Berlin, August 2018

Naming, shaming and reintegration:

Beyond stigmatization in international politics

Paper prepared for the 58th ECPR General Conference,

22-25 August 2018, Hamburg

Author Contacts:

Prof. Dr. Simon Koschut

Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science Freie Universität Berlin

Ihnestr. 22 14195 Berlin

Germany

Tel.: +49 (0)30 838 75792 Fax: +49 (0)30 838 54160

Email: simon.koschut@fu-berlin.de Web: www.simon-koschut.com

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Naming, shaming and reintegration: Beyond stigmatization in international

politics

Simon Koschut

The standard view in International Relations theory, and much of social sciences, argues that, to resolve conflicts peacefully requires ‘keeping shaming out’ because shaming is stigmatizing and produces a category of outcasts, which often impels people to perform irrational acts of violence and harm. In this paper, I turn this assumption on its head by suggesting that, under certain conditions, shaming may contribute to social repair. Instead of ‘keeping shaming out’, we need to differentiate between different types of shaming in order to fully understand the mechanisms underpinning social exchange in communities. The main argument raised here is that reintegrative shaming – shaming, which is followed by efforts to reintegrate the offender back into the community – is central to peaceful conflict resolution in international politics. This argument is empirically illustrated by the case of NATO’s military intervention in Libya.

Introduction

Shaming is a social process of expressing disapproval, with the intention or effect of invoking

suffering in the person being shamed. Shaming, unlike purely deterrent punishment, involves

a moral component of consciousness-raising, labeling, and persuasion to convince others to

change their behavior. Shaming operates at two levels to effect social control. First, it

dissuades states from non-compliance or inappropriate behavior because social approval of

significant others, such as membership in international society, is something most states do

not like to lose. Second, and perhaps more importantly, shaming reaffirms antagonistic

identities by constructing categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Risse and Ropp 2013: 15).

In some cases, such as US foreign policy toward Iran or North Korea, shaming may be

divisive and stigmatizing, emphasizing social distance, whereas in other cases, such as the

rows among NATO allies over Libya or Iraq, shaming has the opposite effect of eventually

producing social intimacy and mutual understanding. There appear, then, to be very different

ways of shaming in IR. In this paper, I argue that shaming can be both reintegrative and

disintegrative and that much turns on this distinction. The general understanding in IR theory

has thus far failed to distinguish the social distancing effects of shaming that is stigmatizing

and outcasting from the community-building effects of shaming that is reintegrative.

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Uncoupling shaming and stigmatization: Three types of social control

IR scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of theorizing the mechanisms through

which states may be shamed into compliance. Shaming has been employed to punish

deviation from international norms (Risse/Ropp/Sikkink; Keck/Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1999;

Nadelmann 1990; Andreas/Nadelmann 2008; Sandholtz/Stiles 2009; Krain 2012), enforce

international taboos (Tannenwald 2005), and to make international status claims (Zarakol

2011). In a recent volume (Friman 2015), the contributors begin to systematically unpack

naming and shaming practices by looking more closely at the conditions that shape its

effectiveness. They move well beyond naming and shaming as an exclusive weapon of the

weak, adding much-needed analytical precision to broad claims about the power of naming

and shaming practices. Still, the general understanding is that international shaming appears

to be wedded to stigmatization in IR theory. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 892) point out,

“we recognize norm-breaking behavior because it generates disapproval or stigma (emphasis

added)”. Zarakol and Subotic (2012, 924) link shame to particular structural positions in the

international system, arguing that “it is particularly stigmatized states within the international

system that are likely to feel shame”. Stigmatization erects barriers between the offender and

punisher through transforming the relationship into one that segregates the offender from the

in-group via labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination (Adler-Nissen

2014, 146). The stigmatized offender is constructed as an outcast and is placed outside the

moral boundaries of international society (Zarakol 2011, 4). Underlying the notion of

stigmatizing shaming is a strong belief in the actor’s inability to correct itself as well as a

fundamental denial of confidence in the morality of the offender. The offender is excluded

and segregated through public humiliation, condemnation, and ‘branding’ in order to insulate

the stigmatizing community from becoming ‘morally polluted’. Social bonds are broken and

social labels designate a clear separation between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’, ‘us’ and

‘them’. To sum up, stigmatization is disintegrative, “a label of difference imposed from

outside”, in which no effort is made to reconcile the offender with the community (Zarakol

2011, 4).

While IR scholars are right to focus attention on stigma labels and their disintegrative

effects in international relations, such a perspective nevertheless tends to obscure the

conceptual complexity of shaming. Below, I show how this may create problems for scholarly

research both on theoretical and practical grounds.

First, when shaming is reduced to stigmatization, this can have undesirable theoretical

consequences. Specifically, it may obscure alternative mechanisms and effects. For example,

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while moral outrage may indeed evoke stigmatization and labelling, it may also trigger

forgiveness and care, as in the relationship between mother and child. Moreover, shaming

may be practiced for different reasons and different intentions. For example, while in some

cases people may indeed wish to exclude deviant individuals from participation in their group

(for example, a sex offender or child molester who fails to acknowledge any misconduct), in

other cases people may find it preferable to reintegrate them back into society (for example, a

juvenile offender who acknowledges her/his crime and deserves a second chance). Finally, the

modalities of shaming are often historically and culturally specific. For example, whereas

outcasting and stigma labelling obtains a central place in American culture, the cultural

assumption in Japan by contrast emphasizes the basic goodness and belief in each individual’s

capacity for self-correction1. In other words, while shaming occupies a central role in both

cultures its purpose and underlying features differ significantly. In sum, the same mechanism

may trigger different effects in different situations, historical periods and cultures.

Second, the practical implications of linking shaming with stigmatization may be

equally serious. For most IR scholars, it may be assumed that the main reason for studying

stigmatization is to get rid of it. These same scholars would probably also agree that social

control through naming and shaming wrongful behavior is unavoidable in virtually any type

of relationship in order to maintain social order and morality. But this creates a dilemma: we

are morally condemning a practice (shaming) that is, at the same time, indispensable for

upholding moral order. Not clearly distinguishing between different types of shaming, and

thus between different types of social control, may thus result in the extinction of any type of

social control through shaming and, in the end, could undermine social order and morality.

That is, well-intentioned attempts to reduce undesirable practices of stigmatizing shaming in

international politics may have the social side-effect of reducing desirable mechanisms of

social control altogether.

Social repair, stigmatization, and toleration

A reasonable way to avoid this dilemma would be to systematically classify and explain

responses to deviance as a function of the type of deviance and underlying contextual factors.

In fact, social psychology differentiates between three types of social control: repair,

stigmatization, and toleration. Repairing social relationships is a type of social control that is

aimed at continuing cooperative and reciprocal interactions with deviant individuals. To 1 Sakiyama,Mari,"ReintegrativeshamingandjuveniledelinquencyinJapan"(2011).UNLVTheses,Dissertations,ProfessionalPapers,andCapstones.995.

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realize this aim, repair focuses on deviant behavior rather than the personality, identity, and

characteristics of deviant individuals. Major strategies to repair disturbed relationships are (1)

punishment to change the behavior of the deviant individual; (2) compensation for suffered

losses due to deviant behavior; (3) care through medical treatment or therapy if the deviant

individuals cannot autonomously change her or his behavior; (4) forgiveness to allow and

motivate deviant individuals to reintegrate; and (5) prevention by means of warning and

education or isolation of individuals if their deviant behavior seems uncontrollable.

Stigmatization, by contrast and as noted above, is a type of social control that is aimed

at excluding the deviant person from a relationship or group. Stigmatization does not

distinguish between deviant behavior and the person. Instead, stigmatization perceives the

deviant condition as a defining and essential attribute of the individual or social group, thus

rendering the person’s or group’s reputation, character, and identity as culturally inadequate

and morally “bad”. Major strategies are (1) stereotyping, which occurs when an undesirable

property is attributed to all members of a group; (2) labelling or pigeonholing by determining

or influencing the self-identity and behavior of individuals or groups as deviant from standard

cultural norms; and (3) discrimination on the basis of features that usually have nothing to do

with the deviant behavior, such as skin color, sexual orientation, or religion. Stigmatization

can be associated with past, imagined or currently present deviant conditions and is often

functional in the context of hierarchical relationships and employed by dominant groups.

Finally, toleration is a third type of social control. It is important to point out here that

tolerance is not the same as indifference with respect to deviant behavior. Rather, toleration

requires that people do care about the deviant behavior of others in a negative way but that we

also attempt to suppress and restrain our negative response. Simply put, toleration requires

people to look the other way and pretend as if the deviant condition does not exist. While this

may seem to undermine social order and morality, there may be good reasons to practice

toleration. First, there may be a caring or protective attitude toward the individual or group

that may help or even force us to tolerate the deviant condition, such as in the relationship

between mother and child. Second, toleration may result from fear of retaliation by others

whom we depend on and who may decide to break up the relationship. For example, the

appeasing character of European responses to the harsh and humiliating rhetoric US president

Trump toward NATO allies may be viewed as a case of toleration due to a lack of alternative

choices.

To conclude, I argued that much conceptual confusion as well as undesirable

theoretical and practical implications may result from conjoining shaming and stigmatization

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in IR. This may be resolved by first realizing that any social group needs to engage in social

control, and that, on the basis of different situations, historical periods, and cultures, social

control may take three major forms: repair, stigmatization, and toleration. Although each of

these types may be characteristic for distinct groups and historical periods, it is important to

emphasize that even within the same group, situation, or historical period, all three types of

social control can occur, and that one type may easily transform into another type under

changing conditions or contexts. For example, the practice of isolating deviant individuals

with the intention of reintegrating them back into society may quickly turn into stigmatization

if that individual is permanently placed outside of the intimate context of the community. In

the following sections, I will build on and further specify this conceptual distinction within

the context of IR. Since I am concerned with the practice of shaming, I will concentrate on

two types of social control: reintegrative shaming (repair) and disintegrative shaming

(stigmatization). Toleration as a third type of social control does not interest me here as it

does not involve the practice of shaming and is thus not relevant to the argument at hand.

Stigmatization and reintegrative shaming

The previous section sought to decouple the concept of shaming from the concept of

stigmatization by showing the complexity of ‘shaming-in-use’. In this section, I intend to do

two things. First, I will further conceptualize what I call reintegrative shaming (repair) by

contrasting it to its disintegrative other (stigmatization). Second, I will subsequently detail the

conditions and mechanisms under which reintegrative shaming occurs.

Recall that stigmatization involves shaming in the sense that an individual is publicly

associated with a stigma, an attribute or symbol that evokes negative feelings by members of

a social group. A stigma prevents that person from engaging with members of the group and

from adapting his or her behavior. Yet, as pointed out above, it would be erroneous to equate

stigmatization with shaming in general rather than as seeing it as a particular type of shaming.

Although stigma logically implies shame, the reverse is not true: shaming does not logically

imply stigma. In some cases, shaming may occur without engaging in stigmatizing strategies

precisely because the aim is to repair a social relationship. Empirical examples, such as the

row among NATO members over Libya in 2011, certainly do involve practices of shaming as

I will show further below. Yet, the motivation behind these shaming practices is not to

exclude members from participating in group activities but to repair a broken relationship. It

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seems useful and necessary, therefore, to introduce an alternative type of shaming to

stigmatization. I will refer to this type as reintegrative shaming.

Reintegrative shaming is shaming, which is followed by efforts to reintegrate the

offender back into the community through words or gestures of forgiveness and ceremonies

of restoration and repentance. The concept of reintegrative shaming originates from research

in criminological theory, particularly the work of John Braithwaite. He showed that different

groups develop different strategies of shaming wrongdoers. Whereas some groups employ

stigmatization to deter transgression, others pursue shaming within a cultural context of

respect for the offender. In this paper, I argue that this distinction is equally important for the

study of international politics. Reintegrative shaming means that expressions of community

disapproval are followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community (Braithwaite 1989,

55). This presupposes persistent belief in the deviant person’s moral capacity for self-

correction. Reintegrative shaming separates the deviant act from the deviator, according to the

Christian tradition of ‘hate the sin, love the sinner’.2 As Braithwaite (1989, 101) explains, “it

is shaming which labels the act as evil while striving to preserve the identity of the offender

as essentially good”.

It should be noted that reintegrative shaming is not simply a weaker or softer form of

stigmatization. On the contrary, it can be just as cruel at times, making the offender ‘feel the

pain’ of violating community norms through discrediting words, gestures, and status

degrading acts. The key distinction between shaming that is disintegrative and reintegrative

shaming is that the former emphasizes social distance whereas the latter emphasizes social

closeness. Even though the status of the deviant actor may be temporarily lowered, he or she

will eventually be invited to come to terms with it and community ties are reinforced by

combining shame with praise.

As with stigmatization, reintegrative shaming is communicated through words,

gestures, and symbols. However, in contrast to stigmatization, the discourse of reintegrative

shaming is a discourse of social intimacy. It communicates disapproval of wrongdoing with

respect, and emphasizes rehabilitation, reintegration, and restoration. For example, a strong

condemnation of misbehavior (‘you betrayed us’) will be immediately followed by public

expressions of mutual respect and social belonging to the group (‘our mutual bond remains

strong’). Thus, in stark contrast to stigmatization, reintegrative shaming sets out to produce

more interaction and greater interconnectedness, albeit a painful one for the offender,

2 It is important to note that this famous dictum by St Augustine is not confined to Christian theology but was also used in a very different sociocultural context by Mahatma Ghandi in his autobiography.

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between community members. Channels of communication remain open and social

connection is there to facilitate apology and remorse.

There has been a number of studies in IR that focus on peace building and transitional

justice through reconciliation (Daase/Engert/Rennert 2016; Porter 2015; Aiken 2013; Minow

2002; Kritz 1995).3 While there are conceptual overlaps between these studies and the notion

of reintegrative shaming developed here, they differ in at least one crucial aspect.

Reconciliation happens only after social bonds have been broken, “in the aftermath of

traumatic conflicts”, after wars being fought, and between “former enemy countries” (Yinan

He 2015, 1; Bleiker 20054). Hence, processes of forgiveness through reconciliation, on the

one hand, and processes of forgiveness through reintegrative shaming, on the other hand,

move in fundamentally different directions. Whereas reconciliation moves “from enmity to

amity” (Gardner-Feldman 2012), reintegrative shaming never departs from amity.

Reconciliation assumes prior categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, memory divergence, and

separation. Reintegrative shaming assumes the opposite: it requires memory convergence and

a strong sense of community.

To sum up, reintegrative shaming can be said to differ from shaming that is

stigmatizing in at least three aspects. First, actors who seek to reintegrate offenders into the

community tend to employ shaming strategies that primarily target wrongful behavior, not the

offender. Second, reintegrative shaming involves relatively high levels of interconnectedness

and collective identification and a discourse that emphasizes social intimacy instead of

distancing. Third, reintegrative shaming is prosocial: it aims at relational repair and

community-building as opposed to stigmatization which tears relationships apart. Table 1

provides an overview of both types of shaming. Put differently, whereas disintegrative

shaming (stigmatization) divides the community by creating a class of outcasts, reintegrative

shaming unites the community by seeking ways to maintain bonds of mutual respect and

amity in the face of a moral transgression.

3 Elizabeth Porter (2015) Connecting Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation, Lynne Rienner; Nevin T. Aiken (2013) Identity, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice, New York: Routledge; Kritz, Neil J. (ed.) 1995. Transitional Justice. How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. 3 volumes. Washington DC: USIP; Minow, Martha (ed.) 2002. Breaking the Cycles of Hatred. Memory, Law and Repair. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Teitel, Ruti G. 2000. Transitional Justice. New York: Oxford University Press; For an overview of the state of research see van der Merwe et al. 2009; Thoms et al. 2008; Backer 2009. 4 Roland Bleiker (2005) Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Table 1: Types of shaming

Stigmatization

(Disintegrative shaming)

Reintegrative shaming

Shaming strategies Stereotyping, labelling,

discrimination (actor- rather

than behavior-centered)

Punishment, compensation,

care, forgiveness, prevention

(behavior- rather than actor-

centered)

Level of interconnectedness

and identification

Low (‘us’ and ‘them’) High (‘we-feeling’)

Form of discourse Social Distance Social intimacy

Social effects Antisocial: exclusionary and

outcasting

Prosocial: Relational repair

and community-building

The conceptual triad of reintegrative shaming

Having carved out a conceptual way to differentiate the practice of reintegrative shaming

from disintegrative shaming or stigmatization, I will now concentrate on the mechanisms and

conditions under which reintegrative shaming can occur. Reintegrative shaming can be said to

be only effective under certain conditions. These conditions include multiple relationships of

interdependency, the intimate context of relatively small communities, and a normative

consensus on basic values and principles. These conditions translate into a conceptual triad of

reintegrative shaming: moral transgression, justifiable anger, and acknowledgment of shame.

Moral transgression

In order for reintegrative shaming to produce its community-building effects, members need

to follow a scripted series of sequential steps. This begins with the presence of a moral

transgression. To initiate this script, a taboo is violated, or a value disregarded that threatens

the moral order. Each community has its own definitions of what is appropriate and what is

not and violations of these standards of appropriate behavior constitute a potential threat to

the social bonds of the community. Social bonding typically involves two important aspects:

commitment and attachment. Commitment is a legal obligation to follow the rules and accept

a certain degree of restriction of freedom of action. This refers to the cognitive aspect of

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social bond. Commitment is a necessary but insufficient condition for norm compliance. What

is needed is attachment to community norms because these represent the people and values

that matter. Attachment is the emotional connection one feels toward other people, sensitivity

to their opinions, feelings and expectations, which make it also desirable to follow community

norms (Hirschi 1969). Both are at play in processes of reintegrative shaming.

Justifiable anger

Given the emotional investment in social bonds through attachment, the reaction to a violation

of community norms by one of its members can be expected to be anger at the offender. It is

important to distinguish, however, between ‘personal anger’ in response to a frustrating event

that is personally disliked or causes injury to the individual, on the one hand, and ‘justified

anger’ which is morally approved by others and thus constitutes a social condemnation by the

community as a whole, not just by some individual member. To become justifiably angry is to

make a moral claim on behalf of the community, for it serves to identify instances of behavior

that threaten the moral order of the group, not just the moral ideals of an individual. The

concept of justified anger thus defines the boundary between socially acceptable and

unacceptable behavior.

Justified anger can be expressed in various ways, such as refusal to speak with the

offender (the proverbial ‘cold shoulder’), dropping the markers of polite or calm speech, or

through non-verbal gestures of disapproval. With the help of such expressions, members “talk

out” their justified anger so that it becomes “visible or known to the community” (White). In

other words, by “talking out” their justifiable anger members make a moral claim to identify a

transgression and draw attention to certain behavior as a moral breach while, at the same time,

demanding the need for corrective action. Contrary to shaming that is disintegrative, however,

members also make an effort to maintain bonds of respect and amity. The shaming members

acknowledge the value of community bonds, signaling their intention to ritually closing the

conflict episode as a source of division and disruption. This move is important as members

emphasize the moral education rather than the deterrent and stigmatizing qualities of shaming

(Wilson/Herrnstein 1985, 495). The moral claim should be visible, explicit, and unambiguous

so that the offender cannot misinterpret the message. At the same time, bonds of mutual

respect are maintained throughout the shaming process. Preserving the continuum of amity

even in the face of conflict by distinguishing between offense and offender ensures that

reintegrative shaming achieves its desired effect to maintain community ties. More

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importantly, it ensures that justified anger will not lead to aggressive behavior or violence

among its members.

Acknowledgment of shame

After a moral claim has been explicitly stated, the offender is in a position where that person

must admit guilt and express remorse, argue for its innocence, or contest the legitimacy of the

moral claim and rally others around its cause. Political and moral leadership are thus closely

linked to emotional leadership. Justified anger can be understood as a symbolic manifestation

of legitimate power, an indication of how the rest of the community ought to feel and morally

react. Resistance to justified anger reveals an open challenge to the social hierarchy and the

authority of its most significant members. In the latter case, more extended negotiation occurs

over the aptness or justification of the claim and the meaning assigned to the situation. Take,

for example, the case of former US President George W. Bush arguing that the Geneva

Conventions should not be applicable to detainees in Guantanamo Bay because they were

“enemy combatants”. By resisting this line of argumentation, member states such as Germany

and France openly questioned political leadership of the US within NATO.

The longer the shaming process continues, however, the more increases the likelihood

of creating permanent division among members of the community. For shaming to be

reintegrative, the offender then must acknowledge shame, admit guilt and express repentance.

The repentant role can be manifested in remorseful public expressions that amount to formal

or informal ceremonies to address the moral claim and to signal its moral capacity by seeking

rehabilitation. For example, when US President Barack Obama announced his intention to

close Guantanamo Bay, NATO allies interpreted this as an acknowledgement of shame on

behalf of the US. Repentance thus marks the turning point between shame and reintegration:

Only if the offender presents a moral self that is consistent with the values and moral

expectations of the group and by acknowledging wrongful behavior, the offender will receive

positive emotional responses from others, such as praise or sympathy, which opens the door

for reintegration. In this way, a positive image of self and the group can be sustained through

a cultural context of mutual respect while still providing a forceful response to wrongful

behavior.

To sum up, reintegrative shaming closely follows a script that gives rise to a sequence

of particular emotions and their ritual expressions in particular situations as manifestations of

the moral order of a community. The purpose of this script is to resolve conflicts among its

members peacefully, that is without threatening or resort to physical violence. Starting from a

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violation of community values, members make a moral claim of condemnation through

expression of justified anger which is followed by repentant acknowledgment of shame and,

subsequently reintegration through collective expressions of sympathy. In the final section, I

will illustrate the empirical relevance of reintegrative shaming by contrasting it against the

practice of stigmatization during NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011.

Empirical illustration

It has been argued here that shaming can be both reintegrative and disintegrative and that

much turns on this distinction. While it is important to distinguish between disintegrative and

reintegrative shaming for both theoretical and conceptual reasons, it should be acknowledged,

however, that it is not always easy to distinguish them on empirical grounds. This is

especially the case when the motivations and purposes of shaming are unclear: do the actors

really care about each other’s well-being and do they sincerely wish to repair their

relationship? One way to demonstrate this conceptual distinction empirically is to contrast the

practice of reintegrative shaming to the practice of stigmatization in a situation when both

occur almost simultaneously and among members of the same group. As I will argue below,

this is exactly what happened in the case of NATO’s military intervention against Libya.

NATO’s military intervention against Libya in 2011 produced a number of serious

conflicts within the transatlantic security community. Most notable among these conflicts was

the push for greater military engagement in Libya by France and Britain as well as the refusal

by Turkey to hand over command to NATO. The most serious conflict within the transatlantic

security community, however, arouse over the abstaining vote on Resolution 1973 by

Germany in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). UN Resolution 1973 authorized

the use of military force to enforce a no-fly zone over Libya. Since the German Foreign

Minister Guido Westerwelle had previously even insisted to oppose the resolution (but was

eventually persuaded by German diplomats to abstain), the vote was perceived as a “no” by,

France, Great Britain, and the US. It was the first time that Germany had not sided with its

fellow transatlantic community members in the UNSC on a major security issue. This

provoked fears on both sides of the Atlantic of German “nationalist calculations” and a “non-

alligned foreign policy“.5 The German vote thus can be said to have had a destabilizing effect

on the transatlantic security community with the potential to provoke a serious crisis.

5 ‘The Unadventurous Eagle’, The Economist (12 May 2011).

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The community-building effects of reintegrative shaming in NATO will be empirically

traced here on the inside, and subsequently contrasted with the stigmatizing effects of

disintegrative shaming on the outside. Accordingly, the case study is structured into two parts.

First, the presence and effects of reintegrative shaming on the inside will be shown by looking

at how relevant community members reacted to Germany’s abstention in the UNSC. Second,

the case study will switch perspective by looking at the stigmatizing effects of disintegrative

shaming expressed by the same community members toward the Gaddafi regime on the

outside. In doing so, the case study design applies the conceptual framework of

reintegrative/disintegrative shaming developed above. The empirical analysis will only look

at the main parties involved in the conflict, namely Britain, France, Germany, and the US who

are NATO member states and were also members of the UNSC in 2011. In addition, the

analysis will focus on elite discourse among political leaders. Political leaders are defined

here as “responsible decision-makers“ having a political mandate in one form or another

which includes heads of state, heads of governments, cabinet members and other elected

representatives. 6 Since political leaders are publicly mandated representatives of their

respective state one would expect them to internalize (at least to a significant extent) NATO’s

values and norms.7

Reintegrative shaming

The decision for military intervention in Libya was controversial among NATO members

from the very start. With France and Britain actively pushing for military enforcement of a

no-fly zone to protect the Libyan opposition, the United States and Germany (along with

others) remained at first skeptical of fighting another war in the region. In March 2011,

however, the US changed its position when it became clear that a humanitarian crisis in the

city of Benghazi was imminent. In addition, the Arab League came out in support of a no-fly

zone, and Security Council veto powers China and Russia signaled that they would not block

a UN resolution to authorize the use of military force. Germany, in contrast to its NATO allies

in the UNSC, held on to its position not to become a war party in Northern Africa opting

instead for more far-reaching economic and financial sanctions against the Gaddafi regime.

The German abstention in the UNSC on March 17 must have been a shock to political

leaders in France, Britain, and the US because Germany could have supported the resolution

without automatically having to contribute troops. The symbolic meaning of the abstaining

vote thus proved to be much more destabilizing than the material lack of German military 6 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 7 Eznack, ‘Crises’, p. 242.

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capabilities. As an important member of the transatlantic security community, Germany had,

for the first time, openly sided with non-members like China, Russia, Brazil, and India in the

UNSC on a significant security issue leaving France, Britain, and the US isolated. What

shook the community’s foundation was thus less Germany’s refusal to participate in the

military intervention – many NATO member countries chose not to participate militarily – but

Germany’s refusal to offer political and moral support for the mission. As a result, Germany’s

symbolic move was interpreted as a serious moral transgression, an undermining of allied

solidarity or, bluntly speaking, as ‘a stab in the back’.

In defending its position, Germany was quick to point out that its decision to abstain

on UN Resolution 1973 was not to be mistaken with indifference or even sympathy for the

Gaddafi regime.8 Instead, Germany portrayed its decision as a rational choice, a process of

logical reasoning, a “difficult evaluation process (…) of weighing up the pros and cons”.9 The

underlying psychological motives of the German decision making process – the “concerns

and fears about the consequences of a military operation” based on Germany’s “painful

experience” in the past – were, at least initially, sidelined in public declarations and

speeches.10

Disappointed by the emotional indifference expressed by Germany, NATO members

could hardly conceal their anger at the German government. French foreign minister Alain

Juppé was rather polite when he said that, “I would have liked to see us accompanied by

Germany“. Anonymous voices in the French diplomatic service spoke more bluntly of a

German “mistake with unpredictable political consequences“ and a “crisis“ within NATO.

Echoing French diplomats, the French newspaper Le Monde wrote that “the German

government is lacking solidarity or any maturity”. The French magazine Le Parisien even

quoted a French diplomat who directly attacked the German Chancellor: “Our relationship is

getting markedly colder (…) Angela Merkel will have to pay for this!” These statements

clearly reveal that French policymakers no longer viewed Germany as an equal and instead

attempted to coerce and change is behavior.11 This notion is further substantiated by Le

Figaro which cites another French diplomat who calls the German UNSC abstention “a

severe blow to the Franco-German friendship”. Another statement by the French foreign

8 Angela Merkel, Press Statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel on Current Developments in Libya (18 March 2011). 9 Guido Westerwelle, Statement by the German Foreign Minister in the German Bundestag on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (18 March 2011). 10 Westerwelle, Statement. 11 ‘Setback for Franco-German Relations’, SpiegelOnline (24 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/setback-for-franco-german-relations-paris-and-berlin-at-odds-over-libya-operation-a-752992.html} accessed 14 March 2013.

15

minister Alain Juppé even conveys the threat not to cooperate with Germany in the future:

“The common security and defense policy of Europe? It is dead!”12

In a meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Brussels, Alain Juppé, supported by his

Danish colleague, Lene Espersen, confronted Guido Westerwelle directly with this justifiable

anger stating that “if we had not intervened there would have probably been a bloodbath in

Benghazi”. In NATO headquarters, Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen openly

accused the German NATO representative of violating group solidarity. In response, the

German representative interrupted the NATO meeting by leaving the room.13 But Rasmussen

went on to link his anger at Germany directly to the transatlantic norm of amity: “Obviously

some of those allies and partners carrying the heavy burden start to ask whether it would be

possible to broaden the participation a bit (...). That is also the essence of our alliance: that

allies that actually have the necessary assets at their disposal, also contribute those assets,

based the principle of solidarity.”14

In the transatlantic security community, such meetings represent ritualized

performances symbolizing solidarity and their abrupt disruption undermines social cohesion

and trust among its members. Accordingly, members of the House of Commons spoke of

“obstruction” and “cowardice” while British Prime Minister David Cameron did not even

attempt to defend Germany against such accusations.15 In Washington, President Barack

Obama wrapped his anger into a not so subtle verbal side blow against Germany: “Some

nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of

America is different”.16 Setting Germany apart from the rest of the group, Obama left out

Germany when he spoke of “our close allies”.17 Moreover, in April 2011, US Secretary of

State Hillary Clinton chose Berlin of all places as the venue for making clear just how angry

American leaders were at Germany. In front of her predominantly German audience, Clinton

evoked emotions of shame and embarrassment: “The world did not wait for another

12 ‘France Plays Hawks, Germany Demurs’, The Guardian (24 March 2011), available at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/24/france-hawk-germany-demurs-libya-europe} accessed 14 March 2013. 13 ‘Libya Crisis Leaves Berlin Isolated’, SpiegelOnline (28 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/a-serious-mistake-of-historic-dimensions-libya-crisis-leaves-berlin-isolated-a753498.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 14 ‘NATO Pushes Allies on Libya’, Army Times (8 June 2011), available at: {http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-nato-pushes-allies-for-more-libya-involvement-060811} accessed 14 March 2013. 15 David Cameron, Prime Minister Statement to the House of Commons Following the UN Security Council Adoption of Resolution 1973 on Lybia (18 March 2011); Sebastian Borger, ‘London kritisiert Berlin wegen Enthaltung’, Der Standard (19 March 2011). 16 Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya (28 March 2011). 17 Obama, Remarks.

16

Srebrenica in a place called Benghazi”.18 Subsequently, at a NATO meeting on June 8, US

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates linked justifiable anger to the transatlantic norm of amity

by demanding German solidarity as “a matter of fairness in an alliance built on the principle

of shared burdens“.19 In a similar way, French foreign minister Alain Juppé criticized

Germany for undermining allied solidarity when he argued that “NATO must play its full

role, and it is not doing so sufficiently“20 Finally, in a joint declaration by state leaders

Obama, Sarkozy, and Cameron published simultaneously in the International Herald Tribune

(New York), Le Figaro (Paris), and the Times (London), they hardly hid their justifiable anger

at the German norm violation of amity by calling the German lack of solidarity in Libya “an

unconscionable betrayal“ and that opposition to the Gaddafi regime needed to “begin with a

genuine end to violence, marked by deeds not words“.21 Consequently, French Defense

Minister Gerard Longuet, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, and British Foreign Minister

William Hague argued in similar ways.22 While such allied finger pointing may be easily

mistaken for stigmatization and emotional rigidity against the German norm breakers, NATO

allies simultaneously were careful to maintain bonds of mutual respect and amity in the face

of the moral transgression. For example, the joint declaration by Obama, Sarkozy, and

Camerov cited above begins with the following statement: “Together with our NATO allies and coalition partners, the United States, France and Britain have been united from the start in responding to the crisis in Libya, and we are united on what needs to happen in order to end it.”

This emphasis on mutual bonds and solidarity, prominently placed before any accusations or

expressions of justifiable anger, underlines the willingness for social repair and to maintain a

discourse of social intimacy among NATO allies, which obviously includes Germany.

Indeed, German political leaders began to publicly express solidarity toward Britain,

France, and the US, thus acknowledging shame over wrongful behavior. When Angela

18 ‘United in Mutual Annoyance’, SpiegelOnline (6 June 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/united-in-mutual-annoyance-what-s-gone-wrong-with-german-us-relations-a-766826.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 19 ‘Gates Presses Allies To Do More Against Libya’, Army Times (8 June 2011), available at: {http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/06/ap-gates-presses-allies-to-do-more-against-libya-060811} accessed 14 March 2013. 20 ‘France and Britain Say NATO Is Not Fulfilling Its Role In Libya’, Deutsche Welle (12 April 2011), availale at: {http://www.dw.de/france-and-britain-say-nato-not-fulfilling-its-role-in-libya/a-14980521-1} accessed 14 March 2013. 21 Barack Obama, David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, ‘Libya’s Pathway to Peace’, International Herald Tribune (14 April 2011), available at: {http://www.ufppc.org/us-a-world-news-mainmenu-35/10324-document-obama-cameron-a-sarkozy-say-nato-attacks-will-continue-until-gaddafi-goes.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 22 ‘France, UK Say NATO Falling Short On Libya’, CBS News (12 April 2011), available at: {http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20053078.html} accessed 14 March 2013.

17

Merkel addressed fellow party members in the German Bundestag, she wished the allies

success and conceded that the decision to abstain on Resolution 1973 had been made “with a

heavy heart”.23 In various speeches and remarks by members of the German cabinet in the

following days and weeks, an emotional pattern emerged, expressing “gratitude”, “honor”,

and “respect” vis-à-vis other security community members.24 German foreign minister Guido

Westerwelle underlined that: “We respect and understand those partners (…) who (…) came

to a different conclusion than we did. We understand those who, for honourable motives,

chose to support international military intervention in Libya”.25

Up to this point, the overall performance by Britain, France, and the US can be viewed

as sanctioning the emotional non-conformity of Germany. This performance was arguably

intended to provoke feelings of shame – an acknowledgement that Germany had violated the

norm of allied solidarity. Former German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, for example,

wrote in a contribution to a German national newspaper that he felt “nothing but shame for

the failure of our government”.26 Other members of the German political elite reacted in

similar emotional ways. Former German Chief of Staff and former head of NATO’s military

planning committee, Klaus Naumann, echoed Joschka Fischer by stating: “I am ashamed of

the position of my country.” In the German media, Richard Herzinger, an influential journalist

writing in the conservative newspaper Die Welt, criticized “the shameful way that Germany

emerged as the party seeking to delay action” and the liberal German weekly newspaper Die

Zeit published a headline calling the Libya intervention “A German shame”.

Feelings of collective shame among German political elites were not, however,

confined to inactive policymakers like Joschka Fischer. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, a

prominent member of the German Bundestag, shouted in a parliamentary debate on Libya: “I

think it’s a shame that the federal government, as a member of the UN Security Council,

abstained in this situation.” The head of the oppositional Social Democratic Party, Sigmar

Gabriel, followed suit depicting the vote in the UNSC as “simply undignified”. Omid

Nouripour, defense spokesperson of the Green Party in the German Bundestag, also found

allied anger over the German vote in the UNSC understandable: “This was a disgrace!” But

even in her own party, Merkel faced the repercussions of allied anger expressed, for example, 23 Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles, ‘Berlin lässt seine Verbündeten alleine kämpfen’, Spiegel Online (18 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/libyen-einsatz-berlin-laesst-seine-verbuendeten-alleine-kaempfen-a-751673.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 24 ‘Merkel Praises NATO for Libya Campaign’, in: The Local (18 March 2011), available at: {http://www.thelocal.de/national/20110827-37221.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 25 Guido Westerwelle, ‘Interview with German Foreign Minister’, SpiegelOnline (21 March 2011), available at: {http//www.spiegel.de/international/germany/Spiegel-interview-with-german-foreign-minister-gadhafi-must-go-ther-s-no-question-a-752164.html} accessed 4 November 2012. 26 Joschka Fischer, ‘Deutsche Außenpolitik – eine Farce’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (24 March 2011).

18

by her German parliamentary spokesperson for foreign policy, Philipp Mißfelder, the

chairperson of the foreign relations committee in the European Parliament, Elmar Brok, as

well as Ruprecht Polenz, head of the foreign relations committee in the German Bundestag,

who all feared that Germany had lost its previous status and trustworthiness among members

of the transatlantic security community as a result of the UN vote.27 Moreover, a usually calm

and collected Günther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for Energy and also a fellow party

member of Angela Merkel, responded to a question on Libya at a press conference in a very

emotional way: “In Berlin, they can say what they want, to the point of embarrassment!”28

Feelings of shame are usually equated with inferior status. In the transatlantic security

community, it means the loss of “love and respect of those whose approval matters” and it is

this type of appraisal that can lead to social conformity. 29 As pointed out above,

acknowledging feelings of shame can lead to reconciliation and community-building while

denial of shame leads to further isolation.30 In the Libyan case, it can be tentatively argued

that German political leaders indeed felt shame resulting from the emotional expression of

anger and disappointment expressed by important community members. As a result, Germany

became emotionally disconnected from the rest of the group. In order to regain its previous

status within the community, Germany, at least implicitly, acknowledged feelings of shame,

thus expressing feelings of gratitude, honor, and respect toward its fellow members. In

addition to the feelings of collective shame cited above, Angela Merkel’s statement that she

was “saddened” by the political discussions among NATO members following the UN

Security Council vote points into this direction.31 When it did, arguably, the door for

reintegration was open.

This case of reintegrative shaming – following Germany’s reaffirmation of solidarity

and symbolically underscored by the decision to step up its military surveillance in

Afghanistan to disburden NATO members involved in the air campaign over Libya – was

embedded into a series of community-building symbolic rituals. On April 14, the NATO

ministers of foreign affairs held their meeting in Berlin (of all places) to issue a joint

statement on Libya that included a reaffirmation of NATO unity and solidarity. On June 7, 27 ‘Koalition der Kämpfer’, SpiegelOnline (22 March 2011), available at: {http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/militaereinsatz-in-libyen-koalition-der-kaempfer-a-752488.html} accessed 14 March 2013. 28 ‘Westerwelle vollzieht Kehrtwende bei Nato-Militäreinsatz’, Süddeutsche Zeitung (28 August 2011), available at: {http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/die-deutschen-und-der-krieg-in-libyen-westerwelle-vollzieht-kehrtwende-bei-nato-militaereinsatz-1.1135764} accessed 14 March 2013. 29 Elias, Process, pp. 414-415. 30 Hutchison and Bleiker, Reconciliation; Scheff, Revenge. 31 Ulrike Guérot, Germany in Europe: Angela’s Walk of Shame, The European Council on Foreign Relations (24 March 2011), available at: {http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/germany_in_europe_angelas_walk_of_shame} accessed 4 November 2012.

19

Barack Obama awarded the German Chancellor with the Presidential Medal of Freedom – the

highest civilian award in the US32 – and granted her the first state dinner for a European head

of state during his presidential term. This public expression of mutual gratitude, honor and

respect – a “unity reviving ceremony”33 – was accompanied by highly emotional remarks by

the US President and the German Chancellor that ushered an aura of social intimacy between

both political leaders. In his remarks, Barack Obama underlined the degree of emotional

attachment between both leaders by stating that, “it is our joint will that this NATO mission is

successful (…) we have one heart of allies that beats with the other allies”.34 Angela Merkel,

on her part, stressed collective “pride” of the German-American heritage, and “gratitude” for

the US role in World War II. On several other occasions during her remarks, she emphasized

the metaphor of transatlantic “friendship” and linked it to her own personal emotional

experience: “Without the United States of America, I would in all probably not be able to

stand here before you today. Overcoming the Cold War required courage from the people of

Central and Eastern Europe and what was then the German Democratic Republic, but it also

required the steadfastness of Western partner over many decades when many had long lost

hope of integration of the two Germanys and Europe”.35

The day before the award ceremony, Barack Obama gave an interview to a German

newspaper (his first interview with a German print media since his inauguration) in which he

talked about his personal “feelings” for his “friend” Angela Merkel. In tune with the German

Chancellor, the US President appeared eager to expressing “respect”, “gratitude”,

“admiration”, and feelings of “trust”.36

In sum, Germany’s decision to abstain on UN Resolution 1973 was interpreted by

Britain, France, and the US as a violation of the norm of allied solidarity and thus, a serious

moral transgression. Britain, France, and the US sanctioned the non-conformity of Germany

through the expression of justifiable anger. This appears to have produced feelings of shame

and embarrassment on the German side accompanied by a loss of power and status within

NATO. In order to regain its previous status within the community German political leaders

publicly acknowledged shame, which led to a process of reintegration. It can thus be

reasonably claimed that in the Libyan case reintegrative shaming stabilized the transatlantic

32 The Presidential Medal of Freedom is awarded to individuals that have made “an especially meritorious contribution to the security or national interests of the United States, world peace, cultural or other significant public or private endeavors” (EO 9586). Recipients include Mother Teresa, Lech Walesa, and Stephen Hawking. 33 Flam, ‘Emotional’, p. 49. 34 Angela Merkel and Barack H. Obama, Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel in a Joint Press Conference, Washington, D.C. (7 June 2011). 35 Merkel and Obama, Remarks. 36 Barack H. Obama, ‘Interview with President Obama’, Der Tagesspiegel (5 June 2011).

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security community and contributed to a ritualized process of community-building on the

inside.

Stigmatization

In addition to the rift over the German abstention in the UNSC, the Libyan intervention was

accompanied by recurring public emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and even outright

hate toward the Gaddafi regime by NATO’s political leaders. US Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton, for example, depicted the Libyan leader as

“a ruthless dictator that has no conscience and will destroy anyone or anything in his way. If

Qaddafi does not go, he will just make trouble. That is just his nature. There are some

creatures that are like that”.37

Barack Obama described Muammar Gaddafi as a “murderer” and a “terrorist” whom he found

to be involved in “brutal repression” and exercising a “grip of fear”. In a joint statement,

David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy spoke of the “violent dictatorship” of “Qadhafi’s war

machine”.38 Likewise, Angela Merkel and Guido Westerwelle made it clear in various public

statements that Germany regarded Gaddafi as an illegitimate leader who “has to go”.39 More

forcefully, Guido Westerwelle underlined “the brutality of the Libyan regime” and stated that

“I denounce and condemn the horrendous violations of human rights committed by the

Libyan regime (…) We stand against this dictator.”40 His fellow party member and German

minister for economics, Phillip Rösler, publicly referred to “Gaddafi’s homicide units”.41

Echoing French, British and American leaders, Angela Merkel called Gaddafi a “despot”

whose “disgraceful deeds (…) shall not remain unpunished” and whose death made her feel

“relieved and very happy”.42 The German president, Christian Wulff, used even more drastic

words to describe the Libyan leader: “This is state terrorism. This is obviously the kind of act

37 Quoted in: Dan Bilefsky and Mark Landler, ‘As U.N. Backs Military Action in Libya, U.S. Role Is Unclear’, New York Times (17 March 2011). 38 David Cameron and Nicholas Sarkozy, Joint Statement by the French President and the British Prime Minister (28 March 2011). 39 Merkel and Obama, Remarks; Guido Westerwelle, ‘Westerwelle lobt Nato-Einsatz jetzt doch’, Die Zeit Online (27 August 2011), available at: {htpp://www.zeit.de/politik/Deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-nato-einsatz/komplettansicht} accessed 4 November 2012. 40 Guido Westerwelle, Speech at the UN Human Rights Council, Geneva (28 February 2011). 41 ‘Später Respekt für Nato-Einsatz’, FocusOnline (27 August 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen/militaerisches-eingreifen-in-libyen-spaeter-respekt-fuer-nato-einsatz_aid_659482.html} accessed on 14 March 2013. 42 ‘Merkel fordert Gaddafi zum Rücktritt auf’, FocusOnline (27 February 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/libyen-merkel-fordert-gaddafi-zum-ruecktritt-auf_aid_603850.html} accessed on 14 March 2013; Angela Merkel, Press Statement, Berlin (20 October 2011).

21

that can be described as psychopathic”.43 All of these emotional expressions of anger, dislike,

and even hate also reappeared in the joint statement on Libya by the NATO ministers of

foreign affairs in Berlin cited above. At this meeting, the NATO Secretary General spoke of a

“desire for freedom” and contrasted his emotional statement against “Gaddafi’s brutal and

systematic attacks”.44

In addition to these emotional expressions of anger, dislike, and hate NATO political

leaders also frequently stressed emotions like courage and bravery when speaking about

NATO’s military effort in Libya in general and NATO soldiers in particular. For example, on

14 April NATO ministers of foreign affairs paid “tribute to the skill, bravery and

professionalism of our men and women in uniform carrying out this difficult task“.45 Barack

Obama equally praised the “brave pilots that have executed their mission with skill and

extraordinary bravery”.46 David Cameron stated that the military intervention was undertaken

“with some fantastic allies and some very brave other countries“.47 Bravery and courage are

essentially emotional expressions of fear: if one is not afraid of someone or something one

does not have to feel brave or courageous. Thus, in the Libyan case, NATO members

stabilized the transatlantic security community in two ways: first, by finding a stigmatizing

Other that all members could focus their emotions on; second, by framing the military effort

in terms of morally acceptable expressions of fear such as bravery or courage. In sum, by

sharing these stigmatizing expressions towards an outsider, the members of the transatlantic

security community were able to maintain mutual trust and collective identity by setting

themselves emotionally apart from the Gaddafi regime and thereby generating internal

cohesion.

In sum, the expression of anger and fear toward an emotionally shared Other can be

said to have generated internal relief and social cohesion through processes of stigmatization

on the outside: a sense of belonging and togetherness against a common outside foe. It

energized the community and provided its members with a collective sense of power:

“Together we can make a difference. Together we can change the world”. 48 As a

consequence, it can be tentatively claimed that the stigmatizing practices contributed to the

43 ‘Wulff nennt Gaddafi einen Psychopathen’, FocusOnline (24 February 2011), available at: {http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/krise-in-der-arabischen-welt/krise-in-libyen-wulff-nennt-gaddafi-einen-psychopathen_aid_603237.html} accessed on 14 March 2013. 44 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Opening Remarks by NATO Secretary General at the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Libya Partners at Berlin (14 April 2011). 45 NATO, Statement on Libya Following the Working Lunch of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs with non-NATO contributors in Berlin to Operation Unified Protector (14 April 2011). 46 Barack H. Obama, Presidential Statement on Libya (22 August 2011). 47 David Cameron, Libya Statement in Full (18 March 2011). 48 Flam, ‘Emotional’, p. 49.

22

stabilization of the transatlantic security community that included a symbolic process of

emotionally disconnecting insiders from outsiders. This stands in contrast to the prosocial

effects of reintegrative shaming that took place during the transatlantic conflict over the

German abstention in the UNSC.

Conclusion

(still needs to be written...)