Napoleons Foreign Policy a Criminal Enterprise

7/27/2019 Napoleons Foreign Policy a Criminal Enterprise

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Napoleon's Foreign Policy: A Criminal Enterprise

Author(s): Paul W. SchroederSource: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Apr., 1990), pp. 147-162Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1986040 .Accessed: 11/07/2011 22:32

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Napoleon's ForeignPolicy:A CriminalEnterprise*

*Paul W. Schroeder

I indProfessorParker's essay very helpfuland illuminating.Napo-leon's decision to invade Russiaagainst thealmostunanimous adviceofhis closest counsellors presents an intriguing nd importantpuzzleto whichParkerprovidesa persuasivepsychological explanation.Findingmuch in theessay to agree with nd littleto criticize nor-mally poses a problem fora commentator, but ProfessorParkerhasinvitedme to rangefreelynmy comments. I willtake advantage ofthisfreedom to propose not a differentausal explanation of Napoleon'sdecision, butinstead a differentharacterization and understanding fNapoleon's foreign olicyin thecontextofthe international ystem.My text, or pretext,comes fromone of G. K. Chesterton's FatherBrowndetectivestories.In it, FatherBrown,asked whetherhe did notaccept the science ofcriminology,replies that he would gladlyacceptthe science ofcriminology fhis interlocutorwouldaccept the scienceofhagiology.I take Chesterton'spoint to be thathagiologyand crimi-nology concern themselveswith wopoles in therange ofhuman con-duct,both ofwhichrequiremore in thewayofexplanation than doesthatoftheordinary inner. Bothsaintly nd criminal behaviorcan to adegreebe explained, or at least dealt with, n a "scientific"or scholarlymanner, i.e., regardedas phenomena on whichempirical data can begathered nd theories nd generalizationsdevelopedand tested.Whetheror not one attempts o to explain criminality nd saintliness,however,

*'Theoriginalversionofthisessayoriginated s commentson theprecedingpaperbyHaroldT. Parker resentedn a session oftheBicentennialMeeting ftheConsortium n Revolutionary urope, 28-30 September1989, and thatversionappeared intheBicentennial roceedingspublished ytheFloridaStateUniversityPress 1990).

The Journalof MilitaryHistory54(April1990): 147-61 ') AmericanMilitarynstitute * 147


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one needs at least to recognize thattheyexist,not ignorethemwherethey ppear, and nottry oexplain themawayorobscure their ssentialdifferences.This is the context withinwhich I wish to place mydiscussion ofNapoleon's foreignpolicy. I accept ProfessorParker'sexplanation ofNapoleon's psychological make-up, suggestingonly that Napoleon'spsychology nd politicaloutlook,however xplained, should be regardedor classified as criminal. I join Napoleon's admirers n recognizinghisgenius in variousareas-military, administrative, rganizational,polit-ical, even literary. accept that he had an extraordinary apacity forplanning,decision making,memory,work,mastery fdetail, and lead-ership. My sole concern hereis toargue thattheseremarkablequalities,amountingundeniably to genius, wereturned n internationalpoliticsto the service of an undertaking which can properly be labelled"criminal."This demands a definitionof terms. A criminal in politicsby mydefinition s someone who understands theconcept oflaw and recog-nizes thatorganized society is based upon it and cannot dispense withit. He/she knows furtherhat ideas of law and lawfulconduct play arole,thougha more marginaland contested one, also in internationalpolitics.Governments onduct diplomacy,engage in negotiations, on-clude treaties and conventions, and even wage wars withina broadcontext of law and an understandingoflawful nd unlawful onduct.Theygenerally expect and demand thattreatiesbe observed,promiseskept, nd recognizedrights espected,appealing for nternational anc-tions or resorting o self-help gainst putative awbreakers.A politicalcriminal s one who,knowing his, urns hedevices,concepts, and usesof aw in internationalpolitics to his own ends, not merelyselectivelyand partially as statesmen normally do, but in a regular,principialfashion.Repudiatingtheclaims and applicabilityof awforhimself ndhis own actions, he at the same time asserts and usurps its authorityvis-a-vis thers,demanding not only that other international actorsmeet theirputative awfulobligations to him but thattheyalso regardand obey him as the source of law. Thus a political criminal reversesKant's Categorical Imperative,treatingeverythingn politics-othermen, groups,states, institutions-never as ends in themselves, lwaysas means to hisends. He equally reversesClausewitzbymaking politicsa continuation ofwarbyothermeans. Mycontention is thatthisdefini-tionofa criminal outlook in politicscharacterizestheessence ofNapo-leon's foreign olicy.How to show this,or at least back it up, in a short essay? Twomethodswould seem available. One wouldbe to compile a catalogue of148 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Napoleon's ForeignPolicyvariousalleged criminalacts byNapoleon in internationalpolitics.Thiswould not be difficult o do. One could readily howthat he repeatedlyand deliberatelyviolated the neutrality f small states;that he resortedto udicial arrests nd murders gainstforeign ubjects; thathe orderedhisgeneralsand satraps o use preventive error o controltheir omains;thathe not only conquered and suppressedotherstates n war,butalsoused tactics ofbullying,manipulation, and extortionon themin timesofpeace, almost without egardto whether heywerehostileor friendly;that he frequently iolated understandings,promises,and treaty om-mitments; hat on principle he ruthlesslyubordinatedthe interests fall the states and peoples he ruledto those of France and ultimately fhimselfpersonally; that he declined to accept responsibility r showregretfor heenormous humancostsofhisventures, ven,for xample,the destructionof the GrandArmy n Russia;thathe blamed theFrenchpeople and his allies forhis downfall, ccusing themofbetrayal andinsufficient upport; thatwhile displaying ndifference nd contemptfor he rights nd honor of other men and states, he felt enuine rage if(in his perception) he was betrayedor frustratedy anyone else; thatthis rage frequently uelled in him a search forvengeance (e.g., histreatmentof Pope Pius VII or of Venice, his execution of the Ducd'Enghien, the Nuremburgbookseller Palm, and others,his constantvowsand efforts o humiliateand destroyEngland,his attemptto blowup theKremlin on leavingMoscow in 1812, hiscry n 1813 afterBava-ria's defection, "Munich mustburn! and burn it shall!"). Such acts, itcould be argued,demonstrate a patternof awless conduct in interna-tional affairs,how in Napoleon an outlook characteristicofthe socio-pathin civilsociety.A second method would be to choose one important chapter ofNapoleon's foreign olicyfor nalysisas a sample or model ofunderly-ingcriminal principles nd presuppositions n thewhole.A good choicemightbe Napoleon's dealingswithPope PiusVII. Here one would noteNapoleon's insistence thatthe Pope obey him not merelyon politicalissues, but on vital mattersof church doctrine and polity the OrganicArticles, heNapoleonic Catechism,marriage nd divorce,nominationand control ofbishops); his insistence thatPius's refusalto do so hadnothingto do withreligiousfaith, rinciples,orhigher oyalty ut dem-onstrated hePope's willful nd criminalobstinacy;Napoleon's genuinebelief,even while he himselfwas a thoroughgoingkepticand opportu-nist n matters freligion,thatthe Catholic Churchfrom tshead to itslowest members, likeall other religionsand churches,had an overrid-ingmoral and religiousobligation to servehim; his argument, n order-ingthe seizure and imprisonment f the pope and theannexation ofhisMILITARY HISTORY * 149


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lands, that he was carryingout the punishment of God on thepapacybecause thepopes had chosen torule as princeswhileJesushad died onthecross. One might ee in thisevidence oftheconsummate egocen-tricity,he simultaneous rebellion against all law and usurpation ofitsauthority,haracteristic fthe truecriminal.Yet neitherofthese is in myview a satisfactory ayto establish thethesis, thoughboth have plenty ofsubstance to them. The difficultysthatno matterhowmanyinstances ofsupposed criminalconduct oneinduces fromNapoleon's career or any particular ection of t to arguefor hecriminal haracterofthewhole, riticswillofferounter-examplesto showthatNapoleon also could and did oftenbehave in rational andgenerous fashion, that he showed affection oward his family,wives,associates, soldiers,fellow fficers,nd others;or theywill rguethathispoliticalbehaviorwas not criminal,or no more so thannecessary andusual in internationalpolitics, or that his allegedly criminal actionswere forcedupon himby circumstances and the higher aw ofraisond'etat.Mostbasic ofall, theymay claim that ince internationalpoliticsbydefinition s not governedby law,according to the old Roman prin-ciple of nullum crimen sine lege ("no crimewithout law") therecanby definition e no criminal action in internationalpolitics.Thereforeneither method is likelyto convince skeptics.More important,bothtend to distort hereal point I wishto make and distract ttention fromit. The thrust fmyargumentis not thatany decent person ought onmoral grounds to condemn Napoleon as a criminal. Though I do notdisguisemy ownestimate ofhismoralcharacter,myopinion oranyoneelse's on that core is relatively nimportantforhistorical nalysis.Thehistorian s concerned not to reach the most satisfactorymoral udg-ment ofhis characterbut to make thebest historical udgment on hisforeignpolicy,so as to increase our historicalunderstandingofit.Mythesis s simply hatno matterhowone may react toNapoleon's actionsand personality n moralgrounds, n orderproperly o understandhisforeignpolicy and its mpact on theEuropean systemone needs to seeitas a criminalenterprise.This is required, I contend, in order to understandthe originsofNapoleon's wars.With ll ofthem-beginning withBritain n 1803 andcontinuing throughAustria nd Russia in 1805, Prussia n 1806, Spainin 1808, Austria n 1809, and Russia in 1812-one is struckby a com-mon feature:while tcannot be said thatNapoleon went out ofhiswayto avoid any ofthem,neithercan it be said that he wentout ofhiswaydeliberatelyto startthem. Each of these wars, at least at the time itbrokeout, was in some respectunwelcome to him.Thisfacthas helpedlead many historians,especially the biographersand otherhistorians150 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Napoleon's ForeignPolicywhorely hiefly n Napoleon's correspondence and on Frenchsourcesfor heirevidence, to blame his opponents for tarting t least some ofthewars,especially 1803, 1806, and 1809. Italso helps account for hewide disagreement among historianson thegeneral question of Napo-leon's responsibility or hem. A few argelyexonerate him and blamehisenemies; othersexplain them mainlyas the resultof various"objec-tive" forcesbeyond Napoleon's or anyone's control-France's com-mitmentto the securityofits "natural" frontiers s a goal it could notsurrenderand Europe could not accept, the Continental System,thestalemated war withBritain, nd so on. Still others,whilerecognizingthe arge role played by Napoleon's imperialist mbitions, ust for lory,and despotic spirit, lso find onsiderable greed and ambition in otherpowers and assign them part of the responsibility.ProfessorParker'sexplanation ofNapoleon's decision to invade Russiabelongs apparentlyin this attercategory.Like many of its kind, t is plausible,moderate,and fair, nd rests on considerable evidence. Nonetheless, I think tmisses somethingin failing o see and account for nother featureofthesewars,often gnoredbut equally striking.If t is trueNapoleon did not exactly welcome his wars at the timetheybegan, it is even more true thatNapoleon's opponents, even onthose occasions when they technically were the aggressors n startingthewars,werebasically farmore reluctant than he to fight. he sameEuropean powerswhoaccepted, prepared for, nd sometimes aunchedwar withNapoleon, whether under apparentlyfavorableor obviouslyunfavorablemilitary nd diplomatic circumstances, had all withoutexception earlier, sometimes just shortlybefore, pursued policies ofmaking peace withNapoleonic France and seekingcoexistence on thebasis of French hegemony in Europe. A persistent egend about theNapoleonic era holds thatthe main European response to Napoleon'sconquest was one ofstubborn resistance; that the conquered peoplesand states ofEurope continued to harborhopes of iberation and inde-pendence despite theirdefeat nd subjugation,thattheyresisted ssim-ilation into theNapoleonic Empire, and thatfinally,whenthe back ofNapoleon's military owerwas brokenin Russia, theyrose to overthrowhisyoke.This Resistance-WarofLiberation myth s oftencombined with tstwin, helegend of theliberating nd regenerating deals of the FrenchRevolution as spread abroad by the Revolutionary nd Napoleonicarmies. European governments nd peoples, we are told even bysomegreathistorians ikeGeorges Lefebvre, dapted the deals ofthe FrenchRevolution to thepurpose ofdefeating Napoleonic France. Boththeseideas are about as wrong as broad historical nterpretations an be. InMILITARY HISTORY * 151


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fact,the normal, natural,and almost universal response in Europe totheexperience ofNapoleon's military ower and conquest was submis-sion, appeasement, and efforts t accommodation in various forms.Between 1801 and 1812 every major powerwhichcollided withNapo-leon, to say nothing of the lesser ones, tried in thisway to come totermswithNapoleon, oftentimeand again-Britain in 1802 and againin 1806-7, Austriain 1801-4, 1806-8, and 1809-12, Prussia forthewhole decade before 1806 and even more desperately fter1807, Rus-sia in 1801-3 and again in 1807-10. One American historianhas seena markedparallel between the Addingtongovernment's ppeasementof Napoleon in 1802-3 and Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler n1938-39.1 The problem withthisanalogy is not merelythat tbreaksdown at certainpoints, as historical nalogies alwaysdo, but that t istoo restricted.Between 1800 and 1812 almost everygovernment n Europe, andmost statesmen in Europe, went much furthern trying o appeaseNapoleon than Chamberlain did withHitler.The apparent exceptionsto thisrule-the heroic resistanceofSpain from1808, Russia in 1812,and Prussia in 1813-actually help prove the rule that the standardresponsetoNapoleon's power was appeasement. Both Spain and Russiadecided to resistonly after nduringyearsofexploitationand humilia-tion as Napoleon's allies; theirnational resistance occurred only aftertheywereactually invaded, and persistedbecause theywere neverfullyconquered. In Prussia, t was theprovincesofEast Prussia and Silesia,whichwerenever fully ccupied bythe French before1812, which rosein 1813, and thisonly after heFrench had fled; Berlinand theMark ofBrandenburg,occupied since 1806, did not. Everywhere n Europeduringthe War of Liberation in 1813-14 governmentsand peoples,howevermuch theygroaned underNapoleonic tyranny, referred otto rise at all or waited to rise until afterthey were liberatedby alliedarmies,or the French had fled,or theirowngovernmentshad decidedto switch ides. Holland, Switzerland, nd most ofGermanyand Italyare all examples.The failure fGermany to rise in support ofthe Russiansand Prus-sians in the springof 1813, afterNapoleon's defeat in Russia, againproves the point. As for the defection ofNapoleon's satellites, he didmore to driveBavaria, Wiirttemberg,nd otherstates into the enemycamp than the allies did to lure themover. By continuingto demandmoremoneyand men from tates he had alreadyexhausted whileflatlyrefusing o protect them, he made defectiontheironlywayto survive.

1. ErnestL. Presseisen,Amiensand Munich (The Hague,1978).

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Napoleon's ForeignPolicyAs forthe most importantally to defect, Austria, t did so only afterMetternich'sdesperate efforts o mediate a negotiated peace favorableto France had founderedon Napoleon's flatrefusal o negotiate.There is no problem in explaining this virtually niversal resorttoappeasement. The experience of Napoleon's power was enough tomakeevery uropean powertry ome form rother f ccommodationjoining him ifpossible to get a share of the imperialspoils, buyinghimoff, r making an arrangement to stay out of hisway.Some states likeBavaria did this fairly agerly and trustingly,thers like Austria onlywith reservations or in desperation. Only Britain, which Napoleoncould notdestroy, ontinued to fight oggedly, nd thisonlybecause itconcluded in 1803 that n actual peace withNapoleon was humiliatingand intolerable and in 1806-7 that any peace was impossible. Whatdemands explanation is not Europe's repeated recourse to appease-ment, but its consistent failure.The only satisfactory nswer is thesimple and obvious one: Napoleon could not be appeased. Each warwas the outcome ofthe uniform xperience of one European stateafteranotherthat twas impossibleto do business withNapoleon, thatpeacewithhimon histermswas more dangerous and humiliating han war. tis most striking fall that the appeasers themselves, heverymen whohad advocated accommodation and coexistence withFrance, regularlyabandon theirownpolicies, admitting, ven though hey tilldread warand feardefeat,that accommodation will not restrainNapoleon. Thiswas true of Austria's Count Cobenzl and Archduke Carl in 1805, ofEmperor Francis and Carl again by 1809, ofPrussia'sCounts Lombardand Haugwitz, he Duke ofBrunswick,nd KingFrederickWilliam II by1806, of Prussia's Baron vom Stein in 1807, of Prince Hardenberg in1808-12, ofCount Rumiantsev nd Tsar Alexanderby 1812, ofCountMetternichn 1813.

Thus to pose the question in its usual form,why European states,despiteearlierdefeats, ontinued to formnew coalitionsagainst France,is tomiss the point. (It is also historicallynaccurate-Napoleon forgedbigger and more effective oalitions between 1800 and 1813 than hisopponents did-but leave that side.) It is equally irrelevant o dwell onthe immediate or proximatecauses and occasions for hevarious warsin explaining them. For ifone paysseriousattentionto documents andtestimony rom therstatesrather hanFrance alone, one quicklyseesthat the central problem is not how wars broke out, but why peaceconstantly failed,whyefforts t accommodating France broke down,why monarchs and statesmen who genuinely did not want to fightFrance came to the conclusion that theyhad to do so. I find t inexpli-cable thatgood historians can simplyassert what is technically true,MILITARY HISTORY * 153


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that Prussiastartedthe war of 1806 orAustriathat of1809, and not askthemselveswhatcould have induced so timorous and irresolute kingas FrederickWilliam II, eager only toenjoy furthereace and neutral-ity,to gamble everything n war against the French? Or what couldmake so narrow-minded nd fearful sovereignas Emperor Francis,whosehighest mbition was to hangonto his hereditary states npeaceand who had been thoroughly eaten by France in threegreat wars,throwthe iron dice again alone and unsupported in 1809? Thatdemands explanation.While no explanation of individualcases can be attemptedhere,once again the heart of thematter s simple. European statesmenofallkindsbelieved-wanted and needed tobelieve-that Napoleon, thoughan extraordinarily owerful and effective eader, was nonetheless anormal statesmanoperatingsomewhere within he normal rules, withwhomnormal internationalpoliticswas possible. He was not. He was acriminal leader of a criminal enterprise,with whom normal transac-tions and relations designed to achieve their normal aims ofequality,security, nd independence were not possible. Theywere accustomedto the unscrupulous,semipiraticalpolitics ofthe late eighteenthcen-tury; n mostinstances theywanted to continue itto theirownbenefit,in collaboration withFrance. But theirpreviousexperience, farfrompreparingthem fordealing withNapoleon, misled them. Constantlythey foundthemselvesplayinghalfa corsair to his corsair and a half,driven nto a corner where theonlywayoutwas a Flucht nach vorne,desperate resistance. The analogy withEurope's reaction to Hitler sobvious. To adapt Paul Reynaud's famous remark n June 1940, theythought heyweredealing withLouis XIV.Butthey earned thatNapo-leon was not Louis XIV; he was Genghis Khan.Thisschema applies preciselyto thewar n 1812. The central causeofRusso-Frenchalienation was the central issue forRussia's security,thefateofPoland. The real turning ointfrom lliance toward ventualwar was Napoleon's rejection of the agreement reached in February1810 betweentheRussian hancellorRumiantsevnd the French mbas-sador CaulaincourtguaranteeingRussiaagainst a revivalofa Kingdomof Poland. Further,what emerges most clearly in the Russian docu-mentsand literature s thatTsarAlexander and Rumiantsevreallytriedin 1807-10, ifwithgrowing kepticism nd pessimism, to lay the basisfora durable junior partnershipof Russia with France, so as to forceBritain opeace and thereby acifyEurope. That the Russianshad theirownambitions and interestsFinland, Sweden, theBalkans,Turkey, heStraits)was obvious; thatthey saw certain areas whichtheymustnotconcede outright ut somehow preserve as buffer ones or share with154 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Napoleon's ForeignPolicyFrance (Silesia, Poland, Austria) was also plain; but that Russia cededfull control of most of Europe to France, recognizing all the Frenchvassals and satrapies even in Spain, and that the tsar, genuinely anti-British nd eager to forceBritain o the peace table and exclude it fromEurope, had declared war and cut off ritish rade to Russia at consider-able economic cost to Russia, s equally undeniable.What the Russians learned was that no compromise they uggestedever was attainable, no securitypledge honored (the refusal o guaran-tee Russia against a revivedPolish Kingdom being theworstblow); thatNapoleon treated not only old established Russian interests n NorthGermanybut also direct treatyprovisions ike thatofTilsitguarantee-ing the territoryf the Grand-Duke of Oldenburg as scrapsofpaper,noteven worth onsulting Russia about; and thatNapoleon, whiledemand-ing that Russia close its ports to neutral goods as well as British nd toopen them wide to French goods, himself ad launched trade openlyona massive scale withthe Britishforthe benefitofFrance. The issue in1810-12 concerning the Continental System was not whether Russiawould fulfilltspromises to help force Britain to peace; it had fulfilledthosepromises already bythe end of 1807 and neverbroke them. t waswhetherNapoleon, who had pervertedthe Continental Systeminto aweapon for he economic subjugationofhis Continental empire ratherthanofBritain, ould subjugateRussia in thisfashion lso.This lawless, criminal character ofNapoleon's policy explains Rus-sia's decision to accept war. No sane leader or nation goes to waragainst such odds as Russia faced unless itbelieves ithas no choice. Italso illuminatesNapoleon's decision. Professor arker,ike almostevery-one, concentrates n explainingwhatdrove Napoleon into thisventurewhat forcesworkingfrombehind pushed him into it, so to speak. Welland good; but one also needs to ask, as fewdo, whatpositive goals ledhim into it, drew him on. Napoleon was a man characterized by con-stant, ntense, purposivecalculation. Thiscapacitymore thananythingelse made hima great militaryeader. One mustalwaysask about himeven more than about most statesmenwhat end he had in mind,whatexactly he hoped to accomplish. We are accustomed, withGeorgesLefebvre, o deny that there was any final im or coherentoverarchingscheme ofempirebehindhisimperialism. quite agree. He had no finalgoal, because he oftenpursued any and all goals and none in particular;because his imagination and ambition could be captured by anythingand his loyalty ecured by nothing.Butthe lack ofa finalpolitical goalsurelyneed nothave meant theabsence of ntermediateones.One would suppose thatfor o greata venture s thishe must havehad a set ofwaraims, a concept of how and wherethefighting ughttoMILITARY HISTORY * 155


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end. One seeks it n vain in his correspondence. The ForeignOffice ndits activityprovide no clue; by 1812 it was functioning s little morethan an auxiliary commissariat for the Grand Armyand a wing ofFrench military ntelligence.2 Nor does the diplomacy by whichNapo-leon put togetherhis great coalition reveal his aims. His vassals andsatellites were simply commanded into line, Prussiabludgeoned, Aus-triabullied and bribed, all withno notionorpromisesof where t wouldend. The one state in Europe that enjoyed a little room forchoice,Sweden, escaped Napoleon preciselybecause he would not say wherehe was goingormake payoffs o secure its help. Whyno set ofwar aims,no political programforthis massive ventureon whichthe fateof theEmpire and Europe would ride? Napoleon could not state his finalgoalsto his allies or foesbecause he had none. Nothing s morerevealing ndpitiful han his efforts,fterreaching Moscow, to get Alexander to talktohim,to induce the tsar to admit defeatand make peace. Not only didNapoleon, the back of his own armybroken, have no means to makeAlexander admit defeat or even persuade him to talk; had the tsaragainsthis interests nd at the risk fassassination agreed to negotiate,Napoleon would have had nothing to say to him. What terms did hehave in mind? Whatcould he possiblyhave proposed?

But surely Napoleon's concrete war aims can be inferred rom hereasons whichdrovehim nto war? Was he not fightingo close the holein the Continental System which Alexander's ukaz of 31 December1810 had opened up, and thereby o discourage Britain nd force t tothepeace table? Verywell-how? How,by invading nd beating Russia,wouldhe close the alleged hole in theContinental System? Would thismean that Frenchcustoms agentswould be stationed in Russianportsas they already had been all over Europe? Would they prove moreeffective herethantheyhad everywhere lse? Would this mean Frenchannexation ofReval and Tallinn and Petersburg s it had ofHamburgand Bremen and Liibeck?And howexactlywould even this, f ffected,bring Britain to its knees? Britain had been at war with the wholeContinent including Russia since 1807. For most of that time it hadgiven up any serious hope of regainingRussia as an ally. The Russianand Baltic marketwas not critical to the survivalof the British con-omy; the worst blow to British rade in 1811 and 1812, the resultofNapoleon's cunning, American ingenuousness, and British lumsinessand stubbornness,was Britain'sbreak and warwiththe UnitedStates.

2. This is very pparent fromNapoleon's publishedcorrespondence,but formoreevidence ofthedeterioration, ee E. A. Whitcomb,Napoleon's DiplomaticService Durham,N.C., 1979).

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The Britishhad givenway ust too late in 1812 to prevent this war; inreal desperation,theycould always come to termswithAmerica, morethanmaking good any economic losses the defeatofRussia wouldhavecaused them. And anyway, uppose the Britishhad decided in 1812 orwheneverto sue forpeace, whatcould Napoleon have repliedto them?What peace termscould or would he have offered?Whatpeace termshad not been tried? Whatpeace terms, ffered nd agreed on, wouldhenot soon have found ntolerable and overthrown r subverted?This emptiness, this lack of any real political goal in Napoleon'sventures, s by no means special to his invasion of Russia. It character-izes his foreign policy as a whole. In reading Napoleon's correspon-dence 1806-9 to determine ust whathe wantedofAustria,whatroleheexpected Austriato fill n his system, noted that his main complaintabout Austriafrom1806 on was that everywhere-in Germany, n theNear East, withPoland and Russia-Austria was in his way. His mostcommon and persistentdemand was not thatAustriastop armingandmenacing him-that became dominant onlyin 1808-but thatAustriacease to obstructhispurposes,thatAustria eave him alone. Ponderfora moment theconcept ofa European states systemwhichthis mplies:an ancient Great Power located in theheart ofEurope, withroots andtieseverywhereo North,West,East, and South, s assignedtheduty, npain ofdestruction f t fails o obey,of eaving Napoleon alone, gettingout ofhiswaywhereverhis way might akehim.Everyoneknowshowmuch the problemofwhatto do withAustriapreoccupied Talleyrand,how hard and oftenhe tried o persuade Napo-leon, especially in 1805, to find some permanent place forAustria nhis system.All too often schemes like Talleyrand's Strasbourg Memo-randum have been judged on whether r not theywerepractical solu-tions to France's problems, which misses the main point. What theStrasbourgMemorandum and similar proposals illustrate s the funda-mental differencebetween Talleyrand and Napoleon. Talleyrand, anormalvenal, unscrupulous,opportunistic uropean statesman,took tforgranted that one had to find a permanent place and role foracountry ike Austriawithin he international ystem, nd triedto deviseone thatNapoleon would accept. Napoleon, a criminal n internationalpolitics, took it forgranted that he need not assignAustria any role atall ifhe chose not to. ThisNapoleonic concept of nternationalpoliticsdid not apply uniquelyor specially to Austria.The whole of his policytoward Prussia or Poland is exactly the same-a prolonged cat-and-mouse game in which he putoff he decision as towhat, f nything,hewould choose to do with these states. Above all, it applies to 1812.France and all ofEurope weremobilized to invade Russia-hundreds ofMILITARY HISTORY * 157


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thousands ofmen killed, endless sufferingaused-in the last analysisfor no better reason than that Russia and Britain were in Napoleon'sway, would not leave him alone, obstructedwhat he wanted to do,whatever hat was.This is why I say that one cannot understandNapoleon's foreignpolicywithout eckoning with tsessential criminality, ecognizingthedark voidat its center. It is nottrue that Napoleon merely ontinued orsomewhat extended the normal amoral lawlessness of eighteenth-century nternational politics. Certainlythere was a great deal ofthatlawlessness, especially toward the end of thecentury, nd outstandingexemplarsofaggressive nd piraticalpolitics, perhapsthebest or worstbeing Frederick I of Prussia and CatherineII ofRussia. No eighteenth-century eader over hisorherwholecareer, however, onsistently rokeall the rules in the Napoleonic style.There were plentyof semicrimi-nals, demicorsairs,but none on the Napoleonic scale. And to repeat,the scale ofthe crimes is not the correct or decisive criterion.All theeighteenth-centurynternational crimes, including the partitionsofPoland, had some systemof rules, some notion of European order,howeverbrutal and defective,n mind.Napoleon did not; that swhyhecould lie so freely bout iton St. Helena. One can say what Frederick Iwanted-equality withAustrianow, the potential forsuperiority nddomination in Germany ater; what Catherinewanted-superiorityvis-a-visthe German powers, arbitershipn Europe, controlofPoland, thelion's share of the Ottoman Empire. One can make these goals, how-everdangerousand aggressive, ompatible with ome notion ofa Euro-pean system, n international order. One cannot do so withNapoleon.The onlything hat one can confidently ay he wanted was more.Nor without hisunderstandingofNapoleon's nonconception ofaEuropean and world order (a void that tmighttake a JosephConradadequately to portray) an one understand theimpact ofNapoleon onEurope and theEuropean statessystem.The main taskfor he interna-tionalhistorian n thisperiod is to relate and to explain howthecharac-terofEuropean politicscame to be transformed etween theeighteenthand the nineteenthcenturies. This transformation an neither be de-scribed nor explained withoutbringing nto the picture the criminalcharacter ofNapoleon's policy and the effects fhaving tbeaten intoEurope byfifteen earsof Frenchconquest, domination,and exploita-tion, any more than one can account for he changed natureofEuro-pean and worldpoliticssince 1945 without eferenceto thepolicies ofHitler'sGermany and their effects.This is not to claim an essentiallikeness in the phenomena; it is to assert thattheyare both essentialingredients n thetransformation. ntilNapoleon, despite the Eastern158 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Napoleon's ForeignPolicyWar and the wars of the French Revolutionfrom1787 to 1801, Europehad continued to follow he prevailing ighteenth-centuryules of nter-national politics-a wholly ompetitivebalance of power game, operat-ing through compensations, indemnities, and beggar-my-neighborrivalries.Destructive nd unstable thoughthis ystemhad provedto be,nothing lse was believedto be possible; somehow, the reigning ssump-tion ran in the early yearsoftheFrench Revolution nd ensuingwars, fFrance could only be curbed and itsrevolution rushed, the old systemcould still be made to work.That belief was a major reason Europe atfirstgreeted Napoleon's accession to power mainly with relief andanticipation.He looked likea normal, calculable statesman, monarchwithout s yet a crown,someone who would playthe usual game by theknown rules, fmore ruthlesslynd successfully han most.Then came the rude awakening.Napoleon's greatserviceto Euro-pean internationalpoliticswas to be a very fficientcourgeof God. Heconvinced European princes and statesmen that an alternative toeighteenth-century olitics had to be foundbecause playing the oldgame withhim was intolerable. They were used to high-stakes okeramong heavily rmed playersreadyat intervals o tipthe table over andshoot itout; but now theydiscovered thatthegame was runby some-one whoalwayscheated, held the biggestguns as wellas the highcards,made his own rules,always won,and neverpaid off.And so theyhad toend this game ofpoker and invent a new post-1815 game of contractbridge.Napoleon contributednothing positiveto thisoutcome. Never-theless, awless to the end, a law unto himself,he drove Europe into anewsystemof nternationalpoliticsbounded by law.I recognize that n advancing thisthesis open myself o thecharge,dreaded by historians, fbeing a moralizer, prosecuting ttorney.Butthecharge,forone thing, trikesme as shouting "Fire,fire!" n timeofflood.Foreveryhistorianwhodistorts herecordby moralizing, endoso by excessive coyness, calling thingsby any othername-mistakes,errors,blunders, miscalculations, aberrations, irrationality, tupidity,sickness-so as to avoid theword "crime." Not to see the criminal sideof Napoleon, to deny his demonic dimension, is to deny somethingquintessentialto him personallyand vitalto our historic understand-ing,tomake him less greatand less interesting han he was. Howmanyexplanations have not been attempted to show ust where Napoleonwent wrong,who or what corruptedhim and was responsible forhisfinaldefeatand downfall? Is any of them convincing? Is it not moreclear withNapoleon than almost anyone else in history hat characterwas destiny?Who can reallybelieve thatNapoleon somewherechanged,wentwrong,gotoff hetrack tAmiens,orAusterlitz, rTilsit,or (leastMILITARY HISTORY * 159


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convincing of all) with the Austrian connection and in the arms ofMarie Louise? ThisdiminishesNapoleon. Let himbe Lucifer,notSam-son. Wedo himmorehistoric ustice byrecognizing n himthe soul ofacorsair, condottiere, capo mafioso,butarguably hegreatest orsair,condottiere, nd capo mafioso in history.Besides, as I have argued, thisverdict s not a moral udgment onNapoleon, thoughcertainly it implies one. It is instead the key, theprerequisite,to an understandingof his policy and its impact uponEuropean international politics.And anyway,what I am sayingis notnew, but old and conventional. Mosthistorianshave not to my knowl-edge called Napoleon a criminal in so many words (though contem-poraries did, and worse); but they have said the same thing n moresubtleways.Albert-LeonGuerardcalled hima truescoundrel ("un vraiscelerat"). Tocqueville's verdictwas that he was as great as any mancould be withoutvirtue;Marshal Foch's, that he forgotthat a mancannot be God; Madame de Stael's, thatforhim no man existed buthimself.Perhaps ProfessorParkeragrees in calling him an imperialmadman. I sense myselfthat I have here contributed truismsandcliches to thedebate, rediscoveringAmerica. Bywayofexcuse, some-times the obvious needs stating; repeatedly, in reading even newerworks n Napoleon, I feelthat omeone needs to sayagain thatmorallythisemperorhad no clothes.Myconclusion, however, s a modest one:on Napoleon's foreign olicy, ncludingthe invasion ofRussia in 1812,the famousverdicton his udicial murderofthe Duc d'Enghien shouldbe reversedto read: "It was worse than a blunder, t was a crime."

BibliographicNoteThe origins of thisessay, as a commentary on Harold T. Parker'spaper, and its nature as a broad interpretation fNapoleon's foreignpolicy, preclude the citation of detailed footnotes. I merely want toindicate some of the principal documentarysources I have relied onand givea veryfewreferences o themassivesecondary literature.ForNapoleon himself he mostimportant ource is the officialCorrespon-dance de Napoleon Ier; publieepar ordrede l'EmpereurNapoleonIII, ed. A. du Casse, 32 vols. (Paris, 1858-70). In the voluminousmemoir literature, the most importantwork for 1812 and after is

ArmandAugustinLouis Caulaincourt,Memoires du General de Cau-laincourt, 3 vols. (Paris, 1933). ForTalleyrand's role,thebest source ishis Lettresde Talleyrand tNapoleon, d'apres les originauxcon-serves ux Archives esAffairestrangeresParis,1967).160 * THE JOURNAL OF


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Napoleon's ForeignPolicyOn the origins f the war of 1812, the twofundamental orks reGrand PrinceNikolaiMikhailovich omanov, iplomaticheskie no-

sheniia Rossii v Frantsiipo donesian poslov Aleksandra Napo-leona 1808-1812, 7 vols. St. Petersburg,905-14) and Albert andal,Napoleon et Alexandre er,3 vols. Paris, 1891-96). For Russianfor-eign policy n general n thisperiod, he fundamentalource is thedocumentaryollection Vneshnaia PolitikaRossii xixi nachala xxveka, lst series, 1801-1815, 8 vols. (Moscow, 1960-67). However,manyvolumes n the Sbornik mperatorskogo usskogo storichest-kogo Obshchestvo, 48 vols. St. Petersburg,867-1917) alsocontainvitalmaterial. or Prussia, aul Bailleu, d., Preussenund Frankreichvon1795 bis 1807, 2 vols. Leipzig,1881-87) is essential.There s a greatdeal of published orrespondence romAustrianarchives or he arlier eriod n Alfred ivenot nd Heinrich eissberg,eds., Quellen ur Geschichte er deutschenKaiserpolitik sterreichswahrend der franz6sischen Revolutionskriege 790-1801, 5 vols.(Vienna, 1873-90) and various ollections ditedbyHermannHiuffer.For 1812-14 WilhelmOncken, Oesterreich nd Preussen m Befrei-ungskriege, vols. Berlin, 876) remains undamental.For Britain n the earlier period the Grenvillepapers (WilliamWyndham renville, aronGrenville, heManuscriptsofJ. B. For-tescue, sq.,PreservedtDropmore. .,10 vols. London, 892-19271)are indispensable. or 1812 and afterhepapersofCastlereaghMem-oirsand Correspondence fViscountCastlereagh, 2 vols. London,1850-531) and the works f Charles K. Webster, speciallyhis TheForeignPolicyofCastlereagh1812-1815 (London, 1931) are equallyso. Thebest biography f Napoleon remains hatofJ. M. Thompson,Napoleon Bonaparte (London, 1952; reprinted xford, 988); thebestsurvey f the period hat f GeorgesLefebvre, apoleon, Englishtranslation, vols. New York, 969).

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* -in ianaThe Patterns f Warthrough heEighteenth enturyBy Larry . Addington"A emarkableour e forceoveringvastspanoftime,ifferentcultures,arfare owinpaperback!byandndea.-GuntherothenberguropeanNaval andAhistoryfwar ndwarfareromncient Maritime History,timeso the arlymodernra,Larry300-1500Addington'sewbook ompletesissurveyofhepatternsofwarintheestern y Archibald R. Lewis andworld. orAddington,arfares best TimothyJ.Runyanunderstoods a processf hangenwar'social, olitical,echnological,nd "Basedn n mpressiverrayfmono-organizationalspects. is ookxplainsgraphsndmajororks,reshtranslationsnot nly hat appenednwarfareut of ontemporaryhronicles,nd eportswhyarn certainimend ultureook from odemnderwaterrchaeologicalondistinctnd recognizableatterns.sites,his ighlynformedccount..Though is approachs far-ranging,rovideslear videncefa fruitfulAddingtonreatsertainllustrativeattlesmultidisciplinarypproachomaritimeand ampaignsn etailo ivehe eader history."a morentimateook t heway ar as -Americanistoricaleviewfoughtn he ast. ompanionolume, LewisandRunyangivesa uperbbook,The attemsfWarince he ighteenthuiteabrilliantsynthesis.heyareastersCentury,ontinueshe urveynto he of he ubject."presentay. -Historycloth22.50paper10.95 paper9.95 cloth22.50

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Napoleons Foreign Policy a Criminal Enterprise

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