlawful goals and thatthe individual defendant held a specificintent to further those illegal aims.U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.


15. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)

Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations O50

Directors of antiabortion organizationwhich, along with second organization, wasprimary organizer of nationwide networkof antiabortion protesters could be heldliable, under Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Act (RICO) andFirst Amendment, for conduct of networkmembers, given evidence that activitiesplanned for network-sponsored events in-cluded such illegal, unprotected acts asblocking access to abortion clinics and en-tering clinics to block passageways, sup-porting finding that network itself heldillegal aims, and that directors, as high-level leaders within network, knew of suchaims and intended to further them, asshown by their participation in planningand coordinating network events at whichillegal acts occurred. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.

16. Federal Courts O630.1Unlike a criminal trial, there is no

equivalent of ‘‘plain error’’ review in a civiltrial for a jury instruction challenge that isforfeited rather than waived.

17. Federal Civil Procedure O2182.1 Federal Courts O822

Court of Appeals’ review of jury in-structions is deferential, considering onlywhether the instructions, taken as a whole,adequately informed the jury of the appli-cable law.


Instructions adequately informed juryof applicable law in action for alleged viola-tions of Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act (RICO) by individualand corporate organizers of antiabortionprotest network, even though instructionconveying requirement that defendants

could not be held liable unless found tohave specifically intended to further net-work’s illegal aims was not incorporatedinto verdict form, inasmuch as jury waspresumed to have followed instructionsand judge was not required to replicateevery instruction on verdict form itself.

19. Constitutional Law O90.1(1)

Injunction O189

Injunction entered in action underRacketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-zations Act (RICO), barring illegal conductby antiabortion protesters associated withnationwide network was not impermissiblyvague or overbroad, so as to chill protectedspeech, even though some of injunction’slanguage, taken in the abstract, was some-what general, given that injunction, by itsterms, prohibited only illegal conduct, in-cluding trespassing, obstructing access toabortion clinics, damaging property, usingviolence or threats of violence, or aiding,abetting, inducing, directing, or incitingsuch acts, and included provision under-scoring that protected expression, such aspeaceful picketing, speeches, and prayingon public property, were not within scopeof injunction. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1;18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.

20. Injunction O189

Injunction did not impermissibly holddefendants in action under Racketeer In-fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(RICO) responsible for actions of personsbeyond their control by barring illegal an-tiabortion protest activities by defendantsand those working in ‘‘active concert’’ withdefendants or their nationwide antiabor-tion network; those not closely associatedwith defendants or network were not af-fected by injunction, and, with respect tothose encompassed by injunction, violatorsacting without inducement or direction ofdefendants would be in contempt of order,


not defendants themselves. 18 U.S.C.A.§ 1962.

21. Federal Civil Procedure O392 Judgment O564(1)

No final judgment existed in class ac-tion by abortion clinics and women’s rightsorganization against organizers of antia-bortion protest network to which princi-ples of res judicata could apply after Su-preme Court ruled solely on viability ofclinics’ claims under Racketeer Influencedand Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),resulting in antitrust claims asserted byclinic and women’s rights organizationdropping out of case, inasmuch as caseremained pending in Court of Appeals andthen district court; thus, district court didnot abuse its discretion when it permittedamendment of complaint to allow women’srights organization to continue as plaintifffor RICO claims. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962.

22. Federal Civil Procedure O828.1Whether to allow amendments to a

complaint is a question committed to thediscretion of the trial court.

23. Federal Civil Procedure O833, 840As a general rule, amendments to

complaints are liberally allowed up to andeven after trial, judgment, and appeal.

24. Federal Civil Procedure O758, 1951Defendants in Racketeer Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) ac-tion waived defense of res judicata whenthey failed to list it as affirmative defensein their trial brief. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962;Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

25. Compromise and Settlement O17(2)Even if settlement in separate action

between one plaintiff and one defendant inclass action under Racketeer Influencedand Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)had preclusive effect, preclusion would runonly between settling plaintiff and defen-

dant and would not affect any other plain-tiffs, including class members, or otherdefendants, and all defendants would re-main jointly liable for damages to plain-tiffs, with exception of settling defendant,who would not be liable to settling plain-tiff.

26. Federal Civil Procedure O162Class certification decisions are com-

mitted to the discretion of the districtcourt.

27. Federal Civil Procedure O181Women’s rights advocacy organization

did not have interests antagonistic to thosewomen who were not members of organi-zation and whose rights to seek abortionservices had been or would be interferedwith by organizers of antiabortion protestnetwork, so as to be inadequate class rep-resentative in action in which plaintiffsalleged that network members’ protest tac-tics violated Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Act (RICO); toshow such antagonism, organizers had toshow that some women in the class wantedto seek abortion services, but did not wantto be free from harassment and intimi-dation while doing so, which was exceed-ingly unlikely and speculative scenario. 18U.S.C.A. § 1962.

28. Federal Civil Procedure O181Class certification was not abuse of

discretion in action in which abortion clin-ics and women’s right organization allegedthat tactics of antiabortion protest networkviolated Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act (RICO), on grounds thatnamed plaintiffs had not performed ade-quately as class representatives, given thatplaintiffs pursued litigation diligently for15 years, through trip to Supreme Courtand seven-week trial, and ultimately weresuccessful in securing nationwide injunc-tion prohibiting conduct they set out tochallenge. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.


29. Extortion and Threats O8Intangible property such as the right

to conduct a business can be considered‘‘property’’ under Hobbs Act’s definition of‘‘extortion.’’ 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951.

See publication Words and Phras-es for other judicial constructionsand definitions.

30. Extortion and Threats O8Extortionist can violate the Hobbs Act

without either seeking or receiving moneyor anything else, in that a loss to, orinterference with the rights of, the victimis all that is required. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1951.

31. Federal Courts O909Any error in jury instruction given on

elements of state-law extortion offensesalleged as predicate acts in civil actionunder Racketeer Influenced and CorruptOrganizations Act (RICO) was harmless,given jury’s finding that defendants com-mitted 21 predicate acts under Hobbs Actalone, which was far in excess of two pred-icate acts required by RICO. 18 U.S.C.A.§§ 1951, 1962.

32. Federal Civil Procedure O2641Relief from judgment is an extraordi-

nary remedy granted only in exceptionalcircumstances. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule60(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

33. Federal Courts O829Review of district court’s decision de-

nying relief from judgment is deferential,and Court of Appeals will reverse only ifthe district court has abused its discretion.Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

34. Federal Civil Procedure O2655Relief from judgment was not war-

ranted where district court found thatmovants had documents in their possessionfrom which they could have discoveredmost of ‘‘new’’ evidence for more than adecade and that it was very unlikely thatany of ‘‘new’’ evidence, if admitted at trial,

would have had any impact on jury’s ver-dict. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b)(2, 3),28 U.S.C.A.

35. Federal Civil Procedure O2655

Motions for relief from judgment can-not be used to present evidence that withdue diligence could have been introducedbefore judgment. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

36. Federal Civil Procedure O2655

Motions for relief from judgment can-not be used to put forth evidence that isnot material or that would likely notchange the result at trial. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

Lowell E. Sachnoff, Sachnoff & Waver,Chicago, IL, Fay Clayton, Robinson, Cur-ley & Clayton, Chicago, IL, Sara N. Love,Arlington, VA, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Thomas L. Brejcha, Jr., Chicago, IL,Larry L. Crain, American Center for Law& Justice, Brentwood, TN, for Defen-dants–Appellants at No. 01–2050.

Walter M. Weber, American Center forLaw and Justice, Alexandria, VA, for De-fendant–Appellant at No. 99–3336.

James A. Serritella, Burke, Warren,Mackey & Serritella, Chicago, IL, EdwardM. Gaffney, Jr., Valparaiso UniversitySchool of Law, Valparaiso, IN, S. Eliza-beth Mitchell, Heller, Ehrman, White &McAuliffe, Palo Alto, CA, for Amicus Curi-ae at Nos. 99–3336, 99–3892, 99–3891 and99–3076.

Walter M. Weber, American Center forLaw and Justice, Alexandria, VA, for De-fendant–Appellant at No. 99–3892.

Thomas L. Brejcha, Jr., Chicago, IL, forDefendants–Appellants at Nos. 99–3891,99–3076.


Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD,and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

This case is in its fifteenth year of con-tentious litigation. The defendants areanti-abortion activists who employ a pro-test tactic they call ‘‘rescues,’’ in whichthey and other activists physically blockaccess to abortion clinics so that the pa-tients and staff cannot get in or out of thebuildings. Plaintiffs use words less benignthan ‘‘rescue’’ to describe the defendants’activities. We will refer to them as ‘‘pro-test missions,’’ in the hopes that this willbe understood as a neutral term. Thedefendants’ goal is frankly to preventabortions from taking place. Participantsin the protest missions engage in a sub-stantial amount of protected speech, in-cluding efforts to persuade clinic patientsnot to have abortions and to persuadeclinic doctors and staff to quit performingabortions. Unfortunately, the protest mis-sions also involve illegal conduct: protest-ers do everything from sitting or lying inclinic doorways and waiting to be arrestedto engaging in more egregious conductsuch as entering the clinics and destroyingmedical equipment and chaining their bod-ies to operating tables to prevent the ta-bles from being used. In a few instances,protesters apparently have physically as-saulted clinic staff and patients. In addi-tion to staging these protests, the defen-dants have issued letters and statementsto other clinics threatening to stage mis-sions at those clinics unless they voluntari-ly shut down.

The plaintiffs, the National Organizationfor Women (NOW) and two clinics thatwere the targets of protest missions,brought this class action alleging, amongother things, that the defendants’ conductamounted to a pattern of extortion whichviolated the Racketeer Influenced andCorrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1961–68 (RICO). The trial judge certi-fied two classes: one, represented byNOW, of all NOW members and non-mem-bers who have used or would use the ser-vices of an abortion clinic in the UnitedStates, and a second of all such clinics.After a trip through this court to the Su-preme Court of the United States duringwhich many of the legal issues in the casewere clarified or resolved, the case wasremanded to the district court for trial ofthe plaintiffs’ RICO claims. A jury foundfor the plaintiffs and awarded damages tothe two named clinics, and the districtcourt issued a permanent nationwide in-junction prohibiting the defendants fromconducting blockades, trespassing, damag-ing property, or committing acts of vio-lence at the class clinics. The defendantshave appealed a wide range of issues relat-ing to the conduct of the trial and theissuance of the injunction. We find thatthe district court navigated its waythrough this complex and difficult casewith care and sensitivity and affirm itsjudgment in all respects.

I

Many of the facts pertinent to this opin-ion are set out in the Supreme Court’sdecision remanding the case, National Or-ganization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,510 U.S. 249, 114 S.Ct. 798, 127 L.Ed.2d 99(1994) (NOW I), and in our earlier decisionin the case, National Organization forWomen, Inc. v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612(7th Cir.1992), and we will not recountthem in detail here. Nonetheless, in orderto put the defendants’ appeal in context, abrief overview of the facts presented attrial and of the procedural history of thecase may be helpful.

The individual defendants, Joseph Schei-dler, Andrew Scholberg, and TimothyMurphy are on the Board of Directors of


one of the corporate defendants, the Pro–Life Action League (PLAL). The othercorporate defendant is Operation Rescue.(Randall Terry, the director of OperationRescue, was also originally a defendant inthe case, but he has since settled with theplaintiffs). All of the defendants wereamong the organizers of the Pro–Life Ac-tion Network (PLAN), which is a loosenational organization of groups that en-gage in protest missions and other aggres-sive anti-abortion tactics. Beginning inthe mid–1980’s, PLAN held annual conven-tions, organized in part by the defendantshere, which included seminars on proteststrategies. Those conventions concludedwith protest missions being staged in theconvention city. PLAN also sent a news-letter to its members and coordinated ahotline that potential protesters could callto get information about upcoming mis-sions. The plaintiffs alleged, and at trialthe jury found, that PLAN was an ‘‘organi-zation or enterprise’’ for purposes of RICOliability.

Initially, the plaintiffs alleged that thedefendants’ tactics violated both RICO andfederal antitrust law. In 1992, however,this court issued an opinion dismissingboth theories of liability, reasoning thatthe antitrust laws were not applicable be-cause the plaintiffs had not alleged thatthe defendants exercised any form of mar-ket control over the supply of abortionservices and that RICO did not reach thedefendants’ conduct because the plaintiffshad not shown that the alleged racketeer-ing acts were ‘‘economically motivated.’’968 F.2d at 617–30. The Supreme Courtgranted certiorari on the limited questionwhether RICO requires proof that eitherthe racketeering enterprise or the allegedpredicate acts were motivated by an eco-nomic purpose. (The antitrust holding ofour 1992 decision was thus left undis-turbed.) The Court concluded that RICOcontains no such economic motive require-

ment and therefore reversed our decisionon that point. 510 U.S. at 256–62, 114S.Ct. 798. Thereafter, we remanded thecase to the district court for trial of theplaintiffs’ RICO claims.

During the course of the seven-weektrial, the plaintiffs introduced evidence ofhundreds of acts committed by the defen-dants or others acting in concert withPLAN which, the plaintiffs contended, con-stituted predicate acts under RICO. Thealleged predicate acts included violationsof federal extortion law (the Hobbs Act, 18U.S.C. § 1951), state extortion law, thefederal Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, andconspiracy to violate these laws. A few ofthe more egregious acts the plaintiffs al-leged included:

w At a protest mission in Chico, Cali-fornia, protesters pressed four clinicstaff members up against a glassentranceway to the clinic for severalhours and refused to let them goeven when they complained theywere being crushed. The glass walleventually either loosened or shat-tered, injuring a clinic staffer.

w At a similar mission in Los Angeles,protesters grabbed at a patient’sarms and legs and tried to restrainher physically from entering theclinic. The patient was actually atthe clinic for a follow-up to ovariansurgery, and the attack by the pro-testers reopened her incisions. As aresult of the attack, the patient hadto be rushed to the hospital.

w In several instances, protesters en-tered clinics and destroyed medicalequipment.

w In several cases, protesters not onlyblocked doorways with their bodies,but chained themselves to the door-ways of clinics, or, in some cases, tooperating tables inside clinics.


w In December 1985, defendant Schei-dler sent letters to every abortionprovider in the Chicago area callingfor a ‘‘Christmas Truce.’’ In theseletters, he requested that the clinicsshut down for a specific day in De-cember, stated that he would ‘‘call toconfirm’’ the clinic’s decision, andwarned that non-complying clinicswould be subjected to ‘‘non-violentdirect action,’’ a catch-phrase PLANand PLAL frequently used for theiractivities.

Based on this and other evidence in thevoluminous record that was created at thetrial, the jury found in response to specialinterrogatories that the defendants or oth-ers associated with PLAN committed 21violations of the Hobbs Act, 25 violationsof state extortion law, 25 acts of conspiracyto violate federal or state extortion law,four acts or threats of physical violence, 23violations of the Travel Act, and 23 at-tempts to commit one of these crimes.The jury awarded damages to both clinics;once the damages were trebled, as RICOrequires, the awards totaled over $163,000to Summit Women’s Health Organizationand over $94,000 to Delaware Women’sHealth Organization.

After the jury returned its verdict, thedistrict court held three days of additionalhearings and then entered a permanent,nationwide injunction prohibiting the de-fendants or those acting in concert withthem from interfering with the rights ofthe class clinics to provide abortion ser-vices, or with rights of the class women toreceive those services, by obstructing ac-cess to the clinics, trespassing on clinicproperty, damaging or destroying clinicproperty, or using violence or threats ofviolence against the clinics, their employ-ees and volunteers, or their patients.

II

Initially, we must consider the defen-dants’ contention that RICO does not per-mit private plaintiffs to seek injunctiverelief. The only court of appeals to haveaddressed this issue directly, the NinthCircuit, concluded in 1986 that privateplaintiffs cannot seek injunctions underRICO, relying largely on the court’s read-ing of the statute’s legislative history. SeeReligious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.1986). The other courtsof appeals that have addressed the point indicta are split. Compare Johnson v. Col-lins Ent’mt. Co., 199 F.3d 710, 726 (4thCir.1999), In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d821, 828–30 (5th Cir.1988), and Trane Co.v. O’Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28–29 (2dCir.1983) (expressing doubt about avail-ability of injunctive relief for private plain-tiffs), with Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361,1366 (8th Cir.1983) (McMillan, J., concur-ring) (suggesting injunctive relief is avail-able); see also Lincoln House, Inc. v.Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir.1990),Northeast Women’s Ctr. v. McMonagle,868 F.2d 1342, 1355 (3d Cir.1989) (notingcontroversy but expressing no opinion onresolution). Our study of Supreme Courtdecisions since the 1986 Wollersheim opin-ion convinces us that the approach of theNinth Circuit (which relied almost exclu-sively on the legislative history of RICO toreach its result, as opposed to the actuallanguage of the statute) no longer con-forms to the Court’s present jurispru-dence, assuming for the sake of argumentthat it was a permissible one at the time.We are persuaded instead that the text ofthe RICO statute, understood in the prop-er light, itself authorizes private parties toseek injunctive relief.

[1] In interpreting the remedial provi-sions of the RICO statute, our inquirybegins with the statute’s text, and, if thetext is unambiguous, it ends there as well.


See Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049,121 S.Ct. 1511, 1520–21 & n. 7, 149L.Ed.2d 517 (2001); NOW I, 510 U.S. at261, 114 S.Ct. 798. RICO’s civil remediessection provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The district courts of the UnitedStates shall have jurisdiction to preventand restrain violations of section 1962 ofthis chapter by issuing appropriate or-ders, including, but not limited to TTT

imposing reasonable restrictions on thefuture activities TTT of any person, in-cluding, but not limited to, prohibitingany person from engaging in the sametype of endeavor as the enterprise en-gaged in, TTT or ordering dissolution orreorganization of any enterprise, makingdue provision for the rights of innocentpersons.(b) The Attorney General may instituteproceedings under this section. Pend-ing final determination thereof, the courtmay at any time enter such restrainingorders or prohibitions, or take such oth-er actions, including the acceptance ofsatisfactory performance bonds, as itshall deem proper.(c) Any person injured in his businessor property by reason of a violation ofsection 1962 of this chapter may suetherefor in any appropriate UnitedStates district court and shall recoverthreefold the damages he sustains andthe cost of the suit, including a reason-able attorney’s feeTTTT

18 U.S.C. § 1964.

Both parties have offered interpreta-tions of this text that support their posi-tions. The plaintiffs read the statute in astraightforward manner. Section 1964(a),they contend, grants the district courtsjurisdiction to hear RICO claims and alsosets out general remedies, including in-junctive relief, that all plaintiffs authorizedto bring suit may seek. Section 1964(b)makes it clear that the statute is to be

publicly enforced by the Attorney Generaland it specifies additional remedies, all inthe nature of interim relief, that the gov-ernment may seek. Section 1964(c) simi-larly adds to the scope of § 1964(a), butthis time for private plaintiffs. Those pri-vate plaintiffs who have been injured intheir business or property by reason of aRICO violation are given a right to sue fortreble damages. As the plaintiffs note,this reading of the statute gives the wordstheir natural meaning and gives effect toevery provision in the statute.

The defendants argue for a less intuitiveinterpretation. Relying on Wollersheim,they argue that § 1964(a) is purely a juris-dictional provision authorizing the districtcourt to hear RICO claims and to grantinjunctions to parties authorized by otherprovisions of the law to seek that form ofrelief. Section 1964(b), in the defendants’view, allows the Attorney General to insti-tute RICO proceedings and authorizes thegovernment to seek not only the reliefdescribed in that subsection, but also therelief described in § 1964(a). Section1964(c) then provides a limited right ofaction for private parties. They read thetwo clauses of § 1964(c), however, as tight-ly linked provisions, under which privateplaintiffs may sue only for monetary dam-ages. The mention of this type of relief inthe second clause must mean, the defen-dants argue, that by implication no otherremedies, particularly injunctive remedies,are available. We cannot agree that this isa reasonable reading of the statute.

As an initial matter, we note that theWollersheim decision apparently misreads§ 1964(b) when it states that § 1964(b)explicitly ‘‘permits the government to bringactions for equitable relief.’’ Wollersheim,796 F.2d at 1082. Section 1964(b) doesallow the government to seek equitablerelief, but it specifically mentions only in-terim remedies. Although no one doubts


that permanent injunctions are also avail-able to the government, the government’sability to seek permanent, as opposed tointerim, equitable remedies comes fromthe general grant of authority for districtcourts to enter injunctions found in§ 1964(a), not from anything in § 1964(b).(The sentence ‘‘[t]he Attorney Generalmay institute proceedings under this sec-tion’’ is in that respect the equivalent ofthe first clause in § 1964(c), which says‘‘[a]ny person injured in his business orproperty by reason of a violation of section1962 of this chapter may sue therefor inany appropriate United States districtcourtTTTT’’ Neither one addresses whatremedy the plaintiff may seek.) Giventhat the government’s authority to seekinjunctions comes from the combination ofthe grant of a right of action to the Attor-ney General in § 1964(b) and the grant ofdistrict court authority to enter injunctionsin § 1964(a), we see no reason not to con-clude, by parity of reasoning, that privateparties can also seek injunctions under thecombination of grants in §§ 1964(a) and(c).

[2] In addition, we cannot agree withthe defendants’ contention that § 1964(a)is a purely ‘‘jurisdictional’’ statute, despitethe Ninth Circuit’s characterization of it inthat way in Imagineering, Inc. v. KiewitPac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir.1992) (construing Wollersheim holding asjurisdictional). What § 1964(a) does is togrant district courts authority to hearRICO claims and then to spell out a non-exclusive list of the remedies districtcourts are empowered to provide in suchcases. In that sense, § 1964(a) is striking-ly similar to the statute the SupremeCourt construed in Steel Co. v. Citizens fora Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90, 118S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Thestatute at issue in Steel Co. provided that‘‘[t]he district court shall have jurisdiction

in actions brought under subsection (a) ofthis section against an owner or operatorof a facility to enforce the requirementconcerned and to impose any civil penaltyprovided for violation of that requirement.’’Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c). Notingthat ‘‘ ‘[j]urisdiction’ TTT is a word ofmany, too many, meanings,’’ the Courtheld that it would be ‘‘unreasonable toread [the statute] as making all the ele-ments of the cause of action under subsec-tion (a) jurisdictional, rather than as mere-ly specifying the remedial powers of thecourt, viz., to enforce the violated require-ment and to impose civil penalties.’’ Id.This part of the Steel Co. holding super-sedes any rationale to the contrary thatthe courts of appeals may have followed inearlier years. We find that it is applicableto RICO and that § 1964(a) both confersjurisdiction on the district courts and spec-ifies certain remedial powers that thecourts will have in cases brought beforethem.

Once we accept that § 1964(a) is notpurely jurisdictional, but also describesremedies available under RICO, the defen-dants’ position becomes untenable. In thedefendants’ view, despite the general pro-visions for equitable relief in § 1964(a),injunctive relief is not available to anyparticular plaintiff unless it is also provid-ed by some other section of the statute.This reading renders § 1964(a)’s provisionfor injunctive relief a nullity. Because analternative reading exists which givesmeaning to every section of the statute,see Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain,503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (‘‘courts should disfa-vor interpretations of statutes that renderlanguage superfluous’’), we reject the de-fendants’ approach.

[3] The defendants’ final textual argu-ment springs from the maxim that ‘‘wherea statute expressly provides a particular


remedy or remedies, a court must bechary of reading others into it.’’ Trans-america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,444 U.S. 11, 19, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d146 (1979). While we have no doubt thatthis is good advice as a general matter, wedo not find it particularly helpful in thiscase. This is not a situation in whichCongress has provided for a private dam-ages remedy and has remained silent as tothe availability of injunctive relief. In-stead, Congress explicitly provided for in-junctive relief in § 1964(a), although it didnot specify in that section which plaintiffscan seek such relief. Given that the nexttwo sections describe two types of plain-tiffs, the government and private plaintiffs,and spell out additional remedies specificto each type, we find that the only logicalconclusion is that Congress intended thegeneral remedies explicitly granted in§ 1964(a) to be available to all plaintiffs.

[4] Although we would be confidentresting our holding purely on the plaintext of § 1964, we note that our interpreta-tion is consistent with Congress’s admoni-tion that the RICO statute is to be ‘‘lib-erally construed to effectuate its remedialpurposes.’’ Pub.L. No. 91–452, § 904(a),84 Stat. 947 (1970). Adhering to this ad-monition, which ‘‘obviously seeks to ensurethat Congress’ intent is not frustrated byan overly narrow reading of the statute,’’Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183,113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993), theSupreme Court has consistently rejectedinterpretations by the courts of appealsthat would limit the scope of RICO actionsin ways not contemplated by the text ofthe statute. See, e.g., Cedric KushnerPromotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158,121 S.Ct. 2087, 150 L.Ed.2d 198 (2001)(rejecting argument that employee of cor-poration acting within scope of employ-ment cannot be a ‘‘person’’ distinct fromthe corporation); Salinas v. United States,

522 U.S. 52, 61–66, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (rejecting requirementthat conspiracy defendant himself hascommitted predicate acts); NOW I, 510U.S. at 256–62, 114 S.Ct. 798 (rejectingrequirement that enterprise have an eco-nomic motive); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. ImrexCo., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (rejecting requirementsthat defendant has been convicted of pred-icate act and that plaintiff has suffered a‘‘racketeering injury,’’ as opposed to injuryfrom mere predicate acts); United Statesv. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524,69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (rejecting argumentthat RICO enterprise must have legitimateas well as illegitimate aspects). RICO’sliberal-construction clause has particularforce, as the Supreme Court has stated,when we are construing § 1964, the civilremedy provision, because it is in this sec-tion that ‘‘RICO’s remedial purposes aremost evident.’’ Sedima, 473 U.S. at 491 n.10, 105 S.Ct. 3275. In keeping with thespirit of these cases, we decline to restrictthe remedies available under RICO, whenCongress has provided for broad equitablerelief under § 1964(a).

Our interpretation of § 1964 is also inkeeping with the underlying purposes ofthe RICO statute. As the Supreme Courtrecently noted, Congress in enacting RICOintended to ‘‘encourag[e] civil litigation tosupplement Government efforts to deterand penalize the TTT prohibited practices.The object of civil RICO is thus not merelyto compensate victims but to turn theminto prosecutors, ‘private attorneys gener-al,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeeringactivity.’’ Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549,557, 120 S.Ct. 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1047(2000). Recognizing that the statute givesprivate citizens the ability to seek injunc-tive relief as well as damages is fully con-sistent with this role for civil RICO litiga-tion.


Perhaps realizing that the plain text ofthe statute strongly suggests that privateplaintiffs can seek injunctions, the Woller-sheim court relied heavily in its decisionon two pieces of legislative history. First,the court noted that, during the floor de-bate on the bill in the House, Representa-tive Steiger, the House sponsor of the bill,introduced an amendment that would have,among other things, made private plain-tiffs’ right to seek injunctive relief explicit.The amendment was withdrawn after an-other representative described it on theHouse floor as creating ‘‘an additional civilremedy.’’ See Wollersheim, 796 F.2d at1085–86. Second, the court noted that oneyear after the bill’s passage, Congressfailed to pass a bill introduced in the Sen-ate with the same language as the Steigeramendment. See id. at 1086. From thesetwo occurrences, the Ninth Circuit con-cluded that ‘‘in considering civil RICO,Congress was repeatedly presented withthe opportunity expressly to include a pro-vision permitting private plaintiffs to se-cure injunctive relief. On each occasion,Congress rejected the addition of any suchprovision.’’ Id.

Again, with respect, we cannot agreewith the Ninth Circuit that these snippetsof legislative history amount to the kind of‘‘ ‘clearly expressed legislative intent to thecontrary’ ’’ that we would require to castdoubt on unambiguous statutory language.NOW I, 510 U.S. at 261, 114 S.Ct. 798.Even these excerpts do not unequivocallyindicate that Congress intended privateplaintiffs to be limited to damages reme-dies. As the Wollersheim decision itselfnotes, there are indications in the legisla-tive history to the contrary. Id. at 1085.More importantly, however, although theWollersheim court may well have made areasonable decision in 1986 to rely on Con-gress’s refusal to enact amendments to thestatute, recent Supreme Court precedentteaches that this type of legislative history

is a particularly thin reed on which to restthe interpretation of a statute. See, e.g.,Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531U.S. 159, 169–70, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (‘‘Failed legislative pro-posals are a particularly dangerous groundon which to rest an interpretation of aprior statute. A bill can be proposed forany number of reasons, and it can berejected for just as many others.’’); Cen-tral Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Inter-state Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,187, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994)(‘‘Congressional inaction lacks persuasivesignificance because several equally tena-ble inferences may be drawn from suchinaction, including the inference that theexisting legislation already incorporatedthe offered change.’’). Given the Court’sreluctance in recent years to rely on thetype of legislative history that underpinsWollersheim, we cannot agree with theNinth Circuit’s earlier view that this legis-lative history trumps the otherwise plainlanguage of § 1964.

In a last effort to save their reading ofthe statute, the defendants urge us thatcertain differences between the languageof RICO and the language of section 4 ofthe Clayton Act (on which RICO wasbased) demand the inference that no pri-vate right to injunctive relief exists underRICO. The Clayton Act, they note, pro-vides private rights of action in two sepa-rate sections: one for damages in § 4, 15U.S.C. § 15(a), and one for injunctive re-lief in § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26. RICO, incontrast, has only one statutory sectionaddressing civil remedies, and the onlysubsection that specifically talks about pri-vate actions mentions only damages. De-fendants argue that Congress’s failure toinclude in § 1964(c) language analogous tothat in Clayton Act § 16 must mean that it


did not intend to allow private parties toseek injunctions.

[5] We reject this line of analysis for anumber of reasons. First, the mere factthat the Clayton Act spreads its remedialprovisions over a number of different sec-tions of the U.S.Code,1 and RICO does not,adds little to our understanding of eitherstatute. More importantly, the SupremeCourt regularly treats the remedial sec-tions of RICO and the Clayton Act identi-cally, regardless of superficial differencesin language. See, e.g., Klehr v. A.O. SmithCorp., 521 U.S. 179, 188–89, 117 S.Ct. 1984,138 L.Ed.2d 373 (1997) (applying ClaytonAct rule for accrual of cause of action toRICO); Holmes v. SIPC, 503 U.S. 258,267, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992)(applying proximate cause rule to RICO).Since the Court has already determinedthat litigants other than the Attorney Gen-eral may obtain broad injunctive relief un-der the Clayton Act, see California v.American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 110S.Ct. 1853, 109 L.Ed.2d 240 (1990), caseslike Klehr and Holmes indicate that weought to adopt the same interpretationwith respect to RICO. Indeed, AmericanStores (which came to the Court from theNinth Circuit) pointedly rejected the wayin which the Ninth Circuit had relied onlegislative history to limit the ClaytonAct’s textual grant of private injunctiverelief. Id. at 285, 110 S.Ct. 1853. This inturn undercut Wollersheim, which hadused the same methodology as the discred-ited American Stores opinion. For allthese reasons, we find that § 1964 autho-rizes injunctive relief at the behest of boththe Attorney General and private plain-

tiffs, authorizes interim measures whenthe Attorney General sues, and authorizesprivate treble damages only for privateplaintiffs (and not the United States). Thedistrict court thus correctly concluded thatRICO authorized the private plaintiffshere to seek injunctive relief.

III

[6] With this much established, wemay turn to the defendants’ First Amend-ment arguments. All parties acknowledgethat the defendants engaged in a substan-tial amount of protected speech during theprotest missions and other anti-abortionactivities, including picketing on publicsidewalks in front of clinics and verballyurging patients not to have abortions. Weentirely agree with the defendants thatliability cannot constitutionally be imposedon them for this portion of their conduct.But the record is replete with evidence ofinstances in which their conduct crossedthe line from protected speech into illegalacts, including acts of violence, and it isequally clear that the First Amendmentdoes not protect such acts. As is true inmany political protest cases, the defen-dants’ protected speech was often closelyintertwined with their unprotected illegalconduct. Nevertheless, we believe the dis-trict court adequately ensured that thejury’s verdict was not based on activitiesprotected by the First Amendment, andthat the remedies it ordered also respectedthe line between protected expression andunprotected conduct.

The defendants’ First Amendment argu-ments fall into two categories. First, they

1. The remedial provisions of the Clayton Actare actually spread over far more than thetwo sections the defendants mention. In ad-dition to §§ 4 and 16, the Clayton Act alsoincludes (as codified) 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (suitsfor actual damages brought by foreign gov-ernments), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (suits for treble

damages brought by the United States for itsown injuries to business or property), 15U.S.C. § 15c (parens patriae suits brought bystate attorneys general for treble damages onbehalf of natural persons in the state), and 15U.S.C. § 25 (actions for injunctive reliefbrought by the Attorney General).


argue broadly that imposing liability onthem on the basis of their protest activitiesviolates the First Amendment. Second,they argue that, even assuming they couldconstitutionally be held liable for their al-leged conduct, the jury instructions andverdict form in this case did not containnecessary First Amendment safeguards.Before we reach either of these argu-ments, we pause to consider the standardof review we should apply in analyzing thedefendants’ First Amendment claims.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly heldthat, in cases in which First Amendmentconcerns are implicated, reviewing courtshave an obligation to conduct an ‘‘ ‘inde-pendent examination of the whole record’in order to make sure that ‘the judgmentdoes not constitute a forbidden intrusionon the field of free expression.’ ’’ BoseCorp. v. Consumers Union of UnitedStates, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499, 104 S.Ct.1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), quoting NewYork Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,284–86, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686(1964). Although this maxim has beenapplied most often in cases reviewing thefactual findings of lower courts, the Courtin Bose noted that the rule is equallyapplicable ‘‘whether the factfinding func-tion be performed in the particular case bya jury or by a trial judge.’’ 466 U.S. at501, 104 S.Ct. 1949. Citing this rule, thedefendants urge that our review of theirFirst Amendment challenges must be ple-nary.

As we have noted before, however, eventhough Bose calls for an ‘‘independent ex-amination of the whole record,’’ it is notentirely clear what this ‘‘plenary’’ review issupposed to entail. See Brown & Wil-liamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827F.2d 1119, 1128–29 (7th Cir.1987). In par-ticular, it is not clear whether Bose re-quires an independent review only of theultimate factual conclusion that the defen-

dants’ conduct fell outside the protection ofthe First Amendment, or whether thiscourt is required to conduct a more search-ing review of ‘‘findings of underlying facts,evaluations of credibility, and the drawingof inferences.’’ Brown & Williamson, 827F.2d at 1128. In cases in which we arereviewing a jury verdict rather than thefindings of a lower court, the question iseven more complex, because we mustsomehow reconcile the defendants’ FirstAmendment rights against the commandof the Seventh Amendment that ‘‘no facttried by a jury shall be otherwise re-exam-ined in any Court of the United States,than according to the rules of the commonlaw.’’ U.S. Const. amend. VII. Bose itselfinvolved review of facts found by the dis-trict court under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), andthus the Court had no occasion to considerthis problem. For a different reason, weconclude that it is not necessary here todecide whether or not a broader version ofthe re-examination of jury findings is per-missible when First Amendment rights areat issue. Even assuming that the Bosedicta requires us to conduct a plenaryreview of all of the factual findings rele-vant to the First Amendment issues beforeus (which is the most favorable position wecan take for the defendants), we find thatthe jury’s determinations are fully sup-ported by the record.

A.

[7–12] Protection of politically contro-versial speech is at the core of the FirstAmendment, and no one disputes that thedefendants’ speech labeling abortion asmurder, urging the clinics to get out of theabortion business, and urging clinic pa-tients not to seek abortions is fully protect-ed by the First Amendment. See, e.g.,Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clin-ic, 506 U.S. 263, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d34 (1993). It is equally clear, however,


that the First Amendment does not pro-tect violent conduct, Wisconsin v. Mitchell,508 U.S. 476, 484, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124L.Ed.2d 436 (1993), nor does it protectthreats, Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.,512 U.S. 753, 773, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129L.Ed.2d 593 (1994), or language used tocarry out illegal conduct, Giboney v. Em-pire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502,69 S.Ct. 684, 93 L.Ed. 834 (1949). Evenwhen a defendant’s conduct involves ex-pressive elements, the government is freeto regulate the non-expressive aspects ofthe conduct if such regulation is necessaryto serve important government interests.United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).The protection of the plaintiffs’ rights toseek and provide medical care free fromviolence, intimidation, and harassment issuch an important government interest.See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703,715, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597(2000); Schenck v. Pro–Choice Network ofW. New York, 519 U.S. 357, 376, 117 S.Ct.855, 137 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Madsen, supra,512 U.S. at 768, 114 S.Ct. 2516. As theSupreme Court has explained, ‘‘violence orother types of potentially expressive activi-ties that produce special harms distinctfrom their communicative impact TTT areentitled to no constitutional protection.’’Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.609, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462(1984).

[13] In this case, the plaintiffs present-ed ample evidence that the individual de-fendants and others associated with PLANengaged in illegal conduct that directlythreatened an important governmental in-terest. The evidence presented at trialshowed that, at PLAN-sponsored events,protesters trespassed on clinic propertyand blocked access to clinics with theirbodies, including at times chaining them-selves in the doorways of clinics or to

operating tables. At other times, protest-ers destroyed clinic property, includingputting glue in clinic door locks and de-stroying medical equipment used to per-form abortions. On still other occasions,protesters physically assaulted clinic staffand patients. In addition, defendantScheidler, on behalf of defendants PLALand PLAN, sent letters to class clinicsthreatening that they would be subjectedto similar attacks if they did not ceaseperforming abortions. In light of the pro-testers’ conduct at other PLAN events, thedistrict court correctly concluded thatthese letters were not protected politicalspeech but constituted true threats outsidethe protection of the First Amendment.

Assuming that the defendants can beheld liable for these incidents, all of whichoccurred under PLAN sponsorship, thenthe plaintiffs produced ample evidence ofillegal conduct that may legitimately beregulated given the importance of the gov-ernmental interest in protecting the rightto seek and provide medical care. In acase where a similarly important govern-mental interest is not present and theconduct in question has an expressive ele-ment, we do not disagree with the defen-dants that the First Amendment mightwell shield that particular conduct frombeing used as the basis for RICO liability.(We express this thought cautiously onlybecause the balance between the strengthof the government’s interest and the de-gree to which conduct has an expressiveelement will vary from case to case.) Inany event, this case presents no such prob-lems. We are satisfied that the recordhere easily supports the jury’s finding ofliability.

[14, 15] At this point, the defendantsshift their argument to a more personalone: maybe someone associated withPLAN was engaged in unprotected con-duct, but the evidence did not establish


that the defendants themselves were in-volved, as opposed to being involved exclu-sively in PLAN’s protected speech activi-ties. In NAACP v. Claiborne HardwareCo., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), the Supreme Courtnoted that, where an organization engagesin both protected speech and unprotected,illegal conduct, the First Amendment doesnot permit individuals to be held liable forthe organization’s illegal acts merely basedon their association with the organization.Id. at 908–09, 102 S.Ct. 3409. Rather, inorder to impose liability on an individualbased on that individual’s association withan organization, a plaintiff must show boththat the organization itself, rather thanjust isolated members, possessed unlawfulgoals and that the individual defendantheld a specific intent to further those ille-gal aims. Id. at 920, 102 S.Ct. 3409.

We agree that Claiborne Hardware isdirectly applicable to our case. Althoughthe plaintiffs established that the individu-al defendants themselves participated inmany of the incidents described during thetrial, the plaintiffs also introduced evidenceof many other incidents coordinated ororchestrated by PLAN for which they didnot specifically show that the individualdefendants themselves committed the ille-gal acts described. In order for the defen-dants to be held responsible for acts com-mitted by other members of PLAN duringPLAN-organized events, Claiborne Hard-ware required the plaintiffs to show thatPLAN itself, and not merely isolated mem-bers, intended that the illegal acts occur,that the defendants were aware of PLAN’sillegal aims, and that the defendants held aspecific intent to further those aimsthrough their association with PLAN.

Even though this is an exacting test,once again the record shows that the plain-tiffs satisfied it in this case. All of theindividual defendants who remain in the

case were on the board of directors ofPLAL. PLAL and Operation Rescue, thetwo remaining organizational defendants,were in turn the primary organizers ofPLAN. The plaintiffs put into evidencenumerous letters, newsletters, and otherpublications authored by defendant JosephScheidler, executive director of PLAL, andby Randall Terry, executive director ofOperation Rescue, detailing the activitiesplanned for upcoming PLAN events. Theactivities detailed in these letters includedblocking access to clinics and entering clin-ics to block passageways. As noted above,these types of protest activities are illegalconduct unprotected by the First Amend-ment. Similarly, the threatening letters toplaintiff clinics were sent on PLAL letter-head, signed by Scheidler, and specificallydescribed the threat as coming fromPLAN. The jury was entitled to concludefrom this evidence that PLAN itself, notmerely isolated members, held illegal aims.

It is also significant that all of the indi-vidual defendants were high-level leaderswithin PLAN, and as such they knew ofPLAN’s illegal aims and intended to fur-ther those aims. The record showed thatdefendant Scheidler personally organizedand coordinated many of PLAN’s activi-ties. Defendants Scholberg and Murphyalso participated in planning meetings forPLAN events at which illegal blockadeswere to take place and spoke at PLANconventions designed to train protesters inthe use of these tactics. The plaintiffspresented more than enough evidence toconvince us that the individual defendantsactively intended to further PLAN’s illegalgoals.

B.

Turning to the defendants’ narrowerFirst Amendment argument, the defen-dants contend that, regardless of whetherthere was sufficient evidence from which


the jury could have found that they en-gaged in unprotected activities, the juryinstructions and verdict form used by thetrial court allowed the jury to find thedefendants liable based solely on the de-fendants’ protected speech. The verdictform that the district court used asked thefollowing relevant questions:

1. Is the Pro–Life Action Network(PLAN) a group of people or organi-zations associated together for acommon purpose?

2. Were the TTT defendants associatedwith PLAN? (See Jury InstructionNo. 20 for the definition of ‘‘associat-ed with.’’)

TTT

4. Did any Defendant, or any otherperson associated with PLAN, com-mit any of the [alleged predicateacts]?

The jury instruction to which the verdictform referred stated, in relevant part:

Jury Instruction No. 20: Plaintiffs mustshow that the defendant was ‘‘associatedwith’’ PLAN. That is, the defendantmust have had some minimal associationwith PLAN and have known somethingabout PLAN’s activities as they relate tothe illegal acts under RICO. It is notnecessary that the particular defendantcommitted acts unlawful under RICO orwas aware of all of the unlawful actscommitted by the other people who wereassociated with PLAN.TTTT

In the district court, the defendants ob-jected to these instructions, arguing thatthey did not require the jury to find thatthe defendants harbored a specific intentto further PLAN’s illegal aims, as requiredby Claiborne Hardware. The districtcourt apparently agreed, because it addedan additional jury instruction which stated:

Jury Instruction No. 30—Defendants’Liability for Acts of Others

Liability may not be imposed upon anydefendant merely because that defen-dant belonged to a group, some mem-bers of which committed acts of violence.In order to find the defendants liable,you must conclude that the enterprise,or those acting on behalf of the enter-prise, directly or indirectly authorized orratified unlawful activities and that thedefendants held a specific intent to fur-ther those illegal objectives.

The defendants did not renew their ob-jection to the jury instructions after thedistrict court made this change. Never-theless, in this court, the defendants haveargued that, even with the additional in-struction, the jury instructions did not ade-quately protect their First Amendmentrights, because the Claiborne Hardwarestandard was incorporated only into thejury instructions, not into the verdict form.

[16] Initially, we note that by not re-newing their objection to the jury instruc-tions and verdict form after the districtcourt added Instruction 30, the defendantsat least implied that they were satisfiedwith the court’s resolution of their objec-tion. Accordingly, we are inclined to findthat the defendants have waived any objec-tion to those instructions on appeal. SeeUnited States v. Jones, 224 F.3d 621, 626(7th Cir.2000) (objection to jury instructionwaived where defense counsel agreed toinstruction at trial). Because this is a civiltrial, not a criminal trial, there is no equiv-alent of ‘‘plain error’’ review for a chal-lenge that is forfeited rather than waived.In the interest of absolute fairness, howev-er, we will consider this point based on theearlier objections.

[17, 18] Our review of jury instructionsis deferential, and we consider only wheth-er the instructions, taken as a whole, ade-quately informed the jury of the applicablelaw. Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 602


(7th Cir.2000). We are confident thatthese instructions did so. This jury couldnot have found the defendants liable with-out finding that the defendants themselvesspecifically intended to further PLAN’s il-legal aims. Jury Instruction 30 made thisrequirement explicit, and absent any indi-cation to the contrary, we presume thatjurors follow the instructions they are giv-en. Miksis v. Howard, 106 F.3d 754, 763(7th Cir.1997). There is no requirementfor a district judge to replicate every in-struction on the verdict form itself. Weare confident that the jurors followed theirinstructions, heeded Instruction 30 whenthey considered the questions on the spe-cial verdict form, and that nothing on theform misled or confused them or causedthem to ignore their instructions.

IV

The last serious contention we must ad-dress is the defendants’ argument that theinjunction in this case is vague and over-broad. The operative portion of the in-junction reads as follows:

Defendants TTT and any other on theirbehalf or in concert with them, are here-by enjoined from directly or indirectly:

a. interfering with the right of anymember of the Certified Class ofPlaintiff Clinics to conduct its busi-ness (including but not limited to theright to provide abortion services) orthe right of any NOW member orany member of the Certified Classof women to avail herself of thePlaintiff Clinics’ services (includingbut not limited to abortion services),by:

(1) blocking, impeding, inhibiting, orin any other manner obstructing orinterfering with access to, ingress intoand egress from any building or park-ing lot of any Plaintiff Clinic;

(2) trespassing on the premises or theprivate property of any Plaintiff Clin-ic;(3) destroying, damaging or stealingproperty of any Plaintiff Clinic, itsemployees, volunteers, or any womanwho seeks to use the services of sucha Clinic;(4) using violence or threat of violenceagainst any Plaintiff Clinic or any ofits employees, volunteers, or anywoman who seeks to use the servicesof such a Clinic;

b. aiding, abetting, inducing, directing,or inciting any of the acts enumerat-ed in subsection a. of this paragraph(the ‘‘Acts’’) through any of the De-fendants or through others; or

c. Operating an enterprise through anyof the Acts described above.

This injunction does not prohibit orpreclude activities that are constitution-ally protected, including but not limitedto the following conduct:

a. Peacefully carrying picket signs onthe public property in front of anyPlaintiff Clinic;

b. Making speeches on public property;c. Speaking to individuals approaching

the clinic;d. Handing out literature on public

property; ande. Praying on public property.

This injunction shall bind DefendantsTTT and all other persons in active con-cert with them, and who have actual orconstructive notice of this Order, andany other person acting in concert withPLAN.

The defendants raise two principal ob-jections to the scope of the injunction.First, they complain that it contains anumber of terms that are vague or indefi-nite, and that as such, it is likely to chill asubstantial amount of protected speech.


Second, the defendants charge that theinjunction makes them liable for the con-duct of persons they do not control and foractions they do not authorize or approve.We consider each of these contentions inturn.

[19] First, we recognize that it is adelicate task to craft an injunction thatprohibits illegal conduct when that conductis closely tied to political protests and oth-er protected activity. The court musttread carefully to avoid hampering protect-ed speech. Here, we do not disagree withthe proposition that some language in thisinjunction, taken in the abstract, is rathergeneral. But the key question is: Com-pared to what? Any effort to deal with acase of this complexity will inevitably in-volve some imprecision. Many criminalstatutes contain key terms such as theword ‘‘material’’ which are somewhat im-precise but have never been consideredvoid for vagueness. The defendants inthis case never proposed any alternativelanguage for an injunction, despite severalinvitations from the district court to dojust that, so the real question is whetherthe injunction the court entered is as pre-cise as possible while still ensuring thatthe defendants’ illegal activities are en-joined.

We are satisfied that the injunctiondrafted by the district court here hasstruck the proper balance and has avoidedany risk of curtailing protected activities.By its terms, the injunction prohibits onlyillegal conduct—trespassing, obstructingaccess to clinics, damaging property, usingviolence or threats of violence, or aiding,abetting, inducing, directing, or incitingany of these acts. We do not find anyambiguity in the terms the district courtused to describe the prohibited conduct,and as discussed above, none of this con-duct is protected by the First Amendment.

Although we do not believe that theterms of the injunction would reach pro-tected speech in any case, the injunctionitself includes an additional safeguard. Aspecific provision underscores that it doesnot prohibit peaceful picketing, speeches,or praying on public property, attempts tospeak with patients and staff, handing outliterature, or any other activity protectedby the First Amendment. Given this ex-plicit language, there can be no doubt thatthis injunction reaches only unprotected,illegal conduct, not protected speech. Thedefendants’ alarmist prediction that, underthe terms of the injunction, a protesterwho engages in ‘‘months of peaceful picket-ing’’ and then takes ‘‘two accidental foot-steps onto private property’’ could be sub-ject to contempt proceedings not only fortrespass but also for the picketing is purefancy and bears no relation to the actualwording of the injunction.

[20] Nor do we find that the injunctionimpermissibly holds the defendants re-sponsible for the actions of persons beyondtheir control. The injunction applies onlyto the defendants and to persons workingin ‘‘active concert’’ with the defendants orin concert with PLAN. For that reasonalone, the injunction’s sweep is not sobroad as the defendants suggest. Activ-ists and protesters not closely associatedwith the defendants or with PLAN, anorganization the defendants control, arenot affected by the injunction. (This takescare of the specter of renegades who, thedefendants assert, are utterly beyond theircontrol.) Moreover, to the extent the in-junction reaches the conduct of individualsnot named in this lawsuit, the order en-joins those individuals from violating itsmandates. If individuals acting in concertwith the defendants or PLAN violate theinjunction, without inducement or directionby the defendants, the violators, not thedefendants, would be in contempt of the


court’s order. Nothing in the order pur-ports to hold the defendants liable foractions they do not direct, incite, or con-trol.

The injunction as it is written is narrow-ly tailored to prohibit the specific types ofillegal conduct that the defendants haveengaged in on past protest missions. Assuch, it does not threaten the defendants’First Amendment rights. We are confi-dent that the district court will take asmuch care in enforcing the injunction as itplainly took in crafting it. Indeed, with itsexplicit protection of peaceful picketing,speech, literature, and prayer, perhaps inthe end the injunction may further rationaldiscourse on one of the most volatile politi-cal controversies facing the nation today.Violence in any form is the antithesis ofreasoned discussion. By directing thosewith passionate views about the abortioncontroversy—on either side—away fromthe use of threats and violence and back to‘‘all the peaceful means for gaining accessto the mind,’’ the injunction the districtcourt issued is in harmony with the funda-mental First Amendment protection offree speech.

V

[21] The defendants have raised ahodgepodge of other challenges to thejudgment, none of which need detain uslong. First, the defendants point out thatin the plaintiffs’ First and Second Amend-ed Complaints (which were filed before thefirst set of appeals in the case) only theclinic plaintiffs alleged RICO claims;NOW joined only the counts alleging anti-trust violations. As noted above, when theSupreme Court granted certiorari to re-view our earlier decision in this case, thatgrant was limited to questions concerningthe RICO counts. The antitrust claimsfell out of the case after the Court declinedto review our decision with respect to

them. According to the defendants, onceall the counts to which NOW was a partyfell out of the case, the effect was the sameas a final judgment against NOW, and resjudicata barred the plaintiffs from amend-ing their complaint to include NOW as aplaintiff in the RICO counts. The districtcourt, however, permitted the plaintiffs tofile a Third Amended Complaint, after re-mand from this court, which includedNOW as a plaintiff in the RICO counts.

[22, 23] Whether to allow amendmentsto a complaint is a question committed tothe discretion of the trial court. BethanyPharmacal Co. v. QVC, Inc., 241 F.3d 854,861 (7th Cir.2001). Contrary to the defen-dants’ assertion, there was no final judg-ment in this case after the SupremeCourt’s decision to which res judicataprinciples could apply. The case was stillpending, first in this court and then in thedistrict court. As a general rule, amend-ments to complaints are liberally allowedup to and even after trial, judgment, andappeal. See United States v. SecurityPac. Bus. Credit, Inc., 956 F.2d 703, 707–08 (7th Cir.1992); see also Guse v. J.C.Penney Co., 570 F.2d 679, 680 (7th Cir.1978) (even after plaintiff lost on appeal,there was no final judgment against plain-tiff, and district court was free to allowplaintiff to file amended complaint puttingforth new legal theory). The SupremeCourt made it clear in its opinion that itwas evaluating the complaint only on thepleadings, see 510 U.S. at 256, 262, 114S.Ct. 798, which is the most preliminarystage of proceedings one can imagine.The district court was thus well within itsdiscretion in allowing NOW to continue asa plaintiff for the RICO claims in theThird Amended Complaint.

[24] The defendants also argue thatthe clinics’ claims are barred by res judi-cata. While this case was pending, one ofthe plaintiff clinics, Summit Women’s


Health Organization, filed suit in statecourt in Wisconsin seeking an injunctionagainst Scheidler and several other defen-dants to prevent PLAN from engaging inillegal blockades during a PLAN conven-tion in Milwaukee. The Wisconsin courtsultimately dismissed that lawsuit withoutprejudice as to most of the defendants.However, before the case was dismissed,Scheidler and the Summit Women’s HealthOrganization entered into a settlementagreement that specified that ‘‘all claimsagainst [Scheidler] relating to conductwhich occurred prior to the signing of thisstipulation are hereby dismissed as to[Summit] with prejudice.’’ The defendantsargue that, because the claims that Sum-mit raises in this case had already accruedat the time Summit entered into this stipu-lation, Summit is barred from bringingthese claims in this lawsuit.

[25] We need not consider what pre-clusive effect the Wisconsin settlementmight have, because the defendants waivedthis issue in the district court. Res judi-cata is an affirmative defense that iswaived if a party does not plead it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Under the local rules of theNorthern District of Illinois, the defen-dants were required to list all their defens-es in their trial brief, and any defenses notlisted were waived. The defendants admitthat they did not list res judicata based onthe Wisconsin litigation as an affirmativedefense in their trial brief, and accordinglythey have lost the opportunity to arguethat issue here. Although we find thatthis claim is waived, we also note that,even if it were not waived and if the Wis-consin settlement had a preclusive effect inthis case, the preclusion could run onlybetween Summit and Scheidler and wouldnot affect any of the other plaintiffs, in-cluding the class members, or any of theother defendants. The injunction wouldnot be affected, all of the defendants would

remain jointly liable for the damages toDelaware Women’s Health Organization,and all of the defendants except Scheidlerwould remain liable to Summit. The prac-tical effect of any preclusion would there-fore be negligible.

[26, 27] The defendants have alsourged this court to decertify the twoclasses, arguing that NOW and the namedclinics are inadequate class representa-tives. The defendants particularly objectto the district court’s decision to include inthe NOW class women who are not mem-bers of NOW, arguing that because NOWis a partisan advocacy group and the is-sues involved in this case concern a matterof great social controversy, NOW is likelyto have interests antagonistic to the viewsof some members of the class. Class certi-fication decisions are committed to the dis-cretion of the district court, however, seeChavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d612, 629 (7th Cir.2001), and we find thatthe district court’s decision to certify thetwo classes here was well within thecourt’s discretion. It is inaccurate in anyevent to imply that the district court certi-fied a class of ‘‘all women.’’ The court didno such thing. Instead, it certified a classthat included only those women, whetheror not members of NOW, whose right toseek abortion services has been or will beinterfered with by the defendants. In or-der for these women’s interests to be an-tagonistic to the claims NOW is bringing,the defendants would have to argue that atleast some women in the class want toseek abortion services, but do not want tobe free from harassment and intimidationwhile doing so. This scenario strikes us asexceedingly unlikely; at the very least, weagree with the district court that it ‘‘isclearly speculative and projects personallyheld views onto the plaintiff class.’’ Na-tional Organization for Women, Inc. v.


Scheidler, 172 F.R.D. 351, 362 (N.D.Ill.1997).

[28] As to the defendants’ more gener-al arguments that the named plaintiffshave not performed adequately as classrepresentatives, we note that the namedplaintiffs have pursued this litigation dili-gently for fifteen years, through a trip tothe Supreme Court of the United Statesand a seven-week trial, and ultimatelywere successful in securing a nationwideinjunction against the defendants prohibit-ing the conduct they set out to challenge.Given this record of performance, we can-not say that the district court in any wayabused its discretion in certifying theseclasses.

[29] The defendants have also arguedthat the conduct in which they engaged isnot prohibited by RICO for a number ofreasons. First, the plaintiffs alleged aspredicate acts numerous violations of thefederal extortion statute, the Hobbs Act,18 U.S.C. § 1951, and the defendants ar-gue that the Hobbs Act does not apply totheir conduct. The defendants’ primarycontention on this point is that the HobbsAct defines extortion as ‘‘the obtaining ofproperty from another, with his consent,induced by wrongful use of actual orthreatened force, violence, or fear,’’ andthat the things the plaintiffs claim weretaken here—the class women’s rights toseek medical services from the clinics, theclinic doctors’ rights to perform their jobs,and the clinics’ rights to provide medicalservices and otherwise conduct their busi-nesses—cannot be considered ‘‘property’’for purposes of the Hobbs Act. However,this circuit has repeatedly held that intan-gible property such as the right to conducta business can be considered ‘‘property’’under the Hobbs Act, see, e.g., UnitedStates v. Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 450 (7thCir.1983), and we will not revisit that hold-ing here.

[30] In a similar vein, the defendantsassert that, even if ‘‘property’’ was in-volved, the defendants did not ‘‘obtain’’that property; they merely forced theplaintiffs to part with it. Again, this argu-ment is contrary to a long line of prece-dent in this circuit holding that ‘‘as a legalmatter, an extortionist can violate theHobbs Act without either seeking or re-ceiving money or anything else. A loss to,or interference with the rights of, the vic-tim is all that is required.’’ United Statesv. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir.1995).

[31] In addition to their challenges tothe application of the Hobbs Act, the de-fendants argue that the district courterred in giving the jury a generic instruc-tion describing the elements of the statelaw extortion offenses the plaintiffs allegedas additional predicate acts. According tothe defendants, there are substantial dif-ferences in the extortion laws of the statesin which these alleged predicate acts oc-curred, and the district court’s attempt tocover all the relevant state laws with asingle, generic instruction impermissiblydiscounted these differences. Without ex-pressing an opinion on whether this ap-proach was permissible, we simply notethat, if any error occurred, it was harm-less. The jury found that the defendantscommitted 21 predicate acts under theHobbs Act alone, which is far in excess ofthe two predicate acts that RICO requires.In the face of this finding, any error in thestate extortion law instructions, whichcould at most have affected the jury’s deci-sion on the additional state-law predicateacts it found, could not have had any effecton the outcome of this case.

Finally, while this appeal was pending,the defendants filed motions in the districtcourt seeking relief from the judgmentunder Rules 60(b)(2) and (3). The districtcourt denied the motions, and the defen-


dants appealed. We consolidated that ap-peal with this case and suspended briefingon the 60(b) issues. We have reviewed thedefendants’ motions in the trial court andthe trial court’s resolution of those issues,and we conclude that no further briefingon the issues is necessary.

[32–36] ‘‘Rule 60(b) relief is an ex-traordinary remedy granted only in excep-tional circumstances.’’ Rutledge v. UnitedStates, 230 F.3d 1041, 1052 (7th Cir.2000).Our review of the district court’s decisiondenying relief is deferential, and we willreverse only if the district court hasabused its discretion. J & W Fence Sup-ply Co. v. United States, 230 F.3d 896, 898(7th Cir.2000). We find no abuse of dis-cretion in this case. In their 60(b) mo-tions, the defendants argued that they hadnewly discovered evidence relating to twospecific incidents described by witnessesduring the trial. In addition, the defen-dants posited that newly discovered evi-dence called into doubt whether an anony-mous witness who testified at the trial infact needed to remain anonymous. Thedistrict court denied the motions on thegrounds that the defendants had docu-ments in their possession from which theycould have discovered most of the ‘‘new’’evidence for well over a decade, and thatrelief at this late date accordingly was notwarranted. In addition, the court notedthat it was very unlikely that any of the‘‘new’’ evidence, if admitted at trial, wouldhave had any impact on the jury’s verdict.Given that Rule 60 motions cannot be usedto present evidence that with due diligencecould have been introduced before judg-ment, Rutledge, 230 F.3d at 1052, or to putforth evidence that is not material or thatwould likely not change the result at trial,Jones v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 188 F.3d 709,732 (7th Cir.1999), we find no error in thedistrict court’s denial of relief.

We have considered all of the defen-dants’ remaining contentions, but findnone that requires comment. For theforegoing reasons, the judgment of thedistrict court is AFFIRMED in all respects.

,

Robert S. MERHEB, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

ILLINOIS STATE TOLL HIGHWAYAUTHORITY, Defendant–

Appellee.

No. 00–2547.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued March 30, 2001.

Decided Oct. 3, 2001.

Male Lebanese former employee suedstate tollway authority alleging that histermination constituted sex and nationalorigin discrimination in violation of TitleVII, and breach of contract under Illinoislaw. The United States District Court forthe Northern District of Illinois, CharlesR. Norgle, Sr., J., granted summary judg-ment for authority. Employee appealed.The Court of Appeals, Posner, CircuitJudge, held that: (1) termination did notviolate agreement settling past discrimina-tion claim, and (2) termination was justi-fied given employee’s threatening behaviortowards supervisor.

Affirmed.

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