Natalia Sobrevilla - The Enduring Power of Patronage in Peruvian Elections: Quispicanchis, 1860

The Enduring Power of Patronage in Peruvian Elections: Quispicanchis,1860

Natalia Sobrevilla Perea

The Americas, Volume 67, Number 1, July 2010, pp. 31-55 (Article)

Published by The Academy of American Franciscan HistoryDOI: 10.1353/tam.0.0300

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THE ENDURING POWER OF PATRONAGE

IN PERUVIAN ELECTIONS:Quispicanchis, 1860

Political patronage was at the very basis of society’s functioning in nine-teenth-century Latin America, yet we still know very little about its innerdynamics. Recent analyses of national politics have questioned the idea that

Latin American elections were restrictive and fraudulent, or that there was noeffective citizenship.1 These studies have widened the understanding of politicalparticipation, and have argued persuasively for the agency of those who had beenpreviously reduced to the background. Leading scholars have stressed the impor-tance of early widespread suffrage and electoral mobilization in Latin America,noting that detailed analysis of local power struggles promise to reveal the dynam-ics of social structures and electoral politics.2 This new literature has also firmlyestablished that in Latin America the process through which this happened wasnot linear, as generous voting rights were often restricted over time.

The result has been an abandonment of the more traditional view of nineteenth-century elections as a farce or mere class instrument. As Marta Irurozqui hasasserted, seeing the electoral marketplace as a space for competition—even ifvoters did not always act as the autonomous, free citizen envisioned by liberals—established the principle that authority had to emerge from periodic elections,

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COPYRIGHT BY THE ACADEMY OFAMERICAN FRANCISCAN HISTORY

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Research was funded by the University of London and was made possible thanks to the generosity of Ada Arrieta andMarta Solano at the Instituto Riva Agüero in Lima and the staff of the Archivo Regional del Cuzco. A previous versionwas presented in LASA Puerto Rico, March 2006 as “Las Elecciones a la diputación de Quispicanchis en 1860.” I amgrateful to Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Iñigo García-Bryce and the two anonymous reviewers of The Americas for their com-ments, as well as to Richard Warren for his help editing the final manuscript. I am particularly indebted to Vincent Pelosofor his unwavering support. His insights have greatly improved this work. All shortcomings remain my own.

1. For an excellent review of historiography on elections see Marta Irurozqui, “La Ciudadanía en debate enAmérica Latina. Discusiones historiográficas y una propuesta teórica sobre el valor público de la infracción electoral,”Documento de Trabajo 139 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruano, 2004), p. 15. See also the comparative studies by Anto-nio Annino, Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995), CarlosMalamud, Elecciones y partidos políticos en América Latina y la Península Ibérica, 1830-1930, (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1995),and Eduardo Posada Carbó, Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America (London:MacMillan, 1996).

2. Posada Carbó, Elections before Democracy, p. 5 and Annino, Historia de las elecciones, p. 15.

giving way to a new conception of political legitimacy.3 Irurozqui has also notedthat authors interested in the electoral behavior of elites have questioned the ideathat elections were simply the reproduction of pre-arranged agreements. Thesestudies suggest a potential dilemma faced by elites: how to reconcile their ownpolitical control, the legitimacy of the political system, and the unknowns of elec-tions.4 This study examines this dilemma and contributes to this discussion, as itdeparts from most work on elections in two ways. First, it focuses on a campaignfor a seat in Congress in a rural area instead of a presidential campaign in a maincity. This perspective allows for a fresh view of the local dynamics of power, andmakes it possible to shed light on how provincial and national elites workedtogether to resolve the electoral dilemma. Second, it analyzes in detail theendurance of a patron-client system weathering the mid-century liberal reformmovements, a subject to which scant attention has been paid.

The following detailed analysis of the battle for a seat in the Peruvian nationalCongress representing Quispicanchis, a typical provincial center in the Depart-ment of Cuzco, illustrates how patronage continued to guide the politicalprocess despite a successful election reform that gave individuals greater access tothe polls. Quispicanchis was chosen because it was the province where Manuelde Mendiburu, a major figure in mid-nineteenth century Peruvian political soci-ety, ran for a seat in the national Parliament in 1860. Mendiburu, a man whosearistocratic background and connections allowed him to enjoy an illustriouscareer as a military officer, politician, and confidant of many powerful individu-als on both sides of the liberal-conservative divide, also enjoyed a reputation asan extraordinary amanuensis, and later in life an accomplished historian; he wenton to write a ten-volume Diccionario Histórico Biográfico of Peru. One mighthave expected Mendiburu to have been reluctant to enter politics at a time ofradical liberal reform, since he had been a very powerful member of the govern-ment that Ramón Castilla overthrew. As Minister of Finance, he had signed anagreement in London to convert Peruvian debt into bonds, and thus he wasblamed for being the author of the consolidation policy that was the central actof the government of José Rufino Echenique (1851-1854). Yet, given his con-nections and his talents, he was encouraged to run by some of the reformers whoknew him well and trusted him. Highly skilled in the use of patronage to getthings done in the public sphere as well as in the private sector, he returned topolitics hoping to clear his name. 5

32 THE ENDURING POWER OF PATRONAGE IN PERUVIAN ELECTIONS

3. Irurozqui, “La Ciudadanía en debate en América Latina,” p. 21, 26.4. Ibid., p. 28.5. For him as a historian, see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Soldier and Scribe: Manuel de Mendiburu and Biogra-

phy” paper presented at the workshop, “Writing the Republic: Historical Writing in Nineteenth-Century Spanish Amer-ica,” University of Warwick, 7 November 2008.

This article is structured in four sections. The first, “Background to the 1860Election,” looks at the context that led to this election, explaining why the admin-istration worked so hard to ensure that the candidates selected would supportconstitutional change. The second section, “Mendiburu’s Electoral Campaign,”presents the actors involved in the electoral process and how patronage was prac-ticed. The following section, “The Seat of Quispicanchis,” details the events thattook place after the ballots were cast. It shows how seats in Congress were con-firmed, paying particular attention to the political maneuvering at the national,departmental and local level. The final section, “The 1860 Congress,” concludeswith a reflection on the results of the election and how patronage was used to per-petuate local and national elites in power.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1860 ELECTION

At mid-century the struggle between liberals, conservatives, and radicals was evi-dent in all of Hispanic America. As the great upheavals that followed independ-ence diminished, a second wave of more ideologically charged conflict ensued,influenced by the 1848 European revolutions.6 The results were mixed. Somecountries, like Mexico, entered into a prolonged period of instability during theWars of the Reform. Similarly in Colombia, radicals introduced universal male suf-frage and direct elections in the 1850s, and the country soon faced recurrent civilwars.7 In other places, most notably Chile, those in power made incrementalchanges after defeating revolutions, and were able to maintain a large degree ofstability.8 In Peru, liberals came to power through revolution and were initiallyable to introduce the innovations they had campaigned for, but their success wasshort-lived. Peruvian liberals had sought electoral reform since the 1840s, butthey failed to win an important presidential election in 1851. They revolted in1853 and backed ex-President Ramón Castilla, the General who had governedPeru during the years of economic expansion fueled by the export of the naturalfertilizer, guano. During the revolution some of the policies liberals had been pro-moting for over a decade, including the abolition of slavery and of the Indianhead tax, were enacted. After the victory in early 1855 the most radical membersof the governing parliamentary coalition were able to impose an electoral direc-tive that allowed all adult men to vote for the one-house National Convention. Inturn, the Convention began drafting a new constitution.

NATALIA SOBREVILLA PEREA 33

6. For the influence of 1848 in Latin America see Guy Thompson, ed. The European Revolutions of 1848 and theAmericas (London: ILAS, 2002).

7. James E. Sanders, Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race and Class in Nineteenth-Century Colombia(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).

8. Maurice Zeitlin, The Civil Wars in Chile or the Bourgeois Revolutions that Never Were (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1984).

Broad participation in elections had been the norm since the 1812 Cádiz Consti-tution, when illiterates were first allowed to vote. However, electoral colleges hadmediated this participation until 1855, when the Convention first provided fordirect elections.9 This change promised to dilute the political power of the aris-tocracy and political elites in general and spread that power more widely througha voting age population that was deeply distrusted by a political class whose atti-tudes about politics were linked to deeply held feelings about race. Leading mem-bers of the elite were horrified when recently freed slaves were given the vote.10

Debates over whether illiterates—Indians and castas—should be allowed to votehad been recurrent, and an extension of such a provision had been granted for atime in the 1840s.11 A decade later the political class faced a dilemma: they neededthis constituency but feared that it might get out of hand.

In 1856 the National Convention sought to resolve the problem by enacting themost radical constitution Peru had yet seen. The constitution stripped the execu-tive of some of its power and handed it to the national Parliament, and alsorestricted the independence of the Church. In reaction, a conservative revolutionbroke out in the south, the Parliament was closed, and elections were called for in1858. The new national legislature repeated the resolve of their predecessors, andagain Parliament was shut down. Fresh elections were held in 1860, and this timethe National Congress (formerly the Parliament) was filled with more conservativerepresentatives. The legislators this time passed a new, more moderate constitution,which—after a brief failed attempt at a return to radicalism in 1867—proved to bethe most durable of Peru’s 13 Constitutions, lasting for 60 years. It brought an endto years of confrontation between liberals and conservatives. Suffrage was nolonger an issue after indirect voting was reintroduced in 1861, and in 1896 thefranchise was finally limited to those who could read and write.12


9. On direct voting see Gabriella Chiaramonti, “Ensayos de sufragio electoral directo” in Ciudadanía y en elPerú (1808-1860): Los itinerarios de la soberanía (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2005), pp. 305-319. Also see Cristóbal Aljovín “Sufragio y participación política en el Perú 1808-1896” in Cristóbal Aljovín and Sine-sio López, Historia de las elecciones en el Perú: Estudios sobre el gobierno representativo en el Perú (Lima: IEP, 2005), pp.19-74. The Reglamento de Eleccciones de 6 de febrero de 1857 gave the vote to those who could either read and write,were in charge of workshops, owned a property, or had retired from the army or navy. See http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/LeyesXIX/1857221.pdf .

10. For slaves voting see Barriga y Álvarez, El Perú y los gobiernos del General Echenique y de la revolución por Tim-oleón (Lima: Imp. Monterola, 1855), p. 69; Manuel Atanasio Fuentes, Aletazos del murciélago (Paris: Imp. Lainé yHavard, 1866), p. 8; and Monsalve, “Del sufragio a la sociedad civil: Pánicos morales, utopías liberales y las campañaselectorales limeñas de 1850 a 1858,” in Paulo Drinot and Leo Garofalo, eds. Más allá de la dominación y la resistencia(Lima: IEP, 2005), pp. 215-237.

11. For the debate on illiterate suffrage, Chiaramonti, “A propósito del Debate Herrera-Gálvez: breves reflexionessobre el sufragio de los indios analfabetos” in Aljovín and López, Historia de las elecciones, pp. 325-358.

12. Indirect elections were reinstated by the new electoral law of 1861. See Cesar Gamboa, “Los filtros electoralesdecimonónicos: los órganos y procedimientos electorales. Perú: 1822-1896” in Aljovín and López, Historia de las elec-ciones, pp. 179-261, esp. p. 223. For the closing of the franchise, see Gabriella Chiaramonti, “Andes o nación: la reformaelectoral de 1896 en el Perú” in Antonio Annino, ed., Historia de las elecciones en Iberoamérica, siglo XIX (Buenos Aires:Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1995), pp. 315-346.

The National Convention of 1855 was dominated by liberals. Some of its mostprominent members had become ever more radical over time. This made it diffi-cult for the regime to control the legislature, even as it was presided over byGrand Marshall Miguel de San Román, a close collaborator of Castilla.13 After fif-teen months of intense debate, the 1856 Constitution was enacted, but opinionwas divided.14 Some saw it as a triumph of liberal ideas that sought to modernizethe country, including the ending of military and ecclesiastical fueros, the deathpenalty, and life tenure jobs; creating new public offices such as the Attorney Gen-eral and the Council of Ministers; and reviving departmental government inJuntas Departamentales. Radicals, however, were disappointed that separation ofChurch and State had not been more complete. Freedom of worship was notdeclared, and instead the constitution defended Catholicism. At the other end ofthe political spectrum were those who thought that the new constitution was anattack on the nation. This was a diverse group that brought together conserva-tives, members of the clergy, the army and the state bureaucracy, most of whomlost significant privileges.15

Castilla remarkably contained his impatience with the radical reforms. The presi-dential term was reduced from six to four years, and the national legislature wasempowered to declare the presidency vacant if he abused his power, prevented themeeting of Congress, suspended its sessions, or attempted to dissolve it.16 Castillawrote to the bishop of Arequipa that he hoped the charter would “soon bereformed because it is against the most vital interests of the country.”17 Althoughhe publicly endorsed the constitution, the president sought, at the same time, toreform it. He failed because of the intransigence of the National Convention. Inthe context of confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches, anuprising broke out in Arequipa. During the constitutional debates, conservatives inthe southern city had declared they would not obey a charter if it attacked theChurch.18 According to the rebels, the Convention had sanctioned a constitutionthat was anomalous, anti-religious, inopportune, and opposed to popular opin-ion.19 Some provinces, such as Moquegua, and some areas of Ayacucho supported


13. During the many years of their political and military careers, Castilla and San Román were as often enemiesas they were friends.

14. The parliamentary debates are reproduced in Convención Nacional de 1855-1856. Actas Oficiales y Extractosde las Sesiones en que fue discutida la Constitución de 1860 (Lima: Empresa Tipográfica “Unión,” 1911).

15. For details on constitutional change see José Gálvez, “La Contención Nacional y la Constitución de 1856”in Pensamiento Constitucional (Lima), no. 6, 1999, p. 657.

16. Ibid.17. Letter from Ramón Castilla to José Sebastián de Goyeneche, Lima, 13 October 1856 in Archivo Castilla, vol.

V (Lima: Instituto Libertador Ramón Castilla, 1966), p. 162.18. “Acta de Protesta,” Arequipa, 30 April 1855, signed by Manuel Arredondo Barreda, rector of the University

and its corporation followed by 10,000 signatures, published in El Católico, Lima, 12 May 1855.19. Acta de la Revolución de Arequipa 31 Octubre 1856, El Registro Oficial del Departamento, no. 21, Cuzco,

8 November 1856, p. 59.

the rebels, who held control of parts of the south for nearly eighteen months.20

When the navy joined the uprising the government lost its main source of income:the guano-rich Chincha islands. Some cities in the north briefly joined the rebels.Castilla took personal charge of the response and in his absence two attempts totake Callao were defeated. Parliament was closed by a subaltern officer when theConvention announced it was prepared to begin talks with the rebels.21

Although Castilla was not involved with this closure, he found it useful not to haveto deal with the Convention.22 Once the revolution was defeated, elections wereheld once again and the new Congress confirmed Castilla as president under the1856 charter. Congress then reviewed all the government’s actions from the clos-ing of the Convention on and answered a formal request to discuss “the conven-ience of constitutional reform, as well as to ensure that it was done following all legalprovisions.”23 An ideological sea change had weakened the liberals in the secondphase of Castilla’s second term. Of the two hundred and twelve representatives inthe National Congress, in 1855 and 1858 only five were elected both times.24

Even without the participation of well known liberals and the return of many longterm deputies, the Castilla government was unable to implement the constitu-tional changes it desired. The situation was further complicated when, instead ofsupporting the actions of the previous administration, Parliament voted to cen-sure the closure of the Convention. The officer responsible was struck off the mil-itary payroll and stripped of his citizenship.25 The executive objected, claiming thelegislature had no right to take this action. Ensuing tension led ministers to becalled to Parliament. Not all attended, but those who did accepted the punish-ment meted out to the officer and an Acta (official report) was prepared acknowl-edging that the legislative branch had acted within its powers. When ministersrefused to sign it, a motion was presented declaring “the nation in peril” and thepresidency vacant.26 Castilla used all his connections in Congress to prevent thesefrom passing. He was partly successful when the demand for presidential vacancywas dropped. With the country at the brink of war with Ecuador, Castilla was able


20. Details on this uprising can be found in Hipólito Sánchez, Vencer o Morir, (Arequipa, no editorial: 1857).21. More on the closing of the Convention in Basadre, Historia de la República, tomo III, pp. 1142-1150.22. Letter from Ramón Castilla to Manuel Ortiz de Cevallos, Sacacha, 20 November 1857 in Archivo Castilla.

vol. VI, p. 129. 23. Miguel de San Román, Manuel Ortiz de Zevallos, Manuel Morales y Luciano María Cano, “Mensaje del Con-

sejo de Ministros al Congreso Extraordinario de 1858” in Mensajes de los Presidentes del Perú (Lima: Imprenta Gil, 1941),p. 321.

24. This total includes the 94 deputies that were ‘owners’, the 68 substitutes and the 50 senators, see ColecciónDocumental: El Poder Legislativo y sus Representantes 1822-2000 (Lima: Congreso de la República, 1998), pp. 355-359,678, 688. Under the electoral regulations of 1855 and 1857 the representatives were elected and 50 were selected atrandom to be Senators after Congress was installed, see Chiaramonti, Ciudadanía y Representación, p. 310.

25. For more details on this Congress see Basadre, Historia de la República, vol. III, pp. 1153-1163.26. Ibid.

to convince enough legislators to temporarily close Congress with the under-standing it would resume its activities in July 1859. But the most radical pressaccused Parliament of prostituting itself.27 Meanwhile rebels arose in Cuzco,asserting that Castilla had “systematically violated the Constitution, and estab-lished, over the broken law, an indescribable DICTATORSHIP.”28

After quelling this small uprising, Castilla called for elections by decree on July 11,1859. He argued that the previous legislature had no right to call itself into ses-sion, and accused its members of having not done any work after his confirmationas constitutional president. The president believed that not “enough effort [hadbeen put] to the other objectives set for them, even though they had extendedtheir sessions one hundred and twenty five days over the one hundred that werestipulated by article 48 in the constitution.”29 Many believed the closure of the1858 Congress was “the death of the Republic hurt by a poisoned dagger.”30 Themove was controversial even within the Castilla administration. Vice-presidentJuan Manuel del Mar assured the Prime Minister that the July 11 decree wasunconstitutional, and he concluded “from today [forward], all thinking men con-sider the government one of force. It will be sustained by force, but you knowhow much public opinion is worth.”31

In spite of all the political uncertainty, Castilla traveled to Ecuador in Septemberto wage war. Two months later elections to the new legislature took place. Thepresident was convinced the Constitution needed reform, and he sought toensure that those elected could be trusted. One of the men he called upon wasManuel de Mendiburu. Mendiburu was born in Lima in 1805. His father was aCreole lawyer at the Tribunal del Consulado and the Real Audiencia. His motherwas the daughter of Creole landowners who lost their fortune during independ-ence. Educated at home by his father and not wanting to be a lawyer or a cleric,he studied mathematics at the school of medicine. He joined the patriots after SanMartín declared independence in Lima just shy of his sixteenth birthday. He par-ticipated in all the conflicts of the early republic and earned quick promotion dueto his skills as a soldier and a secretary.32 Between 1839 and 1842 he held the postof Prefect of Tacna, an administration that won him praise, and he remained loyal


27. La Zamacueca Política, no. 26, Lima, 20 April 1859.28. Capitals from the original, La Opinión en Triunfo, periódico político y popular, no. 2, Cuzco, 9 July 1859.29. Ramón Castilla “Decreto de 11 de Julio de 1859, Convocando a elecciones para Congreso y poniendo fin al

existente,” in Documentos Relativos al Decreto de 11 de Julio de 1859 (Lima: Imprenta del El Comercio, 1859), pp. 11-12.

30. La Zamacueca Política, no. 47, Lima, 13 July 1859.31. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar to Manuel Ortiz de Zevallos, Lima, 11 July 1859, Archivo Castilla, vol.

VIII, 1974, pp. 148, 149.32. Mendiburu’s biographical information can be found in his manuscript Memoirs in the Archivo Historico del

Instituto Riva Agüero.

to the central government even when, surrounded by hostile troops in 1841, hewas asked to join a rebellion. Unable to defend the province from Bolivian occu-pation and with the city under siege, Mendiburu was called to Lima by a caretakergovernment, and he was appointed Minister of War and Navy in 1845. Between1847 and 1850, he was a member of the State Council, and in 1851 he was madeMinister of Hacienda. During his tenure he signed the controversial conversion ofdebt into bonds payable in the London Stock Exchange. The scandal that ensuedfrom this act on his part helped trigger the revolution of 1854 that brought ex-president Ramón Castilla back to power with the support of the liberals.33

Branded a consolidado, which at the time was synonymous with being corrupt, heretired to private life. Although distanced from politics since then, Mendiburuhad remained close to Castilla’s Vice-President Juan Manuel del Mar, who con-vinced Mendiburu to be a candidate in the congressional elections. Although hehad never before been a member of the legislature, it was hoped that he couldorganize the administration’s position in Congress. Mendiburu’s private corre-spondence opens a window onto the campaign and offers a privileged view of howthe political apparatus and patronage networks worked together.

MENDIBURU’S ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN

As Ulrich Muecke proposes, to understand elections it is necessary to look at morethan the polls; it is also necessary to take note of the exchange of favors, recom-mendations, and help, all of which are part of the work that takes place before andafter the balloting.34 These elections for Congress did not see mass mobilizationaround electoral clubs, editorials in the press, or other indications that the civic lifedescribed by Carlos Forment had made inroads in the rural provinces of Cuzco.35

Rather, the campaign was managed within patronage networks in the departmentcombined with those in Lima. Sponsorship of candidates by notables was of utmostimportance. Moreover, in this context where the aim of the government was soexplicitly to reform the constitution, the ideological persuasion of the candidateswas taken into account when decisions were made to give or withhold support.


33. For more details of the economic policies implemented during the Echenique administration, see NataliaSobrevilla Perea, “Entre el Contrato Gibbs y el Contrato Grace: la participación británica en la economía peruana (1842-1890),” Histórica, Lima, vol. XXVII, no. 2, December 2003. On the revolution see, “El proyecto Liberal, la Revoluciónde 1854 y la Convención de 1855,” in Carmen McEvoy ed., La Experiencia Burguesa Peruana (Madrid, Frankfurt: Veu-vert Verlag, Iberoamericana, 2004). For the consolidation see Alfonso Quiroz, La deuda defraudada, consolidación de1850 y dominio económico en el Perú, Lima: Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 1987.

34. Ulrick Mücke, “Elections and Political Participation in Nineteenth-Century Peru: The 1871-1872 Presiden-tial Campaign,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 33:2 (May 2001), pp. 311-346, esp. p. 318.

35. Carlos Forment, Democracy in Latin America, 1760-1900, Volumen I, Civic selfhood and Public Life in Mexicoand Peru, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

36. The only times when he was not a member of Congress were 1855, 1849, and 1839. There is no referenceto Mar’s experience as a legislator in any of Mendiburu’s letters, but information appears in Colección Documental: ElPoder Legislativo, pp. 348, 352, 358, 362.

Mendiburu’s political sponsor, Vice-President Mar, was an established politicianin Cuzco. Mar had represented different provinces of Cuzco in nearly every Con-gress since 1832.36 To ensure that the campaign ran smoothly, the administrationappointed as prefect General Miguel Saturnino Zavala, a close collaborator ofMendiburu. They had been friends since at least 1849, when they ran a govern-ment road-building project.37 In spite of the recent uprising, the new prefect wasgiven a warm welcome in Cuzco with bells tolling, parades, and dances. He notedwith satisfaction that “my friends here wanted to honor me,” and felt that theseacts expressed that “the country is anxious to change authority.”38

The patronage machine was set in motion from the very beginning. PrefectZavala wrote to Mendiburu of a Colonel Beleaser, “a friend,” helped no doubt“by the introduction letter sent by you. He has endeavored to entertain me. Hehas helped me and he is at the moment my most trusted associate. Mr. Becerra’scourtesy has not been less—you owe him your appreciation.”39 Zavala initiallyestablished contacts with the most “influential residents” in the province ofCanas but changed his plans when he found out a crucial ally also was cam-paigning there. The sub-prefect of Canchis, a man Zavala described as “veryimportant in his locality,” was vying for the Canas seat.40 The new Prefect ofCuzco noted how awkward it would be to campaign in a province where “theMares family is used to working.” It was critical to retain the support of this allyand at the same time maintain the agreements already reached with “goodpeople” he had met.41 To control the results in the province Mendiburu wouldrun in, it was vital not to enter into conflict with other powerful groups in theregion. Rather than Canas, the province of Quispicanchis was selected forMendiburu’s campaign because there was plenty of room to maneuver. It wasthe only province in the Department of Cuzco, outside of the city, that had threerepresentatives and two substitutes.

Support was immediately sought from friends, acquaintances, friends of friendsand important local people with whom favors would be traded later.42 In Quispi-canchis, Zavala established contact with those he described as the most powerfullocals: the priest, the governor, a retired judge, a local colonel, and the governor


37. See Guía de Forasteros, 1849.38. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 11 September 1859, Colección Mendiburu Archivo Histórico del Insti-

tuto Riva Agüero (CMAHIRA) 129-2.39. Ibid.40. Gervacio Mercado had represented Canchis in Congress in 1853, Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo,

p. 352.41. Justo Mar was the representative for Canas in 1855 and for Anta in 1860, Colección Documental: El Poder

Legislativo, pp. 136, 362.42. The networks described by Zavala are very similar to those studied by Jeremy Boissevain in Friends of friends:

Networks, manipulators and coalitions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

of the town of Urcos.43 The judge was not only the cousin of a society lady theyknew, but also a candidate, so an agreement for “reciprocal help” was reached.44

Mendiburu’s three main local correspondents were the priest Mariano Chacon yBecerra, local landowner Ramón Nadal, and aspiring politician and son of a millowner José Valcarcel, who traveled immediately to the province with letters fromZavala and Becerra.45 Zavala described them as “fanatical friends of yours.”46

The vice-president considered it important for Mendiburu to be a candidate inseveral provinces.47 Zavala agreed. He believed Mendiburu should run in moreprovinces “just in case.”48 One of the options considered was Chumbivilcasbecause the sub-prefect, Juan Antonio Salas, was “a friend.” Zavala portrayed himas “not simply influential, but the most powerful man in the province.” Hereported that Salas objected to Mendiburu’s candidacy

because he wanted his godson D. Felipe Barrionuevo elected. But talking to himabout you, in the terms you can imagine, and offering him with your friendship asure protection, I found him accessible. I obtained his word decidedly in your favor.The basis of our agreement is this—you will be the main deputy and Barrionuevo thesubstitute. As you will also be elected for Quispicanchis, you will choose to representthat province leaving the place for Chumbivilcas to his godson.49

Salas agreed to work with him, and sent Mendiburu a list of people to whom heshould write. Even though Zavala had not met the sub-prefect before, he warmedto Salas because Mendiburu knew him, and because Salas had been a representa-tive in 1853. Zavala wrote that he appreciated Salas because “of his decent appear-ance, his forthright judgment and his air of sincerity.”50


43. A review of the most important tax payers in Quispicanchis for the years there are records 1845 and 1865reveals that the only landowners were Farfán and Jara. Archivo Regional del Cuzco (ARC) Extracto de la Matricula dePredios Rústicos de la Provincia de Quispicanchis actuado por el sub-prefecto Dn. Francisco Hermosillo y su apoderado fiscalD.D. Ángel Ugarte. Semestre de Navidad 1845 and Padroncillo de predios rústicos que empiezan a regir desde el semestre deSan Juan inclusive del presente año de 1865, Provincia de Quispicanchis.

44. Letter from Miguel Zavala, CMAHIRA 129-2, fls. 2, 3. Although no letters from any of these men survives,the Prefect made several references to them.

45. In the notary records of Juan Chacón y García held at the ARC a contract signed 1858 shows that MarianoChacón y Becerra had this post and that he was involved in selling of church land following the decree of February 1856.In this contract it is noted that land, such as the one in this deed could be sold with no public auction or governmentallicense as long as it was valued under 300 pesos.

46. From these the only one who was a landowner in Quispicanchis was Ramón Nadal, who in 1845 had beenthe collector of the Indian head tax in Quispicanchis, see Extracto de la matricula de Indígenas de la Provincia de Quispi-canchis actuada por su Sub-prefecto Dn. Francisco Hermosilla y Apoderado Fiscal Dr. Dn. Ángel Ugarte, Navidad 1845, fl.143a, in ARC. Valcarcel’s family owned mills in this cereal producing valley see Padroncillo de predios rústicos.

47. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar, Lima, 24 August 1859, CMAHIRA 190-6. 48. The underlining is from the original. Letter from Miguel Zavala, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 129-2,

fl. 3.49. Barrionuevo was elected and confirmed as the deputy for Chumbivilcas, the underlining is from the origi-

nal, Ibid. 50. Ibid., fl. 4.

Zavala’s work for the campaign was not restricted to receiving lists of corre-spondents and talking to supporters. He also made political appointments,replacing, for instance, the sub-prefect of Quispicanchis with the one for Aban-cay. He did so because the elections were as much to prevent liberals from beingelected as to ensure that those close to the administration would gain access toseats and to avoid liberals who might want constitutional change. As a result,previous ideological positions were carefully evaluated. The vice-president criti-cized Zavala for his choice for the sub-prefecture of Urubamba since this manwas “in no way the right person to lead and who should have no influence. Hewas a deputy for the Convention, as a substitute due to the death of Peralta, andhis behavior was reproachable.”51 Yet, differences between Mar and Castillaexisted, and Zavala did not make all the changes Mar asked him to, so as not toalarm the president.52

Mendiburu mobilized the patronage network through the letters of recommen-dation he wrote to, and received from, associates in Cuzco. Favors were notalways asked for up front, but a relationship that facilitated future exchange wasbuilt on offers of support. In his first letter, prominent Cuzqueño property ownerFrancisco Garmendia wrote:

By allowing me to help in your campaign you give me the pleasure of serving you.I will work for it, as if it were my own cause. I have already contacted MistersBecerra, Barcarcel [sic] and some neighbors in the province who are all very happyto back you.53

Garmendia was the owner one of the largest and most prosperous haciendas inQuispicanchis.54 In 1858, when he was the mayor of Cuzco, he had asked Parlia-ment whether Indians, as property owners, could vote.55 It was decided theycould, and he was elected to Congress. In 1859 when the Parliament was closedhe was appointed prefect, and soon after he was replaced by Zavala.56 Garmendiaoffered funds for the campaign, but wrote that he did not consider them neces-sary. He thanked Mendiburu for recommending him to the new prefect, and said


51. Letter from Juan Manuel del Mar, Lima, no date but due to the context it must have been written in 1859,CMAHIRA 190-214.

52. Ibid.53. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Cuzco 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 22-1.54. The information on Garmendia can be found in the ARC, the papers of the Consejo Provincial del Cuzco 1860-

1867, a document that shows he rented large houses in the city of Cuzco where schools functioned. The Padroncillo depredios rústicos shows him as the owner of the hacienda Lucre, later the locale of an important textile factory.

55. For his queries on the Indian vote see Chiaramonti, “A propósito del Debate Herrera-Gálvez,” p. 326.56. Roberto Cáceres Oliva, “Los Prefectos del Cuzco siglo XIX,” Revista del Archivo Histórico del Cuzco, No. 15,

(2000), pp. 121-128, has a complete list of all the Prefects, and the Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 356,has him as a Deputy in 1858-1859. By the 1870s he had become a prominent supporter of Pardo. Carmen, Mc Evoy,“Estampillas y Votos: El rol del correo político en una campaña electoral decimonónica,” Histórica (1994), vol. XVIII,no. 1, p. 116.

he was happy the government was adopting “the system of conciliation I believeis the most adequate for peace and for the people.”57

Another of Mendiburu’s correspondents was an experienced legislator, JoséEnrique Gamboa. He had twice represented the province of Paruro in Congress,first in 1845-1848 when he advocated the opening of the franchise to Indians,and again in 1858-1859.58 After congratulating Mendiburu on his candidacy, heassured him he would be elected without opposition. Like Garmendia, he men-tioned money. He wrote “I will take the liberty to impose only one condition.Please do not ever think again of sending money. This might be necessary in otherplaces, but here it could even be prejudicial.”59 Gamboa explained that all munic-ipal authorities and “decent men” favored his election. So, he asked why moneywould be needed, if the men who were “in charge of generating the public vote”supported him with the enthusiasm shown by the likes of Nadal, Garmendia, andBarrios. He also recommended writing to Don José Astete, a member of anotherimportant landowning family in Quispicanchis.60

The main pillar of the patronage network was the reciprocal exchange offavors. Examples of this abound. Zavala asked Mendiburu for help approach-ing the vice-president. He described his situation as “very difficult,” claimingthat the supplement he received to his salary was insufficient to cover hisexpenses. The prefect wanted Mendiburu to make the kind of “effort youknow how to use in favor of your friends.”61 Gamboa asked Mendiburu to helphim look after his orphaned nephew who studied in Lima, claiming he did sobecause he knew of Mendiburu’s “inexhaustible kindness” to Cuzqueños. Healso asked Mendiburu to assure Vice-President Mar that “his desires are com-mands for me, and in all elections he is interested in, I will always be the firstto help, please tell him I will never be ungrateful for his distinguishedfavors.”62 Gamboa, the career bureaucrat and sometime deputy for Paruro,would soon inform Mendiburu that he was looking for a position either inLima or Callao.63 Shortly thereafter, having rejected one position in the For-


57. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Cuzco, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 22-1.58. For his career in Parliament see Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, pp. 337, 356. For his stance on

Indigenous voting see Chiaramonti, Ciudadanía y representación, p. 313. 59. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 25 September 1859, CMAHIRA 5-1.60. José Astete was a landowner in Quispicanchis ARC Padroncillo de predios rústicos for 1865 and Extracto de la

Matricula de Predios Rústicos for 1845. Pedro Astete had been the representative for Quispicanchis in 1849, 1851-1852,and 1853, Bartlomé Astete held the post in the National Convention between 1855-1857 see Colección Documental: ElPoder Legislativo, pp. 135, 341, 347, 351. Bartolomé Astete was the Prefect of Cuzco during two revolutionary con-junctions for six months in 1843, and between 1854 and 1855, both times appointed by General Miguel de San Románsee Cáceres Oliva “Los Prefectos del Cuzco siglo XIX,” p. 125.

61. Letter from Miguel Zavala, 11 September 1859, CMAHIRA 129-2., fl. 3.62. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 25 September 1859, CMAHIRA 5-1.63. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 November 1859, CMAHIRA 5-3.

eign Service, Gamboa thanked Mendiburu for his help in securing for him theConsulate in Valparaiso.64

The police commissioner of Cuzco, Juan José Larrea, also corresponded withMendiburu, illustrating Meniburu’s independent power base from his tenure asMinister of War. Larrea noted:

I have spoken often with Prefect Zavala about you; he must have told you about myfeelings. I assure you that if, as I hope, I am elected deputy for the province of Con-vención, you can count me amongst your best friends. You have my vote for the leg-islature guaranteed.65

Larrea was an important political operator. He was related to Andrés de SantaCruz’s wife and had been Prefect of Cuzco between 1835 and 1837 during thePeru-Bolivia Confederation.66 He was a deputy for Abancay between 1845 and1848, and in the 1870s he ran Manuel Pardo’s presidential campaign in Cuzco.67

Larrea understood patronage as reciprocal, and he expected help to be elected justas he promised his vote in Congress.

These letters illustrate how favors were at the heart of the patronage network.Mendiburu took Gamboa’s nephew as his protégé in Lima. In exchange, Gamboaassured him there would be no opposition in the province.68 Garmendia asked forhelp with electing a friend, and took the opportunity to tell him of his efforts toget in direct contact with the citizens of Ocongate and Marcapata.69 These twohighland towns, populated by Indians, became the heads of new districts after theelections. Garmendia, however, made no mention of who these citizens were orwhat was discussed. In some cases, even if favors were not granted in the shortterm, support was still provided. Larrea, the police commissioner from Cuzco,thanked Mendiburu for his “interest in recommending my son for the sub-pre-fecture of La Convención. But another has been appointed.”70 Larrea assured himhe would obtain the seat for Quispicanchis “canonically.” He explained that assoon as Zavala told the influential people in the province of his candidacy, “we setin motion our relations and influences immediately. Positive answers had beennearly unanimous.”71


64. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 5-4.65. Letter from Juan José Larrea, Cuzco, 17 September 1859, CMAHIRA 390-1. 66. Cáceres Oliva, “Los Prefectos del Cuzco,” p. 124.67. Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 337, Mc Evoy, “Estampillas y Votos,” p. 118, and Ulrich

Muecke, “Elections and Political Participation,” p. 325.68. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 October 1859, CMAHIRA 5-2.69. Letter from Francisco Garmendia, Capana, 13 October 1859, CMAHIRA 22-2.70. Letter from Juan José Larrea, Cuzco, 11 October 1859, CMAHIRA 390-2.71. Ibid.

Reciprocity was the general expectation, as can be gleaned from the corre-spondence of Manuel Aurelio Orihuela. He was an important landowner in theUrubamba valley who had been a representative for Cuzco in 1858-1859, andsenator in 1853.72 He explained that as soon as he found out aboutMendiburu’s candidacy in Quispicanchis, “I gave up my usual seat to a candi-date who made his regular seat available to you. Support for your candidacywas so unanimous that once Dr. Manuel Luna was given my place, all awk-wardness has disappeared.”73 Orihuela assured Mendiburu he deserved nogratitude. Instead, he asked Mendiburu to write letters to support his electionfor the city of Cuzco, guaranteeing he would work with Mendiburu in Con-gress. A month later he thanked Mendiburu for having recommended him tothe prefect.74

There was only one threat to Mendiburu’s election, and it came from outsideCuzco. Mendiburu was being encouraged to think about a presidential candidacyfor 1862. One of his correspondents, the vicar of the church of Pupuja in Azán-garo (the province between Quispicanchis and Puno) wrote to Mendiburu, argu-ing he should not be content with a “miserly provincial seat.” Instead, he shouldrun for president, and the vicar promised his unconditional support.75 GeneralMiguel de San Román, who had been president of the National Convention in1855, and had represented Puno since 1831, also had presidential ambitions. Hehad only been absent from Congress in 1849, when he was exiled by Castilla. By1860 he had grown close to liberals and lost the confidence of the government.76

San Román had a safe seat in Puno, but he wanted to prevent Mendiburu’s elec-tion, thus short-circuiting any greater ambitions.77

San Román recruited troops in Puno, and used them to pressure candidates toabandon the race. Zavala stood firm and prevented him from doing the same inCuzco.78 According to the prefect, the election in Quispicanchis was “exemptfrom all doubt, all peril, even considering the plans that could be brought forwardby the Indian,” a disparaging reference to San Román. 79 Gamboa wrote,


72. Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 356, 685.73. In 1858, Luna had been the representative for Quispicanchis where he was an important landowner. Letter

from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco, 13 October 1859, CMAHIRA 65-1.74. Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco, 25 November 1859, CMAHIRA 65-2.75. Letter from Mariano Chacón y Becerra, Cuzco, 13 September 1859, CMAHIRA 564-1.76. Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, for the details of San Román’s participation in Congress.77. Very little is known of San Román, who was elected president with the backing of the liberals in 1862 and

died in office in 1863. He began his career at independence and was a fixed participant in all the events of the first halfof the nineteenth century. He was well known for his ability to recruit men both in Cuzco and Puno and in the 1840she organized a veteran’s association.

78. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 27 October 1859, CMAHIRA 129-3.79. This is how San Román was referred to. See Ibid.

[M]any think the plan of the Low Marshall80 is to force electoral boards to desist, sohe can appoint deputies by force, and use his power against you. Whether this is trueor not it is impossible to say, but—because in politics nothing can be discounted andeverything is possible—I have decided to return to the province to strengthen theresolve of our friends. I will explain to them the real significance of Don Miguel, andto assure them that the day the electoral board meets in the capital, I will be thereto protect them.81

Violence during these elections was common. Most references come from Limaand Arequipa, where armed men fought to control the plazas where the pollingstations were set up.82 Although fears of attacks coming from Puno were notunwarranted, as Quispicanchis is located on the road connecting that province toCuzco, there were no reports of unrest here. The local political operators whowere members of the elite commanded support at the polls. Now, Mendiburu’snetwork had to secure the support of the provincial electoral board.

THE SEAT OF QUISPICANCHIS

Voting took place in the first days of December of 1859. Precise data on elec-tions and other demographic information are inconsistent and cannot be com-pared over time. The 1827 census reported 26,865 inhabitants, of which23,033 were indigenous, 3,832 were castas and none were considered white.83

In 1845, however, the tax register showed that only 8,217 Indians were payingthe head tax. Changes in the size of the jurisdiction can account for some ofthe differences between the 1827 census and the records that can be locatedfor 1845, but further confusion is added by the 1876 Census, which reports10,239 men 20 years of age and older in the province.84 In terms of electoralparticipation, although the franchise was slightly restricted when a new set ofrules was approved in 1857, it still allowed for wide participation, and Indians,as property owners, voted.85 According to the 1860 Diario de Debates,707,955 citizens voted nationally; 11,890 votes were recorded in the provinceof Quispicanchis.86


80. This was an irreverent reference to San Román’s rank of Grand Marshall.81. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 11 November 1859, CMAHIRA 5-3.82. For descriptions of violence in elections during this period see José Ragas, “Cultura política, Representación

y Modernidad en el Perú: La campaña electoral de 1850,” Licenciatura Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú(2004), and Monsalve, “Del sufragio a la sociedad civil”.

83. Paul Gootenberg “Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revisions” in Latin AmericanResearch Review 26:3 (October 1991), p. 124.

84. For the 1845 numbers see ARC Extracto de la matricula de Indígenas de la Provincia de Quispicanchis, fl. 141,for the 1876 Census see Chiaramonti, Ciudadanía y representación en el Perú, p. 319.

85. For voting regulations and their changes see Gamboa “Los filtros electorales,” pp. 179-261.86. Actas de Elecciones Provincias de Apurimac, Ayacucho y Cuzco in ACP, also quoted in Chiaramonti, Ciu-

dadanía y representación en el Perú, pp. 318, 319.

While it is therefore impossible to measure quantitatively voter sentiment in thiselection, or to compare it with others, Mendiburu’s supporters had no doubt thatthey had done their job well. As soon as he returned from the province, Gamboaassured Mendiburu that his victory was absolute.87 José Valcarcel added that therehad been no opposition and assured him that he had “thanked all the presidentsof the voting stations and all its members in his name.”88 Prefect Zavala describedMendiburu’s success as splendid, and he assured him that

if it has cost me anything, it has been more because of my fervor than for the diffi-culties your election could have presented. I have nothing more to add; and nothingto fear from the electoral board. With such a comfortable election there can be noneof the scheming or fraud often seen at polling stations. Nevertheless, my attentionwill not diminish until I have the Actas in my hands.89

Gamboa did not want unscrupulous men to demand payment from Mendiburu,so he explained that inasmuch as the sub-prefect had embezzled the 190 pesosassigned by the government for the election, no funds had been used in Quispi-canchis.90 Mariano Chacón y Becerra also assured Mendiburu that, according tothe parish priests, his election “had been welcomed with the greatest enthusiasmeven by the Indigenous class, without any expense.”91

Zavala mentioned how Nadal had asked if it was possible to raise funds inMendiburu’s name, but the prefect had been clear:

I prohibit you using Mister Mendiburu’s name in this matter. I will cover anyexpenses you might have. But I am sure that outside of some bottles opened the daythe electoral board met, and the small expenditure made by Balcarcel [sic] solely intwo trips to the province, no more has been needed.92

Mendiburu immediately wrote to Nadal offering to repay him, but the landownerand former tax collector refused. His response makes it possible to gauge howfavors took precedence over money. Nadal claimed he had not spent much, andhe considered the debt more than covered by the help Mendiburu had given hisfriends in their election in Lima.93 Similarly, Valcarcel assured him he had onlyneeded a cigar box. As for payment, he only expected “the kind steps you havegiven to aid me with the fair demands I have pending with the government. Please


87. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 5-4.88. Letter from José Valcarcel to Manuel de Mendiburu, Cuzco, 17 December 1859, CMAHIRA 78-1.89. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4.90. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Callapampa, 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5.91. Letter from Mariano Chacón y Becerra, Cuzco, 26 March 1860, CMAHIRA 564-1.92. The underlining is from the original, letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA

129-5.93. Letter from Ramón Nadal, Cuzco, 2 March 1860, CMAHIRA 248-1.

continue helping me with them, as I am sure you will be able to achieve theneeded results.”94 It is possible that these political operators had spent moremoney than they were admitting to, but what is clear is that in exchange theywanted the favors they were asking for.

To ensure that Mendiburu would obtain his seat, however, not only was it neces-sary to guarantee the results at the polling stations; he also had to be confirmedby the provincial electoral board in the official report of their meeting, the Acta.Gamboa, who presided over the board meeting in Quispicanchis, was a skillfulpolitical operator. He also became a substantial landowner in the province; hemoved from having no property in 1845 to owning an important hacienda in1865.95 As the secretary of the electoral board he took care of all the details andasked Mendiburu to write thanking the priest and the three young men who hadworked hard to ensure everything was in place for their meeting. He also tookcare that the electoral board ran smoothly. Santiago Muñiz, an importantlandowner in the town of Quiquijana, the second largest urban center in Quispi-canchis, had hoped to be elected secretary of the provincial electoral board, buthe only obtained four votes.96 “To prevent conflict,” and to have Muñiz con-firmed as a deputy, Don Antonio Monteagudo was asked to give up his candidacy.Gamboa asked Mendiburu to thank him personally for his help.97 Another impor-tant landowner in the province who was owed special acknowledgement was JoséAstete. He “had made every effort to ensure the timely presence of the Presidents.He traveled to many of the towns providing for those who needed items such ascargo beasts, servants and all kinds of resources.”98 Not everyone had been sohelpful and Gamboa provided Mendiburu with those details as well, not to castthe opponents as enemies, but to ensure that he wrote to those who had provento be friends.

Opposition did exist and it was expressed in the so-called “dualities.” These werea particularly Peruvian phenomenon that happened when rival political forces setup parallel polling stations. When one of the sides monopolized access to theballot box, either because of the number of men or because of their use ofweapons, alternate spaces for voting were created in a different plaza or in privateresidences. Congress then had to decide which of the parallel processes was con-


94. Letter from José Valcarcel, Cuzco 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 78-2.95. Gamboa does not appear in the records for 1845, but by 1865 he owned the hacienda Callapacpa valued in

600 pesos. See ARC Padroncillo de predios rústicos 1865, fl. 1.96. ACP, Actas de Elecciones de las Provincias del Cuzco, not numbered. Santiago Muñiz appears as an important

landowner both in the records for 1845 Estracto de la Matricula de Predios Rusticos and those for 1865, see Padroncillode predios rústicos for 1865, ARC.

97. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5.98. For details on Astete see footnote 63. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860,

CMAHIRA 5-5.

sidered legal.99 Not only could this happen during polling days, as was oftendescribed in the press, but it could also be claimed in the Actas of the electoralboard meetings. This is what happened in Quispicanchis. Manuel Luna, a largelandowner in Quispicanchis, had been a member of the 1858 Congress. Now, inspite of having been allocated the seat of Urubamba, usually occupied by Ori-huela, he had proposed that the electoral board report a duality (where none hadactually taken place) to show that some opposition to Mendiburu existed. Theaim, Luna claimed, was to prove the election had not been rigged. According toGamboa, Luna made it “a condition not to oppose the proclamation of GeneralsMendiburu, Muñis and Jara as the deputies.”100

Convinced that this was already an agreement, Gamboa wrote:

[W]e were surprised by an infinite number of malicious claims presented by Luna.He wanted time to persuade other members of the electoral board and convincethem to change the Actas. He even attempted to switch Mendiburu’s name with SanRomán’s. This clumsy and aspiring boy hatched many schemes and I thank you verymuch for having warned me about him in your last letter.101

So even if conflict had been absent from election day, there was some when theelectoral board met, when three deputies for the province had yet to be confirmed.Zavala claimed to Mendiburu that he had more sympathy for one candidate dueto “the relationship between his family and yours,” but this was a time to repayother favors.102 The prefect claimed that he could not interfere on behalf of thiscandidate because of agreements he had entered into with Luna to ensureMendiburu’s election, which “demand of my honor at least the neutrality he hasasked for.”103 Indeed, Luna and Gamboa quickly managed to repair their relation-ship. A month after having called him a “clumsy and aspiring boy,” Gamboadescribed him as “our friend Luna.” Luna received four-fifths of the votes in theprovincial electoral board of Urubamba and Gamboa asked the General to supporthim in Lima.104 Luna was confirmed, to a large degree because he had been instru-mental in providing Mendiburu with backing in Quispicanchis, even if at the meet-ing of the provincial electoral board he had not been the most reliable participant.


99. Chiaramonti describes this process and how it became stronger after 1855, Ciudadanía y representación enel Perú, p. 305. See also Vincent Peloso, “Liberals, Electoral Reform, and the Popular Vote in mid-nineteenth-centuryPeru,” in Vincent Peloso and Barbara Tenenbaum, eds. Liberals, Politics and Power, State Formation in Nineteenth-Cen-tury Latin America (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), p. 202.

100. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 17 January 1860, CMAHIRA 5-5.101. Ibid.102. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4.103. Ibid.104. Letter from José Enrique Gamboa, Cuzco 16 February 1860, CMAHIRA 5-6. Colección Documental: El

Poder Legislativo, p. 362 lists Manuel Luna as the representative for Huancavelica, but the Actas de Elecciones Provinciasde Apurimac, Ayacucho y Cuzco in ACP, show him as the representative for Urubamba, as do the letters of Mendiburu.

Repayment of a favor was also the central issue in the confirmation of Manuel Ori-huela, the prominent Urubamba landowner. This case highlights the importanceof having a friend when the congressional confirmation board met. To helpMendiburu, Orihuela had given his usual seat to Luna, so that he would free theone for Quispicanchis. In return for this he asked for help with his confirmationin the city of Cuzco, claiming he had to “fight against the minister’s recommen-dation for another candidate.”105 Orihuela wrote that he only wanted to be in thelegislature to work with Mendiburu and “promote questions of true publicvalue,” offering in exchange his vote in Congress.106 Fearing he would not beconfirmed because of jealousy, he offered his future support to Mendiburu, assur-ing him “my vote would never be for whims or sinister interests, but only for thepublic good, and for the true national interest.”107

The provincial electoral board confirmed Orihuela, even though his opponenthad organized a noisy mob outside the place where the board met. He hadinsisted on being acclaimed by the people and although he “managed to get themto shout his name, he could not prevent them from also shouting that of DoctorTorres, so his acclamation was confused.”108 Orihuela was nevertheless afraid thathis opponent, who claimed to have the support of Vice-President Mar, wouldtravel to Lima and receive confirmation directly from the Congress. Zavalaexplained, “there is nothing against the election of Orihuela, [. . .] as it is of a dif-ferent kind—that grew out of a popular outcry that democrats call ‘Elections byacclamation.’”109 The prefect remarked that Orihuela’s alarm stemmed from hisstrained relationship with Vice-President Mar and General Castilla.110 Because hehad to be confirmed by Congress, possible popular opposition combined with thelack of government support made his position precarious.

This support at the congressional level was eagerly sought, and it is not alwaysclear why some candidates were backed instead of others, even when ideologyshould have played a decisive role. Zavala had assured Mendiburu that “no red”would represent Cuzco.111 He could guarantee the vote of nineteen of thetwenty representatives because “all the deputies of the Department are resolutethat they will be guided by your inspiration.”112 “Due to their background andcircumstances,” the prefect claimed they offered “security of order.” Only thevote of Pio Benigno Mesa could not be guaranteed. The prefect described this


105. Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco 25 December 1859, CMAHIRA 65-3.106. Ibid. 107. Ibid.108. Letter from Manuel Aurelio Orihuela, Cuzco 11 January 1860, CMAHIRA 65-4.109. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco 11 February 1860, CMAHIRA 129-6.110. Ibid.111. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 Decembre 1859, CMAHIRA 129-4.112. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 129-5.

man who had represented Cuzco in the 1855 Convention as an “ex-red.”113

According to Zavala he had been elected due to the ineffectiveness of policecommissioner Larrea.

Mesa and Larrea both wanted the seat for La Convención, and Congress had todecide on dualities. Mesa, who had been an active advocate of extending the fran-chise, asked Zavala for a recommendation letter. Aware that he lacked the help ofa patron in Lima, Mesa now made clear to Zavala “his regret for the exaggerationof his previous ideas; he assures me that the disappointments he has suffered havecorrected his fantasy.”114 The prefect wrote to Mendiburu that Mesa “has veryclearly said he will subordinate and correct his ideas, under the power or yours—he is sly, but can be led with care not to hurt his pride.”115 Larrea, on the otherhand, wrote directly to Mendiburu accusing his opponent of being dangerous. Toprove this, he sent him copies of Mesa’s articles in the newspaper Instructor Pop-ular. His aim was to demonstrate that

this character is against all of Congress, but especially against you and Bishop Her-rera. Even more, this furious Jacobin or Red, as he calls himself, says to his corre-spondents that in Lima, work is being carried out to raise the rabble against moder-ates like you and bait you to death.116

The seat for La Convención ultimately went to Mesa in spite of Larrea’s efforts topaint him as a radical. The police commissioner offered Mendiburu his potentialvote in Congress, but this was not enough. Larrea did not have much clout. Hehad already failed to secure a post for his son as the sub-prefect of La Convención.Mid-level government officials like Larrea could not control electoral resultswithout the backing of men like Mendiburu and Zavala. The prefect believed thepolice commissioner lost the election due to a lack of capacity, so at that pointeven an appeal to ideological differences and the risk of having a Jacobin as a rep-resentative was not enough to gain him support. Mesa, meanwhile, neededMendiburu at the last level of confirmation. To obtain his backing, he offered theGeneral his vote in Congress, the same thing Larrea was offering. But with Zavalaas an intermediary, Mesa was ultimately more successful in his bid for a seat thanLarrea, who worked for the state and was ideologically closer to Mendiburu.Larrea’s repeated appeals to Mendiburu were not enough.


113. Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo, p. 136. When the new voting regulations were discussed in theConvention Mesa voted as the liberal Galvez brothers for an inclusive direct vote for all males. See Convención Nacionalde 1855-1856. Actas Oficiales, p. 112. He had also defended the State Council, but advocated representation should beelected by the departments, see Daniel Soria Lujan, “La defensa política de la Constitución del Perú en el Siglo xix (1839-1855),” Revista de estudios históricos-jurídicos 23 (2003), pp. 525-545, esp. p. 539.

114. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 25 January 1860, CMAHIRA 129-5.115. Letter from Miguel Zavala, Cuzco, 12 June 1860, CMAHIRA 129-9.116. Letter from Juan José Larrea, Cuzco 11 August 1860, CMAHIRA 390-4.

In the nineteenth century the Congress was not in session permanently, but wascalled for specific purposes. In 1860 it was called to reform the 1856 Constitu-tion. These letters show how Castilla’s government tried to ensure that thoseclose to the regime were elected. Thanks to this effort, Mendiburu went frombeing a disgraced General to Minister of War and congressional candidate. Thecorrespondence also provides evidence on how elections were carried out at theprovincial and national level, making it clear that even in direct elections with aninclusive franchise, getting the majority of the votes in the polling station was noguarantee of winning a seat in the National Congress. Control of provincial elec-toral boards and support from powerful patrons in Congress were needed beforeone could be confirmed in a seat.

THE CONGRESS OF 1860

Castilla had been repeatedly unable to obtain a constitutional arrangement heconsidered appropriate. The National Convention was dominated by the mostradical liberals, and the charter they produced in 1856 did not suit the president,who approved it only reluctantly. This led to a conservative reaction and to theeventual closure of the legislature. As it was no longer possible to achieve changewithin the constitutional framework and Castilla did not want to call the Con-vention back, a new Congress was elected in 1858. Even though it was composedof new members, this Parliament was dominated by men who thought the 1856Constitution needed no reform. Irritated by this group’s lack of compliance, theexecutive again closed the legislature and in spite of some protest, Castilla oncemore called for congressional elections. Pressured to obtain results, the adminis-tration sought experienced legislators. Many of those ousted in the revolution of1855 were returned, confirming that the regime veered back toward more con-servative positions.

Career politicians from Arequipa and Cuzco, the two most important southernAndean provinces, were returned to the national legislature in 1858.117 In 1860,out of the 159 representatives to Congress (120 deputies, 4 substitutes and 35Senators) eighteen had also been elected to that body in 1858, while seven hadbeen members of the Convention. Only four men had held seats in 1855, 1858and 1860. One was Miguel de San Román. Another was Manuel Macedo fromCuzco, who had been in every Parliament since 1845. The other two were mem-bers of the Terry family who held on to the seats for Conchucos in the northern


117. This was the case of Evaristo Gomez Sanchez from Arequipa who from 1829 on had been a member of everyCongress, except 1839, 1851, and 1855 as well as vice-president Juan Manuel del Mar who had represented Cuzco since1832, with only three exceptions. All the information on members of Congress can be found in the Colección Docu-mental: El Poder Legislativo.

department of Ancash for more than thirty years, sending two members of theclan to each Congress from 1845 on. Only three other representatives that hadbeen legislators earlier in the 1850s returned in 1858 and 1860.118 These long-serving congressmen provide a good example of men whom the government con-sidered most suited to bring about constitutional reform. They were a combina-tion of landowners and local bosses who controlled the politics of particularregions, career politicians, members of the army and bureaucrats.

Opposition to constitutional change was still strong, and in July 1860, when Con-gress was to begin sessions, Mendiburu received information from Tacna thatthere was a project circulating to present a pledge that would accept the Congress,but reject its mandate to modify the charter.119 The regime already knew that73.59% of the voters had already approved constitutional change in their ballots,and to counter any possible difficulties, the government prepared a massive sign-ing of counter-pledges to back constitutional change. Mendiburu organized thisinitiative using the large network of friends and associates he had throughout thecountry. Letters from Trujillo, Cuzco and Arequipa show his involvement inpreparing the pledges, publishing newspaper articles and putting forward the gov-ernment’s position.120

Under the presidency of conservative cleric Bartolomé Herrera, several consti-tutional projects were presented. The proposal to reinstate the ecclesiasticalfuero made by writer and career politician Felipe Pardo y Aliaga and the pro-clerical charter proposed by Herrera elicited particularly passionate responses inthe intense public debate that ensued.121 Disillusioned by the rejection of hisconstitutional project, Herrera stepped down and Mendiburu was elected pres-ident of Congress, playing a crucial part in the defense of a moderate solu-tion.122 In the final draft of the Constitution of 1860 a mixed moderate solu-tion to the crisis of electoral power emerged. Corporate courts were notrestored, but the executive regained many of the prerogatives it had lost in1856, especially control over the army and the legislature. Meanwhile, newelectoral regulations in 1861 continued to allow for wide popular participationin indirect elections.


118. Mariano Loli, Manuel Osores and José Nicolás Rebaza Colección Documental: El Poder Legislativo.119. Letter from Domingo Valle Riestra, Tacna, July 1860, CMAHIRA 82-2.120. In Trujillo Manuel Amadeo Alzadora worked see CMAHIRA 516-1, from Arequipa he received news from

José Bustamante CMAHIRA 589-3, and Zavala sent him an acta with more than 700 signatures CMAHIRA 129-11.121. Felipe Pardo y Aliaga Proyecto de Constitución Política con notas y comentarios de José Antonio Lavalle

(Lima:Tip Alfaro, 1859) and Bartolomé Herrera Proyecto de Constitución Política (Lima, no editorial 1860).122. For details on the electoral debate see Basadre, Historia de la República, vol. III, pp. 1167-1179.

CONCLUSIONS

Large-scale fraud, the purchase of votes, or the generalized falsifying of electoralboard documents were not needed to guarantee success in elections such as thosefor Quispicanchis. Instead they were won by mobilizing local political brokers,provincial notables, and other candidates in a patronage network that linkedregional and national elites. The available documentation reveals little about howpower brokers worked at the level of individual voters, but local political bossessuch as Gamboa and Garmendia felt so confident in their ability to obtain thebacking of Indians that they sought to make Indians eligible to vote when theissue came up in 1849 and again in 1858. Although not much can be said abouthow Indians actually voted, what can be asserted is that large amounts of moneywere not needed to bribe them, there was no recourse to violence and soon afterthe elections some of the most heavily indigenous areas in Quispicanchis weregiven greater local advantages. In spite of the reforms introduced by the liberals,few changes were made to empower direct elections. The most delicate decisionswere made by the elites at the provincial electoral boards and in Congress, espe-cially when there was genuine disagreement at the polling stations and more thanone candidate claimed to be legitimate. After the moderate electoral reforms of1860, support from government agents and powerful men at the departmentaland national levels remained crucial for political success. Members of the armycontinued to engage meaningfully in politics, some landowners became profes-sional politicians and bureaucrats, and in some provinces principal families held onto their seats in the national Congress.

Competition between local elites was significant. The fact that in some provincesthere were two or three candidates for a congressional seat whose cases had to bedecided in the national arena illustrates how when there were discrepancies amongprovincial elites, the backing of powerful patrons in the capital became essential.The importance of favors and the symmetry in providing support is evident in thecase of Manuel Orihuela. Despite a lack of sympathy from the president or the vice-president, Orihuela did manage to get a seat because he had the support ofMendiburu, who owed him for the help he had given his campaign. In contrast,Larrea, a career bureaucrat and experienced political operator, failed to prevent anideologically dangerous candidate from being elected and as a result lost support.Mendiburu and Zavala did not owe him favors and he was ultimately unable togain a seat in the National Congress because he did not have the backing heneeded. In contrast to most of the candidates discussed, Luna and Mesa had noparliamentary experience prior to 1855. They both acted in ways that were con-sidered questionable by the other actors, but were nevertheless confirmed in theirseats. Mendiburu owed much of his success in the province to Luna, a powerful


landowner in Quispicanchis. So when confirmation time came the General had topay his debt and support him. In the case of Mesa, a radical politician, damage con-trol was put into effect when he defeated the government’s candidate. In spite ofhis known political inclinations he was willing to play the game and asked for aletter of recommendation from Zavala, and to further ensure his confirmation, heoffered his vote in Congress to Mendiburu. He proved, however, to be an untrust-worthy client, as he tried to prevent Congress from being seated altogether andpublished an embarrassing pamphlet that accused many government-backed can-didates (most prominently Herrera) of having been elected irregularly.123

Even though the country had seen much polarization, with revolutions in 1854and 1858 proposing liberal and conservative ideas respectively, the correspondencebetween Mendiburu and his clients show a lack of deep ideological conflict. Thesemen were interested in obtaining their own advancement: a post, a salary increase,or a confirmation in Congress for oneself or a friend. Although certain provinceswere tightly held by local powerbrokers who controlled access to seats in Congress,sometimes over generations, this was not always the case. Different factions werepresent even within the government and there was no hegemonic group that actedwith complete coherence during the elections. Those deeply entrenched in partic-ular provinces were most often landowners, and their experience is very similar tothe ones described for Brazil and the northern provinces of Argentina. What wasdifferent and emerges very strongly in these letters was how it was possible, and inmid-century Peru quite common, to be a successful politician at the provincial andnational level sustaining patronage networks based on a state post. While it waspossible to make the jump and become a landowner thanks to a successful careeras bureaucrat and politician (as Gamboa had), some members of the military heldimportant political posts, but did not become large landowners themselves.Mendiburu, Zavala and even Castilla did not have large haciendas and only SanRomán held vast properties in Puno, which he had inherited.

Much remains to be learned about how these provincial elites, bureaucratic orotherwise, managed the relationship between national prominence and localclout. In the second half of the nineteenth century local elites became more pow-erful; I contend that to unravel this process it is necessary to understand themechanisms its members used to maintain and increase their influence. Morestudies are needed to understand how power was exercised in the provincial andrural settings and the links between provincial and national elites, as their rela-tionship was much more fluid than has been hitherto believed. Local electionsprovide an opportunity to delve into the process of the consolidation of these


123. Ibid. p. 1167.

elites. The political practices seen in this case illustrate how patronage networkswere used to create alliances based on the exchange of favors and not money, andhow direct elections did not guarantee more participation and inclusion. In spiteof the efforts made by reformers to make crucial changes in the political system,real change was not forthcoming. This was because patronage, the very core ofthe political process, remained untouched. This undermined reform to such anextent that even with direct elections, the most crucial decisions were still madeby elites at the provincial electoral boards and in Congress. Patronage remainedat the center of politics, so to understand the limits of mid-nineteenth centuryreforms it is necessary not only to look at changes in legislation or how elitesreacted in the capital and large urban centers, but also to reconstruct the way inwhich elections were actually carried out at all levels.

University of Kent NATALIA SOBREVILLA PEREA

Canterbury, United Kingdom


Natalia Sobrevilla - The Enduring Power of Patronage in Peruvian Elections: Quispicanchis, 1860

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Transcript of Natalia Sobrevilla - The Enduring Power of Patronage in Peruvian Elections: Quispicanchis, 1860