Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts

Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contractsof Employees and Employers

Guillermo E. Dabos and Denise M. RousseauCarnegie Mellon University

The authors assessed the joint perceptions of the employee and his or her employer to examine mutualityand reciprocity in the employment relationship. Paired psychological contract reports were obtained from80 employee–employer dyads in 16 university-based research centers. On the basis of in-depth study ofthe research setting, research directors were identified as primary agents for the university (employer) inshaping the terms of employment of staff scientists (employees). By assessing the extent of consistencybetween employee and employer beliefs regarding their exchange agreement, the present study mappedthe variation and consequences of mutuality and reciprocity in psychological contracts. Results indicatethat both mutuality and reciprocity are positively related to archival indicators of research productivityand career advancement, in addition to self-reported measures of Met Expectations and intention tocontinue working with the employer. Implications for psychological contract theory are presented.

Shared understandings and reciprocal contributions for mutualbenefit are the core of functional exchange relationships (Blau,1964) and constructive psychological contracts between workersand employers (Rousseau, 1995). Although workers and employ-ers often differ in their perceptions and interpretations regardingthe terms of employment (Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000, 2002;Porter, Pearce, Tripoli, & Lewis, 1998), some degree of mutualityor shared understanding is essential for the parties to achieve theirinterdependent goals (Rousseau, 1995). Mutuality exists, for ex-ample, where both worker and employer concur that the employerhas committed to providing career development opportunities.Failure to reach an objective agreement can give rise to psycho-logical contract violation (Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau,1995), for example, where the worker and employer hold widelydiffering notions of what career development means. In addition,workers and employers typically strive to maintain a fair balancein the reciprocal inducements and contributions each has offeredthe other (Blau, 1964). When one party’s contributions generate animbalance in the relationship, the indebted party experiences feel-ings of obligation to the other and seeks to reciprocate as means ofrestoring the balance (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, &Rhoades, 2001; Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa,1986; Greenberg, 1980; Shore & Wayne, 1993). For example, anemployer providing career development might anticipate thatworkers enjoying such opportunities will recognize an obligation

to provide the employer a substantial return in the future. Failureto reciprocate the other party’s actions erodes the quality of theexchange relationship (Cotterell, Eisenberger, & Speicher, 1992;Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Rousseau, 1995).

Although mutuality and reciprocity play important roles intheories of relationships and employment, they are seldom studieddirectly. The present study examines the extent to which workersand employers share beliefs regarding specific terms of the ex-change (mutuality) and their reciprocal commitments (reciprocity).By investigating the extent of consistency between worker andemployer beliefs, this study maps the variation in mutuality andreciprocity occurring in an employment relationship. It providesevidence of how mutuality and reciprocity impact suchemployment-related outcomes as objective indicators of produc-tivity and career advancement and subjective measures of MetExpectations and intention to continue working with the employer.

This study differs from previous research in several ways. First,it matches each employee’s psychological contract report with thatof his or her employer, an uncommon feature in previous research.Although there has been little work incorporating the employer’sperspective, those studies that do exist typically have used eithergeneral unit-level reports from the employer’s representative (e.g.,Porter et al., 1998) or between-group comparisons of managersand workers (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000). Second, theresearch site was selected to overcome the limitations of pastresearch in capturing the employer’s perspective. Determiningwho speaks for the organization is a major challenge (Guest &Conway, 2000). Previous research has used direct supervisors ortop managers to represent the employer’s perspective withoutascertaining whether these individuals were the primary agent forthe firm in shaping the terms of employment (e.g., Lester, Turnley,Bloodgood, & Bolino, 2002). Because previous studies mixeddifferent kinds of firms or organizational activities, it cannot,however, be inferred that each employer’s representative playedthe same role in their firm’s employment relationship. This studyfocuses on autonomous research units in a university setting whereeach research director had primary control over recruitment, de-velopment, and research opportunities of the scientists studied.

Guillermo E. Dabos, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management,Carnegie Mellon University; Denise M. Rousseau, Heinz School of PublicPolicy and Management and Graduate School of Industrial Administration,Carnegie Mellon University.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting ofthe Academy of Management, August 2002, Denver, Colorado. A HeinzFoundation Research Chair supported this research.

We thank Mark Fichman and Carrie Leana.Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Guill-

ermo E. Dabos, Heinz School of Public Policy and Management, CarnegieMellonUniversity,Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania15213.E-mail:[email protected]

Journal of Applied Psychology Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.2004, Vol. 89, No. 1, 52–72 0021-9010/04/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0021-9010.89.1.52

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Finally, because this research design is likely to introduce unit-level variance, the present study also examines the extent to whichunit-level variables might confound the effects observed at thedyadic level.

Psychological Contract Theory

The psychological contract in employment refers to the systemof beliefs that an individual and his or her employer hold regardingthe terms of their exchange agreement (Rousseau, 1995). Thesebeliefs are shaped by preemployment factors (e.g., values, mo-tives), on-the-job experiences (e.g., socialization practices), andbroader societal context (e.g., norms). Psychological contracts arecharacterized as “schemas shaped by multilevel factors” (Rous-seau, 2001a, p. 525), which affect the creation of meaning aroundpromises and commitments workers and employers make to eachother, the interpretations of the scope of their obligations, and thedegree of mutuality and reciprocity the parties manifest. Much ofthe value in creating psychological contracts lies in their capacityto reduce insecurities and anticipate future exchanges, helping bothindividuals and organizations to meet their needs (Rousseau, 1995;Shore & Tetrick, 1994). When workers and employers agree on theterms of the contract, their future exchanges develop into actionspredictable by each party, facilitating planning, coordination, andeffective performance (Rousseau, 1995). This agreement becomesmanifest in the degree of mutuality and reciprocity between theparties to a psychological contract. In the context of psychologicalcontract, mutuality describes the degree to which the two partiesagree on their interpretations of promises and commitments eachparty has made and accepted (i.e., agreement on what each owesthe other). Reciprocity refers to the degree of agreement about thereciprocal exchange, given that commitments or contributionsmade by one party obligate the other to provide an appropriatereturn.

Relatedly, the leader–member exchange (LMX) approach hasrecognized that managers develop differentiated exchange rela-tionships with their subordinates (e.g., Dansereau, Graen, & Haga,1975; Graen & Scandura, 1987). It also has addressed the dynam-ics of agreement in the manager–subordinate relationship (Graen& Schiemann, 1978). Although LMX research often adopts adyadic perspective to investigate both manager and subordinateperceptions of their relationship (e.g., Engle & Lord, 1997; Maslyn& Uhl-Bien, 2001; Schriesheim, Neider, & Scandura, 1998), ittypically does not examine the nature of the commitments theparties have exchanged (Rousseau, 1998). Instead, most LMXresearch on agreement investigates the quality of the exchange asa function of the similarity between manager and worker charac-teristics (Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993), attitudes (Phillips &Bedeian, 1994), personality traits (Deluga, 1998), positive affec-tivity (Bauer & Green, 1996), values (Ashkanasy & O’Connor,1997; Steiner, 1988), cognitive styles (Allinson, Armstrong, &Hayes, 2001), or implicit theories and self-schemas (Engle & Lord,1997). Although these studies demonstrate that high-qualityleader–member relationships resulted from manager–worker sim-ilarity, they did not investigate the consequences associated withagreement regarding specific exchange terms. In contrast, thepresent study focuses more directly on the degree of agreement inthe actual commitments employer and employee have exchangedand investigates its impact on subjective and objective measures ofperformance and continued membership in the organization.

There is limited empirical investigation of mutuality or reciproc-ity in psychological contract research. Studies to date have beenlargely one-sided, dominated by the employee perspective (e.g.,Guzzo, Noonan, & Elron, 1994; Robinson, Kraatz, & Rousseau,1994; Rousseau, 1990) and have focused primarily on dysfunc-tionality in the employment relationship. In particular, the vastmajority of studies have investigated contract violation and itsassociated consequences (e.g., Bunderson, 2001; Robinson, 1996;Robinson & Morrison, 1995; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Turn-ley & Feldman, 2000). Little attention has been paid to the poten-tial upside of functional employment relationships, that is, theconsequences associated with agreement and psychological con-tract fulfillment.

In an initial study of joint employee– employer perceptions,Porter and colleagues (1998) found that gaps between employeeand employer perceptions of organizational inducements pro-vided unique explanatory power for an employee’s satisfactionwith the organization, even after controlling for job satisfactionand individual performance. That study used high-level execu-tives to represent the employer and to report on the averagelevel of inducements the firm provided to specific groups ofemployees. In accordance, the authors assumed no significantwithin-group variance in inducements, or in other words, thatthe employee– organization arrangements were largely stan-dardized across workers rather than idiosyncratic forindividuals.

Two studies examined the specific terms of the psychologicalcontract and general level of agreement between workers andmanagers. Herriot, Manning, and Kidd (1997) conducted a nation-wide survey using the critical incident technique and conveniencesamples of individuals where workers and managers represented avariety of firms and economic sectors. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler(2000) examined between-groups differences in the psychologicalcontracts of workers and managers from a wide range of publicservice departments of the same large local authority. Both studiesreported considerable overall agreement regarding the terms of thepsychological contract but also significant differences regardingthe saliency of mutual obligations. Herriot et al. found that whileboth groups endorsed similar sets of obligations, managers focusedmore on intangible employment terms, such as humanity andrecognition, whereas workers focused more on fair pay, safeconditions, and job security. Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2000)confirmed that while managers and work groups agreed on thegeneral nature of the employment relationship, managers re-ported higher scores than workers did on employer fulfillmentof its commitments to workers. Finally, in an analysis extendingthe same data on the public sector organization over time,Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler (2002) explored the bidirectionalityof the norm of reciprocity. They found empirical support thatthe norm of reciprocity operates for both parties to an employ-ment relationship, extending prior research that focused exclu-sively on the employee perceptions of reciprocity (Shore &Barksdale, 1998). These studies provided evidence of variationsin between-groups agreement but could not investigate theimpact of joint perceptions because of the absence of pairedemployee– employer data. To investigate joint perceptions, wenext describe the distinctive context of our research, a settingchosen because its work process and structure facilitate thestudy of employee– employer beliefs regarding their joint psy-chological contracts.

53PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS: MUTUALITY AND RECIPROCITY

Social Structure of Research Organizations

The present study focuses on employee–employer relations inthe context of research centers. Research centers exist in a varietyof venues, from universities and government agencies to privateenterprises (de Hemptinne & Andrews, 1979; Lambright & Teich,1981; Payne, 1990). Despite the variety of organizational types,the social structure of research organizations is strikingly similar(P. B. Cohen, Kruse, & Anbar, 1982; Mintzberg, 1979). Thissimilarity has been attributed to the ethos of science and itsspecific norms regarding appropriate behavior for scientists inorganizations (Pelz & Andrews, 1966; Storer, 1966). Researchorganizations tend to allow scientists a great deal of autonomy andcontrol over their own tasks. As Lambright and Teich (1981)pointed out, “The standard model for a research setting is theuniversity, a self-consciously egalitarian organization that empha-sizes autonomy, individual entrepreneurship, peer evaluation ofperformance, non-uniformity, and minimal administrative control”(p. 305). The broader organization, whether it is a university or aschool within the university, a government agency, or a researchand development facility of a large corporation, often acts as anumbrella hosting a number of research centers. Knorr, Mittermeir,Aichholzer, and Waller (1979) reported that university-based re-search centers retain most of the structural power in terms of goalsetting, budget and resource allocation, promotions and incentives,and control over research tasks. In effect they “constitute more orless independent small-scale organizations” (p. 97).

Research directors (center leaders) play a crucial role, acting ineffect as the primary agent of the employer and foremost contractmaker in expressing commitments and evaluating performance ofstaff scientists (center members). The opportunities staff scientistshave for funding, publication, participation at conferences, access-ing promotions, or career development are largely determined bythe research director and his or her personal management style,competence, and power (Knorr et al., 1979). At the same time,directors depend on contributions from center scientists for accom-plishing research goals and scientific productivity. Directors retainconsiderable control over administrative decisions affecting theircenters by taking part in various academic committees or byinfluencing the selection of other colleagues who occupy criticalmanagerial positions in the hierarchy. Thus, as critical players oforganizational politics, the role of research directors is “muchmore similar in structural terms to the role of top management thanto the role of a departmental head in an industrial firm” (Knorr etal., 1979, p. 98).

The university-based research centers studied here consisted ofa leader or research director (often a prestigious head professor)and a number of members or staff scientists with different levels ofscholarly development. Moreover, they benefited from a great dealof autonomy, functioning as truly independent small-scale organi-zations. In this context, the relationship between research directorand center scientists captures a substantial portion of the employ-ment relationship. Although certain aspects of the employmentrelationship are still managed at the university level (e.g., benefitsadministration), an important number of contract expectations areinstantiated at the center level (e.g., performance requirements,scholarly development, access to promotions and incentives). Ingeneral, research center directors are the primary “contract mak-ers” (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Greller, 1994) in this employ-ment relationship.

Psychological Contracts in Research Collaborations

This collaborative relationship between research director andstaff scientists, built around specific research tasks (e.g., hypoth-esis testing, experimentation, theory development, writing), entailsmutual promises and reciprocal commitments made and acceptedby the parties. How each party perceives these promises andcommitments regarding the terms of the collaborative exchangecan be conceptualized as their psychological contract (Rousseau,1995).

We used the framework developed by Rousseau (1995, 2000) tocharacterize the psychological contracts of research collaborations.Typical measures of psychological contracts have focused onwhether the nature of the exchange is relational or transactional.Transactional contracts refer to collaborations of limited durationwith well-specified performance terms that can be characterized aseasy-to-exit agreements with relatively high turnover. Low levelsof organizational commitment and weak integration into the orga-nization allow for high member rotation and freedom to enter newcontracts. Two dimensions reflect the transactional psychologicalcontract: (a) narrow involvement in the organization, limited to afew well-specified performance terms, and (b) short-term duration.Relational contracts, in contrast, are open-ended collaborationswith only loosely specified performance terms. With high affectivecommitment, strong member–organization integration, and stabil-ity built on the traditions and the history of the relationship,relational contracts exemplify many emblematic characteristics ofpaternalistic relationships. Relational obligations include mutualloyalty and long-term stability, often in the form of job security.Although these two forms of employment agreement have provenbroadly relevant to organizations over many years (e.g., Macneil,1985; Rousseau, 1990; Williamson, 1979), more recently, employ-ment arrangements have manifested a hybrid pattern, often char-acteristic of high involvement work and knowledge organizationsoperating in highly competitive markets (Pfeffer, 1994; Rousseau,1995). Hybrid or balanced contracts, because they balance orblend features of both relational and transactional arrangements,maintain the involvement and long-term time horizon that charac-terize relational exchanges while at the same time allowing forgreater flexibility and changing contract requirements as projectsevolve and circumstances change. Balanced terms include dy-namic performance requirements and career development. Themeasurement framework Rousseau (2000) developed operational-izes these three psychological contract forms.

Joint Perceptions of Mutuality and Reciprocity

Mutuality and reciprocity are represented by the extent of agree-ment center directors and staff scientists manifest across differentpsychological contract obligations. Whether the parties agree onspecific contract terms (mutuality) and on the reciprocal contribu-tions these terms entail (reciprocity) has been postulated to play afundamental role in shaping the operation of an employmentrelationship (Rousseau, 1995, 2001a). Although psychologicalcontract theory is predicated on a perception of mutuality, somedegree of objective agreement (i.e., actual mutuality) is essentialfor the parties if they are to achieve their interdependent goals.Mutuality provides both parties the basis to align behaviors withthe actual commitments made and accepted in the context of therelationship. Frequent communication, shared information, and

54 DABOS AND ROUSSEAU

common frames of reference (e.g., implicit theories and mentalschemas regarding employment) are likely to give rise to highlevels of perceived and objective agreement (Engle & Lord, 1997;Rousseau, 2001a). Nonetheless, workers and employers often havedifferent understandings regarding specific terms of the exchange(Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Porter et al., 1998). Potentialdiscrepancies in each party’s beliefs regarding what was promisedand what was delivered can lead to breach of contract (Morrison &Robinson, 1997), with negative consequences for both individualsand organizations. Conversely, an employment relationship ismore likely to have positive consequences where its parties de-velop shared understandings regarding the existence and meaningsof specific contract terms (Rousseau, 1995, 2001a). Thus, mutu-ality exists where both research director and staff scientist have thesame beliefs regarding the extent of one party’s particular obliga-tion. Evidence for mutuality exists when scientist and directorassessments of the same psychological contract obligation (e.g., ascientist’s rating of the director’s balanced obligation and thedirector’s rating of his or her own balanced obligation) are morehighly related to each other than to dissimilar obligations (e.g., ascientist’s rating of the director’s balanced obligation and thedirector’s ratings of his or her own transactional or relationalobligations).

Hypothesis 1: A staff scientist’s belief regarding his or herresearch director’s obligation will be more highly and posi-tively related to that director’s own belief regarding the sameobligation than to that director’s beliefs regarding dissimilarobligations.

Commitments made by one party to the contract obligate the otherto reciprocate because both parties are expected to strive forbalance in their exchange (Blau, 1964). Under the general norm ofreciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), recipients of help, contributions, orbeneficial treatment not only increase their liking for the giver butalso seek to reciprocate as means of restoring the balance in therelationship (e.g., DePaulo, Brittingham, & Kaiser, 1983; Eisen-berger et al., 1986; Greenberg, 1980). An employment relationshipis more likely to endure and meet its goals where parties recipro-cate their commitments and obligations to one another (Rousseau,1989, 1990; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997). In general, an ex-change relationship can involve economic resources (e.g., money,goods, services, and information) and/or more socioemotionalresources (e.g., status, love, devotion, and affection). However,reciprocity typically entails the return of relatively similar types ofresources, particularly in work relationships as opposed to familyor communal ones (Foa & Foa, 1980). Reciprocating behavior atwork is also found to be targeted toward the entity from whichbenefits accrue (e.g., one’s manager or the larger organization,Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996;Wayne et al., 1997), in contrast to the more generalized reciprocitycharacterizing family or communal relationships. Thus, reciprocityin commitments exists where the obligations a staff scientist hastoward his or her research director are given in return (recipro-cated) for corresponding director obligations to that scientist. Ev-idence for reciprocity exists when corresponding director andscientist obligations are more highly and positively related to eachother (e.g., scientist’s balanced obligation and director’s balancedobligation) than to noncorresponding obligations (e.g., scientist’s

balanced obligation and director’s transactional or relational obli-gations).

Hypothesis 2: A staff scientist’s belief regarding his or herobligation to the research director will be more highly andpositively related to that director’s belief regarding his or herown corresponding obligation to the scientist than will non-corresponding obligations.

Joint Perceptions and Consequences for the EmploymentRelationship

Joint perceptions of the two sides of the psychological contractcan provide important insights into the outcomes an exchangerelationship yields (Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1998). When partiesdevelop shared understandings and reliance on their reciprocalcommitments, psychological contracts can become construed asself-fulfilling prophecies reflecting anticipated future exchanges,making both individuals and organizations more productive andtheir interactions more mutually supportive and constructive(Rousseau, 1995, 2001a). Previous research on perceived organi-zational support and LMX has suggested that shared understand-ings and reciprocity-based behaviors affect such employment-related outcomes as productivity, Met Expectations, affectivecommitment, and intention to remain in the organization (Deluga,1998; Eisenberger et al., 2001; Engle & Lord, 1997; Maslyn &Uhl-Bien, 2001; Wayne et al., 1997). To date, however, littleresearch has been conducted on the joint perceptions of the em-ployee and employer regarding the commitments they haveexchanged.

Psychological contract research in general has focused on thenegative or dysfunctional consequences associated with perceivedbreach of contract and contract violation (e.g., Bunderson, 2001;Robinson, 1996; Robinson & Morrison, 1995; Robinson & Rous-seau, 1994; Turnley & Feldman, 2000). Less attention has beenpaid to the positive or functional outcomes associated with agree-ment and psychological contract fulfillment (for an exception, seeCoyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000). An employment contract is cre-ated to benefit both parties; yet, its operation is largely based oneach party’s perception of mutuality and reliance on reciprocity.Despite the inherent subjectivity in how the parties understandtheir employment relationship (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau &Parks, 1992), some degree of actual or objective agreement isrequired to meet the parties’ goals regarding the exchange. Thus,we expect that positive outcomes for both parties will occur wherepsychological contracts between research directors and staff sci-entists are characterized by mutuality and reciprocity.

Hypothesis 3: Mutuality will explain additional variance inthe outcomes associated with the employment relationshipbeyond that provided by the separate perceptions researchdirectors and staff scientists have regarding the terms of theirpsychological contracts.

Hypothesis 4: Reciprocity will explain additional variance inthe outcomes associated with the employment relationshipbeyond that provided by the separate perceptions researchdirectors and staff scientists have regarding the terms of theirpsychological contracts.


Method

Sample and Procedure

Data for this study were collected from 16 university-based researchcenters at a leading research-oriented school of biosciences in Latin Amer-ica. Both research directors and staff scientists completed questionnairescontaining identity codes to permit matching each scientist’s ratings withthose of his or her corresponding research director. Participants wereassured that all survey responses would be confidential. Demographicinformation and objective outcome measures were collected from admin-istrative records.

All 107 full-time faculty members of the 16 research centers at theschool were surveyed, yielding 96 completed surveys (89.72% responserate). All 16 center directors returned the questionnaire. Among the 11nonrespondents, 6 were on sabbatical, pursuing either doctoral or postdoc-toral studies abroad. The average center size was 6.69 members includingthe director, ranging from 4 to 10 (actual respondents ranged from 3 to 10per center). An initial interview with each center director provided infor-mation on how the center was structured, its research activities, and majorgoals.

Participants were fairly evenly distributed with respect to gender (51were male and 45 were female); nonetheless, 15 out of the 16 researchdirectors were male. Almost 60% of the researchers held a graduate degree(doctoral degrees were the standard, but master’s degrees were also com-mon in more applied fields). Respondents represented the university’s fiveformal positions on the academic ladder: 21% assistant professors (thetypical entry level), 27% senior assistant professors, 26% associate pro-fessors, 20% senior associate professors, and 6% full professors. Averageage was 45.63 years (SD � 5.98 years) for research directors and 38.18years (SD � 7.09 years) for staff scientists. Average organizational tenurewas 17.86 years (SD � 6.44 years) for research directors and 11.26 years(SD � 6.89 years) for staff scientists, reflecting the setting’s relatively lowturnover. Finally, average center or unit tenure was 6.50 years (SD � 3.29years) for directors and 5.53 years (SD � 2.77 years) for scientists.

This school was one of the most successful and developed units of agrowing national university, employing the highest number of full-timeprofessors and collecting the highest amount of research funding from bothgovernmental and nongovernmental sources. Since its inception, the schoolprioritized its research and development programs, showing a high reten-tion rate among its often internationally educated researchers and thesuccessful creation and development of its own doctoral program. Theschool’s dominant human resource strategy was to “make” its own faculty,either by educating them directly or by supporting their educational en-deavors abroad. As the school developed into a research institution, re-search centers replaced the traditional teaching-oriented academic depart-ments as the central unit of organizing within the school. Research centersconsisted of a research director, usually a prestigious senior faculty in asubstantive area of expertise, and a number of staff scientists whosescholarly development ranged from entry-level assistants without doctoraldegrees to senior faculty whose status was comparable with the director.Interviews with research directors confirmed that centers were instrumentalin providing the context and resources for faculty to conduct programmaticresearch consistent with the typical objectives research faculty have: sci-entific productivity measured in terms of publications and career advance-ment along an internal tenure track (Long, Allison, & McGinnis, 1993).Each center comprised a number of research lines, and for the most part,center scientists worked independently from one another under the generalsupervision of the center director. On occasion, unusually large lab exper-iments or interdisciplinary field projects demanded the collaboration ofseveral staff scientists from one or more research centers. However, evenin these cases, interdependent collaborations among scientists were largelylimited to data collection. Scientist mobility between centers was unusualand to a large extent constrained by the scientist’s specialization. Out of the16 research centers, 10 were long-standing and well-recognized units withinterests grounded in basic science, representing the school’s established

areas of study. The remaining 6 units were relatively newer, reflectingincreasing demands for research in applied and emerging fields. At the timeof this study, all research centers had been in place formally for at least 3years.

This study used surveys administered in Spanish and archival data. Toguarantee consistency, survey measures were independently translatedback and forth from the original English version (Brislin, 1980). The fewambiguities or discrepancies in meaning resulting from the comparison ofthe two versions of the questionnaires in the source language (English)were solved using a process of consultation and collaboration with bilin-gual members of the school’s top management team. Moreover, wherelexical equivalence was impractical, the process of achieving conceptualequivalence was facilitated by the bilingual first author’s intimate knowl-edge of the research setting’s culture (Frey, 1970).

Measures

Psychological contract scales (staff scientists [S]). Using itemsadapted from the Psychological Contract Inventory (PCI; Rousseau, 2000),staff scientists evaluated their psychological contracts by assessing (a) theextent to which the director had made such commitments or obligations tothem and (b) the extent to which they in turn had made such commitmentsor obligations to the director. All items used a 5-point Likert-type scaleresponse format ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent).Participants responded to two sets of 12 items, measuring first the direc-tor’s obligations to them and then their own obligations to the directoracross the three types of psychological contract: transactional, relational,and balanced.

Because organizational and cultural factors may affect perceptions of thepsychological contracts, we evaluated the construct validity of the psycho-logical contract scales in this setting. We used principal axis factoring witha varimax rotation to conduct an exploratory factor analysis on 23 of 24items (1 balanced item turned out to be unclear to respondents and wasdropped from the analysis). The initial solution resulted in the six expectedfactors consistent with the original English-language version of the PCI,each with eigenvalues greater than 1 and item loadings greater than .4 (seeTable 1). These factors comprised the following scales:

Director Transactional (S; i.e., transactional obligations from directorto scientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured alldirector-to-scientist obligations along the narrow and short-term di-mensions of the contract (initial eigenvalue � 2.04). Cronbach’s alpha(�) for the scale was .85.

Director Relational (S; i.e., relational obligations from director toscientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured alldirector-to-scientist obligations along the loyalty and stability dimen-sions (initial eigenvalue � 2.84, � � .92).

Director Balanced (S; i.e., balanced obligations from director toscientist as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured alldirector-to-scientist obligations along the dynamic performance andcareer development dimensions (initial eigenvalue � 8.40, � � .94).

Scientist Transactional (S; i.e., transactional obligations from scientistto director as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured allscientist-to-director obligations along the narrow and short-term di-mensions (initial eigenvalue � 1.61, � � .82).

Scientist Relational (S; i.e., relational obligations from scientist todirector as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured three outof four intended scientist-to-director obligations along the loyalty andstability dimensions (i.e., one of the items did not load significantly onany single factor; initial eigenvalue � 1.27, � � .79).

Scientist Balanced (S; i.e., balanced obligations from scientist todirector as rated by the staff scientist): This factor captured three out


of four intended scientist-to-director obligations along the dynamicperformance and career development dimensions (initial eigen-value � 1.11, � � .78).

The fourth item (i.e., “take personal responsibility for making this researchcenter more successful”) was found to convey a confusing meaning be-tween relational and balanced aspects of the contract and thus was droppedfrom our analysis. This result is similar to that reported by Rousseau (2000)in a pretest of the PCI where she suggested the need for rewording thisitem.

Psychological contract scales (research directors [D]). Similarly, re-search directors were given seven psychological contract statements (Rous-seau, 2000) and were asked to consider their own commitments or obli-gations to a specific staff scientist. Because research directors used separatequestionnaires to rate one by one their psychological contract with eachcenter scientist (varying from 3 to 9 across research centers), a reducedversion of the PCI was used. The instructions in the director questionnaireread as follows: “Consider your relationship with (name of the scientist).To what extent have you made the following commitments or obligations

to (name of the scientist)?” Directors were provided with a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent), along withseven statements assessing the psychological contract. Consistent with staffscientists’ measures above, the seven directors’ statements were also sub-jected to a principal axis factor analysis with a varimax rotation. Athree-factor solution supported the construction of the following scales:

Director Transactional (D; i.e., transactional obligations from directorto scientist as rated by the research director): Three items captured thedirector-to-Scientist Transactional obligations as reported by directors(� � .86).

Director Relational (D; i.e., relational obligations from director toscientist as rated by the research director): Two items captured theDirector-to-Scientist Relational obligations (� � .87).

Director Balanced (D; i.e., balanced obligations from director toscientist as rated by the research director): Two other items capturedthe Director-to-Scientist Balanced obligations (� � .87).

Table 1Exploratory Factor Analysis of Psychological Contract Scales for Staff Scientists (S) and Research Directors (D)

Statement Factor loading

Staff scientist scaleDirector Transactional (S)

1. Limited involvement in the research center and other organizational matters .732. Makes no commitments to retain me as center scientist in the future .703. Research collaboration for a specified time period only .694. A job limited to specific, well-defined research responsibilities .67

Director Relational (S)5. Concern for my short- and long-term personal welfare .786. Stability within the research center .767. Make research decisions with my interests in mind .748. Stable benefits and resources for my research work .71

Director Balanced (S)9. Support me to attain the highest possible levels of research productivity .86

10. Contacts that facilitate opportunities for scholarly development inside and outside the university .8311. Help me respond to ever greater scientific challenges within the field .8212. Opportunities for scholarly development within the field .81

Scientist Transactional (S)13. Fulfill limited number of research responsibilities .7214. I have made no commitments to the center director regarding future research collaborations .6115. Work in this research center for a limited time only .6116. Only perform specific research activities for which I am compensated .50

Scientist Relational (S)17. Remain with this research center indefinitely .8218. Be loyal to this research center and protect its image .6419. Be a steady research center scientist, without looking for a job elsewhere .6020. Commit myself personally to this research center (ns item) .19

Scientist Balanced (S)21. Actively seek opportunities for scholarly training and development .7622. Build contacts inside and outside the university to enhance my scholarly career potential .7523. Accept increasingly challenging performance standards in research .6624. Take personal responsibility for making this research center more successful (dropped item) —

Research director scaleDirector Transactional (D)

1. Limit scientist’s job to a set of specific, well-defined research responsibilities .832. Makes no commitments to retain this scientist within the research center in the future .713. Limit scientists’ involvement in the research center and other organizational matters .66

Director Relational (D)4. Stability within the research center .905. Concern for scientist’s short- and long-term personal welfare .73

Director Balanced (D)6. Support scientist to attain the highest possible levels of research productivity .897. Provide opportunities for scholarly development within the field .81

Note. Factor analysis was conducted separately for each group of respondents. The dash indicates that the item was not included in the analysis.


All in all, these results show that the factor structure for both scientist itemsand director items are strikingly consistent with those reported by previousresearch based on larger samples (e.g., Hui, Lee, & Rousseau, in press).

Quality of the employment relationship. We adapted two measures ofthe quality of the employment relationship from previous work conductedin an academic setting (Wade-Benzoni & Rousseau, 1998) as follows: (a)met expectations, or the extent to which the research collaboration has beenbeneficial to the scientist, and (b) continuity, or the intention to continueworking with the director. In both cases, staff scientists used a 5-pointLikert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a great extent). For metexpectations, staff scientists were asked to evaluate the results of theresearch collaboration with their research director and rate a set of fouritems. Items assessed the extent to which this research collaborationresulted in scientists being in a better position to make scientific contribu-tions, to achieve higher scientific performance, to advance in their aca-demic career, and to position themselves within the scientific community(� � .88). For continuity, staff scientists were asked to evaluate the futureof the relationship using four items. These items assessed the extent towhich scientists had plans for future research collaboration with the direc-tor, their willingness to keep working with this director, their willingnessto remain with this research center, and the feasibility of mutually bene-ficial future collaborations (� � .89). To further assess the validity of thesemeasures, we reran the exploratory factor analysis for all scientist re-sponses at once, including not only the psychological contract reports butalso the eight relationship quality items assessing met expectations andcontinuity. A principal axis factoring analysis with varimax rotation on thecombined item sets of both the psychological contract and outcome scalesfrom the scientist questionnaire produced the expected eight-factor solutionwith eigenvalues greater than 1 and item loadings greater than .4. The sixpsychological contract scales remained unchanged with item loadingsranging from .50 to .84 (cf. Table 1). The two additional factors capturedthe eight relationship quality items with item loadings ranging from .68 to.75 for met expectations and from .66 to .82 for continuity.

Publications and coauthorship. Objective outcomes were gathered tocorroborate the self-report outcome measures and to assess whethercommon-method variance was a concern. Weighted totals of individual

publications and publications coauthored with the research director in thelast 3 years were obtained from official university records. The universityused a normalized total weighted for publication’s reputation (e.g., inter-national vs. national, refereed vs. nonrefereed). This normalized publica-tion measure was applied as basis for distributing federal funding amongthe research units. In a further analysis, we corroborated that more than90% of the international publications reported by university’s archiveswere also represented in the Web of Science Citation Index. The number ofpublications coauthored with the center director was an important measurebecause the average number of authors per publication was around 5.5authors, with little variation across different specialties. Directors con-firmed during interviews that every person who substantially contributed toa particular research line was listed on its subsequent publications regard-less of his or her organizational status. Typically, publication authorsincluded those center scientists who were actively involved in that researchline and peripheral contributors, such as student assistants, part-time per-sonnel, or external scientists who also participated in the project. Directorsalso confirmed that the total number of publications was not expected tovary significantly across specialties because most had similar publicationnorms. Because scientific performance in this university was largely mea-sured in terms of publications, the normalized counts of publications andpublications coauthored with the research directors provided convergentvalidation for the scientists’ self-reported measure of met expectationsregarding the research collaborations.

Formal career advancement. This index obtained from universityrecords represents an internal rating system completed annually by schooldepartment heads assessing each scientist’s likelihood of success in futureevaluations. It was prepared primarily for budgeting and academic plan-ning purposes. In the system governing recruitment and promotion pro-cesses at this university, scientists must renew their appointments every 3to 5 years, depending on their position, through an external evaluationprocess incorporating faculty reviewers from other universities. Becausesuccessfully passing an external evaluation warranted the scientist’s reap-pointment for another period and often a promotion to the next level, thisinternal rating of formal career advancement provides convergent valida-tion for the scientists’ self-reported measure of continuity.

Table 2Descriptive Statistics and Correlations Among Variables

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Control1. Organizational tenure 11.26 6.89 —2. Center tenure 5.53 2.77 .44** —3. Gender (male) 0.45 0.50 .13 .18 —4. Educational level (PhD) 0.54 0.50 .46** .26* .26** —

Scale5. Director Transactional (S) 2.31 1.07 .02 .00 �.21 �.22* (.85)6. Director Relational (S) 3.34 1.17 �.24* .12 .17 �.09 �.58** (.92)7. Director Balanced (S) 3.81 1.03 �.44** �.10 .10 �.24* �.33** .48** (.94)8. Scientist Transactional (S) 2.27 1.04 .15 .06 �.11 �.10 .54** �.47** �.40**9. Scientist Relational (S) 4.00 0.87 .08 .11 .08 .15 �.40** .54** .37**

10. Scientist Balanced (S) 4.09 0.74 �.19 .15 .04 �.20 �.04 .09 .33**11. Director Transactional (D) 2.42 1.16 �.01 �.09 �.19 �.21 .44** �.46** �.27*12. Director Relational (D) 3.73 1.05 �.08 .10 .02 .03 �.41** .52** .1513. Director Balanced (D) 4.01 1.02 �.20 �.16 �.04 �.19 �.26* .18 .32**14. Scientist Fulfillment (D) 3.79 1.12 �.13 .04 .13 .03 �.37** .39** .31**15. Met Expectations 3.40 1.02 �.32** .10 .09 �.04 �.45** .52** .57**16. Continuity 3.41 1.05 �.21 �.05 .09 �.04 �.37** .60** .44**

Objective Outcome17. Publications 9.19 4.16 .24* .27* .34** .49** �.30** .22* .1218. Coauthorship 5.00 4.24 �.12 .21 .30** .18 �.44** .43** .43**19. Formal career advancement 3.41 1.15 �.07 .11 .07 .25* �.34** .50** .25*

Note. N � 80 for all variables. Cronbach’s alphas for director (D) and scientist (S) scales appear on the diagonal in parentheses.* p � .05. ** p � .01.


Fulfillment. Two final items in the research director questionnaireassessed overall perceived scientist fulfillment. Directors were asked torespond about the extent to which each center scientist fulfills his or hercommitments or obligations as follows: (a) “Overall, how well does (nameof the scientist) fulfill his or her commitments to you?” (b) “To what extentdoes (name of the scientist) deliver what he or she promises?” (� � .88).As per the scientists’ questionnaire, we reran the exploratory factor anal-ysis for all director responses, including the psychological contract reportsas well as the directors’ assessments of scientist fulfillment. Scientistfulfillment (D; i.e., scientist fulfillment of his or her obligations as rated bythe research director) emerged as an additional factor beyond those ofdirectors’ psychological contract scales.

Control variables. In the data analysis, several demographic variableswere controlled for in order to rule out alternative explanations for thefindings, including organizational tenure, center tenure, gender, and edu-cational level (Bauer & Green, 1996; Maslyn & Uhl-Bien, 2001). Anindividual’s center tenure was a good indicator of how long the researchcenter director and staff scientist had been working together (i.e., dyadictenure) because only two leadership changes had occurred since the incep-tion of the research centers and, in both cases, replacements were centerinsiders. We also controlled for gender because the effects of genderdifferences on research productivity and rank advancement in academicsettings are well-documented (Long et al., 1993; Xie & Shauman, 1998).Finally, educational level was also expected to have a significant impact onboth perceptual and objective outcomes, with those holding doctoral de-grees enjoying better opportunities for scientific productivity, career ad-vancement, and Continuity. A correlation matrix of relevant variables inthe study appears in Table 2.

Group-level variables. Archival sources provided data on center-levelvariables that also might have affected perceptions, behaviors, or outcomesat the individual level. These variables were used in an exploratory exam-ination of group-level predictors via hierarchical linear modeling (HLM)when significant between-groups variance existed. Such variables includedcenter size, center longevity, director’s tenure, his or her formal position,power (reflected in terms of the number of university committees thedirector served on which we categorized as low [1 or 2 committees],

medium [3 or 4 committees], and high [more than 4 committees]) and totalnumber of publications in the last 3 years (normalized as per scientistpublications described above).

Results

Discriminant Validity of Psychological Contract Scales

We first examined the discriminant validity of the psychologicalcontract scales for staff scientists by conducting a confirmatoryfactor analysis using AMOS software (Arbuckle & Wothke, 1999)with maximum likelihood estimation. To find the best fittingstructure, we compared several a priori psychological contractfactor models. The one-factor model reflects a contractual contin-uum with two opposite types of contract at the ends: transactionaland relational (e.g., Macneil, 1985). Then, loadings of both trans-actional and relational items contribute to the same factor but withopposite sign. In the two-factor model, the most commonly usedconceptualization in previous psychological contract research,transactional and relational items separately contribute to distinctfactors (e.g., Rousseau, 1990; Robinson & Rousseau, 1994). Inaddition to the transactional and relational obligations, the three-factor model also includes the balanced obligations usually relatedto either the dynamic performance and/or training and develop-ment dimensions of the psychological contract (e.g., Coyle-Shapiro & Kessler, 2000; Rousseau, 1995). In comparison with thetwo-factor and the three-factor models, the four-factor and six-factor models further discriminated between commitments madealong each obligation according to their directionality (i.e., fromdirector to scientist or from scientist to director; e.g., Rousseau,2000).

Fit statistics for these models are shown in Table 3. Resultsindicate that among them, the best fitting factor structure was the

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

(.82)�.45** (.79)�.32** .06 (.78)

.43** �.36** .03 (.86)�.35** .48** �.05 �.59** (.87)�.26* .02 .15 �.46** .35** (.87)�.35** �.02 .20 �.34** .15 .35** (.88)�.34** .31** .18 �.39** .30** .36** .44** (.88)�.34** .33** .09 �.43** .49** .32** .54** .48** (.89)

�.31** .24* �.07 �.42** .27* .25* .32** .39** .37** —�.33** .32** .08 �.48** .30** .45** .37** .66** .43** .67** —�.35** .40** �.02 �.41** .50** .24* .32** .41** .53** .41** .49** —


six-factor model, which also reached the standards of good fitalong a variety of fit indices. Indeed, the absolute measure ofdiscrepancy between covariances implied by the model and co-variances observed in the data (i.e., chi-square) reveals that thesix-factor model fitted the data better or, in other words, presentedthe lowest chi-square index. This result was also corroborated byusing the index of chi-square relative to its degrees of freedom, ameasure researchers have used to correct for the effect of samplesize with a ratio of 2 as an arbitrary indicator of good fit (Arbuckle& Wothke, 1999). The six-factor model was the only one havingincremental fit index (IFI), Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), and com-parative fit index (CFI) above the recommended standard of .90.These indices compare the fit of a given model with a standardmodel that usually has no covariance among the variables and hasbeen confirmed to perform well even with sample sizes as small as50 (Bentler, 1990). Finally, the six-factor model presented thelower root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and areasonable fit to the hypothetical population covariance matrix ofoptimally chosen parameter values (i.e., RMSEA values between.05 and .08; Browne & Cudeck, 1993).

We repeated the analysis of discriminant validity this time onthe psychological contract scales research directors used, conduct-ing the same confirmatory factor analysis procedure. In this case,however, we only compared the fit of the first three psychologicalcontract factor models given that the director questionnaire as-sessed the commitments or obligations from director to scientistbut not from scientist to director. The three-factor structure, in-cluding a transactional factor, a relational factor, and a balancedfactor, was the only one reporting a good fit for the data, IFI � .96,TLI � .92, and CFI � .96. All these analyses confirm that thefactor structure underlying the PCI measures used here conformsto the measurement model Rousseau specified (2000) and toresults reported by previous research based on larger samples (e.g.,Hui et al., in press).

Joint Perceptions: Mutuality and Reciprocity

Using several methods, we examined the variation in mutuality(i.e., agreement regarding one party’s specific obligations) andreciprocity (i.e., agreement regarding the reciprocal exchange) thatoccurs in the research collaborations between research director andstaff scientist. Consistent with the approach applied by Porter et al.(1998), we first calculated the absolute value of the gaps inperceptions across all psychological contract obligations, asfollows:

For mutuality: GAPij � �Director Obligationi �D�

� Director Obligationj �S��

For reciprocity: GAPij � �Director Obligationi �D�

� Scientist Obligationj �S��,

where i and j represent the three different types of psychologicalcontract obligations (i.e., transactional, relational, and balanced).The extent to which mutuality and reciprocity exist should bereflected by smaller average gaps between director and scientistperceptions along the same psychological contract obligation (e.g.,balanced–balanced) than along dissimilar obligations (e.g.,balanced–transactional). In addition, we examined the correlationsamong all corresponding psychological contract obligations (de-pending on whether the focus was on mutuality or reciprocity) andtested the significance of the difference between on-diagonal (e.g.,balanced–balanced) and off-diagonal correlation coefficients (e.g.,balanced–transactional). Significantly higher and positive correla-tions were expected along director and scientist scales of the samepsychological contract obligation (on-diagonal scales) than acrossdifferent obligations (off-diagonal scales). Finally, we ran severalregression models regressing each scientist scale onto all corre-sponding director scales and vice versa. When regressing a par-ticular scientist scale (e.g., balanced) onto all director scales, thecorresponding director scale (i.e., balanced) was expected to be thestronger predictor among all director scales. We also tested thesignificance of the difference between on-diagonal and off-diagonal partial regression coefficients.

The gap analysis yields two 3 � 3 tables in which the meandifference and the 95% confidence interval of the difference werecalculated for all nine mutuality gaps and all nine reciprocity gaps,respectively. As indicated above, lower means along the on-diagonal elements reflect whether mutuality and reciprocity existin the employment relationship. Starting with the gaps betweendirector and scientist perceptions of the director obligations to thescientist (i.e., variation in mutuality), Table 4 reveals that thesmaller gaps indeed occurred along the on-diagonal elements forall scales: transactional, relational, and balanced. For instance, thedirector’s perception of his or her transactional obligations to thescientist displays a significantly smaller gap with the scientist’sperception of the same transactional obligations (M � 0.87) thanwith the scientist’s perceptions of director relational or balancedobligations (M � 1.87 and M � 1.90, respectively). Although allresults follow the same pattern, it is important to note that the

Table 3Comparison of Alternative Psychological Contract Factor Structures for Staff Scientists

Model �2 df �diff2 �2/df IFI TLI CFI RMSEA

One-factor 736.07 209 — 3.52 .53 .47 .52 .179Two-factor 651.45 208 84.62 3.13 .61 .55 .60 .164Four-factor 544.09 203 107.36 2.68 .70 .65 .69 .146Three-factor 445.81 206 98.28 2.16 .79 .76 .78 .121Six-factor 281.07 194 164.74 1.45 .92 .91 .92 .075

Note. N � 80. All �2 and �diff2 values are significant at p � .01. �2 � chi-square measure of discrepancy; �diff

2

� difference in chi-square from the previous factor structure; �2/df � chi-square relative to its degrees offreedom; IFI � incremental fit index; TLI � Tucker–Lewis index; CFI � comparative fit index; RMSEA �root-mean-square error of approximation.


on-diagonal mean difference between director and scientist per-ceptions of director relational obligations (M � 0.88) marginallyfell within the confidence interval of the off-diagonal mean dif-ference between the director’s perception of his or her relationalobligations and the scientist’s perception of director balancedobligations (0.87, 1.25). This overlap between directors’ beliefsregarding relational obligations and their subordinates’ interpreta-tions of both relational and balanced obligations is not surprising.In the context of the directors’ role in the professional growth anddevelopment of their staff, subordinates are likely to experiencesupport that is at once personal (relational) as well as performance-based (balanced).

Correlations among scales shown in Table 2 support the pre-ceding results, revealing strong, positive correlations along direc-tor and scientist assessments of the same psychological contractobligation. In particular, when assessing obligations from thedirector to the scientist, the correlation between director and sci-entist scales was .44 ( p � .01) for transactional obligations, .52( p � .01) for relational obligations, and .32 ( p � .01) for balancedobligations. The tests for the significance of the difference betweencorrelation coefficients reveal that on-diagonal coefficients weresignificantly higher than off-diagonal coefficients for transactionaland relational obligations but not for balanced obligations. Theon-diagonal-balanced-(S)–balanced-(D) coefficient was signifi-cantly higher than the off-diagonal-balanced-(S)–transactional-(D)coefficient, t(77) � 3.20, p � .01, but it was not significantlyhigher (albeit in the right direction) than the off-diagonal balanced(S)-relational (D), t(77) � 1.35, ns.

Finally, Table 5 presents the results of the subsequent regres-sions of each scientist scale onto all director scales. For instance,

Table 4Gaps Between Director and Scientist Perceptions AcrossPsychological Contract Obligations

Scale

Mutuality

DirectorTransactional

(S)

DirectorRelational

(S)

DirectorBalanced

(S)

Director Transactional (D) 0.87 1.87 1.90(0.69, 1.05) (1.62, 2.12) (1.64, 2.16)

Director Relational (D) 2.02 0.88 1.06(1.78, 2.25) (0.70, 1.05) (0.87, 1.25)

Director Balanced (D) 2.12 1.24 0.83(1.89, 2.36) (1.03, 1.45) (0.63, 1.03)

Reciprocity

ScientistTransactional

(S)

ScientistRelational

(S)

ScientistBalanced

(S)

Director Transactional (D) 0.83 1.93 1.85(0.64, 1.02) (1.66, 2.21) (1.61, 2.09)

Director Relational (D) 2.00 0.80 1.05(1.77, 2.23) (0.65, 0.94) (0.86, 1.24)

Director Balanced (D) 2.15 1.03 0.91(1.92, 2.38) (0.85, 1.22) (0.74, 1.07)

Note. Values are the mean of the absolute value of the gaps (95%confidence interval of the difference in parentheses). S � scientist scale;D � director scale.

Table 5Regressions of Scientist Scales Onto Director Scales Examining Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts

Dependent variable Director Transactional (S) Director Relational (S) Director Balanced (S)

Predictor B

Bdiff

B

Bdiff

B

Bdiff

Null (H0) t Null (H0) t Null (H0) t

Mutuality

Director Transactional (D) .26* �.27* B2 � B1 � 0 3.67** �.15 B3 � B1 � 0 2.84**Director Relational (D) �.23† B1 � B2 � 0 2.70** .43** �.04 B3 � B2 � 0 2.31*Director Balanced (D) �.05 B1 � B3 � 0 2.24* �.09 B2 � B3 � 0 4.11** .26*

F 7.65** 11.22** 3.48*R2 .23 .31 .12

Dependent variable Director Transactional (S) Director Relational (S) Director Balanced (S)

Predictor B

Bdiff

B

Bdiff

B

Bdiff

Null (H0) t Null (H0) t Null (H0) t

Reciprocity

Director Transactional (D) .28* �.15 B2 � B1 � 0 3.55** .05 B3 � B1 � 0 0.90Director Relational (D) �.14 B1 � B2 � 0 2.29* .36** �.05 B3 � B2 � 0 2.11*Director Balanced (D) �.07 B1 � B3 � 0 2.55* �.19* B2 � B3 � 0 5.73** .15

F 6.34** 9.69** 0.96R2 .20 .28 .04

Note. Degrees of freedom (dfs) for F are 3, 76; df for t is 76. S � scientist scale; Bdiff � difference between Bs; D � director scale.† p � .10. * p � .05. ** p � .01.


when the scientist’s perception of director transactional obligationswas regressed onto all corresponding director scales, directortransactional (D) was the strongest predictor (B � 0.26, p � .05).Similarly, when the scientist’s perception of director relationalobligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales,director relational (D) was the strongest predictor (B � 0.43, p �.01), and when the scientist’s perception of director balancedobligations was regressed onto all corresponding director scales,director balanced (D) was the strongest predictor (B � 0.26, p �.05). Overall, results indicate that the best predictor of each scalewas the same scale from the other party’s perspective. Similarresults were obtained when regressing each director scale onto allscientist scales. In addition, Table 5 shows the tests for the signif-icance of the difference between on-diagonal and off-diagonalpartial regression coefficients revealing that on-diagonal coeffi-cients were significantly and consistently higher than off-diagonalcoefficients along all three types of psychological contract obliga-tions. For instance, when the scientist’s perception of directorrelational obligations was regressed onto all corresponding direc-tor scales, the on-diagonal relational (D) partial regression coeffi-cient was significantly higher than the off-diagonal transactional(D) coefficient, t(76) � 3.67, p � .01, and the off-diagonalbalanced (D) coefficient, t(76) � 4.11, p � .01. These resultsprovide support for Hypothesis 1.

With regard to analyses of reciprocity (Hypothesis 2), exami-nation of the gaps between director and scientist perceptions oftheir own obligations to one another (i.e., variation in reciprocity)reveals that the smaller gaps occurred along the diagonal elementsfor all scales (see Table 4). However, on-diagonal gaps weresignificantly smaller than off-diagonal gaps only for transactionaland relational obligations but not for the balanced obligation.Correlations and regression analyses confirmed this result. Inparticular, when assessing their own reciprocal commitments toone another, the correlation between director and scientist scaleswas .43 ( p � .01) for transactional obligations, .48 ( p � .01) forrelational obligations, and .15 (ns) for balanced obligations. More-over, the tests for the significance of the difference betweencorrelation coefficients reveal that on-diagonal coefficients weresignificantly higher than off-diagonal coefficients only for thetransactional and relational obligations. We conducted follow-uptests that confirm the reciprocal effects found for both transac-tional and relational scales. When the scientist’s perception of hisor her transactional obligations was regressed onto all correspond-ing director scales, director transactional (D) was the strongestpredictor (B � 0.28, p � .05). Similarly, when the scientist’sperception of his or her relational obligations was regressed ontoall corresponding director scales, director relational (D) was thestrongest predictor (B � 0.36, p � .01). However, when thescientist’s perception of his or her balanced obligations was re-gressed onto all corresponding director scales, director balanced(D) was not a strong predictor (B � 0.15, ns). Similar results wereobtained when regressing each director scale onto all scientistscales. In addition, Table 5 shows the tests for the significance ofthe difference between on-diagonal and off-diagonal partial regres-sion coefficients revealing that on-diagonal coefficients were sig-nificantly and consistently higher than off-diagonal coefficientsonly for the transactional and relational obligations. Thus, Hypoth-esis 2 is partially supported.

Joint Perceptions and Quality of the ResearchCollaborations

Previous organizational research on congruence (i.e., agree-ment, fit, or match) between two constructs has advised on thenumerous substantive and methodological problems that arisewhen congruence indices, developed by collapsing two measuresinto a single one (e.g., algebraic, absolute, square difference), areused as predictors in regression models (Edwards, 1994). For thatreason, we departed from gaps in perceptions for subsequentanalyses. We examined the extent to which the joint perceptions ofdirector and scientist provided distinct explanatory power foroutcomes using hierarchical regressions to test the interaction term(Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the first step, we entered all controlvariables along with the individual scales of directors and scien-tists into the regression equations. In the second step, we enteredthe joint perceptions (i.e., interaction term) to examine whether theinterplay between director and scientist perceptions has explana-tory power beyond that of their individual scales. This procedure,suggested by Cronbach (1958), has been also used in previousstudies of congruence (e.g., Berger-Gross & Kraut, 1984; Butler,1983; Maslyn & Uhl-Bien, 2001; Rice, McFarlin, & Bennett,1989) to eradicate most of the substantive and methodologicalproblems associated with the use of a congruence index, in par-ticular those surrounding the effects of its constituent components.Moreover, results obtained using the hierarchical regressions totest the interaction term were substantiated in a third and final stepby applying Edwards’ polynomial regression technique (Edwards,1994). In particular, we used this technique to test for the possi-bility that curvilinear effects account for the significance of theinteraction term. Because the constituent components (i.e., directorand scientist perceptions) were measured using the same scale andwere positively correlated to each other (see Table 2), their inter-action term was also expected to be positively correlated with thesquare of either component. In cases like this, the likelihood of aspurious interaction increases when these higher order terms areomitted.

In preparation for examining the hierarchical regressions, wenote other methodological issues. The individual scales of direc-tors and scientists were centered to minimize multicollinearityproblems, often caused in moderator models by the very highcorrelations associated with the introduction of the interaction termin the regression equation (Aiken & West, 1991). Moreover, giventhat psychological contract obligations are defined based on sim-ilar or opposing characteristics along the same two key contractfeatures (i.e., duration and specificity of performance terms; Rous-seau, 1995), scales tend to correlate (either positively or nega-tively). To avoid confounding effects, each type of obligation wasseparately entered in subsequent regression equations. Thus, re-sults can also shed light on how specific psychological contractobligations are related to specific outcomes. Finally, two prelim-inary tests were conducted to rule out potential problems in thedata. First, we tested for the omnibus null hypothesis that allpossible correlations among the variables in the individual regres-sion equations equal zero, a situation likely in exploratory studieswhere the sample size is relatively small (J. Cohen & Cohen,1983). When the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, no furtheranalysis involving these correlations should be performed (Steiger,1980). Our results, however, led to an overwhelming rejection ofthe null hypothesis in all individual regression equations ( p �


.01). Second, we tested for the null hypothesis that no differenceexists among all outcome variables (i.e., met expectations, conti-nuity, publications, coauthorship, and formal career advancement),given the relatively high average intercorrelation among them. Ofcourse this effect was to some extent anticipated in our researchdesign by deliberately choosing objective outcomes that wouldprovide convergent validation for the self-reported measures ofmet expectations and continuity. Nonetheless, the fact that theaverage intercorrelation is still high between performance-relatedoutcomes (i.e., met expectations and both publication measures)and job-security–related outcomes (i.e., continuity and formal ca-reer advancement) raises the issue that all outcomes might in factreflect the same phenomenon. Using a canonical correlation anal-ysis including all relevant variables (e.g., J. Cohen & Cohen,1983), we tested the null hypothesis that all outcome variables arethe same, or in other words, that all remaining correlations fol-lowing the first canonical variate are zero. Our results, however,rejected this null hypothesis and confirmed the expected twocanonical variates: one performance-related, �2(70, N � 80) �184.08, p � .01, and the other job-security–related, �2(52, N �80) � 98.93, p � .01.

Turning to the hierarchical regressions, our results reveal astrong support for Hypothesis 3 (see Tables 6 and 7) suggestingthat mutuality, or agreement regarding one party’s specific obli-gations, explains unique variance in the outcomes associated withthe employment relationship. The mutuality interaction terms weresignificantly related to several outcome variables. In particular,mutuality in balanced contracts was a significant predictor of metexpectations (B � 0.24, p � .01) and number of coauthoredpublications with the research director (B � 0.89, p � .01), aftercontrolling for the individual perceptions by directors and scien-tists (see Step 2, Table 6). The mutuality interaction term forbalanced was not, however, a significant predictor of the totalnumber of publications or job-security–related outcomes (i.e., con-tinuity and formal career advancement). Not surprisingly, giventhat balanced contracts are performance-based, stronger effects ofmutual balanced agreement manifest for performance-related out-comes. On the other hand, mutuality in relational contracts was asignificant predictor of both continuity (B � 0.30, p � .01) andformal career advancement (B � 0.35, p � .01; but not of metexpectations or publication measures), after controlling for theindividual perceptions by directors and scientists (see Step 2, Table7). Consistent with the nature of relational contracts, the impact ofmutual relational obligations is evident around job-security–related outcomes. Finally, mutuality in transactional contracts didnot have a significant impact on any outcome measures, a resultplausible given the long-term focus regarding outcomes inacademia.

To illustrate the mutuality interaction, Figure 1 shows the re-gression lines of the effects of mutuality in relational obligationson continuity and formal career advancement. Scientist and direc-tor reports regarding the extent of the director’s relational obliga-tions to the scientist were dichotomized into low and high on thebasis of �1 SD from the mean of each variable (J. Cohen &Cohen, 1983). The interactions indicate that continuity and formalcareer advancement were greatest when both parties agreed thatrelational obligations have been committed to by the director. Onthe other hand, differences in perceptions or agreement on theabsence of relational obligations led to lower outcomes in bothcases. Similar patterns were obtained for the effects of mutuality in T

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Results obtained for the mutuality interaction terms were sub-stantiated using Edwards’ polynomial regression technique ex-tended up to the quadratic terms (see Step 3, Tables 6 and 7). Byapplying this technique, we tested for the possibility that curvilin-ear effects account for the significance of the mutuality interactionterms. Results reveal that where the interaction term was alreadysignificant, it remained significant even after entering the squaresof its constituent components into the regression equations (seeSteps 2 and 3, Tables 6 and 7). For example, the interaction termfor mutuality in balanced obligations was a significant predictor ofmet expectations (B � 0.24, p � .01; Step 2, Table 6) andremained significant in the quadratic equation (B � 0.21, p � .05;Step 3, Table 6).

Hypothesis 4 addressed the extent to which reciprocity, oragreement about the reciprocal exchange, explains unique variancein the outcomes associated with the employment relationship. Ourresults reveal no significant effects for the balanced obligations, alikely consequence of the lack of shared perceptions betweendirector and scientist regarding their reciprocal balanced obliga-tions as described above. Significant effects did exist betweenreciprocity in relational obligations and both continuity (B � 0.18,p � .05) and formal career advancement (B � 0.31, p � .01)above and beyond the individual perceptions of directors andscientists (see Step 2, Table 8). In both equations, the form of theinteraction follows patterns similar to those presented in Figure 1for mutuality in relational obligations. Because reciprocity entailsnot only commitments from the director to the scientist but viceversa, we also controlled for staff scientist fulfillment of their

Figure 1. Interaction of scientist and director reports assessing the effects mutuality in relational obligationson Continuity and formal career advancement. S � scientist scale; D � director scale.

Table 7Hierarchical Regressions Examining the Effects of Mutuality in Relational Obligations on Continuity and Formal CareerAdvancement

Outcome and predictor

Continuity Formal career advancement

Step 1(Main effect)

Step 2(Interaction)

Step 3(Quadratic)

Step 1(Main effect)

Step 2(Interaction)

Step 3(Quadratic)

Step 1Organizational tenure �0.01 0.00 �0.01 �0.02 �0.02 �0.02Center tenure �0.05 �0.05 �0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00Educational level (PhD) 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.78** 0.72** 0.73**Gender (male) 0.02 0.09 0.09 �0.19 �0.11 �0.10Director Relational (S) 0.50** 0.47** 0.44** 0.42** 0.39** 0.34**Director Relational (D) 0.27* 0.41** 0.38** 0.34** 0.50** 0.48**

Steps 2 and 3Director Relational (S) square �0.14 �0.18Director Relational (S) � Director Relational (D) 0.30** 0.35** 0.35** 0.42**Director Relational (D) square �0.04 �0.05

F 9.09** 9.82** 7.85** 8.62** 9.73** 7.96**�R2 0.43** 0.06** 0.01 0.41** 0.07** 0.02Adjusted R2 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.44 0.44df 6, 73 7, 72 9, 70 6, 73 7, 72 9, 70

Note. Psychological contract scales were centered. S � scientist scale; D � director scale; square � the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.* p � .05. ** p � .01.


commitments as rated by center directors. Consistent with ourprevious findings for mutuality, stronger effects of reciprocityin relational contracts manifest around job-security–related out-comes. Similar to the case of mutuality, reciprocity in transac-tional contracts did not significantly affect outcomes. In addi-tion, by applying the polynomial regression technique (see Step3, Table 8), we tested for the possibility that curvilinear effectsaccount for the significance of the reciprocity interaction terms.Results reveal that where the interaction term was alreadysignificant, it remained so even after entering the squares of itsconstituent components into the regression equations (see Steps2 and 3, Table 8). For example, the interaction term of reci-procity in relational obligations was a significant predictor offormal career advancement (B � 0.31, p � .01; Step 2) andremained significant in the quadratic equation (B � 0.54, p �.01; Step 3). All in all, results provide partial support forHypothesis 4.

Finally, because the coefficients of polynomial equations areoften difficult to interpret (Edwards, 1994; Edwards & Parry,1993), we also conducted a follow-up examination of the three-dimensional response surfaces to provide additional insight intothe results. Response surfaces, often used graphically and analyt-ically in studies of congruence (e.g., Edwards & Parry, 1993,Edwards & Rothbard, 1999; Kristof-Brown & Stevens, 2001), canbe generated from the coefficients of the polynomial regressionequations (extended up to the square terms) to map the relationshipbetween two paired reports and a given outcome. Although variousrelationships can be investigated, a typical hypothesis is that con-gruence leads to a maximum (or minimum) level of outcome alongthe line of perfect fit (i.e., where the two paired reports matchexactly). Such a relationship can be represented, for example,using a quadratic equation constrained to the squared differencebetween the two constituent components. In a hypothetical form,the quadratic equation can generate response surfaces consistent

with the squared difference (see Figure 2A) by meeting the fol-lowing three constraints: (a) the coefficients of the constituentcomponents are nonsignificant, (b) the coefficients of the squareterms are equal, and (c) the coefficient of the interaction term istwice as large as the coefficient of either square term but with anopposite sign (for an extensive review of congruence tests andtheir related constraints, see Edwards, 1994). In this study, weexpected congruence to lead to more positive outcomes thanincongruence. Nonetheless, our hypotheses do not suggest that thevalue of the outcome is the same (and maximum) at every singlepoint along the line of perfect fit. Rather, we expected agreementon the presence of a particular obligation in an employmentrelationship to have a more positive impact on outcomes thanagreement on its absence. Consistently, our results reveal thatregression coefficients were far from meeting the constraints of thehypothetical form (e.g., the coefficients of the constituent compo-nents were significant in most regressions; see Step 3, Tables 6, 7,and 8), and thus response surfaces differed significantly from thatof Figure 2A. From a graphical standpoint, our typical responsesurface displayed a downward slope on either side along the line ofperfect fit, showing that congruence in director and scientist per-ceptions was indeed related to a higher outcome value. However,the most noticeable pattern was a sharp, positive slope along theline of perfect fit, revealing that the outcome value was higherwhen both director and scientist perceptions were high rather thanwhen both were low. This surface pattern, characteristic of thepolynomial equations studied here, is consistent with the underly-ing dynamics postulated for mutuality and reciprocity, as illus-trated in Figure 2B, using the results of the regression examiningthe effects of mutuality in relational obligations on continuity(Step 3, Table 7). In addition, response surface patterns wereconfirmed analytically using the framework proposed by Edwardsand Parry (1993) for testing the significance of the slopes andcurvatures along both the line of perfect fit where director and

Table 8Hierarchical Regressions Examining the Effects of Reciprocity in Relational Obligations on Continuity and Formal CareerAdvancement

Outcome and predictor

Continuity Formal career advancement

Step 1(Main effect)

Step 2(Interaction)

Step 3(Quadratic)

Step 1(Main effect)

Step 2(Interaction)

Step 3(Quadratic)

Step 1Organizational tenure �0.01 �0.01 �0.01 �0.03 �0.03 �0.03†Center tenure �0.03 �0.04 �0.04 0.02 0.01 �0.01Educational level (PhD) �0.08 �0.05 �0.05 0.63* 0.67** 0.75**Gender (male) 0.05 0.03 0.03 �0.15 �0.19 �0.11Scientist Fulfillment (D) 0.50** 0.52** 0.52** 0.30** 0.33** 0.30**Scientist Relational (S) 0.21* 0.23* 0.21† 0.26* 0.29* 0.06Director Relational (D) 0.34** 0.44** 0.43** 0.38** 0.54** 0.55**

Steps 2 and 3Scientist Relational (S) square �0.02 �0.32**Scientist Relational (S) � Director Relational (D) 0.18* 0.21† 0.31** 0.54**Director Relational (D) Square �0.02 �0.14

F 10.85** 10.59** 8.26** 7.40** 8.61** 8.64**�R2 0.51** 0.03* 0.00 0.42** 0.07** 0.06**Adjusted R2 0.47 0.49 0.48 0.36 0.44 0.49df 7, 72 8, 71 10, 69 7, 72 8, 71 10, 69

Note. Psychological contract scales were centered. D � director scale; S � scientist scale; square � the quadratic term of the corresponding scale.† p � .10. * p � .05. ** p � .01.


scientist reports are equal (i.e., the D � S line) and the line runningperpendicular to the perfect fit (i.e., the D � �S line). A detaileddescription of the procedure and results is included in the Appendix.

Group-Level Effects

Finally, because all director–scientist research collaborationswere formally organized around research centers, it was necessaryto examine whether group-level variables might confound theeffects observed at the dyadic level. Group-level variables such ascenter size, center longevity, research director’s productivity, for-mal position, relative power, and tenure could have explanatorypower on individual-level outcomes such as objective indicators ofproductivity and career advancement and subjective measures ofmet expectations and continuity. We used HLM to determine theamount of variance residing within and between groups as well asto investigate the influence of group-level variables on individual-level outcomes (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Our initial modelinvestigated the amount of between-groups variance and its sig-nificance for each of the five dependent variables used in thisresearch (i.e., met expectations, publications, coauthored publica-tions, continuity, and career advancement). To partition varianceinto its within- and between-groups components, we specified nopredictors in Level 1 or Level 2 equations. This forced anywithin-group variance in the dependent variable into the Level 1residual and any between-groups variance into the Level 2 residual(i.e., a model conceptually equivalent to a one-way analysis ofvariance; Hofmann, 1997). In Table 9 we computed the intraclasscorrelations for each of the five dependent variables, that is, theratio of the between-groups variance in the dependent variable tototal variance in the dependent variable including both the within-and between-groups components. Results reveal that there was nosignificant between-groups variance for met expectations, publi-cations, and formal career advancement. However, results revealthat 33.38% of the variance in coauthored publications and 11.52%of the variance in continuity resided at the group level. In the caseof coauthored publications and continuity, we further investigatedwhether there was significant variance in the intercepts and/or

slopes across groups using the random coefficient regressionmodel. In both cases, results show significant variance in theintercepts, �00 � 4.80, t(15) � 6.48, p � .01, for coauthoredpublications, and �00 � 3.40, t(15) � 23.15, p � .01, for perceivedcontinuity but not in the slopes. Finally, we used the intercepts-as-outcomes model to assess whether the variance in the interceptwas significantly related to one or more of the a priori relevantgroup-level variables. In the case of coauthored publications, wefound that once the total number of publications by the researchdirector in the last 3 years was entered as predictor into Level 2equation, there was no systematic between-groups variance re-maining that could have been modeled by additional group-levelpredictors, �2(14, N � 80) � 22.28, ns. Conversely, the group-level variables we evaluated could not fully explain the remaining

Table 9Intraclass Correlation (ICC): Between- and Within-GroupVariance

Dependent variableVariance

component ICC df �2

Met expectationsLevel 2: Between Groups 0.048 0.0461 15 20.21Level 1: Within Groups 0.989

PublicationsLevel 2: Between Groups 0.556 0.0321 15 19.24Level 1: Within Groups 16.784

CoauthorshipLevel 2: Between Groups 6.083 0.3338 15 53.21**Level 1: Within Groups 12.142

ContinuityLevel 2: Between Groups 0.128 0.1152 15 26.73*Level 1: Within Groups 0.986

Formal career advancementLevel 2: Between Groups 0.056 0.0423 15 17.98Level 1: Within Groups 1.280

Note. Hierarchical linear modeling provides a significance test for thebetween-groups variance component only.* p � .05. ** p � .01.

Figure 2. Three-dimensional response surfaces relating scientist and director reports to assess the effectsmutuality in relational obligations on Continuity. All scales were centered. S � scientist scale; D � directorscale.


between-groups variance in continuity. Nevertheless, this may beinconsequential given the relatively low percentage of the variancein continuity that resided between groups (only 11.52% of the totalvariance). In all, we conclude that the results we observe foremployer–employee mutuality and reciprocity in psychologicalcontracts are not an artifact of center-level factors. Rather, ourfindings suggest that it is the dyadic relationship between individ-ual and employer that gives rise to the level of mutuality andreciprocity that the relationship manifests and the consequencesthat result.

Discussion

Our research provides support for a crucial assumption of psy-chological contract theory, that the psychological contract termsworkers frequently believe to be mutual on the part of themselvesand their employer may indeed be so. Mutuality can be more thana perception; it may be a fact, at least to some degree. Moreover,where mutuality exists, this study demonstrates it has substantialbenefits for both workers (e.g., advancement) and organizations(e.g., coauthorship).

Understanding the origins of agreement in the employmentrelationship is fundamental for enhancing theory development inboth psychological contract and exchange theory and in theirpractical application in organizations. One mechanism underlyingagreement is postulated to be shared mental models (Rousseau,2001a) in which informational cues that are mutually reinforcingmake it easier for scientists of the same social system to formcommon understandings. Such shared mental models are likely toarise in settings that have bundles of support practices, reinforcingsimilar or interrelated social cues (e.g., promotion and develop-ment systems that cue the same kinds of behaviors and perfor-mance outcomes). In the organizational setting we studied, com-mon entry requirements (e.g., advanced education) and similartasks (e.g., research) are likely to reflect mutually reinforcingsupport practices, making mutuality more likely. In organizationswith more diverse employee backgrounds and heterogeneous func-tions, mutuality may be more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless,where mutuality does occur, our results suggest it is highly func-tional for both workers and employers.

Alternative mechanisms underlying agreement also have beensuggested in the LMX literature. For instance, Deluga (1998)found evidence that manager–worker similarity in Conscientious-ness, one of the Big Five personality traits, was positively relatedto worker in-role and extra-role behavior. He further argued thatmanagers and workers similar in Conscientiousness are inclined toengage in processes of frequent communication and continuousfeedback that help develop shared understandings (mutuality) ofrole expectations and stimulate increasing levels of reciprocalsupport (e.g., behaviors consistent with each other’s expectations,improved performance, high-quality exchange). Similarly, Engleand Lord (1997) examined leader–member agreement in the im-plicit theories each holds regarding leadership (what a good leaderis) and performance (what a good worker does), finding evidencethat agreement between worker and leader in implicit performancetheories is related to liking and LMX quality. They also suggestedthat congruence in implicit theories provides the basis for mutu-ality or shared understandings, making it easier for both parties toalign behaviors with expectations. Because our study reveals thatin the presence of mutuality benefits accrue to both workers and

employers, further research is needed on these and other mecha-nisms affecting the creation and development of agreement regard-ing the exchange terms.

Reciprocity, however, is a more complex phenomenon. Ourresults indicate that reciprocity in relational terms produces theexpected benefits of worker retention and career advancement.However, we found far less evidence of reciprocity in exchangesinvolving balanced obligations. There are several possible reasonsfor this. The first is operational, in that workers and employersmanifest less agreement on balanced terms than on the otherpsychological contract obligations. This finding is noteworthybecause balanced exchanges appear to be increasingly common inemployment, particularly among highly skilled knowledgeableworkers (Rousseau, 2000). Appropriate forms of reciprocity maybe especially difficult to achieve in the balanced condition. Bothworkers and firms have far less experience in relating to each otherin ways that intermingle the balanced dimension’s interpersonaland professional support with dynamic and shifting conditions ofperformance.

Another explanation seems particularly likely to us. Althoughmutuality can be construed to be a joint and simultaneous occur-rence, the temporality of reciprocity is uncertain. How long aperiod of time must elapse before contributions one party makes toanother are reciprocated? The importance of the differential im-mediacy of returns has been addressed in previous LMX researchon reciprocity. In particular, Sparrowe and Liden (1997) adopted aframework in which various forms of reciprocity are characterizedby differential immediacy of returns. Generalized reciprocity, inwhich returns take many forms and are not necessarily targeted tothe original giver, is attributed to the indefiniteness of results andaltruistic concern for the other party. In contrast, equivalent reci-procity entails immediate and comparable returns typically pro-vided to the original giver. Our data suggest that reciprocity ofrelational exchanges corresponds to generalized reciprocity, andtransactional exchanges may be characterized by equivalent reci-procity. In contrast, reciprocity in balanced exchanges appears tobe more complex and potentially more difficult to capture in partbecause balanced contracts blend features of both relational andtransactional arrangements. We suspect that in on-going relation-ships, such as the collaborations studied here, significant eventsreflecting cycles of inducements and contributions vary in the timeframes in which they occur. Whereas other scholars have sug-gested that relational exchanges are evaluated across the wholehistory of the relationship (Clark & Reis, 1988), balanced ex-changes may have rhythms that vary, making assessment intervalsmore difficult to capture.

Beyond the specific issues described above, several directionsfor future research are suggested by the evidence this study pro-vides for the role of mutuality and reciprocity in the employmentexchange. One important and basic issue concerns the factors thatcontribute to or impede mutuality of understanding between em-ployee and employer. We note that in the present setting, unit-levelfactors played relatively little role in shaping either mutuality orreciprocity. Unit-level factors may play less of a role in theresearch context studied here because staff scientists work rela-tively independently. However, in settings where greater interde-pendence exists among employees, unit-level factors, such asteam-building practices (e.g., member participation in selection ofteam mates) and socialization activities (e.g., shared training ses-sions) may play a role in shaping how mutuality and reciprocity


arise. Under conditions of greater interdependence among work-ers, shared perceptions regarding the work setting (e.g., climate,cultural values, leadership style) also are likely to contribute to thedegree of agreement both between workers and employers andamong workers themselves. Thus, research is needed on the rolethat task structure and unit-factors play in shaping the degree ofagreement between parties to the employment relationship.

Just as unit-level practices, such as socialization, might enhancemutuality and reciprocity, other contextual factors can impair theextent of agreement employer and employee manifest. Rousseauand Greller (1994) pointed out that workers can derive theirunderstanding of the psychological contract from a variety ofsources presumed to represent the employer. These “contract mak-ers” include first line supervisors, senior managers, and humanresource professionals as well as structural signals, that is, prac-tices of the firm, which can be interpreted by workers to createobligations on the part of the employer or themselves (e.g., policiesof filling higher level positions from within). To the extent thatthese contract makers are interpreted as sending different messagesregarding the nature of the employment relationship, both mutu-ality and reciprocity can be undermined. Research is needed toinvestigate the conditions under which individuals rely on partic-ular sources of information regarding the employment relationship.Further, it is important to examine how individuals respond tomixed messages between sources and the impact that the extent ofconvergence among these sources has on the outcomes associatedwith the employment relationship.

Last, the present study suggests that reciprocity is a morecomplex phenomenon than is mutuality in the context ofemployment-based exchanges. Reciprocity involves exchangesover time in which the intervals associated with the cycles ofexchange vary with the nature of the resources involved (e.g. payvs. career development) and the organizational context (e.g., astart-up firm with uncertain future vs. a growing, diversified cor-poration). To better understand how reciprocity occurs and howparties respond to lags in the exchange cycle, it would be useful tofocus on recurring practices in organizations where exchanges ofpromises occur between employer and employee. For instance,performance reviews and the follow-ups accompanying them ofteninduce exchanges of promises (e.g., of managerial support inexchange for a change in worker contributions) providing a con-text for examining reciprocity as it unfolds over time. We suggestthat future research on reciprocity can benefit from longitudinalstudies following up particular practices or events in employmentwhere promise exchanges are the norm.

The design of this study overcomes several limitations of pre-vious work through its contextualization of the employment rela-tionship and use of paired worker–employer data. In particular, anexamination of the joint perceptions of the individual worker andhis or her primary employer’s agent is crucial for understandingemployment arrangements of knowledge workers. In the knowl-edge economy, employment paradigms have shifted from stan-dardized conditions for all workers toward more idiosyncraticarrangements, making general levels of agreement (e.g., between amanager and a group of workers or a senior human resource personand the firm’s employees) less meaningful (Rousseau, 2001b).Another salient aspect of the study is the relative stability of theinteraction term when using both hierarchical regressions andEdwards’ (1994) polynomial regression technique. Despite thesmall sample size, results are robust in that where the interaction

term was significant using hierarchical regressions, it remainedsignificant when applying the polynomial regression technique.Finally, other strengths of this study lie in the consistency ofresults between both self-reported and archival outcome measuresand in the estimation of potential confounding effects at the grouplevel.

At the same time, this study’s design also presents certainlimitations. First, the instruments employed were Spanish transla-tions from measures developed in the United States. Although thescales have been found to be reliable and valid in non-NorthAmerican contexts (Rousseau, 2000) and when translated intoChinese (Hui et al., in press), interpretations and response patternsin the present sample may differ from those observed in othersocieties. As with all cross-cultural generalizations, our findingsshould be investigated in other regions and with scales in lan-guages other than Spanish. Another limitation to the generalizabil-ity of the results is given by the atypical nature of the researchsetting. In typical organizations, work units seldom present thedegree of autonomy and independence characteristic of the re-search centers studied here. In particular, research directors are theprimary source of employer communication with workers. Futureresearch should find ways to examine the level of agreementbetween workers and employers in cases where organizationsentail multiple contract makers. Finally, this study used recallmeasures of commitments or obligations between research direc-tors and staff scientists, and it was based on a cross-sectionaldesign. This design might be suitable for assessments of mutuality,whereas a longitudinal design might provide a stronger test ofreciprocity as long as it allows for in-depth examination of signif-icant events during which commitments and contributions areexchanged (e.g., recruitment, development opportunities, perfor-mance reviews). Nonetheless, evidence that mutuality and reci-procity do arise from the cycle of inducements and contributionsreflected in psychological contracts opens up many avenues forstudying not only their violation but also their fulfillment andfunctional consequences in contemporary employment.

Practical Significance

Creating and sustaining mutuality of understanding betweenemployers and employees facilitates not only better quality em-ployment relationships, but as our results suggest, mutuality alsocontributes to improved individual performance and career suc-cess. Although research is needed on the factors that create mu-tuality in the first place, efforts to create common information andshared understandings between the workers and their managers arelikely to enhance mutuality.

Our results also suggest that although mutuality may be morereadily achieved, employers may find it more difficult to obtainreciprocal contributions in response to the commitments they haveoffered workers. For instance, an employer may indicate a will-ingness to develop a worker and support his or her career advance-ment and yet fail to explicate what services and efforts that workeris expected to provide in return. Although further research onreciprocity in the employment relationship is needed, our resultssuggest that it may be helpful to couple communications regardingemployer commitments to workers with the types of efforts andcontributions the employer expects from workers in return. Infor-mation regarding reciprocal obligations can be particularly war-ranted in the venues in which commitments to workers are fre-


quently made, such as performance reviews, training sessions, andrecruiting. Moreover, it can be helpful to revisit the degree ofagreement regarding reciprocal obligations periodically becauseevidence exists that individuals are inclined to be more aware oftheir own contributions in an exchange relationship than they areto their partners’ (e.g., Robinson & Rousseau, 1994).

Conclusion

One goal of the present study was to expand beyond researchfocusing on the downside of psychological contracts (i.e., adverseconsequences such as erosion and violation) to investigate theupside of functional or mutually beneficial psychological contractsin employment. The bedrock of functional employment relation-ships are exchanges between workers and employers characterizedby mutuality or shared understanding of all parties’ obligations andreliance on their reciprocal commitments. Convergence in thepsychological contracts of employees and employers as demon-strated here can serve the interests of both parties to an employ-ment relationship.

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Appendix

Analysis of the Response Surface Patterns in the Quadratic Regression Equations

Edwards and Parry (1993) presented a framework for interpreting poly-nomial regression equations extended up to the square terms (i.e., quadraticequations) in studies of congruence. Among other features, this frameworkprovides the basis for testing the significance of the slopes and curvaturesalong both the line of perfect fit where director and scientist reports areequal (i.e., the D � S line) and the line running perpendicular to the perfectfit (i.e., the D � �S line). As presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8, the quadraticequation in this study takes the general form of

Z � b0 � b1S � b2D � b3S2 � b4SD � b5D2, (1)

where S represents the scientist’s perception of a particular obligation, D isthe corresponding director’s perception, and Z is the outcome variablebeing predicted. The constituent components S and D vary with the type ofobligation (i.e., transactional, relational, or balanced) and with the nature ofthe relationship being examined (i.e., mutuality or reciprocity). For sim-

plicity, control variables are not represented in Equation 1, although theyare included in the regression equations of Tables 6, 7, and 8.

The slopes and curvatures along the two lines of interest can be obtainedby substituting the expression for that line in Equation 1. For instance, asignificant positive slope along the D � S line (visible as a surface slopingupward from the front to the back of the graph) would provide support forthe assumption that agreement on the presence of a particular obligationleads to higher values in the outcome variable than does agreement on itsabsence. Using the expression for this line (i.e., D � S), we can substituteS for D in Equation 1 as follows:

Z � b0 � �b1 � b2�S � �b3 � b4 � b5�S2. (2)

Then, the slope (given by the sum of b1 and b2) and the curvature (givenby the sum of b3, b4, and b5) of the surface along the D � S line can beexamined using standard procedures for testing the significance of linear

Table A1Analysis of the Slopes and Curvatures of Three-Dimensional Response Surfaces Along Lines ofInterest

Outcome

Shape along D � S line Shape along D � �S line

Slope(b1 b2)

Curvature(b3 b4 b5)

Slope(b1 � b2)

Curvature(b3 � b4 b5)

Mutuality in balanced obligations (from Table 6)Met Expectations 0.84** 0.30* 0.20 �0.12Publications 2.21** 0.08 �2.51** �0.94Coauthorship 3.83** 1.01* �1.63 �0.67

Mutuality in relational obligations (from Table 7)Continuity 0.82** 0.17 0.06 �0.53**Formal career advancement 0.82** 0.19 �0.14 �0.65**

Reciprocity in relational obligations (from Table 8)Continuity 0.64** 0.17 �0.22 �0.25**Formal career advancement 0.61** 0.08 �0.49* �1.00**

Note. Following the general form of the quadratic equation (Equation 1), the regression coefficients b1, b2, b3,b4, and b5 for each case correspond to the set of predictors included in the quadratic regression equations, aspresented in Step 3, Tables 6, 7, and 8. For instance, in regressions examining the effects of mutuality in balancedobligations on Met Expectations, publications, and coauthorship (Table 6), b1 corresponds to Director Balanced(S), b2 to Director Balanced (D), b3 to Director Balanced (S) Square, b4 to Director Balanced (S) � DirectorBalanced (D), and b5 to Director Balanced (D) Square. D � director scale; S � scientist scale.* p � .05. ** p � .01.


combinations of partial regression coefficients (J. Cohen & Cohen, 1983).Likewise, a significant negative curvature in conjunction with a nonsig-nificant slope along the D � �S line would reveal that the value of theoutcome decrease on either side of the line of perfect fit, demonstrating thatagreement in director and scientist perceptions is indeed related to highervalues in the outcome variables. Using the expression for this line (i.e., D� �S), we can substitue �S for D in Equation 1 as follows:

Z � b0 � �b1 � b2�S � �b3 � b4 � b5�S2. (3)

Then, the slope (given by the expression b1 � b2) and the curvature (givenby b3 � b4 b5) of the surface along the D � �S line can also beexamined using the same procedure indicated above.

Table 1 presents the analysis of slopes and curvatures for all sevenresponse surfaces generated from the coefficients of the quadratic regres-sion equations (Step 3, Tables 6, 7, and 8). Results provide strong supportfor the assumption that the value of the outcome is higher when bothscientist and director agree on the presence of a particular obligaiton thanwhen both agree on its absence. Certainly, the most noticeable pattern isthat the slope along the D � S line was positive and significant for all thesurfaces examined ( p � .01). In addition, the curvature along the D � S

line was positive and significant for met expectations and coauthorship,suggesting that the value of these two outcomes increased at a faster ratewhen reports from both parties were high. Results also provide partialsupport for the downward slope on either side along the line of perfect fit.The curvature along the D � �S line was negative for all surfaces(showing that congruence matters), even though it was significant for theregressions examining mutuality and reciprocity in relational obligations( p � .01), but not for the regressions examining mutuality in balancedobligations. The slope along the D � �S line was negative and significantfor formal career advancement (only in the case of reciprocity; slope ��0.49, p � .05), suggesting that the point at which the value of thisoutcome ceased to rise and began to fall occurred slightly to the left(director’s side) of the line of perfect fit. A similar result was found forpublications. In all, these results confirm the patterns observed in theresponse surface graphs.

Received July 24, 2002Revision received April 1, 2003

Accepted May 6, 2003 �


Mutuality and Reciprocity in the Psychological Contracts

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