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K.U. Leuven

L I R G I A D

Leuven Interdisciplinary Research Group on International Agreements and Development

Working Paper No 7- Mei 2005

The Emergence of Multilevel Governance in Kenya

Develtere Patrick, Hertogen Els and

Fredrick Wanyama

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LIRGIAD, the Leuven Interdisciplinary Research Group on International Agreements and Development, is a joint venture between research groups from four different Faculties and Institutes at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven: the Institute for International and European Policy (IIEB); the Higher Institute for Labour Studies (HIVA) - Sustainable Development; Development Economics/ Research Group on Food Policy, Transition and Development (OOE); the Working Group for International Economics (OIE); and the Institute for international Law (IIR).

In LIRGIAD, researchers from political sciences, social sciences, law and economics work closely together to examine the growing complexity of international agreements and the interactions they cause between a variety of local, national and international actors in the area of international trade and development.

The working paper series, started in 2003, aims at a broader dissemination of the research of LIRGIAD and of other researchers in the academic community and in society. Reference may be made to these working papers with proper citation of source.

For more information, please visit the website of LIRGIAD on www.lirgiad.be

© LIRGIAD, K.U. Leuven, 2003

IIEB - Institute for International and European Policy

HIVA - Higher Institute for Labour Studies – Sustainable Development

OOE - Development Economics/ Research Group on Food Policy, Transition and Development

IIR - Institute for International Law

OIE– Working Group on International Economics

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THE EMERGENCE OF MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN KENYA

2005

Develtere Patrick1, Hertogen Els and

Fredrick Wanyama2

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1. Introduction

Over the last few years development co-operation practices have undergone important changes. Broadly defined development is now seen as a process (a) that is owned and steered by a national community building local institutions that produce wealth for the entire population and reduce poverty and vulnerability of the weakest sections of society and (b) that is fuelled by national and international opportunities and inputs. Co-operation is, therefore, seen as a facilitator and catalyst of the development process. There is a general consensus that development can only be achieved through participation of the different stakeholders of a national community. Since the 1990s, it is generally accepted that development decisions and initiatives need not just be taken by government actors alone, but also by and in consultation with others. In this multistakeholder paradigm, much weight is being given to non-governmental groups and the private sector.

In recent years a multilevel governance dimension has been added to this multistakeholder approach. This dimension emphasises the multiple levels at which participation and governance take place in the development process. In this multilevel governance paradigm most attention goes to the interaction between actors involved at subnational, national, supranational and international levels. Multilevel governance has thus become part of the new credo of development agencies and a new generation of donor conditionalities. In other words, donors increasingly demand that recipient countries allow civil society and private sector participation in policy formulation, project and programme implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation at different levels. They firmly believe that multilevel governance is a precondition for “good” national governance as it guarantees transparency and produces better results in terms of poverty reduction and sustainability of initiatives taken.

However, little is known about the many complexities that arise with multilevel governance. Most research done on the subject suffers from three deficiencies. First, most studies only shed light on one single programme that foresees participation of non-state actors in design, implementation and evaluation of development programmes or projects. The most thoroughly studied programmes in this regard are the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) that have been undertaken under the aegis of the World Bank (cf. Booth, 2003; Craig and Porter, 2003; Achoka and Atema, 2001). Moreover, most of the research on the multistakeholder dimension of these programmes does not take into account the fact that non-state actors simultaneously participate in different similar exercises at the same time. For instance, many times the same civil society and private sector actors are involved in PRSP-exercices, the new ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, different multilateral and bilateral programmes, and government-financed development programmes.

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Second, the majority of the studies mainly aim at measuring the level of satisfaction with the state-civil society interaction. There is little attention to the changes this multilevel governance induces in power relations in the national political arena. It needs to be appreciated that multilevel governance can profoundly alter the power relations between State and non-state actors, as well as between civil society and private sector. There are even major changes to be expected within each of these ‘domains’.

Third, most research considers governance as a one-level game. Attention mostly goes to the national level despite the fact that most actors involved are locally embedded and seek national and international representations. The multilevel approach per definition produces effects at different levels of governance.

In this paper we try to make a broad presentation of multilevel governance in Kenya3. To study multilevel governance in Kenya is particularly interesting because demand for more participation of non-state actors has come from both an increasingly dynamic and vocal civil society at local and national levels as well as from the donor community at the international level. The introduction of multilevel elements in programme negotiations towards the end of the Moi regime should shed some light on the impact on power relations between the state and non-state actors. The issue to observe is whether it weakened the powerhold of the government. As will be clear from the following analysis, multilevel governance has produced a consultative and participatory culture that is far from satisfactory, but has affected minds and practices of those involved, particularly non-state actors.

The information for the paper was gathered in the period October – December 2003. Over 50 key-persons from the Kenyan civil society, the private sector, government agencies and donor institutions were purposively sampled and interviewed. We opted for interviews with representatives of these organisations and institutions mainly at the national level, but also at the district level. For practical reasons we were only able to do district level interviews in Kisumu district. At the local level we held several focused group discussions with representatives of a number of community-based organizations within the district to establish their engagement in programmes with multilevel governance dimensions. All respondents were asked what the effects were of multilevel governance on their modus operandi and their relations with other actors. During the interviews, different programmes that have a multilevel governance dimension were mentioned. Because they were mentioned most frequently, we concentrated on the following programmes: .The National Poverty Eradication Programme .The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper .The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement (“Cotonou-Agreement”) .The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme .The ILO Child Labour Programme

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.The Habitat Urban Governance Programme.

1. Dimensions of Multilevel Governance

A defining characteristic of multilevel governance (MLG) is the pooling and sharing of authority and influence between actors and across levels. In the 1990s (democratically elected) governments in developing countries were called upon to be more responsible and to sit in the driving seat of the development process. “National ownership” had to be a cure for aid and donor dependency. Later on new dimensions were added that would lead to “country ownership”. Participation of non-state actors and decentralisation were the two major ingredients that had to secure ownership of the development process beyond the state.

In our research we follow the grid usually used by those who research MLG in Europe. We distinguish a horizontal and a vertical dimension of MLG. The horizontal dimension refers to the opening up of the political space to non-state actors. In Kenya, and indeed most African countries, this means that the State now has to interact with non-state actors (civil society and business community) in the governance process. In other words, government has to ‘produce’ governance by taking into account the desiderata of a multiplicity of stakeholders. It also has to give room and resources to these stakeholders for the realisation of public policy goals.

The vertical dimension refers to both upward and downward decision-making processes. The upward process is one in which national decision-making becomes increasingly embedded in supra-national decision-making. For Kenya important supra-national decision-making is taking place in a variety of forums. The country is bound by a large number of international agreements and primarily those that determine the very survival of the Kenyan economy such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the World Bank and the IMF. The downward process has to do with the process of decentralisation, particularly the devolution of power that in the Kenyan case began in the early 1990s. As such, multi-level governance involves the existence of multiple political decision-making centres at different levels (subnational, national, supranational, international) and the interdependent relations among these. Political interdependence means that the political processes at one level influence the political processes at the other levels and vice versa (Beyers & Kerremans, 2001: 105).

2. Research Questions

In this research we went out to establish how this system of MLG has affected the Kenyan polity. The major actors that operate on the Kenyan scene were identified as the State; civil society; the business community; and the international donor community. We sought to understand whether (and to what extent) the power relations in Kenya had changed in the light of this new approach to

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development co-operation. Accordingly, we looked at how each of these actors had reacted and tried to accommodate this externally imposed scheme of MLG.

In reviewing the different programmes with MLG dimensions, we first of all identified the rationale of the programme because each programme follows a specific logic. In most cases, this logic has been established by international agencies and brings along an ineluctable structural frame. It was, therefore, important to find out to what extent this frame was elastic and it could be adapted, or adjusted to, by the local stakeholders to create a domestic multilevel governance mode. Secondly, for each programme we sought to identify the dominant forces that steered the process. Most programmes tend to introduce MLG in order to achieve more local and national ownership. However, as we will see, it often remains a dynamic interplay of external and local forces. Thirdly, all programmes seemed to have a multistakeholder philosophy. But, who were the stakeholders? Who was included and who was excluded? And, finally, we attempted to grasp the changes that had been induced by the programmes in the local power relations.

3. Selected Programmes Introducing Multilevel Governance in Kenya

1.0 The National Poverty Eradication Programme

1.0.0 Rationale

In an apparent response to the UN discourse on poverty reduction as well as the sheer reality of rising levels of poverty in the country, the Moi government decided to launch a country-wide poverty eradication programme in 1998. The President subsequently appointed a Poverty Eradication Commission (PEC) in 1999 to co-ordinate the efforts of all stakeholders in the fight against poverty. Thereafter, PEC formulated a strategy in the form of a National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP) that proposed a fifteen year time horizon to eliminate poverty in Kenya. Key components of the Plan were budgeting for, and financing of, poverty reduction initiatives; resource mobilisation through an Anti-Poverty Trust Fund as well as the government budget; implementation of the Charter for Social Integration; establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems as well as indicators for assessing levels of poverty and for measuring progress; capacity building in government and civil society; and advocacy, publicity and awareness campaigns about poverty eradication initiatives.

The programme was launched in April 1999 on a try-out basis in 16 districts and 5 urban centres. By 2002 the coverage had been expanded to all the districts of the country. Lack of funds, however, forced the government to limit its ambitions. The focus was narrowed to micro-credit or revolving loan fund projects to facilitate improved access to social services and promotion of broad based economic growth.

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2.0.0 Who Controls?

The programme is spearheaded by the PEC, with technical and administrative support from a Poverty Eradication Unit that was set up in the Office of the President at its inception. PEC is composed of appointees from diverse backgrounds. The sixteen members come from the private sector (including leading business people as well as representatives of the Kenya Chamber of Commerce and Industry), the NGO Council, the Churches, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, and the Central Organization of Trade Unions.

Donors would have been part of the PEC, but they were not willing because they distrusted the Office of the President, alledgedly for being corruption-riden. They suggested that the programme should be coordinated by the Ministry of Planning, which was rejected by the President. The programme has thus remained country-driven and controlled as donors have since distanced themselves from it.

The programme has two levels of operation. First is at the national level, where the programme is directed by the PEC. In a very inconsistent way, the funds are released from this level and distributed to the districts across the country. By the end of the 2002/2003 financial year, Ksh 126.5 million had been disbursed by the PEC. Second is at the district level, where district-based Financial Intermediaries are contracted by the District Poverty Eradication Commttees (DPECs) to manage programme funds. Membership of the DPECs includes several district government officers (district development officer, district social development officer and others), representatives of the NGO and private sector community and the Financial Intermediary. Besides being the overall managers of the fund, the DPEC screens the proposals, selects the projects to be financed and oversee their implementation.

3.0.0 Who Participates?

From the very beginning, non-state actors had limited participation in the programme. Civil society organisations and private sector representatives were only called in after the programme had been designed and launched. They were simply invited to bring in their expertise and to co-manage the programme at both national and district levels. In a number of cases, civil servants were reluctant to involve civil society organisations and were only willing to do so after intensive lobbying by these organisations.

In practice, local communities are not consulted. Some of them are informed about the programme by local public servants or NGO’s and get help to fill out the application forms. The programme works with a revolving loan system to mobilize grassroot participation. Such engagement is further enhanced by the fact that those groups who receive funding have to consider the money as a loan that they have to pay back to themselves. Otherwise, wider local participation has suffered for a number of reasons. First, the selection of these beneficiaries is skewed in favour of groups that already have contacts with authorities and NGO’s. In many cases the government officers do not really stimulate groups to

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apply for funds, except sometimes the local community groups that come from the officers’ own locality. Most application forms circulate either because an NGO informs its affiliates or target groups to make a request for funding or through the initiative of local political and administrative leaders. Secondly, the PEC recommends that the funding level of groups engaged in income generating activities should have a lower limit of Ksh 100,000 and an upper ceiling of Ksh 300,000. For poor groups this is far too much money to handle. Thirdly, the project application forms are lengthy and complicated. Most of the local groups do not have the skills to write a proposal containing information on objectives, business strategy, viability, sustainability and budget. Fourthly, miss-targeting is also due to the fact that groups need to have a bank account when applying for money, which poor people and groups rarely have. Fifth, since funds are limited, only a few proposals can be selected for funding4. Sixth, this selection is, according to respondents at local level, often biased towards groups known by the government officers. Also, it is the groups that already have a substantial amount of money to their disposal, and thus are already quite well organised, that often receive the loan.

Programme evaluation had not been done, but there was ample evidence that groups that were already being supported by other agencies got access to the funds and that in some cases funds were used to pay back other loans or to double finance an activity. Repayment of the loans was slow and limited due to the absence of incentives to do so and due to the general popular perception that government money was “their money” and had not to be repaid.

4.1.4 Changes Induced in Power Relations

During the Moi era, the programme fuelled the regime’s political patronage system, both at the national and district levels. The fact that the programme was managed directly from the highly politicised and corruption-ridden Office of the President served to strengthen the then existing power relations. Consequently, it created a lot of antagonism and animosity between donors and certain government circuits. Without backing from the donor community, civil society and the private sector, it was very hard to penetrate and change the power relations that revolved around the programme. It was only after the 2002 elections and the subsequent regime change that a more open and transparent environment for the programme was created. At the district level, the situation was not any different. Much depended on the existing local power relations. Beneficiaries tended to be KANU associates who were linked to the programme by their patrons. There is ample evidence that in most districts, government officials and local politicians used the programme to strengthen their own power hold and to reward political clients. Despite regime change, there is still a general feeling among NGOs and CBOs interviewed that corruption and politics play a role in the selection of beneficiary groups. When civil society and some private sector actors stepped in they had to re-engineer and retarget the programme in many places. While these non-state actors have been able to create a more co-operative state-civil society relationship in many districts, the programme remains a bureaucratic

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instrument fully consistent with (and sometimes negatively influenced by) monolithic norms and procedures reminicent of the Nyayo era.

2.0 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

1.0.0 Rationale

Theoretically, the PRSP builds on previous efforts aimed at poverty alleviation through long-term development planning, such as the National Poverty Eradication Plan. But in reality the PRSP was a donor conditionality that was imposed on the Kenya Government as a requirement for enhanced access to donor aid. Donor-support for Kenya was halted in 1997 when donors became disenchanted with corruption and bad management in the Moi government. In order to get access to fresh donor money, the government succumbed to pressure to produce an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP). This document was prepared by the government and presented to a national stakeholders' forum in March 2000 for discussion and adoption. The forum, however, demanded, with the support of donors, that a proper consultation process be conducted to produce a sufficiently inclusive document. Though the IPRSP was eventually adopted by donors in June 2000, an inclusive consultation process was embarked upon in August of the same year to produce an acceptable PRSP for the country.

Eventually, the PRSP was worked out following the international standards set by the World Bank and the IMF for this kind of exercise. This, of course, was related to the fact that the PRSP is to be considered the main financing framework for donor funding. However, while the PRSP was submitted by the end of 2002, the joint board of the World Bank and the IMF had not approved the paper by the end of 2003 due to some anomalies that the joint board wanted rectified. Perhaps another impediment to the conclusion of the exercise was that the new government did not pursue its approval, for it was preparing its own version of PRSP that was christened Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (ERS).

2.0.0 Who controls?

Although the PRSP process was intended to be a joint collaborative and participatory process (PRSP: 73), the government was initially reluctant to open up the preparatory process to non-state actors and was only forced to include them in the process by the donors (Hanmer et al, 2003). On the other hand, civil society organizations and the private sector, just like the donors, never trusted the sincerity of the government and hence demanded their representation in the coordinating body that was responsible for the preparation of the consultative process (PRSP Secretariat), before their actual engagement. The government had to accept this demand if only it could convince donors that it was serious in trying to satisfy their aid conditionality.

Anxious to have a broad based and participatory process as a means of satisfying the said conditionality, the government sought donor assistance to

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finance the preparation of PRSP. Subsequently, the international donor community largely financed the PRSP process. Financial support came from multilateral agencies (World Bank, International Finance Corporation, African Development Bank, IMF, European Union, and UNDP); bilateral agencies (DFID, USAID, CIDA and various embassies); and non-governmental organisations (Action Aid). An Economic Governance Group (EGG), comprised of technocrats of the different donor organisations, was established. The group was represented “in most organs which oversaw the consultative process and played a key role in suggesting modalities and mobilisation of funds” (PRSP: 119). It was no secret to the donors, Kenyan government nor civil society stakeholders that the EGG was set up to force the Kenyan government to put in place adequate budgetary mechanisms to enhance transparency in expenditure.

The process received continuous policy guidance from the Cabinet, but the government would argue that it acted mainly as a “facilitator and enabler” (PRSP: 2). Day-to-day coordination was done by a Technical PRSP-Secretariat comprised of Kenyan professionals mainly from the Government, but also representatives from civil society, the private sector and the donor community.

Parliament had no real stake in the consultative and strategy development processes. There was no debate in Parliament on the process, neither was its approval of the PRSP document required. The Ministry of Finance and Planning organised workshops to inform stakeholders on the process, but only a few Members of Parliament (MPs) participated. The fact that the PRSP would be the new policy framework, under which resources would be allocated, discouraged the active participation of MPs. They would not longer be able to use the development budget for their own interests. Nevertheless, those MPs who tried to get involved, did so through participation in consultative workshops that took place in their own constituencies and districts.

It has been alluded to that as soon as it took power, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government tried to get more control over the implementation of PRSP by developing an alternative strategy. It associated the PRSP with the previous regime and, hence, went on to draw up its own document. On the basis of the PRSP, the NARC Manifesto, the government’s Post-Election Action Plan, an “Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation (2003-2007)” was worked out. To protect its credibility, the government organized a national consultative process in the formulation of the ERS. Contrary to the PRSP-process, this time donors were not involved in this consultation process and only a limited number of national non-state actors were invited to reflect on a “strategy proposal”5. Interestingly, the ERS did not really acknowledge the PRSP. NARC held that only certain ideas were borrowed from it6. Yet most national stakeholders see the ERS as the implementation plan for the PRSP rather than a replacement. Based on the ERS, an investment plan was drafted by consultants and was discussed and endorsed at a national stakeholders' workshop in April 2004.

4.2.3 Who participates?

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The official agenda of the PRSP process was to engender an inclusive participatory approach to development planning. The poor had to be given a voice through widespread consultation among a multitude of stakeholders. With varying coverage, consultations were held at national, provincial, district and divisional levels in the administrative units of the country.

The consultative process was launched on November 6th 2000 at the first National Consultative Forum. The Forum was comprised of a Parliamentary Sub-Committee, an Economic Sub-Committee of Cabinet, all Permanent Secretaries, and heads of the Private Sector Forum and the NGO Council. This was followed by training of facilitators for the consultative process and holding eight provincial PRSP dissemination workshops. The initiators originally only planned to make in-depth studies and consultations in 25 districts. After protest of non-state actors, it was agreed upon to extend consultations to all 70 districts. Nevertheless, in 25 districts the consultations went down to the divisional level, while in the other 45 districts, the consultations were held in one-day meetings at the district level (Hanmer et al, 2003: 97).

The consultations at district level were led by lead agencies identified by the National Steering Committee7, which worked out the structure and framework of the consultations. The funds allocated to organise the consultative workshops, would go through these lead agencies. The lead agencies were mainly civil society actors. The consultations were carried out through plenary as well as focus group discussions. Participants were initially selected by the lead agencies from the well-known local organizations and personalities, but any other interested persons could present themselves to any of the meetings being held. The organisers tried to have as many participants as possible by publicizing the meetings through print and broadcast media using national and local languages. The register of the NGO Bureau of the President's Office was also used to contact local NGOs and CBOs that represented selected special interests8. To ensure wider participation in the 45 districts, questionnaires were sent out to stakeholders, collected and analysed prior to the one-day consultation exercise. In addition, in-depth Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) were done at community level in 10 randomly selected districts.

Contrary to many other African countries, the World Bank was not the major financier of the PRSP consultation process in Kenya. DFID played that role and was also the “donor representative” in the secretariat of the PRSP. The funds that donors committed to this country-wide exercise did not go to the government. In each district a “lead-NGO” was in charge of financial management. This was yet another indicator of the mistrust between the government and the donor community with regard to transparent management of funds.

From the foregoing, it must already be clear that non-state actor participation was not the same at every level. At the local level NGOs, CBOs, local leaders and individual pastors or mullahs were the main actors involved. At district level the private sector stepped in with the participation of the Chambers of Commerce. The participation of the religious organisations also became more formal. The few members of parliament that participated did this mainly at the

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provincial level. At the national level the Private Sector Forum (then representing only a few private sector associations), the religious organisations and the NGO Council (representing all registered NGOs) took care of the interests of the non-state actors.

While the consultative process on the drafting of the PRSP was being carried out countrywide, the National Consultative Forum continued to negotiate at the national level. It, therefore, worked with 8 sector working groups based on the main sectors of the economy and 8 thematic groups reflecting the key socio-political interests in the country. The thematic groups were supposed to set up a consultative and awareness rising process parallel to the formal PRSP process. The National Gender Team (NGT) was the most active of these. Although officially suspended, the NGT outlived the PRSP consultation process. The NGT remained a point of reference for gender-issues.

In terms of issues treated and in terms of mobilisation, the PRSP-process was very much an NGO and CBO event. The social partners (employers’ organisations and trade unions) were invited, but not very much involved in the PRSP-process. They believed that the issues discussed during the PRSP-process were not their major concerns. Interestingly, the Private Sector Alliance believes that not less than 90% of its concerns was taken care of in the final document, while the NGO Council reports that only 40% of its concerns were covered.

The consultative process that led to the ERS was said to have been also participatory, but not at the same level with the PRSP process. It was less intensive, shorter and did not go down to the local level. Also, more formalised categories of stakeholders like the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) were involved. Indeed, representatives of the private sector participated in the PRSP as the Private Sector Forum that was less integrated and homogenous. This Forum was, however, expanded in membership to include 30 other actors and transformed into the more homogenous KEPSA (Kenya Private Sector Alliance, 2003). The focus of the ERS was not on poverty reduction per se as was the case of the PRSP, but on the creation of a more investor-friendly climate in Kenya. The Investment Plan drafted to implement the ERS was not at all developed in a broad consultative way. The Private Sector and Civil Society Organizations were only invited to comment on the draft after donors had made their comments and recommended its adoption.

4.2.4 Changes induced in power relations

First and foremost, the PRSP process is commended by many for opening up the Moi regime to public scrutiny and people's socio-economic demands (Hanmer et al, 2003: 106). This paved the way for civil society organizations to penetrate the government's development planning process and to be accommodated by a hitherto hostile state. This facilitated a change in power relations, especially between the state and civil society. It is against this backgroud that room for a relatively participatory development planning process started to take shape in the country. The multiplication of forums and bargaining

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opportunities that are being created by the NARC government builds up from this foundation.

Importantly, the non-state actors have somehow adapted their strategies in order to have a better grip and impact on the development process (ibid: 107). It should be highlighted that before the PRSP, the private sector was disorganised and there was no united private sector front. With the PRSP process, the Private Sector Forum was formed to create convergence between the concerns of the different private stakeholders. As it has already been mentioned, the Forum eventually changed its name and strategy. It was felt that a broader based representation of private sector organisations was needed to speak with one single voice on cross-cutting issues such as insecurity of persons and property, limited access to credit, overregulation and unfair competition and high taxation levels. Therefore, the forum transformed itself into KEPSA comprising a very wide variety of national organisations ranging from the Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers, the Kenya Private Sector Foundation, the Kenya Bankers Association, the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, to the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Also non-traditional private sector actors such as the Kenya National Federation of Co-operatives, the National Council of Women of Kenya, the Confederation of Informal Sector Organisations, the National Artist Association and even the Central Organisation of Trade Unions joined KEPSA. Several respondents mentioned the fact that they joined KEPSA because this united front was the only way to get informed about what was happening during this process.

The NGO Council has since the change of government developed a more co-operative relationship with the NGO Bureau of the President’s Office. It has also started drafting sector working papers with a critical review of government policy. The Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development has changed its strategy profoundly since the PRSP-process. It used to invest a lot in training and broad sensitisation on gender issues. The PRSP-process convinced them of the necessity of a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, it has increasingly focused its activities in more practical and grassroots initiatives at the lower level of villages and schools. On the other hand, it concentrates more on advocacy on specific national gender-related issues in order to influence government policy.

The PRSP consultative process also made CBOs aware of the necessity of co-operation and a common strategy. Some NGOs and MPs organised meetings to inform the CBOs of the upcoming consultation process. They emphasised the need to organise themselves in order to be able to voice their interests and wishes in a more effective way. In Kisumu-district, for example, the CBOs decided to create their own umbrella organisation after the PRSP process in order to strengthen their capacity to present their interests to the government.

While at the national level the non-state actors seem very satisfied with the changing attitude of the government towards other actors in society, the non-state actors at the local level seem less enthusiastic about state - non-state actors relations. Rural CBOs did not feel that the PRSP process had brought along changes in the way they were being involved in the policy making processes. They

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have since not been invited more frequently by the District Development Officers to participate in development decision-making than before and have not got more assistance and support for their activities. The churches also did not have the feeling that the PRSP process had altered the relationship between them and the government.

3.0 The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement

1.0.0 Rationale

The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement is a comprehensive trade and aid agreement between 78 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU) signed in 2000 in Cotonou, Benin. As a financial and political framework for North-South co-operation, its central objective is to reduce poverty. It is based on four fundamental principles, namely equity and ownership; participation of state and non-state actors; dialogue and mutual obligation; and regionalisation.

Cotonou builds on 25 years of co-operation under the previous Yaoundé and Lomé frameworks, but it departs from these in substantive ways. First, and most important, aid or financial and technical support, via the European Development Fund (EDF), is channeled through two main instruments: the Grant Facility and the Investment Facility. Whereas the former is a lump sum of EDF funds allocated to a country on the basis of need and performance for a wide variety of activities, the latter is a revolving fund whose aim is to help develop the private sector, focusing on intervention and operations that cannot be financed from private capital or local financial institutions.

The second major innovation is that the Cotonou Agreement provides for a mechanism that gives direct access to EDF resources for capacity building to non-state actors without the prior approval of the government of the ACP country.

Thirdly, unlike the Yaoundé and Lomé frameworks, the Agreement contains a timetable for a new trade regime. The centrepiece of this new regime are the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which install reciprocal preferences that are compatible with the WTO rules. The EPAs have to promote regional integration and should be concluded by the end of 2007. It is expected that non-state actors, particularly the private sector and the social partners, will be actively involved in designing these agreements.

To get access to the EDF facilities, an ACP country must observe the fundamental principles and channel the request through the provided programming cycle. The starting point of this cycle is the development of a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) through dialogue between the state, non-state actors and the Delegation of the European Commission. The CSP, based on the country's own development strategy, identifies focal sectors for support. The National

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Indicative Programme (NIP) is then prepared in a similar participatory manner to complement the CSP. The NIP outlines the activities and resources allocated from the Grant Facility as well as other financial sources and the implementation timetable. The NIP is complemented by more detailed sector strategies that are developed for the focal sectors identified in the CSP. There is a continous monitoring and review process of the CSP and NIP during the implementation period.

Whereas all these stages of the cycle are largely expected to be participatory, involving a wide array of non-state actors, the Cotonou Agreement does not provide details on how to structure participative processes. There is no general dialogue mechanism foreseen which all ACP and EU countries could domesticate to their own specific country situations. This has remained a matter of contention between the European Commission and the ACP group. The discussion on the participatory mechanism was still going on in Brussels at the time of writing this paper. A good example of the doubt and hesitation this brings along is the Kenyan case. The Government was in favour of the participation of non-state actors, but awaited a general deal between the Commission and the ACP group to form the basis of involving non-stste actors.

Otherwise, Kenya is a signatory to this Agreement and has made efforts to follow its provisions in order to access the much needed and sought development support. Already under the previous EU/ACP Convention (Lomé IV-bis), a “governance programme” was implemented in Kenya. The programme foresaw the financing of the electoral commission, the reform of the judiciary, refurbishing of parliament and funding of civil society organisations. This was done in conformity with the general Lomé IV-bis philosophy of greater transparency, accountability and involvement of non-state actors9

2.0.0 Who controls?

Formally, the European Delegation is regarded to be a critical observer and facilitator of the national processes. It is the government of Kenya that is supposed to control the consultation process preceeding the drafting of the CSP and NIP. In Kenya, however, the government decided to formulate the CSP and NIP on the basis of the PRSP document. It was reasoned that since the PRSP process had been broadly consultative, the drafting of the CSP and NIP did not have to involve yet another deep consultative process so soon. Consequently, the National Authorising Officer (NAO), who represents the Kenyan government in all operations financed from ressources of the EC, took charge of drafting the CSP and NIP. Thereafter, two separate national consultative forums were held to comment on these drafts, repectively, the last of which was convened in October 2003.

Nevertheless, only a couple of non-state actors that dealt with trade issues were invited to attend these forums, leaving out other non-state actors. In September 2001 some of the leading NGOs such as African Peace Forum and EcoNews Africa, frustrated because they were not invited to participate in the process, had formed a steering committee of five volunteers to monitor the process

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of implementing the Cotonou Agreement. Thus, the Kenyan non-state actors were not directly in control of, neither were they widely involved in, the drafting of their country’s CSP and NIP.

The CSP had to lie for a long time at the EC-offices, but was eventually approved and signed in October 2003. In November 2003, the EC adopted the formulated NIP for Kenya, providing Euro 225 million from the 9th EDF.

The government was also very late in realising that it had to prepare itself to negotiate in a proper way on the review of the CSP/NIP and eventually the negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreement. Therefore, it was decided to set up a national steering committee, comprising of line government Ministries, public institutions, the private sector and civil society. This committee, known as the Kenya Post Lome Negotiation Project (KEPLO-Trade), was launched only at the end of 2003 to oversee the Kenya-EU trade negotiations. The European Community provided support to KEPLO-Trade in the form of two million Euro for capacity strengthening, including staff training, research and trade policy analysis and consultation with the public, the private sector and the civil society.

3.0.0 Who participates?

As mentioned above, only a few non-state actors have been invited to give their views and opinions on what the CSP and NIP should contain. Traub-Merz and Schildberg (2003) concluded that representation in the consultation process in Kenya was among the weakest of the 17 African countries10 they reviewed. In Kenya only two private sector organisations and one research institute11 were consulted. Trade unions, civil society organisations and local government associations were excluded. The few organisations that were consulted were only involved after the preparation of the first draft of the documents, but became part of the National Committee on the Cotonou Agreement (Traub-Merz & Schildberg: 25) throughout the remainder of the preparation process of the CSP and NIP.

The Agreement of Cotonou defines non-state actors as comprising three main components: ‘the private sector; economic and social partners (such as trade unions); and civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics’. Accordingly, it was envisaged that non-state actors would be organised into three main alliances or forums to participate in the implementation of the Agreement. The private sector would deal with the Cotonou-issues through the Kenya Private Sector Alliance and it was likely to benefit from its experience with the PRSP process. Besides this alliance, a new forum for the economic and social partners was being worked out into the Forum for Social and Economic Development Groups (FOSEDEG). At the same time, civil society was busy organising itself under the umbrella of the Kenyan Civil Society Alliance (KCCA). This process was being led by two NGOs: EcoNews and Africa Peace Forum. The first aim of the KCCA was to strengthen the capacity of different actors, such as members of parliament, councillors and NGOs that can influence public policies concerning the Cotonou Agreement. The Alliance was also planning a mapping exercise of the civil society in Kenya in order to identify those that fulfill the eligibility-criteria of the Agreement12. For this, they had foreseen a downward awareness raising

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process among NGOs, CBOs and other civil society actors at all levels in society. After this mapping exercise, they hoped to be able to identify the civil society actors that could join the Alliance. All these preparations were in anticipation of the mid-term review of CSP and NIP that was expected in June 2004.

4.0.0 Changes induced in power relations

So far, the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement has been an exclusive domain of the European Delegation and the Government of Kenya. Only a handful of non-state actors were sought and handpicked by the government to give their opinion on the draft CSP and NIP. There seems to be a fairly co-operative relationship between the National Authorising Officer, the European Delegation and these non-state actors. The present government regularly invites them to discuss their negotiation position on trade matters. Indeed, it is this co-operation that has seen the formation of the National Steering Committee composed of government representatives and non-state actors to negotiate trade issues with EC and WTO. This co-habitation between these parties is captured in one of the resolutions that non-state actors made during a civil society consultative workshop to the effect that they “must not always attack our Government but we need to ask ourselves where the real enemy is. We should be allies with the government in doing certain things and also recognize that the government sometimes has its hands tied” (Mutunga, 2003).

The other non-State actors were very much embroiled in the PRSP process and did not grasp what was at stake in the Cotonou Agreement. To convince the NGO-community of the importance of the Cotonou process, from March 2001 a number of awareness raising seminars were organised by some leading NGOs such as the Africa Peace Forum, Saferworld and EcoNews Africa. Then in February 2002 a regional seminar was organised in Nairobi under the aegis of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the expanded role of non-state actors in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. This seems not to have helped the non-state actors to get their acts together and engage the government in consultations for purposes of getting their interests accommodated in the CSP and NIP. Nevertheless, the point has been made that non-state actors have started to design strategies for involvement in the Cotonou Agreement.

So, non-state actors are increasingly realising that the Cotonou Agreement is another window of opportunity for greater involvement and interest representation. However, the framework set by the Agreement, particularly the definition and eligibility criteria for non-state actors, does produce confusion and even wrangles within the non-state actor community. As in many countries, the employers’ organisations and the trade unions prefer to be treated as social partners and not as civil society organisations. But with the relative poor organization of the social and economic partners, KEPSA seemed to articulate the interests of the employers and trade unions more coherently. This prompted the major employers' organizations like the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) and the leading trade union, the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU), to work through KEPSA rather than FOSEDEG as required by the Agreement. As a

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consequence, FOSEDEG lost clout to spearhead its institutionalisation in the process.

On the whole, the Cotonou Agreement has produced some effects on interest representation and policy making at two levels. There is first of all a growing awareness at the national level. However this has largely been urban biased. Awareness raising, strategy design and consultation have all been handled exclusively in Nairobi. Secondly, a regional consensus on the Cotonou Agreement is in the making. NGOs have established contacts with other NGOs in East Africa in order to design a common strategy. In addition, the private sector is working on a regional strategy in order to maximise their impact on the EPA discussions.

4.4 The Kenya Local Government Reform Programme

4.4.1 Rationale

At independence, a strong system of autonomous local authorities categorised into city, municipal, town/urban and county councils had evolved over the years to provide a wide range of services. However, the central government has since consistently weakened this system, starting with the 1969 Transfer of Functions Act that saw County Councils loose to the central government their statutory responsibility for provision of most of the services except maintenance of feeder roads and markets; providing school bursaries; business licensing; and support of veterinary services.

In 1983, local authorities further lost their significance in local development following the launch of a "decentralization" initiative through the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) strategy. Centrally administered through the Office of the President, DFRD established a system of district development planning committees that linked the district level downwards to the divisional, locational and sub-locational levels. The committees paralleled and bypassed elected local authority councils, with the latter only being partially represented on the District Development Committees (DDCs). Consequently, local authorities had little say with regard to local development matters.

The resultant relationship between the central government and local authorities in Kenya has been one of master and agency, though in theory local authorities are autonomous legal entities established by an Act of Parliament: the Local Government Act. As per this Act, which defines the establishment, functions and dissolution of local authorities, the central government exercises power over local authorities in a number of ways. For instance, the financial base of any local authority is determined by the Ministry of Local Government just as its annual budget and expenditure must be approved by the Minister for Local Government. Senior staff appointments are made by the Public Service Commission, through the Ministry of Local Government. Local authorities are also expected to adhere to guidelines and directives from the said ministry. Above all, the Minister can

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dissolve the council of any local authority for any reason he/she thinks is justified (Wainaina and Okoth, 2002: 40).

This state of affairs has seen a tremendous decline in the provision of public services by local authorities, yet the central government acknowledges its inability to adequately provide such services. Besides the donor pressure for the government to decentralize authority, there has been a growing awareness of the potentially productive role of local authorities in mobilising resources, providing services, stimulating private investment and implementing national development policies (Kinuthia-Njenga, 2002: 19).

It is against this background that the central government has taken the initiative to reform local authorities through the Kenya Local Government Reform Programme (KLGRP). The programme was started in 1995 under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government with three major objectives: (a) to improve service delivery; (b) to enhance good economic governance; and (c) to alleviate poverty (World Bank, 2002: 8). The KLGRP technical secretariat was set up and conducted studies between 1995 and 1998, with funding from the World Bank, on how to achieve these objectives. These studies paved way for the launch of three main initiatives of the programme.

First was the establishment of the Local Authorities Transfer Fund (LATF) through the Local Authorities Transfer Fund Act of 1998. This was a central government grant system for transfering five percent of the personal income tax from the exchaquer to local authorities. This discretionary funding would enable them to improve local service delivery; improve financial management and accountability; eliminate all outstanding debts; and enhance a participatory planning process at the local authority level. LATF essentially replaced the Local Authorities Service Charge (LASC) that had failed to generate adequate funds to finance service provision in all local authorities in the country (Smoke, 2004: 225).

Secondly, the local business licensing system was reorganised by introducing the “Single Business Permit” (SBP) system for all local authorities in 1998. Most of the central government fees that were levied by local authorities were removed and the multiple local authority taxes on each business premise consolidated into a single fee. The Ministry of Local Government issued guidelines to local authorities outlining how to determine fee or tax levels for business operators, thereby helping to reduce the problem of arbitrary and inequitable taxation of business operators across and within local authorities. The new system would help to increase local authorities' revenues and increase equity among businesses while lowering administrative and compliance costs to business operators (World Bank, 2002: 9; Smoke, 2004: 230).

Thirdly, an Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) was developed in four local authorities on experimental basis with the objective of replicating it in other local authorities. It is a computer-assisted financial management system that provides the set of tools to manage all revenue and

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expenditure activities, accounting for funds, and monitoring these against the annual budget in a comprehensive and timely manner.

It is envisaged that these reforms will be gradually institutionalised and strengthened through a review of the Local Government Act in the context of the new constitution that is being prepared.

1.0.0 Who controls?

As it has already been pointed out, the KLGRP operates under the Ministry of Local government. The programme has a technical secretariat that is responsible for the day-to-day management of the reform initiatives. It is headed by a Programme Co-ordinator who reports directly to the Permanent Secretary in the ministry. The secretariat has an interdisciplinary team of experts made up of economists, planners, engineers and finance officers who provide technical support to the reform process.

The KLGRP secretariat also serves as the technical secretariat for the LATF, headed by an Officer Administering the Fund (OAF) that reports to the Permanent Secretary in the ministry. The OAF works with the LATF Advisory Committee that reports to the Minister for Finance.

At the local authority level, the respective council is responsible for implementing the reforms that are initiated by the programme. Though the KLGRP has received technical support through the World Bank's Kenya Urban Transport Infrastructure Project (KUTIP) and the Department of International Development's (DFID) Kenya Urban Poverty Programme, the implementation of the reforms is funded with Kenyan money.

2.0.0 Who participates?

To receive LATF funds, local authorities are required to meet a set of performance conditionalities outlined in the LATF Regulations. One of the conditionalities is that the local authority must submit a Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP). This is a participatory planning process for identifying and prioritising local development needs for inclusion in the annual budget to form the basis for all expenditure. The participants in this three-year rolling plan process are expected to be both state and non-state actors, under the leadership of the respective local authority. The local authority organises the date of the consultations and invites all stakeholders to attend. This is also publicised through the mass media to enable any interested person to attend.

LASDAP became a LATF performance conditionality in 2001/2002 financial year. To start it off, the Ministry of Local Government conducted a series of training and dissemination seminars for local authorities before the latter embarked on the process. The consultations were held in all the 174 local authorities in the country.

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An evaluation of the LASDAP process indicates that in 2002, over 27,899 individuals participated in over 900 meetings (World Bank, 2002: 97). Given that there are 174 local authorities, an average of 1,600 individuals are estimated to have participated in the process in each of the local authorities. This is a relatively significant level of engagement by ordinary people in a system that was hitherto closed. The participants represented a broad section of society, including Jua Kali (Kiswahili for "hot sun" in reference to the open and difficult working conditions in which the informal sector operates) associations; market and traders' associations; the Kenya Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Kenya Association of Manufacturers; women's groups; self-help groups; neighbourhood associations; churches; schools; hospitals and medical groups; Chiefs; District Officers; District Commissioners; Members of Parliament; Councillors; and various government officials. This process saw citizens identify 3,092 projects for inclusion in the 2002/2003 financial year's annual budget (Ibid.: 98).

On the whole, LASDAP succeeded in generating a series of participatory meetings throughout Kenya. Despite the variations in quality, the process generally represents a major breakthrough in mobilising ctizen input into the local level development planning process. It is envisaged that these efforts will bring about a local planning process that is not heavily controlled by the central government, but involves greater citizen consultation (Smoke, 2004: 231).

3.0.0 Changes Induced in Power Relations

It is apparent that the KLGRP still revolves around the ministries of Local Government and Finance, especially with regard to the disbursement of LATF funds. With most of the local authorities being unable to raise adequate funds to carry out their activities and the subsequent reliance on LATF funds, the central government continues to exercise paternalistic control over local authorities. Consequently, the reform measures seem to be an exercise in deconcentration rather than devolution. Indeed, devolution may only be possible with the review of the Local Government Act that subordinates local authorities to the central government.

Nevertheless, the LATF performance conditionalities are steadily helping to improve the management of local authorities. The first of these conditions is that local authorities must provide a financial accounting of actual expenditures of the preceding year. This has enhanced transparency and accountability in budget execution. The second condition of providing a statement of debtors and creditors for the preceding year along with a debt repayment plan has proved to be essential for improved financial management. The third condition is provision of a Revenue Enhancement Plan (REP) outlining a framework for improved local revenue mobilisation. This is gradually forcing local authorities to make more realistic revenue estimates that can be used to make more realistic budgets; thereby enhancing transparency and accoutability. Finally, the fourth condition requires a LASDAP to have enhanced citizen participation in the planning of development activities in local authorities for the first time. However, it remains to

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be seen whether citizens' priorities will eventually be implemented given the poor resource base. This may adversely affect future participation in the process due to disillusionment. 4.5 ILO/IPEC Programme to Eliminate Child Labour

1.0.0 Rationale

Social Dialogue is defined by ILO to include all types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or among, representatives of government, employers and employees, on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy. In Kenya, the machinery for social dialogue is well developed. There is a tripartite system based on the Industrial Charter, which has worked very well. A sophisticated system of co-operation is operational for labour dispute settlement. Besides the dispute settlement, the tripartite partners have strengthened their dialogue on labour issues. This has been supported and stimulated by ILO’s SLAREA (Strengthening of Labour Relations in East Africa) programme. We, however, discuss the tripartite social dialogue that is supported and stimulated by the ILO in the context of the implementation of the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) in Kenya.

IPEC was established in 1992 and is the technical cooperation arm of the ILO on the elimination of child labour. It is a tool for the promotion and implementation of the ILO Conventions related to child labour, i.e. Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age (1973) and the more recent Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999). IPEC specifically stimulates a tripartite approach to the fight against child labour by insisting on collaborative work of trade unions, employers’ organisations and governments. Quite unique for the ILO is the fact that the IPEC also promotes alliances and networking with non-state organisations such as NGOs to combat child labour.

The programme was set up in Kenya in 1992, following a request by the Government of Kenya for assistance to enhance its capacity to tackle child labour. The objectives of the programme are firstly, in the short term, to remove children from work, especially hazardous work and rehabilitating them with their families; and secondly, in the long term, to establish preventive and proactive measures to eliminate child labour. To achieve this, IPEC Kenya has since 1992 been assisting government, social partners and civil society organisation in designing and implementing programmes aimed at both elimination of child labour and protection of working children. This includes capacity-building through training and awareness raising and technical advice to be able to identify child labour problems and intervene effectively.

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2.0.0 Who controls?

It is the government, together with the employers and the workers who own the programme. Concerning child labour, they have agreed to abide by ILO Conventions No.138 – on the minimum age of employment – and No.182 – on the worst forms of child labour. Nevertheless, it is up to the tripartite partners to domesticate these principles and define them according to their own country-specific situation. The ILO/IPEC Kenya supports the partners in undertaking action. The focus of the ILO/IPEC lies in awareness raising by organising training sessions for all interested social partners, direct support programmes and advocacy.

The National Steering Committee (NSC) on Child Labour was set up to provide a forum where coordination and discussion on child labour issues is possible. The NSC is chaired by the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and is composed of 12 members, representing the tripartite partners namely, government, employers' organisations and employees' organisations. Besides these, representatives of NGOs which are involved in child labour issues ( such as the African Network for Prevention and Protection Against Child Abuse and Neglect (ANPPCAN) and the Undugu Society of Kenya) also form part of this committee. In addition to being a discussion forum, the task of the NSC on Child Labour is to identify those partners which can cooperate with the ILO. This implies that the programme is owned by Kenya itself, such that the NSC can select the organisations with whom it wants to cooperate.

Also at district level, District Child Labour Committees (DCLCs) have been created. This emanated from the capacity-building initiative of the District Children’s Advisory Committees. The DCLCs handle the labour problems at the community level. These committees comprise of all social partners at the respective local level. The committees report quarterly to the ILO/IPEC about their activities and experiences. All this information is gathered in the ILO/IPEC resource centre.

3.0.0 Who participates?

Both state and non-state actors participate in the programme. The non-state actors include non-governmental organisations that deal with children's welfare like the ANPPCAN; Child Welfare Society of Kenya (CWSK); Child Rights Advisory, Documentation and Legal Centre (CRADLE); Child Legal Action Network (CLAN); and Undugu Society of Kenya (USK). There are also representatives of employers' organizations, like the Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) as well as trade union representatives like the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU), the Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT), and the Kenya Sugar Union. These actors work together under the NSC on child labour at the national level.

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There are more actors at the district level where the DCLCs are the co-ordinating agencies. All non-state actors engaged in children's welfare and operating at the district level are encouraged to be represented. There are also Children's Department Help Desks in the districts engaged in this process.

All actors involved at the national level evaluate the programme as a very good example of co-operation between the tripartite partners and other non-state actors that are engaged in child labour issue. All actors participate in policy-making processes as well as in the final implementation of the programme.

Changes induced in power relations

The awareness raising campaigns and capacity building initiatives have led to the formation of social and strategic alliances of partners working on child labour. The programme benefits from the fairly cooperative industrial relations in Kenya. Employers’ and workers’ organisations have frequent contacts on a number of issues. However, the issue of child labour is, for both interest groups, a fairly new one for which they can not apply their traditional mechanisms of negotiation and problem solving through social dialogue and dispute settlement. Child labour is considered a facet of the informal economy and they work on it in the context of an informal problem that has a bearing on the public interest. To put it differently, workers’ and employers’ organisations are used to dealing with private interests within the formal economy. Since child labour is part of the dark side of the very widespread informal economy it is not considered a public interest matter. One of the major changes that has been induced by the programme has thus been the introduction of these social partners' interest in public policy matters related to their field of competence, but that can not be resolved through their system of private interest representation. The children concerned are not considered as workers and are not represented by the workers’ movement or any other interest group.

It is significant that workers’ and employers’ organisations in Kenya have, in recent years, started to realise that their members in one way or another are confronted with the child labour issue. Many children and young relatives of workers are involved in child labour. They consider child labour as a necessity and an inevitable form of income generation for the families concerned. However, a section of trade union members, mainly white collar workers, do themselves employ children as domestic workers. They do not see any harm in this. The same can be said for many members of the employers’ organisations. Since most child labour in Kenya is situated in the rural and informal economy, employers’ organisations do not really represent a significant group of employers that use child labour.

The traditional social partners have been sensitised on this issue of child labour in two mutually reinforcing ways that have largely affected their position in the field of labour. First, a number of non-governmental organisations have started working on the issue and declared themselves stakeholders on the issue along with the government and the social partners. Importantly, these NGOs do work on child labour as a public interest matter and thus do not represent the child

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workers as such. This, in Kenya as much as in many other countries, creates regular tensions between the representative workers’ and employers’ organisations on the one hand, and the NGOs on the other. The latter get their legitimacy mainly by participating and referring to an international network or movement for the abolition of child labour (Develtere, 2003).

International organisations, including the ILO, have recognized the role played by these NGOs. As such these NGOs wield a lot of social power and get respect from many parties. They are to a large extent responsible for the initiative by trade unions and employers’ organisations to deal with the issue. Even if NGOs are strange bedfellows for the traditional partners, they impose themselves in the formerly pretty closed tripartite environment. Secondly, the workers’ and employers’ organisations themselves participate in international organisations. COTU belongs to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and FKE to the International Organisation of Employers. Both organisations have committed themselves internationally to combat child labour worldwide. This creates a lot of peer pressure on the national constituents of these international bodies.

2.0 UN-Habitat Global Campaign on Urban Governance

1.0.0 Rationale

Rapid urbanization in developing countries has led to pressure on urban services and facilities, which have increasingly become inadequate for the large numbers of urban dwellers. Consequently, the number of poor people in urban centres is rapidly increasing. It is being appreciated that though cities are regarded to be the engines of economic growth and development, they can as well generate and intensify poverty and social exclusion. In response to this possibility or reality, UN-Habitat launched two global campaigns to bring about "inclusive" cities after the 1996 Habitat II conference that was christened the "city summit". The two campaigns are the Global Campaign for Secure Tenure and the Global Campaign on Urban Governance. We focus on the implementation of the latter programme in Kenya.

The development goal of the Global Campaign on Urban Governance is to contribute to the eradication of poverty through improved urban governance. It aims to increase the capacity of local governments and other stakeholders to practice good urban governance and to raise awareness of, and advocacy for, good urban governance. The major theme of the campaign is “inclusiveness”. This refers to a participatory process at the local, national, regional and international levels; which implies the participation of local stakeholders in the opportunities cities have to offer. UN-Habitat’s experience is that participatory processes are the best means for ensuring the effective use of development resources; for the equitable distribution of development benefits; and for ensuring the sustainability of these benefits. Participation and decentralisation are considered to have a symbiotic relationship, as successful participation requires some degree of decentralisation and vice versa.

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At the local level, the campaign promotes broad-based participatory decision-making processes, involving all major partner groups in identifying and addressing local issues. At the national level, the campaign supports national governments and national associations of local authorities and their partners through capacity-building initiatives to improve urban governance.

2.0.0 Who controls?

The Housing Department of the Ministry of Roads, Public Works and Housing is the national focal point for human settlement in Kenya, and hence responsible for the UN-Habitat Programmes. The government has to take initiative to commit itself to the programme by domesticating the general principles and norms (for instance, equity; efficiency; subsidiarity; transparency; civic engagement; and sustainability) that UN-Habitat prescribes in the promotion of innovations in urban governance that involves various actors. Thus, Habitat is essentially a technical arm rather than a funding agency. However, sometimes it gives ‘seed-money’ to help start up a project or programme. It would seek such funds somewhere else (for example the EU and UNDP). The desire is that the programmes should be fully country-owned and funded by the government and non-state actors. Otherwise, UN-Habitat concentrates on awareness raising and capacity-building initiatives.

4.6.3 Who Participates?

The Government of Kenya recognised in the 1980s the importance of involving non-state actors in housing issues. It is, however, only in recent years that this co-operation with non-state actors has been intensifying. Consequently, the Campaign on Urban Governance is being adopted in a punctuated way. It was initially started in a few cities on a pilot basis, but it is increasingly spreading to cover other cities and towns in the country. For example, in Nakuru the campaign started by setting up a Zonal Development Committee (ZDC) that was beyond the formal structure of the local authority in charge of the town. This committee was composed of the councillors, representatives of the local administration, representatives of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the private sector, etc. Habitat helped the Committee to define its terms of reference, what type of members they need, etc., but did not interfere with the actual organisation of the committee. The committee constituted itself and elected its leaders. The aim of the committee was to identify local needs and search for possible solutions. The Committee served only an advisory function to the local authority.

In Kisumu, a City Development Strategy (CDS) is being developed through the co-operation of the local authority, CSOs and Private Sector. The local authority realised it could not tackle development issues on its own due to the lack of resources, knowledge, experience, etc. The formulation of the CDS has proceeded in stages. First, a community survey was carried out by stakeholders on the needs and perceptions of the community. The report of this survey illustrated that the issues of shelter, income, water, health, and security seemed to be of much importance to the community. Thereafter, the local authority sat together with

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representatives of NGO’s, CBOs, private sector, etc. to discuss which of these issues would take the front priority to be tackled in the CDS. At the time of our survey, efforts were being made to embark on the implementation of the resolutions of the CDS.

Many other municipalities do not necessarily follow the structure of ZDC or CDS, but they have developed other structures of participatory urban planning, such as setting up stakeholder forums, green town programmes13, etc. According to an interlocutor from UN-Habitat, there is no town in Kenya that has not yet had some experience with innovations in urban governance. This could be a bit exaggerated, but it is a pointer to the fact that local governments in Kenya are starting to engage in participatory urban governance.

It is informative to mention here a recent collaborative initiative between the Kenya government, non-state actors and UN-Habitat to improve slums in the cities. The initiatives have coalesced into the National Slum Upgrading Programme. The government realised that it could not cope with the urban housing problem on its own. There was need to fill up its lack of experience, capacities, resources, etc. with the support of other stakeholders. In November 2000, the programme was initiated, though the actual work began in January 2001 with the inception phase. This phase took two years time and was meant to identify informal housing areas and their problems and to work out a programme strategy proposal. Four areas of operation were subsequently identified in Nairobi: Soweto in Kibera slum; "Deep Sea" slum in Parklands estate; "Seven Villages" in Huruma estate; and Mwarubaini in South B estate. Thereafter, a consultative process was started. All possible stakeholders were brought together to achieve consensus on what kind of programme it exactly had to be. Participants were representatives from the government, the private sector, NGOs, CBOs, individual property owners and tenants.14 Then a policy framework was developed and institutional structures15 for implementing the framework set up. At the time of our interviews, the programme had entered the preparatory phase of implementation. The bottomline is that the programme is largely participatory, bringing together a wide array of stakeholders in the housing sector for the first time.

The programme is, however, facing some problems. First, some of the NGOs that have been using the slum problems to source funds from donors to keep themselves in "business" have naturally become resistant to the implementation of the programme, for this would destroy their "survival mechanism" and render them redundant. Such NGOs are cultivating a "resistant culture" among slum dwellers, who have at times turned violent against the initiators of the programme. Second, some slum dwellers do not believe that they will get back their houses after the rehabilitation exercise. Consequently, they have resisted the idea of migrating to alternative sites of temporary residence to pave way for the implementation of the programme. Third, there are difficulties of mobilising people hitherto used to seeing "the government do it or tell them what to do" take responsility for the implementation and management of the programme. Therefore, there is need for capacity-building, information-sharing and proper coordination of the programme.

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3.0.0 Changes induced by the Programme

At the national level, there has been a change with regard to increasing participation in urban governance as evidenced by the many innovations in various cities and towns. This is further attested to by the reforms in local authorities that we have already discussed. The LASDAP and LATF processes have widened the space for citizen participation in urban governance. It is worthy noting that these reforms started during the former regime and are continuing16. In addition, the government has now appreciated the need to participate in service delivery to slum-dwellers in collaboration with other actors rather than leaving it to NGOs as has been the case in the past.

At the local level, urban governance is also gaining momentum as evidenced by the many initiatives for improving the management of service provision. This evolution is taking place, despite the resistance by local authorities councillors towards other stakeholders engaging in policy-making processes. It is nevertheless significant that some councillors are now acknowledging that they lack experience and capacity to fulfil certain tasks. Therefore, they recognise the need for other actors that can help them in policy-making and implementation processes. The appreciation and recognition of all partners involved has been the outcome of the co-operation.

Above all, the involvement of non-state actors in urban governance is steadily eroding the power of patronage in the decision-making process, especially in urban local authorities. City and Municipal mayors are increasingly facing criticisms from private sector and civil society actors in the now open decision-making circles and are being asked to rationalize their positions and actions in service provision. Thus, the “city fathers” are increasingly loosing their leverage power in the decision-making processes as patronge continues to be subordinated to rationality in this regard. The implication is that increased participation of non-state actors in urban governance projects and programmes is likely to reduce the power of patronage in local authorities, which may, in turn, change the “master-agency” relationship that has existed for a long time between the central government and local authorities.

1. What kind of MLG in Kenya?

1.0. Cross-cutting scenarios

The emerging system of multilevel governance, as a system of pooling and sharing of authority and influence, does not come into being on the basis of a predesigned blueprint. Many different actors, pursuing very divergent agenda, get interested in a more participatory multistakeholder mode of governance that works at different levels in order to satisfy their specific, sometimes narrow, interests. In this article we have reviewed the scenarios of six different

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programmes that further MLG in Kenya. There are, for sure, many others. Table 1 below gives an overview of these programmes. It gives an indication of those who are controlling the process, the participating stakeholders, the levels involved and the type of participation.

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Table .1 Comparing the Six Programmes

Programme Who controls? Stakeholders involved

Levels of operation

Type of participation

National Poverty Eradication Programme

The Office of the President

Business representatives; Chamber of Commerce; NGO Council; Churches; Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims; COTU

National; District

Co-management

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

First: Donors Later: Ministry of Finance & Planning (PRSP Secretariat + National Consultative Forum + National Steering Committee) Recent: NARC-Government + donors

COTU; Private Sector Forum (later Alliance); NGO Council; Several NGOs; CBOs; Churches; Cooperatives; Councillors; Government; Prominent personalities

National; District; Division; Community-level

Consultation; Planning; Co-drafting plan

Cotonou-Agreement

First: European Delegation + Government Later: Government + Private Sector

Private Sector Alliance; Econews; Africa Peace Forum; Youth Agenda; Forum for Social and Economic Development Groups; Kenya Civil Society Alliance

National Consultation

Kenya Local Government Reform Programme

National Government; then Local Authorities

Churches; CSOs; CBOs; Private Sector actors

National; Local Authority

Consultation

ILO/IPEC Child Labour Programme

National Steering Committee on Child Labour

Government; Employers’ Organisations; Trade Unions; Several NGOs

National; District

Consultation; Multipartite Dialogue; Planning Programme; Management; Project Execution

UN-Habitat Urban Governance Programme

Housing Department

NGOs; Property Owners; Tennants; CBOs; Private Sector

National; Municipal; Town

Consultation; Planning; Project Execution

Source: Interviews

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It is evident that MLG programmes are characterised by a dynamic

interplay between different stakeholders. The donors, who are often the initiators, bring in their development oriented agenda. The governmental agencies seek control over the process of implementing the agenda in order to monopolise political power and try to domesticate the agenda. They therefore seek accommodation with both donors and national stakeholders. The non-state actors on the other hand use the MLG programmes as a vehicle for both their own organisational and institutional development and for the advancement of the interests of their members or constituents.

The rationale of the different programmes is not identical, but there is a convergence in terms of processes and dynamics. This can be seen in the powerplay that takes place to control the process which follows pretty much the same sequence from donor control; then government control; and finally non-state actor cohabitation with the government. The stakeholders that are selected to participate or that do impose themselves in the MLG process are also very much the same in most programmes. These stakeholders share a number of characteristics: they are often umbrella organisations; have experience in dealing with the government and donors; and have an urban focus. In addition, the alliances, forums, platforms, negotiation tables and workshops also show some kind of isomorphism across the different programmes. And finally, most programmes started with a restricted form of participation, i.e. consultation after the programmes had been designed. Notable exceptions to this are the ILO/IPEC programme and the Habitat Urban Governance Programmes where non-state actors have an active role in policy design, programme management and implementation. These exceptions could, partly, be explained by their more narrow scope, which makes participation at all stages much easier.

On the whole, the relative participation of non-state actors in these programmes has made the horizontal and vertical dimensions of multilevel governance more evident in Kenya than ever before. 5.2. The horizontal dimension

Experimentation with multilevel governance over the last decade has culminated into a multistakeholder approach to decision-making and implementation in governance and development processes in Kenya. Before the onset of the democratisation movement in the early 1990s, the Government of Kenya had limited, if any, engagement with social partners that held different views and opinions on development and governance matters (Wanyama, 2003). However, it is gradually becoming the norm for the government to involve a wide array of non-state actors in such matters. Nevertheless, it seems to be more comfortable with the private sector and trade unions than with other civil society organisations involved in MLG. This is partly due to the past conflictual

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relationship with civil society actors, but also due to the fact that the political attitude of these actors is felt to be less predictable.

Perhaps this explains also why the private sector has been very efficient and effective in representing its interests. This was very clear in the PRSP consultation process. While they were far less interested in the process and did not invest as much as did the NGO community, private sector organisations succeeded in getting a lot of their arguments accepted. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance confidently reported that 90% of its concerns had been taken up in the final PRSP. Conversely, the NGO Council – that invested much more time and energy in the process and brought foreward many more suggestions – had only 40% of its concerns taken up in the final document.

At any rate, non-state actors have got new opportunities because of the MLG programmes. In fact they have been remoulded to play different roles in the course of the programmes. The PRSP process was the initiator of the coherence and convergence within and among these actors. For instance, the Private Sector Forum came into existence as a result of the PRSP process. The process generated bonds and bridges within the private sector community, for it created opportunities through which private sector actors amplified their interests and sought to protect or defend them. On the basis of that experience and in the light of new interest representation opportunities within other programmes such as the Cotonou-Agreement, the private sector broadened its interests and membership to form the Kenya Private Sector Alliance. The PRSP process was also a catalyst for NGO collaboration. It stimulated the NGO Council to develop new, more effective strategies and tactics of exerting pressure, such as setting up sectoral working groups to study government policy and offer critical comments as well as monitoring of government performance in fiscal management and poverty reduction. It also created a platform from which NGOs could work on other programmes such as the Economic Recovery Strategy and the Cotonou Agreement.

The different programmes have also led to the multiplication of forums and alliances in the development space. These have not, however, come about in an organic way, which would be a reflection of intra-civil society dynamics and an internally felt need for interest aggregation. Rather, most of these forums merely exist because a MLG programme calls for a co-operative civil society front to advance various interests. Many programmes do not only facilitate the establishment of a forum or alliance, but also spearhead the process of their formation and development. For instance, the Cotonou Agreement set eligibility criteria for participation; made provisions for “capacity building” of non-state actors; and undertook to pay part, if not all, costs related to co-ordination and participation.

It is significant that MLG programme initiators, most often donor agencies, do not continue to control such programmes. It is the national stakeholders themselves that take over the ownership of the programmes as the initiators

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withdraw. Civil society platforms, coalitions and alliances initiated by the very programmes mature into more homegrown and independent organisations to own the programmes. This can particularly be seen in the PRSP and Cotonou Agreement processes where most platforms have come of age to critisize the restricted forms of co-operation and requested more ownership of the programmes than is permitted with the usual proliferation of superficial consultations through workshops. In addition, contrary to the expectations of many programme initiators, the different segments of the civil society (employers’ organisations, trade unions, NGOs, CBOs, churches, etc.) refuse to be treated as a single unit.

The MLG programmes have also set some new patterns in state-civil society relations. For instance, in the last years of the Moi regime, a new civil society elite used the opportunities made available by the programmes to criticize and obstruct the Moi agenda of resisting change and clinging onto power. This antagonistic relationship seems to have slightly changed as the NARC regime is very much dependent on the goodwill and support of this same civil society. A co-operative relationship seems to be developing between the new government and civil society with regard to some donor conditionalities for aid and trade opportunities. This is quite evident in the WTO and EPA negotiations where the state and civil society share the same stand. Similarly, some civil society organizations, like the state, have come out to criticize and oppose IMF/World Bank conditionalities on aid for lacking "a human face" just as they have opposed US terrorist alerts/warnings for jeopardizing Kenya's tourism.

This seems to support the view that the relationship between the state and the non-state actors is one of antagonistic co-operation (Sanyal, 1994) between mutually dependent partners. Non-state actors are increasingly using MLG programmes to ask ever more from the government, but have not transformed themselves into a constant opposing force. On the other hand, the government multiplies consultations with the different segments of civil society to accommodate them and to establish some kind of co-operative governance and cohabitation. 5.3. The vertical dimension

The vertical front of multilevel governance is not as much developed as the horizontal dimension. MLG in Kenya still largely remains an urban based, Nairobi-dominated and a relatively centralised affair. There are a number of reasons for this. The programme initiators as well as the civil society elite were in the first place interested in opening up the national political space. They therefore primarily sought to have more participation of non-state actor organisations that had a national scope and particularly those that were Nairobi-based.

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Secondly, as soon as opportunities for MLG were created the better organised and formally incorporated organisations presented themselves as interlocutors for the broader civil society. The less organised and less resourced organisations operating in the communities (community based organisations, self-help groups, rural associations, etc.) were even not aware of the new opportunities (Wanyama, 2001).

Thirdly, the better developed and more vocal part of civil society could use their development partners (mainly Northern NGOs) as brokers to get a place in the MLG programmes. Yet rural and less organised organisations that don’t have such linkages and opportunities could not rely on this kind of support.

Fourth, the decentralisation, especially devolution, process of the state apparatus is not very much advanced. And, the subnational authorities in many places are still functioning in the old neo-patrimonial and clientilistic manner, which does not create much room for genuine multistakeholdership.

However, a few programmes are progressively introducing a more decentralised multistakeholdership. For instance, the KLGRP has opened opportunities for all local authorities, including the county councils that operate in the rural areas, to embrace a multistakeholder approach in development planning. Various stakeholders are encouraged to, and actually, participate in the LASDAP process. It is significant that this process has been adopted in all local authorities, both in the urban and rural areas. Similarly, the UN-Habitat Urban Governance Campaign has facilitated numerous innovations in urban governance that involve the participation of all stakeholders as well as any interested parties. Such innovations are found in both cities and smaller towns across the country.

The MLG programmes have also “internationalised” the stakeholders in Kenya. However, not all programmes have contributed to this in the same magnitude. For instance, the PRSP process made a relatively smaller contribution in this regard than did the other programmes. The NGOs involved in PRSP, on their own account, established contacts with NGOs in neighbouring countries to critically review the process. But the Cotonou Agreement that has a greater focus on the international dimension of MLG than the other programmes has significant opportunities for internationalising the actors involved. The non-state actors can participate in Cotonou-related international platforms such as the ACP Business Forum and the ACP Civil Society Forum. Besides these, they are already exchanging information and experiences on strategies and tactics for effective participation in opportunities created by the agreement with their counterparts in the neighbouring countries. For example, the Kenyan private sector and civil society have taken steps towards allying with respective East African organisations to get their interests taken care of in the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations that started in 2002.

In addition, the ILO framework is an international MLG-frame per excellence. Both the trade unions and the employers’ organisations participate in ILO’s regional and international norm-setting processes. In this way, for example,

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the Kenyan social partners have had their say in the elaboration of the ILO Conventions relating to child labour. In addition, the unions and the employers’ organisations belong to regional and international confederations that facilitate contacts and exchanges between their constituents and permit collective international action on certain themes. Kenyan trade unions like the Kenya National Union of Teachers, for example, participate in the Global Campaign for Education. This campaign is a joint initiative of several international trade union federations and NGOs and is a follow-up to the 1998 Global March against Child Labour.

On the whole, it is apparent that most of the stakeholders tend to pay more attention to the horizontal rather than the vertical participation in decision-making processes. Perhaps this is due to the legacy of the highly centralized and authoritatrian state that concentrated all power and resources at the centre and discouraged power sharing with the lower levels of society. One needed to be at the centre to get anything done. Consequently, most stakeholders could be assuming that they can best influence the decision-making process by penetrating the centre at the top rather than engaging the periphery in networking. This could be the explanation for the relative lack of interest in the vertical level of MLG in the country. 2. CONCLUSION

It has been the broad purpose of this discussion to outline some of the programmes that have introduced multilevel governance in Kenya with a view to shedding light on the changes that they have subsequently introduced in power relations, both at the national and local levels. It is apparent that within a relatively short period of time that the MLG paradigm has been introduced in the country, a number of programmes are structured along this paradigm are already in place. Though most of these programmes have been introduced by actors from outside the country, particularly donors, many local stakeholders have quickly embraced them and given them local/national ownership. Even the hitherto centralized and authoritatrian state is steadily opening up space to accommodate non-state actors in the implementation of these programmes at various levels of the Kenyan polity and society.

The participation of these actors in decision-making through these programmes is increasingly reshaping power relations, especially at the national level where the state is now increasingly realising the usefulness of the new partnership in development co-operation. The entry of non-state actors in the decision-making circles is subsequently putting pressure on the state to account for its actions and also respond to their demands. The inability of the financially weak state to satisfy such demands is now forcing it to enter a co-operative and accommodative relationship with non-state actors, which is, in turn, forcing it to

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share power. Indeed, the neo-patrimonial bonds that have sustained the Kenya state over the years are increasingly being broken.

Even at the local level, MLG programmes are increasingly giving local people an opportunity to interact with the government to demand for development services and question the rationality behind some of its actions. Indeed, this interaction has proved to be an “eye-opener” to some of the actors, for they now have an insight into the nature of actual power play at the centre. This has led them to embark on a reorganization exercise in order to strengthen their capacity to influence decisions at that level. Power relations at the vertical level, however, remain less pronounced despite the networking efforts by some actors in a few programmes.

Nevertheless, it is evident that multilevel governance in Kenya is steadily opening up the development space to numerous actors and it is significantly contributing to the much needed decentralization of decision-making power in development co-operation. This is an indicator of the departure from the hitherto centralized approach to development co-operation in the country. The challenge is how to maintain this participatory momentum in the wake of the rising development expectations among the public that these processes generate in the midst of the lack of adequate resources to implement their development preferences.

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1 Patrick Develtere and Els Hertogen: Higher Institute for Labour Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgium); Fredrick Wanyama: School of Development and Strategic Studies, Maseno University (Kenya) 2 We would like to thank Bart Kerremans and Roy Kelly for their valuable comments. 3 We know that the experiences with multilevel governance are quite different from region to region. The conclusions we draw on the basis of the Kisumu-experience might therefore be somehow biased. 4 For example: In the year 2003, approximately 500.000 Ksh was to be released to Kisumu district. Mid October they had already received some 450 applications. Counting that on average 100.000 Ksh was to be given to the selected groups, this means that only 5 or 6 groups were likely to get a loan. 5 The different stages that led to the final ERS were the following: (1) Consultants were hired to write a strategy proposal; (2) Conference in Mombassa where professors and Kenyan non-state actors were invited by the government to reflect on this proposal and to give comments on it; (3) A committee at governmental level was created to integrate those comments into the draft ERS; (4) The adapted draft was presented in several workshops for several different stakeholders; (5) Again, a committee at governmental level was assigned to translate this draft into an action plan; (6) The draft was send to KIPPRA for comments; (7) The government made a summary of the final draft proposal; (8) This summary was again presented in several workshops before the final adoption. (9) The draft investment plan for implementing ERS was sent to the donors for comments. (10) The investment plan was approved by donors, then discussed at a national investment conference in November 2003. The same was also set to be discussed at an international investment conference in March 2004 before the actual implementation. 6 For example: Agriculture is the first priority in the PRSP. In the ERS, agriculture is still one of the priorities, but the first priority is infrastructure. 7 The National Steering Committee of the PRSP-process did a mapping exercise of CSO’s in Kenya. After this mapping exercise, CSO’s could volunteer to become lead agencies in their district. The NSC appointed the lead agencies. 8 The participation of non-state actors at district level was confined to a certain framework that set out the number of persons that represent each category: disabled, women, etc. 9 The Lomé IV-bis “governance programme” was directed by a steering committee comprised of representatives of different government and non governmental stakeholders. 10 Their study covers Namibia, Ghana, Mozambique, Benin, Mali, Angola, Cameroun, Tanzania, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Madagascar and Kenya 11 The Kenya Association of Manufacturers, the Kenya Flower Council and the Kenya Institute of Policy Research and Analysis 12 Article 6 of the Agreement states that “recognition…of non-governmental actors shall depend on the extent to which they address the needs of the population, on their specific competencies and whether they are organised and managed democratically and transparently”. 13 This is a mechanism for environmental management that seeks to involve all stakeholders in decision-making. 14 One distinguishes 7 groups: central government, local authorities, national housing cooperative, cooperative societies, employers, developers (private sector) and individuals. NGO’s and CBO’s were expected to be represented in multiple groups. 15 Project Implementation Unit: composed out of executive officers and a committee of members selected by the people of the settlement. Programme Secretariat: take care of overall coordination of the programme (Department of Housing). Joint Programme Planning Team: composed out of UN-Habitat, government, civil society, private sector, etc. Multistakeholder Support Group: composed out of all stakeholders who have an interest in housing development (international development organisations, NGO’s, CBO’s, etc.). Inter-Agency Coordination Committee: all government-departments on housing and development and all funding agencies are seated in this committee.

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Inter –Agency Steering Committee: Un-Habitat, Permanent Secretaries of Ministry of Public works and Housing, Finance, Land and Local Government. The President is the patron of the programme. 16 The constitutional reform will be of importance regarding the revision of the Local Government Act.