National Fire Protection Association · Chair Report 11/25/2011 Log Proposal No. Code Reference Log...

National Fire Protection Association 1 Bat terymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471 Phone: 617-770-3000 • Fax: 617-770-0700 • www.nfpa.org

AGENDA

NEC Code-Making Panel 13

Report on Proposal Meeting

January 16-20, 2010

Hilton Head, SC

Item No. Subject 12-1 -1 Call to Order 12-1-2 Introduction of Members and Guests 12-1-3 Review of Meeting Procedures and Revision Schedule 12-1-4 Comments/Questions from Committee Members and/or Guests 12-1-5 Task Group Reports (if any) 12-1-6 Processing of Proposals 12-1-7 Fire Protection Research Foundation Requests 12-1-8 Old Business 12-1-9 New Business 12-1-10 Adjournment

Chair Report 11/25/2011

Log Proposal No. Code Reference Log Proposal No. Code Reference

1170l Entire Document13-1

921l Entire Document13-2

1606 100.Battery System (New) and13-3

1613 100.Emergency Systems13-4

1605 100.Nominal Battery Voltage13-5

1604 100.Phase Converter (New)13-6

1608 100.Sealed Cell or Battery13-7

3035 100.Solar Photovoltaic System13-8

1607 100. Storage Battery (New)13-9

2682 445.1113-10

2932 445.1113-11

2643 445.1213-12

1158 445.1613-13

425 445.17 (New)13-14

502 445.17 Exception (New)13-15

480 445.1813-16

501 445.1913-17

2461 445.20 (New)13-18

3364 445.20 (New)13-19

3302a 45513-20

2996 480.xx (New)13-21

3007 480.xx (New)13-22

3008 480.xx (New)13-23

3009 480.1, Informational Note13-24

2241 480.213-25

2989 480.2.Cell (New)13-26

2990 480.2.Container (New)13-27

2991 480.2.Electrolyte (New)13-28

2992 480.2.Intercell Connector13-29

2993 480.2.Interior Connector13-30

2994 480.2.Nominal Battery Voltage13-31

2995 480.2.Terminal (New)13-32

2997 480.4 and 480.513-33

52 480.513-34

620 480.513-35

1076 480.5(A) and (B) (New)13-36

2998 480.713-37

2999 480.8(C)13-38

53 480.9(A), Informational Note13-39

119 480.9(C)13-40

3001 480.9(C), Informational Note13-41

3000 480.9(C)(1) and (2) (New)13-42

3002 480.9(D) (New)13-43

3003 480.9(D)13-44

3004 480.9(E)13-45

3005 480.9(F) (New)13-46

3006 480.9(X) (New)13-47

2242 480.11 (New)13-48

3366 695.1(C) (New)13-49

1660 695.213-50

401 695.2.Fire Pump - Sprinkler13-51

1271 695.2.On-Site Standby13-52

497 695.3(A)(1)13-53

611 695.3(A)(1)13-54

549 695.3(C)(1)13-55

1530 695.4(B)(2)(a)13-56

2639 695.4(B)(2)13-57

2640 695.4(B)(2)13-58

2738 695.4(B)(2)(a)13-59

321 695.4(B)(3)(a)13-60

326 695.4(B)(3)(b)13-61

844 695.4(B)(3)13-62

1496 695.5 (New)13-63

1531 695.5(B)13-64

1532 695.5(C)(2)13-65

1673 695.5(C)(2)13-66

1118 695.6(A)(2)(d)(1)13-67

10 695.6(B)13-68

141 695.6(D)13-69

702 695.6(D)13-70

1529 695.6(D)13-71

1828 695.6(D)13-72

2419 695.6(D) and 695.14(E)13-73

2445 695.6(D) and 695.14(E)13-74

2641 695.6(D)13-75

2843 695.6(D) and 695.14(E)13-76

2913 695.6(D)13-77

2669 695.6(E)13-78

142 695.6(I)13-79

1350 695.6(J)(5) (New)13-80

3020 695.7(A)13-81

703 695.7(B)13-82

143 695.12(G)13-83

2808 695.14(E)13-84

11 695.14(F)13-85

1119 695.14(F)(1)13-86

144 695.14(G)13-87

1469 700.113-88

1



1395 700.2 Luminaire, Directly13-89

3312 700.2 and 700.10(B)13-90

747 700.2.Emergency Systems13-91

1272 700.2.Emergency Systems13-92

2526 700.3(F)13-93

1448 700.4(A) and (B)13-94

1011 700.5(C)13-95

2263 700.5(E), 701.5(D), and13-96

906 700.7(B)13-97

3330 700.8 (New)13-98

63 700.9(B)(5)13-99

64 700.9(B)(5)(b)13-100

12 700.9(D)(1)13-101

3313 700.10(B)13-102

496 700.10(B)(5)13-103

2131 700.10(B)(5)13-104

1116 700.10(D)13-105

1564 700.10(D)13-106

2087 700.10(D)13-107

1143 700.10(D) Exception (New)13-108

1117 700.10(D)(1)13-109

65 700.12(B)(6), 701.11(B)(5),13-110

550a 700.12(B)(6), 701.12(B)(5) and13-111

2153 700.12(D)13-112

3125 700.12(D)(1)13-113

428 700.12(F)13-114

1565 700.12(F)13-115

838 700.12(F) Exception No. 113-116

2024 700.12(F)(4) Exception No. 313-117

3367 700.19 (New)13-118

764 700.2013-119

1398 700.2313-120

1397 700.24 (New)13-121

1470 700.2613-122

2255 700.2613-123

765 700.2713-124

1062 700.2713-125

1566 700.2713-126

2256 700.2713-127

1114 700.100(D)(1)(5)13-128

1471 701.113-129

746 701.2.Legally Required13-130

1273 701.2.Legally Required13-131

1012 701.5(C)13-132

907 701.7(B)13-133

1986 701.7(C) (New)13-134

1985 701.1013-135

3126 701.12(D)13-136

495 701.12(E)13-137

1472 701.2613-138

1567 701.2713-139

2344 701.28, Part V (New)13-140

745 702.2.Optional Standby13-141

1274 702.2.Optional Standby13-142

3244 702.4(B)13-143

174 702.4(B)(2)(a)13-144

897 702.7(B)13-145

3488 702.7(C) (New)13-146

3419 702.913-147

3254 702.11(A) and (B)13-148

3127 702.11(C) (New)13-149

3376 702.1213-150

2525 702.13 (New)13-151

2918 707 (New)13-152

406 70813-153

1473 708.113-154

1452 708.2.Category I13-155

744 708.2.Critical Operations13-156

1277 708.2.Supervisory Control and13-157

1454 708.4(A)13-158

3442 708.10(A)(1)13-159

814 708.10(C)13-160

801 708.10(C)(1)13-161

815 708.10(C)(1)13-162

2420 708.10(C)(1)13-163

2446 708.10(C)(1)13-164

2809 708.10(C)(1)(3)13-165

2844 708.10(C)(1)(3)13-166

13 708.10(C)(2)13-167

1115 708.10(C)(2)(3)13-168

1351 708.12(A)13-169

1528 708.1413-170

1624 708.14(7)13-171

1453 708.2013-172

2271 708.20(F)(5)13-173

1013 708.52(B)13-174

743 708.52(D)13-175

1569 708.5413-176

2



813 708.54 Exception (New)13-177

3444 708.54 Exception (New)13-178

2916 Article 710 (New)13-179

3480 750 (New)13-180

2908 Annex F13-181

3348 Annex J- (New)13-182

3349 Annex J (New)13-183

3

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-1 Log #1170l NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Russell LeBlanc, The Peterson School

In articles 90 through 830, if the wording is not already there, then add the words (or otherstructure(s)) after the word BUILDING(S) wherever the intent of the requirement is to also include STRUCTURES aswell as buildings.

There is a flaw in the NEC. The term "building" is used over 1000 times in the NEC, and in most of thecases the words "or other structure" should follow and apply the same requirements to bridges, billboards, towers,tanks, and other structures that are by definition NOT BUILDINGS. One specific example I can use is section 225.10Wiring onBuildings. I believe that this section is also intended to be applied structures, but the wording "or other structures" is notin the heading or the paragraph. There are literally thousands of other instances throughout the code that this sameproblem exists. This can easily be seen by doing an electronic search for the word "building". In some cases the words"or other structure" (or similar wording) are present, but in the vast majority where the requirements should also beapplied to structures other than buildings, the wording is not there.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-2 Log #921l NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Joe Tedesco, Boston, MA

The term "adequate" and "adequately" and "inadequately" and "inadequate" should be replacedwith terms that can be properly enforced and understood.

Terms are not defined and are considered vague and unenforceable per Table 3.2.1 in the NEC StyleManaual. They are all "incorrect" 148 times in the NEC.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-3 Log #1606 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James F. Williams, Fairmont, WV

Revise text to read as follows:

Interconnected battery subsystems consisting of one or more storage batteries and battery chargers,and can include inverters, converters, and associated electrical equipment.

Interconnected battery subsystems consisting of one or more storage batteries and battery chargers,and can include inverters, converters, and associated electrical equipment.

The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: , ,, (4), , , , , , , ,

, , , &In general, Article 100 shall contain definitions of terms that appear in two or

more other articles of the .

1Printed on 11/25/2011

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-4 Log #1613 NEC-P13



Those systems legally required and classed as emergency by municipal, state, federal, or othercodes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intended to automatically supplyillumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in theevent of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential forsafety to human life.

Informational Note: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination isrequired for safe exiting and for panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such ashotels, theaters, sports arenas, health care facilities, and similar institutions. Emergency systems may also providepower for such functions as ventilation where essential to maintain life, fire detection and alarm systems, elevators, firepumps, public safety communications systems, industrial processes where current interruption would produce seriouslife safety or health hazards, and similar functions.

Those systems legally required and classed as emergency by municipal, state, federal, or othercodes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intended to automatically supplyillumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in theevent of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential forsafety to human life.

Informational Note: Emergency systems are generally installed in places of assembly where artificial illumination isrequired for safe exiting and for panic control in buildings subject to occupancy by large numbers of persons, such ashotels, theaters, sports arenas, health care facilities, and similar institutions. Emergency systems may also providepower for such functions as ventilation where essential to maintain life, fire detection and alarm systems, elevators, firepumps, public safety communications systems, industrial processes where current interruption would produce seriouslife safety or health hazards, and similar functions.

The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: 225.30(A)(3), 230.2(A)(2), 230.72(B),T240.3, 517.2 Critical Branch, 517.2 Emergency System, 517.2 Life Safety Branch, 517.14, 517.18(A),517.18(A)<exc3>, 517.19(A), 517.19(A)<exc2>, 517.19(B)(1)(2), 517.30(B)(1), 517.30(B)(2), 517.30(B)(4),517.30(C)(1), F517.30<info1>, 517.30(C)(3), 517.30(C)(1)(4), 517.30(E), 517.31, 517.32, 517.33, 517.34, 517.42<info>,518.3(C), 520.8, 540.11(C), 551.30(B)(1), 551.33(1), 700.2, 700, 701.2, T705.3, 708.1<info4>.

The NEC Style Manual: 2.2.2.1 Article 100. In general, Article 100 shall containdefinitions of terms that appear in twoor more other articles of the NEC.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-5 Log #1605 NEC-P13



The voltage of a battery based on the number and type of cells in the battery.Informational Note: The most common nominal cell voltages are 2 volts per cell for the lead-acid systems, 1.2 volts per

cell for alkali systems, and 4 volts per cell for Li-ion systems. Nominal voltages might vary with different chemistries.

The voltage of a battery based on the number and type of cells in the battery.Informational Note: The most common nominal cell voltages are 2 volts per cell for the lead-acid systems, 1.2 volts per

cell for alkali systems, and 4 volts per cell for Li-ion systems. Nominal voltages might vary with different chemistries.The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: , , , &

In general, Article 100 shall contain definitions of terms that appear in two ormore other articles of the .





An electrical device that converts single-phase power to 3-phase electric power .Informational Note: Phase converters have characteristics that modify the starting torque and locked-rotor current of

motors served, and consideration is required in selecting a phase converter for a specific load.

An electrical device that converts single-phase power to 3-phase electric power.Informational Note: Phase converters have characteristics that modify the starting torque and locked-rotor current of

motors served, and consideration is required in selecting a phase converter for a specific load.The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: , , , , ,

.In general, Article 100 shall contain definitions of terms that appear in two or

more other articles of the .

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-7 Log #1608 NEC-P13



A cell or battery that has no provision for the routine addition of water or electrolyte or forexternal measurement of electrolyte specific gravity and might contain pressure relief venting.

A cell or battery that has no provision for the routine addition of water or electrolyte or forexternal measurement of electrolyte specific gravity and might contain pressure relief venting.

The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: , , , ,, &


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-8 Log #3035 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________D. Jerry Flaherty, Electrical Inspection Service, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:The total components and sub-system that, in combination, convert solar energy into

electric energy suitable for connection to a utilization load.Clarification and consistency. Article 690 is very changeling to read and understand. Using different

terms to identify the same thing makes this article more difficult. Using only one term for identification the photovoltaicsystem will enable the reader to better absorb the requirements of this article rather than trying to figure out what thedifferent terms mean. The term “Photovoltaic System” is used 16 times in article 690 while the term “Solar PhotovoltaicSystem” is used only 5 times.Article 690 is titled “Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Systems” making it obvious the all discussion in the article refers to Solar.The word “Photovoltaic” is use hundreds of times in Article 690. Reducing the term to “PV”, like is done with ac and dc,

would also lead to better comprehension of Article 690.





A battery comprised of one or more rechargeable cells of the lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, or otherrechargeable electrochemical types.

A battery comprised of one or more rechargeable cells of the lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, or otherrechargeable electrochemical types.

The defined term is referenced in several articles of the NEC: , (7), (5),(3), (2), (4), , , , , , ,

, , (1), (1), , , ,, , , , , , , , ),

, , , , ), , , , ,(3)(2), , & , & & .


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-10 Log #2682 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Donald R. Cook, Shelby County, AL Dept of Development Services

Add new text to read as follows:

Each generator shall be provided with a nameplate giving the manufacturer’s name, the rated frequency, power factor,number of phases if of alternating current, the subtransient and transient impedances, the rating in kilowatts or kilovoltamperes, the normal volts and amperes corresponding to the rating, rated revolutions per minute, insulation systemclass and rated ambient temperature or rated temperature rise, and time rating.

Where the neutral point of a generator is bonded to the generator frame, marking to indicate where that connection ismade shall be provided.

NEC Article 250 allows generator installation to be provided as separately derived systems or not.Installers, AHJ’s, and users must be able to determine if the neutral point of the generator is bonded to the frame toselect transfer equipment and wiring requirements. Marking on the generator will facilitate that selection.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Raymond J. Stanko, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:Each generator shall be provided with a nameplate giving the manufacturer’s name, the rated

frequency, power factor, number of phases if of alternating current, the subtransient and transient impedances, therating in kilowatts or kilovolt amperes, the normal volts and amperes corresponding to the rating, rated revolutions perminute, insulation system class and rated ambient temperature or rated temperature rise, and time rating.Nameplatesfor all stationary generators and portable generators rated more than 15 kW, shall also give the power factor, thesubtransient and transient impedances, rated revolutions per minute, insulation system class, and time rating.

Portable generators rated 15 kW or less are not permanently connected to a structure in the same waystationary generators are installed. These small portable generators are used in various applications where all of thepresently required nameplate information is not relevant due to the simple use powering temporary loads. Informationregarding the subtransient and transient impedances, rated revolutions per minute, insulation system class and timerating do not provide meaningful information to users about the proper use of these small generator products.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-12 Log #2643 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Constant-voltage generators, except ac generator exciters, shall be protectedfrom overload and short circuit by inherent design, circuit breakers, fuses, protective relays, or other identifiedovercurrent protective means suitable for the conditions of use.

Wiring and devices between the constant voltage generator and the first overcurrent protective device that providesshort circuit protection shall also be protected from short circuit.

Section 445.12 is titled overcurrent protection. Overcurrent protection typically includes short circuitprotection in addition to overload protection. The proposal offers clarification for overcurrent protection of a generator toinclude short circuit protection.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-13 Log #1158 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Neil A. Czarnecki, Reliance Controls Corporation

Revise text to read as follows:Where field-installed wiring wires pass passes through an opening on an enclosure, conduit box, or barrier, a bushing

shall be used to protect the conductors from the edges of openings having sharp edges.Despite the fact that 90.1(C) clearly states that the Code is not intended as a design specification,

authorities having jurisdiction continue to apply sections of the Code intended only for field-installed wiring tofactory-installed wiring as well. There are many varied methods for protecting factory-installed wiring that may passthrough internal barriers within an enclosure that are perfectly safe and acceptable to Qualified Electrical TestingLaboratories. This change will clearly indicate to the AHJ that the busing requirement applies only to field-installedwiring.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Joel A. Rencsok, Scottsdale, AZ

Add new text to read as follows:Generator terminal housings shall comply with 430.l2. Where a horsepower

rating is required to determine the required minimum size of the generator terminal housing, the full-load current of thegenerator shall be compared with comparable motors in Table 430.247 through Table 430.250. The higher horsepowerrating of Table 430.247 and Table 430.250 shall be used whenever the generator selection is between two ratings.

Table 430.12 only applies to generators rated less than 600 volts. The sizes shown are too small for15 kV conductors. See Article 430 Part XI for over 600 volts.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-15 Log #502 NEC-P13


Generator terminal housings shall comply with 430.12. Where a horsepowerrating is required to determine the required minimum size of the generator terminal housing, the full-load current of thegenerator shall be compared with comparable motors in Table 430.247 through table 430.250. The higher horsepowerrating of Table 430.247 and Table 430.250 shall be used whenever the generator selection is between two ratings.

Table 430.12 only apples to generators rated less than 600 volts. The sizes shown are to small for 15kV conductors. See article 430 Part XI for over 600 volts.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-16 Log #480 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Edward G. Kroth, Verona, WI

Revise text to read as follows:Generators shall be equipped with disconnecting means capable of being locked disconnect(s), lockable in the open

position, by means of which...(the remainder to stay unchanged).This is a companion proposal to a proposal to Code-Making Panel 1. The idea of the latter proposal is

to standardize the phrase "disconnecting means capable of being locked". The proposal herein should only be acceptedif the proposal to Code-Making Panel 1 or some similar version is accepted.




A single generator supplying more than one load, or multiplegenerators operating in parallel, shall be permitted to supply either of the following:

(1) A vertical metal-enclosed switchgear and switchboard with separate sections(2) Individual enclosures with overcurrent protection tapped from a single feeder for load separation and distribution if a

generator(s) is provided with overcurrent protection meeting the requirements of 240.15(A).It appears that metal-enclosed switchgear was inadvertently left out when this was included in the

NEC.See also Article 100 definitions.See also Part VIII Section 230.200 for additional requirements.Switchboards by definition are not intended to be enclosed. See definition.Article 490 Part VII does not include installation requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-18 Log #2461 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Gary L. Olson, Cummins Power Generation

Add text to read as follows:Where multiple generators are operated in parallel, the

common bus between the generator sets shall be considered as the source of power for the distribution system.As emergency-standby power systems have grown larger, often encompassing all the loads in critical

facilities, it has become more common to parallel generator sets in the system. This results in a number of challenges inthe system design, especially considering that many of the NEC requirements have been developed with theunderstanding that the main disconnecting device is the largest device in the system and fed from a utility service.

It is not uncommon for the breakers protecting a generator and providing the paralleling switch function are muchsmaller than the downstream feeders providing power to the balance of the system. For example, a system with four1250kW generator sets operating at 480 VAC would commonly use 2000 amp breakers for the paralleling function, butwould often require use of 4000A feeder breakers. In many applications this would technically require the 4000 ampfeeder to coordinate with the “upstream” 2000 amp breaker, which is not possible.

.Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________James T. Dollard, Jr., IBEW Local 98


All 125-volt, single-phase, 15- 20-, and 30-ampere receptacle outlets, that are a part of a 15 kW or smaller,portable generator, shall have ground-fault circuit interrupter protection for personnel integral to the generator orreceptacle.

The proposed text and substantiation is essentially the same as proposal 13-19 during the 2011 Codecycle. That proposal achieved consensus during the ROP, but deliberations during the ROC, and the resulting vote(which was “9 Affirmative, 9 Negative”), resulted in the TCC directing the vote to be recorded as a “Reject”, noting thatconsensus was lost during the ROC. The companion proposal (3-139) did get accepted by CMP 3, and was adoptedinto Section 590.6.This issue needs to be revisited by CMP-13.

Small portable generators, sized at 15 kW or smaller, are used for many different purposes, such as power on campingtrips; on construction sites for temporary power for electrical equipment, such as table saws, pressure washers, andhand-held tools as well as lighting and similar purposes; for temporary connection of electrical circuits in a home or forsmall commercial buildings; and for power during emergency situations for all different types of installations due tonatural disasters. In all of these applications, there are many potential hazards associated with these temporaryinstallations, such as cut and abraded wire and cable, standing water and wet locations, and similar hazardousapplications.

During power outages from storms and other natural disasters, persons who may not be familiar with adequate safetyprocedures often use these generators to supply power in less than optimal conditions. Requiring all 125-volt, singlephase, 15-, 20-, and 30-ampere on 15 kW or smaller generators to be integrally GFCI protected will help eliminate thepossibilities of shock hazards from damaged circuits, damaged equipment, or use of equipment in wet locations.

This new section will ensure that portable generators will have adequate personnel protection for these receptacleswherever these generators are used. By limiting GFCI protection to only 15-, 20-, and 30-ampere, single phase, 120 voltcircuits, these small generators can still be used for supplying standby power for non-GFCI protected 20-ampere,30-ampere, and larger 120/240 single phase, 3-wire with ground as well as 3-phase circuits of all sizes for houses andsmall commercial buildings. Providing the proper transfer switch or transfer method with the proper compliance with therequirements in Article 250 for separately derived systems or non-separately derived systems is the responsibility of theinstaller of the system.


Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-20 Log #3302a NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Elliot Rappaport, Coconut Creek, FL

Replace the phrase “equipment grounding conductor” with the phrase “equipment bondingconductor” in the Articles and Sections as identified below. Replacement of “grounding” or “ground” when usedseparately is covered in separate proposals.

455.5

This proposal is one of a series of proposals to replace, throughout the Code, the term “grounding”with “bonding” where appropriate.

As used in the Code, “grounding” is a well defined term and refers to connecting to the earth or ground for any one of anumber of reasons. Similarly, “bonding” is the connection of two bodies together to form a continuous electrical path.The term “equipment grounding conductor” has a definite purpose that is not uniquely expressed in the term. As aresult, there is a misconception that “grounding” will make a system safe. On the contrary, connecting equipment toground without providing the bonding connection back to the source can make the equipment less safe.

The purpose of the “equipment grounding conductor (EGC) is to provide a low impedance path from a fault atequipment “likely to become energized” to the source of the electrical current (transformer, generator, etc,). If it isargued that the purpose is to connect the equipment to ground, then the requirement of 250.4(A)(5) that “the earth shallnot be considered as an effective ground fault path” would no longer be valid because fault current would then beintended to flow to the ground (earth).

From the conductor sizing requirements of 250.122, and specifically 250.122(B), it is apparent that the purpose of theEGC is related to connection (bonding) to the source of power rather than connection to ground. If the principle purposewas the connection to ground, then the sizing requirements would be less important since near equipotential conditionscan be achieved with much smaller conductors.

The fundamentals of these proposals are to clearly state that “systems” are “grounded” and “equipment” is “bonded”.The fact that the bonding conductor may be grounded also is secondary to the primary function of bonding.

This proposal proposes changing the word “grounding” to “bonding”, where appropriate, throughout the Code. It isclear that there are many places where “grounding” is used to identify the connection to earth (grounding electrodeconductor) and “grounding” should remain. Additionally, the expression “EGC” should be changed to “EBC”, “equipmentbonding conductor” for consistency.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stephen McCluer, APC by Schneider Electric / Rep. IEEE Stationary Battery Committee


(A) Battery overcurrent protection devices shall be permitted in accordance with 240.21(H)- in some applications, batteries (typically under 60 volts) may be permitted to be installed

without an overcurrent protection device.(B) Battery overcurrent protection devices shall be listed for the dc application

IEEE 1375 provides guidance for battery circuit protection.(A) Battery overcurrent protection is already addressed in 240.21(H) of the Code. This citation

ensures that the appropriate section is not overlooked.The informational note clarifies that an OCPD is permitted but not required. Some critical applications (notably

telecommunications) do not use an OCPD.(B) This requirement ensures that if an ac device (e.g., circuit breaker) is used with a battery, it must be listed for the

application. Usually the dc rating is lower than the ac rating for the same device.The Informational Note directs the reader to the applicable standard for battery circuit protection.This proposal tentatively falls into the section as 480.4, but it probably needs a new section or paragraph number. The

existing 480.4 addresses overcurrent protection only when a battery is used for prime movers; it would not apply tobatteries used as stored energy for emergency power systems, uninterruptible power systems, or telecommunicationssystems.

This proposal was developed as a joint effort of the NEC DC Task Force of the Technical Correlating Committee andthe IEEE Stationary Battery Codes Working Group. The DC Task Force is chaired by John R. Kovacik / UnderwritersLaboratories, and the IEEE Codes Working Group is chaired by Steve McCluer / Schneider-Electric. This proposal is thecollaborative effort of battery manufacturers, users, integrators, installers, engineers and other battery stakeholders.The battery sub-task group members are Phyllis Archer / C&D ; Curtis Ashton / Century Link; Matt Balmer / Mitsubishi;Allen Byrne / Interstate Batteries; Bill Cantor / TPI Engineering; Terry Chapman / SCE; Troy Chatwin / GE; Allen Fowler/ Eaton; Dan Lambert/ APC; Linda Little / IBEW; Robert Lord / Analex; Ron Marts / Telcordia; Stephen McCluer /Schneider Electric; Dan McMenamin / DNM Assoc.; Mark Ode / UL; John Polenz / Emerson; Rob Wills / Intergrid.

10Printed on 11/25/2011




When mating dissimilar metals, antioxidant material suitable for the battery connection shall beused.

Ampacity of field-assembled intercell and intertier connectors and conductors shall be of such cross-sectionalarea that the temperature rise under maximum load conditions and at maximum ambient shall not exceed the safeoperating temperature of the conductor insulation or the material of the conductor supports.

Conductors sized to prevent a voltage drop exceeding 3% of maximum anticipated load,and where the maximum total voltage drop to the furthest point of connection does not exceed 5%, will providereasonable operation, but may not be appropriate for all battery applications. IEEE Std 1375 provides guidance forovercurrent protection and associated cable sizing.

Electrical connections to the battery, and cable(s) between cells on separate levels or racks,shall not put mechanical strain the battery terminals. Terminal plates shall be used where practicable.

(A) Antioxidant material is the standard method of minimizing current imbalance, corrosion and increased resistance ina connection that could cause excessive heat or fire when dissimilar metals are used in battery terminations.

Some substances used for battery connections, as well as for cleaning batteries, are inappropriate because they candegrade and/or damage the battery case material. The informational note alerts the reader that battery containermaterials can be compromised with certain chemicals, so any chemical used on a battery must be acceptable to themanufacturer.

(B) The language of this text parallels the text used in 668.12(B). Because of the wide variety of battery types,configurations, applications, and battery runtimes, prescriptive requirements are not feasible.

The language in the informational note (B) parallels existing language in 215.2(A)(4), informational note #2, but as itapplied specifically to a battery installation.

(C) Terminal plates offer three advantages when cabling a battery.(1) Terminal plates offer more width in which to 'land' lugs from multiple cables enabling reduced cabling resistance

losses between the battery and the load.(2) By moving the lugs a bit further from the battery post, the corrosive effects of leaking seals is less likely to

degrade electrical connections. In the case of lead-acid cells, a lug tends to be more vulnerable to sulfur attack thandoes a properly installed terminal plate.

(3) The weight or tension of cable connections can potentially damage the terminals of a battery unit, depending uponthe battery type and construction. Terminal plates allow the landing of one or more conductors, but not all batterydesigns can accommodate terminal plates.

If accepted, this proposal would add new paragraphs, possibly under 480.3 (Wiring & Equipment Supplied FromBatteries), or as a new numbered section, probably following 480.3 and renumbering subsequent paragraphs.


11Printed on 11/25/2011




When mating dissimilar metals, antioxidant material suitable for the battery connection shall beused.

Consult the battery manufacturer’s guidance for acceptable materials.

Ampacity of field-assembled intercell and intertier connectors and conductors shall be of such cross-sectionalarea that the temperature rise under maximum load conditions and at maximum ambient shall not exceed the safeoperating temperature of the conductor insulation or the material of the conductor supports.

Conductors sized to prevent a voltage drop exceeding 3% of maximum anticipated load,and where the maximum total voltage drop to the furthest point of connection does not exceed 5%, will providereasonable operation, but may not be appropriate for all battery applications. IEEE Std 1375 provides guidance forovercurrent protection and associated cable sizing.

Electrical connections to the battery, and cable(s) between cells on separate levels or racks,shall not put mechanical strain the battery terminals. Terminal plates shall be used where practicable.

(A) Some substances used for battery connections, as well as for cleaning batteries, are inappropriatebecause they can degrade and/or damage the battery case material. The informational note recommends to find outfrom the battery manufacturer what compounds are suitable.

(B) The language of this text parallels the text used in 668.12(B). Because of the wide variety of battery types,configurations, applications, and battery runtimes, prescriptive requirements are not feasible.

The language in the informational note (B) parallels existing language in 215.2(A)(4), informational note #2, but as itapplied specifically to a battery installation.

(C) The weight or tension of cable connections can potentially damage the terminals of a battery unit, depending uponthe battery type and construction. Terminal plates allow the landing of one or more conductors, but not all batterydesigns can accommodate terminal plates.

If accepted, this proposal would add new paragraphs, possibly under 480.3 (Wiring & Equipment Supplied FromBatteries), or as a new numbered section, probably following 480.3 and renumbering subsequent paragraphs.


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Add text to read as follows:

The following standards are frequently referenced for the installation of stationary batteries(1) IEEE Std. 484,

2008(2) IEEE 485, , 1997(3) IEEE 1145,

, 2007(4) IEEE Std 1187,

, 2002(5) IEEE 1375, , 1996 (R2003)(6) IEEE 1578 - , 2007(7) IEEE 1635/ASHRAE 21 –

(TBD)(8) IEEE 1657 - ,

2009Some of these installation standards were referenced in NPFA 70 E and were removed because they

were outside the scope of NFPA 70E and because installation requirements belong in NFPA 70. Additional referencesare included for battery technologies other than lead-acid, monitoring, spill containment, and technician qualifications.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-25 Log #2241 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Laurie B. Florence, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:The voltage of a battery based on the number and type of cells in the battery.

Informational Note: The most common nominal cell voltages are 2 volts per cell for the lead-acid systems, 1.2 volts percell for alkali systems, and 3.6 – 3.8 4 volts per cell for Li-ion systems. Nominal voltages might vary with differentchemistries.

Nominal voltages for lithium ion batteries vary between 3.6 Vdc to about 3.8 Vdc depending uponchemistry. A voltage of 4 Vdc would be too high and would be more typical of a charge voltage for this chemistry.

13Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:The basic electrochemical unit, characterized by an anode and a cathode used to receive, store, and deliver

electrical energy.The term “cell” is used and not defined. This definition correlates with a definition that was revised in

NPFA 70E. This definition is needed in order to make the distinction between a battery and a cell. A consists ofone or more . This definition is preferred by the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-27 Log #2990 NEC-P13


Add new text to read as follows:A vessel that holds the plates, electrolyte, and other elements of a single unit in a battery.

: A container is sometimes improperly referred to in the industry as a single-cell or multi-cell “jar”;this term should not be used.

This term is used in Article 480 and is not defined. This definition is preferred by the IEEE StationaryBattery Committee


14Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:Electrolyte: The medium that provides the ion transport mechanism between the positive and negative electrodes of a

cell.The term “electrolyte” is used in other companion proposals for Article 480 and is not defined (see

480.XX Mechanical connections and 480.9 Working clearance). This definition is preferred by the IEEE StationaryBattery Committee.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-29 Log #2992 NEC-P13


Add new text to read as follows:An electrically conductive bar or cable used to connect adjacent cells.

This term is used in companion proposals for Article 480 but is not defined (see: 480.xx, MechanicalConnections; 480.xx Intercell and Intertier Conductors; and 480.xx Battery & Cell Terminations. This definition ispreferred by the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee.


15Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:An electrical conductor used to connect two cells on different tiers of the same rack or different

shelves of the same rack.This term is used in companion proposals for Article 480 (see 480.xx Mechanical Connections;

4890.xx Battery and Cell Terminations; and 480.xx Intercell and Intertier Conductors), but is not defined. This definitionis preferred by the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-31 Log #2994 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The

value assigned to a cell or battery of a given voltage class for the purpose of convenient designation; the operatingvoltage of the cell or system may vary above or below this value.

This term is used in Article 480. Unlike alternating current, batteries always start at a higher voltageand decrease during discharge. They are recharged at a voltage higher than nominal. This definition can be applied toeither a cell or a battery.


16Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:Terminal: That part of a cell, container, or battery to which an external connection is made (commonly identified as

post, pillar, pole, or terminal post).This term is used in Article 480 (if other proposals are accepted) but is not defined. This definition is

preferred by the IEEE Stationary Battery Committee. The parenthetical statement clarifies that is the “official”term, but it acknowledges that other terms are commonly used that mean the same thing.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-33 Log #2997 NEC-P13



Over current protection shall not be required for conductors from a battery rated with a nominal voltage of less thanvolts if the battery provides power…<etc>

A disconnecting means shall be provided for all ungrounded conductors derived from a stationary battery system with anominal voltage over volts. A disconnecting means shall be readily accessible and located within sight of thebattery system.

The change from 50 volts to 60 volts harmonizes Article 480 with Table 11(B) in Chapter 9 and110.26(A)(1)(b). The voltage levels from 60 volts and less provide safety levels for shock and fire hazards.


17Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James E. Brunssen, Telecordia Technologies Inc. / Rep. Alliance for Communications Industry Solutions(ATIS)

The Panel Action should have been Accept in Part. Per Mr. Degnan’s affirmative comment, add anexception as follows: “

” Further, the Panel should consider assigning an energy level at which 480.5applies. As written the requirement applies equally to a string of 20 “D” cells or three 12-volt automobile batteries inseries. The ampere-hour rating, and hence the capacity for injury and property damage is orders of magnitude greaterfor the auto batteries; it is almost non-existent for the “D” cells.

The current requirement is too broad and considers neither applications requiring higher reliability norenergy level (i.e., ampere-hour rating of the battery).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-35 Log #620 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James E. Brunssen, Telecordia Technologies Inc. / Rep. Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions

(ATIS)Revise first sentence as follows:

A disconnecting means shall be provided for all ungrounded conductors derived from a stationary battery system over50 volts, nominal.

Stationary battery voltages cannot be stated in the absolute as the voltage varies depending uponwhether the battery is discharging, floating or charging. For example, a 48 volt lead-acid battery has a float voltage of52.8 volts and a charge voltage of 54 volts.

18Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Daleep C. Mohla, DCM Electrical Consulting Services, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:A disconnecting means shall be provided for all ungrounded conductors derived from a

stationary battery system over 50 volts.(A) The disconnecting means shall be readily accessible and located within sight as close as practicable of the battery

system terminals.The disconnecting means shall be legibly marked in the field with the nominal battery system

voltage and maximum available fault current derived from the stationary battery system. The field marking(s) shallinclude the date the fault current calculation was performed and be of sufficient durability to withstand the environmentinvolved.

Within sight is defined in Article 100 as the specified equipment is to be visible and not more than 15 m(50 ft) distant from the other. Battery system disconnect should be as close a s practicable in 240.21( H) for quickisolation of battery from other sources such as battery chargers etc.

NFPA 70E- 2012 has requirements for needed personal protective equipment (PPE) while working on Direct Currentsystems. Information on maximum available fault current available from the battery system is required to select therequired PPE.

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Delete text as follows:

The provisions of 480.6 shall apply to storage batteries having the cells connected so as to operate at a nominal voltageexceeding 250 volts, and, in addition, the provisions of this section shall also apply to such batteries, cells shall beinstalled in groups having a total nominal voltage of not over 250 volts. Insulation, which can be air, shall be providedbetween groups and shall have a minimum separation between live battery parts of opposite polarity of 50 mm (2 in.) forbattery voltages not exceeding 600 volts.

The intent of this requirement is not clear. There is no evidence that the separation or insulatingmaterial required by this section creates any safety benefit.

For example, let's say we have a nominal 480 volt battery consisting of (240) two-volt cells. Separating battery cellsinto groups of 250 volts creates abnormal installation requirements but does not create any safety advantage becausevoltage potential on each of the final 115 cells will be greater than 250 volts.

cells 1-125 = 2 volts to 250 voltscells 126 – 240 = 252 volts to 480 voltsThe fault potential on cells #126 to 240 is not reduced by physically separating the high voltage group from the low

voltage group. Such a separation or barrier requires non-standard inter-cell and/or inter-tier connectors and additionallabor and materials. It also introduces more failure points that reduce the reliability of the system and increase thepossibility of human error.

With the development of a wide range of emerging technologies such as photovoltaic (e.g. Article 690 where typicalvoltages are 150-300 Vdc), or in emerging dc distribution methods in data centers or other applications at nominal 380Vdc, there is no uniform means of enforcing this requirement. Compliance is open to interpretation because of theambiguity over the intent of the existing text.

Refer to the supporting material.This proposal was developed as a joint effort of the NEC DC Task Force of the Technical Correlating Committee and

the IEEE Stationary Battery Codes Working Group. The DC Task Force is chaired by John R. Kovacik/UnderwritersLaboratories, and the IEEE Codes Working Group is chaired by Steve McCluer/Schneider-Electric. This proposal is thecollaborative effort of battery manufacturers, users, integrators, installers, engineers and other battery stakeholders.The battery sub-task group members are Phyllis Archer / C&D; Curtis Ashton/Century Link; Matt Balmer/Mitsubishi;Allen Byrne/Interstate Batteries; Bill Cantor/TPI Engineering; Terry Chapman/SCE; Troy Chatwin/GE; AllenFowler/Eaton; Dan Lambert/APC; Linda Little/IBEW; Robert Lord/Analex; Ron Marts/Telcordia; StephenMcCluer/Schneider Electric; Dan McMenamin/DNM Assoc.; Mark Ode/UL; John Polenz/Emerson; Rob Wills/Intergrid.

Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

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Add new text to read as follows:The terminals of all cells or multi-cell units shall be readily accessible for readings, inspection,

and cleaning where required by the equipment design. All transparent battery containers shall be readily accessible forinspection of the internal components.

This new text is derived from text removed from NFPA 70E-2009, 320.5(A)(2), because it is aninstallation requirement outside the scope of NFPA 70E.

Most battery systems require visual inspection. All require periodic or regular monitoring of voltage, resistance, etc.When taken manually, the measurement points (such as where to put probes) must be accessible so as not to create ahazard to maintenance personnel. Some equipment designs encapsulate the batteries into modules with embeddedmonitoring where standard maintenance practices are neither required nor possible. Some battery types are made oftransparent containers, thereby allowing visual inspection of internal components; most are not transparent.

We ask the TCC for guidance. This proposal creates a new paragraph (C) under 480.8. An alternate location could beunder 480.9 [Battery Locations]. 490.9(B) already exists for “Live Parts”; it directs compliance with 110.27, “Guarding ofLive Parts.”

See related proposal for 480.9(C) for top clearance.This proposal was developed as a joint effort of the NEC DC Task Force of the Technical Correlating Committee and

the IEEE Stationary Battery Codes Working Group. The DC Task Force is chaired by John R. Kovacik/UnderwritersLaboratories, and the IEEE Codes Working Group is chaired by Steve McCluer/Schneider-Electric. This proposal is thecollaborative effort of battery manufacturers, users, integrators, installers, engineers and other battery stakeholders.The battery sub-task group members are Phyllis Archer / C&D; Curtis Ashton/Century Link; Matt Balmer/Mitsubishi;Allen Byrne/Interstate Batteries; Bill Cantor/TPI Engineering; Terry Chapman/SCE; Troy Chatwin/GE; AllenFowler/Eaton; Dan Lambert/APC; Linda Little/IBEW; Robert Lord/Analex; Ron Marts/Telcordia; StephenMcCluer/Schneider Electric; Dan McMenamin/DNM Assoc.; Mark Ode/UL; John Polenz/Emerson; Rob Wills/Intergrid.

21Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Stephen McCluer, APC by Schneider Electric / Rep. IEEE Stationary Battery CommitteeRevise text to read as follows:

Informational Note: See IEEE/ASHRAE Std. 1635, Guide for the Ventilation and Thermal Management of StationaryBattery Installations. NFPA 1 Chapter 52 for ventilation considerations for specific battery chemistries.

Some battery technologies do not require ventilation greater than that required for human habitation.The standard included in the original proposal will include design guidelines for various battery types, but the standardhas not been released by IEEE and ASHRAE at the time of this comment. The Uniform Fire Code (NFPA 1) identifiesventilation requirements for several types of batteries.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-40 Log #119 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Palmer L. Hickman, NJATC

Revise text to read as follows:(C) Working Space and Clearance. Working space about the battery systems shall comply with 110.26. Working

clearance shall be measured from the edge of the battery rack.480.9(C) addresses both working space and working clearance. Therefore, "and Clearance" is being

recommended as an addition to the title to reflect that.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-41 Log #3001 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Additional space may be needed to accommodate battery hoisting equipment, tray removal, or

spill containment.Article 110.26(A) already adequately covers general working space, but the informational note

addresses the need to get battery hoisting equipment into and out of the room.This proposal was developed as a joint effort of the NEC DC Task Force of the Technical Correlating Committee and

the IEEE Stationary Battery Codes Working Group. The DC Task Force is chaired by John R. Kovacik / UnderwritersLaboratories, and the IEEE Codes Working Group is chaired by Steve McCluer / Schneider-Electric. This proposal is thecollaborative effort of battery manufacturers, users, integrators, installers, engineers and other battery stakeholders.The battery sub-task group members are Phyllis Archer / C&D ; Curtis Ashton / Century Link; Matt Balmer / Mitsubishi;Allen Byrne / Interstate Batteries; Bill Cantor / TPI Engineering; Terry Chapman / SCE; Troy Chatwin / GE; Allen Fowler/ Eaton; Dan Lambert/ APC; Linda Little / IBEW; Robert Lord / Analex; Ron Marts / Telcordia; Stephen McCluer /Schneider Electric; Dan McMenamin / DNM Assoc.; Mark Ode / UL; John Polenz / Emerson; Rob Wills / Intergrid.

22Printed on 11/25/2011



Revise text to read as follows:Working space about the battery systems shall comply with 110.26. Working clearance

shall be measured from the edge of the battery rack cabinet, or by using 480.9(C)(1) or 480.9(C)(2) for racks orstationary trays.

480.9(C)(1) Single Row Battery Racks. In addition to the minimum aisle width, there shall be a minimum clearanceof 25 mm (1 in.) between a cell container and any wall or structure on the side not requiring access for maintenance.This required clearance does not preclude battery stands touching adjacent walls or structures, provided that the batteryshelf has a free air space for no less than 90 percent of its length.

480.9 (C)(2) Double-Row Battery Racks. The minimum aisle width shall be maintained on one end and both sides ofthe battery. The remaining end shall have a minimum clearance of 100 mm (4 in.) between any wall or structure and acell container.

This language was deleted from NFPA 70E-2009, 320.5(B) because it is an installation requirementoutside the scope of NFPA 70E. This proposal would add two requirements for when batteries are installed on openracks.

This proposal adds spill containment , which is required by Fire Codes on some battery systems with free-flowingliquid electrolyte and which can add dimensions to the battery supports. We have also added as it is commonfor VRLA or other non-aqueous electrolyte battery types to be installed in cabinets.

For the proposed text clarifies that the “rear” of the battery is permitted to be adjacent to a wallwhen no access is required on that side for maintenance.

For (i.e., racks installed back-to-back), the intent is to ensure adequate clearance for torquingof terminals or rack bolts for routine maintenance.


23Printed on 11/25/2011



Add text to read as follows:Each battery space shall be marked "Battery room restricted to

authorized personnel” or "Area restricted to authorized personnel".This proposal would add a new subparagraph (D) or (E) [depending on whether other proposals add

paragrphs.Because batteries are always energized, access should be restricted to qualified personnel. In some instances batteriesare not installed in spaces that are designated as “battery rooms”, hence the distinction is made between room andarea.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-44 Log #3003 NEC-P13


Add text to read as follows:When top-terminal batteries are installed on tiered racks, working space in

accordance with the battery manufacturer’s instructions shall be provided between the highest point on a cell and therow or ceiling above it.

Battery manufacturer’s installation instructions typically define how much top working space isnecessary for a particular battery model.

This language meets the intent of the installation requirements that were deleted from NFPA 70E-2009,320.5(B). It replaces the prescriptive requirement with a performance-based requirement.

The informational note explains that the space required above the cell can vary from one battery model to another,depending upon the type of maintenance service required.


24Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:Egress from a battery room where the stored energy exceeds 5000 Ah or 250 kWh shall comply

with the requirements of 110.26(C).This proposal would add a new subparagraph to section 480.9. If a separate proposal to add a new

subparagraph (D) is accepted this would become subparagraph (E).Article 110.26(C) already adequately covers doors with panic bars opening outward in 110.26(C)(3), and includes other

useful requirements on means of egress. However, 110.26(C) language is based on a minimum 1200 Ampereequipment rating for ac voltage. 1200 Amperes roughly correlates to 5000Ah for battery installations at the 3-hour rate.The 250 kWH roughly correlates to 1200A at the 15 minute rate, which is the typical rate for lead-acid batteries in UPSapplications.


25Printed on 11/25/2011




(1) Any flexible electrical conduit used in or passing through battery rooms containing vented batteries shall beliquidtight.

(2) Water pipes in battery rooms or areas shall be installed in such a manner that water cannot drop directly onto thebatteries, except where required for fire suppression sprinkler systems.

(3) Gas piping shall not be permitted in dedicated battery rooms.This proposal would add a new subparagraph to section 480.9. If separate proposals to add new

subparagraphs (D) and (E) are accepted this would become subparagraph (F).This requirement was removed from NFPA 70E because it is an installation requirement that is outside the scope of

NFPA 70E.The purpose of this new subparagraph is to prevent corrosion of piping due to the acid or alkali vapors. Such vapors

are quite small in volume, so the corrosive effect is negligible.(1) This potential is limited to vented batteries. Valve-regulated and sealed batteries (such as lithium batteries) give

off little, if any, caustic vapor. Experience has shown that the biggest corrosion problem is with flexible metallicconduit. Non-corrugated types of raceways are unaffected by the small amount of corrosive vapors.

(2) Water from pipes leaking onto batteries could cause a short circuit or ground fault.(3) Gas piping, whether iron or Corrugated Stainless Steel Tubing (CSST) are grounded bodies that could be subject

to short circuits during accidents in a battery room. Virtually all battery systems would contain sufficient energy topuncture CSST or Iron pipe during electrical fault conditions and simultaneously ignite escaping gas, thereby creatingconditions for life safety issues and collateral fire.


26Printed on 11/25/2011



Add text to read as follows:Spaces containing battery systems shall comply with 110.26(D). The location of luminaires

shall not:(1) expose personnel to energized battery components when performing maintenance on the luminaires; or(2) create a hazard to the battery upon failure of the luminaire.

NFPA 70E, 320.5(F) covers illumination for battery rooms. By adding this reference in Article 480, itensures that battery spaces are sufficiently illuminated to perform electrical maintenance. The location of luminairesshould be covered in NFPA 5000, but is added here to provide guidance for the installer. 480.9(X)(2) is intended toprevent debris from falling onto the possibly exposed terminals or intercell connectors of the battery in the event of aluminaire failure (such as a burst bulb, failed lanyard, etc.)

We seek guidance from the TCC for paragraph numbering. This text is one of several proposals arbitrarily locatedunder 480.9 (Battery Locations). Paragraph numbering will depend upon whether other proposals are accepted.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-48 Log #2242 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Laurie B. Florence, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.

Add text to read as follows:All batteries, electrical materials, devices, fittings, and associated equipment for a storage battery

system shall be listed.Energy storage solutions are utilizing new technologies other than standard lead acid batteries such as

lithium ion, flowing electrolyte, sodium sulfur and other technologies, which may have unique safety concerns requiringadditional evaluation. In addition, storage battery systems consist of wiring, battery management systems, overcurrentdevices, inverters, converters, and battery subsystems that operate at hazardous voltage and energy levels. Thevarious parts of these systems should be determined adequate to handle these currents and voltages under normaloperating and potential anticipated abnormal conditions. Use of equipment evaluated to appropriate safety standardsshould help to assure a level of safety of the system.

27Printed on 11/25/2011




Informational Note: Text that is followed by a reference in brackets has been extracted from NFPA 20-2010, Standardfor the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection. Only editorial changes were made to the extracted text tomake it consistent with this Code.

This article covers the installation of the following:(1) Electric power sources and interconnecting circuits(2) Switching and control equipment dedicated to fire pump drivers

This article does not cover the following: (1) The performance, maintenance, and acceptance testingof the fire pump system, and the internal wiring of the components of the system

(2) Pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumpsWhere a pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pump(s)

is not connected to the circuit supplying the fire pump this article shall not apply. Where a pressure maintenance(jockey or makeup) pump(s) is connected to the circuit supplying the fire pump this article shall apply.Informational Note: See NFPA 20-2010, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, for furtherinformation.

This proposal is written in attempt to provide clarity for the user of the NEC. Many attempts have beenmade over several cycles to clarify when/where the installation of pressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps iscovered by Article 695.

In the last revision cycle Proposal 13-53 attempted to make this clarification and the proposal was rejected. However,the statement to reject Proposal 13-53 agreed with the submitters substantiation. Clarification is needed.

No technical changes are proposed. The present text of 695.1 is misleading as 695.(B)(2) exempts all pressuremaintenance (jockey or makeup) pumps and the committee statement to reject Proposal 13-53 agrees that where apressure maintenance (jockey or makeup) pump(s) is connected to the circuit supplying the fire pump Article 695applies.

28Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Greg Chontow, Hopatcong, NJ

Add new text as follows:

Annex AA.9.3.2 A reliable power source possesses the following characteristics:(1) The source power plant has not experienced any shutdowns longer than 4 continuous hours in the year prior to

plan submittal. NFPA 25,, requires special undertakings (i.e., fire watches) when a water-based fire protection system is taken out of

service for longer than 4 hours. If the normal source power plant has been intentionally shut down for longer than 4hours in the past, it is reasonable to require a backup source of power.

(2) No power outages have been experienced in the area of the protected facility caused by failures in the power gridthat were not due to natural disasters or electric grid management failure. The standard does not require that the normalsource of power is infallible. NFPA 20 does not intend to require a back-up source of power for every installation usingan electric motor–driven fire pump. Should the normal source of power fail due to a natural disaster (hurricane) or due toa problem with electric grid management (regional blackout), the fire protection system could be supplied through thefire department connection. However, if the power grid is known to have had problems in the past (i.e., switch failures oranimals shorting a substation), it is reasonable to require a backup source of power.

(3)The normal source of power isnot supplied by overhead conductors outside the protected facility. Fire departmentsresponding to an incident at the protected facility will not operate aerial apparatus near live overhead power lines,without exception. A backup source of power is required in case this scenario occurs and the normal source of powermust be shut off. Additionally, many utility providers will remove power to the protected facility by physically cutting theoverhead conductors. If the normal source of power is provided by overhead conductors, which will not be identified, theutility provider could mistakenly cut the overhead conductor supplying the fire pump.

(4) Only the disconnect switches and overcurrent protection devices permitted by 9.2.3 are installed in the normalsource of power. Power disconnection and activated overcurrent protection should only occur in the fire pump controller.The provisions of 9.2.2 for the disconnect switch and overcurrent protection essentially require disconnection andovercurrent protection to occur in the fire pump controller. If unanticipated disconnect switches or overcurrent protectiondevices are installed in the normal source of power that do not meet the requirements of 9.2.2, the normal source ofpower must be considered not reliable and a back-up source of power is necessary.

NEC 695.3 refers to a reliable source of power, however nowhere in the NEC is a definition. Thisproposal would give the user the official definition as described in NFPA 20 without having to refer to anotherpublication. In addition, many users to NFPA 70 do not own or have access to NFPA 20.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-51 Log #401 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Wayne Elmore, Douglas County Electrical Inspector

Add new text to read as follows:Fire Pump - Sprinkler Pumps for Residential Homes.

If you take 2 hsp sprinkler pumps with 20 amp breaker, motor never started, bearings rusty, need togive motor higher breaker to break loose and start sprinkler. I inspect three houses a month with sprinklers - fire pump -low voltage fire alarm wiring in houses over 10,000 sq. ft. or gated community.


29Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Marcelo M. Hirschler, GBH International

Revise text to read as follows: A facility producing electric power on site as the alternate supply of electric power. It

differs from an on-site power production facility, in that it is not constantly producing power.It differs from an on-site power production facility, in that it is not constantly producing power.

The NFPA Manual of Style requires definitions to be in single sentences. The information provided inthe subsequent sentences is not really a part of the definition; it is further information that is best placed in aninformational note.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-53 Log #497 NEC-P13


A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from aconnection located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or a vertical section of a metal-enclosedswitchgear or switchboard as the service disconnecting means. The connection shall be located and arranged so as tominimize the possibility of damage by fire from within the premises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of theservice disconnecting means shall comply with 230.82(5). The service equipment shall comply with the labelingrequirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in 230.72(B). [ 9.2.2(1)]

Switchboard is by definition not intended to be enclosed. See definitions.I do not believe it was the code panel's intent to allow this.Maybe the intent was to allow this installed in a metal-enclosed switchgear or metal-enclosed switchboard.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-54 Log #611 NEC-P13


Add “metal-enclosed power switchgear”, to section to read as follows:A fire pump shall be permitted to be supplied by a separate service, or from a

connection located ahead of and not within the same cabinet, enclosure, or a vertical section of a metal-enclosed powerswitchgear or switchboard as the service disconnecting means. The connection shall be located and arranged so as tominimize the possibility of damage by fire from within the premises and from exposing hazards. A tap ahead of theservice disconnecting means shall comply with 230.82(5). The service equipment shall comply with the labelingrequirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in 230.2 and the location requirements in 230.72(B). [ 9.2.2(1)]

Switchboard is by definition not intended to be enclosed. See definitions.I do not believe it was the code panel's intent to allow this.Maybe the intent was to allow this installed in a metal-enclosed power switchgear or metal-enclosed switchboard.

30Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Lawrence W. Forshner, Bard, Rao & Athanas Consulting Engineers, LLC

Revise text as follows:" Two or more feeders shall be permitted as more than one power source if such feeders are

connected to, or derived from, separate utility services. A feeder connection where a backup source of power isprovided from a source independent of the normal source of power. The connection(s) overcurrent protective device(s),and disconnecting means for such feeders shall meet the requirements of 695.4(B).

The substantiation for proposal 13-77- 2010 ROP said that 695.3(B)(2008NEC) "was out of sync withthe requirements of NFPA 20. Originally, in NFPA 20, there were a number of convoluted rules involving feeder sourcesto fire pumps that were carried over to the NEC. Since that time, the NFPA 20 committee has revised the feederrequirements to be more practical, buth the NEC provisions have not been revised." CMP 13 did a good job extractingfrom NFPA 20 in the rewrite of 695 in 2011, but missed a key part and retained some of the convoluted language that isnot consistent with [20:9.2.2]. Specifically, 695.3(C)(1) is still requiring two or more feeders to a fire pump when theprotected facility is part of a multibuilding campus-style arrangement. The need for two feeders has been eliminatedfrom NFPA 20. [20:9.2.2(4)]. (Please see the one line drawing I have provided of a typical building feeder arrangement ,that's part of a mulit-building campus arrangement). The one-line meets the requirements of [20:9.2.2(4)] thereforewould be considered a normal source [20:9.2.1] by providing the fire pump with a "continually available source."[20:922(4)(b)] requires a backup source, which is provided by the second feeder to the building with the automatictie/main/tie transfer equipment, however some AHJ's interpret this section to require two feeders to the pump room,which is not required or described in NFPA 20.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-56 Log #1530 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)

Revise 695.4(B)(2)(a) as follows;Overcurrent devices shall comply with (a) or (b).

(a) The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be sized to comply with all of the following:1. Shall not open within 2 minutes at 600% full load current.2. Shall not open with a restart transient of 24 times the full load current.3. Shall not open within 10 minutes at 300% full load current.

rated to carry indefinitely Full load current is the sum of the locked-rotor full load current of the fire pump motor(s) andthe pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipmentwhen connected to this power supply. Where the locked-rotor current value does not correspond to a standardovercurrent device size, the next standard overcurrent device size shall be used in accordance with 240.6. Therequirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrentdevices in the fire pump motor circuit(s). [ 9.2.3.4]

The revised text correlates with changes in NFPA 20 related to the tripping characteristics ofovercurrent protection “upstream” of the fire pump controller. The revisions will eliminate unnecessary oversizing of the“upstream” overcurrent protection and allow for a reduction to a value that is more practical for the application.

31Printed on 11/25/2011



Revise 695.4(B)(2) as follows;Overcurrent devices shall comply with (a) or (b).

(a) The overcurrent protective device(s) shall be rated to carry indefinitely the sum of thelocked-rotor current of largest the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-loadcurrent of all of the other pump motors and associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this powersupply. Where the locked-rotor current value does not correspond to a standard overcurrent device size, the nextstandard overcurrent device size shall be used in accordance with 240.6. The requirement to carry the locked-rotorcurrents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motorcircuit(s). [ 9.2.3.4]

The proposed revision is taken from recent NFPA 20 Committee action affecting extract material forArticle 695. The Committee concluded that the upstream overcurrent protective devices do not need to carry the lockedrotor current of all fire pump motors, only the largest. The possibility of all the fire pump motors being in a locked rotorcondition at the same time is negligible.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-58 Log #2640 NEC-P13


Revise 695.4(B)(2) as follows;Overcurrent devices shall comply with (a) or (b).

(a) Overcurrent protection for individual sources shall comply with (1) or (2).(1) The oOvercurrent protective device(s) shall be rated to carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the

fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load currentof the associated fire pumpaccessory equipment when connected to this power supply. Where the locked-rotor current value does not correspondto a standard overcurrent device size, the next standard overcurrent device size shall be used in accordance with 240.6.The requirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other thanovercurrent devices in the fire pump motor circuit(s). [ 9.2.3.4]

(2) Overcurrent protection shall be provided by an assembly listed for fire pump service and complying with thefollowing:

(a) The overcurrent protective device shall not open within 2 minutes at 600 percent of the full load current of the firepump motor(s).

(b) The overcurrent protective device shall not open with a re-start transient of 24 times the full load current of the firepump motor(s).

(c) The overcurrent protective device shall not open within 10 minutes at 300 percent of the full load current of the firepump motor(s).

(d) The trip point for circuit breakers shall not be field adjustable. [ 9.2.3.4.1]The proposed revision is taken from recent NFPA 20 Committee action affecting extract material for

Article 695. The Committee concluded that the upstream overcurrent protection for individual sources could be providedby an assembly listed for fire pump service that provides overcurrent protection equivalent to overcurrent protectionrequired by current 695.4(B)(2)(a). The assembly referred to in the proposed text would incorporate integral fuses or acircuit breaker complying with the proposed new text for 695.4(B)(2)(a)(2) (a) thru (d).

32Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Richard Schneider, Lancaster, SC

Please replace present (a) with the following:

This correlates with 9.2.3.4 of NFPA 20 (2013) .

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-60 Log #321 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stanley J. Folz, Morse Electric Company

Revise text to read as follows:(a) The disconnecting means for the normal power source shall

comply with all of the following: [ :9.2.3.1](1) Be identified as suitable for use as service equipment.(2) Be lockable in the closed position. The provision for locking or adding a lock to the disconnecting means shall be

installed on or at the switch or circuit breaker used as the disconnecting means and shall remain in place with or withoutthe lock installed.

This proposal has been developed by the Usability Task Group assigned by the Technical CorrelatingCommittee. The committee members were Stanley Folz, James Dollard, William Fiske, David Hittinger, Andy Juhasz,Amos Lowrance, Susan Newman-Scearce, Marc Bernsen and Vincent Zinnante. Requirements for a disconnectingmeans to be lockable in the open position exist in numerous locations in the NEC. A new section has been proposed inArticle 110 to consolidate the requirements for a disconnecting means required to be “capable of being locked in theopen position” in a single section for clarity. It is understood that this requirement includes more than disconnecting andlocking electrical power sources.

This proposal is intended to facilitate a lockout/tagout scenario. It is equally important to ensure that the means forplacing the lock remain in place. The concept suggested by this proposal is necessary to provide correlation throughoutthe NEC with respect to the capability of placing a lock on a disconnecting means to secure it in the open position.

33Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Stanley J. Folz, Morse Electric, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:(b) The disconnecting means for an on-site standby

generator(s) used as the alternate power source shall be installed in accordance with 700.10(B)(5) for emergencycircuits and shall be lockable in the closed position. The provision for locking or adding a lock to the disconnectingmeans shall be installed on or at the switch or circuit breaker used as the disconnecting means and shall remain inplace with or without the lock installed.

This proposal has been developed by the Usability Task Group assigned by the Technical CorrelatingCommittee. The committee members were Stanley Folz, James Dollard, William Fiske, David Hittinger, Andy Juhasz,Amos Lowrance, Susan Newman-Scearce, Marc Bernsen and Vincent Zinnante. Requirements for a disconnectingmeans to be lockable in the open position exist in numerous locations in the NEC. A new section has been proposed inArticle 110 to consolidate the requirements for a disconnecting means required to be “capable of being locked in theopen position” in a single section for clarity. It is understood that this requirement includes more than disconnecting andlocking electrical power sources.

This proposal is intended to facilitate a lockout/tagout scenario. It is equally important to ensure that the means forplacing the lock remain in place. The concept suggested by this proposal is necessary to provide correlation throughoutthe NEC with respect to the capability of placing a lock on a disconnecting means to secure it in the open position.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-62 Log #844 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Ronnie H. Ridgeway, Siemens Industry, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:All disconnecting devices that are unique to the fire pump loads shall comply with items (a)

through (e).(a)The disconnecting means for the normal power source shall comply with all of the following: [ 9.2.3.1](1) Be identified as suitable for use as service equipment(2) Be lockable in the closed position(3) Not be located within equipment the same enclosure or panelboard or within lineups of switchboard, switchgear or

motor control center vertical sections, with or without common bus, that feeds loads other than the fire pump(4) Be located sufficiently remote from other building or other fire pump source disconnecting means such that

inadvertent operation at the same time would be unlikely“(3) Not be located within equipment that feeds loads other than the fire pump” is being interpreted by

some local AHJs as allowing a fire pump disconnect in the same switchboard lineup but not in the same vertical sectionas disconnects that feed other loads. This change would clarify the intent that the fire pump disconnect should not be inthe same line up of switchboard, switchgear or motor control center sections. See an example of an interpretation asapplied to a switchboard line up below:

Note: Supporting Material is available for review at NFPA headquarters.

34Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan / Rep. APPA.ORG - Leadership in Education

Add New Section Article 695.5+ as shown below:It shall be permitted to assess the reliability of the fire pump supply

according to the method shown in Example D14 of Annex DThe electrical industry has evolved from a point where the presence of electricity was a fire hazard, to

a point where the greater hazard lies in the absence of electricity. Friends of the NEC need a broader vocabulary todiscuss power system reliability. That vocabulary needs to be “numerate” i.e., probabilistically/statistically informed tosupplement the present, prevailing practice of depending upon precedent and prejudice . The 2011 NEC made a goodfirst step when, in Article 700, an important IEEE reference was added to Informational Note 2.

Informational Note No. 2: Assignment of degree of reliability of the recognized emergency supply system depends onthe careful evaluation of the variables at each particular installation. For further information, see ANSI/IEEE 493-2007,Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.

This proposal is a continuation of the drive to acclimate the power industry to the science of reliability. A good place tostart is with fire pumps. Probabilistic methods, supplemented with the judgment of experienced reliability engineersought to inform not only decisions about fire pump supply reliability but also other important decisions such as

- A. whether designers select fuses, molded case breakers, or steel frame breakers;- B whether the second source of power to a fire pump ought to be provided by an existing utility overhead line, an

on-site generator, or a new underground line to be built at the Owner's expense.- C. how a utility cooperative develops the last mile of municipal distribution that is typically the primary source of power

to fire pumps.- D the type and application point of transfer switchesThe proposed Example 14 for Annex D -- which will be submitted separately by my colleagues (identified below)-- will

help electrical and safety professionals assess and scale risk based upon quantitative information that might challengedesign approaches that are built upon anecdotes rather than the best science we have. The airline and automobileindustries, informed by Total Quality Management practices and the reliability methods NASA used for the spaceprogram, increased product and mission reliability by developing these methods and, given that the next generation ofNEC users will need power that is even more reliable, we need to be doing this, too -- and now.

This proposal and related proposal submitted to the technical committee assigned to Annex D development wasprepared by the following individuals: Mike Anthony (University of Michigan), Robert Arno (ITT Information Systems),Neal Dowling (MTechnology), Robert Schuerger (HP Mission Critical).

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-64 Log #1531 NEC-P13


Revise 695.5(B) as follows;The primary overcurrent protective device(s) shall be sized to comply with all of the

following:1. Shall not open within 2 minutes at 600% full load current.2. Shall not open with a re-start transient of 24 times the full load current.3. Shall not open within 10 minutes at 300% full load current.Full load current is the sum of the locked-rotor full load current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure

maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connectedto this power supply. Secondary overcurrent protection shall not be permitted. The requirement to carry the locked-rotorcurrents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motorcircuit(s). [ 9.2.3.4]


35Printed on 11/25/2011



Revise 695.5(C)(2) as follows;The transformer size, the feeder size, and the overcurrent protective device(s) shall be

coordinated such that overcurrent protection is provided for the transformer in accordance with 450.3 and for the feederin accordance with 215.3, and such that the overcurrent protective device(s) is be sized to comply with all of thefollowing:

1. Shall not open within 2 minutes at 600% full load current.2. Shall not open with a re-start transient of 24 times the full load current.3. Shall not open within 10 minutes at 300% full load current.Full load current is selected or set to carry indefinitely, the sum of the locked-rotor full load current of the fire pump

motor(s), the pressure maintenance pump motor(s), the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessoryequipment, and 100 percent of the remaining loads supplied by the transformer. The requirement to carry thelocked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devices other than overcurrent devices in the fire pumpmotor circuit(s). [ 9.2.3.4]


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-66 Log #1673 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The transformer size, the feeder size, and the overcurrent protective device(s)

shall be coordinated such that overcurrent protection is provided for the transformer in accordance with 450.3 and forthe feeder in accordance with 215.3, and such that the overcurrent protective device(s) is selected or set to carryindefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s), the pressure maintenance pump motor(s), thefull-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment, and 100 percent of the remaining loads supplied bythe transformer. The requirement to carry the locked-rotor currents indefinitely shall not apply to conductors or devicesother than overcurrent devices in the fire pump motor circuit(s).

Remove archaic language.NEC style manual: 3.3.4 Word Clarity. Words and terms used in the shall be specific and clear in meaning, and

shall avoid jargon, trade terminology, industry-specific terms, or colloquial language that is difficult to understand.language shall be brief, clear, and emphatic. The following are examples of old-fashioned expressions and word usesthat shall not be permitted: "...and such...".

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-67 Log #1118 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas Guida, TJG Services, Inc.

Accept the panel action on ROC 13-102 from the 2010 Annual Revision Cycle.The fire protection requirement for critical circuits in Article 695 is 2-hr. Although 2 inches of concrete

was used to meet a 1-hr fire protection requirement, it is well documented in the IBC and NFPA Fire ProtectionHandbooks that 2 inches of concrete encasement is not sufficient for 2-hr fire protection. The panel action provided aprescriptive value (4 inches) of concrete that allows for objective enforcement.

36Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code®,The Technical Correlating Committee directs that this comment be reported as "Hold" as it

introduces new material and is not in accordance with 4.4.6.2.2 of the NFPA Regulations Governing CommitteeProjects.

The concept of 4 inches of concrete equated to a 2 hour fire-rating has not had public review.This is a direction from the Technical Correlating Committee on National Electrical Code Correlating

Committee in accordance with 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 of the Regulations Governing Committee Projects.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-69 Log #141 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James S. Nasby, Columbia Engineering

Revise to read as follows:. All electric motor-driven fire pump control wiring shall be in rigid

metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit,…. [E.g.: renumber extant text as 695.6(D)(1).] The supply conductorslocated in the electrical equipment room where they originate and in the fire pump room shall be in rigid metal conduit,intermediate metal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit Type B (LFNC-B),listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable. [New Clause.

Wiring in the pump room is not protected by the 1 hour or 2 hour requirement for wiring outside thepump room. (1) Thinwall (EMT) is not suitable for conductors protected at or above 300% of the conductor rating.Nowhere in the code do raceways carry conductors rated above 125% of the conductor rated ampacity. (2) EMT andEMT fittings are not capable of reliability nor safely carrying fault currents in fire pump circuits since these are protectedat no less than 300% by the fire pump controller and no less than locked rotor (600%) upstream of the controller. This isa distinct personnel and fire hazard and is a hazard to personnel including fire fighters attending a running pump orpumps during a fire. (3) Conductors can and do short and melt in conduits supplying fire pumps.

37Printed on 11/25/2011



Revise text to read as follows:All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit, intermediate

metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit TypeLFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable. Electrical connections at motor terminalboxes shall be made with a listed means of connection. Twist-on, insulation-piercing–type and soldered wire connectorsshall not be permitted to be used for this purpose.

Connections in motor terminal boxes made with twist-on, insulation-piercing and soldered connectorshave been shown to compromise from motor vibration and thus become a source of failures such as disconnection,overheating, ground fault and short circuit. Para. 13.5.9.2 of NFPA 79 (Industrial Machinery) already prohibits their use.The NEC requires the use of listed terminals, junction blocks, wire connectors and splices in fire pump junction boxesper 695.6(I)5). Requiring "listed" connectors in the motor termination box would be consistent with the precedentestablished in Article 695.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-71 Log #1529 NEC-P13


Revise to read as follows:695.6 (D) Pump Wiring. All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit, intermediate

metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit TypeLFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable. Electrical connections at motor terminalboxes shall be made with a listed means of connection. Twist-on, insulation-piercing–type and soldered wire connectorsshall not be permitted to be used for this purpose.

Twist-on, insulation-piercing and soldered connectors have been shown to vibrate loose from motorvibration and thus become a source of failures. Para. 13.5.9.2 of NFPA 79 already prohibits their use.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-72 Log #1828 NEC-P13



metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing (EMT), liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduitType LFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

"electrical metallic tubing" is also referred to as “EMT”Suggest that "EMT" be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "electrical metallic tubing" easier

and more reliable.[The following files are related: 100_EMT, 225_EMT, 230_EMT, 250_EMT, 300_EMT, 334_EMT, 374_EMT, 392_EMT,

398_EMT, 424_EMT, 426_EMT, 427_EMT, 430_EMT, 502_EMT, 503_EMT, 506_EMT, 517_EMT, 520_EMT, 550_EMT,551_EMT, 552_EMT, 600_EMT, 610_EMT, 620_EMT, 645_EMT, 680_EMT, 695_EMT, 725_EMT, 760_EMT]

38Printed on 11/25/2011




All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit, intermediate metalconduit (IMC), electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit TypeLFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

All electric motor–driven fire pump control wiring shall be in rigidmetal conduit, intermediate metal conduit (IMC), liquidtight flexible metal conduit, liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduitType B (LFNC-B), listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable..

"Intermediate Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “IMC” “Metallic Conduit”Suggest that "IMC" be added to all references. This will make finding all references to “Intermediate Metal Conduit"

easier and more reliable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-74 Log #2445 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit (RMC),

intermediate metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallicconduit Type LFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

All electric motor–driven fire pump control wiring shall be inrigid metal conduit (RMC), intermediate metal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, liquidtight flexible nonmetallicconduit Type B (LFNC-B), listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

"Rigid Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “RMC” “Metallic Conduit”Suggest that "RMC" be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Rigid Metal Conduit" easier

and more reliable.

39Printed on 11/25/2011



Revise 695.6(D) as follows;All wiring from the controllers to the pump motors shall be in rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal

conduit, electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit, or liquidtight flexible nonmetallic conduit TypeLFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable. Where the raceway between thecontroller and pump motor is not capable of conducting ground fault current sufficient to trip the circuit breaker in thecontroller when a ground fault occurs, a separate equipment grounding conductor shall be installed between thecontroller and pump motor.

The proposed revision is taken from recent NFPA 20 Committee action. Shorting of motor conductorsand their connectors to the grounded metal of the terminal box is a common failure mode. The Committee concludedthat proper grounding of the motor terminal box and frame is critical to insuring a safe installation. In some installationsthe raceway between the controller and pump motor may be determined not to provide adequate equipment grounding.A specific example would be electrical metallic tubing with set-screw type connectors. In those installations a separateequipment grounding conductor should be installed between the controller and pump motor.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-76 Log #2843 NEC-P13



metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing, liquidtight flexible metal conduit (LFMC), or liquidtight flexible nonmetallicconduit Type LFNC-B, listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

All electric motor–driven fire pump control wiring shall be inrigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit (LFMC), liquidtight flexible nonmetallicconduit Type B (LFNC-B), listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

"Liquidtight Flexible Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “LFMC”Suggest that “(LFMC)” be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Liquidtight Flexible Metal

Conduit" easier and more reliable.

40Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan

Add new text as 695.6(D)+(1) Conductors for a fire pump circuit provided from a normal power supply source or from an emergency power supply

source shall have an ampacity not less than(a) 200% of the full load current rating of the motor, where an individual motor is provided with the fire pump; and(b) 200% of the sum of the full load currents of the fire pump, jockey pump, and the fire pump auxiliary loads, where

two or more motors are provided with the fire pump.The intent of this Rule is to recognize the fact that the trip settings of the circuit breaker in the normal

or in the emergency power supply circuits will have to be coordinated with the settings of the circuit breaker in the firepump controller or in the transfer switch accordingly, and that the ampacity of the circuit conductors should be sufficientto carry a fault current in excess of 20 times of the full load current without being subjected to damage. It has beendemonstrated by engineering calculations that the ampacity selected at 200% of the full load current will be sufficient inorder for conductors to effectively operate without being damaged during occurrence of a fault current which could becleared by the instantaneous trip of the fire pump controller or of the fire pump transfer switch only at a level of 20 timesof the full load current

This proposal is similar to actions recently taken place at the Canadian Standards Association and has been preparedwith the assistance of Ark.Tsisserev at Stantec Engineering. See supporting documents I have provided.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-78 Log #2669 NEC-P13


Omit EMT from the clause, or as an alternative, require a separate equipment grounding conductor(wire) where EMT is used.

Thin wall conduit and fittings are designed and listed to carry fault currents for conductors protected ateither their ampacity.

Fire pump conductors are protected at a value between 300% and 600% between the fire pump controller and themotor and at something at or above 600% ahead of the controller, and very often Service Entrance from high faultsupply sources. As such, EMT and EMT fittings may not conduct fault currents sufficiently to ensure tripping of the firepump or other OCP devices, resulting in an energized motor frame (often at 277 or 350 Vac to ground) since line toground faults are, by far, the most common ones.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-79 Log #142 NEC-P13


Add new text to read as follows:Add new Clause to read: 695.6(I) Arc-Fault Protection of Equipment. Arc-fault protection (AFCI) of equipment shall

not be permitted for fire pumps.AFCI protection (equipment) could intefere with operation of a fire pump during a fire, expecially when

sprinklers are activated, or during fire fighting operations.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Abel Lampa, Innovative Engineering Inc.

Add the following new text:(5) add this section. The size of the equipment grounding conductor shall be based on 125% full load

amperes & table 250. 122, if the fire pump & the Maindistribution panel share the same meter. Use table Table 250.66, if the Fire pump has its own electric meter.

Some ofthe AHJ have different interpretation on this. Some AHJ uses the 600 percentFLA others use 125 percent basis. This is just to give clarification to some AHJ.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-81 Log #3020 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Eric Stromberg, Stromberg Engineering, Inc.

Revise text to read as follows:The voltage at the fire pump controller line terminals shall not drop more than 15 percent below normal

(controller-rated voltage) under motor starting conditions. Voltage drop shall be calculated as per Chapter 9 Table 9Note 2, taking into account the power factor of the motor during startup.

Chapter 9 Table 9 is the only method that is in the NEC for calculating voltage drop, although it is notpointed out by any sections of the as such.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-82 Log #703 NEC-P13



(no changes)The voltage at the load terminals of the fire pump controller contactor(s) motor terminals shall not drop

more than 5 percent below the voltage rating of the motor connected to those terminals when the motor is operating at115 percent of the full-load current rating of the motor.

The requirements of 695.7(B) as currently written are problematic for the following reasons.1. Measuring the voltage at the motor terminals when running at its Service Factor is potentially dangerous because of

the shock hazard present when accessing motor lead termination points. In the interest of safe work practices, themeasurements are often not being made.

2. Connections in motor terminal boxes are often made with splice bolts which are wrapped with insulating tape.Accessing the energized parts of the terminal for voltage measurement requires removal of this tape, at least partially,and disturbing the wiring in the terminal box. It is not desirable to tamper with the motor leads and connections after theinstallation is complete and the terminal box is closed. Shorting of motor conductors and their connectors to thegrounded metal of the terminal box is a known failure.

3. The voltage drop in properly sized (at 125% Motor Full-Load Current) conductors between the load terminals of thefire pump controller contactor(s) and the fire pump motor is negligible. As such, measuring the voltage at the motorterminals is unnecessary.

Measuring the voltage at the load terminals of the fire pump controller contactor(s) is a better and safer solution todetermining voltage drop. The contactor terminals are easily accessible without disturbing the controller wring. Thevoltage measured at their location in the fire pump circuit will produce the desired result.

42Printed on 11/25/2011



Add new text to read as follows:Add new Clause I Informational Note: Working Clearances. Motors, engines and batteries shall be

installed with adequate clearances and working spaces to allow adequate access to electrical devices and wiring.Informational Note: Controllers and other equipment must be installed in accordance with Section 110.26 Spaces

About Electrical Equipment.Motor Junction boxes are not always accessible. Engine electrical devices and wiring is often not

safely accessible. Ditto for engine starting batteries, which represent an arc flash hazard if close working spaces areinvolved since wrenches are always needed with installing, removing or servicing battery post clamps and/or cables.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-84 Log #2808 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:All electric motor–driven fire pump control wiring shall be in

rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, liquidtight flexible metal conduit (FMC), liquidtight flexible nonmetallicconduit Type B (LFNC-B), listed Type MC cable with an impervious covering, or Type MI cable.

"Flexible Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “FMC”Suggest that “(FMC)” be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Flexible Metal Conduit"

easier and more reliable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-85 Log #11 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________





43Printed on 11/25/2011





_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-87 Log #144 NEC-P13


Add new text to read as follows:Add new Clause: All wiring between fire pump controllers required to

either start or stop a fire pump shall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring. They shall be protected to resistpotential damage by fire or structural failure. They shall be permitted to be routed through a building(s) encased in 50mm (2 in.) of concrete or within enclosed construction dedicated to the fire pump circuits and having a minimum 1-hourfire resistance rating, or circuit protective systems with a minimum of 1-hour fire resistance. The installation shall complywith any restrictions provided in the listing of the electrical circuit protective system used.

This matches ther requirements of 695.14(F); however, this controller interconnect wiring is morecritical since it usually in the "critical starting path" of one or more pumps. One example is pumps in series where upperzone pumps must signal lower zone pumps to start in order to supply the needed water and prevent pump cavitation.This is most critical in high rise buildings where the upper zone(s) are "protect in place" (beyone fire departmentpumping capability), and especially where people sleep.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-88 Log #1469 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Ed Larsen, Schneider Electric USA

Revise text to read as follows:Informational Note No. 2: For further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in

health care facilities, see NFPA 99-20052012, .Informational Note No. 3: For specification of locations where emergency lighting is considered essential to life safety,

see NFPA -20092012, .Informational Note No. 4: For further information regarding performance of emergency and standby power systems,

see NFPA 110-20102013, .Update the dates on the codes referenced in Informational Notes to the current edition or the next

edition that is scheduled to be published before the 2014 NEC is published.

44Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Steven R. Terry, Electronic Theatre Controls Inc. / Rep. US Institute for Theatre Technology - Engineering

CommissionAdd new definition to section 700.2:

An emergency lighting luminaire that operates on constant power and has a normalcontrol input for dimming or switching when utility power is present and emergency control input that drives the luminaireto full brightness upon loss of utility power.

A new class of luminaire has appeared and is being used in emergency lighting systems. These aretypically dimmable LED luminaries that operate on constant power with an analog or digital input connected to an analogor digital control system to provide a dimming or switching function in the luminaire when normal utility power is present.The luminaire may also have a separate analog or dry-closure "emergency" control input which can be actuated by anupstream transfer switch. When this emergency input is asserted upon loss of utility power and transfer of theluminaries' branch circuit to emergency power, the luminaire turns on full, regardless of the control setting of the normalcontrol system.

I have made a separate proposal for section 700.24 (new) that defines the requirements for this type of luminaire. Ifthat proposal is accepted, a definition of this type of luminaire should be added to section 700.2.

45Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________James E. Degnan, Sparling


A complete functioning Emergency Power Supply coupled to a system ofconductors, disconnecting means and overcurrent protective devices, transfer switches, and all control, supervisory, andsupport devices up to and including the load terminals of the transfer equipment needed for the system to operate as asafe and reliable source of electric power. [ :3.3.5]

. Emergency system wiring includes the EPSS up to the transfer equipment defined in Chapter 7.Emergency system wiring also includes transfer equipment dedicated to emergency loads and the wiring from theemergency transfer equipment to the emergency load(s). Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied form thesame source shall be permitted in the same raceway, cable , box or cabinet. Wiring from an emergency source oremergency source distribution overcurrent protection device to emergency loads The emergency system wiring shall bekept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwise permitted in (1) through(5):

(1) Wiring from…(retain text to end of (4))…the unit equipment.(5) Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source in the same raceway, cable, box or

cabinet.(5) Wiring from and emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads. in

accordance with (a), (b), and (c).a. From… (Delete the rest of the text in a, b, c, and d)….are separated.

The first two sentences help to define the emergency wiring system, something that is not explicitlydone in 700.1 through 700.9. The definition is developed in a manner that is consistent with the reliability approach tothe Essential Electrical System defined in NFPA 99, and the Emergency Power SupplySystem(EPSS) defined in NFPA 110, The Essential Electrical System andthe Emergency Power Supply System both identify the distribution between the emergency source and the transferequipment as being part of a common system, with the point of separation being the transfer equipment. In Healthcarefacilities the essential electrical system is separated into Life Safety, Critical and Equipment branches at the transferequipment, and according to NFPA 110 the EPSS is separated in Level 1 and Level 2 systems at the transferequipment.

The third sentence (previously the first sentence) is simply relocated to a location that is consistent with thegrammatical construction of the paragraph.Paragraph 700.9(B)(5) should be deleted. Some of the reliability and intent of this paragraph is met by insertion of thefirst two sentences in (B) Wiring noted above. The intent to require separation of emergency distribution systems aheadof the transfer equipment should not be required. The emergency source has to be split apart at some point, this pointshould be at the transfer equipment, and not as currently required in the NEC, for the following reasons:

1. It would be an extremely rare event that a fault on one emergency system feeder would propagate and affectmultiple emergency feeders.

2. Even if the separation in the switchboard is constructed it may not achieve what it is intended to. Most faults resultin some consumption of material with associated vaporization, hazardous gasses, etc. The materials often leavedeposits throughout a switchboard, compromising components in adjacent sections and often throughout the room.

3. The existing language notes that group mounted switches comply with the code. Considering the expense andspace requirements of switchboards, using a wireway to serve individual overcurrent devices is a cost effectivealternative to switchboard vertical sections. However, a wireway with field made taps to switches, has a much betterchance of erroneous assembly than a regulated product like a panelboard or even a single switchboard section. Thislanguage may result in a less reliable system.

4. The code language requires separate vertical sections but is not really clear on the degree of isolation that thevertical sections are suppose to offer. Switchboards can be constructed with separate vertical sections that are notbarriered between the sections. If barriers are the intent, then do they extend all the way to the rear and across thehorizontal bus or is it adequate to just isolate the feeders? At some point there still must be a separate definition ofemergency system vs legally required, where does this occur?

5. The original substantiation for adding this into the 2008 NEC lacks merit and substation. The language of700.9(B)(5) began with ROP A2007 13-118, The substantiation for ROP A2007 13-118 was as follows:

46Printed on 11/25/2011

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70The separation of emergency system wiring from all other wiring is required by NEC 700.9, and is

clearly understood. Just where the separate emergency, legally required standby, or optional standby systems feedersoriginate at or near the generator is less well defined. The supply tap box on generators equipped with disconnects withor without overcurrent protection is not generally designed or manufactured for installation of multiple devices to serveseparate circuits for emergency loads, fire pumps, legally required standby loads, and optional standby loads, althoughAHJs have interpreted the mandated separation of wiring to require just that. In addition, such an interpretation does notconsider parallel operation of multiple generators, which require some type of distribution to separate the systemsdownstream of the paralleling bus. The recommended revisions clarify that, for both single generator and parallelgenerator installations, separation of the circuits served by an emergency generator(s) source may be accomplishedusing a single feeder from the generator to separately mounted enclosed overcurrent devices or a distributionswitchboard that separates emergency circuits in different vertical sections from other loads. Separately enclosedovercurrent devices or overcurrent devices mounted in separate vertical sections of a distribution switchboard willprovide physical separation of the different systems or branches and define that the origin of the emergency, legallyrequired standby, and optional standby systems is at the feeder overcurrent protection device, not the generatorterminals. This proposal was developed by the Task Group directed by the TCC to consider comments 13-6 and 13-71and if appropriate to develop proposals for the 2008 NEC. The task group consisted of the following: Thomas H. Wood;Chair (Chair NFPA-70, panel 13), Hugh O. Nash; (Chair NFPA 99), Douglas S. Erickson; (Chair NFPA 110), JamesCostley; and Herb Whittall.

I have contacted Nash and Erickson, and they both deny any involvement in the subcommittee, and at the 2011 ROCmeeting Herb Whittall stated that he had no involvement with the subcommittee. I have contacted NFPA, and they haveverified that there is no other backup substantiation associated with the original A2007 proposal. There is no data fromindustry resources such as IEEE Std 493(Gold Book) or the Up Time Institute that indicates there is a reliability problemwith devices in a common vertical section.

6. The present language suffers from the following shortcomings:a. Between 700.10 and 700.10B)(5)(a) “from’ appears three times and “to” twice. B says from emergency source to

emergency load, (5) says from emergency source to a combination of loads. The first two "from, to" pairs arecongruous, however (a) is supposed to be a subset of 5 and it says “from switchboard” so is ‘from switchboard” thesame as “from emergency source” or is it intended to be from emergency source “to” a switchboard? Or?

b. In 5(b) ”common bus”, “separate sections of the switchboard”, and “the individual enclosures” are each separatedby “or” making them a list of three items, hence what is meant by “The common bus” is not clear, as there is no previousdiscussion of a common bus. The text may have require a comma after “switchboard”, but that begets the question: How(or why) would you supply separate sections of a switchboard with a single feeder, and is this possible within UL891? There’s also the possibility that the individual disconnects could be served by a bussed gutter that is a “commonbus” but that leads to additional confusion that is not explainable.

c. (5)b Exception: If (5) b’s “shall be permitted” is permissive language per 90.5, then why is an exception needed?The exception says that you can supply OCP at the source if it is selectively coordinated, but 700.27 would requireselective coordination in any case. I think this exception could be deleted and the code wouldn’t change.

d. (5)c Says “…panelboard enclosure…” how does “panelboard enclosure” play into this when it’s not previouslymentioned in (5)? (5) identifies this as from source to “any combination” if you have a combination going to thepanelboard how are the branches suppose to “not originate” there?

7. Consideration of design issues with hospitals and central generating plants challenge the logic behind therequirement for separate vertical sections:

a. Most emergency power systems fail because of problems at the generator: fail to start, poor fuel, loss of supportsystems, etc. The frequency of failures and subsequent loss of life that can be prevented by placing overcurrentdevices into separate sections is very, very small, if it even exists. The cost to accomplish separate vertical sections issignificant. If remodels are considered, the cost of adding additional vertical sections to existing central plants is very,very large, and may result in canceling projects that would otherwise be able to offer significant benefit to the publicwelfare.

b. If a central plant serves multiple building is it acceptable to put the life safety feeder to each building in the samevertical section? The code answer to this question appears to be yes, but if it is unacceptable to have a LRS deviceaffect an adjacent emergency device, why is it acceptable to have one emergency device affect another?

c. Consider hospitals: If placing overcurrent devices in a separate vertical section improves reliability, and a patientbed is fed by two critical transfer switches and feeders, the feeder overcurrent devices should be in separate verticalsections not the same! It becomes clear that if a hospital central plant is serving multiple wings and many transferswitches (some hospitals have over twenty) that separate vertical sections becomes impractical. (This may not be aconcern if Article 517 follows the lead of NFPA 99 and “emergency” is removed from the life safety and critical branches,severing the tie to Article 700.)

47Printed on 11/25/2011

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70d. Consider hospitals again: If there is a statistically significant number of failures that would benefit from placing

overcurrent devices into separate vertical sections, why stop at the feeders to the ATSs? The code requirement wouldlogically extend to panels serving operating rooms. If there was failure data associated with the original code proposalthe logical stopping point could be assessed, but none is available.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-91 Log #747 NEC-P13


Add a figure to the definition of Emergency Systems (see figure below).

******Insert Figure Here******

Adding a figure to the definition of Emergency Systems will aid in clearly differentiating the normalsystem from the emergency system. This figure should be similar to Figures 517.30, 517.41 and the figure in AppendixB.1 of NFPA 110.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-92 Log #1272 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows: Those systems legally required and classed as emergency by municipal, state, federal, or

other codes, or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intended to automatically supplyillumination, power, or both, to designated areas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in theevent of accident to elements of a system intended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential forsafety to human life.

These systems are intended to automatically supply illumination, power, or both, to designatedareas and equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in the event of accident to elements of a systemintended to supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential for safety to human life.


48Printed on 11/25/2011

NEC A2013/NFPA 70/Log #747/Rec


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Kenneth E. Vannice, Leviton Manufacturing Company Inc.

Add new text to read as follows:(F) Testing Emergency Lighting Controls. Where lighting control equipment other than manual air-gap switches are

installed in emergency lighting circuits these circuits including the light source shall be included in any requiredperiodical testing.

In the past most control of lighting circuits was by toggle switches placed so they could be turned onmanually and controlled by responsible people, or fixed so that the lighting would come on upon energization of theemergency source. Modern control includes local and remote control of air-gap and solid-state dimming and switchingdevices including remote-controlled ballasts and power supplies located with the light source itself. These devices canbe in several locations and from several manufacturers. They are loosely covered by UL 924 but even the UL 924standard admits that is doesn't have control of enough of the field factors to guarantee a reliable system. Consequentlythese circuits need to be tested in the field as a system at least initially.

For more background refer to the recent article on emergency lighting systems in the March/April 2011 issue of IAEImagazine.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-94 Log #1448 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Gary A. Beckstrand, Salt Lake City, UT

Revise text to read as follows:700.4 Tests and Maintenance Required Testing.(A) Conduct or Witness Test. The authority having jurisdiction shall conduct or witness a test of the complete system

upon installation. and periodically afterward. The system shall be tested on a schedule acceptable to the authorityhaving jurisdiction to ensure the systems are maintained in proper operating condition.

(B) Tested Periodically. Systems shall be tested periodically on a schedule acceptable to the authority havingjurisdiction to ensure the systems are maintained in proper operating condition.

(C)(B) Battery Systems Maintenance. Where battery systems or unit equipments are involved, including batteries usedfor starting, control, or ignition in auxiliary engines, the authority having jurisdiction shall require periodic maintenance.

(D) (C) Written Record. A written record shall be kept of such tests and maintenance.(E) (D) Testing Under Load. Means for testing all emergency lighting and power systems during maximum anticipated

load conditions shall be provided.Informational Note: For testing and maintenance procedures of emergency power supply systems (EPSSs), see NFPA

110-2005, Standard for Emergency and Standby Power Systems.700.4 (A) and (B) are redundant. The AHJ has the responsibility to test emergency systems upon final

inspection and can provide an acceptable schedule of testing to the owner or building occupant. Section 3.2.1 of theNEC Style of Manual does not allow the use of the word "periodically" as it is unenforceable. This revision of the700.4(A) and (B) will provide better clarity and will allow the AHJ to not only inspect and test the emergency systems butrequire occupancy owners to test the system on a timely basis.

49Printed on 11/25/2011



Replace 600V with 1000V.This proposal is the work of the “High Voltage Task Group” appointed by the Technical Correlating

Committee. The task group consisted of the following members: Alan Peterson, Paul Barnhart, Lanny Floyd, AlanManche, Donny Cook, Vince Saporita, Roger McDaniel, Stan Folz, Eddie Guidry, Tom Adams, Jim Rogers and JimDollard.

The Task Group identified the demand for increasing voltage levels used in wind generation and photovoltaic systemsas an area for consideration to enhance existing NEC requirements to address these new common voltage levels. Thetask group recognized that general requirements in Chapters 1 through 4 need to be modified before identifying andgenerating proposals to articles such as 690 specific for PV systems. These systems have moved above 600V and arereaching 1000V due to standard configurations and increases in efficiency and performance. The committee reviewedChapters 1 through 8 and identified areas where the task group agreed that the increase in voltage was of minimal or noimpact to the system installation. Additionally, there were requirements that would have had a serious impact and thetask group chose not to submit a proposal for changing the voltage. See table (supporting material) that summarizes allsections considered by the TG.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-96 Log #2263 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Patrick Murphy, City of Richmond

Add new text to read as follows:A transfer switch shall be marked with its short-circuit current

withstand close-on rating which consists of the maximum available short-circuit current when protected by specificovercurrent protective device(s). The marking shall be plainly visible after installation. Transfer switches shall not beinstalled where the available fault current exceeds its marked short-circuit current withstand close-on rating.

Information Note: UL 1008 Transfer switch Equipment has several short-circuit current withstand close-on ratings eachwith a short-circuit current magnitude dependent on the specific type of overcurrent protective device utilized for transferswitch protection.

The added paragraph provides clear language that the short circuit current withstand close-on ratingfor transfer switches is to be used to evaluate suitability. For transfer switches listed for emergency use, UL 1008Transfer Switch Equipment has several different short circuit current withstand close-on rating options depending on thetype overcurrent protective device protecting the transfer switch. A transfer switch will typically have three or fouroptions, each with a different short-circuit current magnitude/overcurrent protective device type. It is important that for aspecific installation the transfer switch short-circuit withstand close-on rating is appropriate for the specific overcurrentprotective device installed and the available fault current at the lineside terminals of the transfer equipment.Manufacturers and industry personnel commonly use the term WCR (withstand close-on rating) rather than short-circuitcurrent rating. Presently there is some confusion due to the wide use of the WCR term and the multiple options. Thisrequirement will help ensure proper design and installations.

50Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael J. Johnston, National Electrical Contractors Association

Add a new last sentence after the warning text as follows:The warning sign(s) or label(s) shall comply with 110.21(B).

This proposal is one of several coordinated companion proposals to provide consistency of danger,caution, and warning sign or markings as required in the NEC. The proposed revision will correlate this warning markingrequirement with proposed 110.21(B) and the requirements in ANSI Z 535.4.

51Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________Steven Goble, Olathe, KS

Insert the following new requirement.A listed SPD shall be installed in or on all emergency systems switchboards and

panelboards.Throughout its history, the NEC® has mandated the practical safeguarding of persons and property

from hazards arising from the use of electricity. However, one of the hazards that is often overlooked is damage toproperty, such as fire, or the destruction of appliances and electronic equipment, due to surges caused by (1) thestarting and stopping of power electronic equipment, (2) direct or indirect lightning strikes, and (3) imposition of a highervoltage on a lower voltage system. While NFPA 70 haslong recognized the practical application of surge protective devices as evidenced by several NEC® Articles, includingbut not limited to, 285, 694 and 708, the vast majority of equipment is not required to be protected from damage bysurges. This lack of required protection results in, as the State Farm Insurance Company notes on their web site, " ...power surges are responsible for hundreds of millions of dollars of property damage every year ... Over time, surges canalso cause cumulative damage to your property, incrementally decreasing the lifespan of televisions, computers, stereoequipment, and anything else plugged into the wall."

This proposal is intended to expand protection against damaging surges through the use of listed surge protectivedevices. While progress has been made in this area, it is evident that expanded use of listed surge protective deviceswill be a step function improvement to the practical safeguarding of persons and property.Some very recent specific examples of events that call attention to this need include the documented destruction of ahouse due to electrical surge as a result of a transformer fire. This occurred in Kings County California in October of2011.In the UK in 2010, 71 incidents were caused by electrical power surges according to the fire inspector. In fact, the causeof the surge was related to the theft of a copper component in a substation. Of the 71 incidents, 48 resulted in damageto electrical equipment, including 36 panel boards, a number of televisions, washing machines and other electricalappliances.

In Dallas, Texas, a utility electric crew repairing a transformer in front of a residence caused a significant surge. Thetransformer was seen to be arcing with the subsequent destruction of equipment in nearby homes. This included CentralHeat and Air units, refrigerators, washers, dryers .... and the like.

Another recent event in Carthage, MO, occurred in October of 2011. Lightning hit the Jasper County Jail and theresultant surge knocked out the security system as well as fire alarms, locks and other key systems. The same eventalso resulted in a small fire at a Carthage home. Only because of an alert homeowner and quick response by the localfire department was extensive damage and possible loss of life prevented.

Studies by recognized authorities including NEMA, IEEE, and UL, all substantiate the fact that surges can and docause significant damage. Nationwide Insurance recognizes the need for effective surge protection as well and haspublished recommendations that include point-of-use surge protectors and installation of main service panelsuppressors.

Unprotected surges do cause catastrophic damage to industrial, commercial and residential electronic equipment andresidential appliances, sometimes resulting in fire and loss of life. Surge protective devices are readily available toprotect against these common surges, but have simply not been required in most applications. This Code Making Panelhas the opportunity to take a significant step toward better protection of persons and property by accepting thisproposal.

52Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James E. Degnan, SparlingRevise (5) to read as follows:

(5) Wiring from an emergency source shall be permitted to supply any combination, legally required, or optional loads.A feeder supplying combinations of emergency and legally required or optional loads is an emergency feeder. A feederserving a combination of emergency and legally required or optional loads shall separate the loads at a switchboard orat taps from the feeder to individual disconnects mounted in separate enclosures. Legally required and optional standbycircuits shall not originate from the same vertical switchboard section, or individual disconnect enclosure as emergencycircuits.

I have submitted another comment suggesting that 700.9(B)(5) be deleted and replaced with: “It shallbe permissible to utilize single or multiple feeders to supply distribution equipment between an emergency source andthe point where the combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads are separated.” I prefer that the panelaccept that comment over this one, however if the panel finds statistically significant substantiation to retain therequirements for separate vertical sections and is interested in improving the language, this comment provides theappropriate opportunity.

Many large campus facilities with multiple buildings such as medical centers, colleges/universities, prisons, shoppingmalls, etc rely on central generation of emergency power. The present code language does not make it clear thatfeeders serving combinations of emergency, legally required standby, and optional standby loads can run from agenerator switchboard to a remote building, and then be separated into the appropriate load types at the building. Thestatement “From separate vertical switchboard sections, with or without common bus, or from individual disconnectsmounted in separate enclosures.” can be interpreted to require separation of emergency, legally required standby andoptions standby systems at the first switchboard downstream of the generators. If applied to campus type powersystems this interpretation would triple the amount of feeders run around a site, and double the amount of manholes. Itwould also ignore the common use of medium voltage system designs such as primary selective systems or loops withsectionalizing provisions. It would require complete rebuilding of many substantial and reliable emergency powerdistribution systems across the country.

53Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________

James E. Degnan, SparlingDelete the exception to 700.9(B)(5)(b).

Exception: Overcurrent protection….at the source.700.9(B)(5)(b) contains the phrase "shall be permitted". According to 90.5 (B) the phrase "shall be

permitted" makes 700.9(B)(5)(b) an action that is allowed, but not required. Therefore an Exception is not needed for arule that is not a mandatory rule. Additionally, an Exception that refers to another part of Article 700 is not necessary,because the complete requirements of Article 700 are always applicable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-101 Log #12 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________





54Printed on 11/25/2011


_______________________________________________________________________________________________James E. Degnan, Sparling

Revise text to read as follows:. Emergency system wiring includes any wiring between the emergency source and the transfer equipment

defined in the Articles of Chapter 7. Emergency system wiring also includes transfer equipment dedicated to emergencyloads and the wiring from the emergency transfer equipment to the emergency load(s). Wiring of two or moreemergency circuits supplied form the same source shall be permitted in the same raceway, cable , box or cabinet.Wiring from an emergency source or emergency source distribution overcurrent protection device to emergency loadsshall be kept entirely independent of all other wiring and equipment, unless otherwise permitted in (1) through(5):(1) Wiring from…(retain text to end of (4))…the unit equipment.

(5) Wiring of two or more emergency circuits supplied from the same source in the same raceway, cable, box orcabinet.

(5) Wiring from and emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads. inaccordance with (a), (b), and (c).

a. From… (Delete the rest of the text in a, b, c, and d)….are separated.The first two sentences help to define the emergency wiring system, something that is not explicitly

done in 700.1 through 700.9. The definition is developed in a manner that is consistent with the reliability approach tothe Essential Electrical System defined in NFPA 99, and the Emergency Power SupplySystem(EPSS) defined in NFPA 110, The Essential Electrical System andthe Emergency Power Supply System both identify the distribution between the emergency source and the transferequipment as being part of a common system, with the point of separation being the transfer equipment. In Healthcarefacilities the essential electrical system is separated into Life Safety, Critical and Equipment branches at the transferequipment, and according to NFPA 110 the EPSS is separated in Level 1 and Level 2 systems at the transferequipment.

The third sentence (previously the first sentence) is simply relocated to a location that is consistent with thegrammatical construction of the paragraph.Paragraph 700.9(B)(5) should be deleted. Some of the reliability and intent of this paragraph is met by insertion of thefirst two sentences in (B) Wiring noted above. The intent to require separation of emergency distribution systems aheadof the transfer equipment should not be required. The emergency source has to be split apart at some point, this pointshould be at the transfer equipment, and not as currently required in the NEC, for the following reasons:

1. It would be an extremely rare event that a fault on one emergency system feeder would propagate and affectmultiple emergency feeders.

2. Even if the separation in the switchboard is constructed it may not achieve what it is intended to. Most faults resultin some consumption of material with associated vaporization, hazardous gasses, etc. The materials often leavedeposits throughout a switchboard, compromising components in adjacent sections and often throughout the room.

3. The existing language notes that group mounted switches comply with the code. Considering the expense andspace requirements of switchboards, using a wireway to serve individual overcurrent devices is a cost effectivealternative to switchboard vertical sections. However, a wireway with field made taps to switches, has a much betterchance of erroneous assembly than a regulated product like a panelboard or even a single switchboard section. Thislanguage may result in a less reliable system.

4. The code language requires separate vertical sections but is not really clear on the degree of isolation that thevertical sections are suppose to offer. Switchboards can be constructed with separate vertical sections that are notbarriered between the sections. If barriers are the intent, then do they extend all the way to the rear and across thehorizontal bus or is it adequate to just isolate the feeders? At some point there still must be a separate definition ofemergency system vs legally required, where does this occur?

5. The original substantiation for adding this into the 2008 NEC lacks merit and substation. The language of700.9(B)(5) began with ROP A2007 13-118, The substantiation for ROP A2007 13-118 was as follows:

The separation of emergency system wiring from all other wiring is required by NEC 700.9, and isclearly understood. Just where the separate emergency, legally required standby, or optional standby systems feedersoriginate at or near the generator is less well defined. The supply tap box on generators equipped with disconnects withor without overcurrent protection is not generally designed or manufactured for installation of multiple devices to serveseparate circuits for emergency loads, fire pumps, legally required standby loads, and optional standby loads, althoughAHJs have interpreted the mandated separation of wiring to require just that. In addition, such an interpretation does not

55Printed on 11/25/2011

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70consider parallel operation of multiple generators, which require some type of distribution to separate the systemsdownstream of the paralleling bus. The recommended revisions clarify that, for both single generator and parallelgenerator installations, separation of the circuits served by an emergency generator(s) source may be accomplishedusing a single feeder from the generator to separately mounted enclosed overcurrent devices or a distributionswitchboard that separates emergency circuits in different vertical sections from other loads. Separately enclosedovercurrent devices or overcurrent devices mounted in separate vertical sections of a distribution switchboard willprovide physical separation of the different systems or branches and define that the origin of the emergency, legallyrequired standby, and optional standby systems is at the feeder overcurrent protection device, not the generatorterminals. This proposal was developed by the Task Group directed by the TCC to consider comments 13-6 and 13-71and if appropriate to develop proposals for the 2008 NEC. The task group consisted of the following: Thomas H. Wood;Chair (Chair NFPA-70, panel 13), Hugh O. Nash; (Chair NFPA 99), Douglas S. Erickson; (Chair NFPA 110), JamesCostley; and Herb Whittall.

I have contacted Nash and Erickson, and they both deny any involvement in the subcommittee, and at the 2011 ROCmeeting Herb Whittall stated that he had no involvement with the subcommittee. I have contacted NFPA, and they haveverified that there is no other backup substantiation associated with the original A2007 proposal. There is no data fromindustry resources such as IEEE Std 493(Gold Book) or the Up Time Institute that indicates there is a reliability problemwith devices in a common vertical section.

6. The present language suffers from the following shortcomings:a. Between 700.10 and 700.10B)(5)(a) “from’ appears three times and “to” twice. B says from emergency source to

emergency load, (5) says from emergency source to a combination of loads. The first two "from, to" pairs arecongruous, however (a) is supposed to be a subset of 5 and it says “from switchboard” so is ‘from switchboard” thesame as “from emergency source” or is it intended to be from emergency source “to” a switchboard? Or?

b. In 5(b) ”common bus”, “separate sections of the switchboard”, and “the individual enclosures” are each separatedby “or” making them a list of three items, hence what is meant by “The common bus” is not clear, as there is no previousdiscussion of a common bus. The text may have require a comma after “switchboard”, but that begets the question: How(or why) would you supply separate sections of a switchboard with a single feeder, and is this possible within UL891? There’s also the possibility that the individual disconnects could be served by a bussed gutter that is a “commonbus” but that leads to additional confusion that is not explainable.

c . (5)b Exception: If (5) b’s “shall be permitted” is permissive language per 90.5, then why is an exception needed?The exception says that you can supply OCP at the source if it is selectively coordinated, but 700.27 would requireselective coordination in any case. I think this exception could be deleted and the code wouldn’t change.

d. (5)c Says “…panelboard enclosure…” how does “panelboard enclosure” play into this when it’s not previouslymentioned in (5)? (5) identifies this as from source to “any combination” if you have a combination going to thepanelboard how are the branches suppose to “not originate” there?

7. Consideration of design issues with hospitals and central generating plants challenge the logic behind therequirement for separate vertical sections:

a. Most emergency power systems fail because of problems at the generator: fail to start, poor fuel, loss of supportsystems, etc. The frequency of failures and subsequent loss of life that can be prevented by placing overcurrentdevices into separate sections is very, very small, if it even exists. The cost to accomplish separate vertical sections issignificant. If remodels are considered, the cost of adding additional vertical sections to existing central plants is very,very large, and may result in canceling projects that would otherwise be able to offer significant benefit to the publicwelfare.

b. If a central plant serves multiple building is it acceptable to put the life safety feeder to each building in the samevertical section? The code answer to this question appears to be yes, but if it is unacceptable to have a LRS deviceaffect an adjacent emergency device, why is it acceptable to have one emergency device affect another?

c. Consider hospitals: If placing overcurrent devices in a separate vertical section improves reliability, and a patientbed is fed by two critical transfer switches and feeders, the feeder overcurrent devices should be in separate verticalsections not the same! It becomes clear that if a hospital central plant is serving multiple wings and many transferswitches (some hospitals have over twenty) that separate vertical sections becomes impractical. (This may not be aconcern if Article 517 follows the lead of NFPA 99 and “emergency” is removed from the life safety and critical branches,severing the tie to Article 700.)

d. Consider hospitals again: If there is a statistically significant number of failures that would benefit from placingovercurrent devices into separate vertical sections, why stop at the feeders to the ATSs? The code requirement wouldlogically extend to panels serving operating rooms. If there was failure data associated with the original code proposalthe logical stopping point could be assessed, but none is available.

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(5) Wiring from an emergency source to supply any combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads inaccordance with (a), (b), (c), and (d):

a. From separate vertical sections of a metal-enclosed switchgear or switchboard sections, with or without a commonbus, or from individual disconnects mounted in separate enclosures.

b. The common bus or separate sections of the metal-enclosed switchgear and switchboard or the individualenclosures shall be permitted to be supplied by single or multiple feeders without overcurrent protection at the source.

c. Legally required and optional standby circuits shall not originate from the same vertical section of a metal-enclosedswitchgear or switchboard section, panelboard enclosure, or individual disconnect enclosure as emergency circuits.

d. It shall be permissible to utilize single or multiple feeders to supply distribution equipment between an emergencysource and the point where the combination of emergency, legally required, or optional loads are separated.

Switchboard is by definition not intended to be enclosed. See definitions.I do not believe it was the code panel's intent to allow this.Maybe the intent was to allow this installed in a metal-enclosed switchboard.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-104 Log #2131 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Chad Kennedy, Square D Company/Schneider Electric

Revise text to read as follows:(5) Wiring from an emergency source to supply emergency and other loads any combination of emergency, legally

required, or optional loads in accordance with (a), (b), (c), and (d):a. From sSeparate vertical switchboard sections, with or without a common bus, or from individual disconnects

mounted in separate enclosures shall be used to separate emergency loads from all other loads.b. The common bus or separate sections of the switchboard or the individual enclosures shall be permitted to be

supplied by single or multiple feeders without overcurrent protection at the source.

c. Legally required and optional standby Emergency circuits shall not originate from the same vertical switchboardsection, panelboard enclosure, or individual disconnect enclosure as emergency other circuits.

d. It shall be permissible to utilize single or multiple feeders to supply distribution equipment between an emergencysource and the point where the combination of emergency, legally required, or optional emergency loads are separatedfrom all other loads.

The requirements for Article 700 apply to Emergency Systems but the existing language can bemisinterpreted to also set requirements for legally required and optional standby systems. This proposal clarifies thatthe requirements of this section separate emergency wiring from all others. In addition, the requirements in700.10(B)(5)a imply that emergency loads must be separated from each other. The revised wording clarifies thatseparation of emergency from all other loads is the intent.

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Revise text to read as follows:(D) Fire Protection. Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in (D)(1) through (D)(3) in assembly

occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height. with any of the followingoccupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.Informational Note: For the definition of Occupancy Classification, see Section 6.1 of NFPA 101-2009, Life Safety Code.

The need for fire protection of emergency systems is the same regardless of the occupancyclassification.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-106 Log #1564 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________David Clements, International Association of Electrical Inspectors

Revise text to read as follows:Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in (D)(1) through (D)(3) in assembly

occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height. with any of the followingoccupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.

Requirements in Article 700 are intended to supply illumination, power, or both to designated areasand equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in the event of accident to elements of a system intendedto supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential for safety to human life. If the current 75 foot heightlimitation was included for non-assembly occupancies as the point where risk had increased to an undesirable level, it isdifficult to understand how that risk would be significantly different based on occupancy type. Currently, EMERGENCYfeeders to an 80 foot high office building are required to have fire protection, but an EMERGENCY feeder to a 300 foothigh health care, day care, or board and care occupancy does not seem to require fire protection. If buildings are greaterthan 75 feet in height and classed as mixed or multiple occupancy (a common application), it is not obvious if fireprotection is required for the EMERGENCY feeder.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-107 Log #2087 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Donald R. Cook, Shelby County Development Services

Revise text to read as follows:Emergency systems shall meet the additional requirements in (D)(1) through (D)(3) in assembly

occupancies for not less than 1000 persons or in buildings above 23 m (75 ft) in height with any of the followingoccupancy classes: assembly, educational, residential, detention and correctional, business, and mercantile.

Requirements in Article 700 are intended to supply illumination, power, or both to designated areasand equipment in the event of failure of the normal supply or in the event of accident to elements of a system intendedto supply, distribute, and control power and illumination essential for safety to human life. If the current 75 foot heightlimitation was included for non-assembly occupancies as the point where risk had increased to an undesirable level, it isdifficult to understand how that risk would be significantly different based on occupancy type. Currently, EMERGENCYfeeders to an 80 foot high office building are required to have fire protection, but an EMERGENCY feeder to a 300 foothigh health care, day care, or board and care occupancy does not seem to require fire protection. If buildings are greaterthan 75 feet in height and classed as mixed or multiple occupancy (a common application), it is not obvious if fireprotection is required for the EMERGENCY feeder.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Russell LeBlanc, The Peterson School

Add an exception before the informational note.

Relief is needed from the stringent fire protection requirements in situations where the originalgenerator, transfer switch, or wiring fails or needs to be repaired. In this case, a temporary portable or vehicle mountedgenerator may be quickly brought in and wired temporarily, or perhaps a temporary emergency feeder could be runquickly from a different switchboard or transfer switch while the faulty equipment or wiring is being repaired or replaced.In these urgent situations, it may be nearly impossible for all of the temporary equipment or wiring to be installed quicklyand in accordance with 700.10(D).

Since 590.2(A) requires that ALL requirements for permanent wiring apply to temporary wiring, this exception isneeded because no other sections of Article 590 modify the requirements of Article 700. This exception is a permissiverule and is only intended to allow the option of a short term solution to be executed quickly and safely until permanentrepairs can be made.

Even with the best preventive maintenance plans and contingency plans, equipment failures happen. They can happensuddenly and unexpectedly. It can happen from mechanical breakdown or it can happen from storms, floods,earthquakes, or fires. When these failures happen, rapid solutions are needed. This new exception will allow temporarysolutions to happen rapidly and safely.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-109 Log #1117 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:. Feeder-circuit wiring shall meet one of the following conditions:

(1) Be installed in spaces or areas that are fully protected by an approved automatic fire suppression system(2) Be a listed electrical circuit protective system with a minimum 2-hour fire ratingInformational Note: UL guide information for electrical circuit protective systems (FHIT) contains information on proper

installation requirements to maintain the fire rating.(3) Be protected by a listed thermal barrier system for electrical system components with a minimum 2-hour fire rating(4) Be protected by a listed fire-rated assembly that has a minimum fire rating of 2 hours and contains only emergency

wiring circuits.(5) Be encased in a minimum of 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete

This proposal brings consistency of fire protection with article 695 and 708. An automatic firesuppression system is used to protect the building and the occupants after the fire starts.

Emergency feeders can be damaged before the automatic fire suppression system is activated.Thermal barrier systems tested to UL 1724 are listed as Electrical Circuit Protective Systems are already included in

(2). See section 1.4 (scope) in UL 2196 - Tests for Fire Resistive Cables.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________

Lawrence W. Forshner, Bard, Rao & Athanas Consulting Engineers, LLCRecommendation: Delete existing text and Replace 700.12(B)(6); 701.11(B)(5); and 702.11 as

follows:Where an outdoor housed generator set is equipped with a readily accessible disconnecting means meeting the

requirements of 445.18, and the installation meets the requirements of 250.32(D), an additional disconnecting meansshall not be required where ungrounded conductors serve or pass through the building or structure served. Allinstallations permitted by this section, unless meeting the requirements of 225.32 Exceptions 1, 2, 3, or 4, shall have thegenerator disconnecting means located within sight of the building or structure served.

Recommendation: Add exception to 225.36 and 225.38 as follows:Exception: Outdoor housed generator set disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 445.18.

Also submit the recommendations to CMP 4 for consideration, and information.Also submit to CMP 5 for information.I believe these recommendations are consistent with the panel statement and address the concerns identified by the

submitter.The construction requirements of the disconnecting means should be consistent with those recognized in 445.18., and

described in UL2200. If 445.18 describes an acceptable disconnecting means for a generator, it should be acceptablewhen applying 700.12(B)(6); 701.11(B)(5); and 702.11. A "break glass" lockable mushroom button, for example, servingas the disconnect for the generator and the feeder, meets the requirements of all the rules, in that it is recognized per445.18 and described in UL2200 section 11.

With the new rule changes to 250.32(D) in the last two code cycles, the grounding requirements and conditionsspecified in 250.32(D) are what are important. Listed generators have provisions for installing bonding jumpers and aneutral disconnecting means in the generator terminal box if required and as described in UL2200 section 14. Suitablefor use as service equipment has become a moot point, and has created confusion in the field when referring to thedisconnecting means at the generator location. ((see 2001 ROP 4-30 that was accepted and later rejected via ROC,4-13 Log #1769), the substantiation for the rejection did not address disconnects at a generator, it only referred to thedisconnect inside or outside of a building that had to be constructed to open under load, and also referenced theconfusion the rule change would create with other rules, such as, how to apply the "two to six disconnect rule" at thebuilding.) When AHJs are asking for additional NEMA 3 fused disconnects or breaker enclosures at the generator, itadds cost and reduces reliability. When the generator is shut down via its own controls, annunciation and fire alarmsupervision as required per NFPA 110 and NFPA 72 alert the building occupants of an inoperable life safety system, oressential electrical system in a health care application. Additional breakers hinder coordination and create a single pointof failure, without required annunciation. Isolating the generator feeder also gives someone working on or around agenerator, a false assurance, that the generator cannot start.

Allowing 225.32 Exceptions No. 1 and No. 2 address the submitter's concerns and provides the relief he is asking for.Why should a generator source have different rules than those of a feeder from a building or structure? Is an "IntegratedElectrical System" requiring an "Orderly shutdown"...with "Effective safeguards acceptable to the AHJ", not toincorporate onsite generators?

In summary, my comments keep the disconnecting means in sight, defines the construction of the feeder disconnect,when located at the generator, consistent with the rules in Article 445 and UL2200, and provides needed relief byallowing the existing rules as to the location of the generator/disconnect to be applied when applicable.

60Printed on 11/25/2011

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-111 Log #550a NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Lawrence W. Forshner, Bard, Rao & Athanas Consulting Engineers, LLC

Delete existing text and replace: 700.12(B)(6) including the exception; 701.12(B)(5); and 702.12, as follows:Where an outdoor housed generator set supplies a building or structure, and is equipped with a readily accessible

disconnecting means, an additional disconnecting means shall not be required where ungrounded conductors serve orpass through the building or structure. The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 445.18, and theinstallation shall meet the requirements of 250.32(D). All installations permitted by this section, unless meeting therequirements of 225.32 exception 1, or 2, shall have the generator disconnecting means located within sight of thebuilding or structure served.

Add an exception to 225.36 and 225.38 as follows:Renumber existing exceptionException No. 1:

Exception No. 2: Outdoor housed generator set's disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 445.18.Staff Note: A copy of this proposal has also been submitted to Code-Making Panel 4 for consideration in 225.36 and

225.38.The construction requirements of the disconnecting means for an outdoor housed generator should be

consistent with those recognized in 445.18, and described in UL 2200. If 445.18 describes an acceptable disconnectingmeans for a generator, it should be acceptable when applying 700.12(B)(6); 701.12(B)(5); and 702.12. A "break glass"lockable mushroom button, for example, serving as the disconnect for the generator, meets the requirements of Article445 and UL 2200 Section 11. It also meets the definition in Article 100 in that it is a "means by which the conductors of acircuit can be disconnected from their source of supply."

With the new rule changes to 250.32(D) in recent code cycles, the grounding requirements and the installationrequirements specified in 250.32(D) are what are important. Listed generators have provisions for installing bondingjumpers and a neutral disconnecting means in the generator terminal box if required and as described in UL 2200,Section 14. Suitable for use as service equipment has become a moot point, and has created confusion in the fieldwhen referring to the disconnecting means at the generator location. (See 2001 ROP 4-30 (225-36) Log #4286) thatwas accepted and later rejected during the ROC process, by comment (2001 ROC 4-30 (225-36) Log #1769). It is avery thorough exchange documenting why a feeder disconnect located on or in a building should be SUSE. However,there is no mention or discussion about the construction requirements of upstream equipment. The discussionmentioned requirements such as having the ability to open under load, and recent rule changes to the two to sixdisconnect rule or breaker enclosures at the generator, it adds costs and reduces reliability. When a generator is shutdown via its own controls, annunciation and fire alarm supervision as required by NFPA 110 and NFPA 72 alert thebuilding occupants of an inoperable onsite standby power system. Additional breakers hinder selection coordination,create a single point of failure, and give someone working on or around a generator a false assurance that the generatorcannot start.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Phil Simmons, Simmons Electrical Services

Revise text to read as follows:(D) Separate Service. Where approved by the authority having jurisdiction as suitable for use as an emergency source

of power, an additional service shall be permitted. This service shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions ofArticle 230 and the following additional requirements:

(1) Separate overhead service conductors, service drop, underground service conductors or service lateral shall beinstalled

(2) The service conductors for the separate service shall be installed sufficiently remote electrically and physically fromany other service conductors to minimize the possibility of simultaneous interruption of supply

The terms “overhead service conductor” and “underground service conductor” were added to Article100 and used in Article 230 during the processing of the 2008 NEC. These terms need to be added to Article 700 forproper application of the requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-113 Log #3125 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Frederic P. Hartwell, Hartwell Electrical Services, Inc.

Revise as follows:(1) Separate service drop or service lateral, or separate set of overhead or underground service conductors.

This provision was not correlated with the revision of service terminology in the 2011 NEC.

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Revise text to read as follows:Individual unit equipment for emergency illumination shall consist of the following:

(1) A rechargeable battery(2) A battery charging means(3) Provisions for one or more lamps mounted on the equipment, or shall be permitted to have terminals for remote

lamps, or both(4) A relaying device arranged to energize the lamps automatically upon failure of the supply to the unit equipment(5) Unit equipment shall be installed in accordance with (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).(a) The batteries shall be of suitable rating and capacity to supply and maintain at not less than 87½ percent of the

nominal battery voltage for the total lamp load associated with the unit for a period of at least 1½ hours, or the unitequipment shall supply and maintain not less than 60 percent of the initial emergency illumination for a period of at least1½ hours. Storage batteries, whether of the acid or alkali type, shall be designed and constructed to meet therequirements of emergency service.

(b) Unit equipment shall be permanently fixed in place (i.e., not portable) and shall have all wiring to each unit installedin accordance with the requirements of any of the wiring methods in Chapter 3. Flexible cord-and-plug connection shallbe permitted, provided that the cord does not exceed 900 mm (3 ft) in length.

(c) The branch circuit feeding the unit equipment shall be the same branch circuit as that serving the normal lighting inthe area and connected ahead of any local switches.

(d) The branch circuit that feeds unit equipment shall be clearly identified at the distribution panel and is provided witha lock-on feature.

(e) Emergency luminaires that obtain power from a unit equipment and are not part of the unit equipment shall bewired to the unit equipment as required by 700.10 and by one of the wiring methods of Chapter 3.

This will make this section easier to read and enforce. Adding the requirement for the lock-on device toall branch circuits is important because there is no requirement in the code to keep the battery equipment at full chargefor the area branch circuit.

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Revise text to read as follows:Individual unit equipment for emergency illumination shall consist of the following:

(1) A rechargeable battery(2) A battery charging means(3) Provisions for one or more lamps mounted on the equipment, or shall be permitted to have terminals for remote

lamps,or both(4) A relaying device arranged to energize the lamps automatically upon failure of the supply to the unit equipment(5) Unit equipment shall be installed in accordance with (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e).

(a) The batteries shall be of suitable rating and capacity to supply and maintain at not less than 871/2 percent of thenominal battery voltage for the total lamp load associated with the unit for a period of at least 11/2 hours, or the unitequipment shall supply and maintain not less than 60 percent of the initial emergency illumination for a period of at least11/2 hours. Storage batteries, whether of the acid or alkali type, shall be designed and constructed to meet therequirements of emergency service.

(b) Unit equipment shall be permanently fixed in place (i.e., not portable) and shall have all wiring to each unit installedin accordance with the requirements of any of the wiring methods in Chapter 3. Flexible cord-and-plug connection shallbe permitted, provided that the cord does not exceed 900 mm (3 ft) in length.

(c) The branch circuit feeding the unit equipment shall be the same branch circuit as that serving the normal lighting inthe area and connected ahead of any local switches.

(d) The branch circuit that feeds unit equipment shall be clearly identified at the distribution panel and is provided witha lock-on feature.

(e) Emergency luminaires that obtain power from a unit equipment and are not part of the unit equipment shall be wiredto the unit equipment as required by 700.10 and by one of the wiring methods of Chapter 3.

This will make this section easier to read and enforce. Adding the requirement for the lock-on device toall branch circuits is important because there is no requirement in the code to keep the battery equipment at full chargefor the area branch circuit.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-116 Log #838 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Exception No. 1: In a separate and uninterrupted area supplied by a minimum of three normal lighting circuits that are

not part of a multiwire branch circuit for unit equipment shall be permitted if it originates from the same panelboard asthat of the normal lighting circuits and is provided with a lock-on feature.

Section 210.4(B) requires each multi-wire branch circuit be provided with a means to simultaneouslydisconnect all ungrounded conductors at the point where the branch circuit originates. This can be accomplished usingmulti-pole breakers or 1-pole breakers with identified handle ties. If a multi-wire branch circuit is used to comply with thisexception, there is an increased possibility of leaving the area in total darkness if one circuit were to trip and cause theothers to open as a result. This revision seeks to improve consistency with other NEC rules that restrict multi-wirebranch circuit in areas where similar hazards have been identified such as 517.18(A) and 517.19(A).

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Ryan Smith, TS Electric

Revise text to read as follows:700.12(F)(4) Exception No. 3The unit equipment may be fed by the emergency lighting circuit if the unit equipment is a redundant source of lighting

for the area being covered by the emergency lighting circuit. Allowing lighting coverage during the 10 second powertransfer from utility to generator from the unit equipment or until the emergency light fixtures are powered.

This proposal will allow the use of supplying power to a unit equipment from an "emergency" lightingcircuit not just a "normal" lighting circuit as listed in 700.12(F). This can be accomplished with an exception No. 3. Theyactual wording may be changed as the code panel sees fit.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-118 Log #3367 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The branch circuit serving emergency lighting and power circuits shall not

be part of a multi-wire branch circuit.This proposal is modeled after the requirements added to 517.18(A) and 517.19(A) in the 2011 NEC®.

The requirements were added to Article 517 to prevent the unnecessary opening of the other one or two poles of amulti-wire branch circuit because of an overload, ground fault, or short-circuit on one pole of the multi-wire branchcircuit. Emergency power and lighting circuits have the same need for continuity of service. For example, reliability iscertainly decreased when a short in a 277 volt lighting ballast takes out the other two poles of a three pole circuitbreaker, knocking out the remaining 2/3 of the lighting. With this proposed requirement only the 1/3 of the lighting on theaffected pole is out, leaving 2/3 of the lighting in operation. It should be noted that as per 240.15(B)(3), a multiwire branchcircuit supplying 277-volt lighting requires a common trip circuit breaker which results in the loss of multiple lightingbranch circuits when one circuit is subjected to an overcurrent.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Daniel J. Caron, Bard, Rao + Athanas Consulting Engineers, LLC


The switch or switches installed in emergency lighting circuits shall be arranged so that only authorizedpersons have control of emergency lighting.

Switches connected in series or 3- and 4-way switches shall not be used.It shall be permissible to control emergency lighting circuits with motion sensors, provided all of

the following conditions are met:(I) Spacing between motion sensors and installation is in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.(2) Manual intervention is not required to reenergize emergency lighting when occupied.(3) Areas must be vacant for 15 minutes continuously prior to extinguishing lighting.

Proposal includes breaking up existing Section 700.20 into parts (A) and (B), but keeping the originaltext and intent, in order to add a new section (C)

Currently, most buildings with emergency generator backup for emergency lighting leave emergency lighting on24/7/365. In buildings that operate during set business hours and/or are vacant for significant periods of time (such ashigh rise commercial office buildings, out-patient facilities, etc.), this results in a substantial amount of wasted energy.Currently there are few provisions to switch emergency lighting when not in use.

Conditions are included to ensure motion sensors are installed appropriately, that emergency lighting automaticallyreenergizes when space is occupied, and a significant amount of time has passed prior to extinguishing emergencylighting to ensure the space is truly unoccupied.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-120 Log #1398 NEC-P13


CommissionRevise text of section 700.23 as follows:

A dimmer or relay system containing ore than one dimmer or relay and listed for use in emergency systems shall bepermitted to be used as a control device for energizing emergency lighting circuits. Upon failure of normal power, thedimmer or relay system shall be permitted to selectively energize only those branch circuits required to provide minimumemergency illumination. All branch circuits supplied by the dimmer or relay system cabinet shall comply with the wiringmethods of Article 700.

Dimmer systems and relay systems listed for use in emergency systems are now common. There isno functional difference between a dimmer system and a relay system with regard to the contents of existing section700.23. Relay systems should be added to the wording to acknowledge this.

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CommissionAdd new section after existing 700.23 and renumber following sections to accommodate:

Where emergency illumination is provided by one or more directlycontrolled luminaires that respond to an external control input to bypass normal control upon loss of normal power, suchluminaires shall be listed for use in emergency systems.

A new class of luminaire has appeared is being used in emergency lighting systems. These aretypically dimmable LED luminaires that operate on constant power with an analog or digital input connected to an analogor digital control system to provide a dimming or switching function in the luminaire when normal utility power is present.The luminaire may also have a separate analog or dry-closure "emergency" control input which can be actuated by anupstream transfer switch. When this emergency input is asserted upon loss of utility power and transfer of theluminaries' branch circuit to emergency power, the luminaire turns on full, regardless of the control setting of the normalcontrol system. Current solutions from some LED luminaire manufactures may use a design that does not havesufficient reliability or predictable performance for use in emergency systems. This type of luminaire contains complexelectronics and just like other critical components in the emergency lighting chain, should be listed for use in emergencysystems.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-122 Log #1470 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The alternate source for emergency systems shall not be required to

have ground-fault protection of equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication of theemergency source shall be provided in accordance with 700.6(D) if ground-fault protection of equipment with automaticdisconnecting means is not provided.

Reword section for clarity of intent.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-123 Log #2255 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________David Bredhold, Eaton Corporation

Add text to read as follows:700.26 Ground-Fault Protection of Equipment. The alternate source for emergency systems shall not be required to

have ground-fault protection of equipment with automatic disconnecting means and shall be selectively coordinated inaccordance with 700.27. Groundfault indication of the emergency source shall be provided in accordance with 700.6(D).

IEEE Std 493-2007 offers insight to the proclivity for ground faults over other faults. Table 10-32 in thestandard states that cable faults involving flashover and arcing to ground constitute 73% of cable faults. From this data itcan be presumed that more ground fault protection rather than less provides added protection and fault-tolerance forelectrical systems. Having a system trip out due to a ground fault, start the emergency system, then close on a groundfault offers no fault-tolerance to an electrical system.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Daniel J. Caron, Bard, Rao + Athanas Consulting Engineers, LLC

Add text to read as follows:700.27 Coordination. Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all emergency

system supply side overcurrent protective devices.

The verbiage of 700.27 states "all supply side overcurrent protective devices" must meet therequirements of selective coordination, which would include the supply side overcurrent protective device on the normalside of an automatic transfer switch, as this device is also a supply side overcurrent protect device of an emergencysystem.

However, in Proposal 13-197, in the Report on Proposals A201O, the submitter included a similar concept that wasultimately rejected by Panel 13 with the comment "The proposal for 'CAl Normal System' covers devices in the normalsource that are outside of the scope of Article 700. While the concept is correct, (emphasis added) the additional text isunnecessary."

Without the proposed additional text, the requirement is for all overcurrent devices to be selectively coordinated with allsupply side overcurrent protective devices. "All' Means ALL, and does not differentiate between normal and emergencysystems. This proposal should be accepted as Panel 13 has already indicated that they agree with the concept.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-125 Log #1062 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________William R. Jennings, Jr., William R. Jennings, Jr. - Consulting Engineering PC

Revise text to read as follows:Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective

devices. Overcurrent protective devices serving emergency electrical systems shall selectively coordinate for the periodof time that a fault's duration extends beyond .1 seconds.

Currently there is not a standard for coordination and it is being interpreted as absolute coordinationwith no crossing of curves. NFPA 99 Paragraph 6.4.2.1.2.1 has a less restrictive requirement that requires coordinationonly after .1 seconds (six cycles). This was a 2012 change to NFPA 99. I am proposing the NFPA 70 adopt similarwording to NFPA 99. As it is right now, the two code are in conflict with each other since NFPA 70 Article 700.27 appliesto all emergency systems including hospitals.

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Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protectivedevices. Selective Coordination shall be selected by a licensed professional engineer or other qualified personsengaged primarily in the design, installation, or maintenance of electrical systems. The selection shall be documentedand made available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operate the system.

Currently, Selective Coordination is not being uniformly enforced, or not enforced at all. This additionallanguage identifies who is responsible for the design and insures that the completed project will be selectivelycoordinated. It will also provide verification documentation for the AHJ, which can become part of the constructiondocuments. The design professional is the only one who has overall control of the selective coordination system. Theelectrical gear manufacturer is only going to coordinate his equipment, which means that the generator and ATS aregenerally left out of system coordination due to the fact the gear supplier has no control of it. This process has beenused in a few jurisdictions and has met with great success without adding any burden to the AHJ.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-127 Log #2256 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________David Bredhold, Eaton Corporation

Add text to read as follows:700.27 Coordination. Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side

overcurrent protective devices for the following types of faults:(1) Phase to phase (singe phase and 3 phase)(2) Single phase to neutral(3) Single phase to ground

IEEE Std 493-2007 offers insight to the proclivity for ground faults over other faults. Table 10-32 in thestandard states that cable faults involving flashover and arcing to ground constitute 73% of cable faults. From this data itcan be presumed that more ground fault protection rather than less provides added protection and fault-tolerance forelectrical systems. Having a system trip out due to a ground fault, start the emergency system, then close on a groundfault offers no fault-tolerance to an electrical system.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-128 Log #1114 NEC-P13




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Revise text to read as follows:Informational Note No. 1: For additional information, see NFPA 99-20052012, .Informational Note No. 2: For further information regarding performance of emergency and standby power systems,

see NFPA 110-20102013, .Update the dates on the codes referenced in Informational Notes to the current edition or the next


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-130 Log #746 NEC-P13


Add a figure to the definition of Legally Required Standby Systems (see figure below).


Adding a figure to the definition of Legally Required Standby Systems will aid in clearly differentiatingthe normal system from the legally required standby system. This figure should be similar to Figures 517.30, 517.41and the figure in Appendix B.1 of NFPA 110.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-131 Log #1273 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows: Those systems required and so classed as legally required standby by

municipal, state, federal, or other codes or by any governmental agency having jurisdiction. These systems are intendedto automatically supply power to selected loads (other than those classed as emergency systems) in the event of failureof the normal source.

These systems are intended to automatically supply power to selected loads (other than thoseclassed as emergency systems) in the event of failure of the normal source

Legally required standby systems are typically installed to serve loads, such as heating andrefrigeration systems, communications systems, ventilation and smoke removal systems, sewage disposal, lightingsystems, and industrial processes, that, when stopped during any interruption of the normal electrical supply, couldcreate hazards or hamper rescue or fire-fighting operations.


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-133 Log #907 NEC-P13




_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-134 Log #1986 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas J. McNicholas, Mac-Publications

Add new text to read as follows:All boxes and equipment shall be permanently marked to indicate that they are part of the standby power

system.Failure to indentify standby power wiring leaves these critical loads subject to misuse.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-135 Log #1985 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas J. McNicholas, Mac-Publications

Revise text to read as follows:The legally required standby systems wiring shall not be permitted to occupy the same raceways cable or

boxes and cabinets with other general wiring.NFPA 110 makes no attempt to differentiate between standby and emergency systems. Failure to

quantee seperation is contrary to logical principals for many vital loads.

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Revise as follows:Where approved, a separate service shall be permitted as a legally required source of standby

power. This service shall be in accordance with the applicable provisions of Article 230, with a separate service drop orlateral or a separate set of overhead or underground service conductors sufficiently remote electrically and physicallyfrom any other service to minimize the possibility of simultaneous interruption of supply from an occurrence in anotherservice.

This provision needs to be correlated with the revisions in service terminology for the 2011 NEC.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-137 Log #495 NEC-P13


Where acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction, connections located ahead of and not within the same cabinet,enclosure, or vertical section of a metal-enclosed switchgear or switchboard section as the service disconnecting meansshall be permitted. The legally required standby service shall be sufficiently separated from the normal main servicedisconnecting means to minimize simultaneous interruption of supply through an occurrence within the building orgroups of buildings served.

Informational Note: See 230.82 for equipment permitted on the supply side of a service disconnecting means.Switchboard is by definition not intended to be enclosed. See definitions.

I do not believe it was the code panel's intent to allow this.Maybe the intent was to allow this installed in a metal-enclosed switchgear or metal-enclosed switchboard.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-138 Log #1472 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:The alternate source for legally required standby systems shall not be

required to have ground-fault protection of equipment with automatic disconnecting means. Ground-fault indication ofthe legally required standby source shall be provided in accordance with 701.6(D) if ground-fault protection of equipmentwith automatic disconnecting means is not provided.

Reword section for clarity of intent.

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Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protectivedevices. Selective Coordination shall be selected by a licensed professional engineer or other qualified persons that areacceptable to the AHJ engaged primarily in the design, installation, or maintenance of electrical systems. The selectionshall be documented and made available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operate thesystem.

Currently, Selective Coordination is not being uniformly enforced or not enforced at all. This additionallanguage identifies who is responsible for the design and insures that the completed project will be coordinated. It alsowill provide verification documentation for the AHJ, which can become part of the construction documents. The designprofessional is the only one who has overall control of the selective coordination system. The electrical gearmanufacturer is only going to coordinate his equipment, which means that the generator and ATS are generally left outof system coordination due to the fact the gear supplier has no control of it. This process has been used in a fewjurisdictions and has met with great success without adding a burden to the AHJ.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-140 Log #2344 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Eric Kench, Kench Engineering Consultant

Add new Part V and 701.28 as follows:

For branch circuits that supply equipment used in a supervisory station, there shall be a legall required supplysource to which the load will be transferred automatically upon failure of the normal supply.

Supervisory stations exist for the purpose of assisting those who are responding to an emergencysuch as a fire. At no time should a supervisory station be blacked out for the very reason that it would inhibit those whoare responding to an emergency. At this time there is no requirement in the NEC addressing this issue. this proposal willadd a new Part V and a new NEC section 701.19. These additional requirements are necessary to ensure that notragedy will occur because of a power failure in a supervising station.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-141 Log #745 NEC-P13


Add a figure to the definition of Optional Standby Systems (see figure below).


Adding a figure to the definition of Optional Standby Systems will aid in clearly differentiating thenormal system from the optional standby system. This figure should be similar to Figures 517.30, 517.41 and the figurein Appendix B.1 of NFPA 110.

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Revise text to read as follows: Those systems intended to supply power to public or private facilities or property where

life safety does not depend on the performance of the system. Optional standby systems are intended to supply on-sitegenerated power to selected loads either automatically or manually.

Optional standby systems are intended to supply on-site generated power to selected loadseither automatically or manually.

Optional standby systems are typically installed to provide an alternate source of electric powerfor such facilities as industrial and commercial buildings, farms, and residences and to serve loads such as heating andrefrigeration systems, data processing and communications systems, and industrial processes that, when stoppedduring any power outage, could cause discomfort, serious interruption of the process, damage to the product or process,or the like.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-143 Log #3244 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James Grant, Strafford, NH

Revise text to read as follows:For other than single family dwellings, the calculations of load on the standby source shall be

made in accordance with Article 220 or by another approved method.Where manual transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shall have

adequate capacity and rating for the supply of all equipment intended to be operated at one time. The user of theoptional standby system shall be permitted to select the load connected to the system.

Where automatic transfer equipment is used, an optional standby system shallcomply with (2)(a) or (2)(b).

The standby source shall be capable of supplying the full anticipated load that is transferred by theautomatic transfer equipment.

Having to go to Article 220 to calculate lighting loads can lead to a super inflated number. Section220.12 would have to be used in a dwelling no matter how much actual load is connected. The same can be stated forloads that are supplied by a generator in a dwelling that supplies only one receptacle outlet in every room would have tobe calculated using 3VA per square foot using the total square footage of the home. The permissive language thatpoints to other approved methods puts the inspector in an unjust position being that they do not know what is pluggedinto and left on to an outlet while the load is transferred. The normal loads that would be transferred are those loads thatare left on. Items such as the refrigerator, heater, air conditioners, and the like normally left on and cycling loads are theones that are transferred while being unattended. While being attended to, loads can be selected by the user and beconsistent with the existing language for manual transfer equipment that puts the management on the user of thesystem such as the ability of turning on a 700watt countertop microwave without having to carry the whole smallappliance branch circuit’s 1500 watts per Article 220.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Thomas B. Leonard, Hartland, VT

Revise text to read as follows:The standby source shall be capable of supplying all automatically applied loads that are transferred by the automatic

transfer equipment.An automatic 702 system should be able to be designed and installed to serve only critical loads such

as heating, refrigeration and security systems during unoccupied modes. This would accommodate affordable protectionfor vacant occupancies. During occupied modes, any overloading conditions would open an overcurrent device, thus,averting system and/or utilization equipment damage. This is a design issue not a safety issue.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-145 Log #897 NEC-P13




_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-146 Log #3488 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James Grant, Strafford, NH

Add new text to read as follows:Where a power inlet is used for a temporary connection to a portable generator, a warning sign

shall be placed near the inlet to indicate the type of derived system that the system is capable of based on the wiring ofthe transfer equipment. The sign shall read one of the following:

WARNING:FOR CONNECTION OF A SEPARATELY DERIVED SYSTEM ONLYorWARNING:FOR CONNECTION OF A NONSEPARATELY DERIVED SYSTEM ONLY

The portable generators are not normally part of an electrical inspection, nor are they subject toinspection when an owner purchases a new one. Depending on what type of transfer equipment is installed; this canlead to dangerous situations such as paralleling grounded currents on both the equipment grounding conductor and thegrounded conductor or to cases were the system does not benefit from a system bonding conductor or one that acts assuch. The requirement would give indication to the type required to achieve electrical safety.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Alfio Torrisi, Pelham, NH

Add text to read as follows:702.9 Portable Engine Generator, 250 V or less.Portable engine generators; 250 V or less, supplying AC receptacles mounted on the frame and used for supplying AC

power to a premises wiring system shall be installed as a separately derived system.This issue addresses Portable engine generators; 250 V or less, supplying AC receptacles mounted

on the frame and used for supplying AC power to a premises wiring system. Some generators are installed asnon-separately derived systems for connection to a building and these generators are used not only to supply power tothe building but also used as a standalone generator supplying power only to the receptacles on its frame; such as aconstruction site or other event.When this type of generator is installed as non-separately derived system and the system bonding jumper is removedthe user is limited in using this generator only when connected to a premises wiring system, however a hazardouscondition can occur when the same generator is then used only to supply the outlets on its frame without reinstalling thesystem bonding jumping, thereby compromising the return ground-fault path exposing the user to a potential electricalshock hazard. This section would enhance safety by using the product within in its primary electrical system designintent, supplying receptacles mounted on the frame. Any other use should be an extension of the primary electricalsystem. In this case a separately derived system.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-148 Log #3254 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Mark R. Hilbert, MR Hilbert Electrical Inspections & Training

Revise text to read as follows:702.11 Outdoor Housed Generator Sets(A) Permanently Installed and Portable Generators Greater Than 15KW. Where an outdoor housed generator set is

equipped with a readily accessible disconnecting means located within sight of the building or structure supplied, anadditional disconnecting means shall not be required where ungrounded conductors serve or pass through the buildingor structure. The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 225.36.

(B) Portable Generators 15 KW or Less. Where a portable generator that is rated 15 KW or less is installed using aflanged inlet or other cord and plug type connection, a disconnecting means shall not be required where ungroundedconductors serve or pass through a building or structure.

When portable generators was added to the scope of Article 702 a small portable generator connectedby means of a flanged inlet and a flexible cord was not considered with regard to the disconnecting means at thebuilding or other structure supplied required by 225.31. These small portable generators (mostly residential) are ofteninstalled without a disconnecting means where a flanged inlet and flexible cord is used as the connection means.

Panel 13 embraced this concept in the panel statement for Proposal 13-257 in the last cycle. The Panel noted, “Asuitable disconnecting device is always available with a portable generator – the act of shutting it down.” Revising thissection as recommended will bring the requirements in line with typical installation practices.

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Insert a new subsection (C) and an informational note as follows:A generator with a grounded circuit conductor connection as part of its output shall be

wired as a separately derived source unless its grounded circuit conductor is not bonded to the frame, or where used tosupply a premises wiring system it shall be permitted to be wired as a nonseparately derived source if all of the followingconditions are met:

(1) The generator rating does not exceed 15 kW.(2) The generator is connected through a flexible cord and a cord connector to a flanged inlet.(3) The flexible cord does not exceed 4.5 m (15 ft) in length.(4) The flanged inlet connection point is not more than 3.0 m (10 ft) from the main bonding jumper or system bonding

jumper for the supplied premises.(5) The point of connection is marked “Disconnect cord when generator is not in service”.(6) Ground-fault protection of equipment has not been installed on any portion of the premises wiring system supplied

by the generator.Informational Note: Current product standards require all portable generators rated 15 kW and below and supplying

grounded output circuits to have the grounded circuit connections bonded to the generator frame.UL has now modified its generator standard to require all small generators to have bonded neutral

connections, which makes them only suitable for transfer switches that transfer the grounded circuit conductor alongwith the ungrounded conductors. This is incompatible with the overwhelming majority of transfer arrangements now inplace and available in the market for residential and light commercial applications. Relief is needed. This proposal limitsthe time of system exposure to the second neutral bonding point and also limits the potential for elevated voltage toappear on grounded surfaces due to parallel circuit return pathways by limiting connection distances. Flexible cord hasno conductive surfaces, and the first ten feet of feeder distance from a main bonding jumper is comparable to thelong-standing permission for multiple meter sockets to be grounded to the neutral in 250.142(B) Exception No. 2. Thisproposal is intentionally located in Chapter 7, where it will automatically modify conventional practice in Article 250. Thisproposal has been written so that it is acceptable for a generator with a bonded neutral, but not in any way objectionablefor a generator with a floating neutral, merely conservative. That way the untrained user need not investigate thecharacteristics of his generator prior to using this provision.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Brendan A. Foley, Eaton Corp.


Where an a permanently-mounted outdoor housed generator set is equipped with a readily accessibledisconnecting means located within sight of the building or structure supplied, an additional disconnecting means shallnot be required where ungrounded conductors serve or pass through the building orstructure. The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of 225.36.

Where power inlets rated 100 Amps or greater are installed for the connection of aportable generator set. an interlocked disconnecting means shall be required at the point of connection to preventdisconnection under load.

Exception: If the inlet device is rated as a disconnect.A portable generator can be out of line of site from the point at which it electrically connects through a

permanently installed inlet. If a person cannot visibly see the generator to which it is connected, disconnecting underload can present a safety hazard if the inlet is not rated for load break.

The intent of the proposal is to either require:a. Inlets (receptacles) to be load break rated (There are inlet load-break solutions on the market for applications above

100 Amps. This proposal will help ensure the solution is a safe one for portable generators.) orb. Require the power inlet be interlocked with a disconnect to ensure that the disconnect is opened prior to unplugging

the cord. This would prevent someone from removing a cable from a non-load break device under load - which wouldresult in an arc flash event.

The proposal acknowledges the fact that devices up to 60 amps can be rated as a disconnecting means. There arealso solutions on the market that advertise load-break capabilities above 100 Amps. This proposal aims to ensure theright solution is provided for the application.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-151 Log #2525 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Kenneth E. Vannice, Leviton Manufacturing Company Inc.

Add new text to read as follows:Equipment with markings indicating emergency installed as optional standby equipment shall

have all markings referencing emergency eliminated.It does no good to identify emergency equipment and circuits as in 700.10(A) unless all other

equipment not installed in accordance with Article 700 is not so identified. There is equipment suitable for installation inemergency systems that are often installed in optional standby systems which blurs the differing requirements causingconfusion. There are UL 1008 transfer switches investigated for use on optional standby systems marked EmergencyTransfer Switches. There are control components marked Emergency that are compliant with Article 700 as installed.

This proposal is patterned after 725.130(A) Ex. 2.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert H. Wills, Intergrid, LLC

Move common language in Articles 690, 692 & 694 to a new common Article 70X:

The provisions of this article apply to electric systems that supply power independent of the electricproduction and distribution network (utility). Stand-alone electric systems can be supplied by sources including enginegenerators, inverters, fuel cells, and renewable energy sources such as wind and solar-electric systems.

Whenever the requirements of other articles of this and Article 70X differ, the requirementsof Article 70X shall apply.

When used to supply a building or other structure, a stand-alone electric system shall be adequate to meet therequirements of this for a similar installation connected to a service. The wiring on the supply side of the buildingor structure disconnecting means shall comply with this except, as modified by 690.10(A) through (D).

The ac output from an electrical source such as a generator or stand-alone inverter shall bepermitted to supply ac power to the building or structure disconnecting means at current levels less than the calculatedload connected to that disconnect. The electrical source output rating shall be not less than the load posed by thelargest single utilization equipment connected to the system. Calculated general lighting loads shall not be consideredas a single load.

The circuit conductors between the inverter output and the building or structuredisconnecting means shall be sized based on the output rating of the inverter. These conductors shall be protected fromovercurrent in accordance with Article 240. The overcurrent protection shall be located at the output of the inverter.

The inverter output of a stand-alone solar photovoltaic system shall be permitted to supply120 volts to single-phase, 3-wire, 120/240-volt service equipment or distribution panels where there are no 240-voltoutlets and where there are no multi-wire branch circuits. In all installations, the rating of the overcurrent deviceconnected to the output of the inverter shall be less than the rating of the neutral bus in the service equipment. Thisequipment shall be marked with the following words or equivalent:WARNINGSINGLE 120-VOLT SUPPLY. DO NOT CONNECTMULTIWIRE BRANCH CIRCUITS!

Energy storage or backup power supplies shall not berequired.

The same language for stand-alone systems is included in the three renewable energy Articles (690,692 and 694).It makes sense to eliminate redundancy and to move it to a general Article so that common language can serve allthree.In addition, the permissions and safety issues resolved by this language are not solely applicable to PV, fuel cells andwind energy.In particular, there are many houses that are powered “off-grid” by prime-power generators that are not capable of thefull 100 or 200A capacity of a conventional service. Experience with the approximately 100,000 off-grid PV systems inthe USA has shown the need to clarification the requirements for stand-alone systems in the . This should beextended to the general case.There is no existing article that covers the general area of stand-alone systems:

- Article 705 covers the opposite (interconnected systems).- These systems are not for standby use, and so do not belong in Article 702 (Optional Standby Systems).

It makes sense then to create a new article in Chapter 7 to complement Articles 702 and 705. (covering essentially“non-interconnected prime power production sources”).The language above is based on that of Article 690.10, but with the specific references to PV power sources changed tothe generic term “stand-alone electric system source”. The language was also changed to make it compliant with theNEC Style Manual.This proposal was rejected in the last code cycle mainly due to lack of time. It’s now time to take care of this issue.

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Delete Article 708 in its entirety.This Article is unenforceable by the AHJ due to too many performance requirements.

Performance requirements appear to be design requirements and this not the intent of the Code or under the authorityof the AHJ. The NEC is a minimum standard and COP buildings should not be placed in a position of minimum designstandards.

Also the scope of Article 708 states what is included in the Article and all items are not.How the electrical system is installed should be the key issue.

The purpose of this is the practical safeguarding of persons and property fromhazards arising from the use of electricity.

This contains provisions that are considered necessary for safety. Compliance therewith andproper maintenance results in an installation that is essentially free from hazard but not necessarily efficient, convenient,or adequate for good service or future expansion of electrical use.

Informational Note: Hazards often occur because of overloading of wiring systems by methods or usage not inconformity with this This occurs because initial wiring did not provide for increases in the use of electricity. Aninitial adequate installation and reasonable provisions for system changes provide for future increases in the use ofelectricity.

This is not intended as a design specification or an instruction manual for untrained persons.The requirements in this address the fundamental principles of

protection for safety contained in Section 131 of International Electrotechnical Commission Standard 60364-1,

Informational Note: lEC 60364-1, Section 131, contains fundamental principles of protection for safety that encompassprotection against electric shock, protection against thermal effects, protection against overcurrent, protection againstfault currents, and protection against overvoltage. All of these potential hazards are addressed by the requirements inthis

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-154 Log #1473 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Informational Note No. 2: For further information on disaster and emergency management see -20102013,

.Informational Note No. 3: For further information regarding performance of emergency and standby power systems,

see NFPA 110-20102013, .Informational Note No. 4: For further information regarding performance and maintenance of emergency systems in

health care facilities, see NFPA 99-20052012, .Informational Note No. 5: For specification of locations where emergency lighting is considered essential to life safety,

see NFPA -20092012, .Informational Note No. 6: For further information on regarding physical security, see NFPA 730-20082011,

.Informational Note No. 7: Threats to facilities that may require transfer of operation to the critical systems include both

naturally occurring hazards and human-caused events. See also A.5.3.2 of -20102013.Update the dates on the codes referenced in Informational Notes to the current edition or the next


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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert Schuerger, HP Critical Facilities Services

Add text to read as follows:Category I COPS – are those systems that have been designated to remain operational for emergency services to

function.Category II COPS – are those systems that have been designated to significantly contribute to the delivery of

emergency services or are essential for disaster recovery.Category III – Critical systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are not

immediately essential for providing emergency services. Category III systems are required to be restorable to operationwithin 24 hours.

Category IV – Critical systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are notimmediately essential, as there are multiple facilities providing the same function. Category IV systems are required tobe restorable to operation within 24 hours of the time utility power, water and sewage disposal are available to thefacility.

To date article 708 has not had significant implementation across the US by the AHJs. Whendiscussion why this is the case with the responsible group for a major metropolitan area, the response was because wedo not have the finances that would be required for implementation. Having a gradient scale of categories of criticalsystems provides a method to align the importance of the COPS to the protection of life and property.

The classifying governmental agency having jurisdiction would benefit from a gradient level of criticality, which providesa means to ensure the most critical systems have the resources allocated to them so that they are available whenneeded to deliver emergency services and provide for disaster recovery. Without a gradient scale, fewer systems canbe addressed because they would all require the most extensive amount of resources.

The definitions are needed for several companion proposals that provide a gradient scale of requirements.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-156 Log #744 NEC-P13


Revise the text as follows:Power systems for facilities or parts of facilities that require continuous

operation for the reasons of public safety, emergency management, national security, or business continuity. Thesesystems are intended to automatically supply power to the designated critical operations areas in the event of failure ofthe normal supply or in the event of accident to elements of the normal supply system.


In comparing the definition of a Critical Operations Power System to those of emergency and legallyrequired systems, there appears to be some text missing. The scope of Article 708 clearly states that it applies to the“circuits and equipment intended to supply, distribute, and control electricity for illumination, power, or both, to requiredfacilities when the normal electrical supply or system is interrupted”, hence the addition of this text is appropriate andneeded.

Adding a figure to the definition of Critical Operations Power Systems will aid in clearly differentiating the normalsystem from the critical operations power system. This figure should be similar to Figures 517.30, 517.41 and the figurein Appendix B.1 of NFPA 110.

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Revise text to read as follows: An electronic system that provides monitoring and controls for

the operation of the critical operations power system. This can include the fire alarm system, security system, control ofthe HVAC, the start/stop/monitoring of the power supplies and electrical distribution system, annunciation andcommunications equipment to emergency personnel, facility occupants, and remote operators.

This can include the fire alarm system, security system, control of the HVAC, thestart/stop/monitoring of the power supplies and electrical distribution system, annunciation and communicationsequipment to emergency personnel, facility occupants, and remote operators.


_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-158 Log #1454 NEC-P13


Add text to read as follows:In critical operations power systems, risk assessment shall be performed to identify hazards, the likelihood of their

occurrence, and the vulnerability of the electrical system to those hazards. The Risk Assessment shall includeprobabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram (RBD) for the electrical power to the DCOA anddocument the predicted reliability, availability and mean time to repair of the design.

At present, the Risk Assessment required for a COPS is completely subjective. There are noqualifications required of the individual(s) performing the assessment and the AHJ has no method to determine if theresults and strategy devised have any validity.

Probabilistic modeling techniques which use statistical analysis techniques, such as fault tree and reliability blockdiagram, have been used in Reliability Engineering to quantitatively assess risks for many years. The airline industry,FAA, NASA, the military, engineers that design electronic devices including the data center infrastructure all useprobabilistic modeling techniques to predict reliability and availability. The Army Corp of Engineers, as part of the PowerReliability Enhancement Program for the military, has developed a large database of failure and repair data for manytypes of electrical equipment used in both industrial and commercial power systems, so they would have the dataneeded to perform probabilistic modeling techniques. This data is publicly available; it has been published in IEEE Std493 -2007 (Gold Book).

Quantitative analysis provides a direct comparison between various design possibilities and thus provides a method todetermine what is required to achieve the required level of reliability and availability. COPS, by definition are thesystems requiring continuous operations for reasons of public safety, emergency management, national security orbusiness continuity. Achieving continuous operation for a power system requires a correct design. Properly evaluatingthe design requires the technology of reliability engineering.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________James R. Steed, ARCADIS

Revise text to read as follows:In a building or at a structure where a critical operations power system and any other type

of power system is present, all All boxes and enclosures (including transfer switches, generators, and power panels) forcritical operations power system circuits shall be permanently marked so they will be readily identified as a componentof the critical operations power system.

Components of a COPS system are required to be identified even if there are no other power systemsin the building or structure to distinguish between. The change would require identification for components of the COPSsystem only when another power system was present.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Philip DuChene, Verizon Wireless

COPS feeders shall comply with 708.10(C)(1)through (C)(3).

The wiring of the COPS system shall be protected against physicaldamage.Wiring methods shall be permitted to be installed in accordance with the following:

(1) Rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, electrical metallic tubing (Type EMT), or Type MI cable.(2) Where encased in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete, any of the following wiring methods shall be permitted:a. Schedule 40 or Schedule 80 rigid polyvinyl chloride conduit (Type PVC)b. Reinforced thermosetting resin conduit (Type RTRC)c. Electrical metallic tubing (Type EMT)c. d. Flexible nonmetallic or jacketed metallic racewaysd. e. Jacketed metallic cable assemblies listed for installation in concrete

(3) Where provisions must be made for flexibility at equipment connection, one or more of the following shall also bepermitted:

a. Flexible metal fittingsb. Flexible metal conduit with listed fittingsc. Liquidtight flexible metal conduit with listed fittings

As currently written, 708.10(C)(1) does not permit EMT as an acceptable raceway for “protectionagainst physical damage” unless it is used with a concrete encasement in accordance with 708.10(C)(1)(2), whichappears to be inconsistent with the definition of EMT in 358.2 which indicates it is designed for “physical protection androuting of conductors……” (see below).

An unthreaded thinwall raceway of circular cross section designed for the “physicalprotection” and routing of conductors and cables and for use as an equipment grounding conductor when installedutilizing appropriate fittings.

The submitter might surmise that current approach relative to EMT was intended to be consistent with 358.12(1) whichindicates that EMT shall not be used where subject to “severe physical damage”. However, the 708.10(C)(1) make noreference to protection against “severe” physical damage and furthermore it would be extremely unusual for any facilityfalling under Article 708 - Critical Operations Power Systems (e.g. police stations, fire station, hospital, etc.) toincorporate feeders that could in any way be subject to “severe physical damage”; and if they were then EMT could notbe used per 358.12(1) anyway.

EMT shall not be used under the following conditions:(1) Where, during installation or afterward, it will be subject to severe physical damage.The submitter also believes that these feeders as well as all other wiring associated the Critical Operations Power

Systems (COPS) are almost universally protected from any physical damage by both the construction and the operationof facilities that require COPS (see example below). In addition, there is no reference within Article 708 to “severephysical damage”

As such, it is the submitter’s position, that permitting only the use of concrete encased wiring methods or alternativelyonly rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, or Type MI cable (and not EMT) is unwarranted and provides nosubstantial benefit.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Paul E. Guidry, Fluor Enterprises, Inc. / Rep. Associated Builders and Contractors

Add new text to read:708.10(C)(1)(4) Cable tray with types of cables allowed in 392.10 in supervised industrial locations.708.10(C)(1)(5) Bus duct in supervised industrial locations.

The substantiation for creating Article 708 included industrial establishments such as refineries andpetrochemical plants in the Scope of this article. The way Art. 708 is presently written focuses on buildings only. If thisarticle is to apply to refineries and petrochemical plants, then cable tray and bus ducts must be allowed as a wiringmethod. It is unreasonable and economically not viable to construct a petrochemical plant's electrical system in one ofthe wiring methods currently allowed by 708.10(C)(1). With the addition of these two wiring methods, it will allow a safe,economical installation.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Philip DuChene, Verizon Wireless

Revise text to read as follows:COPS feeders shall comply with 708.10(C)(1) through (C)(3).

(1) Protection Against Physical Damage. The wiring of the COPS system shall be protected against physical damageeither by wiring method or by a suitable protected location. Wiring methods shall be permitted to be installed inaccordance with the following:

(1) Rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, or Type MI cable.(2) Where encased in not less than 50 mm (2 in.) of concrete, any of the following wiring methods shall be permitted:a. Schedule 40 or Schedule 80 rigid polyvinyl chloride conduit (Type PVC).b. Reinforced thermosetting resin conduit (Type RTRC)c. Electrical metallic tubing (Type EMT)d. Flexible nonmetallic or jacketed metallic racewayse. Jacketed metallic cable assemblies listed for installation in concrete

(3) Where provisions must be made for flexibility at equipment connection, one or more of the following shall also bepermitted:

a. Flexible metal fittingsb. Flexible metal conduit with listed fittingsc. Liquidtight flexible metal conduit with listed fittings

As currently written, 708.10(C)(1) appears to infer that COPS feeders are inherently subject to physicaldamage and must therefore always be installed using a more robust raceway method (RMC, IMC, or MI cable) orconcrete encasement. This approach is inconsistent with other Articles or Sections of the NEC where a more robustmethod, raceway, or protection means is required only “if exposed to physical damage” (i.e. NEC 250.64(B), 230.50(B),250.64(B), 332.12(1), 334.15(B), 547.5(E), 645.5(D), etc.). It is also questionable if the approach currently used in708.10(C)(1) is consistent with paragraph 3.2.5.5 of the NEC Style Manual (below)

NEC Style Manual - 3.2.5.5 Provisions on Protection Against Physical Damage. If protection against physical damageis to be one of the requirements, this can be standardized by the use of this terminology instead of using the phraseprovided with mechanical protection to mean the same thing. In many cases, one or two acceptable methods ofproviding the intended protection can be stated as examples for better understanding without restricting the rule to aspecification-type requirement. There have been some cases, such as in the instance of grounding electrodeconductors, where the means provided by the installer for protection against physical damage has impaired theelectrical function of the conductor or equipment. This can be largely avoided by an explanatory note if the intent cannotbe otherwise made sufficiently clear.

It is the submitters position that 708.10(C) should also allow for locations where the feeders and other wiring is locatedin a manner whereby there is no possibility of physical damage (e.g. COPS Switchboard in secure and locked AC PowerRoom at a Hospital with a 10’0” feeder to an immediately adjacent COPS Panelboard). If the entire electrical space totalwas inaccessible to unqualified staff, the room was locked and secure, the feeder was located overhead in the web of aprecast concrete structure, supported by structural steel members at 3’0” spacing and routed down a CMU wall againsupported on strut at 3’0”, the benefit offered by 10’ of overhead IMC instead of 10’0” of overhead EMT might beconsidered questionable.

The submitter believes the proposed revision and additional wording permitting protection either by location or wiringmethod is consistent with the wording elsewhere in the NEC (NEC 392.30(B)(3), 430.232, 501.140(A)(2), 505.17).

If the installation is such that there is no likelihood of damage or means of physical damage to the feeders, then wiringmethods permitted in Chapter 3 should be acceptable; while recognizing the requirements of 708.10(2) are still going tolimit non-encased feeders to metallic raceways to meet the list 2-hour fire rated assembly requirements of 708.10(C)(2).

This approach relative to physical protection “by location” is supported in practice with most facilities falling underArticle 708 being highly secure facilities that include COPS feeders in which the feeders are inherently protected fromphysical damage by both the construction and the operation of the facility.

In conclusion, permitting only the use of concrete encased wiring methods or alternatively only rigid metal conduit,intermediate metal conduit, or Type MI cable where there is no reasonable likelihood of physical damage is unwarrantedand appears to provide no benefit.

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(1) Rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit (IMC), or Type MI cable."Intermediate Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “IMC” “Metallic Conduit”

Suggest that "IMC" be added to all references. This will make finding all references to “Intermediate Metal Conduit"easier and more reliable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-164 Log #2446 NEC-P13



(1) Rigid metal conduit (RMC), intermediate metal conduit, or Type MI cable."Rigid Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “RMC” “Metallic Conduit”

Suggest that "RMC" be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Rigid Metal Conduit" easierand more reliable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-165 Log #2809 NEC-P13



b. Flexible metal conduit (FMC) with listed fittings"Flexible Metal Conduit" is also referred to as “FMC”

Suggest that “(FMC)” be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Flexible Metal Conduit"easier and more reliable.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-166 Log #2844 NEC-P13



c. Liquidtight flexible metal conduit (LFMC) with listed fittings 708.10(C)(1)(3).k"Liquidtight Flexible Nonmetallic Conduit" is also referred to as “LFMC”

Suggest that “(LFMC)” be added to all references. This will make finding all references to "Liquidtight Flexible MetalConduit" easier and more reliable.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________





_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-168 Log #1115 NEC-P13


Accept the panel action on ROC 13-179 from the 2010 Annual Revision Cycle.The requirement for fire protection of critical circuits in Article 708 is 2-hr. Although 2 inches of

concrete was used to meet a 1-hr fire protection requirement, it is well documented in the IBC and NFPA Fire ProtectionHandbooks that 2 inches of concrete encasement is not sufficient for 2-hr fire protection. The panel action provided aprescriptive value (4 inches) of concrete that allows for objective enforcement.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-169 Log #1351 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Abel Lampa, Innovative Engineering Inc.

Revise to read as follows:. An electric power production source shall be permitted to be connected to the supply side of

the service disconnecting means as permitted in 230.82(6). The sum of the rating of the overcurrent devices connectedto production sources shall not exceed the rating of the service.

Replace this word to "service disconnecting means or rating of the main busbar"Explanation. My experience especially in NYC, if! apply say, 3000A service with my main switchboard

rated at 3000A, with a 3000A Main Fuse Disconnecting or Main Circuit Breaker built in to it, the electric co. (Coned) willnot give you the service you actually applying for. You will be lucky, ifthey will give you 2000 A service, or sometimeseven less, which is equivalent to 5-6 sets of 4# 500 KCmil Cu. Cable.

Some services do not have Main fuse switch or Main Circuit Breaker. Therefore, you have to base the sum, to the mainbusbar or conductors (if the main service goes into awireway) of the switchboard or panelboard.

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All conductors or cables shall be installed using any of the metal wiring methods permitted by 708.10(C)(1) and inaddition shall comply with 708.14(1) through (8), as applicable.

(1) All cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems, and emergency communications shall be shielded twisted paircables. installed in accordance with manufacturers published installation instructions.

(2) Shields of cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems, and emergency communications shall be continuousarranged in accordance with manufacturers published installation instructions.

In many cases, the use of the wrong wiring type for a signaling system could in fact cause the systemto perform erratically and thereby adversely impact its reliability. Further, distance limitations would be significantlyreduced. For example, shielded, twisted pair cables would not be at all suitable for Internet Protocol (IP) based systemsolutions. It is therefore strongly recommended to leave it up to the system manufacturer to determine which type ofwiring will perform best.

While it is clearly understood and fully supported by the NEMA industry members that the installation wiring for lifesafety and emergency signaling systems need to survive worst case conditions, the determination for proper systemwiring types should remain the responsibility of the system manufacturer and the wiring used should be in accordancewith recognized industry standards.

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Revise text to read as follows:All conductors

or cables shall be installed using any of the metal wiring methods permitted by 708.10(C)(1) and in addition shall complywith 708.14(1) through (8), as applicable.

(1) All cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems, and emergency communications shall be shielded twisted paircables.

(2) Shields of cables for fire alarm, security, signal systems, and emergency communications shall be continuous.(3) Optical fiber cables shall be used for connections between two or more buildings on the property and under single

management.(4) A listed primary protector shall be provided on all communications circuits. Listed secondary protectors shall be

provided at the terminals of the communication circuits.(5) Conductors for all control circuits rated above 50 volts shall be rated not less than 600 volts.(6) Communications, fire alarm, and signaling circuits shall use relays with contact ratings that exceed circuit voltage

and current ratings in the controlled circuit.(7) All cables for fire alarm, security, and signaling systems shall be riser-rated and shall be a listed 2-hour electrical

circuit protective system. Riser emergency Emergency communication cables shall be Type CMR-CI or shall beriser-rated and a listed 2-hour electrical circuit protective system.

(8) Control, monitoring, and power wiring to HVAC systems shall be a listed 2-hour electrical circuit protective system.In the absence of this added requirement, the cables would be permitted to be simply appropriate from

the point of view of maintaining circuit integrity but would be permitted to have poor fire performance because no ratingin terms of reaction-to-fire (flame spread) is required. This is not safe and is not consistent with the requirements for firealarm, security, and signaling system cables in the first sentence. If the cable is not required to be “riser-rated” it canspread flame beyond what is desirable. The word “riser” is proposed to be deleted from the start of the sentencebecause it can create confusion: CMR (or CMR-CI) cables are riser-rated cables but listed 2-hour cables are not and thesentence could be taken not to require them to be riser-rated.

Note that fire alarm cables can also be listed as being both circuit integrity listed and riser-rated; the listing exists forFPLR-CI cables (see 760.2 and 760.154).

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Add text to read as follows:(A) Current supply shall be such that, in the event of failure of the normal supply to the

DCOA, critical operations power shall be available within the time required for the application, based on the Category ofCOPS as defined in (1) through (4) below. The supply system for critical operations power, in addition to the normalservices to the building and meeting the general requirements of this section, shall be one or more of the types ofsystems described in 708.20(E) through (H).

(1) Category I – Power to the Category I COPS is required to either remain operational throughout the disaster or to beimmediately restorable to service at the end of the event; any equipment that shuts off during the disaster can berestarted without requiring equipment repair. On-site generation capable of supporting the DCOA with only refuelingand minor servicing which can be performed without loss of power to the DCOA while servicing is required.

(2) Category II – Power to Category II COPS is required to survive the disaster or be restored to operation with on-siteparts within 4 hours. On-site generation would normally be required, unless the utility infrastructure was sufficientlyrobust that utility power would be restored in 4 hours.

(3) Category III – Power to Category III COPS is required to be restorable to operation within 24 hours. Temporary oron-site generation would be required if utility power could not be restored in 24 hours. Where on-site generation has notbeen deemed necessary because of the robustness of the utility infrastructure, a means to connect a temporarygenerator shall be installed.

(4) Category IV – Power to Category IV COPS is required to be restorable to operation within 24 hours of the timeutility power, water and sewage disposal are available to the facility. Temporary or on-site generation would not berequired.

The requirement for the various types of COPS should align with the importance of the criticalsystems to the protection of life and property. A set of specific requirements for the various levels of criticality providesdesign criteria for consistent application.

The classifying governmental agency having jurisdiction would benefit from a gradient level of criticality, which providesa means to ensure the most critical systems have the resources allocated to them so that they are available whenneeded to deliver emergency services and provide for disaster recovery. Without a gradient scale, fewer systems canbe addressed because they would all require the most extensive amount of resources

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-173 Log #2271 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________Leo F. Martin, Sr., Martin Electrical Consulting

Add an additional sentence to read: The disconnecting means shall meet the requirements of225.36.

700.12(B)(5) and 702.12 all read the same and reference the requirements for disconnecting means225.36.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-175 Log #743 NEC-P13


Revise text to read as follows:Ground-fault protection for operation of the service and feeder disconnecting means shall be fully

selective such that the feeder device, but not the service device, shall open on ground faults on the load side of thefeeder device. A six-cycle minimum separation between the service and feeder ground-fault tripping bands shall beprovided. Operating time of the disconnecting devices shall be considered in selecting the time spread between thesetwo bands to achieve 100 percent selectivity. Separation of ground-fault protection time-current characteristics shallconform to manufacturer’s recommendations and shall consider all required tolerances and disconnect operating time toachieve 100 percent selectivity.

In the 2008 Code, the text in 517.17(C) and 708.52(D) was identical. In the 2011 Code the text in517.17(C) was revised but the text in 708.52(D) was not. Acceptance of this proposal will once again bring 708.52(D)into alignment with 517.17(C). The result will be an improvement in selective coordination in COPS.

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Critical operations power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply sideovercurrent protective devices. Selective Coordination shall be selected by a licensed professional engineer or otherqualified persons engaged primarily in the design, installation, or maintenance of electrical systems. The selection shallbe documented and made available to those authorized to design, install, inspect, maintain, and operate the system.

Currently, Selective Coordination is not being uniformly enforced or not enforced at all. This additionallanguage identifies who is responsible for the design and insures that the completed project will be coordinated. It alsowill provide verification documentation for the AHJ, which can become part of the construction documents. The designprofessional is the only one who has overall control of the selective coordination system. The electrical gearmanufacturer is only going to coordinate his equipment, which means that the generator and ATS are generally left outof system coordination due to the fact the gear supplier has no control of it. This process has been used in a fewjurisdictions and has met with great success without adding a burden to the AHJ.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-177 Log #813 NEC-P13



In comparing the requirement for Critical Operations Power Systems selective coordination to those foremergency and legally required standby systems, there appears to be some text missing. Adding the same exceptionas in 700.27 and 701.27 will be an improvement in selective coordination in COPS.

_______________________________________________________________________________________________13-178 Log #3444 NEC-P13

_______________________________________________________________________________________________James R. Steed, ARCADIS

Revise text to read as follows:Critical operation power system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all

supply side overcurrent protective devices.Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required between two overcurrent devices located in series if no loads

are connected in parallel with the downstream device.The requirements for selective coordination differ between sections of the code. Adding the exception

to 708.54, equalizes the requirements between 708.54 and 700.27, Coordination, and 701.27, Coordination.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert H. Wills, Intergrid, LLC


This article applies to electric power systems consisting of one or more dc sources, dc-dc converters, dc-ac inverters,wiring, switchgear and dc utilization equipment. This article also applies to multiplexed and pulse-dc power systems.

A direct current microgrid is a power distribution system consisting of one or moreinterconnected sources, dc-dc converters, dc loads, and ac loads powered by dc-ac inverters. A dc Microgrid is typicallynot directly connected to a primary source of electricity, but may interconnect via one or more bidirectional ac-dcinverters.

Direct current sources for dc microgrids include ac-dc rectifiers, bidirectional ac-dc inverters orgateways, photovoltaic systems, wind generators, batteries, fuel cells, etc.

A two-wire dc power system that has a direct connection between one of the currentcarrying conductors and the equipment grounding system.

A dc power system that has no direct or resistive connection between one of the currentcarrying conductors and the equipment grounding system.

A dc power system that uses a resistive connection between one of the currentcarrying conductors and the equipment grounding system to stabilize voltage to ground.

A dc power system that uses a solid connection between the center point of a bipolar dcsource and the equipment grounding system to stabilize voltage to ground.

A nominal value assigned to a circuit or system for the purpose of conveniently designating its dcvoltage class (e.g., 24 volts dc, 190/380 volts dc, 380 volts dc). The actual voltage at which a circuit operates can varyfrom the nominal within a range that permits satisfactory operation of equipment.Informational Note: See EMerge xxx

A dc power system that distributes dc power to multiple loads by switching loads onand off in sequence.

A dc power distribution system where the power sources supply pulsating rather than continuousdirect current.

Wherever the requirements of other articles of this and Article 7xx differ, the requirements of Article 7xx shallapply.

Any equipment used in a direct-current micro-grid is required to be listed or labeled for dc use and for the purpose.

. Circuit conductors in dc microgrids shall be color coded as required by (a)through (c):(a) Grounded Conductor. Grounded current-carrying conductors of dc microgrids shall be identified in accordance with200.6,(b) Equipment Grounding Conductor. Equipment grounding conductors of dc microgrids shall be identified in accordancewith 250.119.(c) Identification of Ungrounded Conductors. Ungrounded conductors of dc microgrids shall be identified in accordance(1), (2), or (3):(1) Application. Where single conductors are used, each ungrounded conductor of the dc system shall be permitted tobe identified by polarity at all terminations, connections, and splice points for conductors 6 AWG or smaller as follows:(a) Durably marked by printing +/–, pos/neg, or positive/negative on the insulation or the jacket over the singleinsulated conductors, where applicable, at a maximum of 610 mm (24 in) interval in accordance with 310.120(B);(b) a solid color (red for positive, black for negative) for the insulation or the jacket over single-insulated conductors,where applicable; or(c) a continuous colored stripe of black for negative, red for positive for the entire length of the conductor colored other

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Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70than green, white or gray, over the outermost layer of single-insulated conductors, where applicable.

. Disconnecting means and overcurrent devices are required to open allungrounded conductors on ungrounded, resistively grounded, or three-wire dc systems.

. Disconnecting means and overcurrent devices that use magnetic quenchingof dc arcs and that are designed for a single current direction shall only be used in the designated current direction.

[TBD]

Direct-current microgrids shall be grounded in accordance with 7xx.52(A),(B) or (C):A 2-wire, dc microgrid system operating at greater than 50 volts but not

greater than 300 volts shall be grounded.. The neutral conductor of all 3-wire, dc systems shall be grounded.

may be grounded,ungrounded, or resistively grounded.

Three-wire grounded systems with bipolar sources are required to have sufficient fault currentcapacity to be able to trip the largest branch or feeder overcurrent device in the system.

. DC microgrids operating at over 300V dc require ground fault protection that:(a) Detects the fault(b) Indicates that a fault has occurred(c) Disconnects power from the faulted equipment.

.[As there is presently no commercial equipment available for dc arc-fault detection, this heading is a place-holder. It isexpected that dc arc-fault equipment will become available (for example as developed and required in photovoltaicsystems) during this 2014 code cycle].

. Panelboards in dc microgrid systems shall be marked with the nominal voltage,grounding system and polarity (if appropriate) of the power system.

Consideration shall be given to the contribution of fault currentsfrom all interconnected power sources for the interrupting and short-circuit current ratings of equipment on Microgridsystems. Circuit protection devices used within a dc microgrid shall have a rated interrupting capacity greater than theavailable fault current at the device location.

Systems with a maximum voltage between conductors of over 600 volts dc shall comply with Article 490 and otherrequirements applicable to installations rated over 600 volts.

This proposal was developed by a subgroup of the NEC DC Task Force of the Technical CorrelatingCommittee. The Task Force is chaired by John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories. The subgroup members areRobert Wills, Intergrid, LLC - subgroup lead), Audie Spina (Armstrong Industries) and David Geary (Starline DCSolutions).

There is an increasing interest in direct-connection of direct current generation sources and direct current loads, suchas LED lighting, communications equipment, computers & servers, variable-speed motor drives, etc.Direct utilization of dc, whether generated by PV, fuel cells, or other means, without intervening dc-ac and ac-dcconversion steps leads to higher efficiencies and potentially smaller and lower-cost equipment.While the basic requirements for wiring methods, over-current protection and grounding are specified in other parts ofthe , they do not cover all of the issues involved when dc multiple sources and dc loads are interconnected in abuilding.

We see this new, proposed article as a strong first-pass and a place-holder for future requirements in this rapidlydeveloping area of dc micro-grids. The TCC DC Task Force plans to continue development of this Article through thiscode cycle.Here are some of the key issues:1. DC has a much higher arcing capability as it lacks the 120Hz nulls of 60 Hz ac. This leads to the use of:

- ungrounded systems- ground-fault and arc-fault detection and de-energization.

2. An ungrounded system requires multi-pole circuit breakers.

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Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 703. An ungrounded system will not trip branch breakers given a single equipment ground fault. The fault will beobserved throughout the system, but localization can be a difficult process.4. DC breakers and switchgear are often “uni-directional” due to the use of permanent magnets to extinguisharcs. This point needs to be brought out in code.5. Polarity Vs phase6. Wire and cabling issues (no reactance, no skin effect)7. Insulation breakdown8. Availability of switches and breakers – does a breaker in each pole equal two poles in series?9. UL489 vs .. 1077 supplementary protectors. (not suitable for branch circuit protection).10. Breaker as a switch11. Hybrid breakers and switches that include semiconductor elements.12. Ground fault detection and isolation; residual current circuit protection (RCD)13. The need for faster acting circuit protection14. The need for improved circuit protection coordination and overall system control.

The DC Task Group discussed the location and title of this proposed new article. As written, it is targeted at Chapter 7(Special Conditions). It is similar to other Chapter 7 Articles such as 705 and 720 in scope. There was also thesuggestion that the scope and title be broadened to “Direct Current Electrical Systems” and that the Article be insertedin Chapter 2 (Wiring and Protection). We look forward to Panel and TCC input and direction in this area.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Alan Manche, Schneider Electric


This article applies to the installation and operation of energy management systems.Informational Note: Performance provisions in other codes establish prescriptive requirements that may further restrict

the requirements contained in this article.For the purpose of this article the following definitions shall apply.

The predetermined process of connecting, disconnecting, increasing, or reducing electric power.A system consisting of any of the following: monitor(s), communication equipment,

controller(s), timer(s), or other device(s), that monitors and /or controls an electrical load or a power production orstorage source.

An electrical or electronic means to observe, record, or detect the operation or condition of the electric powersystem or apparatus.

An energy management system shall not override any control necessary to ensurecontinuity of an alternate power source for the following:

(1) fire pumps(2) health care facilities(3) emergency systems(4) legally required standby systems(5) critical operations power systems

Energy management systems shall be permitted to monitor and control electrical loadsunless restricted in accordance with any of the following:

(A) An energy management system shall not override the load shedding controls put in place to ensure the minimumelectrical capacity for the following:

(1) fire pumps(2) emergency systems(3) legally required standby systems(4) critical operations power systems(B) An energy management system shall not be permitted to cause disconnection of power to the following:(1) elevators, escalators, moving walks, or stairway lift chairs.(2) positive mechanical ventilation for hazardous (classified) locations(3) ventilation used to exhaust hazardous gas or reclassify an area(4) circuits supply emergency lighting(5) the essential electrical system in health care facilities(C) An energy management system shall not cause the capacity of a branch circuit, feeder, or service to be exceeded

at any time.Where an energy management system is employed to control electric power through the use

of a remote means, a directory identifying the controlled device(s) and circuit(s) shall be posted on the enclosure of thecontroller, disconnect, or branch circuit overcurrent device.

Informational Note: The use of the term “remote” is intended to convey that a controller can be operated via anothermeans or location through communications without a direct operator interface with the controlled device.

This proposal is the work of the “Smart Grid Task Group” appointed by the Technical CorrelatingCommittee. The task group consisted of the following members: Neil LaBrake, Vince Baclawski, Todd Stafford, MikeHyland, Kent Donohue, Jeff Silveira, Keith Lofland, David Wollman, Bill Moncrief, Bob McCullough, Allen Hefner, DavidHolmberg and Alan Manche.

The Task Group identified two key areas of focus which included interconnection and energy management systems.Information from the Fire Protection Research Foundation Report - Smart Grid and NFPA Electrical Safety Codes andStandards also served as a resource for the TG.

Energy Management has become common place in today’s electrical infrastructure through the control of utilizationequipment, energy storage and power production. Installation codes currently establish requirements for utilizationequipment, energy storage and power production that serve to address facility and personnel safety, however limitedconsideration has been given in installation codes to actively managing these systems as a means to reduce energy

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Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70cost or support peak power needs for a much broader electrical infrastructure demand. This new article is proposed asArticle 750 as it is a “special system” (not a special occupancy or special equipment) as it potentially can serve acrossthe entire electrical system. It may be appropriate to group in a code panel with other articles that have similar scopes ofaddressing system controls such as electrified truck parking, elevators, and electric vehicle charging controls.

Energy Management has two basic aspects, monitoring the system and controlling some aspect of the system. Thesetwo basic elements must be separated in order to permit an energy management system to monitor and possibly restrictthose areas of control that would adversely impact the electrical system. Initial thoughts were to restrict energymanagement from controlling emergency systems or fire pumps, however the NEC already permits alternate energysources to be load managed with a priority assigned to those loads. The most important aspect here is to make sure anoverall energy management system does not override a system specific to addressing load shedding for an alternatepower source for fire pumps and emergency systems.

Restricting the control of the system by the energy management system becomes critical to ensure safety. Forinstance turning off ventilation systems for hazardous materials or a moving walkway causing someone to fall areexamples or where load management control needs to be restricted in the NEC.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Michael A. Anthony, University of Michigan

Add two new sections to Annex F:For critical operations power

systems, risk assessment should be performed to identify hazards, the likelihood of their occurrence, and thevulnerability of the electrical system to those hazards. The thoroughness of the risk assessment should be appropriateto the level of criticality of the facility. One method, though not the only method for determining the criticality of theCOPS to the protection of life and property is to group them into categories as follows:

(1) DefinitionsCategory I – Systems that have been designated to remain operational for emergency services to function. These

facilities are required to remain operational during the event or be immediately restorable after the event. “Immediatelyrestorable” is to means no significant repair required, just manual switching or similar operational procedures arerequired to restore the system to operation.

Category II – Systems that have been designated to significantly contribute to the delivery of emergency services orare essential for disaster recovery. These facilities are required to be restorable to operation within 4 hours after theevent. Therefore any repair required to get the system back into service would have to be able to be accomplished byon-site personnel with on-site parts and equipment.

Category III – Systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are not immediatelyessential for providing emergency services. Category III systems are typically restorable to operation within 24 hoursafter the event. Repairs may require the assistance of off-site parts and service personnel.

Category IV – Critical systems that have significant impact on the protection of life and property, but are notimmediately essential, as there are multiple facilities providing the same function. Category IV systems are typicallyrestorable to operation within 24 hours of the time utility power, water and sewage disposal are available to the facility.

(2) Risk Assessments(a) Category I risk assessment should include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram

(RBD) for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9999 and a mean time to repair ofless than 1.0 hours. The probabilistic modeling should also include naturally occurring hazards, such as earthquakes,floods, hurricanes and snow/ice storms to the extent that weather data is available. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) forwhich there is no data available, such as human-caused events, the risk assessment should include a systematicmethod analysis, such as a fault tree. The analysis should include what types of human-caused events are most likely tocause the COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.

(b) Category II risk assessment should include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram(RBD) for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9995 and a mean time to repair of4.0 hours or less. The probabilistic modeling should also include naturally occurring hazards, such as earthquakes,floods, hurricanes and snow/ice storms to the extent that weather data is available. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) forwhich there is no data available, such as human-caused events, the risk assessment should include a systematicmethod analysis, such as a fault tree. The analysis should include what types of human-caused events are most likely tocause the COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.

(c) Category III risk assessment should include probabilistic modeling, such as fault tree or reliability block diagram(RBD) for the electrical power to the Category I systems to verify an availability of 0.9973 and a mean time to repair of24.0 hours or less. For hazards listed in 708.4 (B) the analysis should include what types of events are most likely tocause the COPS to be taken out of service with a mitigation strategy to minimize the probability of it occurring.

(d) Category IV risk assessment should include what types of events are most likely to cause the COPS to be takenout of service with a mitigation strategyto minimize the probability of it occurring. Probabilistic modeling is not required.

(3) Commissioning(a) Category I shall include the performance and documentation of electrical acceptance testing of the components in

the critical electrical distribution system, startup and functional testing of the major subsystems such as generators,automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of the critical load. AnIntegrated Systems Test shall also be performed in which load banks are connected to the critical distribution panelsand the operation of the electrical and mechanical systems are verified under critical electrical design load conditions.

(b) Category II shall include the performance and documentation of electrical acceptance testing of the components inthe critical electrical distribution system, startup and functional testing of the major subsystems such as generators,

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Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of the critical load.

(c) Category III shall include the performance and documentation of startup and functional testing of the majorsubsystems such as generators, automatic transfer switches, UPS systems and the mechanical equipment for thecooling system of the critical load.

(d) Category IV shall include the performance and documentation of startup and functional testing of the majorcomponents in the critical electrical distribution system and the mechanical equipment for the cooling system of thecritical load

Another possible approach based upon an A, B, C, Drating (A being the best and D being the worst) is the following:

A. Emergency responders would require the highest grade because of the nature of their operations. Locations suchas Fire and Police stations would require the highest availability of Power.

B. Next would be FEMA locations requiring coordination of first responders. This includes the individual stateemergency response centers as well.

C. Hospitals and emergency shelters.D. Services such as water and sewer operations providing essential services to maintain a healthy environment for the

general population.Each level is identified by the required power infrastructure similar to the Data Center Tier system. For example Awould be a redundant power system exhibiting six 9”s of availability. etc… In addition a re-evaluation must take place ina 5 year period to ensure these locations maintain the level of operational readiness.

To make Article 708 a more effective tool, we need broaden the vocabulary and provide technicaldirection for the agencies who are responsible for its implementation. The classifying governmental agency havingjurisdiction would benefit from a gradient level of criticality for the facilities that has specific operation guidelines. Itprovides the framework by which the jurisdiction can evaluate the criticality of all of their facilities relative to each otherand thus provides a means to ensure the most critical systems are recognized as such and have the resourcesallocated to them so that they are available when needed to deliver emergency services and provide for disasterrecovery. Without a gradient scale, fewer resources would be available to the most critical systems because all of thecritical facilities would require the same amount of resources. The requirement for the various types of critical systemsneeds to align with the importance of the system to the protection of life and property. A set of specific operationalrequirements for the various levels of criticality is needed to provide design criteria and for consistent application. Agradient level of risk assessment with probabilistic modeling provides a quantitative method to ensure the most criticalsystems have been designed sufficiently robust so that they are available when needed to deliver emergency servicesand provide for disaster recovery.

All of the proposed text originated in material presented to this committee during the 2011 NEC revision cycle byRobert Schuerger and Robert G. Arno.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert G. Arno, ITT Information Systems

Please add a new Annex X (Power System Reliability), that builds upon the reliability basics thatnow appear in Annex F.

I. Definitions. (A) Failure for this system is defined as “failure to have power available to the fire pump”. NOTE: Forthis analysis, power has to be available continuously during the entire time period. The probability of losing power to thefire pump AND HAVING A FIRE AT THE SAME TIME has not been addressed.

(B) Mission time for this analysis is one year (8760 hours)(C) Reliability data for the analysis is from IEEE Std 493-2007.1. Reliability – the ability of a component or system to perform required functions under stated conditions for stated

periods of time.2. Mean time between failures (MTBF) – the mean exposure time between consecutive failures of a component3. Mean time to repair (MTTR) – the mean time to replace or repair a failed component. Logistics time associated with

the repair, such as parts acquisitions, crew mobilization, are not included.II. Reliability of utility power sourcei. This example was performed using the MTBF and MTTR data from IEEE Std 493-2007.1. Single utility source: MTBF = 4,478.5 hours; MTTR = 1.32 hours2. Two utility sources from separate substations: MTBF = 27,077 hours; MTTR = 0.52 hoursii. Site specific reliability data should be obtained from the utility and used for the analysis, if available. Caution: be

sure to include all types of failures, including failures caused by the weather in the calculation of the reliability of thespecific utility feeder or substation.

III. The fire pump is driven by an electric motor. Electric power is delivered to the motor via a motor starter. The motorstarter is fed from the output of an automatic transfer switch (ATS). Electric power from the utility is fed to the normalinput of the ATS. Electric power from a standby generator is fed to the emergency input of the ATS. If the utility powerfails, the ATS is expected to signal the generator to start and run, and to switch over to use this standby power source.A simplified one-line diagram describing this system is Figure X.1.

IV. A fault tree describing the logic of failure, based on the definition above appears in Figure X.2 Names in calloutboxes in the one-line diagram are the names of basic events in the fault tree. Basic events have been organized intotables to simplify the appearance of the fault tree Figure X.3.

V. The data used for assemblies in the RBD is as follows:

******Insert Table #1 Here******

VI. In Addition to the data given in VI above, two probabilities were also included:(A) The probability of the engine-generator starting is 0.99394(B) The probability of the ATS transferring is 0.99VII. Various software packages are available to perform the statistical calculation. In this case, SAPHIRE ver. 6.80,

was used to calculate the unreliability and unavailability of the system. The results appear in Figure X.4VIIII. The results of the reliability analysis are as follows:


I have provided the following:X.1: One Line DiagramX.2: Fault Tree

As surely as voltage and voltage drop during locked-rotor conditions are essential characteristics of afire pump system so should the reliability (and availability) of a fire pump system be considered an essentialcharacteristic. Methods to assess reliability should be quantitatively informed so that the Authority Having Jurisdiction

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70/Log #3348/Table #1/A2013/ROP/Rec

Description MTBF (Hours)

MTTR (Hours)

Transformer 2,642,019 37.23

Fused Disconnect 3,829,588 3.95

Generator 545.1 4.10

Circuit Breaker 2,644,087 1.52

ATS 101,642 5.73

Motor and Starter 348,699 7.96


Description of Fault Tree Probability of

Failure - 1 Year Unavailability Availability Power to Fire Pump - single utility & generator

12.33% 0.0001077 0.9998923

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70has the information necessary to make the appropriate determination about whether or not the utility supply alone isavailable enough to avoid the capital expenditure of a fire pump in those situations where a fire pump is optional. Innon-high rise buildings the fire pump supply may be derived from a protected tap ahead of the main. In the case ahigh-rise facility, most jurisdictions require that the utility supply be supplemented with a fire pump as shown in thisexample

At present, the electrical engineer asks about the historical availability of the local utility supply and the Fire Marshallmakes the decision upon anecdotes and facility history. We need to migrate away from this practice. Gettingquantitative reliability concepts tracking in the NEC will provide both the Fire Marshalls and the electrical engineersdesigning the system with tools to perform actual analysis. At the moment there is only a reference to

that now appear inArticle 700. Placing reliability methods into the NEC – to join the other arithmetic methods shown in the 13 examples ofAnnex D will have the practical effect of conveying quantitative methods into the toolbox of the next generation ofelectrical power engineers.

Validation of quantitative methods like this appear in the last ROP of NFPA 20, the Fire Pump Code, regardingElectronic Fuel Management Control. 20-107 Log #57, (11.2.4.3.2)

This proposal, and related, coordinating proposals to be submitted to other technical committee have been prepared bythe following individuals:

Michael A. Anthony (University of Michigan)Neal Dowling (MTechnology)Robert Schuerger (HP Critical Facilities Services)Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.

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_______________________________________________________________________________________________Robert G. Arno, ITT Information Systems

I. Definitions. (A) Failure for this system is defined as “failure to have power available to the fire pump”. NOTE: Forthis analysis, power has to be available continuously during the entire time period. The probability of losing power to thefire pump AND HAVING A FIRE AT THE SAME TIME has not been addressed. (B) Mission time for this analysis is oneyear (8760 hours) and five years (43,800 hours).(C) Reliability data for the analysis is from IEEE Std 493-2007.

1. Reliability – the ability of a component or system to perform required functions under stated conditions for statedperiods of time.

2. Mean time between failures (MTBF) – the mean exposure time between consecutive failures of a component3. Mean time to repair (MTTR) – the mean time to replace or repair a failed component. Logistics time associated with

the repair, such as parts acquisitions, crew mobilization, are not included.II. Reliability of utility power sourcei. This example was performed using the MTBF and MTTR data from IEEE Std 493-2007.1. Single utility source: MTBF = 4,478.5 hours; MTTR = 1.32 hours2. Two utility sources from separate substations: MTBF = 27,077 hours; MTTR = 0.52 hoursii. Site specific reliability data should be obtained from the utility and used for the analysis, if available. Caution: be

sure to include all types of failures, including failures caused by the weather in the calculation of the reliability of thespecific utility feeder or substation.

III. Systems analyzedi. Three systems were analyzed:1. Single utility source supplying power to the fire pump motor2. Two separate utility source supplying power to the fire pump motor using an automatic transfer switch (ATS)3. Single utility source and a standby generator supplying power to the fire pump motor using an automatic transfer

switch (ATS)ii. The fire pump system

1. The fire pump motor is fed thru a motor starter and fused disconnect switch. The fuse is sized much larger than themotor load or starting current, so it would only open on an electrical fault, not an overload.

2. For the two systems with an alternate source of power and an ATS, the ATS is between the fused disconnect switchand the motor starter.

IV. The Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) used for the analysis is shown in Figure X.2. Names in callout boxes in theone-line diagram are the names of basic events in the fault tree. Basic events have been organized into tables tosimplify the appearance of the fault tree Figure X.3.

V. Each individual block in the RBD is an assembly of several parts. For example, the block “motor and starter”consists of a motor, a motor starter, cable and cable connections. Each of the parts have failure and repair data thathas been totaled to make the failure and repair data for the assembly.

VI. The data used for assemblies in the RBD is as follows:


I. In Addition to the data given in VI above, two probabilities were also included:(A) The probability of the engine-generator starting is 0.99394(B) The probability of the ATS transferring is 0.99II. The results of the reliability analysis are as follows:


Attachments:

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Description MTBF (Hours)

MTTR (Hours)

Transformer 2,642,019 37.23

Fused Disconnect 3,829,588 3.95

Generator 545.1 4.10

Circuit Breaker 2,644,087 1.52

ATS 101,642 5.73

Motor and Starter 348,699 7.96


Description of RBD

MTBF (hours)

MTTR (hours) Availability

Probability of Failure -

1 YR

Probability of Failure -

5 YR Power to Fire Pump - single utility source

4,409 1.47 0.9996663 86.38% 99.99%

Power to Fire Pump - dual utility source

20,689 2.07 0.9999025 34.58% 87.92%

Power to Fire Pump - single utility & generator

64,373 4.84 0.9999169 12.47% 48.99%

Report on Proposals – June 2013 NFPA 70X.1: One Line DiagramX.2: Reliability Block Diagram (supporting material)

As surely as voltage and voltage drop during locked-rotor conditions are essential characteristics of afire pump system so should the reliability (and availability) of a fire pump system be considered an essentialcharacteristic. Methods to assess reliability should be quantitatively informed so that the Authority Having Jurisdictionhas the information necessary to make the appropriate determination about whether or not the utility supply alone isavailable enough to avoid the capital expenditure of a fire pump in those situations where a fire pump is optional. Innon-high rise buildings the fire pump supply may be derived from a protected tap ahead of the main. In the case ahigh-rise facility, most jurisdictions require that the utility supply be supplemented with a fire pump as shown in thisexample

At present, the electrical engineer asks about the historical availability of the local utility supply and the Fire Marshallmakes the decision upon anecdotes and facility history. We need to migrate away from this practice. Gettingquantitative reliability concepts tracking in the NEC will provide both the Fire Marshalls and the electrical engineersdesigning the system with tools to perform actual analysis. At the moment there is only a reference to

that now appear inArticle 700. Placing reliability methods into the NEC – to join the other arithmetic methods shown in the 13 examples ofAnnex D will have the practical effect of conveying quantitative methods into the toolbox of the next generation ofelectrical power engineers.

This proposal, and related, coordinating proposals to be submitted to other technical committee have been prepared bythe following individuals:

Michael A. Anthony (University of Michigan)Robert Arno (IT Technology)Neal Dowling (MT Technology)

104Printed on 11/25/2011

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