Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good 13

volume13,no.14 july2013

Wisdom and Happiness

in Euthydemus 278282

Russell E. JonesHarvard University

2013 RussellE.Jones

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

1. Introduction

There is perhapsnophilosophical thesis that hasmore oftenbeenthoughttobemostcentraltoormostdistinctiveofthephilosophyofSocratesinPlatosdialogues1thanthethesisthatwisdomissufficientfor happiness. The sufficiency thesis amounts to the claim that nomatterhowthingsgoinyourlife,ifyouarewise,thenyouarehappy,eitherbecausebeingwisesomehowinfalliblygivesyoutheresourcestobecomehappyorbecausehappinessjustamountstobeingwise.HenceitscentralityforSocrates:ThesufficiencythesisexplainswhySocrates is so interested inwisdom(which is thesameasbeing in-terestedinvirtue,accordingtoSocrates)andwhyheisalwaystryingtoacquire itandalwaystryingtopersuadeotherstoacquire it, too.But thesufficiency thesis isadeeplycounterintuitiveone.Aristotlefamouslywrote that no onewouldmaintain it unless defending aphilosophersparadox.2Hence itsdistinctiveness forSocrates:Fewothershavebeenwillingtogosofar.

ThiscommonportraitofSocratesisappealingbutfalse.Thelocus classicus forattributingthesufficiencythesistoSocratesisEuthydemus 278282.3The interpretation Iwill challenge is a long-standingone,

1. Andthis is thephilosophyIaminterested in inthispaper, thephilosophyexpressedbythecharacternamedSocrateswhoappearsinPlatosdialogues,andparticularlyintheEuthydemus.

2. Nicomachean Ethics 1095b311096a2. I borrow philosophers paradox fromTerence Irwins translation of . Strictly speaking,whatAristotle saysnoonewouldmaintainisthatavirtuouspersonwhoiscompletelyinactivethroughouthislife,orwhosufferstheworstmisfortunes,ishappy.Thisisnotthesufficiencythesisitselfbutsomethingthatthesufficiencythesis(atleastoncertainnaturalconstrualsofthethesis)plausiblymightbethoughttoen-tail.Similarly,at1153b1921,Aristotledenieswhatseemstobe(ornearlytobe)thesufficiencythesis:Somemaintain,onthecontrary,thatwearehappywhenwearebrokenonthewheel,orfallintoterriblemisfortunes,providedthatwearegood.Whethertheymeantoornot,thesepeoplearetalkingnon-sense(Irwintrans.).

3. Thepassageislargelyunfamiliartonon-specialists,butspecialistshaveoftenturnedtoitascrucialforunderstandingPlatosethics.Forexample,Irwin,inoneofthemostinfluentialandprovocativeworksonPlatonicethicsinrecentdecades(Platos Ethics[Oxford:1995]esp.ch.45)reliescentrallyonEuthyde-mus278282toestablishthefollowingclaims,eachofwhichisbothcentraltohisinterpretationandapointofcontroversyamongscholars:Everyaction

ImprintPhilosophers

russelle.jones Wisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 278282

philosophersimprint 2 vol.13,no.14(july2013)

show,theso-calledlocus classicus forthesufficiencythesis,Euthydemus 278282,providesnoevidencefor,andevensomeevidenceagainst,Socratescommitmenttothesufficiencythesis.Itdoes,however,pro-videclearevidenceforSocratescommitmenttothenecessityofwis-domforhappinessandsoexplainsthecentralimportanceofwisdomforSocrates.Ifcorrect,myargumentforcesthosewhowouldattributethesufficiencythesistoSocratestolookelsewherefortheirprimaryevidence.But evenmore radically, since thepassageactually givesus some reasons to reject the sufficiency thesis, the interpretation Ioffersuggests that suchahunt forevidence ismisguided. If that iscorrect,whatweneedisathoroughgoingreevaluationofthenatureofandrelationshipsbetweenthemostimportantconceptsinSocraticphilosophy:wisdom andhappiness.Thispaperisbutthefirststepinsuchareevaluation.

2. AllegedargumentsforthesufficiencythesisinEuthydemus 278282

Onthestandardreading,SocratesarguesforthesufficiencythesisinEuthydemus 278282. Irwinnicely illustrates thiswayof reading thepassage:

Socratestakesit tobegenerallyagreedthatweachievehappinessbygainingmanygoods (279a14), buthe ar-guesthattheonlygoodweneediswisdom.Hearguesinthreestages:(1)Happinessdoesnotrequiregoodfortuneadded towisdom (279c4280a8). (2)Wisdom is neces-saryandsufficient for thecorrectandsuccessfuluseofothergoods(280b1281b4).(3)Wisdomistheonlygood

endorsementfortheirowncentraltenetthatvirtueistheonlygood-in-itself. Stoics were attracted, in particular, to the protreptics con-densedand,consequently,intriguinglyproblematicargumentforthethesis that the possession of wisdom guarantees eudaimonia for itspossessornomatterhowmuchapparentbadluckthatpersonmightencounter(280a68).

On Stoic interpretation of theEuthydemus, see alsoGisela Striker, PlatosSocratesandtheStoics,inThe Socratic Movement,ed.PaulA.VanderWaerdt(Cornell:1994)pp.241251.

stretchingbackat least to theStoics, and common today.4As Iwill

performedbysomepersonisaimedatpromotingherownhappiness(oftencalledpsychological eudaimonism);wisdomispurely instrumental for, ratherthanpartiallyorwhollyconstitutiveof,happiness;wisdomisnecessaryforhappiness;wisdomissufficientforhappiness.

For others who rely on the passage to establish the sufficiency thesis,see, e. g., JuliaAnnas,Platonic Ethics, Old and New (Cornell: 1999) ch. 2;Pa-nosDimas,HappinessintheEuthydemus,Phronesis47(2002)127;R.S.W.Hawtrey,Commentary on Platos Euthydemus (American Philosophical Soci-ety:1981);RichardKraut,Socrates and the State(Princeton:1984)pp.211212;MarkMcPherran, What Even a ChildWould Know: Socrates, Luck, andProvidence atEuthydemus 277d282e,Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005) 4963;DanielRussell,Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life(Oxford:2005)ch.1;Greg-oryVlastos,Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher(Cornell:1991)pp.227231.FortheviewthatSocratesintheEuthydemusisnotconcernedwiththelogi-calrelationsofnecessityandsufficiency,seeNaomiReshotko,Socratic Virtue: Making the Best of the Neither-Good-Nor-Bad(Cambridge:2006)ch.7.Fortheview that in the so-called Socratic dialogues, Socrates rejects both the suf-ficiencyandthenecessityofwisdomforhappiness,seeThomasBrickhouseandNicholasSmith,Platos Socrates(Oxford:1994)ch.4.

Amongthosewhohavetakentheargumenttoaimatestablishingthesuf-ficiency thesis, some of these have thought the argument to fail qua argu-ment.Mostrecently,BenjaminRider(Wisdom,,andHappinessintheEuthydemus,Ancient Philosophy 32(2012)114)hasarguedthatSocratesargumentsare insufficient toestablishhis strongconclusions.This isnottosaythatthepassageisunimportant,forRiderarguesthatSocratesargu-mentsneverthelessraiseimportantquestionsforCliniasandforthereaderabouttherelationshipbetweenhappinessandwisdomandsetthestageforlaterphilosophicaldebatesonthetopic.Indeed,itseemsthatonRidersview,Socratesrecognizestheinsufficiencyofhisarguments,buthasprotrepticrea-sonstoofferthem.Tosaythathehasprotrepticreasonsis,inthiscontext,tosaythatheusestheargumentsinordertoturnorurge(protrepein)Cliniastoward philosophy. Though Iwill not engage such interpretations directly,myanalysis, ifpersuasive,givesusreasontorejectthem.This isbecauseIanalyzeSocratesargumentsinawaythatshowsthemtomeetareasonablestandardofplausibility.Myapproachcruciallyinvolvesembracingtheideasthat Socrates has a protreptic purpose and defends a strong conclusion.However, theprecisenatureof this conclusionproves somewhatdifferentfrom what other interpreters have supposed. Appreciating Socrates argu-mentforitwillrequireustoattendtodetailsofthepassagethathavelargelygoneunderappreciatedormisinterpretedbypreviouscommentators.

4. McPherran(2005,49)remindsusjusthowfarbacktheimpressivepedigreeoftheviewstretches:

[T]heEuthydemus began tobe seenas the locus classicus for the suf-ficiencyofvirtue thesisbeginningno later thanwith theStoics, forinitskey,initialprotrepticsection(277d282e)theyfoundaSocratic



claimstoshowthatwisdomistheonlygood,andithasbeenagreedthathappinessrequiresthepresenceofalltheappropriategoods.Ir-winreconstructstheargumentasfollows:

(1)Eachrecognizedgood[e. g.,health,wealth]isagreaterevilthan its contrary, if it is usedwithoutwisdom, and eachisagreatergoodthanitscontrary,ifitisusedbywisdom(281d68).

(2)Therefore,eachrecognizedgoodother thanwisdomis, initself (auto kathhauto), neither good nor evil (281d35,d8e1).6

(3)Therefore,eachofthemisneithergoodnorevil(281e34).

(4)Therefore,wisdomistheonlygoodandfollytheonlyevil.

Thereare,then,nofewerthanthreeargumentsthatpurporttodemon-stratethenecessityandsufficiencyofwisdomforhappiness.Contraryto Irwins interpretation, and others thatmay differ in detail but en-dorsethegeneralpointthatSocratesarguesforthesufficiencythesis,7IwillarguethatSocratesinnowaydemonstratesorattemptstodemon-stratethesufficiencyofwisdomforhappiness.8IagreewithIrwinthatthepassagedividesnaturallyintothreestages,andIwilltreateachinturn,devotingthemostspacetothemoreproblematicfirststage.

3. Stage 1: Wisdom is good fortune. (Euthydemus 279c280b)

AtEuthydemus 279d67,Socratesmakesa shocking claim: Wisdom()surely isgood fortune();evenachildwouldknow

6. Irwinsargumentcites281e34asevidenceforpremise(2).Ithinkhemustmeantoreferto281d35or281d8e1instead,butifthereaderhasdoubtsaboutthis,shecanjudgeforherselfbyexaminingIrwinstext,therelevantpassagesintheEuthydemus,andsection7ofthispaper.

7. IhaveinmindthoseinterpretationsonwhichsomepartorallofEuthydemus 278282ismeanttosupportthesufficiencythesis.Seenote3.

8. Iagree,aswillbecomeclear,thatinthispassageSocratesdoesendorsethenecessityofwisdomforhappiness.

(281b4e5).FromthisSocratesconcludesthatifwewantto securehappiness,weneednot acquiremanygoods;weneedonlyacquirewisdom(282a1d3).5

Insupportof this reading, Irwin identifies threearguments,one foreachofthethreestages.First,Socratesargues:

(1)Ineachcasethewisepersonhasbetterfortunethantheun-wise(280a45).

(2)Genuinewisdomcannevergowrongbutmustalwayssuc-ceed(280a78).

(3)Therefore,wisdomalwaysmakesusfortunate(280a6).

SoSocratesisarguing,asIrwinputsit,thatwisdomguaranteessuc-cesswhateverthecircumstances.Butifwisdomaloneissufficientforsuccess nomatterwhat ones situation, thenwisdommust be suffi-cientforhappinessnomatterwhatonessituation.

In the second stage, Irwin reconstructs Socrates argument asfollows:

(1) It is possible to use assets well or badly (280b7c3,280d7281a1).

(2)Correctuseofthemisnecessaryandsufficientforhappiness(280d7281e1).

(3)Wisdomisnecessaryandsufficientforcorrectuse(281a1b2).

(4)Therefore,wisdomisnecessaryandsufficientforhappiness(281b24).

Socrates final argument is meant to secure Socrates previousclaim that wisdom is necessary and sufficient for happiness, for it

5. Irwin(1995)55.ThepresentationofIrwinsargumentsthatfollowsinthissec-tion,includingallquotations,drawssolelyonIrwin(1995)5557.



Whatdoyoumean?

Wisdom surely is good fortune, I said. Even a childwouldknowthat.

Andhewassurprised,forheisstillsoyoungandnave.(279c9d8)10

So,notonlyisitquitenaturaltoreadtheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortuneasanidentityclaim,theimmediatecontextoftheclaimalsosuggests that it is an identity claim. To add good fortune to a listthatalreadyincludeswisdomistohavesaidthesamethingagainandtoaddagainwhatwasalreadymentioned,andtosaythesamethingstwice.11

ButtheargumentthatfollowsshowsdecisivelythatSocratesdoesnotintendtoputforwardanidentityclaim.Hereisthepassageinfull:

And recognizing that he was surprised, I said, Clinias,dontyouknow,then,thatflautistshavethebestfortune( )concerningplayingfluteswell?

Heagreed.

And, I said, dont grammarians have the best fortuneconcerningthewritingandreadingofletters?

Verymuchso.

Wellthen,withrespecttothedangersofthesea,doyouthink that anyone has better fortune ()thanthewisepilots,forthemostpart?

10. Translations aremy own throughout, unless otherwise attributed (thoughsomewillnodoubtdetectsomeinfluencefromSpraguestranslation).Ifol-lowBurnetstext.

11. Furthermore,Eudemian Ethics 1247b1415maybeevidencethatAristotletookthis to be an identity claim: or even all the knowledgesas Socratessaidwouldhavebeencasesofgoodfortune( , , ).

that.Tworelatedinterpretiveissuesimmediatelyarise.First,arewetotakethisasaseriousidentityclaim,thatwisdomandgoodfortunejustaretheverysamething?9Thiscertainlydoesnotseemlikesomethingevenachildwouldknow,butitisanaturalwaytoreadSocratesclaim.Andsecond,whatexactlydoes goodfortunemean?Idealwiththefirstissueinthissectionandthesecondinthefollowingsection.

Certainlyonenaturalwaytoreadtheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfor-tuneis,atleastinisolation,asanidentityclaim.AndSocratesmakesthe claim in the context of giving a list of goods the possession ofwhichwillmakeushappy.Helistsvariousgoodsofthebody(health,wealth,goodlooks,andasufficientsupplyofthingsthebodyneeds),thengoodshadinrelationtoothers(noblebirth,power,andhonoramongonescountrymen),andfinallygoodsofthesoul(temperance,justice,courage,andwisdom).But,justwhenitlooksliketheyhavecompletedthelist,Socratesexclaimsthattheyhaveleftoffthemostimportantitem,goodfortune,whicheveryone,eventhelowliest,saysisthegreatestofthegoods(270c78).Havingputthelasttwogoods,wisdomandgoodfortune,onthelistwithhisyounginterlocutorCli-niasconsent,Socratesreconsiders:

And reconsidering the matter I said, You and I havenearlybecomeridiculousinfrontofthestrangers,sonofAxiochus.

Howso?heasked.

Becausebyputtinggoodfortuneinthepreviouslist,wehavesaidthesamethingagain.

Howisthis?

Itismostridiculoustoaddagainwhatwasalreadymen-tioned,andtosaythesamethingstwice.

9. Scholars who have given an affirmative answer to this question includeMcPherran(2005,53)andRussell(2005,ch.1throughoutbutmostexplicitlyonpp.30,3637).



and says that wisdom is the source of good fortune.12 At 282c89Socratesagainsaysthatwisdomistheonlyexistingthingthatmakesapersonfortunate.

Thesesummationsoftheconclusionoftheargumentfortheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortunearenotnaturallyreadasidentityclaims.Nevertheless,perhapstheyarenotflatlyinconsistentwiththeclaimthatwisdomisidenticaltogoodfortune.Assumingtheidentityofwis-domandgood fortune, the conclusion at 280b13 seems to follow:Whenwisdom[=goodfortune]ispresent,inwhomitispresent,thereisnoneedofgoodfortune[=wisdom]inaddition.But,ofcourse,asitisformulatedinthetext(withoutthebracketedbits),280b13doesnotentailtheidentityclaim.

Likewise, perhaps the other three formulations, which seem toamount tovariationsof the claim thatwisdom makes people fortunate, are consistentwith, butweaker than, the identity claim.Given theidentityclaim,weshouldreadthethree latersummationsasclaimsthatwisdom makes people wise,oralternativelythatfortune makes people fortunate.Thissounds likesomethingwemightfindSocratessayinginsomedialogues;thinkofthefamouspassageatPhaedo 100dwhereSocrates says that all beautiful things are beautiful by thebeautiful.Butsuchaclaimseemstomissthepointinourpassage.Afterall,at281b24and282a45Socratessaysthatwisdomisthesourcenotonly

12. Strictly speaking, at 281b24 and 282a45 Socrates uses the term knowl-edge()ratherthanwisdom().Butitisplainthatwisdomandknowledgearebeingusedequivalently.Socratesisclearlysummingupagaintheresultsoftheargumentat279d280b,whichconcernswisdomandgoodfortune.Werewisdomandknowledgebeingusedtorefertodistinctthings,thissummationwouldmisrepresenttheearlierargument.Butthereisnohintinthetextthatanyconflictarises.Andat282a16,Socrateseasilyslidesbetweenwisdomandknowledgeinsumminguptheresultsoftheentirepassage:

Thenletusconsidertheconsequenceofthis.Sinceweallwanttobehappy,and sinceweappear tobecomehappybyusing thingsandusingthemcorrectly,andsinceitisknowledgethatprovidesthecor-rectness and good fortune, it is necessary, it seems, for allmen topreparethemselvesineverywayforthis:howtheywillbecomeaswiseaspossible.

Clearlynot.

Wellthen,wouldyoupreferwhencampaigningtosharethedangerandthe luckwithawisegeneralorwithanignorantone?

Withthewiseone.

Well then, with whom would you rather risk dangerwhensick,withthewisephysicianortheignorantone?

Thewise.

So then, I said, you think that it is more fortunate()todothingswithawisepersonthanwithanignorantperson?

Heagreed.

Then wisdom makes people altogether fortunate ( ).For surely wisdom, at least, would never err, but nec-essarily does rightly and succeeds ( );forotherwiseitwouldnolon-gerbewisdom.

Intheendweagreed,thoughIdontknowhow,thatinsum thingswere like this:Whenwisdom is present, inwhom it is present, there is no need of good fortune()inaddition.(279d8280b3)

WhenSocratessumsuptheresultsofhisargumentat280b13,heputsitinawaythatisnotnaturallyread,atleastinisolation,asanidentityclaim:Whenwisdomispresent,inwhomitispresent,thereisnoneedofgoodfortuneinaddition.Afewlinesearlier(280a6)hehaddrawntheconclusionthatwisdommakespeoplefortunate.At281b24herecallsthisconclusionandsaysthatwisdomprovidesmenwithgoodfortune.Againat282a45herecallsthisconclusion



Sothen,youthinkthatitismorefortunatetodothingswithawiseperson thanwith an ignorant person? The proposition is that it ismorefortunatefor youtodothingswithawiseperson.Itismorefor-tunate for you tobeunder thecommandofawisegeneralorunderthecareofawisephysician.Thatiswhyyoushouldchooseit.Butitisnotyouwhoisactingwiselyinthesituation;itisthegeneralorthephysician.Soyourgoodfortuneisaresultofsomeoneelseswisdombeingoperative.The importantpointhere is that thewisdomis thephysicians(butnotyours)andthegoodfortuneisyours(butnotthephysicians).14Butthismeansthatwisdomandgoodfortunearenotidentical,foryoucanhaveonewithouttheother.ThepointSocratesismakingisthatthewisephysiciancausesyourgoodfortune,whereastheignorantphysicianwilllikelynotbringyougoodfortune.Butthisverypointentailsthattheidentityclaimcannotbetrue.

Notonly that,buteven in theexpert,wisdomandgood fortunesometimescomeapart.NoticethatSocratesqualifieshisclaimswhentalkingaboutpilots.15Expertpilotshavebetterfortuneatseathannon-

14. Ofcourse,thephysicianmightbesaidtohavegoodfortune,too.Neverthe-less, it is not identical to your good fortune, and even if itwere, that youcanpossessgoodfortunewithoutpossessingwisdomisenoughtomakethepoint.

15. On for themostpart:Russell (2005,42) isunusual incallingattention tothis qualification. Butwhereas he thinks the qualification highlights a sig-nificantgapinanargumentfortheverystrongconclusionthatsuccessliesentirelyintheexerciseofwisdomagap,moreover,thatcannotbefilledinfromwithinthestandardsortofcraftanalogythatSocrateshereemploysIarguethat thequalificationplaysaplausibleandcomprehensiblerole inarelativelycompleteargumentforamoremodestconclusion.Itakeitthatthecomparativelygreaterplausibility,completeness,andfitwiththeargumenta-tiveframework(thecraftanalogy)oftheargumentIattributetoSocratesareadvantagesoverRussellsinterpretation.Russelldoesreasonablycallinasev-idenceSocratescuriousnarrationoftheconclusionheandCliniasreached:Intheendweagreed,though I dont know how,that.RusselltakesSocratestobeadmittingaseriousshortcoming in theargument itself, thatSocratesdoesnotknowhowtheyreachedthatconclusionfromthosepremises.Itakeittobeadmittingratheranarrativeshortcoming.Itisanadmissionthatthisisamoreorlessroughretellingoftheconversation,ratherthanastrictrecita-tion.Callingintoquestiontheaccuracyofthereportisnotthesamethingascallingintoquestionthecogencyoftheargument.Butcallingintoquestiontheaccuracyofthereportaloneisnoreasontothinkthattheretellinghas

ofgoodfortunebutalsoofcorrectuse,butthereisnohintthatcorrectuseisidenticaltowisdom.Indeed,correctuseandgoodfortuneseemtohavethesamerelationtowisdominthispassage,andtheyseemtobedistinctfromoneanother.Butifwisdomwereidenticaltogoodfortune,wewouldexpectittobeidenticaltocorrectuseaswell,andsogoodfortuneandcorrectusewouldbeidentical.

Moreover, the relationbetweenwisdomandgood fortune isex-plicitly causal, and the causal passages (280a6, 281b24, 282a45,282c89)militatestronglyagainsttheidentityreading.Acausalanal-ysis implies that there are twodifferent things involved: the cause(wisdom) and the effect (good fortune).13 But the identity readingimplies that there is only one thing involved. If causation requiresacausethatisnotidenticaltoitseffect,thentheidentityreadingisinconsistentwithSocratesexplicitclaimsthattherelationbetweenwisdomandgoodfortuneiscausal.

Evenifwecouldforcethesevariousexpressionsoftheconclusionoftheargumentintotheidentitymold,thereisanotherfeatureoftheargumentthatcountsstronglyagainst takingtheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortunetobeanidentityclaim.Socratesbeginstheargumentby claiming that various expertsflautists, grammarians, and pi-lotshavethebestfortunewhenitcomestomattersintheirfieldofexpertise.Hethengeneralizesfromtheseexamplestotheclaimthatexpertsquitegenerallyhave thebest fortuneconcerningmatters intheirfieldofexpertise.Theirexpertiseisclearlymeanttocountasakindofwisdom,andsosomeconnectionbetweenwisdomandgoodfortuneisestablished.

ButthenSocratesaddstohislistofexamplesthatitispreferabletoactwithawisegeneralorphysicianratherthananignorantone.Hegeneralizesfromthechoicetoactwiththewisegeneralandphysician:

13. Thoughitisadifficultpassage,eveninthePhaedoitdoesnotseemthatthebeautiful inparticularscanbeidenticaltothebeautiful itself.Rather,theremustbetwodifferentthingsinvolvedinthecausalanalysis:thebeautifulinthingsandthebeautifulitself.Ofcourse,eventhosewhomightdisagreewithmeonthispointaboutthePhaedo arenotinanywaytherebycommittedtodisagreeingwithmeabouttheEuthydemus.



havebetterfortunethannon-expertsfor the most partistoimplythatsometimestheydonot.Successforapilotconsistsin,roughly,gettingonesshipsafelytothedesiredport.Skilledpilotswillgenerallyhavethemost successatgetting ships safely to theirdestinations.But inthecaseofpilots,thepossibilitythatanon-pilotmighthavegreatersuccessthanapilotbecomesmoresalient.Inthecaseofflautistsandgrammarians,therearenotmanyobviousexternalinfluencesontheirsuccess.17Agoodflautistplaysherfluteandbeautifulmusic comesout.Agoodgrammarianreadsaccuratelyandwriteseffectively.Butforpilots,oneexternalinfluenceloomsparticularlylarge:theweather.ThisisespeciallytrueinPlatostime,whenseafaringwouldbeapara-digmaticcaseofahighlyuncertainendeavor.ImaginethatI,thoughwoefullyunskilled,amtopilotashipfromPiraeustoMegara.Atthesametime,askilledpilotistopilotashipfromPiraeustoAegina.ItiseasytoimagineacasewhereIhavemoresuccessthantheskilledpilot.

pilots,aparticularlydifficultcaseforthesufficiencythesis.Thepoint,then,maybethatthoughthesufficiencythesisisnotstrictlyspeakingtrue,itap-plies for all practical purposes and in virtually every case, even themostdifficult.Thisispossible,thoughIamskepticalofrestrictingtheforceofthequalificationsomuch.Intheancientworld,piloting(likemedicineandgen-eralship)wasfraughtwithdanger,evenfortheskilled.Soifwereadthisassayingthatevenpilotsareprettymuchalwayssuccessful,weshouldwonderwhySocrates ispermitted suchan implausiblepremise.We face, again, aslightlyweakerversionofRussellsgap(seen.15,above),andmyaimistoofferaplausiblereadingthatclosesthegap.

17. Though,ofcourse,onecanturnupsuchexternalinfluenceswithabitofef-fort.Grammariansmayhavetodealwithbetterorworselighting,flautistswithhigher-orlower-qualityflutes,etc.Indeed,BenRidermakesaninterest-ingcasethattheexampleoftheflute-playerismeanttobehighlysubjecttoexternalinfluences.Heargues(i)thatfluteisapoortranslationof,sincethewasadouble-reedinstrument;(ii)double-reedinstruments,eventhoseproducedwithmoderntechnologiesandplayedincontrolleden-vironments, are notoriouslyfinicky; and so, (iii) the skilled-player,muchliketheskilledpilotorphysician,wouldhavebeenhighlysusceptibletonegative influencesoutsideofher control (Rider2012, 1213).Whetherthis iscorrectornothardlyaffectsmymainpointhere,whichisthatevenexperts can fail to achieve success.Nordoes it challenge the idea that ex-pertsaremoresusceptibletofailureinsomedomainsthaninothers.Whatitchallengesisthecategorizationof-playersaslesssusceptibletofailurethanmostotherexperts.

experts,forthemostpart( ).16Tosaythatexperts

providedanargument that isasdeficientas theoneRussellfinds. Indeed,suchanarrativeshortcoming isofapiecewithwhatwefindelsewhere inthedialogue.Forexample,at290291,whenSocratesattributessomerathersophisticatedstatementstoClinias,Critobreaksintothenarrativetocallhimonit.Socratesadmitsthathemayhavegottenthespeakerwrongbutinsiststhathegotthecontentright.Andthen,oddly,throughtherestofthatargu-ment,itisnotreportedasbefore,butSocratesandCritoactuallyengageinanargumentthatissupposedtotracktheargumentofthepreviousday.Socratesstrangephraseat280b,thoughIdontknowhow,is,onmyinterpretation,perfectlyconsistentwiththeoverallnarrativepracticeofthedialogue.Alter-natively,thoughlesslikely,perhapsSocratesisnothedgingabouttheaccu-racyofthereportbutisexpressinguncertaintyaboutwhyCliniashasagreedtotheconclusion,givenCliniasownstartingpoints.

16. Thephrase isuncommon.Alternativetranslationsmightincludeasageneralrule,onthewhole,ortospeakgenerally.Ihavecho-senatranslationthatespeciallyhighlightsthebasicfunctionofanyoftheseversionsofthequalification:toservenoticethattheprincipleadmitsofex-ceptions.ForasimilaruseinPlato,seeLawsXI917a45:Nowthesuperiorsof badmenare the good, andof the young their elders (usually)whichmeansthatparentsarethesuperiorsoftheiroffspring(Saunderstrans.).The usually translates . For similaruses inAristotleseeMeteorology386b24,On Length and Shortness of Life466b15,History of Ani-mals 573a28,andGeneration of Animals 732a201. Ineachof theseAristotlepassages,itisclearthatheusesthephrasetoindicatethatthegeneralruleunderconsiderationadmitsofexceptions.Lessobviously,butprobablywiththe samesense, seeLaws II667d57: Generally speaking ( ),Isuppose,thecorrectnessinsuchcaseswoulddependnotsomuchonthepleasuregiven,asontheaccuraterepresentationofthesizeandquali-tiesoftheoriginal?(Saunderstrans.)(Theonlyotheroccurrenceofeither or IamawareofinclassicalGreekis inProclusandissimplyaquotationofLaws 667d57.)Theseusagesareconsistentwiththemorecommon () ,oftenusedtoindicateageneralrulethatadmitsofexceptions.(See,e. g.,TheophrastusHistoria plan-tarum3.2.1.78and8.1.6.2.)

Itakethelinguisticevidencetobeverystrongforthisunderstandingof .Butevenifsomeoneweretodoubtthatthephraseneed betakentoindicateexceptions,thisisclearlyanavailableandevenprevalentsense,andIsubmitthattheplainsenseofourpassageintheEuthydemus in-dicatesthisreading.Afterall,itissimplyobviousinthecaseofpilotsthat,forthemostpartbutnotalways,wisepilotswillachievetheiraimsbetterthanignorantpilots.Onthisreading, recognizablycontributestotheargument.Butitisdifficulttodiscernitsfunctionifitisnotindicatingthepossibilityofexceptions.

Areaderforthisjournalsuggests,however,thattheforceofthequalifica-tionisalmostwholly,andnotesthatitisonlybroughtupwithrespectto



arguingthatwisdomisidenticaltogoodfortunebutratherthatwis-domproducesgoodfortune.

4. Good fortune and outcome-success

Inowturntothesecondinterpretiveissueconcerningtheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortune:themeaningofthetermgoodfortune.Goodfortuneisambiguousbetweenatleasttwosenses:goodthingsthathappen to us that are largely out of our control, and successesweachieve.19Theformercouldbedescribedashavingfavorablecircum-stances inwhich to liveones life.Beingborn intoawealthy family,livinginastablepoliticalclimate,andwinningthelotteryallfallintothiscategory.Callthissortofgoodfortune good luck,whereluckis,nottoounnaturally,hererestrictedtowhatisoutsideoftheagentscontrol.

Goodluckcannotbethesortofgoodfortuneatissueinthispas-sage,fortworeasons.20First,goodluckisnotthesortofthingonepur-sues,foritis,bydefinition,outsideofonescontrol.Ithappenstoone;itconstitutesthecircumstancesinwhichonehastoact;butitisnot

19. IdonotmeantosuggestthatitisonlytheEnglishgoodfortunethatisam-biguousinthisway.Onthecontrary,theGreekisambiguousinthesameway.Fortheformersense(thingsthatare largelyoutofourcontrol),see (in the Platonic corpus)Symposium 217a3,Meno 72a6,Laws 710c7 and798b1, Seventh Letter 340a5; (in other philosophical texts) AristotlesRheto-ric1361b391362a2andNicomachean Ethics 1100b2324.Forthelattersense(thingsweachieve),see(inthePlatoniccorpus)Laws 754d4,Epinomis986c7,Demodocus 382e4; (in other philosophical texts)AristotlesEudemian Ethics 1235b1112,EpicurusLetter to Menoeceus10.135.13(fromDiogenesLaertius).Foranicelyambiguouscaseinvolving,asinpiloting,ajourneyseePha-edo 117c13,where,inoneofhisfinalutterances,Socratesoffersaprayertothegodsthathisjourneyintotheafterlifewillbefortunate().Foracloseparalleltoourpassage,which,giventhecontext,fairlyclearlyhastheformersenseof inmind,seeEudemian Ethics 1214a2425( ).

20.ThatisnottosaythatCliniasmightnothearSocratesinitialclaimthatwis-domisgoodfortuneastheclaimthatwisdomisgoodluck.Perhapsthatpar-tiallyexplainshissurpriseattheclaim.IfAristotleisrightthatmanysaythathappinessandgoodfortunearethesame(Eudemian Ethics 1214a2425,quot-edinpreviousnote),whereAristotleprettyclearlymeanssomethingmoreakintogoodluck,thatmighthelpexplainwhyCliniasmightunderstandtheclaimasoneaboutgoodluck.ButtheargumentthatfollowsmakesclearthatSocratesdoesnothavegoodluckinmindwhenhemakestheclaim.

SupposethatIsetsailfromPiraeuswithmycrew,withfairskiesandfriendlywinds.ThisfairweathercontinuesasIfollowthecoastlineforsomedaysandfinallydocksuccessfullyatMegara.TheskilledpilotleavesPiraeusat thesametime,sailing towardAeginawithequallyfairskiesandfriendlywinds.However,midwaytoAegina,heencoun-tersanunpredictableandfiercestorm.Despitethebesteffortsofthisexpertpilotandhiscrew,theshipistossedaroundbytheseverewindandwavesandfinallycapsizes.I,unskilledthoughIam,havesuccess-fullyguidedmyship to thedesiredport,while the skilledpilothasfailedtodoso.

Socratesrecognizesthatthesescenariosbecomesalientinthecaseofpilots,18andhequalifieshisquestionintheircase:Wellthen,withrespecttothedangersofthesea,doyouthinkthatanyonehasbetterfortunethanthewisepilots, for themostpart( )?Socratesisnotaskingwhetherineverycasepilotshavebetterfortunethannon-pilotswhenitcomestosailing.Rather,heisaskingwhether,taking all the cases together, pilots have the best fortune at sailing.Thisallowsthattherecouldbeinfrequentcasesofnon-pilotshavingbetterfortunethanpilots,solongaspilotshavethemostfortunemostofthetime.Andthisisaperfectlysensibleposition,towhichCliniasfindsiteasytoaddhisconsent.

Theconsequenceofthepilotexamplefortheclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortuneistoaddanotherreasonitcannotbeanidentityclaim,forwisepilots retain theirwisdom,even incaseswhere they fail tohavegoodfortune.Sometimestheypossesswisdombutnotgoodfor-tune,andsowisdomcannotbeidenticaltogoodfortune.AddtothisfactaboutpilotsthefactthatIcanbefortunatethoughitisnotI,butmyphysician,whoiswise,andweseewhySocratesrepeatedlyat280a6,280b13,281b24,282a45,and282c89expresseshiscon-clusioninwaysthatdonotatall looklikeidentityclaims.Heisnot

18. Aristotlerecognizesthispointforbothpilotsandgenerals(Eudemian Ethics 1247a57).Itseemstomethatinthepresentpassagethequalificationappliesatleasttogeneralsandphysicians,inadditiontopilots.



focus,anadequateunderstandingofthegame,andapracticedswing,orbeingdisciplinedatsavingmoneyandinvestingwithanadequateunderstandingofvariousinvestmentvehicles,arecasesofachievingsuccessatactingwell:actingas theskilledgolferor investorwouldact.Onemayactwellinthesewayswithoutachievingthedesiredre-sult: theballmaytakeanunexpectedbounceoffanill-placedsprin-klerhead,orthestockmarketmaycrashandthelocalbankfail.Callthissortofsuccessthesuccessthatisamatterofhowoneplaysthegameratherthanwhatthefinalscoreisinternal-success.Callthesortofsuccessthatamountstoachievingcertainresultsoutcome-success.

TheappealoftakingSocratestobetalkingaboutinternal-successratherthanoutcome-successresultsmainlyfromtakingSocratesclaimthatwisdomisgoodfortunetobeanidentityclaim.Giventhatwis-domisneitheromnisciencenoromnipotence,thewisewillnotalwaysachievetheresultsatwhichtheyaim.But,plausibly,theycanalwaysactwellinthepursuitoftheseresults.23AndsoSocratesistakentobearguing that wisdom guarantees internal-success, and that internal-successistheimportantkindtoachieve.

Insofar as this line of interpretation depends on taking Socratesclaim thatwisdom is good fortune to be an identity claim, it is un-derminedbytheargumentoftheprevioussection.Additionally,andrelatedly,itfailstomakesenseofSocratesqualificationthatthewisehavebetterfortunethantheignorantfor the most part.Tosaythatex-pertshavebetterfortunethannon-expertsfor the most partistoimply

23. AsDavidBronsteinhassuggestedtome,perhaps it isnotreallyplausiblethat thewise canalways achieve internal-success.To revive thegolf anal-ogy:evenTigerWoodsmaysometimesfailtoplaygolfwellintheinternalsense,perhapsbecauseheisdistractedbyotherconcernsorbecauseheissimplyhavingabadday.Likewise,perhapsthewisepilotsometimesfailsto achieve internal-success.GivenSocrates claim thatwisdomnever errs,though, either Socrates fails to admit this possibility (perhaps in keepingwiththeAristotelianphronimoswhodoesnotactakraticallyortheStoicsagewhoneverfailstoactinaccordancewithwisdom),orthereissomeimplicitqua-operator atwork: Insofar as thewise person fails to achieve internal-successwithrespecttohisdomainofwisdom,heisfailingtoactquawisepersonthatis,failingtoactoutofhiswisdomandsocountsasnoexcep-tiontotherulethatwisdomnevererrs.

itselfanobjectofpursuit.Onedoesnottrytobebornintoawealthyfamilyorastablepoliticalclimateor trytomakeones lotterynum-berscomeup.Insofarasonecouldmakeonesfamilywealthy,onescity politically stable, and ones lottery ticket a winner, this wouldamount to theother kindof good fortune; itwouldbe an achieve-mentorsuccessratherthansomethingoutsideofonescontrol.ButSocratesmakesthisclaiminthecontextofaprotrepticargument,oranargumentaimedatpersuasiontoaction.SocratesisattemptingtopersuadeCliniasthatheoughttopursuewisdom.Aprimaryreasontopursuewisdomisthatitenablesitspossessorreliablytohavegoodfortune.Butthengoodfortuneissomethinglargelywithinthecontrolofthewiseperson.

Asecondreasontothinkthatgoodluckisnotthesortofgoodfor-tuneatissueisSocratesheavyrelianceontheideathatexpertshavebetterfortune(forthemostpart)thannon-experts.Itwouldbestrangetothinkthatexpertsgenerallyhavebetterluckthannon-experts.Wiseandignorantpilotssailthesameseasinthesametypesofships.Wiseandignorantphysicianstreatthesamesortsofdiseaseswiththesamesortsofmedicineattheirdisposal.Whatdistinguishesthemisnotthecircumstancesinwhichtheyactbuttheirlevelofsuccesswhentheyactinthosecircumstances.21IfwearetomakesenseofSocratespointsaboutthefortuneoftheexperts,wemusttakehimtobetalkingaboutakindofachievementorsuccess.

ButconcludingthatSocratesistalkingaboutakindofsuccessdoesnotyetsettlethematter.Somescholarshavearguedthatgoodfortuneisasortofsuccessthatamountstoactingwell,ratherthanachievingacertainresult.22Thissortofsuccessisdifferentfrom,say,breaking80 in a roundof golf or saving enough to retire; these are casesofachievingacertainsuccessfulresult.Playinggolfwithahighdegreeof

21. Suppose, though, thatwise pilots encounter fewer serious storms per tripthan ignorantpilots encounter.Even thiswouldnot show thatwisepilotshavebetterluckthanignorantpilots,forthedifferentratesofstormsencoun-teredcanbeattributedtotheskillofthewisepilots.

22. SeeRussell(2005)ch.1foranespeciallycleararticulationoftheview,aswellasDimas(2002).



Thewisepilotwillhavethebestoutcomespossiblegiventhecondi-tionsinwhichhehastoact.Andthisisdueentirelytohiswisdom,the only thing that differentiates him from the ignorant pilot whowillhaveworseoutcomes,onthewhole,giventhesameconditions.Socratesclaimsthatwisdomwouldnevererr(280a7). Ineverycircumstance, wisdom produces the greatest outcome-success pos-siblegiventhatcircumstance.So,toputgoodfortune,understoodasoutcome-success,onthelistbelowwisdomistoaddsomethingthatisalreadythereimplicitly.Socratessumsuptheargumentbymakingjustthispoint:WeagreedfinallyIdontknowhowthatinsumthingswerelikethis:Whenwisdomispresent,inwhomitispresent,thereisnoneedofgoodfortuneinaddition.Wisdomisgoodfortuneinthesensethatitprovideswhatevergoodfortuneispossiblegiventhecircumstances.But it isnot identical togoodfortune,norcanitprovidegood fortune thatgoesbeyondwhat ispracticallypossiblegiven thecircumstances.Here isa reconstructionof thebasicargu-mentthatwisdomproducesgoodfortune(WPF):

(WPF-1) Experts usually have the best fortunewhen itcomestomattersintheirfieldsofexpertise.

(WPF-2) The only difference between experts and non-expertsisthegreaterwisdomoftheexperts.

So,(WPF-3)Itmustbewisdomthatproducesthegreaterfortune.

(WPF-4)Nevertheless,expertscanfail tohavegoodfor-tune,andnon-expertscanaccidentallyhavegoodfortune.

So, (WPF-5)Wisdom isneithernecessarynor sufficientforgoodfortune.

(WPF-6)Wisdomnevererrs.

So,(WPF-7)Wisdomproduceswhatevergoodfortuneispossibleinthecircumstances.

thatsometimestheydonot.Butinternal-successisalwaysavailabletothewise.Theycanalwayscontrolthewaytheyactwhentheyact.Itistheoutcomesoftheiractionsthattheymaynotbeabletocontrol.Andnon-expertswillneveractwellinthisinternalsensetothedegreethatthewisedo,fortheywillneveractoutofunderstanding.Theymaytryhard;theymaychoosecorrectly;theymayachievetheiraims.Buttheywillnotactwellinthesameinternalsenseasthewise.Forthemostpartmakesnosenseifgoodfortuneisinternal-success.

Takinggoodfortunetobeoutcome-success,however,allowsustomakeexcellentsenseofthisqualification.Socratesrecognizesthatex-ternalfactorsmayhindersuccess,preventingeventhewisepilotfromreachingportsafely.Thewisepilotisneitheromniscientnoromnipo-tentandmustdealwiththecircumstancesinwhichhefindshimself.Sometimes these circumstances include unpredictable weather pat-terns or unexpected problemswith crewor ship. Evenwhile neverfailing to actwisely, thewisepilotmay fail to achieve the result ofgettingtoportsafely.Butingeneral,wisepilotsdogettoportsafelymoreoftenthanignorantpilots,forthewisearebestabletodealwiththecircumstancesinwhichtheyfindthemselves.24

Tosumuptheresultsso far,whenSocratesuses the term goodfortune,hehas inmindoutcome-success, rather thangood luckorinternal-success,buthedoesnotmeantoidentifywisdomandgoodfortune.Wearenowinapositiontoseeexactlywhatheisarguing:Wisdomproducesgoodfortune.Thisclaimisestablishedbyappealtotheexamplesoftheexperts,whoproducebetterfortunethannon-experts.Butthewisedonotinfalliblyproducegoodfortune,forex-ternalfactors(luck,bothgoodandbad)influencethedegreeofsuc-cessagentshave.Bothwisdomandluckaffectoutcome-success.Eventhewisepilotmayencounterstormsthatcannotbeweathered.Butthewisepilotwillhandleeachsituationaswellasitcanbehandled.

24.Note, then, thatwhilemyargument is thatSocratesmustbe talkingaboutasoutcome-success,thisdoesnotentailthatthenotionofinternal-successisunimportant.Indeed,itisbecausewisdomproducesinternal-suc-cessandinternal-successleadstooutcome-successthatthewisehavegreateroutcome-success.



orentailsgoodfortune,wisdomsufficesforhappiness.Goodfortunemightevenitselfentail theothergoods, likehealthandwealth,pro-videditisnotsimplyinternal-success.Second,thehighestsortofgoodfortune mightbethoughttobetheachievementofsuccessinoneslifeasawhole.Butachievingsuccessinoneslifeasawholejustishappi-ness.So,ifwisdomisidenticaltoorentailsgoodfortune,thenwisdomsufficesforhappiness.

Theproblemwithbothoftheselinesofargument,ifmyinterpreta-tionofthepassageiscorrect,isthatSocratesisnotcommittedtothecrucialpremise,ineachversion,thatwisdomisidenticaltoorentailsgood fortune.He is committedonly to themuchweaker claim thatwisdomentailswhatevergood fortune ispossiblegiven the circum-stances.So,weareleftwithoutanargumentthatwisdomsufficesforhappiness.Indeed,thoughSocratesdoesnotgiveit,andsoIofferittentatively,thereareresourcestoconstructanargumentthatwisdomdoesnotsufficeforhappiness.Forsurelysomesuccessatachievingonesaimsisnecessaryforhappiness.Successatachievingonesaimsisidentifiedasthegreatestofthegoods,andoneofthemainreasonsSocratesgivesCliniasforpursuingwisdomisthatwisdomiscondu-civetoachievingonesaims.Butwisdomisnotsufficientforsuccessatachievingonesaims.Eventhewisemaybefrustratedintheiren-deavors.But ifwisdomisnotsufficient foranecessaryconditionofhappiness,thenitisnotsufficientforhappiness.

6. Stage 2: Wisdom and correct use (Euthydemus 280b281d)

Thefirststageoftheargumentfailstodemonstrate,oreventoattempttodemonstrate, thatwisdom is sufficient forhappiness. Indeed, thefirststagegivesusreasontodoubtthesufficiencythesis.Butwhatofthesecondstage?Doesitjustifythestandardviewthatthepassageasawholeconstitutesaringingendorsementofthesufficiencythesis?Iwillarguethatitdoesnot,butratherprovidesanargumentonlyforthenecessityofwisdomforhappiness.

Initially,SocratesandCliniasagreedonsomebasicassumptions:Everyone wants to be happy; happiness comes from having many

Noticethatthisaccountrequiresthatwereadtwolinesinawaythatmayinitiallyhaveseemedimplausible.TheeasiercaseisSocratessummation:Whenwisdomispresent,inwhomitispresent,thereisnoneedofgoodfortuneinaddition.Wemighthavebeentemptedto read thisas theclaim thatwisdomentailsgood fortune,but theargument that leads to this summationdoesnotwarrant that read-ing. Instead,wemust read this summation in itsprotrepticcontext.SocratesistryingtoshowCliniaswhatheshouldpursue,andwhathehasarguedisthattheonlythingunderCliniascontrolthatwillcontribute reliably togood fortune iswisdom.Good fortune isnotsomething separate to be pursued, some additional item to be putonthelistbehindwisdom,forgoodfortuneisproperlypursuedonly throughthepursuitofwisdom.Thisisnottosaythatluckplaysnorole,butonlythatluckisnotsomethingtobepursued.

Themoredifficultlineisthesurprisingstatementthatstartedtheargument:Wisdomsurelyisgoodfortune;evenachildwouldknowthat.Thismaylooklikeanidentityclaimwhenreadinisolation.Buttheargumentthatfollowsdoesnotallowthatreading,andsowemustconcludethatitisanattention-grabbingandasyetunqualifiedclaimto theeffect thatgood fortuneduplicates somethingalreadyon thelistwisdominthesensethatpursuingwisdomamountstodoingeverythingonecanproperlydotopursuegoodfortune.So,wisdomisnotidenticaltogoodfortune,nordoeswisdomentailgoodfortunesimpliciter,25 but the pursuit of wisdom exhausts the ways one canproperlypursuegoodfortune.

5. Stage1andthesufficiencythesis

IemphasizedabovethatitiscommontoreadEuthydemus279c280basanargumentforthesufficiencythesis.Iseetwodifferentlinessuchanargumentmight take.First, ifgood fortune is,asSocratescalls it,thegreatestofthegoods,thengoodfortunemightbegoodenoughtosufficeforhappinessallbyitself.Butthen,ifwisdomisidenticalto

25.Wisdomdoesentailwhatevergoodfortuneispossibleinthecircumstances.Sometimes,though,thecircumstancesmayallownogoodfortuneatall.



Clearlynot,Socrates.

Thenitseems, Isaid,thattheonewhoisgoingtobehappymust not only possess such goods, but also usethem.Otherwise,thereisnobenefitfromthepossession.

Thatstrue.(280b5d7)

Thepassagelicensestwoprinciples.First,thingscontributetoourhappinessjustincasetheyprovidesomebenefittous.Thatthisisabiconditionalisafairlyclearimplicationof280b78:Ifthingsbenefitus, theymakeus happy, and if they donot benefit us, they donotmakeushappy.Second,thingsprovidesomebenefittousonlyifwenotonlypossessthembutalsousethem.Fromthesetwoprincipleswecan inferanecessarycondition for things thatcontribute toourhappiness:Thingscontributetoourhappinessonlyifwenotonlypos-sessthembutalsousethem.Butthisconditionisstilltooweak,andSocratesstrengthensit.

Sothen,Clinias,isthisnowsufficienttomakesomeonehappy,topossessgoodthingsandtousethem?

Itseemssotome.

If,Isaid,heusesthemcorrectly,orifnot?

Ifheusesthemcorrectly.

Wellsaid.ForIthinkitisagreaterharmifsomeoneusessomethingincorrectlythanifheleavesitalone.Forintheformercasethereisevil,butinthelattercasethereisnei-therevilnorgood.Ordontwesaythis?

Heagreed.(280d7281a1)

Nowoursecondprinciplehasbeenmodified:Thingsprovidesomebenefittousonlyifwenotonlypossessthembutalsousethemcor-rectly.Thatcorrectness isnecessary isdemonstratedbyconsidering

goodthings;thingslikehealth,honor,courage,wisdom,andgoodfor-tunearegood things.Havingalready reconsidered the lastof theseassumptions by arguing that good fortune need not be added to alist that already includeswisdom, Socrates now revisits the secondoftheseassumptions,thathappinesscomesfromhavingmanygoodthings.Hearguesthathappinessrequiresnotonlythepossessionofgoodthingsbutthatthesegoodsbeusedaswell.

Weagreed,Isaid,thatifwepossessedmanygoodthings,wewouldbehappyanddowell.

Heagreed.

Then would we be happy through possessing goodthingsiftheydidntbenefitus,oriftheydidbenefitus?

Iftheybenefittedus,hesaid.

Thenwould theyprovide somebenefit, ifweonlyhadthem,butdidnotusethem?Forexample,ifwehadmuchfood, but didnt eat any, or drink, but didnt drink any,wouldwebenefitfromthesethings?

Clearlynot,hesaid.

Wellthen,ifeverycraftsmanhadalltherequisiteprovi-sionsforhisownwork,butneverusedthem,wouldtheydowellthroughthepossession,becausetheypossessedeverythingwhicha craftsmanneeds topossess?Forex-ample,ifacarpenterwereprovidedwithallthetoolsandenoughwood,butneverbuiltanything,wouldhebenefitfromthepossession?

Innoway,hesaid.

Wellthen,ifsomeonepossessedwealthandallthegoodthingswe just said,butdidnotuse them,wouldhebehappythroughthepossessionofthesegoodthings?



Then,Isaid,alsoconcerningtheuseofthefirstofthegoodswespokeofwealthandhealthandbeautywasitknowledgewhichdirectedandmadeouractioncorrectwith respect tousingall such things correctly,or some-thingelse?

Knowledge,hesaid.

It seems then that knowledge provides men not onlywithgoodfortunebutalsowithwell-doing,inallposses-sionandaction.

Heagreed.(281a1b4)

Socratesagainbeginsbyconsideringcraftsmenandproceedsbyin-ductiontoageneralconclusion.Whenitcomestocorrectlyusingthematerialsofcarpentry,itistheexpertiseofthecarpenterthatproducescorrectuse.Thecarpentersexpertiseallowshimtomakeproperuseofeachtoolandmaterial.Anon-expert,onewhodoesnotunderstandthecarpenterscraft,willnotbeabletomakecorrectuseofeachtoolandmaterial.Likewise,thesameistruefortheexpertmakerofuten-sils.Thepointisparalleltotheargumentthatwisdomprovidesgoodfortune,andsoweshouldstillhaveinmindthatitistheexpertpilot(orgeneral,orphysician)whomakescorrectuseofships(ortroops,ormedicine).Ineachofthesedomains,itisknowledgethatprovidesbothsuccessandcorrectuse.

Socratesthengeneralizestheclaimforallthegoodsontheinitiallist. It is knowledge thatprovides for the correctuseofgoods suchaswealthandhealthandbeautyandso,too,weshouldinfer,withgoodslikepowerandhonorandbravery.Knowledgeprovidespeoplewithcorrectuseinallpossessionandaction. It isdifficult todeter-minestrictly fromthepassageat281a1b4whetherthis ismeanttobeanecessarycondition,asufficientcondition,orboth.Butifwere-callfrom280a78theprinciplethatwisdomwouldnevererr,butnecessarilydoesrightlywecanseethatitmustatleastbeasufficient

the consequenceswhencorrectness is lacking.Whencorrectness islacking,harmresultsratherthanbenefit.So,correctness isrequiredforbenefit.Andthenecessaryconditionforthingsthatcontributetohappinesshas therebybeenstrengthened:Thingscontribute toourhappinessonlyifwenotonlypossessthembutalsousethemcorrectly.

Twootheradvancesaremadeat280d7281a1.Socratesintroducesthe idea that incaseswheresomething isused incorrectly, itwouldhavebeenbetterhaditnotbeenusedatall.Thisclaimwillbecomeakeypointintheargumentmomentarily,andwecansetitasideuntilthen.Moreimportantly,upuntil280d7wehadnoexplicitindicationthatSocrateswaslookingfornecessaryandsufficientconditionsforsomethings contributing toourhappiness. Indeed, to thispointwehadarrivedonlyatseverallynecessaryconditions.Butherehemakesitclearthatheisafterjointlysufficient()conditionsaswell.So,ourstrengthenednecessaryconditionforthingsthatcontributetoourhappinesscannowbestrengthenedevenfurther,thistimebymakingitabiconditional:Thingscontributetoourhappinessjustincasewenotonlypossessthembutalsousethemcorrectly.

Socratesgoesontoconsiderwhatprovidesforcorrectuse.Justashearguedthatwisdomprovidesgoodfortune,henowarguesthatwis-domprovidescorrectuse.26

Wellthen,inworkingandusingthingsconcerningwood,surelythereisnothingelsethatproducescorrectusethanknowledgeofcarpentry?

Clearlynot,hesaid.

Andalsoinworkconcerningutensilstheproducerofthecorrectnessisknowledge.

Heagreed.

26.The shift from speaking of wisdom () to speaking of knowledge()isunproblematic;seenote12.



Andifweakorstrong?

Weak.

Andifhonoredorwithouthonor?

Withouthonor.

Andwould he do less if courageous and temperate orcowardly?

Cowardly.

Sothenalsoifhewerelazyratherthanhard-working?

Heagreed.

Andifslowratherthanfast,anddullofsightandhearingratherthansharp?

With all such things we agreed with one another.(281b4d2)

Forthepersonwithoutknowledge,doinglessmeanserringless.Inotherwords,withoutknowledge,apersonwillnotcorrectlyuseherpossessions.Themainpointofthispassageisthatthereisnobenefitinpossessionsapart fromknowledge.Knowledge, then, isbothnec-essaryandsufficient forcorrectuse. Indeed,onewholackswisdomwouldbebetteroff the fewerpossessionshehas,and thewisewillalwaysbebetteroffthantheignorant.Havingreachedthisconclusion,wearenowinapositiontosumuptheargumentofthissecondstageof278282theargumentthatwisdomprovidescorrectuse(AWC).

(AWC-1)Ourpossessions(broadlyconstruedtoincludeallsuchthingsasthoseonthe initial listofgoods)con-tribute toourhappiness just incasetheyprovidesomebenefittous.(280b78)

condition.Knowledge,whenever present, guarantees correct use ofwhateverfallsunder itsdomain.Thenextpartof theargumentcon-firmsthatthisisalsomeanttobeanecessarycondition:27Correctuseisprovidedforjustincaseknowledgeispresent.28

Then,byZeus, I said, is thereanybenefit fromotherpossessions without intelligence and wisdom? Woulda man benefit more from possessingmany things anddoing many things without sense, or from possessinganddoing littlewithsense?Examine it thisway:Doingless,wouldntheerr less?Anderring less,wouldnthedolessbadly?Anddoinglessbadly,wouldnthebelessmiserable?

Certainly,hesaid.

Thenwouldsomeonedolessifhewerepoor,orwealthy?

Poor,hesaid.

27. Itisalsopossibletoreadthepassageassupportingonlyageneralrule:Forthemostpart,correctusedoesnotcomeaboutexceptbyknowledge.Inthatcase,theargumentbelow(AWC)wouldrequireadjustmentintwoplacesasfollows:

(AWC-4*)Correctuseofpossessionsisprovidedforifknowledgeispresentand,asageneralrule,isnotprovidedforifknowledgeisnotpresent.

(AWC-6*)Wisdomguarantees that ones possessions contribute tooneshappiness,and ignorance,asageneral rule,makes it thecasethat ones possessions fail to contribute (and, if used, even detractfrom)oneshappiness.

Evensoadjusted,theargumentwillsupportmygeneralinterpretation.Inso-farasonewhoisignorantdoes,againsttheodds,useoneofherpossessionscorrectly,thiswillbeamatterofluckandso,again,notsomethingthatisanappropriateobjectofpursuit.

28.Again, I emphasize that the words I am translating as wisdom (),knowledge(),intelligence(),andsense()arebe-ingusedinterchangeablythroughout.Otherwise,Socrateswouldbegivingabizarreargument.Outsideofthetranslation,Ishallusetheminterchangeably.



possessionofthethingsonourlistofgoods.29Giventhatwepossessthem,wisdomguaranteestheircorrectuse.Butthereisnoevidencethat wisdom guarantees their possession. And if wisdom does notguaranteetheirpossession,thenforallthispassagetellsus,wisdomdoesnotevenguaranteecontributionstohappiness.

WhereasthefirststageofSocratesprotrepticargumentsupportedneitherthenecessitynorthesufficiencyofwisdomforhappiness,thesecondstagesupportsthenecessityofwisdomforhappiness. Ifwis-domisnecessaryforcorrectuse,andcorrectuseisnecessaryforben-efit,andbenefitisnecessaryforhappiness,thenwisdomisnecessaryforhappiness.30However,asinthefirststage,nowhereinthesecondstagedowefindsupportforthesufficiencyofwisdomforhappiness.Tobesure,wedonotfindanexplicitargumentagainstthesufficiencythesis,butwedonotfindsupportforthesufficiencythesiseither.

29.Oneexceptionisdiscussedaboveinsections3and4:Socratesclaimsthatwisdomproducesgoodfortune,andgoodfortuneisonthelistofgoods.Buteveninthecaseofgoodfortune,wisdomdoesnotguaranteegoodfortunesimpliciterbutonlywhatevergoodfortuneispossiblegiventhecircumstances.

AreaderforthisjournalrightlynotesthatinthesecondprotrepticsectionoftheEuthydemus,at288292,SocratesconsiderswhetherthewisdomCli-niasshouldseekhastodowithmakingthings(whichincludesacquisition),orusingthem.Thepuzzlinganswerhegivesisthatthiswisdommustknowhowtousewhatitmakes(289a47).Thismakingandusingrequirementispuz-zlingforatleasttworeasons.Oneisthatitseemstobeunanticipatedbyany-thingthatcomesbeforeit.Inparticular,thecraftanalogy,whichisinplayin278282,suggeststhatwisdomwillbothmakeanduse,buttypicallynotthesamethings.Thehousebuilder,forexample,willuselumber,hammer,andnails(tooversimplify)theproductsoflumberjacksandsmithstomakeahouse.Hethusbothmakesanduses,butnotthesamething(forevenifheweretousethehouse,itwouldnotbequahousebuilder).Anotherreasontheanswerispuzzlingisthatitleadsdirectlytotheapparentlyintractableaporia of thesecondprotreptic. Icannotmakea fullcase for thishere,but itwillsufficetonotethatinthecaseofeverycraftofthemanymentionedinthispassage,includingtherulingcraft,itsfailuretomeetthemakingandusingrequirementistheexplicitgroundforrejectingitasacandidateforthewis-domwemustseek.Thatistosay,ineverycase,themakingofaproductandtheusingofthatproductbelongtotwodifferentcrafts.Giventheapparentdisconnectofthemakingandusingprinciplefromthefirstprotreptic,aswellasitscentralroleinproducingtheaporia,itisnotreadilyapparenthowthispassageshouldaffectourinterpretationofthefirstprotreptic.

30.Butseenote27,above.

(AWC-2)Ourpossessionsprovidesomebenefittousjustincasetheyareusedcorrectly.(280b5281a1)

So, (AWC-3) Our possessions contribute to our happi-nessjustincasetheyareusedcorrectly.

(AWC-4)Correctuseofpossessionsisprovidedforjustincaseknowledgeispresent.(281a1d2)

(AWC-5) If possessions are used incorrectly, positiveharm(andnotsimplylackofbenefit)results.(281b4d2)

So,(AWC-6)Wisdomguaranteesthatonespossessionscontributetooneshappiness,andignoranceguaranteesthatonespossessions fail tocontribute to(and, ifused,evendetractfrom)oneshappiness.

AWC-6remainsimplicitatthisstage,butitisentailedbytheexplicitclaimsthataredefended.ButnoticethatAWC-6doesnotentailthatwisdomsufficesforhappiness.Rather,itentailsthatanypossessions(broadlyconstruedtoincludeallsuchthingsasthoseontheinitiallistofgoods)awisepersonhaswillcontributetohishappiness.Butthisisjustaconditionalstatement:Foranythingonourlistofgoods,ifawisepersonpossessesit,thenitwillcontributetohishappiness.Therearetwoproblemswiththinkingthatthisconditionalexpressesthesuffi-ciencyofwisdomforhappiness.First,thereislittlereasontothinkthat,ifsomethingcontributestomyhappiness,itfollowsthatIamhappy.Forexample,Ihaveaone-dollarbillonmydesk.Itseemstruetosaythatthisone-dollarbillcontributestomywealth.ButitdoesnotfollowthatIamwealthy.Itscontributionhardlysufficestomakemewealthy.Likewise,evenifsomethingcontributestomyhappiness,itmayleavemefarshortofbeinghappy.So,evenifwisdomdidguaranteecontri-butionstohappiness,itwouldnotfollowthatitguaranteeshappiness.

Second, there is no claim anywhere in the first protreptic thatwisdom guarantees the satisfaction of the antecedent of this condi-tional.That is,nowhere is it suggested thatwisdomguarantees the



iseithergoodorevil,ofthesetwo,wisdomisgood,andignoranceisevil?

Heagreed.(281d2e5)

Irwinreconstructstheargumentasfollows:

(1)Eachrecognizedgood[e. g.,health,wealth]isagreaterevilthan its contrary, if it is usedwithoutwisdom, and eachisagreatergoodthanitscontrary,ifitisusedbywisdom(281d68).

(2)Therefore,eachrecognizedgoodotherthanwisdomisjustby itself (auto kathhauto) neither good nor evil (281d35,d8e1).

(3)Therefore,eachofthemisneithergoodnorevil(281e34).

(4)Therefore,wisdomistheonlygoodandfollytheonlyevil(281e45).32

IrwindistinguishestwoviewswemightattributetoSocratesfromthispassage:

The Moderate View: When Socrates says that the recog-nizedgoodsarenotgoodsjustbythemselves,hemeansthattheyarenotgoodswhentheyaredivorcedfromwis-dom.Whenheconcludesthatwisdomistheonlygood,hemeans simply thatonlywisdom isgoodallby itself,apartfromanycombinationwithotherthings.

The Extreme View: When Socrates says that the recog-nizedgoodsarenotgoodsjustbythemselves,hemeansthat they are not goods; any goodness belongs to thewiseuseofthem,nottotherecognizedgoodsthemselves.

32. Irwin(1995)57.

7. Stage 3: Wisdom as the sole good (Euthydemus 281de)

WehaveseenthatthefirstandsecondstagesofEuthydemus278282donotconstituteanargument for thesufficiencythesis, thoughthesecondstageismeanttosecurethenecessitythesis.Butthethirdandfinalstagehassometimesbeentakentobeanearlyexplicitendorse-mentofthesufficiencythesis.Forhappinessrequiresgoodthings,andSocratessaysat281e35thatwisdomisthesolegoodandignorancethesolebad.Fromthisitappearstofollowthatwisdomisnecessaryandsufficientforhappiness.Hereisthisshortbutimportantpassageinitsentirety:

Insum,Clinias,Isaid,itislikelythatconcerningallthethingsthatwefirstcalledgoods,theaccountofthemisnotthattheyarebynaturegoodsjustbythemselves31( ),butratheritseemstobethis:Ifignoranceleadsthem,theyaregreaterevilsthantheir opposites, insofar as they are better able to servetheevilmaster;butifintelligenceandwisdomleadthem,theyaregreatergoods,thoughjustbythemselvesneithersortisofanyvalue.

Hesaid,Apparently,itseemstobejustasyousay.

Thenwhatfollowsfromthethingswevesaid?Isitany-thingotherthanthat,whereasnoneoftheotherthings

31. FollowingVlastos(1991)305306.Irwinhasinitselfinpremise(2),below,and in themselves in theopening clausesdescribingTheModerateViewandTheExtremeView.Ihavetakenthelibertyofchangingthesetojustbyitselfandjustbythemselvestosimplifythediscussiontofollow,asIdonotthinkthedifferenceaffectsIrwinspoint.(Notehow,indescribingTheMod-erateView, Irwinwrites, onlywisdomisgoodallby itself.This languageseemsabetterfitwith justbyitself thanwith initself.)Thedifferenceisimportant,however:Initselfmaymisleadinglysuggestthatthedistinctionisbetweenintrinsicandextrinsicvalue,whereasthepassageitselfisincon-clusiveaboutthis.Thepointisratheraboutwhethertherecognizedgoodsaregoodsby themselves, that is, regardlessof thepresenceof some furtherthingwisdom.



TheExtremeView,ifcorrect,makestheargumentanuglything.Theproblemisthatifwesupposethatin(3)and(4)Socratesistell-ingusthattherecognizedgoodsareinnowaygoodsatall,thenhedirectlycontradictswhathehasjustsaidin(1),thattherecognizedgoodscanbegreatergood[s]thantheiropposites.ButifSocratesis tellingus in the same argument that the same things arebothgreatergoodsandnotgoodsatall, thentheargumentappears tobeincoherent.

TheModerateViewismuchmoresensibleandcontextuallysen-sitive.Wecaneasilyreinterpretthetroublingphrasesin(3)and(4)inawaythatavoidsIrwinschargethattheinferenceisillicit,whileallowingustoseethesenseinwhich(3)and(4)areadescriptionofwhat has been achieved in the conversation. The key is to rec-ognize that in (3),Socrates isnotdrawingan inferencebut ratherrestating(2). [N]eithergoodnorevil in(3) is thentoberead, inlightof(2),asacontractionofjustbyitselfneithergoodnorevil.36 (4), in turn, should be read as, Wisdom is the only good just byitselfandfollytheonlyeviljustbyitself.NotonlydoesthisavoidtheapparentcontradictionthatTheExtremeViewfoistsonthear-gument,but itpreventsus frombeingconfrontedwithaclaimforwhichtheargumenttothispointhasnotpreparedus,thattherec-ognizedgoodsareneithergoodnorevilinanyway.Thisclaim,theextremeone,doesnotfollowatallfromwhathascomebefore.Butif(3)isarestatementof(2),and(4)justtakestheconclusionastepfurther,thenwehaveaperfectlyreasonableexplicationofthetextonwhichSocratesholdsTheModerateView.Theargument,follow-ingIrwinbutmodifying(3)and(4)tomakethemoderatereadingexplicit,wouldgoasfollows:

(1) Each recognizedgood [e. g.,health,wealth] is agreaterevilthan its contrary, if it is used without wisdom, and each

36.SeeVlastos(1991)229230foradefenseofreadingneithergoodnorevilasacontractedformofjustbyitselfneithergoodnorevil.

WhenSocratesconcludesthatwisdomistheonlygood,hemeansthatnothingelseisgood.33

Commentators have divided over these two readings. Recent com-mentatorswho accept TheModerate View include Brickhouse andSmith,Parry,Reshotko,andVlastos.RecentcommentatorswhoacceptTheExtremeViewincludeAnnas,Dimas,McPherran,andRussell.34 IrwinarguesforTheExtremeViewonthegroundsthatTheModerateViewcannotexplaintheinferenceto(3)and(4).Afterall,TheModer-ateViewlicensescallingtherecognizedgoodsgoodswhentheyareconjoinedwithwisdom.But(3)and(4)ruleoutcallingtherecognizedgoodsgoods.So,SocratesmusthaveinmindTheExtremeViewrath-erthanTheModerateView.35

33. Ibid.

34. SeeBrickhouseandSmith,MakingThingsGoodandMakingGoodThingsinSocraticPhilosophy, inT.RobinsonandL.Brisson, eds.,Plato: Euthyde-mus, Lysis, Charmides: Proceedings of the V Symposium Platonicum: Selected Papers (AcademiaVerlag:2000)7687;RichardParry,TheCraftofRulinginPlatosEuthydemus andRepublic,Phronesis 48(2003)128;Reshotko(2006)98103;Vlastos(1991)227231;Annas(1999)ch.2;Dimas(2002);McPherran(2005);andRussell(2005)ch.1.

35. TheStoicsalsointerpretedSocratesasexpressingTheExtremeViewandsotookthispassagetobeevidencefortheSocraticoriginoftheirviewthatwis-domistheonlygood.EvenwithintheStoicschool,however,therewasroomfor disagreement aboutwhat the passage implies.Orthodox Stoicswouldhavefoundinthepassageroomforadoctrineofpreferredindifferents,ac-cordingtowhichtheconventionalgoods(health,wealth,etc.)arevaluables butnotgoods.Aristo,ontheotherhand,wouldhavefoundsupportfortheviewthatnothingbutwisdomisgoodorvaluableatallandnothingbutig-noranceisbadordisvaluableatall.Forausefuldiscussion,seeA.A.Long, Hellenistic Philosophy(Duckworth:1986)esp.164ff.

DiogenesLaertius (2.31)clearlyhas thispassage inmindwhenheattri-butesTheExtremeViewtoSocrates:Thereis,[Socrates]said,onlyonegood,that is,knowledge,andonlyoneevil, that is, ignorance. It is,ofcourse,apointofdebatewhetherthisisthecorrectviewtoattributetoSocrates.ButDiogenesLaertiusplainlymisinterpretsSocrateswhenheimmediatelygoesontowrite,Wealthandgoodbirthbringtheirpossessornodignity,butonthecontraryevil(Hickstrans.)( , , , ).



time.38TheModerateViewmakessenseoftheentirepassage,whileTheExtremeViewcannot.

IfTheModerateViewprovidesthemostplausiblereadingofthetext,thenwecanseethatitreinforcesthenecessitythesis.Ifthegood-ness of all other things requireswisdom, and if happiness requiresgoodness,thenhappinessrequireswisdom.Butthesufficiencythesisdoesnotseemtobeinviewhere.39Again,wisdomconfersgoodness

38.RaviSharmahasnotedincorrespondencetomethatthegrammaticalstruc-tureof the sentence supports thispoint.Thefirst conjunct is expressedbymeansofadependentclause(governedbytheparticiple),whilethesec-ondisthemain,andnovel,thought(governedbytheimplicitindicative).

39. Contra DonaldZeyl,SocraticVirtueandHappiness,Archiv fr Geschichte der Philosophie 64(1982)p.231,who takesSocrates tobeexpressingTheMod-erateViewallofthecandidategoodsbutwisdomaredemotedfromthestatusofbeinggoods intheirownrighttobeingneithergoodnorbadinthemselves,butgood,badorindifferentonlyunderthedirectionofknowl-edge,ignoranceortheabsenceofanysuchdirectionyetconcludes,Wis-domalonesurvivesastheonlygoodwhosemerepossessionguaranteesitsusefulness:itisthusthepossessionofwisdomwhichconstituteshappiness.Butthisisanon sequitur foratleasttworeasons.First,nothinginthepassagedecidestheissuewhetherwisdomconstitutes happinessorcontributestoitinsomeotherway.Second,by it is thus thepossessionofwisdomwhichconstituteshappiness,Zeylclearlymeans toexpress thesufficiency thesis.But,forthereasonsexpressedabove,thesufficiencythesisdoesnotfollowfromTheModerateViewendorsedbyZeyl.WereSocratesexpressingTheExtremeView,thesufficiencythesiswouldseemtobeinplay,forhappinessconsistsinhaving(orcorrectlyusing)goodthings,andwisdomwouldbetheonlygoodthing.Thus,tohavewisdomwouldbetohaveeverythingrequiredforhappiness.Weshould,then,forthereasonsIhavegiveninthemaintext,goalongwithZeylinendorsingTheModerateView,thoughweshouldnotfollowhimindrawingconclusionsthatcanatbestbedrawnonlyfromTheExtremeView.

Like Zeyl, Parry starts out correctly but concludes too strongly. Parryrightlynotes that Stage2doesnotmakea clear case that the recognizedgoodsarenotneededforhappiness(2003,p.6),andrightlyendorsesTheModerateViewofStage3,butgoestoofarintakingthesepassagestoimplythat ifwisdomdetermines the goodness of the recognized goods, then itguaranteeshappiness:

Fromthecontext,itisclearthat[Socrates]meansthatthethingsleftaloneareindeterminatewithrespecttothegood.Wisdom,ontheoth-erhand,isthedeterminingprinciple.Asthedeterminingprinciple,itisalsodeterminatewithrespecttohappiness.Beingdeterminatewithrespecttohappinessdoesnotmeanthatwisdombyitselfishappiness.

isagreatergood than itscontrary, if it isusedbywisdom(281d68).

(2)Therefore,eachrecognizedgoodotherthanwisdomisjustby itself (auto kathhauto) neither good nor evil (281d35,d8e1).

(3*)Therefore,eachofthemis justbyitselfneithergoodnorevil(281e34).

(4*)Therefore,wisdomistheonlygoodjustbyitselfandfollytheonlyeviljustbyitself(281e45).

Perhapssomeonewouldobjectthat(3)/(3*)and(4)/(4*)areintro-ducedwithaninference-term,,andsomustbeinferencesratherthanrestatements.37Thisisafairobservation,butitshouldbenotedthatwhatfollowsis,strictlyspeaking,nottwoinferencesgivenseparately but a conjunction inwhich the conjuncts are being con-trastedwithoneanotherbyuseofaconstruction.Ifsome-oneinsiststhatweread(3*)and(4*)asinferences,defendersofTheModerateViewcaninsistbackthat(3*)and(4*)mustbereadratherasan inference.Thatis,(3*)and(4*)areaninferencefromwhatpre-cedes.Onthisunderstanding,theconclusionoftheargumentisacon-junction: Noneof theother things is [justby itself]eithergoodorbad,butofthesetwo,wisdomisgood[justbyitself],andignoranceisbad[justbyitself].Granted,thefirstconjuncthasalreadybeenmadeexplicitinitsuncontractedform,butitisrestatedinordertocontrastitwiththesecondconjunct,whichisheremadeexplicitforthefirst

37. Long(1986,167n.62)objectsonsimilargrounds:In281d35,Socrateshasalreadyassertedthatthethingswefirstsaidweregoodarenotgoodjustbythemselves.Ifthisisallthatheisassertinginthefirstpartofhisconclusion,noneoftheseotherthingsiseithergoodorbad,hisostensibleconclusionisreducedtoasummary,whichcontributesnothingnew.



So,(WOG-3)Wisdomistheonlygoodjustbyitselfandfollytheonlyeviljustbyitself.41 42

8. Conclusion

Together,theargumentsinthefirststagethatwisdomprovidesgoodfortune,inthesecondstagethatwisdomprovidescorrectuse,andinthethirdstagethatwisdomistheonlygoodpresentapotentprotrep-ticforwisdom.Cliniasshouldpursuewisdombecausewithithewillhaveagoodchanceofbeinghappy,whilewithoutithewillhavenochanceatall.SinceCliniasshareswithallofusthesingledominantgoal in life of attaininghappiness, this conclusion is all Socrates re-quirestoaccomplishhisprotrepticaim.43Contrarytoalonganddom-inant interpretive tradition, Ihaveargued that this conclusion is allthatSocratesaimstoestablish.Specifically,IhavearguedthatSocratesis notmaking the case for the sufficiency ofwisdom for happiness.Wisdom is necessary for and conducive to happiness, but nowhereinthispassagedoesSocratesclaimorrevealthatheiscommittedtothesufficiencyofwisdomforhappiness.Indeed,whathesaysaboutwisdomandgood fortuneprovidesevidenceagainst the sufficiency

41. Theposition I amattributing to Socrates in theEuthydemus resembles thepositionAristotleexpressesatEudemian Ethics 1248b2634:

Agoodman,then,isoneforwhomthenaturalgoodsaregood.Forthegoodsmenfight forandthinkthegreatesthonour,wealth,bodilyexcellences,goodfortune,andpowerarenaturallygood,butmaybetosomehurtfulbecauseoftheirdispositions.Forneitherthefool-ishnortheunjustnortheintemperatewouldgetanygoodfromtheemploymentof them, anymore than an invalid from the foodof ahealthyman,oroneweakandmaimedfromtheequipmentofoneinhealthandsoundinalllimbs.(Solomontrans.)

42. Theremustbethefurthertacitpremisethattherearenogoodsotherthantheso-calledrecognizedgoods:those,thatis,ontheinitiallistofgoods(or,moreliberally,thoseonthelistplusothersofthesamesort).Thisistrueoftheearlierreconstructionsoftheargument,aswell.

43. Or,atleast,itisalltherationalargumentherequires.ThequestionwhetherCliniasacceptanceofthisconclusionissufficient,inSocratesview,tocausehimtopursuewisdomgoesbeyondthescopeofthisessay.

onwhatever so-called recognizedgoods, likehealth andhonor,wepossess.Butnowhereinthisthirdstageis itsuggestedthatwisdomguarantees thepossessionof therecognizedgoods.The focus isen-tirelyonnecessityratherthansufficiency.40

Wearenowinapositiontosumuptheargumentthatwisdomistheonlygood(WOG):

(WOG-1)Eachrecognizedgoodotherthanwisdom[e. g.,health,wealth] isagreaterevil than its contrary, if it isusedwithoutwisdom,andeachisagreatergoodthanitscontrary,ifitisusedbywisdom.

So,(WOG-2)Eachrecognizedgoodotherthanwisdomisjustbyitselfneithergoodnorevil.

Rather, itmeansthatwheneverwisdomisatworkoneisinvariablyhappy.(2003,p.12)

40.Areaderforthisjournalwonderswhetherjustbythemselvesneithersort[i. e., neither the recognized goodsnor their opposites] is of any value at281d89impliesthattheoppositesoftherecognizedgoodshavesomeposi-tivevaluewhenconjoinedwithwisdom.Iftheydo,wouldthatthenimplythatwisdomcanmakegooduseof even the recognizedbads, andwouldthatthenestablishthesufficiencythesis?First,itneednotimplythattherec-ognizedbadshavepositivevaluewhenconjoinedwithwisdom.Thepointcouldsimplybethatthereisnodeterminateanswertothequestionwhetheritismorevaluableforsomeonetoberichratherthanpooruntilitisdeter-minedwhethersheiswiseorignorant.ButIthinkamorenuancedanswerisavailable,too:poverty,weakness,slowness,anddullnessofsightandhearingcanbeusedbywisdomsolongastheyarenotcompletepoverty,etc.(Cow-ardiceandlazinesspresentdifferentproblemswithrespecttohowtheycouldbeconjoinedwithwisdom,anddishonorseemsadifficultcasetomakeout,soIleavethosethreeaside.)Poverty(liketheothers)comesindegrees,andwisdomcanusewhatevermoneyisavailabletoit.Completepoverty,then,isnotsusceptibletousebywisdom;281b68suggeststhatthisjustishavingnothing(monetary)availableforuse.Butinsofarasawisepersonispoorbutnotpenniless,what littlemoneyshehas isofsomelittlegoodtoher.Andthegreaterthemoneyavailabletoher,thebetter.This,ofcourse,stillfailstosettleanythingaboutthesufficiencythesis,sinceitisstillanopenquestionhowmanyresources,andofwhatqualityandvariety,oneneedstobeabletoachievehappiness.Thetextunderdeterminesthematter.(Onthelastpoint,seethediscussionattheendofsection6.)



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thesis.Thesummationofthepassagereinforcesthisinterpretation,asitappealsonlytothenecessity,butnottothesufficiency,ofwisdomforhappiness:

Thenletusconsidertheconsequenceofthis.Sinceweallwanttobehappy,andsinceweappeartobecomehappybyusingthingsandusingthemcorrectly,andsinceitisknowledge that provides the correctness and good for-tune,itisnecessary,itseems,forallmentopreparethem-selvesineverywayforthis:howtheywillbecomeaswiseaspossible.(282a16)

Somuch forwhat I takemyself tohaveestablished. It isequallyimportanttobeclearaboutwhatIdonottakemyselftohaveestab-lished. While Euthydemus 278282 does not provide evidence thatSocratesendorsesthesufficiencythesis,Idonottakemyselftohavedemonstrated thatwhatSocratessays in thispassage isflatly incon-sistentwiththesufficiencythesis.Certainly,though,someofwhathesaysherewillbedifficulttoreconcilewiththesufficiencythesis.Fur-thermore,IdonottakemyselftohaveshownthatSocratesnowhereendorsesthesufficiencythesis.Indeed,Ihavehardlyconsideredanypassagesoutsideofourfocaltext.Myclaim,strictly,isonlythatacaseforthesufficiencythesiswillhavetofinditsimpetusinpassagesotherthanEuthydemus 278282. Champions of the sufficiency thesis willneedanew locus classicus, for theoldonewillno longer serve.Butbyshowingthatthesupposedlocus classicus forthesufficiencythesisnotonly fails to support the thesisbut is in factquiteunfriendly toit,IhopetohavesowninthereaderaseedofdoubtaboutwhetherthesufficiencythesisdeservesitsdominantstatusininterpretationsofPlatosthought.44

44.Manypeoplehavehadabeneficial impactonthispaper.AmongthemaremembersofaudiencesattheAcademyofAthens,theAmericanPhilosophi-calAssociation(2010EasternDivisionmeeting),BrandeisUniversity,CornellUniversity,theHumboldt-UniversittzuBerlin,theUniversityofAlaskaAn-chorage, theUniversityofOxford,andmy2012Harvardgraduateseminar



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_GoBackWisdom and Happiness in Euthydemus 2782821.Introduction2.Alleged arguments for the sufficiency thesis in Euthydemus 2782823.Stage 1: Wisdom is good fortune. (Euthydemus 279c280b)4.Good fortune and outcome-success5.Stage 1 and the sufficiency thesis6.Stage 2: Wisdom and correct use (Euthydemus 280b281d)7.Stage 3: Wisdom as the sole good (Euthydemus 281de)8.Conclusion

References

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