NADER_The Harder Path-Shifting Gears

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Social Thought &Commentary: The Harder Path: Shifting GearsAuthor(s): Laura NaderSource: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Autumn, 2004), pp. 771-791Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic ResearchStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150857 .

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2/22

SOCIAL

HOUGHT

COMMENTARY

h e

a r d e r

Path Shifting

e a r s

LauraNader

Universityf California, erkeley

Introduction

This

essay

deals

withold

science

practices

nd the

development

f innovative

practices

hat are a

mixture

f

theory,

research,

nd

practicality.

mericans

have an

extraordinary

ecord

n

starting

up

projects,

but

they

have trouble

shiftinggears.

Some

say

we havecreateda worldwhere

everything

hanges,

but

nothing

moves. Professional

mind-sets, rises,

ncremental

hange,

and

leapfrogging

re

part

of the

story.

So too is culture-science

culture,

political

cultureand the

production

f

knowledge.

In

a

book

about

he

biological

onstraintsn the human

pirit, nthropolo-

gist

MelKonner

1982:xii)

opened

withthe

following

bservation:

The

prob-

lem is not thatwe knowmore

about ess

and

ess.

The

problem

s

that

we

know

more

and more

about

more

and

more,

and

although

we

will

neverknow

very-

thing

about

everything

he time will come

when

we know o

much

aboutso

manyhings

hatno one

person

an

hope

o

grasp

ll

the

essential

acts...need-

ed to makea

single

wise decision.

Knowledge

ecomes ollective

n the

weak-

*An

earlierversion of

this

paper

was

presented

as the 6th Annual

Lecture

n

Energy

nd

the

Environment,

University

f

California,

Berkeley,

n

1998.

771


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3/22

The

Harder

ath-Shifting

Gears

est senseandsciencebecomes ikemenandwomen

n

a

crowd,

ooking

orone

another,

ach

holding

single

piece

of

a

veryexpensive

adio."

A. L.

Kroeber

aid much he sameabout

ust plain

people

n

1948

(p.291):

"As

he total

culture

s

thereby

ariedand

enriched,

t

also becomesmore

dif-

ficult

or each member f the

societyreally

o

participate

n most

of its

activ-

ities. He

begins

o be an

onlookerat most

of

it,

then a

by-stander,

nd

may

end

up

with indifferenceo the welfareof his

society

and

the

values

of his

culture.He alls

back

upon

he immediate

roblems

f his livelihood nd he

narrowingange

of

enjoyments

till

open

to

him,

because

he

senses hat his

society

and

his

culturehavebecome ndifferento

him."

SuchKroeberianbservationstem froman anthropologicalrameof ref-

erence hat reaches

deep

into the human

past

in

order o

comprehend

he

moment

n

which

we

live.

A

long

time

perspective

ncludes

recognition

f

cumulative

knowledge,knowledges

athered

n

real

life

conditions

Nader

1996).

As

others

have

noted,

he inventors f

myth

also

invented

fire,

and

the

meansof

keeping

t.

They

domesticated

nimals,

bred

new

types

of

plants,

kept

varieties

eparate

o an extentthat exceeds

what is

possible

n

today's

scientific

griculture.

hey

nventedrotation f

fields and

developed

an

art

now soughtafteron thewesternmarket.They rossed ceans nvesselsmore

seaworthy

han

modern

vessels

of

comparable

ize,

and demonstrated

sophisticated

knowledge

f

navigation.

Native

Americansmaintained

con-

tinuity

of

occupation

n

Californiand

Nevada or

over8000

years,

andas

my

colleague

Robert

Heizer

reminded

me,

no

complex

civilization an make

such

a

boast,

not

yet

anyways.

Anthropologists

ave

earned

hat

civilizationsre

fragile.

We

haveachieved

an

individualife

expectancy,

utsocial

ife

expectancy-that

s a

moreelusive

accomplishment.

nthropologists

nderstandhatcivilizationsiseand

collapse

which

ndicates

f

course hat sciences oo wax and

wane.

The

evolutionists

know

that in

the

history

f humanexistencewe are but a

tinyspeck

n

time.

However,

e also

live in an

era

in

which he

technological

apacity

o

obliter-

ate the whole chain

of

humanevolution

by

catastrophe

r

by

cumulative

action s a

possibility.

et,

f

we lookaround

s,

there

eems

o be little

urgency.

When

long

ime

perspective

s

absent,

humility

s often n short

upply.

The

capacity

of the

human

species

to

change

the entire

globe

in

irre-

versible

ways

was

limited

until

recently,

nd

decisions

mpacting

n

group

survivalmust have been shared for most of our existence. Weevolved and

survived as hunters

and

gatherers

for

some 1.5

million

years;

there's not

much

hierarchyamong

hunters and

gatherers.

Those

who

think

about this

772




4/22

LAURA ADER

long

past

wonder,

will

civilizational

ociety

be able to

survive or 1.5 million

years?

Throughout

most of humanexistencewhen

people

made disastrous

environmental

ecisions he scaleof destructionwas

relatively

mall,

even

if

at times

overwhelming

or

individual

groups.

The future will

not be an

extrapolation

f the

past

because herehas been

a

qualitative

ransformation

of the humanworld.

Human

echnology

has movedat

breakneck

peed,

and

in modern ultures

people

do not

have

the

necessary

ultural

knowledge

o

routinelyparticipate

n

choosing technologies hough

they may

want to.

It

follows hat as a

species

we are

unprepared

o deal

with

events unrelated o

first-hand

xperience.

nsteadwe

depend

on

experts.

Thecultural imensionnthe fieldof anthropologyomplementsrecogni-

tion of the

global,

he unrestrictedime

perspective

nd

movesus to exam-

ine unexamined

ssumptions

f the

modern

period.

Along

with

othercritical

thinkers,

we

subject

o

inquiry

he dominant

hinking-that

large

scale

sys-

tem-centered

omplex

echnologies

are more

likely

o

spread

he

good

life

than small scale

man-centered

impler

echnologies.

Rooted

n

the belief

that

more

s

always

better ies a

system,

an

ideology,

n

expertise,

hubris,

perhaps,

hat needs

to be

subjected

o critical

nalysis,

ne that

needs

to be

recognizedsa controllingprocesshat normalizesuchbeliefs, eadingus to

accept

hem

as

natural.

This

paper

reflectson old concernsabout dilemmas

nherent

n

expert

knowledge

and

compartmentalization-dilemmas

hat

are

in

the

case

of

energy

associatedwith

stagnation

n

high

places,

unscientific ttitudes

n

sci-

entific

places,

insecuritieshat

produce

new and

powerful

Luddites

ho stick

to old

technologies

or fear of

displacement,

ith the

production

f indiffer-

ence

in

scientific

aboratories,

nd towardsworkon new

technologies

Braun

1995).

My

research eals with old science

practice

ndthe

development

f

new

practices

which

n

the

energy

ield s a

mix

of

theory,

esearch,

and

prac-

ticality,

what

French

nthropologist

ClaudeLevi-Straussn

anothercontext

describes s

"bricolage,"nlightened inkering

one

by

people

who can see

with

different

yes

and utilizewhatexists.

I

first

began

to

workon

energy

n

the mid-1970s s

part

of the National

Academy

f

SciencesCONAES

rojectNader 980).

I

founda

strange

ield,

one

characterized

y

innocenceand

ignorance,by

idealists

and

impresarios, y

pessimists

nd

optimists,

ysecrecy

nd

wild

predictions,

y

an ethicof waste

and

recklessness,

and across the

board

by

a truncated

time

perspective.

The

strangeness

was

undoubtedly

exacerbated

by my

being

the

only anthropolo-

gist

of the 300 or

so

participants,

as well

as

the

only

woman.

773




5/22

The Harder

Path-Shifting

Gears

Also

n

the mid-1970s omeonesent me a

prepublicationopy

of

Amory

Lovins'samous

potboiler

ThePathNotTaken"

hat later

appeared

n

Foreign

Affairs

1976).

Lovins ontrasted oft

paths

and

hard

paths

n

energy

policy.

For Lovins he soft

energy

path

was one full

of alternative

possibilities

nd

central

among

them were renewable

nergy

sources.The soft

path

would

makeuse of the

potential

n

various olar

echnologies;

mall s beautiful

n

the soft

path.

Thehard

path

wouldbe a continuation

r elaboration f tech-

nologies

uch

as

nuclear,

which wouldbe

centralized,

uthoritarian,

ontrol-

ling

and not

friendly

o the democratic

process-such

distinctions

eing

ver-

sions of

LewisMumford's

1970)

earlier

dichotomy

between man-centered

andsystem-centeredechnologies.Lovinswas seen as an ecofreak, n ideal-

ist,

a tree

hugger,

r an

impractical

reamer aston the

calculator.

n

a

word,

"ThePathNotTaken" as

heresy.

At

the time

I

did not understand

hy

his

workcaused

controversy.

oran

anthropologist

t

was obvious hereweredifferent

possibilities.

t

was

equally

obvious hat

all

energy

choiceswouldbe linkedwith if

not determinativef

other

socio-political

hoices;

ifestyles

wasa favoredword.

learned ater hat

Margaret

Meadhad cautioned

youngAmory

never o use the word"soft"

f

you'retryingto persuadeAmericans o take seriouslya differentpath,

because

soft has feminine connotationswhile

hard s masculine nd indica-

tive of

powerfulpossibilities;

oft

paths...well,

"cavesand

candles." n

the

1970s

every

new alternativedeawas

dubbed"caves nd

candles,"

meaning

that

it

was backwards

hinking.

Experience

as to

prove

Margaret

Mead

correct.Soft

energy

paths

were

considered eminineand weak

by

leadingenergy

experts,

while hard

nergy

paths

with heir

accompanyingigh

risk

possibilities

ere

perceived

s intel-

lectually

challenging,

test of the mettleof scientificman.On

hindsight,my

advice to

Amory

Lovinswould have been of a

different ort than

Mead's,

although

t would not have

changed

he substanceof

his

argument.

The

harder

path

is the soft

path,

because t is

the

path

that

changes

he

status

quo.

It

requires

ew

institutions,

ew

technologies,

cience

statesmen ather

than technician

cientists,

nd

engineers

who

rememberhe first

principle

f

engineering-keep

it

simple. Creativity,

rive,

and a dramatic

ealignment

and

disaggregation

f scientists nd their

publics

re also

necessaryngredi-

ents for Lovins' arder r moredifficult

path.

The harder

path

is

what

I

wish to call attention to in what follows. I

chose

this

focus because over the

years

I

notice serious

students

anxiouslytrying

to

understand how

to

change

what does not

change.

I

also call attention to the

774




6/22

LAURA

ADER

harder

path

because it

appears

that while Americans

have a clear and

extraordinary

ecord

n

starting arge-scale

rojects-witness

he Manhattan

Project-once

we have

started

up

we have trouble

shiftinggears.

We have

created,

as David Noble

(1977 xvii)

puts

it,

"a world

where

everything

changes,

yet nothing

moves."

Thereare also

interesting

nd

opposing

heoriesof

change

hat need to

be

addressed.There

are those who

argue

hat

change

n American ulture

only

accompanies

rises-like

war or

depression,

he Araboil

embargo

or some

sort of

catastrophe

ike

the Greenhouse ffect-while others

document he

incremental

processes

f

change

hat

transformed merican

ociety

roman

agriculturalo an industrializedociety Noble1977).Othermodelsof change

may

also need to

be examined-the

leapfrog pproach

a

term

I

believe irst

coined

by

Brazilian

hysicist

ose

Goldemburg)

hereby

hirdworldcountries

jump

the first

world nto new

technology

rather han

following

linearevo-

lutionarypath

of

wood,

coal

oil,

nuclear o the new

technologies,

or

the

absenceof

leapfrogging.

ndof

course,

haos

heory

has

generated

till

other

models.More bout

models ater.

First

Contact-Discovering

Science Practice

As I mentioned t the

outset,

in

the mid-1970s

nterdisciplinary

esearch n

energy

was often characterized

y

ignorance

and innocence.

I

myself

was

both innocent nd

ignorant,

nnocentof howso-calledhard cience

works n

practice,

and

ignorant

f

the relevant

workings

f

energy

echnologies,

heir

economic

justifications,

nd above all how an

anthropologist

might

con-

tributeto

"solving

he

energy

problem."

Permitme

a brief

reviewof

my

socializationnto the cultureof

energy

experts.

When

anthropologists

re in

strange

ands

and

amongst

people

whose cul-

tures

hey

do not

yet

understand

hey

often make

mistakes,

y

which

I

mean

they

violate ultural ules.Part f our

methodology

equires

hat

we review uch

mistakes

s

a

way

o

begin

o

profile

he cultureunder

tudy.

While

doing

he

energy

work

recorded

n

my

notebooknstances f suchrule

violation,

nd

my

responses.

Wordshat

frequently ppeared

n

my

journal

were

bizarre,

ut of

touch, mpervious

o

evidence,unscientific,rapped.

twasculture

hock.

I cameto realize

hat

energy

discourseswereoftenone of

"no

option."

The

inevitablity syndrome

I called it. Whatever

path

was

being

proposed

was a

"haveto

path."

For

example,

"we have to

push

nuclearbecause there are no

alternatives."Such a coercive frame was

limiting

to

say

the

least,

especially

775




7/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

since

other

options

were

whatwas

being

examined.Methodwas also

part

of

the

problem.

For

example,

growth

models-that took for

granted ncreasing

percapita

nergy

onsumption-were

disabling

wheneconomists

even

Nobel

economists)

were

examining

ess is more

options.

Also

striking

was the

omnipresent

modelof

unilinear

evelopment

a concept

hat

anthropologists

had

left

in the dust

decades

earlier),

with

little

general

understanding

f

macro-processes.

or

example,

he

recognition

hat civilizations

risebut

that

they

also

collapse

was

missing

rom he

thinking

bout he

present.

Prevalent

was

the

nineteenth

entury

beliefthat

technological rogress

was

equivalent

to social

progress.

n

such

a

progressivistvolutionary

rame cience oo could

onlyriseand not fall orwane.Furthermore,he possibilityhatexpertsmight

be

part

of the

problem

was novel o the

expert

who

thought

hat

he

stood

out-

side of

the

problem.

The

idea that the

energyproblem

had humandimen-

sions,

that it was

a human

problem,

lowly

began

o sink

in,

although

uch

realizationwas

rarely

ttributedo socialsciencesources.

Many

f

my

com-

mentarieswere

adamantly

pposed

n those

years,

o

put

it

mildly.

Colleagues

rejected

he ideathat the science

bureaucraciesada

limiting

ffect

on defi-

nitions

and

solutions,

nd

also a

framing

ffect

on cultural utlook.This iew

wasadamantly pposedbydirectors t Lawrence ivermoreaboratory,ndby

those

who believe hat

science s

autonomous

nd culture ree.

In

his

thoughtful

book

on

the

SocialProduction

f Indifference

Michael

Herzfeld

1992)

xplores

he

symbolic

oots

of

Western

ureaucracy.

erzfeld

cautionsus not to dismiss

bureaucracyimply,

s inhumane r

inefficient,

s

did Weber nd Marx.

Lumping

ll bureaucracies

ogether

means

accepting

kindof

determinism.He

callsfor more

utopian

consideration-critical on-

siderations,

what he called a

"productive

iscomfort o the

certainties f

bureaucraticlassification." erzfeld nderstands

nly

oo well

that,

"thereal

danger

of indifferences not that it

grows

out

of the barrel f a

gun,

butthat

it too

easily

becomeshabitual.

ibid:184)."

It

was that

habituation

mongenergy

cientists hat

pushed

me

even

fur-

ther to

suggest

hat

Americancientistswere

not as free as

they

thought.

t

followedthat standardizationnd

conformity

were

incompatible

with

the

possibility

orexcellent

deas

n

science o

flourish.

The

most

shocking

ealiza-

tion

was that the most

conformist

f

these

energyexperts xhibitedprofiles

of

reckless

experimentation.

istanced s

they

were from the

social

fabric,

they

could

easily speak

of mass deaths in

percentages.

Their

utterances

of

disdain,

totally

unselfconscious

utterances,

were

indicatorsof the

prevalence

of

group

think,

and a

deep

disregard

or

human

life.

776




8/22

LAURA ADER

To

my

surprise,

fter he

publication

n

PhysicsToday

f

my

essay

"Barriers

to

Thinking

ew

About

Energy"

Nader 981),

an

avalanche

f

responses

rom

scientists nd

engineersworking

n

energy

questions greed

with

many

of

my

critical

bservations

nd

even

expanded

on them.

They

commentedon

cen-

sorship,

he

predominance

f

group

hink,

he

educational

rocess

n

science

that

does little o enhance

original hought

anda

great

deal

to

stop

t,

the

irra-

tionality

amongenergy

pecialists.They

oo noted

positions

hat were

value

laden, macho,

unimaginative,

elf-serving,

nd

unscientific. uchreflections

from

some of

the

leaders

n the

science

and

engineering

ields

argued

or

hope

and

for

disaggregation.

ot all scientistsand

engineers

were alike.

Therewerevarieties f them. Letme lista few:the scientistwho has retained

a

capacity

or

critical

hinking,

he technician cientistwho

does what

he

is

told without

thinking,

he

impresario,

he

lobbyist,

he

propagandist,

he

conformist,

he

creative

problem-solver.

he

standard

scientific

extbook

does

not

describe arieties.Onthe

contrary-the

ideal

science

performer

s

idealized,

ssentialized.

Of

course,

here

s

a

function,

o

making

ifferences

etween cientists

dis-

appear.

t

serves

o contrast cientistswith

non-scientists. he

light

and

the

darkof suchcontrast reprofiled egularlynthe pagesof Sciencemagazine,

thereby

ignoring

eriousdifferences f

opinionamong

scientists,

differences

which

may

be as

great

or

greater

hanthat between he

scientist

and

the

lay

person.

Chemists nd

physicists

avedifferent

profiles,

s

scientists;

nd each

of

them

from

the

biologists,

he

evolutionary

cientists,

etc.

The idea

that

there

is a standard

way

of

thinkingscientifically

as

been

questionedby

sci-

entists

hemselves.One

need

only

read Richard

eynman,

or

instance.

Yeta

recent

Science

ssay

(Augustine,998)

continues he

unenlightened

radition

of

essentializing

cienceto

expose

the

problems

cientistshave in

dealing

with

"ignorant"ay

people.

On

the other

hand,

such

formulation

uggests

that scientists re not that

different

rom

anybody

lse

in

that

they

observe,

make

decisions,

nd

ask

questions

on

the

basis

of cherishedvalues.

Although

had

not startedout to look

at science

practice,

hat

was

what I

was

doing.

The more

I

lookedat

science

practice

he

more it

becameclear

that differentactors

were

caught

n

differentnets.

First,

he

workplace

f sci-

entists-the

institutions nd

bureaucracies

hat hire

scientists nd

organize

science

work-seemed to

expect

creativity

ut

to

require

onformity,

tan-

dardized

hinking

and

compartmentalizedexpertise,

all within

a

well

defined

level of

permissible

dissent. Behavior s selected

for, learned,

structurally

and

culturally

transmitted.

Beyond

the

workplace

there are the

technological

777




9/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

imperatives

hat

drive he

actors,

mperatives

hat are enmeshed

n

particu-

lar

echnologies.

A

physics

olleague

ecently

eferred o LosAlamos cientists

as

"high

price,high

tech,

not

good

at

practical

hings-shiny

and

high

ech"

he

repeated.

To understand

what

anthropologists

ould

contribute o

the

energy

debates

I

had to

understand

cience

practice.

This work has since

taken

anthropologists

ike Sharon

Traweek

1987)

and

Hugh

Gusterson

1996)

and

others into U.S.national

aboratories

o

study

he science

culture hat

C.P.

Snow

1964)

had

written

about

earlier

n

his

Two

Cultures ook.Suchwork

also involves

knowledge

f

science

networking

utside of

laboratories ith

industry ndgovernment gencies as in Schwartzn Nader1996); t exam-

ines the

symbolic mportance

f science

exhibits

denied or

modifiedat

the

Smithsonian

Vackimes

996),

and includes

nterviewing

nterested

parties,

e.g.

aboutradioactive asteon NativeAmericaneservations

Ou1996).

n

all

this

work there

seems to

be

a

disparity

etween he

ideal

scientific

method

and its use

in

ordinary

ife,

between he scientific

pirit

of

free

inquiry

nd

censorship.

he

deal

scientific

nterprise

hows

ess than

perfect ongruence

with

actual

practice

because

of

so

many

ntervening

ariables ike

funding

andbureaucraciesn bothcivilianandmilitaryontexts, r the needsof pri-

vate

industry.

Howelse can we

explain

he

diffusion f civiliannuclear ner-

gy

before

nergy

xperts

hadwritten ven

one

articleor

report

n decommis-

sioning

a nuclear

plant,

and

before

hey

knew

what

they

were

going

to do

with nuclearwastes?

Wehad

to know

all

of

this

if we

were

to

understand

why

so

many

energy

scientistswere

unable o

shift

gears,

o

even

imagine

new

technologies

ther

than the same

old ones

they

were

elaborating

nd

calling

"new."Was t

their

workplace,

asit the

laboratory

cience

culture,

wasit bureaucraticndiffer-

ence,

was

t

lack

of

imagination

r

creativity,

as

t

censorship,

as

t

the

gov-

ernment'swelfare

program

or

science,

or

all

of

these

things?

The

Energy

Decade-What

Happened?

The1970swas

he

energy

decade.Since

henand

even

with

he end

of

the Cold

War he issue s

once

again

nuclear

weapons

s

indicated

y

the

yearly

billion

dollar

budgets

argeted

or Livermore

nd

LosAlamos or

"new"

weapons.

n

the

Reagan,

Bush,

and Clinton

years

the focus has not been on nuclear

energy

but

on nuclear

weapons.

Under Clinton/Gore here

was not

one

major

talk

about civilian

energy

policies.

After

he

dissolution of

the

Soviet

Union

there

778




10/22

LAURA ADER

was

a

possibility

hat

peacetime

onversion

might

alter the directionof the

national aboratories. here

was at least

alk that national aboratories

might

move

ahead

on

new

energy

research uch

as

solar,

hydrogen,

r

photovoltaic.

Alas,

the

laboratory

eadership

ouldnot

shift

gears,

and

although

herewere

some innovators

aliantly

working

or

conversion nside the national

abs,

peacetime

onversion

ailed,

and we

were back o

business s usual.

Philosopher

f sciencePaul

Feyerabend,

imself

rained

n

physics,

pub-

lishedan irreverent ook

n

1978 n which

he asked

"What'so

great

aboutsci-

ence?"He asked

this

question

o

point

out that

today

sciencestands

unop-

posed,

and

for

Feyerabend

hat

is

one of the

problems.

n

the 19th

century

therewerefiercedebates about he worthof sciencebetweenproponents f

religion

nd

proponents

f

science,

but in the

20th

century, articularly

n

the

latter

part

of the

century,

o

criticize cientific

practice xposes

one

to

Gross

and Levitt

1990)

ype

silencing

ccusations. here

s a

difference etweenanti-

science

positions

nd

anti-bad

cience and

technology ritiques.

Public

opin-

ion on scienceas

if

people

mattered,

r an

interest

n

howscience s

practiced

is

necessary

or the nourishment

f an

unopposed

cience.

Physicians,

ike

John

Gofman

who is

also a

physicist,

ave

spoken

out

against

he

"expose

he

people irst, earn heeffects ater"yndrome.Gofmanwasthought o be an

extremist

y

some,

while

public

utterancesike

Sigvard

Eklund ho

was

gen-

eral director f

the

International tomic

EnergyAgency,

were

apparently

ot

extremist.As noted

in

Brownand

Brutoco

1997:25).

Eklund

ays

that "the

problem

of

the

nuclear

power

ndustry

s that we

have had

too few

acci-

dents...It's

xpensive,

but that's

how

you

gain

experience."

Whenstatements

like hat

pass

or "normal"t

makes

one

think hat

Feyerabend

s on the

right

track-science s

being

reated ike he

religious henomena

t

fought

a centu-

ry

earlier,

mpervious

o

doubt,

and reckless s well.

Some

Recent

History

After

he

Cold

War,

ustification

or

nuclear

esearchwas

replacedby

new

jus-

tification-the

rogue

tatesof

Iraq,

North

Korea,

Libya,

tc. Business s usual

continues. ince

he

1990s,

n the

UnitedStatesnuclear

power

s

being

revived

and

described s

a new

generation

f

safe,

clean

plants,

and we still

do

not

know much about

decomissioning

r

what

to do with nuclear waste.

Bureaucratic

ntermingling

f civilian

energy

needs

and national

security

needs at the DOEweakens

possibility

or conversions t the labs. As

David

Noble

ays"everythinghanges

and

nothing

moves,"

eemingly

t. least.

779




11/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

After

dropping

he

atomicbombson Hiroshimand

Nagasaki

n

1945,

he

public

debatewas about nuclear

militarypower.

Later en.

McCarthy

rand-

ed scientific issidents

n

the

subjectguilty

of treason.

n

1962 Linus

auling

won the

Nobel

Peace

Prize

or his work

o

stop

the

atmospheric

esting

of

nuclear

weapons.

Scientific issentabout he

health,

afety

andenvironmen-

tal

impact

of nuclear

energy

urfaced

n the

late 1960s

with the

research

f

Gofman,

nd

Tamplin,

nd

Sternglass.

n

1971,

nuclear

ngineers

nd

physi-

cists

of

the Union

of

Concerned cientists

uestioned

he

safety

of

nuclear

power laiming rrogance,xpert

litism,

and

stacked

AEC

roceedings.

here

was a

national

movement

against

nuclear.

At the same

time,

however.

PresidentNixonexpanded upport or nuclearenergy,which was in some

small measurereversed

by

President

Carter. or

some Carter

had

authority;

he was

after

all a nuclear

ngineer.

In

the Carter

ears

herewasan

expansion

f

coal,

synthetic

uels,

alterna-

tive

energy

and

conservation.

n

the same

period,

anti-nuclearctivistKaren

Silkwoodwas killed

n

a caraccident

eavingpeoplewondering

boutstake-

holders.

Therewas

the

1975

fireat the Browns

erry

uclear

lant.

Four

eac-

tor

engineers

defectedfrom the

industry

o

speak

out.

1977

brought

anti-

nuclearprotestsat the Seabrook nd DiabloCanyonplants.In 1979 the

accidentat 3 Mile

Island

happened

and

in

1986,

Chernobyl.

ut

it

was the

Reagan

revolution

hat

decisively

nded the

energy

decade

and shifted he

discourse

once

again

from

nuclear

power

to nuclear

war

and

weapons.

President

Reagan

branded

anti-nuclear ctivistsas

modern-day

Luddites.

With

Presidents

Reagan

nd

Bush,

downwent

credits or

renewables,

own

went

the Solar

Energy

Research

nstitute

SERI)

nd

solar

energy

subsidies,

down

went

government

esearch

nd

development

nd on

energy

options.

President

Reagan

ook PresidentCarter's

ymbolic

olar

panels

off the White

House,

discontinued

olar

energy

ax

credits,

and had the

safe

efficiency

ar

model

that

had been

developedby

a

fatherand son team

in

Santa

Barbara

with tax dollars and which ran

over 55

miles on the

gallon

physically

destroyed,hereby

adumbrating

he

real

Luddites.

Shifting

Gears-New Alliances

It

is

worth

paralleling

hese

politicalhappenings

with

other

happenings

hat

were

not

making big

headlines.

An

alternative

energy paradigm

of the sort

that

Amory

Lovins

had

written

about in 1976 was

moving

forward.A

coalition

of business

executives,

consumers,

environmentalists, scientists,

labor lead-

780




12/22

LAURA ADER

ers

and

legislators

brought

bout a conservation evolution n some of the

nation's

argest

electric

utilitycompanies.

The conservation evolution

was

an

alternative

o

building

new base-loadnuclearor

coal

plants.

Atthe same

time a

generation

f

energy entrepreneurs

nd solarscientistswere demon-

strating

iable

alternatives. merican

ngenuity

was

creating

ew

echnologies

that

challenged

he old

technologies.

They

demonstratedhe

potential

o

transformhe

energy

ystem

through

renewables

uch as

solar,

ight

weight

electric

cars,

super

efficient

ight

bulbs,

giant

wind farms-

showing

hat a

handful f

innovators,

rivate

itizens,

and

business xecutives an effectan

un-official

ublicenergypolicy

hrough

organizational

work,

and activism.

Peoplebegan o remember istory nd an expandedime horizon.Those

living

during

he 20th

century

will

be

seen

as

having

been

on

a drunken

il

binge.

From

geological

ime

perspective,

il

took

millions f

years

o

create;

spending

t

was

a brief

aberration

n world

nergy

history.

Oil

andcoal uels

are

sunset

industries,

utthe

society

s

still

a

hydrocarbon

ociety.

Thenation

hat

used railroadso

forge

a

political

ntity

s

the leastadvanced f

any

industrial

nation

n

the use

of

long

distancerains.

Even

t the turn

of the

nineteenth en-

tury

we

had

automobiles

unning

n

electricity,

nd steam

power,

s

well as

gasoline Montaguend Bird1971).In 1902,the President f the American

Chemical

ociety,HarveyWiley

1902)

who

was both

chemist

and

physician,

predicted

hatthe United

States

wouldbe

running

n

solar

by

the 1970s.

A

few

examples

of how

an un-official

nergy

policy

was

chartered

would

include

breakthroughs

obilized

by

green

utility

xecutives,

ree market

eg-

ulators,

independent

power

producers,

demand-side

efficiency experts,

renewable

nergy

innovators nd solar

entrepreneurs.

n

California,

everal

of

these

people

have

becomewell-known

ublic

igures.

They

ookthe

hard-

er

path

and came

up

with some

interesting

esults.

ohn

Schaeffer,

ho was

inspired

by

the 1970 Earth

Day,

graduated

rom

the

BerkeleyAnthropology

Department

n 1971.He

got

intothe rural

evitalization

nd

independent

iv-

ing

movements,

developed

a business

n

renewables

espite

the miserable

level of

federal

nvestment n renewable

esearch

and

development.

While

new

energy echnologies

were

being

mothballed

n

Washington,

chaffer's

RealGoodswas

operating

successful

etail

tores

plugging

nto

the sun

(see

also Berman nd O'Connor

996).

The anti-nuclear nd environmental

movements

were

making

alliances

with

progressive

utilities,

once seen as the

enemy.

Unusual

people

like David

Freeman,

author of

Energy:

The New

Era

(1974)

which

brought

him

to

the

attention of President

Carter,

energized

the Sacramento

Municipal Utility

781




13/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

District

SMUD).

Freeman

claims

to have been educated

by

a

group

of

activistswho were

fighting

a nuclear

powerplant

n New

England,

nd

was

inspired

o

join

the race

or

survival

f our

high

energy

civilization. t

SMUD

he rana

tight

ship

strictly

n

economiccriteria.As

Freeman

xplains,

t

was

a

competition

with

Japan

as

a

high

tech leader n the solarand

hydrogen

energy

and

transportation

ields.

He

recognized

obstacles

o

the

great

ndus-

trial

opportunity

f the

future

o

capture

he

automobileand

energy

mar-

kets:

the

nuclear

power industry

discredited n the

grounds

of economic

malpractice

s well as

safety problems,

he

Exxons,

he

Texacos,

he

anti-

Progress

tatus

quo

which

ncludes

he federal

government.

he rulesof the

presentenergyeconomywereestablished o favor ystemsn place.There s

an obvious

inconsistency

etween ree-market

olicies

or

the

economy,

nd

the state

supportedpolicies

or science

of an

industrial elevance.But

hat

did not

stop

DavidFreeman.

The

Sacramento

Municipal

Utility

District

SMUD)egan moving

n 1984

whenSacramento

esidents oted o closeRancho

eco,

a nuclear

owerplant

plagued

withtechnical

problems.

MUD

moved

quickly

nto renewable

ner-

gy.

They

builttwo

of the

world's

argest,utility-owned hotovoltaic ower

plants-twentyacresworth-that surroundedhe defunctRancho ecoPlant.

Not

much,

but a start.

In

1994 SMUD

pened

its

Hedge

SolarStation.

Solar

collectorswere mounted on customer's

rooftops

and the

rooftops

of 5

churches.SMUD

s

harvesting

wind

and

a host

of

other initiatives

uch

as

mini-power lants

and

co-generation;

nd

using

rees

n

lieu

of air

condition-

ing.

Currently

MUD

roduces

ver

half of its

energy

rom renewables

nd

conservation

n

such itemsas

refrigerators,

nd

has

even

developed

lectric

transportation.

reeman imed

to createa new

federal

industrial

olicy.

n

1994 he was

appointed

president

and chief executiveofficerof New York

StatePower

Authority,

aking

with him the

view

that

we areawash

n

power

and don'tneedthe

large

dams

planned

or

Quebec.

Freeman eferredo

him-

self

as

an

electric

repairman.

he ecofreaks f the 1970s

were

innovating,

while

those

backing

he

sunset

technologies

re the new

Luddites,

ureau-

cratic echnicians

fraid

of

being

work

displaced

r downsized.

The

alliances

and

cross-linkages

ave

been

extraordinary.

ould

we have

imagined

n the seventies he

Royal

Dutch/Shell

roupbuying

nto Lovins'

"Road

Not

Taken"? he nuclear

cycle

is a

nightmare-from

the uranium

mines,

to the

dumping

of

tailings,

to

the

transportation

of

radioactive

mate-

rials,

to

the

spent

fuel

rods,

to the

plants

as national

security problems,

the

ambiguously

labeled low level waste

and

high

level waste. There are

also

782




14/22

LAURA ADER

worries boutthe Greenhouse

ffects.

John

Brown f

British

Petroleum nd

European

nsurance xecutives

re

takingglobal

warming eriously.

As

Amory

Lovins

ut

it-before

buying bigger

bathtubbecause he

water

keepsrunning

ut,

go get

a

plug

Bricolage

s attractive.

outhern

California

Edison's

ohn

Bryson

Lerner

997)

pointed

out

there'sno need to mention

nuclear,

nvironmental

hreats,

tc. Small

s

beautiful

and

profitable...noth-

ing

futuristic,

nothing

experimental, othing

technically aulty, hey

made

more

moneyby

saving.

A

smallamount

of

leverage

an

produce

powerful

effect. Conservationnd

alternative

nergy,

Bryson

noted,

could

replace

at

least9

out of

10

big

plants

he

company

has on the

drawing

boards.

n the

meantimehe nuclear nd oil industries ontinued o argue hat renewable

energy echnologies

re

idealistic nd

futuristic,

ut

they

were

speaking

ess

and less

about

Luddites,

r

anti-progress

co extremists.

Consideration

f the

past

25

years

in

energy

is

instructive.

Mundane

changes

were a

reality

by

the

time the National

Academy

CONAES

eport

was

published

n

1980,

even

though

he mainstream

xpert

avants aid

it could-

n't

happen

by

the

year

2010.

They

were

way

off

in their

predictions,

0 to 40

years

off. We haveautomobiles

hat runmore

miles

per

gallon

of

gas (albeit

alongsidegasguzzlingutilityvehicles), nd refrigeratorshatuse lessenergy

without

reduced

unctionality. efrigerators

arketed

n

1972 consumed

14

watts

per

cubic

foot,

compared

o 6 watts

for the

average

refrigerator

old

between1925 and 1950.

Wasting

owerreplaced

prudent

use.

In

1978

the

average efrigerator

sed

1,

663

kilowatthours

per

year

as

compared

o 819

kilowatt ours

peryear

n

1994.

The

energy

avings

rom

refigerator

fficien-

cy

alone

roughly

quals

36,000

coal-bed

methanewells

(see

Hawken,

Lovins

and Lovins

000).

The

Europeans

ave moved

even

faster.Denmark's

ramm

is overtwice as efficientas the best American uilt

refrigerator.

orhomes

without

air

conditioning,

efrigerators

se

20 to 50

percent

of electric

power

consumed. t hastaken

about50

years

o

surpass

he

performance

f the aver-

age

refrigerator

old

between1925

and 1950.

Efficient

ompact

luorescent

lamps

consume

only

one fourth

he

energy

of common ncandescent

amps.

It is

important

o remember

hat the

U.S. s the

world

eader

n

energy

con-

sumption

nd

production

f Greenhouse

ases.

The

economists

who

coupled

economic

growth

and

energyconsumption

were

wrong

about

he futures

hey

predicted.

t

is

possible

o haveeconomic

growth

with reduced

energy

consumption.

Brazil

taught

us about

the

prob-

lems of

producing

alternative

fuels like

ethanol,

but

they

continue

to move

ahead.

Russia

provides

a

dismal

example

of an undiversified

energy policy

783




15/22

The Harder

Path-Shifting

Gears

dependent

on

nuclear

power.

The

coupling

of

technological

progress

with

social

progress

s held as erroneous t

leastsince

Jefferson's

ime.

Evolution

s

not

necessarily

inearnor

built

on

technological rogress.

But he

irony

of

the last

25

years

s also

in

our

headlines.

Although

here

has not beena new

nuclear

plant

ordered orwell

over

a

decade n thiscoun-

try,

he USnuclear

ndustry

as

produced

uclear

plants

or Asia

Cole 998).

Asian

waste,

as

part

of the sales

agreement,

ow n

the

form

of

spent

uel

rods

is sent to the

UnitedStates.

The

waste fromother

countries

was not

part

of

the

civilian cenariobut

rather

part

of

the

military

non-proliferation

gree-

ments.

Nevertheless,

he

reality

s that the

beautiful

tates of

Idaho,

South

Carolina,Kentuckyndelsewhere,orthe mostpartnotknown o the gener-

al

public,

are

becomingdumpinggrounds

or nuclear

uel rods and

other

formsof

waste,

romothercountries.

Washington

Will

Be the Last o

Know-Why?

The

phrase

"Washington

ill be the last o

know"

ppears

requently

n

the lit-

erature n

un-official

nergy

directions. here s

little

question

hat environ-

mentalpolicyhas beenaffectedbythe oil, coal,andchemical ompanies, y

the

power

of the

automobile

ompanies, y

national

ecurity

nterests.

Energy

involves

echnology

nd

profit

making,

s wellas a number

f other

hings

hat

are

subject

o

fierce

bidding

uch

as the formsof

energy

echnology

nd

who

should

profit.

Whenas

part

of

the 1980

National

Academy

CONAES'

tudy,

mathematical

ociologist

Otis

Dudley

Duncan

sked,

"How

id we

get

into

his

mess

anyway,

nd arethe

people

who

got

us

intothis mess

still

n

charge?"

e

was

referring

o a

legacy

of

corporate

nd

government

odies

hatdecidedon

the modesof

technology

ndthe

energy

hoices,

and on theeconomic

rgan-

ization

urrounding

hese modes.The

gravity

f

the

issues, .e.,

safety,

enewa-

bility, carcity,

ntermittency,

nternational

risis,

civil

liberties nd

inflation,

make

it

all the more

strange

hat

energy policy

was treated

as

if it were

estranged

rom

ts environment

f

political

ndeconomic

power.

The act hat

the

phenomenon

of

power,corporate

and

governmentpower,

has been

excluded rommost

analyses

f

energy

policies

has made t

difficult o under-

stand the conflicting ositions f the groups nvolved ndthe contradictory

nature f official

nergy

eports.

he

pretense

f

objectivityequires

hatsocial

power

discussions not

be included. The most recent

study

on Greenhouse

gas

projections provides

an

example.

One

might

argue

that

we don't

need

more

reports

o tell us what

government

needs to

do.

784




16/22

LAURA

ADER

On the other

hand,

these

reports

erve as

ritual

ace-saving

evices,

or

sometimesas forms of non-violent

dueling

or

status

quo

maintenance. n

preparation

or

meetings

n

reducing

missions

f Greenhouse

ases,

Clinton

Administration

conomistswere

arguing

hat

complying

with

any

internation-

al

agreement

n Greenhousemissions

was too

expensive,

hereby

ndanger-

ing

U.S.

cooperation.

A 5

lab

report

Chen 998)

examined arbon-reduction

strategies.

The

report

erved o counter he

position

of the market

conomists

therebyallowing

he U.S. o move

slightly

n the direction f

reducing

arbon

dioxide

output

in the

United

Statesbefore he

meeting

n

Kyoto

n

spite

of

Administrationconomists

predicting

hat suchaction

might

harm he econ-

omyas muchas the oil shocksof the 1970's. ncredible s it might eem,the

choicewas between he chance

of a recession

n

the nextfew

years

and the

near

certainty

f drastic nvironmental

hange

within 50

years

(McKibben,

New YorkTimes:8 March

1997,

p.

A19).

In

Washington

he economists

disagree

with the

imperatives

of

the

Greenhouse

cientists;

he

physicists

lame

the economists or market

para-

digm myopia.

And

reports

re the means of

argument.

The

reports

are not

contaminated

y political

ontent,

nor

are

they

contaminated

y

paradigm

assessment, ndtakenliterallyhey produceunrealassessments.Aformof

denial. Meanwhilehe

unofficial

nergy

effortsare

proceeding

nabetted

n

the

style

of

bricolage,

while

n

othercountries

overnments

re

achieving

ra-

maticsuccess.

Germany

nd

Japan

are two success

stories.

Germany assed

the United

States o become

the world's

eading

wind

energy

producer

n

1997.

In

less than a

decade,

Germany

chieved10%

of its total

electricity

demand

hrough

wind

power. apan's xperience

with

photovoltaic

lso in

the

90s

decade moved he

country

o

become

the world's

argest

producer

nd

user.

Japan

has three times as much

photovoltaic

apacity

as the United

States.

Andas others have

noted,

"It

s

difficult o claim that

something

s

impossible

nce it has

already

ccurred"

Swain

004).

Crisis,

Bricolage

and Models of

Change

People

who

operate

with he crisis

heory

of

change

usually

model

change

as

a seriesof

punctuated

vents.

A

period

of

stability

s

interrupted y

a

period

of

rapid

hange,

ollowed

by

another

period

of

stability.

his

parallels

model

in

biology

of

change operating

in

a nonmonotonic

manner and

suggests

that

cultural

change

may

often

operate

in this

manner,

rather than

in

a

steady

monotonic drift.

Energy

scientists and

government

commissions

commonly

785




17/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

operate

with

the

crisis

heory

of

change.

Things

nly

change

when

there s a

crisis.

Theypoint

o the 1971 crisis n

oil,

the 1973 oil

embargo,

he

hot

sum-

merof 1988

which

stimulated he

interest

n

Greenhouseffectsnow

viewed

as a crisis. n

this

model

crisesare what

make

hings

move,

and one

does not

worry

about

things

not

moving

while

waiting

or the next

crisis,

or

the third

flood

as one

scientist

predicts.

Those

who work

withthe incrementalmodelof

change

visualize

hange

s

happening

it

by

bit,

even

if it

is two

steps

forward nd one

step

back,

onfi-

dent that

things

are

quasi-reversible.

eople

working

n the

bricolage

mode

press

on

from one

pioneering

ask to another.The

eco-pioneers

ee them-

selvesas preparingorthe future n thismanner, nd so do manyenergy on-

servationists. he

Germans nd the

Japanese

ee the incremental

model

as a

win/win

olution

o

jobs,

environment,

nd

energy

ndependence.

Yet

others work

with

linear models

of

development

or

whatever

hey

defineas

progress,

modelswhich

postulate

hat

anything

hat

might

nter-

rupt

unilinealmovement

s eithernot

feasible,

or

anti-progress. hey

arethe

"can't

urn

back

people."

For hem

things

are not even

quasi-reversible.hey

are the

expertsworking

n nuclear

power,

he new Ludditesome

call

them,

scienceworkerswho feardisplacement, nd thereforeearthe newenergy

technologies.

Their

whole life work s threatened.Those

who

think

unilineal

development

s

inevitable

might

read Noel Perrini's

1979)

wonderfulbook

Giving p

the Gun:

apan's

Reversion

o

the

Sword

ndicating

hat

"progress"

s

not an

inexorable

orce

outsideof human

ontrol.

The

crisismodel

is usefulfor

governments

nd

corporations.

rises erve

as

justification

or

shifting gears

and

shafting people.

The

incremental

model

is used

by

people

and

groups

with

more

flexibility,

more slack.

They

makealliances n

unexpected

places.

Thosewho

espouse

the linearmodel

perceive

hemselves

in

one lane.

They

look

for shortcuts

o

maintain

or

extend

heir

power.

In

1984,

a business

executive,

Harold

Willens,

wrote a book titled The

Trimtab

actor-HowBusinessExecutives

an

Help

Solve he Nuclear

Weapons

Crisis.

Hestartsout:

"In

he worldof

business,

unexamined

ssumptions,us-

tifications,

and

self-deception

can become

prescriptions

or

bankruptcy.

Successful

xecutives,managers

nd

entrepreneurs

must be

objective, pen

minded,

and flexible.

They

mustknowwhen it is time

to cut lossesand move

in

a new

direction

(ibid:23)."

Willens hen introduces

architect R. Buckminister

Fuller's

notion of

the "trimtab."Fuller made use of the

analogy

with

large

ships

that

in

days past

had a

second,

smaller

rudder-the

trimtab.

By

exerting

786




18/22

LAURA ADER

a

small amountof

pressure,

ne

person

could

easily

turn the trimtab.

The

trimtab hen turned he

rudder,

nd the rudder urnedthe

ship.

Thus,

he

trimtab actordemonstrates owthe

application

f a smallamountof lever-

age

can

produce

powerful

ffect.Willens awthe trimtab

actor,

n

this case

the

leverage

f business

eadership,

s

changing

ur direction

n

the nuclear-

weapons

risis.

think t

significant

hat

a business

man,

a

sane and sensitive

business

man,

profiled

he trimtab actor

n

relation o businessmobilization

on issuesof nuclearwar.Hiscriteria

or

whata

good

business

man

might

do

wouldhave

been

good

advice orthe nuclear

ndustry

o

heed,

had

hey

been

subject

o market

principles

ather han welfare

principles

f the federal

gov-

ernment.Furthermore,hinking bout how trimtabs ctuallywork ensitizes

us to the likelihood

hat,

like almost

any

control

mechanisms,

rimtabs re

double

edged.

Witness

utility

deregulation

n

California nd

the

disastrous

resultsbetween2000 and 2001.

MachiavellianPower

I

notedearlier hat mostof the discussion nd

reports

n

energy

needsdo not

contextualizehe issues ntermsof anotherkindof power-corporate ower.

I

concludewith reference o the

utility

deregulation

hat

started

n California

with

the unanimous

passage

of

AB1890

n the California

egislature

n

1996.

The

bill demonstrates

he

complexity

f cross-interests hichbuilt nto a cri-

sis that not all

energy

players

were

prepared

o deal

with-the

restructuring

of the

$212

billion-a-year ower ndustry.

Willenswas

right-business

has

clout

n

the

government;

n contributionso state

legislators

he

utility obby-

ists are second

o

none.

Although

AB1890

passedunanimously

ome

legisla-

tors

certainly

ad second

houghts

by

the

year

2000.

Those or

deregulation

dvertised,

n the March

2

Sunday

Chronicle nd

Examiner

upplement

n

"Energy

fter

Deregulation"1998),

hat

deregula-

tion

increases

hoice,

a choiceof

powercompanies, uggesting

hat

competi-

tion

of electric ervicewill

provide

arge

dividends,

better

service,

and more

innovation

responsive

to consumer needs.

They

described the CTC

r

Competitive

ransition

hange

s "the means

by

which

state

law allows he

electric

utilities o recover he reasonable osts

of their uneconomic

power

plants

and

high-costpurchasedpower

contracts" nd reminded

he reader

not to

be

"misled

by

those

with

political agendas."

The headlines were meant

to

call attention to

novelty:

"PG&Eo offer'Green

Power,"'

New EntrantsNow

Free

to

Compete,"

"FuelCells

Have Potential as

Important Electricity

ource."

787




19/22

The

Harder

ath-Shifting

Gears

As

hey

indicated,

he

supplement

wasan advertisement.

ivision

nddouble

talk

are

the themes.

The

other side

of the

picture

ooked a bit different.Consumer

roups

warned

hat

deregulation

ill

drive

prices

down

or

big

ndustrial

sers,

up

for

homeowners,

enters,

ndsmall

businesses.

Unions laimed hat

deregulation

was

a

thinly

veiled

move to de-unionize

he

utility ndustry.

Environmental

groups

hat

originally

houghtderegulation

might

be the

way

to

shut

down

nuclear

eactors

weredividedwithNRDC

nd

utilities n

one side

and

the

rest

who

thoughtderegulation

will

prop

up

dying

nuclear

plants

while diminish-

ing

advances

n

renewables, onservation,

nd

pollution

ontrol.

We

were

n

an oil andgas glut,at thatmoment.Furthermoreherewas the outragehat

state

legislatures

re

helping

utilitieswith a "strainedost"

of

$135

billion n

bad

reactor,

nvestments-stranded

osts ranslates s

imprudent

nvestment

and

the

gift

of utilities

s

corporate

welfare.

Asone

public

itizen

advocate

ut

it

"What

aliforniaasdefinedas

deregulation

means hat

he

big

utilitieswill

get

the

public

o

pay

or

theirnuclear

plants,

and then

establish

network f

nonunion

unregulated

monopolies."

ndeed heredoes

appear

o

be a

merg-

er

frenzy

Wasserman998).

TheNRDClaimed hatAB1890 rovidedome$872million or conserva-

tion

and

another

$540

million

n

subsidies

or

renewable

nergy

ndustries-

merely

drops

n billion

dollar

buckets.

Therewas

a referendum

rewing

n

California.

he

challenge

was

howto

explain

he

complexity

n

a soundbite.

A

senioradvisor

o

GreenpeaceWasserman

998)

put

his

finger

on

the

ulti-

mate hreat

o

private

tility

iants-the

idea

of

publicpower:

"Thosemunic-

ipalities

hat

fought hrough

mountains

f

legal

red

ape

o

win

their

own

util-

ities have

enjoyed

ar

cheaper

rates

and better

service."

He continues:"In

1989 Sacramento's

Municipal

tility

District ecame he first o voteto close

a

reactor

nd

replace

t

largely

with

solar

and wind

power

o increase fficien-

cy,

a transition

hat has

brought

worldwide

ttention."

AB1890

wasa

happening,

n

event,

what

anthropologists

ight

refer

o as

a

social

drama.

Therewas no

pretense-the players

nd

their nterests re

all

out there.

All

he

powers-raw corporate ower,

ocial

power,

nvironmental

power,

nd the

power

of

renewables-all

therefor us to see. The

agenda

was

a

broad

one. Some

ay

t

was

about

reforming

ur

argest

ndustrial

ector,

n

issue

which akes

us back

o

the real

reason

whyAmory

Lovins's 976

paper

was considered

heresy-democratic

control. Human-centered

or

system

cen-

tered

was

the

issue,

and

as

such was not an issue for

experts-unless

the

expert

is the

person

downwind from

a

nuclear

reactor.

This was an issue

for

788




20/22

LAURA ADER

citizens.

By

2004,

the California

nergy

risisof

2000-2001 s

being

ought

out

in

the courtsas an

energyconspiracy, conspiracy

y

meansof a series of

schemesknownwithin

Enron s Death

Star,

Get

Shorty,

Ricochet,

nd others

(Corporate

rime

Reporter,

ol.

18,

No.

32,

Aug.

2004).

Concluding

Comments:

A

Blind

Eye

Inthe

1950s

James

D.

Conant,

ne of the

2

overseers f the

Manhattan

roject

and

president

f

Harvard

niversity,

hought

hat

by

the

end of the

century

solar

energy

would

be "the

dominating

actor

n

the

production

f industrial

power"Hershberg963:595).He had in mind a vast technicalundertaking

modeled fter he

Manhattan

roject.

Conanthe chemist

also referredo "our

friends he atomic

physicists"

s the modern

lchemists.Casks

hat are inches

thick

won't

leak,

but

they

do. Hanfords

leaking

nto the

Columbia iver.

Nuclearwaste is

being

transported

ack o

the US

hrough

he

Bay

Area or

national

ecurity

easons,

utthere s a

security roblem

n that

very ransport.

The

Titanic ouldn't

be

sunk,

butthe

unsinkable

ank.

The

nability

o see

past

a

short

pan

of time

meanswe can't ee what

kindof a worldwe have

created.

Anewworldhasspawnedmultigenerationalechnologieswhosevery ntercon-

nectedness

enerates

ost and

security

problems

s a break n

the

chainwill

reverberate

hroughout

he

society.

Weneed

an answer o Otis

Dudley's ues-

tion,

"Are

he

people

who

got

us intothis messstill in

charge?

f

so,

why?"

nd

how is

it

thatthe

Germans nd the

Japanese

an

accomplish

n a

decadewhat

the

United tateshasnot

beenableto achieve n

severaldecades? f

knowledge

is

power,

nthropologists

ave heirwork ut out

forthemselves.

REFERENCES

Augustine,

Norman.

1998.

"What

We Don't KnowDoes Hurt

Us. How Scientific

Illiteracy

Hobbles

Society."

n

Science,

ol. 279.

Mar.

3,

1998.

Berman,

DanielM.and

John

T.

O'Connor.

996. Who

Owns he Sun?

People,

Politics,

and the

Struggleor

a Solar

Economy.

White

River

unction,

Vermont:Chelsea

Green

Publishing

Company.

Braun,Ernest. 995. Resistanceo a NewTechnology:uclearPower, nformation echnology

and

Biotechnology.

Brown,

erry

nd Rinaldo

Brutoco. 997.

Profiles

n

Power-The

Anti-Nudclear

ovement nd

the Dawnof the SolarAge.NewYork:Twayne

Publishers.

789




21/22

TheHarder

ath-Shifting

Gears

Chen,

Allan. 1998.

"Five-Lab

tudy

ExaminesCarbon-Reduction

trategies."

Lawrence

Berkeley

National

Laboratory,

nvironmental

nergyTechnologies

Division,

Winter.

Cole,

Richard. 998.

"Safety

Upgrade

or

Bay

Nuclear

Shipments."

nS.

F.

Examiner,an.30,

A-9.

Feyerabend,

aul.1978. Science n a Free

Society.

London:

NLB

Publishers.

Freeman,

David.

1974.

Energy:

he

New Era.NewYork:RandomHouse.

Gross,Paul,

and NormanLevitt. 990.

Higher

uperstition:

heAcademic

eft

nd Its

Quarrels

with

Science.

Baltimore,

MD:

ohns

HopkinsUniversity

ress.

Gusterson,

Hugh.

1996. Nuclear

Rites.;

An

AnthropologistAmong Weapons

Scientists.

Berkeley:University

f

California ress.

Hawken,Paul,

Amory

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